Constanze Demuth Liberalism ’ s All-inclusive Promise of Freedom and its Illiberal Effects : A Critique of the Concept of Globalization

The narrative of globalization is twofold: it refers to the hope for the export of democratic state forms and values from the Western world to the states of the so-called global south; it also refers to the aim of worldwide economic growth and extension of capitalist ways of production and consumption. But paradigmatic cases of action of democratic liberal states in international politics throw a twilight on this double hope. In certain cases, aggressive interventions of Western democratic states are legitimized using precisely the norms of non-intervention that claim universal validity, but turn out to follow an agenda of particular interests of economy and power. This article argues that these universal norms are not contingently transgressed, but in light of the second paradigm of globalization—of the economic spread of market relations—the process of self-constitution of democratic states here takes not a self-limiting, but an aggressive and exclusive turn. In addition, the so-called ‘new wars’ and ‘failed states’ (apparently opposing phenomena to the international agency of democratic and liberal Western states) show surprising parallels to late modern democratic liberal society. The ‘management of fear’ typical of these political situations aims at a regularization, through internalized habits and attitudes, of the population—including their agreement to the terror regime. In light of these considerations, the relationship between the aims of global growth and global democratization seems highly ambiguous. It is considered to be a distinguishing mark of modern and democratic societies that they limit the use of violence by the state as a means to enforce its authority. Deliberative processes, practices and institutions limit and control as self-government the exercise of the monopoly of power of the state. Thus, democratic government is a continuing self-constitution. Violence/power is used only as counter-violence outwards to defend against outer threats—a use that is in turn controlled by the governmental measuring of its proportionality. The narrative of globalization claims, on the one hand, the substitution of this dichotomy of outside and inside with an extension of the intrastate nonvioConstanze Demuth, Technische Universität Dresden (TUD) OpenAccess. © 2018 Constanze Demuth, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-006 Unauthenticated Download Date | 5/27/19 8:25 PM lent structures, resulting in an increasingly peaceful cooperation of democratic states. On the other hand, it also refers to the spread of capitalist forms of production to a ‘world market’ and the connected economic regulation of social order beyond the borders of nation states. This view is not without a teleology —in fact, it postulates a progress of the political structures of the world including the global south, directed towards peaceful and evermore rational forms of organization of capitalist democracies. Nevertheless, there are political phenomena which invite us to question this apparently evident narrative, especially in the periphery of the core states of democratic liberalism. They prove wrong the assumption that prosperity and democracy for all are the beckoning aim of the global integration of economies; as if the realization of this aim posed only minor applicatory problems,which could be easily overcome. For these cases show the acceptance and relevance of national borders diminishing without the expected result of peaceful cosmopolitism. Instead, relations of power spread, are restructured and newly established; the disadvantage of the global south deepened and not remedied. A sketch of a critique of theories of democratic peace In order to investigate this thesis further, let’s start with a critical look at the basic assumptions of the so-called ‘theory of democratic peace’ (Geis / Müller / Schörnig 2010). According to this theory, the liberal states have incorporated higher normative demands—specifically norms claiming universal validity— than undemocratic states. They internationally codified these norms, for instance in International Humanitarian Law. The theory of democratic peace doubles this observation with a hypothesis: that democratic states, with their ambitious ideals of human rights and universal values, fight fewer wars than undemocratic ones. Different authors, such as Yves Winter, Anna Geis, Oliver Eberl and others, have shown that this correlation doesn’t hold up to the test. In fact, democratic states fight fewer wars with other democratic states, but more wars with undemocratic ones, and in total about the same amount. In addition and maybe even more significantly, the standards of conduct of war of the former (for instance, with regard to the protection of civilians or of prisoners of war) are not higher; that is, the legal, respectively moral commitment to universal norms neither improves the quality nor the quantity of military conduct of democratic states. 64 Constanze Demuth Unauthenticated Download Date | 5/27/19 8:25 PM How can we account for the failure of this hypothesis? Without a doubt, principles that claim universal validity are the mirror of everyday life of the Western world, which incorporates the respect of the other as other into its practices. It is increasingly transformed into the political structures and institutions of liberal and democratic states. The codified and institutionalized ideal of the participation and respect of everybody, including the marginalized and minoritized, requires the ongoing democratic process of self-constitution of the community as community. This process takes place in practices of the deliberation and participation of potentially everybody. This normative commitment to processual allinclusion has, by definition, global applicability. Internationally, this claim finds its codification in the principle of non-intervention of International Humanitarian Law. But the normative level is not only (as theories of democratic peace claim) guiding for an increasing degree and extension of global democratization and peaceful cooperation. It is precisely the incorporation of universal