There are excellent studies—including Dirk Hoerder’s *Cultures in Contact*—on the subject of labour migration, chain migration, and related concepts, which provide overviews of the literature and try to take stock of the number of people on the move.¹ There is so much literature on this subject that it is impossible and useless to list all the publications that have appeared. Rather than repeat what has been written, this chapter looks at recent publications, paying special attention to gender and class. There are biases in the literature. In the first place, the literature on labour migration is still inspired by the rather outdated push-pull paradigm, tends to focus on free movement and ignores forced labour migration. Secondly, there is much more literature on labour migration from and to Western countries than on labour migration from and to China, Latin America, the (former) Soviet Union, and Africa.² In the nineteenth century, Finns, for example, rushed west to the goldfields in Alaska, as well as east to golden opportunities in the oilfields in Azerbaijan. The eastward labour migration only became visible after Russian archives recently opened. Also, attention to Chinese labour migration is rather recent and tends to be discussed separately from other migration. Between 1840 and 1940 20 million Chinese emigrated overseas, in order to work in the gold fields of California and Australia and on plantations in Latin America and the Caribbean.³ Despite calls to remedy these biases, studies about migration to and from Europe or the US outnumber those regarding other areas, and migration within, for instance, Asia and Africa continues to be seen or presented as the results of what Europeans did or did not do.⁴ Thirdly, the literature about labour migration of women is discussed in different terms than


that of men. Stories about domestic servants dominate the literature on the labour migration of women, suggesting that all or most migrant women were working in that sector. This literature is characterized by discussions about restricted rights, poor labour conditions, abuse, and exploitation. Lastly, there is much more literature about current or recent (nineteenth and twentieth century) migration, than about migration in earlier periods. There is some justification for this last bias. Human mobility did reach unprecedented levels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the period of 1840 to 1940, 60 million people left Europe, 21 to 23 million left South China, 30 to 33 million moved from China to Manchuria, 43 to 50 million moved within or left India, 20 to 40 million moved within China, 9 to 13 million left from the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Asia, 74 million moved within Europa and 35 million within the America’s. These numbers were higher than the numbers of migrants in earlier periods.

This chapter starts with remarks about categorization and continues with a discussion of chain migration and the ever-expanding range of related concepts.

Categorization

In the nineteenth century, authorities needed statistics for their attempts to control migration. Counting people came with categorization, which, in itself, is the key element of governmentality in the Foucauldian sense. Categorization does not describe social order but rather shapes and reshapes power relations, according to Foucault. States have the authority to decide who is who and differentiate rights accordingly. Categorization is used to legitimize differences within policies and between groups of people. Categorizations are constantly renewed with the intention to exclude or deny

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rights (mostly) or to include and grant rights (rarely). As a rule, authorities group migrants into four major categories: labour migrants, refugees, (post-) colonial migrants, and family migrants. Scholars tend to follow the categorizations that policymakers use, partly because sources are organized according to these categorizations.

Formalized categorization is, however, largely artificial. For instance, when possibilities for labour migration to North-Western Europe became fewer after the mid-1970s, refugee migration and family migration became more important, numerically. Whether migrants can switch between categories depends on the migrants (their gender, ethnicity, class, and religion) and the number of migrants. Categories of migrants are like communicating vessels: migrants can change categories, or bureaucrats, who decide on entry or residence, can allocate them to different categories. Policy makers and bureaucrats seek to interpret categories narrowly and to exclude people who do not fit their definitions. In contrast, support groups tend to stretch categories and create sympathy for those who seemed to be inhumanly harmed by the government’s rigour.

Over time, scholars and policy makers introduced numerous sub-categorizations. The stretching and blurring of categories and the introduction of neologisms reflect that categories were inadequate in describing realities. In line with Castles’s ideas, this chapter claims that debates frequently led to a conceptional closure paradox: debates about definitions and categorizations became the enemy of the effective study of migration. Debates became more about definitions than about the explanatory and predictive value of categorizations and concepts. Categorizations and typologies were meant and introduced to create a common language which would enable comparisons over time and between countries. In reality—and despite large debates—this hardly happened.

Researchers tend to over-stabilize the categories they study and start out with the categorizations they seek to explain. McCall, in response to this criticism, identified three approaches: anti-categorical, intra-categorical, and inter-categorical. The anti-

10 Schrover and Moloney, Gender, Migration and Categorisation.
14 Schrover and Moloney, Gender, Migration and Categorisation.
categorical approach deconstructs analytical categories and moves away from essentializing the categories that are the subject of analysis. It questions the existence of social categories and sees them as linguistic constructions. The approach starts by breaking down categories and deconstructing the idea that clear divisions exist, since this ignores the complexities of relationships. In practice, the anti-categorical approach makes analyses difficult or impossible. The intra-categorical approach focuses on social groups at neglected points of intersection. It challenges the use of broad categories and seeks to refine them. Its disadvantage is that it shifts the focus away from larger social processes and structures that might be causing inequalities. Lastly, the inter-categorical approach provisionally adopts existing categories. It starts from the idea that categories may be (linguistic) constructions, but that they are widely used, especially by policy makers and other stakeholders, and, as a result, do have actual societal consequences. It is more interesting and more useful to analyse the categorizations which are used rather than introduce or refine categories: how and why do authoritative bodies define and redefine categories? Rather than attempting to avoid categorizations or introduce endless sub-categorization, the way forward is to identify how authorities implicitly or explicitly use categorizations, how academics reproduce them, and how and why this changes over time.

The observations regarding the categorization of migrants also apply partly to migration typologies. In order to distinguish migration typologies, Lucassen and Lucassen used the term cross-cultural migration, based on Mannings concept of cross community migration. Manning looks at language differences while Lucassen and Lucassen define cross cultural as a different cultural outlook, which includes language, family systems, religion or worldviews, technologies, the nature of civil society organization, the structuring of the public sphere, and labour relations. However, cultural differences are in the eye of the beholder; they are constructed and emphasized with specific aims in mind. Van Schendel and Abraham have pointed out that mobility of groups is of interest (to authorities) when they move between units that count. In the West and from the nineteenth century onwards, the borders that counted were usually state borders. Before the nineteenth century and outside the West other borders were more important. Several authors have therefore suggested to move away from the concept of migration and use mobility instead. Mobility


underlines the need to make clear which boundaries matter to whom, when, and why.¹⁹

The observations about categorization, presented above, are relevant to the discussion about chain migration and related concepts that follow in the next sections. This chapter is about labour migration, but since people can and do move in and out of this category, labour migration cannot be discussed without including other categories of migration. Labour migration is the most important form of migration—this applies both today and when looking at the past. Currently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that 150 million of the world’s approximately 244 million international migrants are migrant workers (about 60 per cent).²⁰ Although it is not completely clear which definition the ILO uses, and, keeping in mind the observations regarding categorization made above, the estimate that roughly 60 per cent of international migrants are labour migrants is probably the nearest we get to reality, both now and in the past. In 2007, the UNHCR explicitly expressed the idea that most migration should be labelled mixed migration.²¹ A distinction can be made between primary and secondary motives—for instance, safety as a first motive and work as a second—but migrants with different priorities do use the same paths and networks. In recent literature, the idea of mixed migration has only partly caught on.²² In September 2016, the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, which tried to find a solution for dealing with the increasing numbers of refugee migrants, made mixed migration the key concept of its New York Declaration, which was accepted by the 193 member states. Refugee migration cannot and should not be separated from other forms of migration, according to the declaration.²³

The sections below describe the concept of chain migration and related concepts, such as migration networks, systems and infrastructures.

