Peter Kivisto

2 The Politics of Integration

Achieving solidarity—and it needs to be construed as something to be achieved rather than taken as a given—constitutes one of the most pressing demands of highly differentiated modern societies. Indeed, David Hollinger (2006: 23-24) contends that solidarity is “shaping up as the problem of the twenty-first century.” Since Durkheim’s efforts a century earlier to comprehend the new bases for order and harmony in what he characterized as societies predicated on organic solidarity, theorists have sought to understand the habits of mind and social conditions essential for, as Iris Marion Young (2011: 120) put it, “separate and dissimilar actors [to] decide to stand together for one another.” This places front and center two of Eriksen’s binaries in the preceding chapter—inclusion/exclusion and uniformity/diversity—which are central in determining the precise boundaries of “we” in any particular place at any particular time. As Hauke Brunkhorst (2005: 5) describes the integrative processes of modern societies as he borrows language from Niklas Luhmann, “Solidarity dialectically combines opposites, contradictions, and differences. The differences, heterogeneity, and fragmentation that *‘can still be held together’* are the ‘criterion for solidarity’.”

If Brunkhorst is correct, we live in a multicultural age, one in which multiculturalism as a mode of incorporation takes root far more powerfully than it has in the past, albeit under different names, such as cultural pluralism. In fact, I will advance just such an argument in the following section. However doing so does not imply naiveté regarding resistance to expanding the boundaries of the societal community by allowing inside the core those minority groups—indigenous peoples, ethnonational minorities, and immigrants—who have heretofore been situated on the periphery. Indeed, the backlash to multiculturalism is real, with its critics seeking to promote exclusion rather than inclusion and demanding a unitary or homogeneous national culture rather than a pluralistic one. These critics are, as Martha Nussbaum (2012) put it, proponents of “the politics of fear”—fear that the nation, its culture and institutions, are being undermined by diversity. They include not only dangerous, extremist groups operating outside of legitimate political channels, but also radical right political parties that work within existing political structures. That their views have tapped into the considerable unease within the publics of the world’s liberal democracies can be seen from the fact that they have had an impact on mainstream parties, which have proven willing in some instances to trim their inclusive policies promoting diversity to respond to this unease (Alexander 2013). Certainly, the continental Nordic countries have not been immune from this backlash. Each of them, for example, has a right-wing populist party: the Danish People’s Party, the True Finns, Norway’s Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats.

This being said, the best analyses to date concerning the presumed retreat of multiculturalism, making use of empirical data from one of a variety of indexes or

measures that allow for comparative analyses (MIPEX dealing explicitly with anti-discrimination, CIVIX with civic integration, and MCP, which looks at multiculturalism) can be used to place these trends into a clearer and comparative perspective. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (2012: 18), the creators of the MCP, have concluded that while there is evidence of “a retreat from multiculturalism policies in a few countries, this is not the dominant pattern.” What they do see is a tendency to layer over existing multicultural policies—be they thick or thin policies—new initiatives aimed at civic integration. Some have charged that this move to civic integration is an indication of the retreat or abandonment of multiculturalism, a view that Banting and Kymlicka dispute. I concur with them when they contend that “there is nothing inherently incompatible between multiculturalism and civic integration” (Banting and Kymlicka 2012: 19). Given the many misconceptions about what multiculturalism actually entails, the following section attempts to sketch out a non-normative sociological understanding of the phenomenon.

2.1 Framing the analysis: Multiculturalism as claims-making

Charles Taylor has pointed out that democratic societies are inclusive insofar as they promote popular sovereignty, but this paradoxically can also contribute to exclusion. This is the case, he contends, because “of the need, in self-governing societies, of a high degree of social cohesion. Democratic states need something like a common identity” (Taylor 1998: 143). If current members define an outside group seeking entry as a threat to that common identity, they seek to effect closure rather than attempting to expand the bonds of solidarity. Groups can be excluded in a variety of ways, with such practices extending to three main groups: indigenous peoples, ethnonational minorities, and immigrants. As one of the prime spokespersons on behalf of multicultural inclusion, he sees it as a mode of incorporation that is ethically preferable to the alternative forced assimilation.

