Defense of ‘Soft’ Universalism or ‘Clash of Civilizations’

Even the politically more tolerant parts of the world are in no way immune to cultural and national delimitation. The world seems to identify with Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. International organizations like the United Nations try to push back. One attempt is the UNESCO program ‘Philosophy, a School of Freedom’, the declared aim of which is to provide a prophylaxis against radicalization and dogmatism. This article points out three specific accomplishments of philosophical education and their significance for the impending ‘clash of civilizations’: (i) philosophical education as differentiation and critique; (ii) philosophical education as a defense for universalism; and (iii) philosophical education as transcendental tolerance education. The Struggle of Cultures and the role played by philosophical education Both the awareness and the configuration of the political international situation have undergone a dramatic paradigm shift. As to how greatly the asserted or actual ‘struggle of the cultures’ dominates minds in general and politics in particular can be shown by citing an optimistic ‘spirit of the times’ of a previous era. 26 years ago, Fukuyama’s assertion of the ‘End of History’ elicited enthusiastic acknowledgement from broad circles of people: scientists, the public at large and politicians (Fukuyama 1992). There were, after all, sufficient grounds for optimism: the ‘bloodless’ revolution of 1989 led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and put an end to the division of the European continent. The so-called ‘Cold War’ was at an end and the successor nation states of the U.S.S.R. were aspiring to democracy. Parliamentarianism in the countries of the newly founded Commonwealth of Independent States proved to be sufficiently resistant. Long despaired-of disarmament agreements were ratified. The Republic of South Africa overcame ‘Apartheid’ and the world celebrated presidents such as Nelson Mandela or Vaclav Havel. The conflict in Northern Ireland was pacified and Israelis and Palestinians extended each other the hand. Markus Tiedemann, Technische Universität Dresden (TUD) OpenAccess. © 2018 Markus Tiedemann, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-007 However, this stage was concluded by September 11 2001, at the latest. This was the greatest symbolic scenario of an open attack on Western life and culture, and demanded new explanation and categorization. A suitable exponent was already available: Huntington’s lecture, article, paper and book, all linked by titles containing Clash of Civilizations. A paradigm shift was again introduced. The ‘Struggle of the Cultures’ became the predominant interpretative sample for national and international conflicts. Dramatic, politically adverse decisions and wars against international law became an expression of as well as a catalyst for such developments. The United Nations, which has become an organization of coagulated ideas of global international understanding, has very little to offer as counteraction to such disturbing developments. One initiative is the UNESCO program ‘Philosophy, a School of Freedom’. Philosophical education, the declared aim of the global project, is to act as a prophylaxis against any form of radicalization and dogmatism. The idea is to promote a ‘world citizen’ of majority age, who does not perceive plurality as a threat, but proceeds to participate in collective opinion-forming by means of critical judgment. Federico Mayor Zaragoza couched this idea in the following terms: Philosophy and Democracy urge each of us to exercise our capacity for judgement, to choose for ourselves the best form of political and social organisation, to find our own values, in short, to become fully what each of us is, a free being. Among so many dangers, we have no other hope. (Mayor 1995, p. 12) But what can philosophical education achieve amidst the increasing ‘clash of civilizations’? I will highlight in this article three specific accomplishments of philosophical education and their significance for the impending ‘clash of civilizations’: (i) philosophical education as differentiation and critique; (ii) philosophical education as a defense for universalism; and (iii) philosophical education as transcendental tolerance education. A differentiated image of the ‘clash of civilizations’ When Samuel P. Huntington published his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in 1993 in the journal Foreign Affairs, the publishers claimed that he triggered more debates in the first three years thereafter than any other contribution published since the 1940s (cf. Huntington 1996, p. 11). Huntington’s principal claim maintains that coherence, disintegration and conflict in a world after the end of the 80 Markus Tiedemann

However,this stagewas concluded by September 11 th 2001, at the latest.This was the greatest symbolic scenario of an open attack on Western life and culture, and demanded new explanation and categorization. Asuitable exponent was alreadyavailable: Huntington'slecture, article, paper and book, all linked by titles containing Clasho fC ivilizations. Ap aradigm shift wasa gain introduced. The 'Struggle of the Cultures' became the predominant interpretative sample for national and international conflicts.D ramatic, politicallya dverse decisions and wars against international lawb ecame an expression of as well as ac atalyst for such developments.
