Conceptualizing Capitalist Globalization

The philosophical theory of globalization is predominantly comprised of a critique of modern globalization, which is based on a theory of equal distribution of goods and guided by universal ethical principles. I argue that philosophical ethics cannot approach the problem in a different way, because of a lacking concept of society. The lack of a theory of society necessitates arguing with universal principles: philosophers focus on poverty and suffering as such, rather than on poverty and suffering generated by the process of globalization. From the perspective of Marx’s critique of political economy, the empirical perception of human society leads to a mystified and overly simplistic analysis of social interaction. This means that only a conceptual theory of society can reveal the hidden relationship between economical categories. It thereby enables a more complex and adequate critique of globalization than the positivistic theory and its solution to the problems provided by philosophical ethics. Based on a theory of capitalist society, the universalist promises of philosophy will not simply be criticized as illusions, but are recognized as realistic opportunities based on cooperative productive capacities to be liberated from their current alienated forms. Thus, globalization ultimately—in its alienated form—generates the basis for the universal principles that are used by philosophy for its critique of globalization.


Introduction
Globalization and its scientific explanation are relevant todayn ot onlyt heoretically. Regarding the enduringg lobal crisiss ince the 1970sa nd the continuing, immeasurable poverty,i ti sa lso important (for political reasons) to clarify what globalization is and to what extent it is the cause of these phenomena. Facing these challenges, aconcept of globalization is ascientific necessity and it is reasonable to place this inquiry within philosophy.
However,inphilosophy, approaches to globalization are formulated primarilyf rom the point of view of ethics. The existing philosophical theory of globalization predominantlyc onsists of ac ritique of modern globalization, which is based on atheory of equal distribution of goods and guided by universal ethical principles. Aboveall, it is practical philosophythatr esponds to the phenomena of globalization and is guidedbythe following principle: an economic and technical globalization needs to be regulatedp olitically and should be guided towards ac ivilized and environmentallyf riendlyc oexistence (Niederberger/ Schink2 011,p. 144). ForN iederbergera nd Schink, the main hurdle in the realization of this goal appears to be the lack of ag lobal society'si dentity,c aused by the non-simultaneity of global development. Nevertheless, philosophersi nsist that the aforementioned problems and the lack of ac ommon value system could be compensated for by philosophy, with its claim of universalreason (Figueroa 2004,p .3 46;R eeder 2009,p .15).
Accordingly, globalization is primarilyproblematized from the perspective of ethics, as justicep roblems cannot be solvedd ue to the lack of institutionalization of the global arena (Hahn 2009,p .1 6)-or solutions would fail because of the subjects' unwillingness to help (Singer 2007). All attemptst oe stablish reason as the foundation of ag lobalo rder,a sw ell as the different proposals to limit global poverty,h aveh ad onlyl imited effects in the past.T his leads to the question of whythe variety of philosophical responses to the multiple crises of the global order has been so unsuccessful.

Philosophy and globalization
Philosophers referringtoglobalization tend to uphold moral-philosophical positions, rather than developing an appropriate concept of globalization. Globalization is not analyzed in its totality;instead, individual sides of it are taken as isolated, presupposed and accepted as given.
As the reference to globalization appears to be made by acknowledging the discrepancy between philosophical ideas and the factual, rather than by ac onceptual theory of globalization, philosophical theory of globalization usually starts with acommonsense definition,instead of developing aconcept of globalization. That definition'sorigin is oftentrapped in everydayexperiences.The solutions thus remain on ageneral level. It is merelysuggested that "apolitical regulatory competence must regain the globalm arkets",w ith the aim of "the cooperation of political regimes and anew form of integration of cosmopolitan solidarity" (Habermas 1998, p. 79).¹ But on this general level, the historicalspecificity of the capitalist eradisappears. The lack of impact of philosophical reflections on globalization seems to be aresult of this superficial approach, which relies on mere juxtaposition of reg-ulatory principles. Even critics of individualized concepts of justicecontributeto af urther individualization by meanso ft heir counter-argument of the overburdening of the individual, and thus to the lack of success in limiting world poverty.I no rder to avoid these shortcomings, it is necessary to clarify the constitutional principles and thus the genesis of the social formation called globalization instead of arbitrarilyp resupposingt hem.
