Globalization, Inequalities and Justice

The considerable inequities and exclusions that exist in our globalized world call for a global framework to deal with them. In particular, the problem of methodological nationalism, citizenship and exclusion from the entitlement to many basic rights (both social and political) in national constitutions is stressed. The consolidation of a global institution (or network of institutions) is presented as necessary; one that, overcoming the discrimination between person and citizen, might watch over and defend fundamental rights, enabling them to become effective rights for all persons, irrespective of the place where they were born and the place where they happen to be. The aim of a just distribution not only of wealth but, in general, of the benefits that globalization has to offer requires institutional reforms that depend on a renewed perspective of global constitutionalism. This in turn demands a new approach leaving behind the confrontation between uniform universalist visions and closed multiculturalisms. Globalization is one of the most controversial phenomena of the contemporary world. Since the end of the last century, it has been regarded by some as a source of prosperity of nations; others, by contrast, see it as the origin of new inequalities between and within nations, hence as fostering global injustice. Yet others view it as a space of power, negotiation and cooperation for the construction of a new global order. We cannot conceive of the development of globalization without the scientific-technological revolution that required a redesigning of nation states, whose frontiers were being eroded as a result of the development of digital information and communication technologies (Castells 1996). These gave rise to information flows and knowledge networks that surpassed the territorial controls of states, and these, in order to maintain their international competitiveness and quotas of power in the world system, had to opt for the formation of regional blocs. Hence, the world was restructured with growing international economic interdependence and an increasing differentiation in development between regions. In the final decades of the twentieth century, the division of global power between two parts—capitalist and socialist—became a thing of the past and, although the United States has continued to exert a strong presence, other imporElisabetta Di Castro, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) OpenAccess. © 2018 Elisabetta Di Castro, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-010 tant nuclei of power have emerged. Likewise the East-West conflict took on new characteristics and was joined by a new disjunction: the North-South divide (Kennedy, 1993 and 2008). The nation states were obliged to promote the liberalization of national markets in goods and services, as well as liberalizing their financial systems, although it must be stressed that national labor markets remained within the narrow margin of each nation state. The great world power intensified its control over the arbitration of regional conflicts—with actions that on many occasions violated international law—and the nation states gave impulse to the creation of supra-national centers of regulation, such as the WTO, and strengthened others, such as the IMF. One of the consequences of the globalization process has been the crisis of the nation state, which questions the traditional significances of sovereignty and citizenship that are implicated in it and which were once a factor of inclusion and equality, present since its origins.1 While the nation state and citizenship came to be regarded as global norms (to the degree that a considerable proportion of the world’s population was living in democratic nation states), the end of the Cold War heralded the appearance of a new world order in which a hierarchy between states became manifest (Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles 2003). The hierarchy of states that characterizes this emerging world order is in accordance with the level of dependence of each in relation to the superpower, as likewise the differing degrees of power they have among themselves, which may vary considerably. Stephen Castles called this new order the ‘hierarchical nationstate system’; its structure can be understood as a set of concentric circles around a dominant superpower. In correspondence with the differing degrees of power (in cultural, economic, military and political terms) wielded by nation states, their populations are subject to a similar hierarchy of rights and freedoms —a situation that Castles refers to as one of ‘hierarchical citizenship’. In this sense, we may say that the dominant development in our globalized world is one of hierarchization, and hence of inequality and exclusion. In contrast with the liberal supposition that all citizens are equal and free persons (irrespective of their belonging to specific groups), in reality, citizenship has always been differentiated in nation states, based on criteria of origin, ethnic identity, race, class and gender. This tendency has become more acute with globalization, and in particular with the increase in international migration and  As Luigi Ferrajoli has pointed out, the changes linked to this crisis should not lead us to the advent of new types of sovereignty and citizenship as many have proposed, but rather, in the long term, to a change of paradigm—both at the international and state levels—to the extent that the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship will inevitably remain connected to relations of inclusion-exclusion in states and between peoples and persons (Ferrajoli, 1998 and 2001). 124 Elisabetta Di Castro

Globalization is one of the most controversialp henomena of the contemporary world. Since the end of the last century,ithas been regarded by some as asource of prosperity of nations; others, by contrast,s ee it as the origin of new inequalities between and within nations, hence as fosteringglobal injustice. Yeto thers view it as aspaceofpower,negotiationand cooperation for the construction of a new global order.