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Chain migration

The plant metaphors of Handlin (The Uprooted, 1951) and Bodnar (The Transplanted, 1987) emphasize the severing of ties.²⁴ Most of the migration literature is, however, about the maintenance of ties. In 1964, MacDonald and MacDonald coined chain migration as a concept.²⁵ Chain migration does not apply to labour migration only. Refugees, family migrants, and (post-) colonial migrants can be part of chains as well. At one end of the scale, the definition of chain migration is clear: it is the stereotypical man who migrates first, while his wife and children join him later. At the other end of the scale, chain migration blurs and breaks down into concepts such as network migration, serial migration, migration systems, and migration cultures, which will be discussed below.

Chain migration means that individuals move from one place to another via a set of social arrangements, in which people at the destination provide aid, information, and encouragement to new or potential immigrants. Behavioural scientists use the word serial migration to describe a very similar situation, in which (one of) the parents migrate(s) first and children follow later.²⁶ Chain migration is incremental, works via personal ties, and differs from incidentally organized group migration. Group migration can lead to chain migration; it does not have to be one single migrant who starts a chain.

It is difficult to say how many people migrate inside or outside chains.²⁷ People who migrate as part of chains are more visible and have attracted more interest from authorities and academics than those who do not. Driven by the interest of policy makers, researchers tried to calculate the so-called multiplier effect: how many relatives and friends does each primary migrant bring?²⁸ Each new migrant can start a

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²⁴ Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted. The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People (Boston, 1951); John Bodnar, The Transplanted. A History of Immigration in Urban America (Bloomington, IN, 1987).
new chain and can bring a new cluster of relatives and friends into the country. Comparisons over time or between countries are difficult because some researchers only include primary relationships, while others also include secondary relationships or non-family relationships. Some migrants say that they received help from people who were like family. That complicates matters: must people have actual family ties or can they also be just like family?

Researchers found that each migrant brings one to three additional people into a country. There are differences according to countries of origin: in countries where nuclear families are large, the potential number of people that can join the primary mover is also large. The multiplier also differs according to the country of settlement. The US allows migrants to bring siblings and parents, while European countries, as a rule, do not. The later only recognize nuclear family members as family.²⁹

There are differences according to gender. The differences in men’s and women’s migration patterns have been explained using the concept of perceived profitability; it is a concept that is relevant to debates about chain migration. The key idea—used both in the neo-classical, or push-pull, model as well as in the family strategy model—is that people move if a cost-benefit analysis points to positive gains.³⁰ The assumption is that, as a rule, men can earn more than women, and it is therefore more advantageous for men to migrate. When women migrate in equal or greater numbers to men it is explained from a remittance perspective; women may earn less than men, but, if they send more money home, it may be more profitable for the families left behind if women migrate, rather than men.³¹ The problem with these models is that it is difficult to assess profitability, because men and women do not have the same (access to) resources, the labour market, power, agency, interests, knowledge, or networks. As yet, it is not clear what difference perceived profitability makes to the gendered nature of migration chains. In her 2015 article, Fidler showed that the person important for starting a chain is not the stereotypical single man. In the case that she studied, the British wives of South Asian seafarers in the UK were instrumental in fostering ties with the country of origin of their husbands


and in facilitating additional migration—thus creating and maintaining migration chains.\textsuperscript{32}

If travel is difficult, dangerous, or expensive, migrants are more likely to start a chain, since they can less easily travel to and from friends and relatives without these support structures. Migrants who are in a country longer are more likely to stand at the beginning of a chain: they know the country, the routes, the labour market and the language. Some migrants help friends and relatives migrate and expect nothing in return. Others, however, expect that the newly arrived will help out on the farm or in the shop, in order to repay the assistance they received.\textsuperscript{33} Those who arrived first may profit from the cheap labour of relatives or acquaintances who arrive later. This type of help can slip into semi-professional brokerage and smuggling. Employers can benefit from recruiting new migrants via chains. They delegate the recruitment to the workers who have been in their employment for a while, whom they trust and whom they expect to help the new immigrants. By doing so, employers enforce chain migration.

**Network migration, migration system, and migration culture**

Network migration is frequently used as a synonym for chain migration, although some authors reserve the term *chain migration* for situations in which only close relatives are helped to migrate and use *network migration* for situations in which friends, people from the same village, region or country, co-religionists, or people working in the same job receive assistance.\textsuperscript{34} In 2005, Krissman highlighted that the network approach underplays the influence of employers and labour recruiters, and thus, in his view, is unable to adequately explain migration.\textsuperscript{35}

The concept *cumulative causation*, introduced by Douglas Massey et al. in the 1980s, has been used to explain migration via networks.\textsuperscript{36} Cumulative causation is the process whereby the propensity to migrate grows with each additional migrant. Networks and accumulated migrant experience demonstrate benefits, diminish familial resistance, and increase security by providing information about and access to

\textsuperscript{35} Fred Krissman, “‘Sin Coyote Ni Patron’: Why the “Migrant Network” Fails to Explain International Migration”, *International Migration Review*, 39, 1 (2005), pp. 4 – 44.
labour market opportunities. Networks make migration less risky for individuals by circulating information among potential migrants. As a result, the nature of migration changes over time. The initial high risk, resulting from a lack of information, declines when more family and friends migrate. Denser networks of migrants provide potential migrants with more and increasingly reliable information. Networks of women tend to be less formalized and less visible than those of men.

The concept migration system—originally introduced by geographers—is like that of network migration related to chain migration. The migration system approach sees migration as part of the global flow of goods, services and information. In 1984, Jan Lucassen proved the usefulness of the approach for the history of labour migration in Europe. Migration systems show continuity over time. They can exist long after the original factors—including labour demand—that led to their creation have disappeared. At one point the migrant community which sprang from the system, rather than the system itself, becomes the reason to migrate. Migrants follow well-trodden paths, and authorities influence the creation and continuation of

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migrations systems, hoping that migrants will benefit from mutual support or exchange of information, reducing the cost of migration for the migrant and others.\textsuperscript{43} Lastly, \textit{migration culture} is also a related concept: people migrate because \textit{everybody} does, often as part of the rites of passage to adulthood for young men.\textsuperscript{44} Fostered within communities of young men, this is borne out of a lust for adventure, which is associated with locally entrenched masculine ideals.\textsuperscript{45} In Morocco, for instance, there are villages where migration has been so common for men since the 1950s that those who do not migrate are ridiculed and equated with children, women, or the elderly.\textsuperscript{46}

\section*{Migration industry}

Light, in a 2013 article, pointed out that the \textit{migration industry} is an important facilitator, next to migration networks.\textsuperscript{47} Migration itself is not an industry, but the facilitation of migration is. The migration industry differs from the migration networks because personal ties, kinship and friendship are not important, while businesses are. As such, the term more or less overlaps with \textit{career migration} or \textit{organizational migration}. The migration industry includes travel agents, lawyers, bankers, labour recruiters, brokers, interpreters and housing agents. These agents have an interest in the continuation of migration and work, in an organized manner, against government restrictions. The migration industry, furthermore, not only profits from travel but also from facilitating integration or adaptation by providing, for instance, integration courses, publishing foreign language news media, or training people. This section discusses five numerically important and different examples of migration industries: shipping, slavery, trafficking, forced labour and missionary work.