If globalization is taken onlya sa ne xternal reason to arguea bout general issues of justicea nd morality,t he results will remain deficient,a sw illb e shown below.The self-imageofpolitical philosophyasa'theory of global distributive justice' is alreadysymptomatic of this (Kersting 1998, p. 11). The ethical reflections associatedw ith it remain on ag eneral level and they are centered on the question of the responsibilityo ft he richer towards the poor in the world (Beck 2016,p .1 4). Considering that one third of all annual deaths are caused by poverty (i. e. by alack of disposition of essential commodities), it seems "important to changet he social structures that influencet he distribution of such goods" (Beck 2016,p .1 4). Valentin Beck insists that the responsibility for this lies not least in the mutual economic and ecological dependency duet oglobalization (Beck 2016,p .15).
However,the meaning of globalization beyond this interdependence remains remarkablyi mprecise, and something which calls for debate. Multiple attempts are oscillating around the phenomenon of "an intensification of global social relations, connectingd istantp laces in such aw ay that events at one place are shaped by events taking place at ad istance of manyk ilometers and vice versa" (Giddens 1995,p .8 5). There is al ack of orientation among academicsoften openlya dmitted-"which expresses itself in the feeling thats ystematic knowledge about the organization of society is not available" (Giddens 1995, p. 10). The point of intervention of philosophicale thics consists in the proposal of organizingt he existingp rocesses 'abovea ll equitably' (Lenk /Maring 2007, p. 16). In this discussion, globalization is what Osterhammel and Petterson call onlyt he 'name of an epoch'.This name is based on the direct experiences of the people, in order to articulate easilycomprehensible everydayexperiences as well as complex interdependencies of globale conomic relationships (Osterhammel /P etterson 2004,p p. 7-8). The attractiveness of the concept of globalization for philosophyseems to be explainedinthis abstractness, since the questions of classical theories of justiceo rp olitical philosophyc ould be transferred to the level of international politics. One can find this exemplified in the essayby Julia Nida-Rümelin and Martin Reichenauer on international justice(Nida-Rümelin /R eichenauer 2009,p p. 302,310). Instead of ac onceptual reconstruction of what is called globalization, the focus is on the experience of borderless eco-nomics, politics, ecology,technologyorculturalconflicts, to transfer theirown or traditionalp hilosophical constructions to an international level.
This abstract-empirical version of ac oncept of globalization is problematic, because in it,a ccording to Hegel, thinking "is satisfied with characteristics, i. e. determinations in which the essentiality [Wesentlichkeit]² is indifferent to the object itself [Gegenstand]and which, on the contrary,has the onlypurpose of being amark for external reflection" (HW 6/516). At this level of empirical methodology,there exists "no othercriterion [for the generality[Allgemeinheit]] than the existence[ Dasein]i tself" (HW 6/515). This is particularlyp roblematic because the being [Dasein]o fa no bject [Gegenstand]l ike globalization does not expose in anyw ay its essentialp urpose, which lies in the social nexus.T his results in the abovementioned individualization and moralization of social contradictions, and culminatesi n" the unsolvedq uestion of what the more fortunate owe to people in extreme poverty" (Beck 2016,p .15).
This question is symptomatic for the world poverty debate that has been going on since the 1970s. It is based on empirical findings, such as the observation of an 'insurmountable gap' between the living conditionsofthe richest and poorest countries in the world (Birnbacher 2007,p.131), often taken into consideration when scholars try to justifyethical aid commitments through moral-philosophical constructions.
This can be illustratedbyanarticle by Peter Singer,who openedthis debate. It begins with the words: "While Ia mwriting this,i nN ovember 1971,people in East Bengal are dying because of the lack of food, shelter and medicalc are" (Singer 2007,p .3 7) But shortlya fterwards, he relativizes the example of Bengal in order to emphasize that sufferingi ng eneral causedb yp overty should be avoided: "Ib egin with the assumption thats ufferinga nd death due to lack of food, homelessness or the lack of medicalc are are bad" (Singer 2007,p .3 9). In this way, the individual case serves onlyasanillustration of the general principle thatsuffering should be avoided; and this task should be the responsibility of the better-off, i. e., the 'western' world. This principle is then explained from a moral point of view by the example of ac hild who is in danger of drowning (Singer 2007,p .3 9). An umber of other arguments subsequentlyf ormulate the moral principle that anyone who can help is obliged to help, i. e., to donate money to fight world poverty (Singer2 007, p. 50). As ar esult, the problem of world poverty is faced with superficial moral-philosophicals peculation and a posterior regulation of unenlightened problems is claimed. There is neither ase- Italicized terms enclosed in squareb rackets […]r efer to specific German (in the majority of cases,H egelian or Marxian) concepts of philosophy, which ared ifficultt ot ranslate. rious reflection on the social nexus that causesthese conflicts, nor an analysis of the social relationships that are intensifying these tensions. The debate also fails to outline the differenceb etween sufferinga ss uch and suffering in capitalism.