In what follows, a parallel argument will be advanced, one based not on the ethics of the matter, but on the empirical reality of the ways that groups seek to negotiate the terms of inclusion. In short, the argument that follows contends that not only should we be multiculturalists, but in fact we are (Kivisto 2012). What follows is the outline of a theoretical argument that is empirically grounded. Its primary empirical referent is the US, which is the settler nation par excellence with perhaps the most diverse population in the world. However, I would argue that the model is germane to all of the globe’s wealthy liberal democracies, which is not to say that the results will be everywhere and always the same—only that the processes will proceed down parallel tracks. In short, what follows is a sociological analysis of multiculturalism that seeks to treat it, in Durkheimian terms, as a social fact.

Multiculturalism ought to be viewed as a form of claims-making, expanding on Giuseppe Sciortino’s (2003: 264) barebones argument that multicultural claims

constitute “political claims expressed by actors on behalf of a social category.” The actors in question—the claims-makers—are the more or less legitimate representatives of the category in question, in this case ethnic groups, and are generally individuals who hold leadership roles within their respective groups. What Sciortino broadly termed a social category, I prefer to call a *community of fate*, and contend further that the claims revolve around concerns about the *fate of the community* as well as the well-being of its individual members. Although a precise definition of the term community of fate does not exist, for our purposes it will suffice to note that one is typically born into this sort of community involuntarily and that members of the community experience various levels of marginalization and stigmatization. They understand the individual and the group as involved in, to borrow from Michael Dawson (1994), a “linked fate.” It is important not to reify or essentialize groups, be they defined in terms of nationality, ethnicity, or religion. Rogers Brubaker (2010; 49) stresses that such identities “need to be understood as particular ways of framing political claims, not as real boundaries inscribed in the nature of things.” With this in mind, claims-making takes place within the public spaces afforded by liberal democracies, where efforts can be made to mobilize support in the court of public opinion. But claims-making is also directed at the state, for success often requires specific legislative actions or court decisions to translate multicultural aspirations into concrete institutionalized practices and policies. These claims should typically be viewed as appeals to the state, and not as postnationalist challenges to it (Koopmans and Statham 1999).

Five types of political demands can be distinguished: exemption, accommodation, preservation, redress, and inclusion. A brief look at each of these will indicate that, contrary to critics such as Samuel Huntington (2004) and Christopher Caldwell (2009), and to some of multiculturalism’s advocates, as well, such claims-making is not entirely new. Indeed, if this is what multiculturalism amounts to, then multiculturalism clearly existed *avant la lettre*, and one can point to examples involving both groups that arrived in the past and those who have arrived more recently.

Exemption refers to calls for differential treatment of a group by waiving certain laws, rules, regulations, and the like in order to allow a group to maintain certain practices deemed to be demanded by its cultural values. Examples include the Amish seeking an exemption to pay into the Social Security system on the grounds that they are theologically opposed to insurance; practitioners of Santeria who have sought permission to engage in animal sacrifice in spite of law prohibiting the practice based on arguments involving public health or cruelty to animals; and Sikhs who have gone to court to seek an exemption from mandatory motorcycle helmet laws. Accommodation is similar to but often less controversial than exemption. It entails a call for reasonable adjustments that will permit people to remain part of the societal mainstream—keeping jobs, doing well in school, and so forth—while also being true to their ethnic identity. For example, an Orthodox Jew might ask an employer to not be scheduled to work on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, making up the time

in a mutually agreed upon way. Likewise, Muslim employees might request that an employer provide the time and space to permit them to pray during the times that the call to prayer occurs during the workday, while making up that time in a mutually agreed upon way.