We cannot conceive of the development of globalization without the scientific-technological revolution that required ar edesigningo fn ation states, whose frontiers were being eroded as aresultofthe development of digital informationand communication technologies (Castells 1996). These gave rise to informationf lows and knowledge networks that surpassed the territorial controls of states,a nd these, in order to maintain their international competitiveness and quotas of power in the world system, had to opt for the formation of regional blocs. Hence, the world was restructured with growingi nternational economic interdependence and an increasing differentiation in development between regions.
In the final decades of the twentieth century, the division of global power between twop arts-capitalista nd socialist-became at hing of the past and, although the United States has continued to exert as trongpresence, other impor-tant nucleio fp ower have emerged. Likewiset he East-West conflict took on new characteristics and was joined by an ew disjunction: the North-South divide (Kennedy, 1993and 2008. The nation stateswereobliged to promotethe liberalization of national markets in goods and services,aswell as liberalizing theirfinancial systems, although it must be stressed thatn ationall abor markets remainedw ithin the narrowm argin of each nation state.The great world power intensified its control over the arbitration of regional conflicts-with actions that on manyo ccasions violatedi nternational law-and the nation states gave impulse to the creation of supra-national centers of regulation, such as the WTO, and strengthened others, such as the IMF. One of the consequences of the globalization process has been the crisis of the nation state, which questions the traditional significances of sovereignty and citizenship thata re implicated in it and which wereo nce af actor of inclusion and equality,p resent since its origins.¹ While the nation state and citizenship came to be regarded as globaln orms (to the degreet hataconsiderable proportion of the world'spopulation wasliving in democratic nation states), the end of the ColdWar heralded the appearance of anew world order in which ahierarchy between states became manifest (Castles and Davidson2 000;C astles 2003).
The hierarchyofstatesthat characterizes this emerging world order is in accordance with the level of dependence of each in relation to the superpower,as likewise the differing degrees of power they have among themselves, which may vary considerably. Stephen Castlescalled this new order the 'hierarchical nationstate system';i ts structure can be understood as as et of concentric circles around ad ominant superpower.I nc orrespondence with the differing degrees of power (in cultural, economic, military and political terms) wieldedb yn ation states,theirpopulations are subject to asimilar hierarchyofrights and freedoms -as ituation that Castles refers to as one of 'hierarchical citizenship'.I nt his sense, we mays ay that the dominant development in our globalized world is one of hierarchization, and hence of inequality and exclusion.
In contrast with the liberals upposition that all citizens are equal and free persons (irrespective of their belongingtospecific groups), in reality,citizenship has always been differentiated in nation states,basedoncriteria of origin, ethnic identity,race, class and gender.This tendencyhas become more acute with globalization,a nd in particular with the increase in international migration and  As LuigiF errajoli has pointedo ut,the changesl inked to this crisis should not lead us to the advent of new types of sovereignty and citizenship as manyh avep roposed, but rather,i nt he long term, to ac hange of paradigm-both at the international and statel evels-to the extent that the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship will inevitablyr emain connectedt or elations of inclusion-exclusion in states and between peoples and persons (Ferrajoli, 1998 and2001). transnationalism. The typicalc ategories of differentiation of citizenship within nation states are: 'full citizens' born in the country, 'naturalizedm igrants', 'legal residents', 'undocumented residents', 'asylum seekers', 'ethnic minorities', 'indigenous peoples' and 'groups discriminated against on the basis of gender'.² In the differentiation of citizenship rights in the international sphere, five levels can be distinguished: the citizensofthe United States;the citizens of other highly developedcountries;the citizens of countries in transition and recentlyindustrialized;t he citizens of less developed countries;a nd non-citizens (without doubt the worst possible situation in aw orld made up of nation states).³ There is ac lose link between these two types of hierarchization of citizenship, that is to sayt he intra-state and the international hierarchies:b eing an ative of ac ountry with ah ighp osition on the international citizenship hierarchy mayw elll ead to ah ighp osition in the hierarchies of other nations; thus, while few migrantsf rom highlyd eveloped countries end up as undocumented migrants or asylum seekers,manypeople from low levels of the international hierarchydoend up in alow position on the national scale of their country of destination. Besides, it must be considered that the greater prevalence of discourses about the naturalness of violence and chaos, and transnationalr acism, clearly playarole in the assignation of groups to asubordinatenational status (Castles 2003).⁴ In view of this situation it is worth rememberingthat,atleast on the normative plane, since the 1940s, with the United Nations Chartera nd the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both the concept of citizenship and the principle of state sovereignty have been supersededb yt he creation of as upranational order in which nation statesb ecame subject to norms, and citizenship ceased to be the sole basis of rights conceivedo fa sv ital (and which are thoset hat allow the enjoymento fo therr ights, such as maye veni nclude thato fc itizenship); rights that ought to belong to each person, irrespective of whereh eo r she was born or happens to be. Obviously, this occurred onlyo nt he normative plane since,a sw eh aves een, in international relations todayt he principle of  While legal discrimination against women is now less common (although still found in some parts of the South), institutional and informal discrimination against them persists.  Persons can be non-citizens for various reasons: because they live in ac ountry in which the stateh as disintegrated and lack anyk ind of protection against rival armed factions;b ecause their country is defined by the United States as a 'proscribed country';o rb ecause they arer efugees that were deprivedoftheir original citizenship when fleeing, and the statewhere they are seekinga sylum denies them citizenship or even the right to remain.  Forabroader development of the relation between migration and rights,see Di Castro(2012b).