By considering these historical and concrete problems as individuation [Besonderung]o fageneral, timeless problem (poverty),o nlya bstract solutions remain, such as the requirement of equal opportunities on the basis of human rights (Kesselring 2003,pp. 25,51-52). The starting point is indeedthe everyday experience of the complex globals tructure of suffering and misery-but the described version of the problem leads to rather ahistorical expression of it,i n which the specific nature of the present situation (and with it its own origin) is obscured. In this way, the philosophical approach to globalization tends towards ideology. In view of the highlighted shortcomings, the question arises of how to movefrom an empirical approach to ascientific concept of globalization, avoiding the aforementioned problems.
Abovea ll, the main challengea rises from the fact that philosophyoperates without atheory of the society that generated globalization in the first place: the capitalist society.One of the authors who developed ac onceptual theory of the capitalist society was Karl Marx. Based on the perspective of Marx'sc ritique of the political economy, the following section attempts to show how to avoid turning philosophical considerations of globalization into abstract ethical and moral reflections.Central to this are the remarks on the constitution of objects through social praxis, which are developed in the 'Capital' and in the Grundrisse. On the basis of this concept,s ocial forms resultf rom the unconscious socialization of work or social praxis. In this way, globalization can be addressed as af orm that mediates the contradictions of the social nexus.T hereby,t he production of globalr elations becomes the focus of the analysis.This demands as cientific analysis of globalization capable of reproducing in theory the social nexus as a mental reproduction of the object which constitutes the form of globalization. This approach is the epistemological consequenceofMarx'sc ritique of political economyasatheory of distribution. It can be stated that the division of the distributional sphere from the production sphere in capitalist society is symptomaticallyexpressedinacriticism based on distributive justice. Thus, onlythe wayof exchangingproducts is considered an issue thatappears as changeable. The distribution of the meansofproduction is ignored in this context,leadingtothe result that "history is banished into the field of distribution" (MEW 42,p .3 2).
The debate on global justice, the attemptsa tauniversalist justification of ethical principles and the explicationo ft he morallys candalousn ature of the current world situation should not be underestimated-but the debate can be criticized by pointing out am ethodological error thate xplains the ineffectiveness of its arguments against factual problems. It does not suffice to confront the worldwith external moral principles (such as in Singer 2007,p.39); rather,it is necessary to explain the inevitability of the world'sd ilemma from its own principles (MEW 1, p. 344). Contrary to the ethical and moral approaches towards globalization by philosophers, it shalln ow be shown thatp hilosophy can contributet oaphilosophicallyr eflected conceptualization of globalization in the context of acomprehensive theory of society,whose goal is the enlightenment of its unconscious preconditions (Stapelfeldt2 004,p .1 4-15).

Approaches to am aterialist theoryo fg lobalization
As ystematic theory of capitalist production, which goes beyond the unconsciouslyp resupposed categorieso fp olitical economya nd on which more concreteforms of the capitalist mode of production such as globalization can be determined, can be built upon the analyses of Marx's Capital. An umber of works alreadye xist (Sandleben 2003;S ilver2 005;H arvey 2001t hat can servea sas tarting point for ac ritical theory of globalization. BeverlySilver (2005) analyzes globalization in terms of the contradiction between capital and labor.The contradiction between the efforts of capital to reducelabor costs on the one hand,and the struggle of workers for adecent standard of living on the other,w ould forcec apital to constantlym igrate and reorganize production sites all over the world, in order to remain profitable or maximize profits.Using the textile and automotive industries,s he showed that shifts of capital are ar eaction to the crisis-ridden relationship between capital and labor,b ut that the conditionsf or the emergenceo fc rises are reproduced along with the movements expectedt os olve them. Capital is thereforef orced to move restlesslya round the globe. Fort his reason, Silverc an analyze globalization as aform of the generalization of the fundamental contradiction between capital and labor.