The next two types of claims-making are more controversial than the preceding two, and tend in general to come from ethnonational groups and indigenous peoples rather than from immigrants. Groups seeking to preserve the community or aspects of its culture sometimes conclude that they can't do it alone and thus they appeal to the larger society for assistance, particularly to the state to pass legislation that will serve to protect a culture and preserve a collective identity. Given that language is an especially tangible manifestation of a culture and a primary vehicle for its articulation, it's not surprising that calls for preservation frequently revolve around language. In the nineteenth century, German immigrants in the US exerted political pressure in a number of cities on public school systems to provide instruction in all subjects in German. In some cities, when enough parents requested it, German became the sole language of instruction, while in other places bilingual instruction was mandated. This would change as a nativist backlash sought to mandate instruction solely in English (Daniels 1990: 159-160), and by the time that the post-1965 immigration wave commenced, preservation had given way to bilingual instruction as a means for transitioning to English-language proficiency. Thus, any contemporary effort to engage public resources to actually preserve languages is confined to Native Americans, as is evident in the Esther Martinez Native American Languages Preservation Act of 2006, which promotes programs designed to allow American Indian languages to survive and in some instances to be restored.

Redress is predicated on a reading of history that concludes that grave injustices have been inflicted on a community of fate, injustices that can only be rectified by various sorts of compensatory actions, typically on the part of the state. Indigenous peoples who had their lands and ways of life undermined by European colonizers constitute a prime example, with numerous court cases having been undertaken in efforts to rectify treaty violations. This sort of claims-making is evident in calls for affirmative action by African Americans whose lives continue to be impacted by the legacy of slavery and the caste-like system of Jim Crow. Groups residing in the nation as a result of voluntary immigration have not been inclined to make this type of claim.

Before turning to the final type, note that despite the fact that each of these claims is intended to protect particularistic ethnic identities, the very way that this is accomplished is through what Alexander and Smelser (1999: 15) refer to as "civil-society discourse." In other words, multicultural claims-making can be seen as simultaneously advocacy on behalf of ethnic identities and solidarities and a performance that affirms one's identity and voice as a citizen of a democratic polity. As such, there is no inherent or necessary conflict between ethnic identity and national identity.

This is more evident in the final type—inclusion—which calls for an expansion of boundaries as a means of overcoming marginalization and stigmatization. Two subtypes of claims in support of inclusion can be distinguished. The first constitutes the least controversial case made for multiculturalism, and it is made with the language of reaching out or appealing to rather than demanding, generally appealing to the public at large rather than to the state. These claims are made on behalf of what Rainer Bauböck (2008: 3) refers to as "celebration multiculturalism" (see Selig 2008 for a related analysis of the "cultural gifts" movement). Members of the mainstream society are called upon to join members of a minority community in celebrating not only their particularities, but the very idea of living in a diverse society. Ethnic and religious festivals are prime examples, which strikes some skeptics as contrived, commercial, or little more than "happy talk" (Hartmann and Bell 2007).

The second subtype involves a call to expand the boundaries of solidarity, not by transforming those on the outside to clones of insiders, but by valorizing the diversity that they bring with them. Rather than calling upon outsiders to transform themselves by getting rid of or confining to the private sphere their stigmatized qualities, a reframing of those qualities takes place, and insofar as that happens the circle of solidarity expands. In the process, something happens to the insiders understanding of their own cultural values when such an expansion takes place (for influential recent explorations of ethnic boundaries, see Alba 2005 and Wimmer 2013). An attempt to redefine the religious identity of the nation in the aftermath of World War II sought to redefine the place of its two largest religious minorities: Catholics and Jews. The claim was made that the US was a Judeo-Christian nation, and not simply the "righteous empire" of Protestantism (Marty 1970). To the extent that people embraced this idea, a shift took place from an earlier period when the relationship between the Protestant majority and the two minority faith communities revolved around whether or not the former would exhibit tolerance from its position of privilege. Now it became a matter of whether or not the three faith traditions would be seen as equally valid expressions of religious conviction. For this to happen, two interrelated things had to occur. First, the previously stigmatized qualities of Catholics and Jews had to be seen in a positive light. Their faiths would no longer merely be tolerated, but valorized (Alexander 2006). Second, if these two traditions were to be so embraced, it would mean that the idea of Protestantism as the one true religion no longer held, but instead a more ecumenical sensibility was called for, one that was prepared to accept the prospect of rethinking how people understood their own tradition on the basis of an ongoing inter-religious dialogue.