claims that creates a new function of legitimatizing aggression against non-democratic states. Liberalism has an aggressive aspect that annuls precisely these standards, even while invoking them. Oliver Eberl even spots a ‘new liberal antipluralism’ (Eberl 2016, p. 364, my transl.). He considers it as a successor of Christianization and colonization. Internationally, the democratic practice of self-constitution is mediated by the construction of an image of the undemocratic other, irrational and dangerous. This construction works by the utilization and, at the same time, transgression of norms with universal claims (such as the abovementioned International Humanitarian Law of non-intervention). These are reformulated and transformed into an instrument of rule and power. The reconstitution and self-affirmation of the Western states as democratic here takes place precisely through this exclusion. The history of the term ‘rogue state’, coined by George W. Bush, exemplifies how the pretext of protective motives according to international laws can be turned into a function of the enforcement of power interests. Indeed, the acceptance and relevance of national borders is decreasing under the democratic pretext of the increase of processual self-government. But this democratic stance is coupled with the conception of a peaceful, global economic cooperation launched by the democratic states of the Western world. This second aspect transforms the very meaning of the processual reconstitution of liberal states. The result is a paradigm of cooperation in the terms of market rationality that raises doubts about the presumed effect of democratization and extension of nonviolent relations of globalization. Globalization, here, turns out not to lead to increasingly homogenous cosmopolitanism via all-inclusive political practices. For the universal norms that correspond to the democratic princiLiberalism’s All-inclusive Promise of Freedom and its Illiberal Effects 65 Unauthenticated Download Date | 5/27/19 8:25 PM ple are utilized as a legitimization of exclusion, oppression and violence motivated by vested interests that they help to veil. The incorporation of these universal principles into the political structures and institutions of liberal and democratic states brings about its own tendency to repress and oppress, which has to be reflected and criticized. In late capitalism, the economistic interpretation of the democratic ideals of equality and participation of all is a very influential one. Thus, the fight for power on the one hand and the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred. The claim to all-inclusion implies here the utilization of the contribution of all and its own radicalized exclusion.Whatever is detracted from this utilization is excluded; it is first imagined as wholly other, and is then imagined on all conceptual levels to be excluded from humanity and rationality as such. This creates the impossibility of the conception of individual and collective ‘agents’ to whom the rules of armed conflict and the right to autonomous self-government do not apply. ‘New Wars’ and ‘Failed States’—cases of dysfunctional state capacity or extreme examples of neoliberal forms of regulation? I now want to take a look at the so-called ‘New Wars’ and their relation to globalization. New Wars are usually considered as a peripheral phenomenon of the globalized world—a form of war activity turned completely irregular. Theories of international politics tend to depict these phenomena as dysfunctional exceptions in contrast to the democratic state capacity with ambitious norms. But this account overlooks or even veils the exemplary character of New Wars within the o

It is considered to be adistinguishingmark of modern and democratic societies that they limit the use of violence by the state as ameans to enforceits authority.Deliberative processes, practices and institutions limit and control as self-government the exercise of the monopolyo fp ower of the state.Thus, democratic government is ac ontinuing self-constitution.Violence/poweri su sed onlya s counter-violence outwards to defend against outer threats-au se that is in turn controlled by the governmental measuring of its proportionality.
The narrative of globalization claims, on the one hand, the substitution of this dichotomyofoutside and inside with an extension of the intrastate nonvio-lent structures,r esulting in an increasinglyp eaceful cooperation of democratic states.Ont he other hand, it also refers to the spread of capitalist forms of production to a 'world market' and the connected economic regulation of social order beyond the borders of nation states.Thisv iew is not without at eleology -in fact,itpostulates aprogress of the political structures of the world including the global south, directed towards peaceful and evermore rational forms of organization of capitalist democracies.
Nevertheless,there are political phenomena which invite us to question this apparentlye vident narrative, especiallyi nt he periphery of the cores tates of democratic liberalism.They provewrongthe assumption that prosperity and democracy for all are the beckoningaim of the globalintegration of economies;as if the realization of this aim posed onlyminor applicatory problems,which could be easilyo vercome.Fort hese cases show the acceptance and relevance of national borders diminishing without the expectedr esulto fp eaceful cosmopolitism.Instead, relations of power spread, are restructured and newlyestablished; the disadvantage of the globals outhd eepened and not remedied.

As ketcho facritique of theories of democratic peace
In order to investigate this thesis further,l et'ss tart with ac ritical look at the basic assumptions of the so-called 'theory of democratic peace' (Geis /M üller / Schörnig 2010).Accordingt ot his theory,t he liberal states have incorporated higher normative demands-specificallyn orms claiming universal validitythan undemocratic states.T hey internationallyc odified these norms, for instance in International Humanitarian Law.The theory of democratic peace doubles this observation with ah ypothesis: thatdemocratic states,with their ambitious ideals of human rights and universal values, fight fewer wars than undemocratic ones.