David Harvey starts with the reproduction process of capital to show how the crisis processeso ft he capitalist economyc onstitutet he global space that is experienced as globalization (Harvey 2005). Harvey adopts Marx'sconcept of fixed capital to analyze the economic processes that are mediated by abuilt infrastructure. The category of fixed capital thereby becomes the pivotal point in the analysis of global time and space by using the two meanings of 'fixing something'. On the one hand, capital is tied up for ac ertain time at ac ertain location on which the global space has its bases; and on the other hand, economic crises are fixed in the short term through relocation of capital.
Günther Sandleben (2003) usesthese categories for the analysis of statehood and international relations. He criticizes the widespread perception of globalization, according to which ahighlymobile financial capital on the basisofderegulated financial markets would provoke crises in asupposedlysmoothly operating real economy ( Sandleben 2003,p.18-19). In contrast,S andleben demonstrates that globalization consists of the expanding and limiting processes of at otal capital. In both the commonsense and the macroeconomics analyses,t he concept of total capital is not present,but rather appears as the economyofapeople'sn ation. These totalc apitals as entities of closest economic interdependencies are commonlyperceivedasregional units (like the RheinischerKapitalismus) or states ( Sandleben 2003,p p. 73 -74,110).
As total capital itself is an on-political, functional-economic entity,a ccording to Sandleben,societal questions are being detached from their economic origin and the states are therefore "continuingthe work of their correspondingtotal capital with other,now political methods" (Sandleben2003,p.129).Inthis analysis,S andleben somehowf ollows Poulantzas'sc ritique of the 'thingification' [Verdinglichung]o ft he state,b yr ecallinga nd reproducing mentally the materialized social struggles that are mediated within the state and the state apparatuses. The problem is that,onthe social surface, this mediation [Vermittlung]appears immediate [unvermittelt]i nt he state as an everlasting thing [Ding]. Transferred to the nexus of total capital and state, the total capital as afunctional economic unit could not exist without separating the political momentumi n the form of as tate and the establishment of borders,whereby the states-independentlyb ut not self-sufficiently-nevertheless remain bound to the movements and struggles within totalcapital. He argues that atheory of financial capital, which in one form or another still forms the basis of globalization theory, leads to misconceptions about the significanceo fp olitical action and the state as an autonomous, self-sufficient actor.The inaccuracy of globalization theory is to presuppose aconstant 'urge to expand' of the states,aswell as the contrary-an external pressureo nt hem-without linking it to the immanent movements thata re produced by the underlying total capitals. Politics is therefore not a "freelym anageable instrument […]a gainst the forces of economic globalization […,but determinated and defined in last instance] by the content of the economyitself" (Sandleben 2003,p.130). Thus, a 'globalization trap' of the state is doubtful-as is currentlyb ecominga pparent from the return of protectionist policies.
What characterizes all of these approaches is thatt hey tracet he wayoft he social constitution of what is experienceda sglobalization. In this way, they are guided by Marx'su nderstanding of science, "to develop from the actual social relations the corresponding celestialized forms of thoser elations" (MEW 23, p. 393). By reconstructing this production basedonatheory of capital, it is possible to differentiatebetween the manifestations [Erscheinungsformen]that determine everydaye xperience (such as the compressiono ft ime and space, or the continuous transformation of the social environment) and their underlying nature [Wesen].

Towards ap hilosophical concept of globalization
In order to transcend the sheer appearance of an object,like the state or globalization, as ystematic conceptualizationi sr equired. Accordingt ot his, it is clear that in the predominant empirical comparison of externala ttributes, the social context in which globalization is located remains obscured. So globalization appears as an external threat,just like an atural disaster that has little to do with human activity and whose destructive forces people try to regulate afterwards. The feeling of beinga tt he mercyo fn aturalized societal conditionsi sr eflected in al anguage, which develops its terms in analogyt on atural disasters (such as the uncontrollable stock market climate, different waveso fg lobalization, or that globalization is unstoppable likeatsunami) to describethe current situation of the global social nexus.
The process of inversion taking place here is thatglobalization does not producethese contradictions and crisis tendencies of the social metabolism, but (in order to modify ar emark made by Marx about money) the contradictions of the capitalist accumulation processa re appearinga sg lobalization and giving it an allegedlyt ranscendental power (MEW 42,p .8 1). It almost seems that the term globalization is actuallyu sed to avoid naming the real problem: capitalism.