Some, such as sociologists of religion R. Stephen Warner (2010) and Rhys Williams (2011) have suggested that something similar may be developing today, albeit in embryonic form, with efforts by Muslims and their allies from the Judeo-Christian community suggesting a further expansion of the circle of solidarity by depicting Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as part of a shared Abrahamic religious tradition or as religions of the book. Needless to say, in the "age of terror," this development

confronts serious challenges, but the earlier enlargement of the nation's religious identity (which, too, continues to have those prepared to challenge its validity) in a way that relocated Catholicism and Judaism from the periphery to the center and in so doing changed the heretofore hegemonic status of Protestantism, constitutes an empirically-grounded rebuttal of Huntington's central claim about the persistent hegemony of Anglo-Protestant culture, which, as Richard Alba (2010: 167) observes, "obliterates the contributions of Catholics and Jews to the mainstream cultural core."

Multiculturalism's critics are numerous, accusing its proponents of undermining national unity by advocating for the balkanization of contemporary social life in which peoples' identities are shaped solely by their ethnic attachments. Some have gone so far as to suggest that terrorist violence is the inevitable outcome of such a philosophy (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Even world leaders have registered their opinions. David Cameron, Angela Merkel, and Nicholas Sarkozy may not agree on many things, including how to save the eurozone, but they are on the same page when it comes to assessing multiculturalism. They deem it a failure that has produced alienation from national identity and thus has contributed to societal disunity. For their part, proponents have tended to make their case on behalf of multiculturalism by arguments that are either explicitly normative or implicitly infused with normative content, and in fairness to the critics have sometimes given short shrift to considerations of the significance of shared values at the national level. It is with this in mind that viewing multiculturalism as claims-making can help get past the polemics by offering a way of viewing the phenomenon sociologically—taking us beyond competing theoretical perspectives and ideologies.

As is evident from some of the examples cited above, what I am calling multiculturalism refers to a phenomenon that claims-makers may or may not have dubbed multiculturalism. They may have called it pluralism, or in some fashion made a case that what they were seeking involved what they understood to be fair terms of integration or, more simply, as an effort to protect something of value from one's ethnic heritage. Understood in this way, multiculturalism is not a new phenomenon, but rather can be found both in the past and the present—and, indeed, insofar as the Amish seem to factor into many discussions of multiculturalism, it can involve groups that arrived in the US prior to 1880. Immigrant groups are not the only claims-making ethnic groups. Indeed, countries where multiculturalism has become robust, with Canada being the leader in this regard, the drivers have been ethnonationalist groups such as the Quebecois and indigenes such as the First Nations peoples, with immigrants making less far-reaching claims (and, according to some politically-involved philosophers such as Will Kymlicka [1995], appropriately so). While in the US, American Indians are a parallel force to the First Nations peoples in Canada, the nation lacks a significant ethnonational minority. Instead, throughout its history, around 12 percent of its population has been composed of the offspring of slaves, the only non-voluntary migrant group in the nation. I note this because the position of immigrants has been shaped in significant ways by their relationship to

these other two minority groups that have been far more marginalized, and who, as a consequence, have made more radical or far-reaching demands than immigrants and their offspring, such as demands for land, reparations, and affirmative action programs. Put another way, the inclusion of immigrants, indigenous people, and national minorities is always intertwined, and since so much rides on the actions of the state, the particular dynamics of state/citizen and state/newcomer relations will also be influenced by the regime type of the state in question.