Different authors, such as Yves Winter,A nna Geis, OliverE berl and others, have shown that this correlation doesn'th old up to the test.I nf act,democratic states fight fewer wars with otherd emocratic states,b ut more wars with undemocratic ones, and in total about the samea mount.I na ddition and maybe even more significantly, the standards of conduct of war of the former (for instance, with regard to the protection of civilians or of prisoners of war) are not higher; that is, the legal, respectively moral commitment to universal norms neither improves the qualityn or the quantity of military conduct of democratic states.
How can we account for the failureo ft his hypothesis?W ithout ad oubt, principles that claim universal validity are the mirror of everydaylife of the Western world, which incorporates the respect of the other as other into its practices.It is increasingly transformed into the political structures and institutions of liberal and democratic states.Thecodified and institutionalized ideal of the participation and respect of everybody, includingt he marginalized and minoritized, requires the ongoing democratic process of self-constitution of the community as community.This process takesp lace in practices of the deliberation and participationofpotentiallyeverybody.This normative commitment to processual allinclusion has, by definition, global applicability.Internationally, this claim finds its codification in the principle of non-intervention of International Humanitarian Law.
But the normative level is not only( as theories of democratic peace claim) guiding for an increasing degreea nd extension of global democratization and peaceful cooperation.It is preciselyt he incorporation of universal claims that creates an ew function of legitimatizing aggression against non-democratic states.L iberalism has an aggressive aspect that annuls preciselyt hese standards,e venw hile invoking them.OliverE berl even spots a 'new liberal antipluralism' (Eberl 2016,p.364,mytransl.).He considers it as asuccessor of Christianization and colonization.
Internationally, the democratic practice of self-constitution is mediated by the construction of an imageo ft he undemocratic other,i rrational and dangerous.This construction works by the utilization and, at the same time, transgression of norms with universal claims (such as the abovementioned International Humanitarian Lawofnon-intervention).These are reformulated and transformed into an instrument of rule and power.The reconstitution and self-affirmation of the Western statesa sd emocratic here takes place preciselyt hrough this exclusion.The history of the term 'roguestate',coined by George W. Bush, exemplifies how the pretext of protective motivesa ccordingt oi nternational laws can be turned into af unction of the enforcement of power interests.
Indeed, the acceptance and relevance of national borders is decreasing under the democratic pretext of the increase of processuals elf-government.But this democratic stance is coupled with the conception of ap eaceful, global economic cooperation launched by the democratic states of the Western world.This second aspect transforms the very meaning of the processual reconstitution of liberal states.The resulti saparadigmo fc ooperation in the terms of market rationality that raises doubts about the presumed effect of democratization and extension of nonviolent relations of globalization.Globalization,here, turns out not to lead to increasinglyh omogenous cosmopolitanism via all-inclusive political practices.F or the universal norms that correspond to the democratic princi-ple are utilizedasalegitimization of exclusion, oppression and violence motivated by vested interests that they help to veil.
The incorporation of these universal principles into the political structures and institutions of liberal and democratic states bringsa bout its ownt endency to repress and oppress,which has to be reflected and criticized.In late capitalism, the economistic interpretation of the democratic ideals of equalityand participationo fa ll is av ery influential one.Thus, the fight for power on the one hand and the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred.The claim to all-inclusion implies here the utilization of the contribution of all and its own radicalized exclusion.Whatever is detracted from this utilizationi sexcluded; it is first imagined as whollyo ther,a nd is then imagined on all conceptual levels to be excluded from humanityand rationality as such.This creates the impossibilityo ft he conception of individual and collective 'agents' to whom the rules of armed conflict and the right to autonomous self-government do not apply.
Inow want to take alook at the so-called 'New Wars' and theirrelation to globalization.N ew Wars are usually considered as ap eripheral phenomenono ft he globalized world-aform of war activity turned completelyirregular.Theories of international politics tend to depict these phenomena as dysfunctional exceptions in contrast to the democratic state capacity with ambitious norms.But this account overlooksorevenveils the exemplary character of New Wars within the organization of an increasingly globalized late modern world.They don'testablish chaotic violence as opposed to the political organization within the clear borders of nation states.Rather,again, the fight for power on the one hand,and the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred-and this entanglement proves to be as pecificallyl ate modern condition in ag lobalized world.