So how can thinkinga pproach reality in such aw ay that the concepts approximatelyr eflect it?T his can be realized by reproducingt he production process of these social forms in thought as arehearsal [Probehandeln], which means amental reproduction of the vanished constitution process of the object.According to this interpretation, the conditions of the possibility of current globalization and world poverty are basedo naspecific social praxis: the accumulation of capital. Globalizationa nd the categories of political economyt herefore exist onlyi naspecific dependency on each other.They are an unconscious "product of the human hand" (MEW 23,p.86) as an expression of ahistoricallyspecified social praxis. Globalization in this wayr efers to an unconscious social nexus that could be named the capitalistm ode of production. In this approach, it is necessary to intervene consciouslyt oi lluminatet he necessity [Notwendigkeit] of the determinate being [Dasein]o ft he actual form of globals ocial relations.
Through this illumination of the genesis of the determinateb eing,i ti sp ossible to reveal the pointsa tw hich social changec an be initiated (MEW 42,p .3 73).
As an example of this approach, one can consider the still controversial (see Beck 2016,p .2 8 -29) postulation of Singer that we are obliged not to spend money on trivialities, but to donate it in order to limit poverty (Singer 2007,e specially p. 43,49). This statement summarizes the central attributes of globalization: locating actions on the worldhorizon, an intensification of social relations and the tendencyofs pacea nd time disappearance in money as immediate aid. The object that mediates this process is money.Onthe level of the social surface, it seems obvious thatm onetary aid could solve the problem of world poverty. Givent he current form of social relations,m oney solvest he problem of world poverty in the form of hunger by interactingw ith commodities thatc an serve as food.H owever,t his is af etishized form of reflectingt he social conditions. In this way, the essence of social relationship appears in am ystified form. The stages of the processt hat obscures the relations of this essence [Wesensverhältnisse]can be revealed using the conceptsofreification [Versachlichung]and thingification[ Verdinglichung], as elaboratedb yT airako Tomonagao nt he basis of Marx.³ Reification [Versachlichung]m eans that the social relations of persons to each othera re expressed in the social relations of objects [Sachen]t oeach other (Tomonaga1 987, p. 111). This is evident in the category of globalization as such, insofara si ti sa lways mediated by objects; the intensification of social relations is mediated through global goods and financial flows, through transport and communication. In globalization, these relations of objectsare obvious, insofar as the compression of time and spaceisalways mediated objectively [sachlich], i. e., materially. In order to remain in the generalized picture of the world'sp overty debate, the relationship between af ortunate person from the western world and ad eprivedp erson from the southern hemisphere appears in the form of ar atio of ac ertain amount of money to another and thereby de- Foraprecise understanding,i ti si mportant to familiarize oneself with and understand the differences between Marx'sc oncepts of thing[ Ding], object [Sache]a nd object as such [Gegenstand]. Object as such [Gegenstand]i sa no bject that is simplyp resent.Thing [Ding]a nd object [Sache]s ynthesize the forms in which an object as such [Gegenstand]a ppears.W hen Marx speaks of object [Sache], he means that the object as such acts in the context of amental reproduction of social relationships (MEW 23,. Marx speaks of the object as such as a thing [Ding], when the formerlypresent relationship of the object has disappeared and reappears as acharacteristicproperty of the thing itself. So, in the thing [Ding]the aspect of mediation or processing has disappeared or is obscured and the properties set by this process areclaimed by the object as its natural attributes (MEW 23,pp. 71-72, 86;Tomonaga1982, p. 72 and1984,p.94).

Conceptualizing CapitalistG lobalization
termines the degree of quantitative participationf rom social wealth in the form of commodities. In this common definition, globalization appears specificallyin the fact that monetary aid makes space and time disappear.M oney enables one to satisfy (almost) anyneed at (almost) anypoint in time and space, if the object of desire exists in the social form of acommodity.⁴ Starting from the generalized capitalist society,itbecomes apparent that in terms of satisfying needs, it is not the persons themselvesthat are related to each otherinasocial nexus,but products in the social form of commodities mediated by money.I no ther words: the processo fr eification [Versachlichung]i nherent in capitalist society transforms workingp roducts as things[ Dinge]i nto "independent entities in relation to each other and to the people" (MEW 23,p.86), and these things[Dinge] "become independent subjects who actively establish social relationships" (Tomonaga 1987, p. 111).