Shipping companies are an example of a migration industry that was important in the interwar period.\textsuperscript{48} In its 41-volume report from 1911, the US Dillingham Commission concluded that the prospect of (better paying) work attracted migrants to

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem[44]{Hein de Haas and Aleida van Rooij, “Migration as Emancipation? The Impact of Internal and International Migration on the Position of Women Left Behind in Rural Morocco”, \textit{Oxford Development Studies}, 38, 1 (2010), pp. 43–62.}
\bibitem[45]{Ali Nobil Ahmad, \textit{Masculinity, Sexuality and Illegal Migration. Human Smuggling from Pakistan to Europe} (Aldershot, 2011); Nobil Ahmad, “The Romantic Appeal of Illegal Migration: Gender Masculinity and Human Smuggling from Pakistan”, in: Marlou Schrover et al. (eds), \textit{Illegal Migration and Gender in a Global and Historical Perspective} (Amsterdam, 2008), pp. 127–150.}
\bibitem[46]{De Haas and Van Rooij “Migration as emancipation?”, pp. 43–62.}
\bibitem[48]{\textit{Idem}.}
\end{thebibliography}
the US. However, the propaganda by steamship ticket agents was an additional and important driving force. Shipping companies bought foreign language newspapers in order to gain access to potential migrants. These papers published immigrant letters and, by doing so, they promoted migration. These papers became part of the migration industry. The Dillingham Commission sought to forbid shipping companies to promise work in the US. The shipping companies, whose activities have been described in detail by authors such as Feys and Brinkmann, not only transported passengers across the water but also organized overland transport by train across Europe.49 Migrants were transported, frequently in sealed train carriages, from Central and Eastern Europe to port cities such as Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg. Along the routes, shipping companies selected migrants, making sure that only migrants who were likely to get into the countries of destination would make the trip. For their selection, the shipping companies set up and ran selection stations along the routes. Private shipping companies, rather than state authorities, were given the task of exercising control over the people who left Europe.50 In addition to the large companies crossing the Atlantic, there were smaller companies, which sometimes had different aims. In 1907, Norway, for instance, sponsored its own transatlantic shipping line—the Norway Mexico Gulf Line—and hired a successful writer to describe first ship’s maiden voyage. The idea, however, was not to increase migration, but rather trade.51

Slavery, trafficking of women, and forced labour are generally excluded from studies on labour migration. Three factors may explain that. In the first place, as pointed out by Adam McKeown in a 2012 publication, before the twentieth century, attention from lawmakers, journalists, and reformers focused on brokers and migration infrastructure. In the late nineteenth century, brokers and middlemen were, however, increasingly seen as the source of evil when it came to migration and as the remnants of a pre-modern culture that undermined the benefits of migration. New immigration laws, introduced in the early twentieth century, focused on regulat-


ing entry at the border and made brokers invisible. Slavery, trafficking, and forced labour are excluded from studies on labour migration because of the implicit assumption that labour migration means choice. The dominance of the traditional push-and-pull paradigm, with its emphasis on choice, obscures the fact that slavery was, in essence, labour migration. Secondly, the rigid categorizations, discussed above, make it difficult to deal with in-between categories. Lastly, claim-makers feel that forms of amoral migration (such as slavery, forced labour, and trafficking) should not be normalized by including them in a standard categorization such as labour migration.

Slavery existed in Ancient Egypt, Ancient China, the Roman Empire, and many other old civilizations. Vikings in Early Modern Europe captured slaves on their raids and sold them on Islamic markets. In the Middle Ages, Arab slavers brought people from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Furthermore, in early medieval Europe there was the system of penal enslavement, enslaving people as a form of compensation for the wrongs they had committed: theft, arson, rape, murder, adultery, or inappropriate conduct harming the family’s honour. Penal enslavement was, however, not labour market driven, but rather sprang from the wish to sever ties between the culprit and his or her kin and community. Slavery also occurred between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century, when Babarby pirates attacked coastal towns in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, captured the inhabitants and sold them or used them as slaves. Spain, Portugal, Britain, and the Netherlands built their colonial empires using slave labour. Slavery was big business: a well-oiled and profitable industry. European slavers moved millions of enslaved people across the Atlantic. There is a large debate about numbers. The website slavevoyages, which collected a lot of data, estimates that the number was 12 million (see figure 1), while Matlou Matlou- leng estimates that 22 million people were enslaved. There are also authors that set the number as high as 100 million. Although slaves were meant to be workers, the slavers did not see the enslaved people as such, nor did they see them as people at all. Slave-traders insured their ‘cargoes’ of slaves—of which a third did not survive the Atlantic crossing—against losses at sea, just like they insured cargo. Slaves were considered to be goods.

England abolished slavery in 1833, France did so in 1848, and the Netherlands followed in 1863. The abolition of slavery did not mean that slaves were emancipated, nor did it end slavery. Enslaved people continued to work as slaves or under slave-like conditions. In 2017, the ILO estimated that there were 21 million slaves and forced labourers worldwide. The redefinition of slavery and force labour, however, makes it difficult to count people. Slavery is defined as the act of buying and selling people as if they were goods or animals. Recent authors have stretched the definition to include also all sorts of bondage, coerced labour, and restrictions on choice.

After the formal abolition, slavery was partly replaced by indentured labour. In 1852, France, for instance, brought Indians from French India (geographically separated enclaves on the Indian subcontinent) to the West-Indies, as well as a group of workers called Neg Congo from their colonial possessions in Africa. About 10,000 Indians arrived in the French West Indies. In 1885, there were 87,000 Indians in Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana. In 1870, the Dutch got permission from the British authorities to contract labourers in the British colonies in Asia. In total 30,304 British Indians were brought to Surinam. This migration continued until 1916, when the British stopped it, under the pressure of British nationalists. Between 1890

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60 Richardson, “Caribbean Migrations, 1838 – 1985”. 
and 1939, the Dutch also brought 33,000 workers from Java to Surinam. British contract labourers from neighbouring British Guiana also moved to Surinam. In total, about one million indentured workers were brought from India to the Caribbean (see table 1). In addition, there were indentured workers from other countries.

Table 1: Number of indentured workers brought from India to the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Period of migration</th>
<th>Number of migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1834–1900</td>
<td>453,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>1838–1916</td>
<td>238,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>1845–1916</td>
<td>143,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1845–1915</td>
<td>36,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1856–1885</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>1858–1895</td>
<td>4,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>1860–1911</td>
<td>152,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts</td>
<td>1860–1861</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincents</td>
<td>1860–1880</td>
<td>2,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunion</td>
<td>1861–1883</td>
<td>26,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>1873–1916</td>
<td>34,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1879–1916</td>
<td>60,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>1895–?</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>?–1916</td>
<td>6,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,194,957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When slavery in British India ended in 1860, it was followed by the creation of a system of voluntary indentured labour. Labour brokers paid travel costs, and the migrants had to work off their debts. Within this system, many Indian migrants moved from India to Malaya, under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office in London. Married men were not allowed to be accompanied by their wives. Chinese traders set up a parallel system of organized migration, which used similar structures. After the 1870s, the Malayan government became the official state agency for organizing Indian labour recruitment and developed a migration infrastructure. British authorities managed emigration procedures at ports, and legislated shipboard conditions. The government stimulated migration by improving transport infrastructures, subsidizing travel, initiating liberal migration regulations, and establishing indentured labour regimes.⁶¹

After indentured labour migration systems were formally abolished, the bulk of Indian migration in Asia continued to be modelled on the former system of inden-

tured migration. Systems of debt and advances tied labourers to employers through the mediation of the labour contractors. The analogies between the colonial and independent Malaysian migration policies are remarkable: the provision of assisted passage for workers continued to exist, the repayment of advances through salary deductions was held onto as a practice, and migrants continued to be tied to a specified employer.

In the US, the abolition of slavery was also followed by the introduction and expansion of a system of peonage, which tied workers to their employers and to the land they worked on because they were under the obligation to pay off debts. About 450,000 to 900,000 people—mostly Afro-Americans—lived as unfree labourers in the US in the 1930s and 1940s.