Authors such as Mary Kaldor or Herfried Münkler draw aclear line between the New Wars and interstatewars.Presumably, these new forms of conflict occur from the beginning under the radar of International Humanitarian Lawofarmed conflicts,since they do not limit themselvestoclassic military action.These new forms, accordingt ot he authors, are constituted by an "indirect warc onduct, wheret he use of traditionalm ilitary means and the use of political strategies merge.I na ddition,e xcessive and broadlys pread violence occurs whose agents are mainlyp rivate entrepreneurs of war with economic interests."(Münkler 2002,p.7 ,m yt ransl.)Accordingtothe authors, the reason for this restructuring of armed conflict is an internal lack of function of state capacity concerning law and state apparatus.This lack of functionisincontrasttothe functioningofregular state forceinWestern states.The latter are affected by this development only derivatively: they suffer from an export of globalization by the destabilized regions in the opposite direction, which transports chaos and amorality in the form of terrorism.
But this opposition is not as convincing as it seems at first glance.Keytothe critique is the following observation: the combination of forms of violence with political strategies of conviction is aform of war not onlyagainst the population, but alsot ow in the population.In this respect,i ti st he equivalent of neoliberal rule.Thus, the conventional military conflict steps back and is replaced in the New Wars by a 'management of fear' exercised on the natives, which continually and excessively terrorizes them, economicallyexploits them and psychologically forms them into allies.This form of terror is neither acceptable under the rules of war conduct of international law, nor does it follow rules of economical and appropriateu se of violence.It is nevertheless highlye ffective.Y vesW inter comments on this entanglement of am ilitarization of politics and ap oliticization of waru nder the economic paradigm: The battle of decision is replaced by the massacrea nd by as ystematic sexual violence which are used as instruments of fear management.[…]The disestablishment of war undermines the limits of international lawa nd initiates an erao fc ommercialization of violence with privatee ntrepreneurs of war,warlords and international mercenary companies.War becomes af orm of life.(Winter2 008,p. 54) This 'form of life' is marked not by the fading of state control, but by the blurring of state control and state dysfunction-of deregulated forms of economya nd 'regulated' enforcement of the interests of global companies.It is far from ineffective and follows its ownr ationality.
This specific structure is alsotypical for so-called 'failed states' like Mexico.From the perspective of Western democracies(which international political theory usuallya ssumes), the nationwide influenceo fd rugc artels appears as the powerlessness of the state.Thecartels preclude resistanceagainst their criminal activities by meansoforganized murder,blackmail and rape.But this apparently apolitical violence spreads even further: independent journalists, tradeunionists and representativeso fi ndigenous people who act as opponents of capitalist forms of privatization, land robbery and exploitation become victims of atrocities as well.Thisterror is used to enforcethe interests of politicallyand economicallyi nfluential groups,without the intervention of the control of the state ex-ecutive.P aramilitary groups act as privatea rmies of great landowners (Zelik 2009,p .2 05 -206).Activities of cartels are supported, protected and veiled by police actionsa nd politically motivated assaults.The different groups of agents become more and more indistinguishable.
Eventually, in this situation in Mexico, the population have formed armed militias.Initially, they try to replacet he lost monopolyo fp ower of the state and resist the attacks of drugc artels organized paramilitarily.B ut theirp rocedures of self-justice themselvesbecome quicklydelimited, irregular and economicallycorrupted, assimilating to the forms of actions of the original agents of excessive violence.(The documentary Cartel Land by Matthew Heinemann follows this development.) That is, in New Wars and 'failed states',the population becomesboth victim and agent of violence; it is formed by and takes over the maintenanceo ft he structures of transgression.This is not accuratelyconceivedo fa sa no pposition between destabilized state government on the one hand and boundless organized crime and privatea gents of violence on the other hand (the latter making use of the gapoforder).Rather,the entanglement of economic interests, government interests and entrepreneurship of violence achieves thorough stability in a regime of violence and forms the population into its participants and supporters.
Authors such as Münkler depict this situation as contingent and theatricalize it.Acaseinpoint is the figure of the southern warlord, who appears in Münkler's account as the emblematic Other of state-ruled order.Diefenbach critically takes this depiction to an extreme: "There he is: de-limited, de-disciplined,corrupted by money and pop culture[…]-amonstrous irregular killing machine."(Diefenbach 2003,p .1 86,m yt ransl.)This theatricalized imagev eils the fact that this state of affairs is not acontingent failureofstate rule, but anecessarilyoccurring symptom.It is the symptom of the entanglement of universal claims of freedom and equality on the one hand and of the paradigm of market rationalityont he other.The consequenceo ft his entanglement is ap articular structure of the development and implementation of habits and ways of action-turning the civil population into ar esourcet hat continuallyn eeds to be worked on by shaping and transgressingt heirf orm of life.It needst ob ep ermanentlyf ormed and coaxed into practical compliance, and to achievet his aim terror (or 'fear management')i sn ot an irrational monstrosity,b ut preciselyr ational.