Globalization, Inequalities and Justice sovereignty and the exclusive vision of citizenship still hold sway. In this respect, as LuigiF errajoli has remarked: […]sovereignty is now no morethan alegalblack hole, its rule beingthe absenceofrules or,inother words,the lawofthe strongest.Asregards citizenship, this has become the ultimatep ersonal privilege, the ultimatef actor of discrimination and the last survivingp remodern relicofdifferentiations by status;assuch, it contravenes the much acclaimed universality and equality of fundamental rights. ( Ferrajoli 1998, p. 178) In spite of their deficiencies and of the critiques that can be directed against them, the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be seen as comprisinganembryonic global constitution. Of course, this constitution, though formally established, still lacks institutional guarantees-thatis to sayt he adequate instruments for activatingt hoser ights-these comprising preciselyo ne of the main pendingt asks of global justice. To achievet hat,a changeo fp aradigm would be required, which in the long term leadst othe 'superseding' of citizenship and the 'denationalization' of rights because,a sF errajoli had alreadyglimpsed before the turn of the century,itwill not be feasible in the long run to maintain the coexistenceo f" rich and comfortable democracies with secure standards of living alongside famine and misery in the rest of the world" (1998, p. 183).
This supersedingofcitizenship and denationalization of rights ought to lead to the future consolidation of aglobal constitution in which fundamental rights would be universal, recognizedf or all persons as such; hence, having lost their mooringsi nc itizenship, they would have to be supervised not onlyw ithin, but beyond and even in opposition to nation states.Here, fundamental rights are to be understood as not onlyt he classical human rights or first-generation human rights, but alsol aterf ormulations, such as: […]a ll those rights which must be guaranteedi no rder to ensuree quality in relation with the faculties, needs and expectations that are assumed as essential; to link the forms and contents of democracytothose faculties, needs and expectations;toensurepeaceful coexistence; and finallytooperateaslawsofthe weakest as against the lawofthe strongest that would rule in their absence. (Ferrajoli 2007,p .2 84) Ferrajoli explains how modern lawwas characterized initiallybythe principle of 'formal legality':alegal norm, whatever its content,e xists and is valid on account of the wayi nw hich it was formulated, thus leaving aside the traditional visions of legality as conferred by the justiceo rr ationalityi ntrinsic in the norm. Later,t he principle of 'substantial legality' was incorporated, by which lawi ss ubject to conditionsn ot merelyf ormal but also substantial, imposed by the fundamental principles and rights established in constitutions.The incor-poration of this second principle took place following the Second World War when, both on the nationala nd international plane, the meaning 'arose' of a 'constitution' as the limit and bond to which the public powers are subject,a s substantivenorms guaranteeingboththe division of powers and the fundamental rights of all individuals, which had been negated by fascism. As ac onsequence, rigid constitutions weretobecome aregular feature of the legal systems of democratic states,along with the subjection of nation states to conventions on human rights in international law( which, as has alreadyb een pointed out,d o not yete njoy the legal forcet hat would be accorded ag lobalc onstitution). Hence, in as ystem with ar igid constitution, an orm is valid not onlyb ecause of being in forcea nd having been issued in accordance with the formsp redisposed for its production, but also because its substantial contents respect the fundamental principles and rights established in the constitution.