2.2 Diversity and integration in the Nordic social democracies

Using Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) well-known model of three different welfare regimes—liberal, corporatist-statist, and social democratic—the Nordic nations today are located very clearly in the social democratic camp. Indeed, they are general viewed as the paradigmatic examples of this particular regime. Borrowing from language introduced in the middle of the past century by T.H. Marshall, social democracy is predicated on the idea of social rights—in addition, of course, to civic and political rights—as universal entitlements accruing to all citizens of the nation. Thus, a range of robust social protections and services have been put in place, including pensions, disability insurance, health care, public education, and so forth. Two features differentiate the social democratic model from the other two. First, its proponents were willing to engage in social engineering in order to insure that the levels of inequality that inevitably arise in capitalist market economies did not rise too high. Thus, social democratic societies valued social equality more highly than other regime-type countries (Kurunmäki 2010; Sørensen and Stråth 1997).

Second, the Nordic countries were leaders in promoting gender equality. This included legislation offering what to the rest of the world's wealthy nations is seen as very generous parental leave plans, coupled with efforts to overcome patterns of gender discrimination in the labor market. Beyond that, there has been a comparable commitment to insure that women and men are equally represented in political office. Despite the incursions of neoliberalism during the past two decades into the social democratic welfare state, there remains a broad consensus that the welfare state is worth preserving (Kivisto and Walhbeck 2013). Suspicious of ideologies of the unfettered capitalist market, citizens of these countries are not drawn to, borrowing the language of Margaret Somers (2008: 211), "romancing the market or reviling the state." In this connection, Janoski (2010: 188) has made the following relevant observation about the general approach of social democratic nations to diversity, "The major difference between Nordic countries and the rest of Europe is the rise of Social Democratic Party power. The role of left parties is well known in welfare state literature. But left parties have also played a role in more open asylum and naturalization policies, and more intensive integration and multicultural programs."

It is within the context of the Nordic social democratic welfare states that the state and civil societies address the cultural and economic challenges confronting minority groups. This includes new manifestations of diversity arising because of the growing number of labor migrants and refugees arriving from a wide array of nations around the world. For Finland, Norway, and Sweden it also involves the indigenous Sámi people. Finally, it involves the persistent marginalization of the Roma who have lived in these countries since the sixteenth century (as opposed to the recently arrived Roma from Eastern Europe). It is within the legal and cultural space created by this type of liberal democratic state that minority groups have and will in the future continue to make claims that are directed to the state, the court of public opinion, or both (Bay, Strömblad, and Bengtsson 2010).

The case studies that follow are intended to explore what is transpiring in these nations today. There is no attempt to offer a comprehensive portrait, for to do so would require a considerably longer volume or, to be more precise, volumes. They do, however, offer evidence of the crucial issues surrounding any effort at achieving solidarity while valorizing diversity. Despite the distinctive character of this group of nations predicated on a welfare state system that promotes an egalitarian capitalism instead of an unbridled neoliberal alternative, in many ways what is happening in these nations parallels what happens in other wealthy OECD countries. In part, this may be because there are sufficient shared features of all liberal democracies, regardless of the type of welfare regime that one can expect states to respond to the claims of minority groups in remarkably similar ways. In this regard, I noted that the discussion of claims-making earlier in this chapter was formulated with the United States specifically and the other settler nation, English-speaking democracies more broadly in mind. Nonetheless, it is the assumption here that this template of types of claims is applicable elsewhere—in all other liberal democracies. In these particular cases, it should be further noted that three of the four countries are members of the EU (the exception being Norway), with Finland being the only one that is also part of the Eurozone. It can be said that all four countries—Norway included—are embedded in various ways in the EU project, and with it the attendant collective problems, such as those that have arisen in the wake of the debt crisis in Greece, Portugal, and elsewhere.