After the end of formal slavery in Africa, former slaves migrated within European colonial territories hoping to find work. They moved away from the sites at which they had been enslaved. The former slaves became migrant workers. Studies on labour migration in Africa focus on ethnicity, rather than on the mobility that resulted from slavery, and its abolition. Emancipation and labour migration should, however, not be treated separately. In her 2011 study, Pelckman shows how labour migration in Africa is, to a large extent, shaped by (former) slave status, (former) slave employment, and remnants of slave networks and hierarchies.

Forced labour migration in Nazi Germany has been labelled slavery, but that is stretching or misusing the concept. The forced labourers in Nazi Germany were (unlike slaves) partly worked to death on purpose, and they were not owned or sold by their employers. They did work in slave-like conditions, and they were moved as workers and put to work for profit.

The movement and deployment of foreign workers during wars did not start with the Second World War. During the First World War, Germany deployed 1.5 million Prisoners of War (POWs), and Austria-Hungary put to work more than 1 million Russian POWs. 2.1 million Austrian-Hungarian and 170,000 German POWs worked in Russia, and tens of thousands of German POWs worked in France and Britain. In 1916, the German occupation forces deported 5,000 Polish workers, of which most were Jews, from Lodz and 61,000 Belgian workers to Germany. In the Second World War the scale of these types of forced labour migration increased dramatically. Two Soviet decrees of 1942, for instance, forced 316,000 ethnic Germans living in the Soviet Union into so-called labour armies and moved them to far away sites to cut

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63 Nicola Pizzolato, “‘As Much in Bondage as They was Before. Unfree Labor During the New Deal (193 5–1952)”, in: Marcel van der Linden and Magaly Rodriguez Garcia (eds), On Coerced Labor. Work and Compulsion after Chattel Slavery (Leiden and Boston, 2016), pp 208–224.
timber, build factories and railroads, work in coal mines, and work in the oil industry. During the Second World War, Japan established a forced labour regime and deported 1 million Korean men and women and 40,000 Chinese to Japan.

In Nazi Germany differences were made between forced labour migrants. The German word for guest worker—*Gastarbeiter*—was coined in Nazi Germany in order to distinguish the more or less voluntary temporary labour migrants form other migrants—*Zwangsarbeiter* and *Ostarbeiter*—who were forced to migrate and work, and who were deemed racially inferior and thereby incapable of carrying out all types of labour. Nazi Germany categorized its foreign workers, allocating them within a hierarchy. Workers from Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Flanders were placed at the top, and Poles, Soviet citizens, ‘Gypsies’, and Jews were at the bottom of the hierarchy. Some of the labour migrants who belonged to the top were recruited on a more or less voluntarily basis and were allowed to return to their home countries, sometimes regularly, in the early years of the Second World War. Most of the forced labourers were forced migrants. In 2002, Spoerer and Fleischhacker estimated that the number of foreign forced labourers in Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1945 was 13.5 million, of whom 12 million were coerced to move.

Trafficking, like slavery and forced labour, can be labelled an industry. There is a wide-ranging debate on whether prostitution, which is assumed to result from trafficking, should be discussed in terms of labour migration: is prostitution work? Here, the same idea applies as in the case of slavery and forced labour: the fear exists that grouping prostitution in the category of labour migration normalizes something that is morally wrong. However, although it may not have been a choice, in essence, prostitution is work.

Around 1900, the women’s movement started to attract attention to the problem of trafficking in women and claimed that prostitution was a form of slavery. Between 1899 and 1913, conferences were held in several European cities. During the First World War, prostitution increased and in 1919, the League of Nations Covenant declared that it would oversee the international anti-sex trafficking movement. The League of Nation wanted to gather evidence to counterweight distortions in the press. As Julia Laite pointed out in 2017, anti-trafficking activists disconnected de-

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bates about trafficking from those about women’s labour migration and the inequalities and exploitation it involved on purpose. Trafficking was seen as a wrong that could be remedied, while claim makers sought to stay away from issues regarding working conditions.\(^70\)

The migration industry metaphor applies to trafficking in three ways. In the first place, there is the trade in women by agents, traffickers, and organized pimps, although, in reality, it was repeatedly found that there were never any business-like organizations.\(^71\) Secondly, there is the very large industry comprised of organizations that try to save women. For the saving industry, trafficking provides leverage because it enabled them to claim moral authority. Lobbyists campaigning against trafficking use the metaphor of the market place and speak about ‘trade centres’, ‘offices’, ‘trade agents’, ‘enterprises’, ‘depots’, ‘customers’, ‘stores’ and ‘orders’.\(^72\) The metaphor is used to highlight the dehumanizing element of trafficking. Lastly, there is the business of newspapers, which found that stories about trafficking increased their sales and readership.\(^73\)

In the 1920s, the concept of trafficking was stretched to include practices in Hong Kong that were called *mui tsai*.\(^74\) This debate is interesting within the context of this chapter because to some *mui tsai* was labour migration, while others redefined it as slavery. *Mui tsai* referred to young girls (5 to 14 year old) who were transferred from their parents’ household to another household, where they worked as domestic servants from when they were about 13 until a suitable marriage was arranged for them, or they became a concubine at age of 20. The girls were not at liberty to leave their new household, and the parents were paid a lump sum the moment the girl was transferred.\(^75\) After Hong Kong became a British colony in 1841, lobbyists emphasized that the *mui tsai* system was slavery and since Britain was a nation of civilization and


\(^73\) Schrover, “History of Slavery, Human Smuggling and Trafficking”, pp. 41–70.


Christianity it should not tolerate this evil.⁷⁶ Leading Chinese in the colony pointed out that obtaining girls for domestic work was a longstanding Chinese practice—it was not slavery. The food, clothes, and other necessities the girls were given by their masters could be considered a wage. The British authorities disagreed it was domestic work, and in 1922 declared that the mui tsai system was slavery. Even though the mui tsai system was not very different from the system under which young domestic servants worked in North-Western European countries,⁷⁷ the British authorities called it slavery because of the criticism by lobbyists.

In the late 1920s, definitions of trafficking and of slavery started to converge. The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery expanded the definition. It marked a turning point, since it stretched the concept of slavery to include all sorts of servitude. In 2000, the Palermo Protocol (to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, a supplement to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) connected trafficking and slavery even more strongly. The Palermo Protocol was the first convention that distinguished between trafficking and smuggling. According to the Palermo Protocol, smuggling is the facilitation and (attempted) transportation of persons across borders illegally or the assistance of persons in entering a country using fraudulent documents. Trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons, by means of threat, use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, or the abuse of power for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes prostitution, forced labour, slavery, practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs. The consent of a victim to the (intended) exploitation is regarded as irrelevant. The definition of trafficking emphasizes that people are transferred against their will, while the definition of smuggling stresses movement to which migrants agree and for which they pay. Trafficking is used more often for women, denying them agency, while smuggling is used more for men, denying their role as victims.⁷⁸

In recent years, the topic of trafficking has dominated conferences on (migrant) women.⁷⁹ The literature, discussions and conferences on trafficking of migrant women are so numerous and show such continuity in their choice of topics and focus that they tend to push out other subjects related to women and migration. The assumption that large numbers of women are trafficked has resulted in stronger

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⁷⁸ Schrover, “History of Slavery, Human Smuggling and Trafficking”, pp. 41–70.
monitoring of migrant women, as opposed to men. It has also led to the generalization that all migrant women are at risk of being raped or being subject to other forms of sexual harassment. The narrative of victimhood and the assumption that women are forced to migrate and work in prostitution has brought about protective measures, which sometimes help women but also restrict their choices, and labour market opportunities.