It must be underlined that the entitlement to rights plays acrucial role in the subjectweare dealing with because existing legal systems have not included all persons as enjoying that status. Although various criteria have existed for setting some human beingsa part from the status that would enable them to be titleholderso farecognized normativity-which historicallyh as been subjectt od ifferent limitations and discriminations-todayo nlyt wo basic differences exist that still delimit the equality of persons: citizenship and capacity to act.O n the basis of these differences, nowadays twoi mportant divisions can be distinguishedinconstitutions:the division between 'rights of the person' and 'rights of the citizen' (whether entitlement belongst oa ll persons or onlyt ocitizens); and the division between 'primary (or substantial) rights' and 'secondary (instrumental or of autonomy) rights' (whetherentitlement belongstoall persons or onlyto those who have capacity to act). Hence, an initial classification is formed that is subjective to the degreet hati ta ttends to subjects to whom are attributed, and who receive,t he expectations of ar ight (whether they are persons or citizens); and as econd classification is formed that is objective in the sense that it rests on the behavior of subjects that make up the selectedc ategory (whether or not they have capacity to act).
When we cross these two basicdivisions, four classes of fundamental rights come into view: 1. The primary rights of persons, whether or not they are citizens or have or do not have capacity to act (These includet he right to life and the integrity of the person, personal liberty,f reedom of consciencea nd freedom to express their opinions, the right to health and education and the penal guarantees.); 2. The primary rights accorded onlyt oc itizens, whether or not they enjoy capacity to act (These include the right to movement within the national terri-tory,tomeeting and association, the right to work, to subsistence and assistance for those who are unable to work.); 3. The secondary rights ascribed to all persons having capacity to act (among which stand out the power to negotiate, freedom to sign ac ontract,t o choose and changej obs, economic freedom, and in general all the potestative rights in which privateautonomyismanifested and upon which the market is founded); and 4. The secondary rights reserved onlyt ot hosec itizensw ith capacity to act (among which are the right to vote,t he right to accede to public office and, in general, all the potestative rights in which political autonomyi s manifested and upon which representation and political democracy are founded).
Thus, the distinction between person and citizen thatunderlies the fundamental rights recognizedi nt he local constitutions of each nation state is as ourceo f considerable inequalities and exclusions;⁵ to which must be added,a sw e have seen, thosed erived from the hierarchical system of the nation state that characterizes our globalized world. Hence, the proposal for aglobal justiceinaccordance with our times oughtt oinclude, even if in the long term, the formulation of aglobal constitution (or equivalent) in which the fundamental rights are guaranteed for all persons withoute xceptions. In this way, for Ferrajoli, justice could finallys top being am atter relegated to individual morality,toa cts of benevolence and sentiments of solidarity.⁶ But how can we arrive at the construction of this global justice? Onemust set off from the fact thatbasic questions regardingjusticearise when we evaluatea present situation as unjust.L uis Villoro (2007) proposed an egative path for understandingjusticefrom the awarenessofits absence: reflection on justicemust set off from some concrete reality,anexperience of suffering causedbyinjustice and the consequent perception that the damagesuffered in our relation with others has no justification, thus elicitingthe rejectionofanunjust situation and the  This is based on the assumptiont hat the rule of lawr eallye xists with its correspondinga dministration of justice-an assumption that also harks back to problems that arecrucial for the subject of inequality and exclusion that remain beyond the matters dealtw ith here.  Manyothers have also suggested this-the most outstandingbeingN ozick (1974), in the context of aminimal state, and Rawls(1999), as regards international relations.Torelegate justice to individualm orality,a cts of benevolencea nd sentiments of solidarity also takesu sback to crucial problems for the subjecto fi nequality and exclusion, sincem anya trocities and arbitrary acts were committed usingt hat as their pretext.F or ab roader development of the relation between rights and global justice, see Di Castro( 2010). determination to resist it.This negative routefor understandingj usticefrom the point of view of its absence has the virtue of concentratingo nc oncrete and diverse situations of injustice, rather than abstract universalisms that ignoret he historical, social and culturald ifferences that influencet he wayp eople live their dailylives. Likewise, Amartya Sen (2009) stresses the need to take specific situations of injusticea sthe starting point: the awareness that manifest injustices can be overcome is what impels social actors to promotechanges in society. Nevertheless,the feeling of injusticet hat mays ervea sasignal for mobilization always demands acritical examination. Atheory of justicethat aims to serveasa basis for practical reasoningmust include ways of judging how injusticeistobe reducedand how to advancetowards justice. The possibilityalsoexists of different arguments regarding justice passing the scrutinyo fc riticism and leading to divergent conclusions. This should, however,not weaken the commitment to the need for reasoning.