Classic theories such as Münkler'sa ssume that 'failed states' and the New Wars are phenomena of state collapse that are not onlyg eographicallyb ut also conceptuallyp eripheral.Accordingt ot hem, the sourceo ft hese developments is that state institutions lose their monopolyo fv iolence including the power to protect theircitizens.In fact,this loss of power is radicallyambivalent: the monopolyo fv iolence of privatew ar entrepreneursw eakens the state out-wards.A tt he same time,these proxies push state interests.It is ak ind of irregular regulation by violence,i nw hich the state suffers from and profits from its own weakness (Zelik 2009).Forg overnments thus don'th avet of ace the problems of legitimation, neither with regard to the violent means the proxies use nor with regard to the aims thus furthered.In Mexico, this is the case, for instance with regard to the capitalist opening of markets and the privatization of common goods connected to land robbery, which thus become available to global capital investors after native peasants are violentlyd ispossessed.
By now,this structure of excessive violence appears not as an opposite to the functionings tate capacity;r ather,i ta ppears as exemplary of the principles of neoliberal organization, insofar as it is agovernment aiming at self-government.The population subjectedt ot hese conditions alsoa cts as their agents.It is an extensive,a ll-present,i nner political police-regulation, which integratesm ethods of convincing and questions of legitimacy into processes of incorporating compliant forms of practice.T he excessive violence is an effective means for this subjectf ormation.Therefore, it assumesb othl iberating and dispossessing traits.Military power mingles with traits of police violence, managingofh ealth care and the control of secret services.Their joint activities record all details of life, regulate and form them.As atraining of the population it is at the same time an economical government,s ince it assigns the work of disciplining to the subjects themselves.These aspectsseem contradictory,but they turn into the condition of each other.
Authors such as Zelik (seea lso Winter 2008;C omaroff /C omaroff 2012) claim as pecial relevance for these phenomenao fd elimitedv iolence in our increasinglyg lobal, liberal world.They assumet hat the developments in the socalled periphery of the corestates of democratic liberalism point to aconstitutive aspect of globalization and its entanglement of democratic politic organization, open markets and deregulation.
This development is oftenaccounted for in very positive terms.Its down side becomes apparent in the New Wars and so-called 'failed states'.That is, to depict the supposedlye nlightened corec ountries of liberalism as 'stable' and committed to universalr ights for humans and people is alreadyo ne-sided.This result yields the following suspicion: the rule with instability and contingencyi sp reciselytypical for the neoliberal shapingofsocieties and its claim on the individual.It forms the individual to conceive of her-orhimself as 'entrepreneur of himself' (Bröckling2 007, my transl.)and to act accordingly.
Thus, the central question turns out to be how exactlyt he phenomena described so far connect to the globalization development of the world and the West in particular-to those developments we are used to seeing as gains of freedom and political liberalization.

Governing with security according to Foucault as at ypeo fj udgment
The narrative of globalization assumesahistorical development from the nation state (whichi ncreasinglyl imits and controls state violence, but executes it outwards) towards global, democratic cooperation.The consequences of globalization are,a ccordingt ot he narrative,g lobal relations of peaceful and egalitarian cooperation in economya nd politics.The corresponding loss of relevance of local formso fg overnmenta nd of nation states to transregional democratic political structures appears as unquestionable gain of freedom and progress.
Without ad oubt,i ti sa ccurate to see this developmenta sastory of emancipation from historicallyspecific forms of ruling and tradition.But to uncritically read it within the mentioned frame of anarrative of globalization is to fall victim to an ideology.On the one hand, this history of emancipation is by no means the history of ap rogress withouts etbacks in terms of peaceful and freec ooperation.It is in fact ah istory of emancipation of people and minorities who increasinglyc ould (and had to) fight for their own voice and political representation.On the otherhand, thereisthe implied equation of an ongoing spreadingof democratic state forms with as preading of economically liberal state forms.In fact,the increasingo verlapo ft hese two levels (the political and the economic) not onlyresults in post-democratic signs of fatigue like new nationalisms, which can be witnessed in all Europe-it also leadstoaform of illiberal rule of its own which finds its current extreme but paradigmatic manifestation in the New Wars and 'failed states'.
The work of MichelF oucault describes the development of rule, lawa nd norms becomingmore and more immanent within the society of late modernity.He is highlycritical in his evaluation of this developmentagainst the framework of the increasingentanglement of politics and economy.Manyphenomena of the by now globalized world disclose themselvesparticularlyclearlyinlight of Foucault'scritical observations of the ever more self-limitingand self-delimiting liberal society of late modernity.C orrespondingly, al ot of authorsb yn ow adopt this frame of interpretation (such as the aforementioned Opitz, Winter,E berl and others).Iw ill now brieflye xplore the ways in which Foucault'st heory of governmentality seems to be auseful tool to analyze developments of globalization.
