Contents

Introduction —— 1

1  Representationalism and Moore's Paradox —— 8
   1.1  Introduction —— 8
   1.2  The Theory of Representationalism —— 10
   1.2.1  Representation —— 10
   1.2.2  Moore's Paradox: A Challenge for Representationalism —— 37
   1.3  Varieties of Representationalism —— 44
   1.3.1  The Approach from Commonsense: Moore’s Original Approach —— 44
   1.3.2  The Approach from Speech Acts: Searle’s Account of Intentionality —— 47
   1.3.3  The Pragmatic Solution —— 61
   1.3.4  Interiors of the Mind—Must we Know our Minds for Having them? —— 64
   1.3.5  The Approach from Metaphysics: Shoemaker’s Higher-Order Belief Model —— 66
   1.3.6  The Approach from Epistemology: Moran’s Transparency Condition —— 82
   1.3.7  The Rational Solution —— 107
   1.3.8  The Representationalist ‘Solution’ to Moore's Paradox —— 112
   1.4  Shared Assumptions: Frege's Legacy —— 119
   1.4.1  Sense and Reference —— 120
   1.4.2  Fregean Thoughts and the Two-Component Model —— 124
   1.4.3  From Thought to Thinking —— 128
   1.4.4  Frege in Representationalism —— 131
   1.5  Summary —— 134

2  Moore’s Paradox Revisited —— 138
   2.1  Moore's Paradox Reconsidered —— 138
   2.2  Wittgenstein on Moore’s Paradox —— 140
   2.2.1  Contextualisation —— 141
   2.2.2  Moore's (Un-) Discovery —— 144
   2.3  The Argument from Moore’s Paradox —— 148
   2.3.1  Assertion and Belief —— 148
   2.3.2  The Two-Component Model —— 150
2.4 The Logic of Assertion —— 165
  2.4.1 Avowals contra Descriptions —— 165
  2.4.2 Assertions in Everyday Use —— 169
  2.4.3 The Parting of the Lines —— 179
  2.4.4 Preliminary Conclusion —— 184
  2.5 Against Referentialism II: There is no such Thing as a ‘Phenomenon of Belief’ —— 185
    2.5.1 Mental Privacy —— 190
    2.5.2 Summary —— 202
  2.6 Conclusion —— 204
    2.6.1 Summary —— 205
    2.6.2 Belief, Assertion, and Truth —— 207
    2.6.3 Not a Something, but not a Nothing, either —— 210

3 ‘I Believe’ in Practice —— 212
  3.1 Objections —— 213
    3.1.1 The Objection from Circularity —— 213
    3.1.2 The Objection from Productivity —— 217
    3.1.3 The Objection from Workability —— 221
    3.1.4 The Objection from Externalism —— 222
    3.1.5 Scepticism or Stipulation? —— 225
    3.1.6 Summary —— 234
  3.2 Meaning in Practice —— 234
    3.2.1 The ‘Gap of Meaning’ —— 235
    3.2.2 Practical Entanglement —— 238
    3.2.3 The Use of ‘I Believe’ —— 243
    3.2.4 Conclusion —— 262

4 Epilogue: The Legacy of Moore’s Paradox —— 263
  4.1 The Lessons of Moore’s Paradox —— 263
    4.1.1 The Logic of Assertion —— 264
    4.1.2 The Conception of Belief —— 266
    4.1.3 The Legacy of Moore’s Paradox —— 268
  4.2 ‘It is Raining, but I don’t Believe it is’ —— 269

Abbreviations of the Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein —— 271

Bibliography —— 272

Index —— 278