The United Nations, which has become an organization of coagulatedi deas of globalinternational understanding,has very little to offer as counteraction to such disturbing developments. One initiative is the UNESCO program 'Philosophy, aS chool of Freedom'.P hilosophical education, the declared aim of the global project,i st oa ct as ap rophylaxis against anyf orm of radicalization and dogmatism. The ideai st op romotea' world citizen' of majoritya ge,w ho does not perceive plurality as at hreat,b ut proceeds to participate in collective opinion-forming by means of critical judgment.F ederico MayorZ aragoza couched this idea in the following terms: Philosophya nd Democracyu rgee ach of us to exercise our capacity for judgement,t o choose for ourselvesthe best form of political and social organisation, to find our own values, in short,tobecome fullywhateach of us is, afreebeing. Amongsomanydangers, we have no other hope. (Mayor1 995,p. 12) But what can philosophical education achievea midst the increasing 'clash of civilizations'?Iwillh ighlight in this article three specific accomplishments of philosophical education and their significance for the impending 'clash of civilizations':( i) philosophical education as differentiation and critique; (ii) philosophical education as ad efensef or universalism; and (iii) philosophical education as transcendental tolerance education.
Ad ifferentiated image of the 'clash of civilizations' When Samuel P. Huntington publishedhis article "The Clash of Civilizations?" in 1993inthe journal Foreign Affairs,the publishers claimedthat he triggered more debates in the first threey ears thereafter thana ny other contribution published since the 1940s (cf. Huntington 1996,p .11). Huntington'sp rincipal claim maintains that coherence, disintegration and conflict in aw orlda fter the end of the Cold Wari sn ol onger emphasized through ideologies and/or individual nation states,b ut by borders and the interplayo fs o-called 'cultural spheres',w hich can be defined by the eight great cultures of the globe (cf. Huntington 1996, p. 19).
The 'One-World Theory', as expounded at the end of the Cold War, and the triumph of liberaldemocracy by leading politicians and intellectuals, are considered by Huntington to be naïveand unrealistic. Furthermore,hebelieves that the universal hegemonyclaim of the West will lead not towards harmonybut to conflict with other culturals pheres.I ncreasing integrational pressurei nt he global world, he maintains,will increase withdrawal into the own cultural identity of nation statesa nd their individuals,a nd although the nation states will remain the more important actors,their negotiations will be more and more influenced by cultural awareness. "The world will decline into aW estern civilization and manyN on-Western civilizations" (Huntington 1996,p .95).
Fukuyama'sassertion of the 'End of History' is considered by Huntington to be agreat error.I nnow ay,h emaintains, will Western culturea utomaticallybecome af uture universal world culture. Western consumer goods are well known and appreciated throughout the world through economic networkinga nd communication, but the 'central characteristics of the West' are neither industrialization nor lifestyle products. Huntington moreover points to the separation of spiritual and political power,the rule of law, social pluralism, representative organs and individualism (Huntington 1996,p.99). Such attributeswerenot necessarily exported with the modernization of other nation states. Modernization is not the same as 'Westernization',but onlyr einforcest he resistance of other cultures towards the West and tends to reduce its worldwide influence. Accordingt oH untington, the survival of Western culturew ill depend on the appreciation that one'sown cultureis'unique but not universal' and is to be understood as worthy of bothp rotection and renewal (Huntington 1996,p .2 0).
No matter what one'sa ttitude mayb et owards Huntington'st heories, his forecasts have arrivedand are being receivedtoabreath-taking extent.Inactual fact,cultural conflicts have predominated the twenty-first century.Economic and power-political aspects have playedi mportantr oles. The separating characteristics of individual groups have always been central fault lines. Huntington describes such fault-line conflicts from which controversies can emerge (Huntington 1996,p .2 53). Accordingt oH untington, the Ukraine is ac ulturallys plit country.T he western half has been dominated partiallyb yP oland, Lithuania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whilst the eastern half has been dominated by Russian Orthodoxy. These differences can be found at the political and languagelevel (Huntington 1996,p.264). Huntington uses the Ukraine as an example of ac onstitution no longer being able to unite ac ountry;w hat is instead needed is areorganization on the basis of cultural values. He states that "the differences between West and East Ukraine are manifested in the attitudes of the people" (Huntington 1996,p.264), and that for this reason, "the Ukraine will devolvei nto two portions along its fault line, and the eastern part of the Donbas will merge with Russia." (Huntington 1996,p .2 66) Despite the admiration for Huntington'sa stuteness and acumen, his interpretation of world affairs is neither mandatory nor without alternatives. Furthermore, the query presents itself as to whether TheC lasho fC ivilizations and the Remaking of WorldOrder turns out to be an objectivephenomenon, or onlypresents one possiblee xplanation of world events. In the latter case, an additional query presents itself, namely thatofc ausality.H as the actual effect of world affairs generated this theory,ordoes an all-dominating interpretationofworld affairs have the effect of producing corresponding political power-awareness and decision-taking as self-fulfilling prophecies?Aphilosophical reflection has the assignment of inspecting such aspects and thereby of investigating the use of terminologies, and the coherence and consistency of the resultant inferences and conclusions.
