## Contents

Francesco F. Calemi  
**Introduction** — 1

Matthew Tugby  
**Mirage Realism Revisited** — 13  
1 Introduction — 13  
2 The one over many problem — 14  
3 Devitt’s charge of mirage realism — 15  
4 The one over many problem and Armstrong’s world of states of affairs — 17  
5 Instantiation as partial identity — 22  
6 The one over many problem and the Platonic view of universals — 24

Francesco F. Calemi  
**Ostrich Nominalism or Ostrich Platonism?** — 31  
1 What is it like to be an ostrich? — 31  
2 The argument from gross facts — 31  
3 The harlot argument — 36  
4 The truthmaker argument — 39  
5 Sketch for a Platonic theory of predication — 42  
6 Concluding remarks — 47

Peter van Inwagen  
**In Defense of Transcendent Universals** — 51  
1 Armstrong’s ontological method — 51  
2 Armstrong’s primary critique of transcendent realism — 56  
3 A reply to the primary critique — 60  
4 “How can distinct particulars have the same properties?” — 64  
5 Arguments, not explanations — 68

Peter Simons  
**Armstrong and Tropes** — 71  
1 Universals and tropes — 72  
2 Tropes and substances — 73  
3 Armstrong’s objections to trope nominalism — 74
Answers to the objections — 76
Some advantages of trope nominalism — 78
Remaining problems for the trope nominalist — 80
Conclusion — 82

Anna-Sofia Maurin
Tropes: For and Against — 85
1 Introduction — 85
2 Tropes and the one over many — 86
3 Armstrong on what is the ‘best’ version of the trope view — 88
4 Armstrong on why there are no tropes — 92
5 Piling, swapping, and ‘Hochberg’s argument’ — 93
6 Laws of nature and resemblance — 96

William F. Vallicella
Facts: An Essay in Aporetics — 105
1 Introduction — 105
2 Facts as contingently existing concreta — 106
3 The truth-maker argument for facts — 108
4 Butchvarov’s objections to realism about facts — 110
4.1 An argument from imperceivability — 110
4.2 An argument from impossibility of reference — 112
4.3 The Paradox of the Horse and the Paradox of Snow — 113
5 Problems with the concretist conception of facts — 115
5.1 The collision of the compositional and necessitarian models — 115
5.2 Problems with the compositionalist model — 118
5.3 Necessitarianism and the collapse of Armstrong’s fact ontology — 120
6 Facts as abstract objects: Reinhardt Grossmann — 126
6.1 The localization argument against concrete facts — 127
6.2 The ‘bare particular’ objection to abstract facts — 128
7 Concluding aporetic postscript — 129

Javier Cumpa
Armstrong’s Hidden Substantialism — 133
1 Introduction: Is Factualism a Truth of Armstrong’s Ontology? — 133
2 States of affairs and the problem of universals — 134
3 States of affairs and the problem of truth — 135
4 The categorial clash between factualism and the victory of particularity — 136
Kristie Miller

**Persisting Particulars and their Properties — 139**

1. Introduction — 139
2. Transdurantism — 141
3. Objects as property bundles — 142
4. Objects as substrata with properties — 149
5. Location relations — 153
6. Explanation and identity — 157

Stephen Mumford

**Armstrong on Dispositions and Laws of Nature — 161**

1. Dispositions, ontologically speaking — 161
2. Was Armstrong’s account sufficiently realist? — 162
3. Powers, actualism and degrees of being — 164
4. Potency and act — 167
5. Laws to the rescue? — 168
6. Tendencies — 170
7. Conclusion — 173

Andrea Borghini

**Recombination for Combinatorialists — 177**

1. Introduction — 177
2. Constituents of states of affairs — 179
3. Recombination for combinatorialists — 182
4. Rebutting the trickle-down objection — 186
5. Rebutting the objection from alien possibilities — 188
6. Conclusions — 190

Michele Paolini Paoletti

**Who’s Afraid of Non-Existent Manifestations? — 193**

1. Introduction — 193
2. The argument — 194
3. Armstrong vs. powers — 197
4. Getting rid of non-existent manifestations — 200
5. Some miscellaneous concerns about Meinongianism — 204
Tuomas E. Tahko

**Armstrong on Truthmaking and Realism — 207**
1. Introduction — 207
2. Truthmaking and realism — 209
3. Truthmaking as ontologically neutral — 211
4. Realism can stand on its own — 214

D. H. Mellor

**From Translations to Truthmakers — 219**
1. Translations — 219
2. Truth conditions — 220
3. Dispositions — 222
4. Truthmakers — 223
5. Functionalism — 225
6. Physicalism — 227
7. Beliefs and desires — 228

Francesco Orilia

**Armstrong’s Supervenience and Ontological Dependence — 233**
1. Introduction — 233
2. The basics of Armstrong’s ontology — 235
3. The no distinctness proposal — 236
4. Supervenience and ontological dependence — 238
5. Supervenience as neither sufficient nor necessary for ontological dependence — 239
6. Cases of asymmetric supervenience — 241
7. Cases of symmetric supervenience — 244
8. Instantiation and Bradley’s regress — 247

Paolo Valore

**Naturalism as a Background Metaphysics — 253**
1. Understanding Armstrong’s naturalistic position — 254
2. The under-determination of the thesis — 255
3. The negative content — 255
4. The positive content — 256
5. Is the a priori back? — 257

**Index — 261**