Lastly, missionary work can also be seen as an example of a migration industry. Missionaries were involved in child rescue operations: saving children from their parents, from heathen influences, from slavery, or from forced marriages. They constructed and led orphanages, in which former slave children, abandoned children, children at risk, orphans, and half-orphans were housed. Their aim was to bring up these children as Christians who as adults would be able to act as intermediaries between the colonizers and the colonized. Thus, one form of migration industry—that of missionaries—led to another form—the forced and institutionalized removal of children from their families. When colonialism came to an end these children were frequently taken to the country of the former colonizers. The mission was, to a certain extent, replaced by voluntourism: a combination of tourism and volunteering activities. Voluntourism refers to mostly young people from Western countries who go to so-called underdeveloped countries (in Asia, Africa, Central and South America) to do voluntary work and who are driven by motives such as ‘giving back’ and ‘doing good’. In this type of migration women outnumber men because of the organized and, according to perceptions, rather safe way of travelling and living abroad that is offered. Organizations advertise the trips and residencies as emotional journeys. The voluntourists keep travel blogs which are used by organizations to attract new voluntourists, in a manner very similar to how shipping companies used immi-

grant letters in the newspapers they owned. The young temporary migrants are usually skilled, although often not in the jobs they work in. They give language courses, teach children, and build orphanages mostly without being trained as professional language instructors, teachers, or brick layers. Their stay is short but the organizational infrastructure that is put in place to organize this migration is permanent. Furthermore, their temporary stay leads to new (chain) migration: marriage migration, and student migration from the countries they visit to the countries they come from.

Migration infrastructure

In 2014, Xiang and Lindquist described the changes in recent Indonesian and Chinese labour migration, and introduced the concept of migration infrastructure, which they defined as the systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors that facilitate and condition mobility. Migration infrastructure relates to mediation, but the interplay between different dimensions of migration infrastructure make it self-perpetuating and self-serving. Rather than describing how migration becomes self-sustaining through networks, the migration infrastructure approach seeks to examine how networks function as part of the migration infrastructure. Xiang and Lindquist use the concept of migration infrastructure to explain why labour migration has become both more accessible and more cumbersome in many parts of Asia since the late 1990s. Migration is easier, since more people have gained legal access to overseas job opportunities, and journeys are quicker and safer. It is cumbersome, since the process of migration has become more complicated with growing numbers of regulations, which have often led to higher migration costs. Xiang and Lindquist break down migration infrastructure into the commercial (recruitment intermediaries), the regulatory (state apparatus and procedures for documentation, licensing, training, and other purposes), the technological (communication and transport), the humanitarian (non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) and international organizations), and the social (migrant networks). Migration can be fragmented and short-lived, but infrastructure retains stability and coherence. According to Xiang and Lindquist, migration infrastructure differs from yet again another concept: mobility regime. Mobility regime or migration regime focuses on how mobility is structured and how it is part of hegemonic power relations. The migration industry approach constructs migration as a form of business and pays less attention to the fact that migration brokers are not simply selling opportunities for migrating, but are also dealing with various components of infrastructure—such as collecting documents, organizing medical tests, or conducting pre-departure training—which have far-reaching regulatory effects. According to Xiang and Lindquist, migration should not be imagined as a line between two places, but rather as a multi-faceted space of mediation occupied by commercial recruitment intermediaries, bureaucrats, NGOs,
migrants, and technologies. Siegelbaum and Page Moch added that it is not only state projects that move people—as the migration regime concept stipulates—but also the migrants’ practices, their relationships and networks. They labelled this *repertoires of migration.*

In the field of labour migration, the mediation by NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has not been studied enough, given the fact that both types of organizations are important to the migration infrastructure. The ILO, which is a relevant organization when it comes to organized labour migration, was part of the migration infrastructure. After the First World War, the ILO tried to create standards for the recruitment and treatment of foreign workers. In the 1920s and 1930s, attempts were made to take stock of how many people moved in order to find work. It resulted in important publications by Ferenczi and Willcox. As of 1920, Imre Ferenczi was the Technical Adviser on Migration and Population Questions at the International Labour Office in Geneva and was acting chef of its Migration Section. In 1921 and 1924, the US installed quota measures, which severely restricted migration from Eastern and Southern Europe. In 1924, the CIOPPM (Comité International des Organisations Privées pour la Protection des Migrants) was created in response, supported by the ILO. In the first months of 1924, 60 NGOs joined the CIOPPM. It campaigned for transportation costs to be fixed before departure, for a reduction of waiting times at stations, and for help with visa applications: these were all issues the shipping companies also tried to address. In the interwar years, the ILO sought to harmonize workers’ rights at the international level, but they failed in the midst of the Depression. Increased workers’ rights also led to the (perceived) need to restrict the entry of migrants, who might compete for labour. Non-migrant workers urged for the protection of the labour market from foreign workers. The extension of voting rights made politicians sensitive to these demands. But preferential treatment of non-migrant workers was only possible if they could be distinguished from foreigners. As a result, workers and their unions started to press for more registration. The ILO’s task did not become easier. During the Second World War, the ILO created a Permanent Migration Committee to organize the selection of (labour) migrants after the war. Recently, the ILO increasingly has been working together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), although both also compete with each other. The ILO and

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87 Siegelbaum and Page Moch, *Broad is My Native Land*.
the IOM have sought more cooperation with NGOs. The IOM—which has recently become a UN organization—is now involved in the pre-migration training of labour migrants. In 2010, it presented a training manual for labour migration, which is used to train government officials, members of local NGOs and potential migrants.²

The concept migration infrastructure can be used to explain or describe the migration within empires, and the large-scale migration organized by state authorities in conjunction with others. Migration to and within empires was frequently the result of a joint or concurrent effort of more than one actor. Authorities tried to encourage migration to the colonies (especially from the end of the nineteenth century onwards) and so did so-called migration societies (civil society organizations that were partly driven by the aim to reduce poverty in their home countries).³ Migration within, for instance, the Habsburg, Chinese, Russian, or Ottoman Empires was long distance migration, as was migration within colonial Empires such as the French, the Dutch, the Portuguese, Spanish, and British empires. People moved to the colonies as sailors, soldiers, merchants, and missionaries. They used the same routes and the same information networks.⁴

Career migration, care drain and care chain, brain drain, and brawn drain

In 1976, Charles Tilly defined career migrants as a sub-category of labour migrants.⁵ A career migrant is, according to Tilly, a person who moves (with or without a household) in response to opportunities within large structures: organized trade, firms, governments, mercantile networks, and armies, for instance. The career migrant differs from the chain migrant because social bonds (for instance with kin and kind) are less important than the large structures they move in. Help is provided by colleagues and not by (former) neighbours, kinsmen, or co-religionists. In 2015, Lucassen and Smit sub-categorized the concept of career migration and distinguished organizational migrants as people (plus their dependents) whose migratory behaviour is primarily determined by the interests of the organization they have joined (voluntary or

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forced). Also, the expat is a sub-category of the career migrant. Originally, the term was used for communities of creative and political bohemians, such as the Russians and Americans in interwar Paris. In recent decades, the term has been adopted by labour migrants, the organizations they work for, and the states who court them, to emphasize that expats are high-skilled, and upper-class. The expats are currently mostly young white Western men, who are moved by firms across the globe and do not seek to settle or adjust to their new surroundings. There is a difference between high-skilled workers who move outside organizational networks and migrants who move inside networks. Those who move outside these networks frequently find it difficult to have their diploma’s recognized. Those who move across national borders within firms (Unilever or Shell, for instance) will have their diplomas validated within the firm and do not have to go through procedures in the country of destination.