Neoliberal governing is not without ambivalence, as neoliberalism'saccount of itself suggests.Indeed, its landmark theme is the restriction of state intervention.But it has adubitable successor: the organization and operationalization by the judgment and calculation of reality.Thisapproach is far from the apparently objective and neutral accounting, but is constitutively the continualt ransgression of rules and rights set so far.That is the case, since it always sets its own standards with its actions.
Accordingt oF oucault,c haracteristic of this structure of overcoming rules and structures is the paradigm of security; the model of it is police action.The 'police government' of social processesc reates one state of exception after the other.I ti s" the permanent state of exception, which proceedsi nt he name and in dependence of the principles of its own rationalityw ithoutb eing based upon the rules of law." (Foucault 2004,GGI,p.488, my transl.)This characterization shows an uncannyr esemblancet ot he terror management carved out as typical for the New Wars and 'failed states' before it.
Af aculty of judgment that is shaped by police action and bureaucracy appears in correspondence to ag overnment of in-security.I tr ules via sub-legal techniques and thus enactsa nd provisions every detail of social life.It counts with insecurity insofar as it works with an on-codified situational knowledge, which is formed out of and applied to preciselyt hese details of everydayl ife and its subjects.It is thus always workingo ni ts own limit; thati s, it is always integrating it.
With respect to the political subjects, this structure is democratic,because it takes into account everybodyand turnseverybodyinto an agent of this accumulation of knowledge.B ut at the same time, this concept of equality shapes it as an economic equality of market agents.Thisparadigm of the organization of society is characterized by an interplayb etween discourses and practices.K nowledge production identifiesd angers and develops forms to react to them in ways of conduct.These ways of conductform the material of an ongoinginvestigation by these discourses and of acontinuous regulation.Society'sagents now have to turn all their ways of being and their prospectsinto valuable goods for the refinemento fr egulation.The regulation of conduct aims at an ormalization of the totality of our ways of being.Infact,this aim appears to be just technical, but it is thus veiled,n aturalized and its normative,p olitical dimension is concealed (Meyer 2009,p .2 9).
Forwithin this paradigm, the 'freedom of all' takes on apeculiarmeaning.It is the freedom of all subjects who realize their own possibilities to full capacity as subjects of theiro wn self-management and self-interpretations of the market of life scripts and symbolic value.Thisc orresponds to ar adical disenfranchisement of the subject who doesn'tconform to this market organization.On the one hand, the very emphasis on everydayf orms of life and the formulation of common understandings of selveshas an aspect of (democratic) generalizations and democratic equality.But on the other hand,this formulation and formation here takes on the shape of ap ractice of dominion.
Though the calculating with constructions of danger seems, accordingtoliberal ideology, maximallyself-limiting,i ti si lliberala tt he core.It is self-limiting and self-delimiting, since it proceeds by forming its own legitimation and object.Itscalculation registers 'reality' first of all, as apotential and as avirtuality-and at the samemoment,itreducesand calculates it.The procedures measure everybodyand the future possibilities emanatingfrom their conduct as surplus value, and enforces them to realizethis futurepotential.It is thus acalculation of profit and ac alculation of risk that binds as if it had factual and normative power.
Accordingt oU lrich Beck'st heory of risks, social risks de facto have increased exponentially.Supposedly,t hese risks are barelyt ob ea nticipated and accounted for (Beck 2007).In contrast,F rançois Ewald considers the contemporary attemptst od etermine and keep in checkapotential danger as ap layw ith the imaginary.Itdoesn'taim at acontrol of the given, but at acertain wayofconstituting the other and, therewith,o ne'so wn (Ewald 1993).This achievement construes the world by reactingt oi tw ith adaptingi nstitutional forms; that is, it is inherentlys elf-exceeding.T his order-transgressing orderingi sa' political strategy' in the broader sense, preciselys ince the entanglement of constitution and depiction in this world figuring activity is concealed by ap ositivist selfimageo fn atural science.
Ac asei np oint is the means of automatic face detection.It speaks of this entanglement of universaln orms turned into institutions on the one hand and, on the other,ofaregulation of the life world accordingt ostatistical calculus.A tt he coreo fi tl ies an emphasis on the permanent adaption of practice rules guided by their limit: the potential and upcoming.It obliges anticipation and prevention; that is, to register not particulars ubjects accordingt of ixed attributes,but all subjects accordingt otheir unrealized potential.Thisc onsideration supplies the means to then classify all and everyone accordingt ot heir utilizability.I nc ase of doubt (i.e., in the border caseo fn on-calculability or nonutilizability necessaryt ot his method), it figures them and treats them as monstrous threats.A ccordingtoSvenOpitz, this means is an 'imaginary technology' that grasps the Other and constitutes it as an 'amorphous, fetishized Other' (Opitz 2008, p. 223 -224, my transl.).