It is of interest to note that Huntington's Civilizations has been translated into German as Kulturen. As am atter of fact,H untington'su nderstanding of the terms eems to originate from that metaphysically 'weighted' context,which is allocated to the sphere of the German culturalc oncept.I ti sn ot necessary to enter into the details of the largely superfluous German-French Culture-Civilization dispute. In fact,Immanuel Kant was using the term Kultur (culture) to demarcate 'morala dvance' from technical and organizational progression ('civilization'). In this manner,K ant does not propound a 'culturalc oncept' characterized by 'blood and soil',but takes up aposition close to the French civilization concept of the Enlightenment.Ofi nterest abovea ll is that the civilization concept of the Enlightenment has an 'including' aspect,whereas the alleged German culture concept has an 'excluding' effect (Fisch 1992).F rom the time of the Enlightenment up to the catastrophe of the First World War, this civilization concept stood for the ethical progression of all rationallygifted beings. Huntington tends to fade out this tradition of the French civilization concept,o rr ejects this out of hand as the 'DavosCulture' of adisappearing 'small educational elite' (Huntington 1996,p.78). International successes as well as the power of the individual are left unmentioned. People have always succeeded in overcoming their culturale mphasis in favoro fauniversal perspective.E thical universalism in the sense of the Enlightenment needs neither ac ommon religion nor ac ommon language. The United Nations are ac ase in point,and the European Union has, over decades,succeeded in converting the most warlikeofcontinents into a community of peace and common values.
It would also appear questionable to denye conomic interdependence and communication from anyform of peace-promotingeffects. Of course, the dissemination of Western consumer goods and pop culture does not equate to correspondence with Western values, but theireffects go beyond techniquesand fashion. Films,a ccordingt oH untington, are onlye ntertainment and not cultural conversions, and have always been otherwise interpreted and evaluated (Huntington 1996,p .8 0). But could not emancipatedf emale protagonists, for example, generate the idea of 'equal rights' and their attractiveness for women, via dancing and sports films?I fi tw ereo therwise,n umerous nation states could waive the censoringo ft heir press and media. More communication means more information on what moral values exist in the world, and how life would look with them. Thea bility to know alternativesr epresents the basisf or areflective observation of one'sown life conditions,and can be atriggerfor discussion (Baumann 1992(Baumann , p. 1966(Baumann -1983. Moreover,t he justification is missing, that values like separation of power or freedom of speech cannot be attractive to people of different cultural persuasions. Forexample the 'Global Ethic Project' of Hans Küng (Küng 1990) rests upon the assumption that the cultures and religions of the world are not all that dissimilar,a nd thatsimilar basic values exist. 'Murder' is almost always negatively connoted, while other institutions such as the family, on the other hand, are givenp ositive significance. Huntington does not dispute this diagnosis, but drawsattention to the fact that humanity'swarlike past is also proved by history (Huntington 1996,p .7 6). The hope, however,t hat soonero rl ater identical universalc ulturalv alues will be generated in all cultural spheres is decidedlyd enied by Huntington. He sends ac lear denial to the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment.P rogression in the culturals pheres is primarilyo fademographic, technical and military,but not of an ethical nature.Civilization is thus reduced to the level of 'technical' accomplishments, whilst identity is coupled with the metaphysical concept of 'culture'.
The civilization concept in the French tradition is thus not substantiallyi nvalidated. The coreo ft his understanding of civilization is embedded in the demarcation to barbarism, as ah igher degree of refinement and sophistication, which can be measured by the objective standards of 'bourgeoisie'.Civilization thus restricts itself to formal ethical criteria, without negatingc ulturalb ackgrounds.I fr ules could be instituted so that people could live together as kind of 'worldcitizens',then auniversal culturewould not be necessary;aform of civilization along French lines would be sufficient.The 'clash of the civilizations' is thus, at least in the concept itself, not at all without alternatives.