Class and gender are important to the definitions of career migrants and related concepts, although that is frequently not made explicit. Career migration and related phenomena are usually discussed separately from the migration of skilled workers. The migration of skilled workers has always been an important part of labour migration. Migrant workers were recruited by organizations and governments because of their special skills. Samis from Northern Finland—to name a little-known example—were brought to Alaska by US authorities to teach the Inuit—who were, at that time, mainly living from fishing—how to herd reindeer. In a similar vein, linen and jute spinners were brought from Scotland and England to France and the Netherlands, and porcelain painters were moved from the UK to the Netherlands. Butter makers were sent to other parts of the world to learn or teach butter making techniques. In the 1930s, the Volkswagen plant in Fallersleben in Germany, modelled on Ford Motor Company’s River Rouge plant in Dearborne, imported engineers from the US. This list can be extended endlessly. The migration was usually meant to be temporary. The migration of these specialized workers was not discussed in terms of brain drain. In the literature, the concept brain drain was mostly used to describe the migration of specialists from underdeveloped countries—for instance doctors and IT specialists—to developed countries. It was less about opportunities and careers and much more about how the countries they left would be negatively affected by the departure of these high-skilled workers, stereotypically portrayed as men.

Singers and theatre performers are career migrants as well, although they are also frequently not recognized as such.⁰¹ In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these performers travelled the globe, usually with a director or manager, who decided where they would go. Athletes form a similar group of highly visible mobile people, who are seldom described as career migrants. An example are rugby players from Fiji. Their highly-organized migration, and that of other athletes, has been labelled brawn drain and muscle trade. Fijian authorities and organizations have actively developed networks and structures to pave the way for future Fijian migrants. In Fiji, rugby has been developed as part of the countries national identity and Fijian rugby players are playing in all major teams of the world. In a similar manner, West Indian cricket players, Dominican baseball players, and Kenyan middle and long distance runners are, and have been for decades, part of highly organized labour migration networks.⁰² In 2013, Darby described the migration of Ghanaian football players, whom he regards both as labour migrants and as commodities that are traded in international markets. By 2010, 350 Ghanaian football players were playing as professionals or semi-professionals for mostly European teams. European football clubs—such as the Dutch teams Ajax, Feyenoord, and FC Utrecht—have set up youth academies in Ghana to train young players, aged 10 to 14. The boys are to play for the European teams who run the academies, or they are sold to other teams when they are 18.⁰³

Care workers are career migrants, despite the fact that they are not discussed in those terms. From the 1960s onwards, nurses were recruited by hospitals or via government programmes by countries such as the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands, from countries such as Suriname, South Africa and, most importantly, the Philippines. In the Philippines, the government organized the ‘export’ of nurses to other countries, hoping that remittances would stimulate the Philippine economy. The migration of nurses was followed by and led to the migration of domestic servants and other care-givers from the Philippines.⁰⁴ Currently, there are domestic servants and other care workers from the Philippines in almost all countries of the world.

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number of overseas workers from the Philippines is 10 million, of which 3.5 million are in the US and 1 million in Saudi Arabia. The Overseas Contract Workers—an official Philippine policy category—are expected to return. They are responsible for a large part of the remittances, which constitute 30 to 40 per cent of the Philippines’s BSP. Regarding gender, the Philippine immigrant population is skewed in most countries, with women outnumbering men at four or five to one. The migration of domestic servants and other care workers from the Philippines is not discussed in the same context as that of the about 255,000 Filipino seafarers, who work as deck hands, engine room oilers, cabin cleaners, and cooks aboard container ships, oil tankers, and luxury cruise liners.¹ Since they are aboard ships most of the time, they are less visible, also in migration statistics, than the women who migrated from the Philippines.

Over centuries, domestic service has been an important sector of employment for immigrant and non-immigrant women alike. Many immigrant women worked as domestic servants, although—as said above—the sector is not as important as the number of publications on migrant domestic servants suggests. The sector was important to migrant women from some countries, but not from all.¹⁶ Domestic work was important to labour migration in the nineteenth century, but the number of domestic servants sharply declined in the second half of the twentieth century. The sector is now on the rebound and offers new opportunities to migrant women.¹⁷ Migrant women currently manage to dominate certain sub-sectors of the labour market for domestic services, such as live-in child-care or care of the elderly, especially in countries where this care has not been institutionalized.

The concept care drain was introduced to describe how women migrate and care for the children or elders of others in foreign countries, leaving behind dependents in the care of others.¹⁸ Care drain is combined with the concept care chain, which labels women as mothers, rather than as workers. The care chains are believed to sustain gender inequality: women in rich countries hire women from poor countries to do what is stereotypically seen as women’s work (caring), rather than contesting the separation of work between the private and the public sphere. Part of this literature about missing mothers has strong moral undertones: we are depriving children elsewhere of care. This claim is made without proving if the women who migrate were indeed caregivers before migration. Furthermore, debates about transnational moth-

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ering are not matched by debates about men who leave their children behind or about the use of the term transnational fathering.¹⁰⁹

Hochschild introduced the concept global care chain. It refers to a series of “personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring”.¹¹⁰ The global care chain focuses on social interactions between various actors in networks and their structural outcomes.¹¹¹ At first, the care chain literature only included women. However, in recent years, Filipino men, trained as foreign care workers, and male doctors from the Philippines, retrained as nurses to gain access to the US and Europe, have been included as well. After gender, authors also started to pay attention to how the chain was shaped by religion: Saudi Arabia prefers Muslim nurses and recruits them from the Islamic Southern Philippines and Indonesia.¹¹² The use of terms like the Filipino–US nanny trade and the global healthcare market suggests that this is a migration industry.¹¹³ The concept global care chain drew on the Wallersteinian global commodity chain approach in the world system analysis. The global commodity chain approach, recently relabelled the global value chain, has been criticized because it oversimplifies relationships, adopts a static view of governance and relations of power, overemphasizes the role of firms in the global North, and allocates a subordinate role to those in the South. As a result, it is seen as having little explanatory power.¹¹⁴

Circular migration and return migration

The concepts of circular migration and return migration are both frequently connected to (government) recruitment programmes: governments recruited workers, or sanctioned programmes to recruit workers, with the idea that their migration would be temporary and that the migrants would return to their country of origin. Frequently, the idea was that this migration would take the form of circular migration: either the same migrant would travel back and forth between countries, or different migrants would move within the same circuit.

¹⁰⁹ Albert Kraler et al. (eds), Gender, Generations and the Family in International Migration (Amsterdam, 2011).
As may be clear by now, in the cases of circular migration and return migration there is also an intersection with other concepts. Career migrants show circular migration patterns, and chain migration was partly circular. Migrants with circular migration patterns moved within migration systems. Vagrants were involved in circular migration. They were of concern to policy-makers long before modern states started to establish migration controls at a national level. Circular migration also occurred in the case of colonial migration. This migration continues in a semi-post-colonial setting. The population of the Caribbean parts of Britain, France and the Netherlands—called British Overseas Territories, French Overseas Departments (départements d’outre-mer (DOMs)), and Dutch special municipalities—, for instance, travels across the Atlantic frequently, while staying within one state.

There is no consensus about the definition of circular migration. Some authors consider one move enough to speak of circular migration, while they exclude seasonal migration because stays are short (6–9 months) and migrants maintain ties with their country of origin. In 2004, Duval defined circular migration as “the actual physical movement of migrants back and forth between multiple localities”. He labelled returns a transnational exercises: migrants are travelling back and forth while they are deciding on where to settle; a process that was sometimes terminated by death before they could make a choice.