Peter Kraus' chapter responds to this situation insofar as it represents an effort to place these nations into a larger Western European framework. He does so by exploring the complex character of peoplehood and national sovereignty, and the implications that competing images of peoplehood have on minorities old and new. Bringing the framework down a level to that of the Nordic world itself, Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermarck offers a comparative analysis of the laws and policies pertaining to minorities in the Nordic countries. In doing so, she points to the tension existing between the egalitarian goals of the respective welfare states, which she contends were formulated with an at least implicit notion of a basically homogeneous population and current calls to respond to the protection of cultural diversity. Or, in other words, the politics

of redistribution meets the politics of recognition. A parallel chapter insofar as it operates at a Nordic comparative level is that written by Birte Siim, who is concerned with the relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality. As noted above, the commitment to gender equality is a central element in the Nordic welfare regime, and the question that is raised in this chapter is one that feminists elsewhere have raised, namely, as Susan Okin (1999) posed it, "is multiculturalism bad for women?"

It is at the same time true that each nation will respond in its own way to these issues based on unique aspects of its history. This need not be seen as path dependence, but rather simply as an indication that the particularities of history and geography do matter. Two chapters in the collection concentrate on local distinctiveness in examining the Roma in both cases and the Sámi in one. Camilla Nordberg's chapter on the Nordic Roma has a primary focus on the Roma in Finland, but in so doing she offers as comparative references discussions of the Roma in both Norway and Sweden. Her study is predicated on the assumption that successful incorporation into the society must address the issue of citizenship. More specifically, it is intent on exploring whether or not the sort of citizenship on offer leaves the Roma existing as second class citizens, rather than as equals in a context where citizenship is conceived in a novel, multicultural way. In interviews with Roma leaders, she offers a sense of the sorts of claims-making coming from spokespersons as well as some of the reactions from the larger society.

Reetta Toivanen's complementary chapter is solely concerned with the Finnish case, but she investigates both the Roma and the Sámi. She contends that efforts to articulate policies that will lead to inclusion while preserving diversity are particularly difficult to accomplish in the Finnish context, due in large part to the ways that a consensus culture works against such a goal. Specifically, in the case of the Sámi she stresses that despite the fact that Finland has signed on to various international mandates to protect the cultures and life-worlds of indigenous peoples, the actions on the ground to date have been disappointing, with the result being that the cultural future of the Sámi is in doubt. The Roma, meanwhile, confront similar difficulties, but the situation regarding their culture, particularly their language, is made more complicated by the fact that it is a secret language and thus it may well be that the state can only play a minimal role responding to this specific claim for language preservation. But Toivanen thinks the real issue for the Roma continues to be economic marginalization, and she concludes that despite various policy initiatives, they remain an underclass.

Two chapters are concerned with the topic of immigration. Niko Pyrhönen, Karin Creutz, and Marjukka Wiede have undertaken a content analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration legislation and the public discussions before, during, and afterwards, making use of editorials, letters to the editor, and discussion forums appearing under the auspices of the *Helsingin Sanomat*, Finland's newspaper of record. In part, the legislative actions leading to the passage of the Aliens Act of 2004 was prompted by the necessity of harmonizing national laws with the general

framework mandated by the EU. A recurring theme, particularly among the public at large, was an expression of concern about the future of national identity, with both explicit and implicit fears raised about the threat immigrants posed to national solidarity. This would seem to be precisely the type of public attitude that contributes to anti-immigrant political posturing, but the authors note that over time—in part due to the role of the media in fostering more tolerant, cosmopolitan attitudes—more accepting views were in evidence while there was a corresponding decline in xenophobia.