The first process of mystification is the process of reification [Versachlichung] described above, which turnsboth people and the things[Dinge]t hey have produced into objects [Sache]w ithin social relations.This is wheret he process of thingification [Verdinglichung]begins-where "the social relationships of objects to each other [are] turning into self-conversion, into real-object-related properties that are adhered to things[ Dinge]" (Tomonaga1 982, p. 112). In other words, things[Dinge]asproducts of human work merge with their economic form-determination.⁵ This processt ransforms the workingp roduct considered as useful into ac ommodity,w ith its supposed properties of use-value and exchange value expresseda sam oney-price. Accordingt oM arx,t he existenceo ft he money formo fa no bject is determined by the fact thati tm ediates in general the abstraction from the concrete use-values and organizes their reduction to abstract labor as avalue measurement.This means that the money form that is attachedtoaspecific object is set by the development of the contradiction between value and use-value. If this objectified relationship is generalized, as in the capitalist economy, it is constituted "as an object,becomes objectified by symboliz- The fact that the expropriation of the immediateproducersisaprecondition for this situation, and that this possibilityi ncludes the entireh istory of colonialism and imperialism,which had helped to release these 'eternal natural laws' of capitalist production (MEW2 3, pp. 787-788), is ignoredb yphilosophical debates about the necessity of financial aid.  Workingproducts arealso things, because as an existingobject the product vanishes its production process.How exactlyithas been produced by the unificationofworkand natureinthe workingprocess is obscured and extinguished in the manufactured product,inwhich natureis transformedi nto an intended useful object-except in the case of malfunction: then, "ab lunt knife or weakt hread forciblyr emind us of Mr.A ., the cutler,o rM r. B., the spinner." (MEW 23,p .197) ing itself in aspace-time sign" (Krahl 2008, p. 64). As aresult, the contradictions of the social nexus which produced the forms of value, commodity and money as forms in which these contradictions can move,a re obscured and mystified in money as at hing and its capacity as as avior on the globals cale.
The differenceb etween reification [Versachlichung]a nd thingification [Verdinglichung]i st herefore thati nt he latter,t he social definitiono ff orm is transformedi nto am aterial attribute of the thing.I no ur case, ap iece of metal,a paper note, or anyo ther commodity becomes the permanent form of money and has the quality to decide about the degree of participation from the already produced social wealth in the form of priced commodities.I nt his constellation, the existenceoftime and spacebecomes irrelevant when an amount of money is transferred from one person to another.M oney therefore is the materialized power of disposition over dead work, which is alreadypreserved in acommodity as the social form of the workingp roduct.What is striking here is that the attempt to overcome world poverty through monetary aid onlyoperates on the surface of society by reproducingt he objective forms of the capitalist economy.
How does this solution of monetary aid emerge?A tthe layerofappearance, it is assumedt hat therei sa nu nequald istribution of wealth, and that this unequal distribution is the essence of the appearingworld poverty.But in this perspective,i tr emains unconscious that the appearances on the social surface are mystified manifestations of essential social relationships. This leadst ot he fact that an adequate understandingo ft he social nexus is lacking,a nd so in (philosophical) attempts to globalization it remains unrecognized that the circulation of money in it "represents social relations of production, but in the form of anatural thing with certain attributes" (MEW 42,p .2 2.). Once exposed,i tb ecomes apparent that the solutions offered by philosophya re reproducing the underlying problem: the ownership structure of society and its accompanying forms. Moneyi sp erceiveda sanatural form of wealth-in other words, the specific character of bourgeois wealth and, accordingly, the exclusion from it,i sn ot understood at all. In particular,i tr emains unclear what the universal concept of sufferingand poverty actuallymean in relation to capitalism. Poverty and suffering in capitalisma re no abstract quantities or mere lack of money-they are a resulto ft he exclusion from ownership of means of production. That means that as long as the stated social nexus and the ownership structures exist,people will be controlled by the unconscious products of their social praxis, as well as its negative impacts. In consequence, globalization must be understood as aspecific manifestation of the capitalist worlde conomy-in Marx'sw ords, "as the theoretical expression of thosematerial relations which rule over them [the people]" (MEW 42,p.97). At this point,i ti se vident that the solutions produced by philosophyare insufficient,and thatthe criticism that Singer'spostulations "put unrealisticallyh ighe xpectations on the individual subjecto fr esponsibility" (Beck 2016,p .2 9) also does not address the real deficit of the argumentation.