Circular migration was originally conceptualized as temporary migration, with migrants making repeated moves between two or more countries. The seasonal migrants of nineteenth-century Western Europe—such as brick makers and agricultural workers, to name only a few—came at Easter and left at Michaelmas. In a similar fashion, about half a million agricultural labourers travelled to Southern Russia in the 1880s, were they hired themselves out at labour fairs for the season. Some seasonal workers—joint by traders and others following the same routes—made these international trips for years on end, while others participated in the systems for a

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119 Lucassen, Naar de kusten van de Noordzee.
few years only.¹²¹ Earlier tramping systems within guild regulations showed comparable forms of circularity. The temporality of the migration was gendered; in the nineteenth century, many authorities did not allow young men to leave permanently until they had fulfilled their military duties. Sailors, who went back and forth between destinations, were also circular migrants, unless their (rather common) death en route broke the planned circle. Miners, who moved between mines in one region—the Rhine-Meuse coal basin for instance—were circular migrants moving between three countries, from the perspective of states, but they moved within one labour market, as seen from the perspective of unions, and employers, and workers.¹²²

Labour market changes led to new migration. The discovery of oil in the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, led to large scale migration into the Gulf region. The migrants were senior staff of the oil companies from the US and UK, high-skilled workers from India, and low skilled migrants from countries in the region. The early development of the oil industry in the 1930s became the driving force behind the first organized introduction of foreign workers to the oil-producing countries of the Arab Gulf States (AGSs). The migration policy in this period was driven by the necessity to favour the migration of skilled and semi-skilled workers from British India and to hire the local workforce.¹²³ After the discovery of oil, and the oil shock of the mid-1950s, migration from Asia to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) increased sharply.¹²⁴ Large numbers of construction workers moved to the Middle East during the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s. The migrants, which were recruited, were called Contractual Temporary Labour. In 2010, there were 15 million of these workers; 29 percent of them were women.¹²⁵

Contractual Temporary Labour was one of the many circular labour migration projects put in place. The migration projects most widely discussed in the literature are guest worker migration in North Western Europe from the 1960s until 1975, and the Bracero Program between the US and Mexico between 1942 and 1960s.¹²⁶ From the 1960s onwards, Canada had a similar programme for the recruitment of tempo-

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¹²⁴ GCC: United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait; for Kuwait see: Nasra M. Shah and Indu Menon, “Chain Migration Through the Social Network: Experience of Labour Migrants in Kuwait”, International Migration, 37, 2 (1999), pp. 361 – 381.
rary workers, mainly from the Caribbean. The Bracero Program was originally established in 1942 as a temporary wartime measure. It was extended by US Congress and expanded in the latter half of the 1950s. The Bracero Program was phased out between 1965 and 1967. The lion’s share of the migration was temporary, and the migration was meant to be circular. During the period 1955–1959, about half a million Mexicans were entering the USA each year. In total, the programme brought 4 to 5 million people into the US, 89 per cent from Mexico and about 4 per cent from the British West Indies or Jamaica.\(^\text{127}\) The end of the Bracero Program did not mean the end of migration from Mexico. After the end of the Bracero Program, migration became less circular, and migrants increasingly travelled without authorization. To a large extent, labour migration from Mexico became illegal migration. Those who did gain legal entry became US citizens more often than they had in the past.\(^\text{128}\)

The guest worker migration programme in North Western Europe—which ran from the 1950s until the mid-1970s—was rather similar. Already before the guest worker migration regime was put into place there were systems in which employers and states collectively recruited migrant workers. In France, for instance, the employers cooperated in a Société Générale d’Immigration, which, between 1920 and 1930, recruited 490,000 Polish migrants to work as miners.\(^\text{129}\) The first post-war guest workers were recruited in a similar manner by employers or via agencies. About 8 million work permits were issued to guest workers to work in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany in the period of 1958 to 1972. Originally, they were mainly recruited to fill vacancies in mining and the steel industry. This explains why 80 per cent of the guest workers were men. It led to a masculinization of migration. In the UK, which was outside the European Coal and Steel Community (established in 1951) and the European Economic Community (established in 1957), workers from the (former) colonies were used to fill vacancies. People used the possibilities to migrate within the guest worker migration regime to flee Franco’s fascist regime in Spain, the Colonels regime in Greece, Salazar’s repressive regime in Portugal, and Portugal’s colonial wars in Mozambique and Angola. Not all guest workers came with a work permit. Especially in the later period of the guest worker migration regime, migrants came via chain migration structures. Employers delegated recruitment to the workers who had been in their employment for a while, whom they trusted and whom they expected to help the new immigrants. By doing so, they saved money that they would have spent on mediation. In the early years, guest


workers were circular migrants. Labour migrants from Spain, Portugal, and Italy repeatedly moved between their countries of origin and recruiting countries such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Authorities emphasized the circular nature of the guest worker migration in order to pacify the labour unions which feared that the guest workers would stay and compete with local workers when economic growth decreased. The emphasis on the temporariness and circular nature of guest worker migration was a way to make this migration acceptable, so shortly after hundreds of thousands of people had been motivated to migrate from Europe to Australia, Canada, and the US. When the guest worker migration system came to an end in the mid-1970s, guest workers reduced the number of trips back and forth, fearing (correctly) that they would not be able to re-enter the recruiting countries once they had left. The economic crisis, which was the reason for stopping the recruitment of guest workers, also hit the countries of origin. Migrants did not want to return to their home countries in the midst of an economic crisis. Furthermore, some of the countries of origin were simultaneously affected by political instability, such as the political coups of the 1970s in Turkey and the Years of Lead in Morocco. Years of Lead refers to the 1960s until the 1980s, when the regime of King Hassan II repressed dissidents, and hundreds of people died and disappeared. Many more were driven across the borders, including to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, making use of the possibilities within the guest worker migration regime.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) also had a guest worker migration regime, albeit with smaller numbers of labour migrants than West Germany. Labour migrants were called ausländische Werktätige and Vertragsarbeiter. In addition, there were Facharbeiter, who were to learn skills in the GDR and bring these to their countries of origin. Until German reunification, there were 69,000 Vietnamese, 50,000 Poles, 40,000 Hungarians, 25,000 Cubans, 22,000 migrants from Mozambique, 8000 from Algeria, 2000 from Angola, and several hundred from China and North Korea. About 70 per cent of them were men. Bilateral treaties were concluded between the countries of origin of the labour migrants and the GDR. Workers received a five-year contract and did not have a right to family housing. Permission by the state was required (and seldom granted) for marriages with a German partner. Migrant women who got pregnant were offered a choice between abortion and return. After reunification, 40,000 Vietnamese returned to Vietnam, of whom 10,000 were contract labourers whose contracts had expired. Both in 1995 and 1996, Vietnam received 100 million Deutsche Mark to help facilitate the resettlement of the returnees.

In the 1980s, there were a total of 300,000 mostly unskilled workers who were sent abroad to work in Communist Bloc countries, including the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought this migration to an abrupt halt.

Labour migration from Vietnam to Germany was replaced by labour migration to other countries. In recent decades, Vietnamese workers have migrated to East and Southeast Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America. Between 2001 and 2005, 295,000 workers travelled abroad on labour contracts. After stories about fraud, breaches of contract, and violations of rights the Vietnamese National Assembly approved its first Law on Vietnamese Overseas Contract Workers.