Within this apparentlyl iberal frame, the self-development of the individual is considered at the same time as his or her participation in the social totality.That is, just by 'goingo n ' ,aperson develops the possibilities and ways of life of the whole, and the knowledge of it.Itthereby affirms and stabilizes this totality.Thisc onvergence turns the contingencies of the particulars ituation and its outcome into the material of the regulating operation that constitutes the order as such.What is yetu naccounted for is its limit and condition of possibility.Itisthis limit which here needstobealways constructed and thus integrated; as far as it staysu nattained, it is to be controlled and violentlym astered as a monstrous threat.This technique of government as amatter of principle even allows the exclusion of individuals from the protection of human rights-as the case of the human rights violations in Guantanamo showed (see Butler2 004, on the emblematicr elevance of this political 'state of exception').These exclusions, using the techniques of torture, rape and murder,s ignify at ransgression of universal norms by democratic government executiveso fs tate power-norms that are by definition non-tradable and non-negotiable.But,a sB utler has shown, this is within this paradigm a 'constitutive' transgression (Butler 2004, p. 50 -51).
In question is preciselya na ppeal to the highest,universal norms, which at present have to become practical in institutional forms.This requires their interpretation and transgression over and over again.The semblance of presumably endangered rights of protection and freedom that necessarilya ccompanies this processisthen used to legitimize preciselytheir most blatant violation: the paradigm of social interactiono fp eaceful, market-shaped cooperation makes aproductive handling of dissent and conflicti mpossible-for it is accompanied by a Hobbesian, omnipresent assumption of the danger of the lapse of these interactions into afight of all against all.This assumption is quite literallyformulatedin the metaphor of war prominent in public discourse in the US in regard to all aspects of social life (Winter 2008, p. 70).
This rhetoric of danger lowers the acceptable standards for ab reach of law in all areas.Itlegitimizes the decentering and delimiting of practices and considerations of securityi nf avor of an increasing integration into the chain of consumption of goods.Potentiallyr isky subjects are identifieda nd their behavior anticipated, and a-human identities are thus not onlyr egistered, but presupposed and first of all constructed.It is ac alculationo ft he cost of freedom, which constitutes the Other as un-economic and irrational (Opitz 2008, p. 223 -224).
In this frame of thought,t he protection of the population necessitatesn ot first of all military measures directed outwards,but police regulationa nd practices of knowledge directed inwards.Security is considered as carceg ood.Against appearances, further demand for this good, which is offered by different, increasinglyprivateproviders,ispreciselyand ceaselesslycreated.Foritisnot a lack of functioning,b ut an ecessary aspect of this paradigm that as ubjective feeling of insecurity needs to be increased further and further,and thus the product 'security' is more and more in demand.In fact,the limit of the current shape of society is its workingt ask, always aiming at ap otentiallyglobal scope.

Singularity as ac ommodity and the possibility of emancipation
It is preciselyt he overlap of juridical, moral, economic and epistemic aspects within the ongoing self-construction of the social whole that creates av iolence at the coreofthe liberal society itself.F or it is potentiallyglobalonlyasastructure further and further integrating and exploiting its own limits.Evidently, this fact concerns the organization of economyi tself, but more radically, it concerns all forms of individual activity as self-realization, including the activity of democratic, political deliberation.Within these forms of democratic participation, everybodyi ss upposed to be able to contributet ot he shaping of the democratic society.B ut at the samet ime, in the course of neoliberal progress,t hese forms themselvesa re economized and thus exclude preciselyt he individual as such, as irreducible and unaccountable, which they are supposedt oe xpress.I ti s this unaccountability of the individual itself that is now turned into as ource of profit.
The ideal of as pirited democracy is the idea of ac ommunity that develops norms and forms of life in its course, by the activity and participation of all of its free subjects, and realizes them consensually.This idea is conceivedh ere under the paradigmo ff reedom shaped as self-interested self-government according to acalculation of costs.Thus, each and every subject, in all their speeches and actions, works to continuallyt ransforma nd shape preciselyt heir own unaccountability as individuals into ap roductive,f unctionings ocial unity.