Whereas this chapter looks at the context of reception, Niklas Wilhelmsson examines the immigrants themselves. He is interested in knowing about their involvements in civil society and in the political system. He appropriately locates his analysis in terms of the larger context in many liberal democracies, wherein some contend that there has been an appreciable decline in civic life by long-time citizens. Using a social capital approach, Wilhelmsson seeks to determine if social networks that immigrants belong to have a positive impact on political and civic engagement. His findings confirm an argument that goes back to the Chicago School of Sociology, which is that involvement in an ethnic community's voluntary institutions, far from contributing to the isolation of newcomers from the societal mainstream, actually serves as a conduit for entry into that mainstream.

If there is one thing that is certain it is that our current state of knowledge concerning the inclusion of minorities in these four countries is limited, and this despite the fact that considerable research has been done in all of them. Moreover, events can quickly upset what might be thought of as trends. The global recession of 2008, which proved to be much deeper than was anticipated, the subsequent threat to the Euro, the growth in influence of various right-wing populist parties, and a level of uncertainty about the future of the EU were not on the table when scholars began to seriously think about these countries as potentially multicultural societies and as nations of immigrants. The rosier prognostications of the turn of the century have given way to growing levels of unease, including unease about what minorities mean for national identity. Things can change very quickly. Thomas Janoski (2010: 218), for example, looking only at one of these nations could write in a very recent book that, "The Finns do not have high immigration to protest against, so there is no need for an anti-immigrant party." Yet a year after the book appeared in print, the Finnish election on April 17, 2011 resulted in the anti-immigrant and anti-EU True Finns winning 19 percent of the vote, up from a mere 4 percent in the previous election.

In terms of the old minorities, the dynamics of minority/majority relations have evolved over an extended period of time, and as the two articles in this collection detail, the picture for both groups is complex, and it is difficult to decide if the glass is half empty or half full. In the case of the Sámi, the first elective assembly was created in Finland 1975 and shortly thereafter in both Norway and Sweden. At both the national and international levels, legislation was passed near the end of the past century that permitted the Sámi language to be used as the official language of

government in a select number of municipalities. And by 2002 a cross-border Sámi Parliamentary Assembly was in place. However, conflict persists over competing ideas regarding economic development in Lapland, particularly over whether or not to expand extractive industries, which the Sámi quite rightly see as a threat to their livelihoods. Meanwhile, as increasing numbers of young Sámi head to the urban centers in the southern parts of these countries, particularly the capital conurbations of Helsinki, Oslo, and Stockholm, it becomes an open question about whether or not the culture can survive into the future.

The Roma face a somewhat different challenge. They constitute an example of what sociologist Georg Simmel (2011 [1908]: 119) called the stranger, which he characterized as the person “who comes today and stays tomorrow,” which is to say that they live among the majority population, but are perceived to be and are thus treated as perpetual outsiders. Negative stereotypes, discrimination, and exclusion are deeply rooted throughout Europe, and though the situation of the Roma in the Nordic countries is without question considerably better than it is in Eastern Europe and many places in Western Europe, nonetheless it cannot be said that the Roma have achieved anything resembling full citizenship. It should also be noted that relatively little research on the internal dynamics and social transformations within the Nordic Roma communities has been done, this lack of knowledge further contributing to viewing them as the stranger.

Turning to the matter of refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sweden not only takes in the largest number of refugees compared to its Nordic counterparts, but its refugee population as a percentage of the total national population is the highest. There is one refugee in the country for every 107 Swedes. Norway is closest to Sweden, with a comparable figure of one refugee for every 119 Norwegians. In contrast, there is only one refugee for every 582 Finns and one for every 5,504 Icelanders. Many refugees in these countries constitute what the Canadians refer to as “visible minorities,” people who are racially and/or religiously distinctive. Thus, although their numbers are low, they are often the objects of various types of racist abuse and ostracism. While the largest migrant groups often blend in quite readily, (such as Finns in Sweden and Estonians in Finland), the relatively small number of visible refugees comes to represent in the public’s mind the “immigrant problem.”