Conceptual proof for an alternative mayn ot be deemed to vouch for its ethical consistency.For this purpose, an explicit defense of universalism is required.
Whoever seeks to defend universalism will be confronted with av ariety of reproaches. These wille xtend from scientific theoretical ignorance all the way to cultural intolerance. In this respect,t he representativeso f' relativism' are also altogethera mbivalent.I nd ay-to-day discussions, people who represent the argument 'otherc ultures, other morals' suddenlyu nderstand that they give up the possibilityo facross-border culturala nd moral understanding.S cience theorists who declare metasciences, such as philosophy, to be superfluous then regret that ar eal exchangeb etween the individual scientific disciplinesi s thus impossible. However,t he regret of such consequences is no argument against the truth of an existent matter of fact.
Anyd efense of universalism must therefore be practicedo nt he theoretical as well as the practical level. Anys orto ft ruth-theoretical discussion would go beyond the limits of this paper.F or this reason, the following statements are based upon an epistemic concept of truth. Truth is the case, independent of insight or acceptance. At the same time, rational beingsshould be in aposition to recognize portions of such transcendentallyp erceivedt ruths, and to show their validity intersubjectively.C onsensus constitutes no truths in itself, but can enhance the probability of truthfula nd justified opinions in the form of an on-hierarchical dialogue, by wayofthe maximization of information. Wittgenstein'sor Foucault'sd ifferenceb etween 'being true' and 'being in the truth',i sn othing more than the difference between truth with or without recognition.
The following statements occupy themselveswith the defense of a 'soft' universalism. An attempt is made here to show that (A) aparticipationinepistemic oriented discourses is culture-independent,a nd that( B) generallyb indingv alues can be achieved durings uch discourses.
Ac ulture-independent participationi na ne pistemic discourse (A) is am atter,o fc ourse, in discourse theory,a nd has experiencedc oncrete form in philosophical didactics. Accordingt oM artens,p hilosophyi sa ne lementaryc ultural technique of human life. As ar esult, not every culture, but every human being can participate in the philosophical search for truth. Philosophy and/or philosophizing is a 'culturaltechnique' because it is acharacteristic of human culture in general, and of the Greek-European culturei np articular ( Martens 2003, pp. 30 -31). Itse tiologym ay well be stronglyE uropean influenced, but its essence is not.Philosophy as 'culturaltechnique' means craftsmanship or artistry, as well as knowledge of suitablem aterials and theories. Aculturaltechnique is teachable and learnable for every human being.P hilosophizing is thus ac rossculturalact of intellectual orientation. All people are equipped with the capability of abstracting themselvesf rom culturali nfluences via pure reason. Ad iscourse on concrete moral questions is seldom realizable without cultural influences and misunderstandings. Such, however,i sn ot valid for the transcendental criterion of 'good'.A ni ntersubjective discourse on the circumstances of the possibilityo fb eing able to sayw hether an action or am otivei s ' good' can be adopted by anyhuman being whose reason is able to differentiate between reality and norms. Across-cultural participation in epistemic discourses is thereforep ossible of consistent thinking.F or this purpose, it is not necessary to raise oneself independentlyinto the position of an intelligible person. It is sufficient to provide, adopt and verify justifications. Auniversal perspective can either be promoted by the rules of discourse or by experiments like Rawls's 'veil of ignorance'.
The samecould apply for the possibility of generallybindingtopics (B). Verities (even the normative type) tend to go beyond the context in which they are discovered. In the descriptive sciences, the differentiation between claim and etiologyi samatter of fact.M anym athematical principles were defined in the Maghreb sphere without losing their validity in Europe. Architectural principles are valid on all continents independent of the culturals phere of their proponents. It is rather more af act of life that numerous inventions and knowledge have been discovered and recognized independentlyofeach other at various locationso ft he Earth concurrently-af act to indicate 'multi-genre' verities.