Ac onceptual theory should thereforen ot simplyp resuppose globalization, but must analyze it as ap roduct of historical and specific conditions.I nt his sense, it does not need an external point of view from which globalization is considered destructive and dangerous,i no rder to oppose globalization with moral principles. Instead, in the above-mentioned mental reproduction of the systematic context,i nwhich the materialization of social relations emergesw ith all of its consequences and which is perceiveda sg lobalization, the critique is preserved in the representation of the systematic context,w hich is at the same time the critique of the matter itself (cf. MEW2 9, p. 550). The critique has been preserved by identifying the destructive forces and shortcomingsa sanecessity of the object itself. The principles for social changet herefored on ot need to be derivedf rom universalistic or moral principles, but result from the matter itself.

Systematic development of concepts in relationt oh istoricald evelopment
In globalization, the contradictions and crises of the capitalist mode of production are intensifyingonaglobal scale. Globalization is the materialized form in which the contemporary global contradictions of capitalist society are moving, such as the conflict between capital and labor.However,not onlythe destructive forces are shown in it,but also the tendencies which transcend the current form of society and the organization of the metabolism between human and nature.
As mentioned, it is problematic thatg lobalization in the philosophical debate is taken as an occasion to point out that aglobal horizon of reflection is increasinglyopening up. Moral and ethical obligations are then attachedtothese, and forms of political participation and supranational organizations are imagined. Ultimately, it is from this external referencet othe factual that the attempt of practical philosophyr esults to actively influencea nd shape globalization. However,s ince philosophyd oes not have ac oncept of social formation (cf. Lefèbvre 1969, pp. 74 -75), philosophersr emain bound to these antagonisms in their attemptst otake sides for certain tendencies.I nt he end, onlyt he distribution sphere appears to be changeable and addressable for historical progress or the overcomingofpoverty and suffering,because of the lack of understanding of what wealth in capitalist society means. Philosophical considerations in this way remain limited to as imple modification of the distribution of goods by state or ethical-moral coercion.
But,b ased on at heory of capital, an alternative space of global experience appears that transcends the present social conditions. If the utopian elements are limited to human rights, supranational organizations or the hopeso fauniversalist ethics, then an important area of social reality fades out of focus: production. Not onlyi np hilosophical reflection, but alsoa nd especiallyi nt he cooperative workflow,itispossible to generate political and social consciousness. In cooperation, accordingtoMarx, in "planned interaction with others, the individual overcomes [or better could overcome] his individual limitations and develops his general capabilities" (MEW 23,p.349). In the division of labor and cooperation, ag lobal horizon of reflection and action is thus also emerging,which Marx refers to within the concept of the 'collective worker'.Within capitalism, however,i ndividuals as laborers develop this competence onlye xternallyi nr elation to and through capital as a 'collective laborer'.But at the same time, it also reveals the utopianp ossibility of ac onscious socialization of the social nexus and the division of labor.
The antagonistic character of cooperation, in its twospheres of intra-company and societal division of labor,c onsists in the fact that,ont he one hand, the capitalist mode of production "does not appear to the individuals as theiro wn, united power,but as aforeign, external force" (MEW 3, p. 34). They onlyform the 'building block' of ac ombination of labor set by capital. On the other hand,the "forms of transition from capitalist mode of production to asocialized and associated mode of production" (MEW 25,p .4 56) become apparent in the form of stock corporations and cooperatives.
Even if the cooperative system alone is not capable of reshaping the globalized capitalist society,anew perspective of social transformation is emerging in this context: "the organizingi dea of an etwork of direct producers that anticipates the collective worker as the trulyo rganizings ubjecto fh istory" (Negt / Kluge 1974,p .2 1). Aprecondition for such ap roject,which could shape globalized human relations, is the understanding of the social nexus.This approach avoids the idea of as ociety that negates the existing destructive forces as being onlyv oluntarilyo pposed to the current one. Therefore, the phenomena, which are collected under the concept of globalization in the philosophicald ebate, should be conceptualized by their real nexus.For this approach, it is essential to develop as ocial philosophyt hat is able to analyze the appearing immediacy of social objects as mediated by revealing the vanished social relationships in these materialized formsofasocial nexus.F romamethodological point of view,this could be achievedb yt he previouslydevelopedc oncepts of reification [Versachlichung]a nd thingification [Verdinglichung], which are ca-