Before the sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers in Europe in the Autumn of 2015, several European countries were talking about reintroducing new systems of circular and temporary labour migration. The reason for this was the so-called demographic suicide in Western Europe: when the baby boomers start receiving their pensions there will not be sufficient workers to finance these. Schemes were put in place (especially in Germany) to recruit labour from outside Europe and increase mobility within Europe. Authorities highlighted the circular nature of this migration. Foreign domestic servants in Germany, for instance, must leave for three years after they have been employed for three years in Germany. In a similar fashion, Canada has started new temporary migration recruitment programmes, targeting the regions from which temporary migrants came in earlier decades. In 2013, however, Leach showed that potential migrants from the Caribbean shy away from these programmes, with their emphasis on temporary and unskilled labour, and prefer to move to Canada via (family) migration networks, which came about because of the earlier migration.

From the 1960s onwards, the concept of circular migration was used to emphasize the double benefit circular migration would generate: migrants would learn skills—nursing skills, for instance—which would be of use to the them, when they returned to their countries of origin. This idea was used to counter criticism regarding the brain drain. This migration-development nexus was one of the justifications for migrant recruiting policies. Within the guest worker migration system, however, migrants were recruited specifically as unskilled workers or acquired skills which were of little use when they returned (they, for instance, were trained as miners, while they aspired to work as farmers upon return). Circular migration is also advocated as a

means to reduce illegal migration: the idea is that if sufficient people can legally migrate, illegal and uncontrolled migration can be reduced. This idea is a key element of the above mentioned UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants that took place in September 2016. At this summit, it was discussed that a possible solution to the recent refugee migration and a way to reduce the number of applications for refugee status would be to provide more opportunities for legal labour migration.\textsuperscript{137}

Return migration is discussed somewhat separate from circular migration. The return of migrants has been labelled a myth. Already in 1974, in one of the first publications on return migration, Bovenkerk wrote that “one will seldom find so much philosophizing about returning to the homeland as among emigrants who will never return.”\textsuperscript{138} At the same time, there is the myth of non-return.\textsuperscript{139} In 2000, King observed that the assumption was made that many migrants would never return, while in fact they did. A quarter to a third of the Europeans who crossed the Atlantic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century returned to Europe. Similarly, about a third of the people who moved from Europe to Australia and Canada in the 1950s returned, even though they left thinking they never would.\textsuperscript{140}

The literature on return migration tends to look at the transatlantic return migration or that from Europe in the 1950s. There were, however, numerous other cases of return migration. In 1921, for instance, Lenin called upon the three million Russians who had migrated to America between 1880 and 1920 and urged them to return home to build the new Soviet Union. The First World War, the Civil War, crop failures, and the famine of 1919–1921 had reduced the population by 20 million people. The Soviet Union needed experts to set up and modernize agriculture. Communist parties worldwide were not keen on the idea of return migration, since they feared that the departure of many of their party members would decrease the Communist Party’s influence in their respective country and thus forestall a possible revolution. The Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia, however, set out to organize this migration. Russians, who had not been able to find work in their new countries of settlement, and who had been hit by the repression of communist organizations, planned to return. They were joined by people who had migrated to Canada and the US from other European countries. Overall, 70,000 to 80,000 foreign workers moved to the USSR between 1917 and 1939, half of whom were Germans and Austrians, and a quarter Americans and Canadians.\textsuperscript{141} Not all of these migrants were thus real returnees, although they were referred to as such. The returnees were to form cooperatives before depar-

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\bibitem{137} http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit
\end{thebibliography}
ture. The Soviet Government gave them land and provided housing. The returnees had to bring means of production (machinery, tools), food, clothes, and other necessities, that would enable them to survive the first two years. Between 1922 and 1928, 35 agricultural communes were founded in the USSR by these returnees.\textsuperscript{142}

Return migration is also related to decolonization. Many of the returnees had never previously been to the country they were said to be returning to. They were labelled returnees, in order to emphasize ties and belonging to their new society.\textsuperscript{143} Pieds noirs, Anglo Indians, the Indo-Dutch, and retornados were given some preferential rights—over other migrants—when they moved from the former colonies to France, the UK, the Netherlands or Portugal. Germany, in a similar fashion, gave preferential rights to the 10 to 12 million ethnic Germans coming from outside of Germany. These so-called expellees or Heimatvertriebene made use of a pre-war Nazi rule regarding belonging and a post-war clause concerning refugees, deportees, and others of German ancestry. Since they got citizenship upon arrival, they do not show up in naturalization statistics. The expellees were explicitly not labelled refugees (to make sure that they did not fall within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention), and they were not labelled labour migrants either. Part of the expellees, however, did, shortly after arrival, acquire the label of labour migrants. Among the expellees were, for instance, the 80,500 Germans who made their way to Australia as labour migrants in the immediate post-war years. The expellees thus shifted from one category to another, within a short period.\textsuperscript{144} When they migrated to Australia, they were registered as German labour migrants (and not as expellees) and as a result the percentage of expellees amongst the post-war migrants to Australia is unknown. The same was true for the 200,000 Germans who migrated to Canada between 1951–1957. Their migration was part of Canada’s \textit{bulk-labour} programme. During “the 1950s, Germany became a major source of manpower for Canada, supplying more farm hands and domestic servants than any other country as well as a disproportionately high number of skilled workers”.\textsuperscript{145}

The expellees or Heimatvertriebene were later followed by \textit{Aussiedler} and \textit{Spätaussiedler}. Since 1950, 4.5 million people moved to Germany within this frame-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Ronald E. Schmalz, \textit{Former Enemies Come to Canada. Ottawa and the Postwar German Immigration Boom}, 1951–57 (Ottawa, 2000), p. 9.
\end{itemize}
work. About half of them came from the Soviet Union and its successor states. In recent years, new EU member states mirrored these policies of return and gave preferential rights to returnees, frequently descendants of people who left generations ago or were deported under Soviet and communist rule. Poland does so for co-ethnic returnees from Kazakhstan, Greece for co-ethnic returnees from the former republics of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Armenia, and Hungary does so for co-ethnics from Romania, Ukraine and former Yugoslavia. The numbers are not negligible. In 1990, the Finnish president Mauno Kovisto, for instance, called upon the Ingrian Ethnic Finns (Lutheran labour migrants who had moved to the Russian province Ingria in the seventeenth century and who were reallocated to other parts of the Soviet Union around the time of the Second World War) to return. About 32,000 Ingrian Finns have since answered this call, while another 30,000 are on a waiting list to get their migration to Finland approved. Until 2010, the Ingrian Finns received automatic residency. After 2010, they were treated as foreigners and were eligible for citizenship after five years. Kivisto, like other leaders, made his call partly because in some parts of the country population figures were falling and industries could not get sufficient workers.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to map and critically review recent developments in the scholarship on labour migration, chain migration, and related concepts. From the review presented above it becomes clear that there are biases in the literature: there is much more literature about Europe, or the West, and related to Europe and the West. The migration of women is discussed separately from that of men. And the migration of unskilled migrants is discussed separately from that of skilled labour migrants. Forced migration is seldom discussed within the context of labour migration.

Most striking is the endless introduction of new concepts. It is a common thing academics do: by introducing a new concept, they are staking a claim to part of the field. Migration researchers seem, however, to be especially prone to introducing new concepts. In part, this reflects what policymakers and politicians do: they introduce endless subcategories in order to restrict or grant rights. This conceptional diarrhoea, which was mapped out in this chapter, has not moved the field forward. It has not led to more or better diachronic or synchronic comparisons. The use of the rigid categorizations of policy makers by academics denies the mobility of migrants between categories. As presented above, the New York Summit of September 2016 moved away from rigid categorizations and emphasized the mixedness of migration. Migration researchers should and will follow up on this.
Suggested reading


Lucassen, Jan, and Leo Lucassen (eds.). *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997).