In fact,t he epistemic, normative and emotional confusions inherent in the modernh avel ed in manyp laces to aR enaissance of 'closed' concepts and world outlooks. Huntington interpreted this development as aw ithdrawal into the culturali dentity and the cultural sphere. Such analysis,h owever,d oes not indicate that culturalr elativism is without alternatives. Just because we find it difficult to redeem our epistemic self-pretension does not mean that this has to be givenu p. Authorities such as Wittgenstein, Lyotard or Zygmunt Bauman mayh avel astingly destroyed the hope of af inal justification of ethical standards,b ut this does not mean 'anything goes',l ike Feyerabend suggests. We can still differentiateb etween the quality of arguments (Tetens 2004,p .2 3), or between sophisticated and unreflected self-interest (Gosepath 1992, p. 49). Whoever undertakes such effortse nds up like Tugendhat-in no final certainty,b ut in a thick tissue of motivesa nd reasons (Tugendhat 1993, p. 89). Martha Nussbaum mentionsavagueb ut stronga nd resilient concept of 'good' (Nussbaum 1993, pp. 323 -363). Thep ossibility of an 'overlappingc onsensus' (Rawls 1971, p. 340) is thus not bound to an expansion of ac ulturals phere. It is rather more dependento nt he extent to which self-discipline, social background and education enable anyone to approximate to the viewpoint of an intelligible person.
The option of procedure-ethical universalism is demonstrated by different theories. One is Otfried Höffe'sj ustification for human rights. The claim to 'human rights' can todayn ol onger be taken for granted. In February 2014,a flyerw as passed from hand to hand among the student community in Berlin, in which human rights were described as the 'European centrist concoction of ap ost-colonial system of repression.' Huntington would probablyd isapprove of such av ulgar, Marxist background of the student authors-but at the same time, similarities can be recognized. Accordingt ot he student authors then, human rights would be a 'product of the West'.They are unique, but not universal. Such an assessment has been resisted by numerous authoritative authors. One of the more important contributions originates from Höffe and was published in 1996,the same year as the book version of Huntington's TheC lasho fC ivilizations.
Although the ethics behindh uman rights mayp ose no final justification, they are certainlyn ot arbitraryo ri mperialistic. Höffe builds his argumentation upon aminimalistic anthropology. It matters not how independent and divergent our cultural 'imprint' mayb e; we can certainlya gree that we are bodily, purely rational, social and political beings. Anyi ntervention into such necessities will restrict our 'freedom of action',a nd will thus prevent us from realizingo ur understandingofasuccessfullyled life. Anybuild-up of differentiality presupposes the capacity to act.S ince human rights seek to protect such a 'capacity to act', they become ag uarantee for diversity and disparity (Höffe 1996,p .6 7). This has nothing to do with the 'imperialism' of an 'Americanway of life',but instead with the circumstances of the possibility of ad iversity.H öffe mentionsa' transcendental exchange' that, similar to Rawls's 'veil of ignorance',c onstructs an intelligible decision-taking situation: Transcendentality is that which one implicitlyaffirms,provided that one always seeks what one wills; transcendental means the circumstances, that one can have and pursue normal interests. ( Höffe 1996,p .77) To put it another way, whoever claims the entitlement to be otherwise in society, must also claim 'human rights'.The concept propounded by Höffe should not be seen as afinal justification. Nevertheless the criteria of reciprocity (as propounded by Forst) and of intersubjective communicability are fulfilled.

Transcendental tolerance education
In 1995,two years after the first appearance of Huntington's ClashofCivilizations, UNESCO publishedi ts explanation of tolerance: Article 1: Meaningo ft olerance 1.1T olerance is respect,a cceptancea nd appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures,o ur forms of expression and ways of beingh uman. It is fosteredb yk nowledge, openness,communication and freedom of thought,conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmonyi nd ifference.I ti snot onlyamoral duty,i ti salso apolitical and legalr equirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peacepossible,contributestothe replacement of the culture of war by ac ulture of peace. (UNESCO 1995) In this definition, UNESCO lays great hope upon school education in general, and philosophicalt eachingi nh igher education in particular. This was underscored by the publication of the UNESCO program 'Philosophy,aSchool of Freedom' (UNESCO 2007). Even in the curriculums in the schools of manyEuropean countries, 'tolerance' is recognized as an educational objective in philosophical schooling (Bruening 1998).The representativeso ft he subjects for school curriculums themselvesevenpromoted such expectant behavior.The possibilityisemphasizedo fb ringingt ogether young people of various cultures and origins in a mutual, normative discourse.