This negative approach to justicehas various antecedents-for example, the historical studybyBarrington Moore (1978)o ft he sentiment of injusticet hat on occasions,though not always,leadst othe rejection of an existing situation and the promotion of change. The starting point of Moore'sstudyisthat social coexistencehas always impliedproblems of coordination, among which those related with authority,t he division of labor and the distribution of goods and services stand out-problems that the members of society must resolve,s ince otherwise that society would cease to exist.Among social needs, Mooredistinguishes three aspectsi np articular: ac ausal relation as regards the ordinary temporal order (i. e., if the need is not satisfied something serious will happen); an element of inevitable choice (i. e., the society mays atisfy the need or fail to do so); and, in the caseofmanagingtosatisfy the need, avariety of forms mayexist for achieving this (which mayg enerate,i nt urn, diverse social inequalities which, it is hoped,willb ea ccepted). This studyc oncludes that social needso ri mperatives lead to moral imperativesa nd, through these, when they are violated, to moral outragea nd the feeling of injustice. But social rules and their violation are not sufficienta sfundamental components of moral affront and the sentiment of injustice. The latter alsoh as to be 'uncovered':p eople must perceive and define their situation as ac onsequenceo fahuman injustice-as as ituation that must not,c annot and need not be borne. This enables us to understand how there can be long periods in the history of peoples in which large social groups accept humiliating and unjust situations, and other periods in which they reject these situations and rebel.
Here, the difference between lawa nd justice takes on its full meaning:n ot every positive lawi sj ust,n or is every demand for justicet ransformed into law. As Javier Muguerza (2004) has pointed out,m oral demands, which are prior to law, are stated in the name of justice and it is intended that they materialize in ajustlaw.Nonetheless,not even in the latter do justiceand lawcoincide perfectly, since thereisalways the possibility of arriving at afairer lawthanany so far known. Muguerza points out that in the history of how the demands for justiceh avec ome to take form in positive law, the most importantt hing has been not so much consensus on the fairness of such laws (thereby making a clear referencet ot he cornerstone of the principal contemporary theories of justice), but rather the dissent in view of the injusticeundergone by those who were excluded from its enjoyment. Hence, when we speak of law, we are thinkingofan institutional fact; on the other hand,when we speak of justice we are thinkingin 'utopian' terms, of that horizon thatu rgesu st o' go forward',t o' make the law advance' so as to become fairer.
One of the most relevant examples of this fundamental differenceisthe history of the struggle for human rights-before their legal recognition, these were only 'moral demands' claiming justice. In this sense, for Muguerza, as long as justicei sa ni deal to be attained (like other ideals of humanity, such as peace or democracy), utopian thinkingw ill remain alive,a ccompanying societies in their development.W hat is involved is au topian form of thinking that does not confuse ideals with illusions,o rw hose struggle is distant from efficacyone that is, rather,c loselyl inked to the 'here and now of reality' setting off along a 'negative path'.Inother words, astruggle for ideals takes place through the rejection of its opposites.I nt he case of justicew hat is aimed at is the eradicationo fi njustices (justa sp eace is opposed to war and democracy to tyrannies). But even in the case of these struggles finallya chieving success, utopian thinking oughtn ot to disappear because, as Muguerza points out: […]ifbygood fortune some dayour world weretosee the instauration of apeace, ajustice and ademocracywidespread and reasonablystable, we would still have to be on our guard against somebodyorsomethingwith the power to summon up regressions, causingthe return of humanity to prehistory or its fallingi ntod ystopia. In other words, we must ensure that nobodyn or anym aterial situation be capable of transformingt he dreamso fr eason into nightmares. (Muguerza, 2013,3 1) As we have alreadyseen with Sen, atheory of justicethataims to serveasabasis for practical reasoning must includew ayso fj udging how injusticei st ob er educed and how to advancet owards justice, without ignoring the possibility of mutuallyo pposing claims arising,o ro fr easonable arguments leadingt od ivergent conclusions. Thus, areflection on justiceshould acknowledge the relevance of differences between social groups,aswellasthe concepts of domination and oppression. In this sense, it is worth mentioninga uthorss uch as Iris Marion Young (1990) who, far from pretending to elaborate acomprehensive and neces-sary theory of universalj ustice, proposes ar ational discourse on justice, the arguments of which cannot be considered definitive because they are directed at other persons and must remain open to their replies in as ituated political dialogue-they form an ormative reflection characterized by historical and social contextualization. In fact,c onstitutions and declarations of fundamental rights can be conceivedo fa ss yntheseso fs pecific historic-socio-cultural dynamics. As Giacomo Marramao(2008 and) has pointed out,far from reflectingsimple abstractions or ideal dimensions, these respond to actual processes of conquest and acquisition of values obtained, whether by hard-fought conflicts or compromise solutions.