Late modernc ivic life is characterized by gains of freedom that have to be analyzed and acknowledgeda ss uch.But neoliberal logic not onlyr equires the minimization of state intervention in social processes and structures-it also models these processes and structures thoroughly after the model of the market.E venp olitical deliberation and civic engagement are pictured as calculationsofcontingencies that are considered as potentials of profit.This calculus is illiberal at the core, not just contingentlyatthe periphery (Opitz 2008, p. 223).Fori td eclaresd ifference,c onflict and social fights to be at the outer zone of democratic society in need of control.Thus, Balibar points to the "irreducibility of the phenomenon of extreme violence as astructuraldeterminant of capitalism" (Balibar 2001(Balibar ,c ol. 1287,m yt ransl., highlighting orig.),m yt ransl., highlighting orig.).
Late modernity values the individual 'as him-or herself',n ot duet or ights which are owed to class membership, tradition and privileges.This is the result of af ar-reaching implementation of universal claims of freedom and of ad emocratic sphere of civic interaction and discourse.However,itispreciselythis individual freedom to shape one'so wn life thati sd efined, utilizeda nd ruled in this form of regime.Neoliberalism designs amodel of humanityw hich pictures the individual as rational and singular onlyi nsofar as he or she contributes to and affirms the social whole by adding one more utilizable possibility to it.He or she has to follow the logic of the market in the realization of his or her individual and societal possibilities.Otherwise he or she is pictured as aviolent, irrational monstrosity.
Paradoxically, it is preciselyt he individuality of identities and life scripts that turns into am aterial of integration, affirmation and processes of stabilization.Anya ctivity-even giving and taking arguments, contesting and resisting -is seen as ap ractical design of meaning.F igured in this way, whatever an individual undertakesisalways productive and 'value creating' insofar as it is read within and createsnew patterns and forms of life to be read and understood.To realize oneself is at the same time ap rocess of creatingr ules and designs of one'so wn and of shapingn ew general forms of human identity and conduct.This dimension of anya ctivity-at once individualizinga nd generalizing-now constitutes an ecessary effect that works as the affirmationo ft he structures of society and as its own integration.On the other hand, these effects pose ap ermanent threat to as ociety conceiveda ss uch.
The legitimation of the hegemonyofneoliberalism consists in the promise of freedom to participateo ffered to everyone under the conditions of aworld society.I th as been argued that this promise has not been fulfilled, at least for the population of the global South, which has been subjected to massive violence and impoverishment.But the problem of the economization of all areas and democratic procedures in neoliberalism is not restricted to the periphery.Neoliberalism is constitutively illiberal, for what is at stake here is always the representation and depiction of the individual and groups in an ongoing construction of both identitiesand aconsensus of social forces.But at the end of the day, this is not modeled as peaceful and liberal, but as forcefullyi ntegrating.
What is at stake here is ac oncept of unrestricted judgment and freedom of radical democratization, which is distorted into the normalization of precisely this faculty of judgment by itself.Judith Butlerp ointst ot his problem as the late modern 'ghostly' creation of rules always to be adapted by a 'managerial power'.What is at stake are "rules that are not binding by virtue of established lawo rm odes of legitimation, but fullyd iscretionary,evena rbitrary,wielded by officials who interpret them unilaterally and decide the condition and form of their invocation."(Butler 2004,p .62)Through this lens, the situation of the late modern subjecta ppears as radicallyd isenfranchised preciselyi nc ommunal processes of deliberation.Itso nly perspective on itself as capable of freej udgment beyond the demandf or conformity seems to be completelyi rrational and excessively violent.B ut it is pre-ciselyt his supposedlyamorphous subject that pointst othe manifold of human life scripts as irreducible to calculation.Balibarcalls it the 'non human' and 'all too human': "but taken together (and they certainlydonot form a tout,an'all' or a 'whole'), all these singularities are the majority,the quasi-totality of mankind."(Balibar 2012,p .2 26) This critique opens up an ew meaning of globalization and, at the same time, of the concept of a 'human right'.A' Humanr ight' now appears as the right to ar eceptive acknowledgment of difference.The idea of cosmopolitan interaction givesu pt he paradigm of cooperation in favoro fac onception of the other as withdrawn, never grasped and determined.In fact,i ts hows the need for the interruption of the activity of acontinuingworld interpretation and practice.This interruption reveals another figure of practice as requiring the bearing of dissent and of confrontations.
Instead of deliberating and calculating as abasisofhuman practice and interaction, this conception of 'self-determination against oneself' implies ac ritique as the renouncement and interruption of one'sh abitual ways of acting and judging.Foucault coins the concept of "the art of not being governed or,better,the art of not being governed likethat and at that cost" (Foucault 1997, p. 29).This account allows ad evelopment of ac oncept of globalization and ap ractice of it in which freedom figures as contra-dominion-not as ac ooperation of potentiallya ll undert he samec alculus,b ut as an endurance of incomprehension and even of aversion against the other.