But,what exactlycan philosophyeducation and the cultivation of tolerance contributetosociety?Essentially, twoforms of tolerance education can be differentiated: the first model represents 'tolerance educational content',i nw hich a 'canon' of behavior and forms of life to be tolerateda nd accepted is communicated; and the second model can be designated as 'transcendental tolerance education'.The latter concept provides no obligatory content,but attempts to promote the circumstances of the possibilities of discernment and tolerance. Basically, the matter revolvesa round a 'reorientation' of attitudes and thinking, understood as an explanation of terminologyand categories, as well as anynonpreconceivedr esultso ft he discussions of individual queries.
Acontextual education in tolerance, understood as apresentation of explicit norms, maybeindispensable. This applies to instructions in legal and statutory affairs, as well as to integration in alreadye xisting social and cultural circumstances.P hilosophical reflection is, however, ap riori unbiased. In 'teaching methodology',t his difficulty is, however,d escribed as a 'values communicative dilemma' (Tiedemann 2015,p p. 23-29).
"We lovep eople who says traight out what they mean, provided they think on lines like us".Thiswas said to be propounded by Mark Twain and shows that it requires several mutes to conduct real philosophic education. Philosophyi s not the administrator of aselective level of ideas: it is the call to thinkingfor ourselves, and the cultivation of that habit.The radicalismo ft he philosophical sapere aude manifests itself in its principle of incompatibility with normative targeted goals. Thisa lso applies to the issuance of legislative and constitutional texts.
Whoever postulates thatp hilosophical reflection leads to ap rimacy of democracy,h uman rights and humanism is in error.O fc ourse, antidemocratic drafts can be convincingly justified and manyp hilosophersw ered efinitelyn ot democrats. Is Plato'si dea of the philosophical tyrant inacceptable because it is antidemocratic?S houldaschool pupil who, after thorough reconstruction and critical reflection, aligns him-or herself with Plato, receive a 'bad' grade? Certainlyn ot.The dogmatic communication of abasic-value canon and the naturalness of philosophicaleducation are contradictorilyopposed. Aphilosophical accomplishment can be measured by the quality of its argumentation and not by compliancew ith 'political correctness'.
What effect,t herefore, does transcendental tolerance education produce? Let us commencew ith the explanation of categorical terminology and differentiations. An example might be the differentiation propounded by ImmanuelKant between 'knowledge,opinion and faith'.Eventhe understanding of this differentiation alone can cultivatet he circumstances for the possibilityo ft olerance. Whoever has perfectlyu nderstood that the essence of faith is the fact that it is sufficientlycredible for the faithful, without requiringany form of substantiation by others, obtains as tronglye ffective dogmatism prophylaxis.
It is alsopossible that for an understanding of tolerance itself, philosophical education can provide valuable perceptions. The initial benefit is the possibility of being able to counteract the inflationary,non-binding and thus worthless application of the term 'tolerance'.Its derivation from the Latin root tolerare shows the necessity of having to bear or suffer an unliked issue. Therefore, tolerance must be justified. It is the same for both those who claim tolerance, and those who reject tolerance: bothh avet oe xplain their reasons in discussion. Only those argumentst hat can be communicated reciprocallyo ri ntersubjectively will be acknowledged. 'We always did it like that' or 'Id on ot want that' are, in fact,noarguments at all. Provided that the arguments are sufficientlyconvincing,the dispute is then settled. In the case of tolerance, atendencytoarejection of the disputed issue remains. The argument is in itself acceptable, but not its claim.
Of particular relevance in this respect,isthe unbiased discussion of concrete cases of conflict: Mayahijacked aircraft be shot down?I st he circumcision of boys and youths inacceptable without medicali ndication?A re burkasasign of culturaldiversity or an attack on aliberal society?Should 'consumingembryonic research' be permitted?Shouldaliberal democratic nation state be allowed to imposeobligatory healthcare insurance upon its citizens?How voluntary may marriages be? Are honor and respect benefits that need to be earned, or is everyone entitled to them?When and wherecan public religious ceremoniesbetolerated?H ow much tolerance should as tate-run school system displayf or immigrant traditions and customs?M ay an individual be ad ual citizen of botha democratic and an undemocratic nation state? Queriessuch as these can be explained, analyzed and interpreted between partieso fd ifferent cultural and religious traditions.