The theories of justiceofthe past centurycentered basically on what had to be equaled between the citizens of astate, what sphere wastobeprioritized for seeking equality(in turn legitimatinginequalities in other spheres) and who are those to be included and who are to remain excluded. Suggestions have been made to equalize primary goods (Rawls 1971 and2001), capacities (Sen 1992 andNussbaum 2006), incomes (Van Parijs 1995), opportunities (Roemer1 998), and resources (Dworkin 2000), to mention just some of the main proposals. But today, it is insisted, the citizens and the state have ceased to be relevant because the living conditions of the subjects of justice do not depend solelyonthe political community of which they are citizens; therea re extraterritorial and/or non-territorial structures thath avea ni mportant impact on those conditions (Fraser 2008).
As we have seen, citizenship and states are not homogeneous but rather differentiated and hierarchized, which leadstoserious inequalities, discriminations and exclusions. Hence it is necessary to overcome 'explanatory nationalism' in order to understand the principal contemporary injustices, which can no longer be reducedt od omesticc ausal factors-such as the dominion of the local elites and the political weakness of the impoverishedm ajority-and which incorporate, for example, international economic and power relations (Pogge2 009). Likewise, in our globalized world, in which at ransition is taking place between am odernity characterized by an inter-state order undert he hegemonyo ft he West and one characterized by an ew supranational order in the process of being constructed multilaterally, the standard conception of the processes of universalization has been questioned. That conception takes as its reference two conditions linked to the beginning of modernity:e quivalence of culturea nd identity,a nd the uniformc onception of universalism. The latter in particular needs rethinkingifitistobeapplicable in aworld of multiplicityand difference: "it must be newlyformulated, taking as its starting point the awareness that-to borrow the celebrated words of Hamlet-thereare more ways towards liberty and democracy thana re dreamt of in our poor philosophy" (Marramao2 009, pp. 14 -15).
Let us take it by stages. There are two basic ways of conceptualizing the problem of culturald ifferences: on the one hand, therei sw hat has been called strongo rm osaic multiculturalism,a ccording to which human groups and cultures are well-delineateda nd identifiable totalities thatc oexist (although with clear frontiers) as if pieces of am osaic; on the other hand, different cultures can be regarded as constant creations,recreations and negotiations of imaginary frontiers between an 'us' and the 'other(s) ' (Benhabib 2002). In the latter case, the 'other' is always linked to the 'us';wecannot lose sight of the fact that 'oneself' can onlyexist as such in distinction from 'another'.Hence, we can conceive the various struggles of persons and groups as ad emand for respect,f reedom and equality,while each maintains as ense of 'oneself'.I nv iew of the cultural differences that characterize everydayc oexistence in almosta ll corners of the planet-the exchangeo fw hich has increased and acceleratedw ith the process of globalization-twoperspectivescan be adopted to accompanythe conceptions alreadymentioned. Thefirst is avision of cultures as clearlydefinable totalities: aview of the cultureunder studyasseen from the outside which generates acoherent imageofitwith the aim of understanding it,and at timesalsoofcontrolling it.I nt he second, on the contrary,t he vision is from within the culture, in which the participants experience their traditions, histories, rituals and symbols, tools and material conditions of life through shared narrative accounts, although also subjectt oc ontroversy and even susceptible of being overturned.⁷ The globalization process is not onlycharacterized by the increasinginterdependence of all nations and, in this sense, by as trong impulse towardsh omogenization-it has also led to aprocess of localization, and hence an insistenceon differences. In responsetothis, the term 'glocalization' has made its appearance in recognition of the fact that the tendencies toward homogenization and heterogenization, far from confronting each other,t ake each other'se xistencef or granted. In fact,a sR oland Robertson (2000) has emphasized, in various areas of contemporary life, both homogeneity and heterogeneity combine, as do universalism and particularism. The dichotomies 'we/others', 'West/East' and 'North/South' maskaconsiderable diversityi ne ach of these poles;t herei sn o single 'we',n or 'West',n or 'North' confronting ad iscrete 'other', 'East' or 'South'.S uch simplifying stereotypes must be left behind, with the understanding that they are mere indicators that include within each extreme aplurality of  Forabroader development of the relation between identities and justice, see Di Castro (2012a).