Labor migration has recently become a topic of considerable concern in policy circles. From the 1970s, Sweden differed from its neighbors insofar as it received substantial numbers of labor migrants. By far the largest component of that migration came from Finland, with over 400,000 Finns finding work, particularly in the construction and manufacturing sectors. When their numbers proved insufficient, Sweden recruited workers from Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The other three countries received only small numbers of labor migrants, with Finland standing out in particular for its low numbers since it remained until the 1990s a nation of emigration

rather than one of immigration. Immigration flows were primarily humanitarian rather than work-related (Friberg and Eldring 2013).

With the two waves of EU expansion eastward, in 2004 and 2007, and with the ability of new EU citizens to move freely in the member states, the number of Eastern Europeans entering the Nordic countries increased. By far the largest sending nation is Poland, but it includes the three Baltic states as well as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The typical Eastern European migrant is a somewhat older male without university training, but often with vocational training. They have found employment in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and the service sector—these trends being most pronounced in Norway. It is estimated that more than 330,000 Eastern Europeans moved to one or another of the Nordic countries between 2004 and 2011, a figure that rises as high as 600,000 when factoring in temporary workers (Friberg and Eldring 2013; Friberg, Arnholtz, Eldring, Hansen, and Thorains 2014). Given how recently this development has occurred, it is not surprising that policy initiatives are in a somewhat fluid state.

The extent to which the Nordic countries will have to rely on migrant labor in the future is an open question. However, there is good reason to assume that the need will increase over time. The birth rates in all of the Nordic countries are below zero population growth (2.1 is the standard figure used for population replacement at existing levels), though in all instances higher than the EU-28 average of 1.58. Denmark currently has the lowest rate of the four nations at 1.73, while Sweden has the highest at 1.91. These rates are not as problematic as they are in several other Western European nations, but there are economic implications that will need to be addressed. Though some quarters of the environmental movement might find a decrease in population salutatory because it would mean less pollution, less of a drain on natural resources, less crowding, and so forth, it would also mean that labor shortages would have to be met by economic constriction. What about policies designed to increase the national birth rate as a way of addressing labor shortages? In instances where such efforts have been undertaken, they have been shaped by a rather unattractive ethnocentric nationalism, often with a heavy dose of racism. And one only has to look eastward to Russia to be reminded that such efforts have seldom if ever been successful. Reduced birth rates in the world's wealthy nations have become by now a well-established pattern, and it is not likely to change anytime soon.

Pragmatic policy makers, for good reason, are concentrating on the idea of increasing immigration levels in at least a modest way as a means of addressing existing and impending labor shortages. And in this regard, though opposition to increasing levels of immigration has increased since 2008, in general the Nordic publics are more open to the idea that immigration is necessary than is true in a number of other Western European nations. Though the success of right-wing populism is sometimes linked to fears about economic competition for scarce jobs between the native-born and immigrants, in fact recent research findings reveal that

cultural fears about national identity are a far more salient contributing factor to anti-immigrant sentiment and support for right-wing parties (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012).

This is the context in which the politics of multiculturalism plays out. Although the metrics used to determine the levels of commitment to multiculturalism vary, the virtue of Banting and Kymlicka's MPI is that it provides measures for policies regarding immigrants, indigenous peoples, and national minorities. For immigrants, 8 policies are considered. Sweden ranks highest among this quartet with 7 out of 8 policies in place, followed closely by Finland with 6. At the other end of the spectrum, Norway only has 3.5 and Denmark's score, reflecting the impact of the anti-immigration platform of the People's Party, is 0. On the other hand, in terms of indigenous people, of the 9 policies that make up this category, Denmark ranks highest, with 7 out of 9. Norway is second with 5 of 9, followed by Finland with a score of 4, and Sweden is at the bottom with a score of 3. In the case of national minorities, only Finland, with its Swedish-language minority, is represented. With a potential score of 6—which is earned by Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom—Finland's score is 4.5. How exactly these results ought to be interpreted is open to debate. The case studies contained in the following chapters can assist in that interpretive task.

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