Within the context of am ulti-culturals ociety,philosophical teachingi nt he curriculums of schools obtains aquite particularsignificance for the arbitration of conflicts. How can the voluntary action of an individual wayoflife and collective integration be guaranteed?H ow can incursions be hindered?D oes not history show thatpolitical and cultural communities tend to bind their members to themselvesa ll too often by the selection and manipulation of informationorby primitive compulsion?Who is going to protect the individual from his owncommunity?P ascal Brucknerr eproachedt hoser epresentativeso fanaïvem ulticulturalism for being anti-racist racists. Bruckners peakso fa' paradoxofm ulticulturalism',inwhich all the various communities are grantedthe same treatment, but not their members, because they refuse them the freedom of renouncing their own traditions (Bruckner 2007,p .5 8).
Indeed, an example of negative dialectic looms at this point.T he heart of racism is to reducet he individual down to its affiliation to an ethnic or cultural sphere. There is alsoadifferentiation between 'persecution racism' and 'neglect racism'.Recent German history producedanexample of the cruelest persecution racism in form of the Holocaust.T he human rights of millions of individuals weret rampledo n, because of ar eduction to members of at argetg roup of hostility.The rule of persecution racism says: 'We infringe upon your human rights, because youb elong to ac ertain group of people'.I no rder to prevent such barbarism from ever again raising its head, meticulous effortsa re made,especially in Europe, at not discriminating against racial or culturalg roups.This is quite right and desirable, as the primacy of individual rights mayn ot be relativized. Otherwise, 'neglect racism' is encouraged, which again reduces an individual down to his affinitytoagroup. The rule of neglect racism says: 'We will not protect your human rights, because youb elong to ac ertain group of people'.
Even UNESCO takes up the position that tolerance and multicultural cohabitation should be subjected to bindingrules and regulations. In its Declaration of Principleso nT olerance, the following is pronounced: 1.2 Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. Tolerancei s, abovea ll, an active attitude promptedb yrecognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.Innocircumstancecan it be used to justify infringements of these fundamentalv alues. (UNESCO 1995) Nevertheless,such aproclamation is far from being alegitimization. The indication that numerous nation states had voluntarilyo bligated themselvest oc omplying with such principles is, of course, ap roper contractual argument-but it loses its bindingquality with the arrival of every new generation after the ratification, who did not personally and activelypolitically ratify the voluntary obligation. The bindingeffect of human rights maybequite natural for some,but it is unfortunately not self-evident. "Reasonable people have no doubt about certain things".J ulian Nida-Ruemelin used this citation from Wittgenstein at the end of his speech to the Congress of the German Philosophical Society in 2014.But even if this remark can be applauded as aposition of 'ethical realism', the problem is far from being resolved. Do not reasonable people reveal their reasonableness by providingaccountability for their decisions and values, and seek to reach others with the unconstrained constraint of ab etter argumentation? Shouldn ot perhaps pure reason be developed and trained?
In this sense, philosophical education is the communication of an elementary 'culturalt echnique' of human wayo fl ife (Martens 2003). The teachingo f philosophya nd ethics are forums for training of 'giving and taking reasons'. Their aims are not to indoctrinate values,b ut to negotiate these on the basis of reciprocal argumentation.I nt his aspect,e thics are morei mportant for the Dalai Lama thanr eligion (Dalai Lama 2015).
Fort he representativeso faconservative communication of values, all this maywell be toolittle.Fromthe aspect of didactical theory,transcendental tolerance education remains without an alternative.T he nurturing of attitudes and philosophical education are not compatible with one another.I na ddition, the outlook on success far exceeds even speculation: the previouslym entioned 'moral judgment test' of GeorgL ind measures the willingness and capability of appreciating arguments that are directed against one'so wn standpoint.O n this basis, numerous empirical studies werea ble to show that the aforementioned capabilities werea ble to be significantlye nhanced ( Lind 2003). In the teachingo fp hilosophya nd ethics,e xactlyt his happens.The school pupils justify their position and then explain what arguments of the counterparty they can accept or reject.With al ittle good fortune, an attitude is formed that Voltaire called 'the philanthropy of intelligence'.The wayi nt his direction leadsp hilosophical education towards being aform of transcendental tolerance education.
The hope and adumbration of UNESCO is anything but unjustified. Philosophical education by itself cannot stop the 'clash of civilizations'-but its contribution is, however,indispensable. Without anycritical analysis of adominant paradigm, without ad efenseo fu niversalism and without anye ducation of discernment and transcendental tolerance, afurther induration of the clash of cultures is not to be avoided.