phenomena. As Marramao has pointed out,the monolithic representation of culture postulates areified imageofcivilizations as monolithic entities, thus preparing afertile soil for the arising of fundamentalisms. Hence, the need arises to go beyond these visions and to confront the crisis of the two models of modern democratic inclusion: both the republican model thata ssimilates differences in aneutral space of citizenship without belonging, and the strongmulticultural model in the 'mosaic' sense. Thus, against the universalism of identity postulated by the conceptions of citizenship by assimilation and the anti-universalist differentialism postulated by the stronga versions of multiculturalism,t he author proposes ac osmopolitanism of difference that,d rawing on multidisciplinary studies of comparative lawa nd cultural anthropology, sets about outlining possible codes for an intercultural democracy based on multi-polar and mestizo law.
The identity characteristic of present global conflicts cause them to manifest ag reater proximity to the fundamental conflicts that had marked the civil wars of religion in the phase before Westphalia thant hose typical conflicts of the industrial era(Marramao2003 and Sen 2006). Against this, the tradition of modern rationalism-even in its noblest forms, such as the Kantian ethical universalism and legal guaranteeism-seems to lack by itself the capacity to find asolution to the conflicts of our times and to contributetobuilding a 'cosmopolitan republic'. In as imilar sense to Sen'sr eflections on the concept of democracy,⁸ Marramao states,q uoting Raimon Panikkar( 2008), that: […]t he house of the universal is still not ready;i th as to be constructedm ultilaterally. We cannot saytoothers: 'come on and be guests in our house; integrateand let yourselvesbe annexed to our civilization of law'.Onthe contrary,itisnecessary to negotiateanew common space: together to build anew house of the universal. If our view of other contexts of experiencew erel ess vitiated by prejudices, we might become awareo ft he existencei n other regions of the world of conceptions of liberty and dignity of persons just as noble as ours (or at least not less respectable). (Marramao 2009,p .2 6) One characteristic that accompanies the history of the nation state is the process of assimilationt hat has tendedt ob lot out community identities, but which in manycases has led to these resistinginunderground forms, with occasional explosions of violence. Hence, we should not be surprised that one of the main problems of contemporary political theory has to do with the conflicts of recognition and their relation with conflicts of redistribution. If we set off from arad- Sen has pointedtothe undue appropriation of values by the West,which responds to "aserious lack of attention to the intellectual history of non-westernsocieties,onthe other,tothe conceptual defect of conceivingdemocracy substantiallyinterms of votesand elections,instead of the broad perspective of public discussion" (Sen 2010,p .40). ical democratic interpretation of the principle of equal value, as does Nancy Fraser (2008), the most general significance of justiceo ught to be parity in participation, and overcoming injusticew ould be am atter of dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some from being able to participateinequality with others. It is here that the political takesonaspecial relevance, to the degree that it provides the scenario in which to develop strugglesfor bothredistribution and recognition. This has to be thoughto ut on ag lobal level, giving particular emphasis to the problems of inequality and exclusion, not onlybetween nations but also within them. Hence, far from remainingc onfined within the narrow sphere of the state, rethinkingj ustice todayr equires considering it on different scales and levels, bothabove and below the state, which introduces alsothe recognition of adiversity of agents and powers, not onlypolitical parties and public agencies.
History has also shown that the attempt to imposeastandard model, ethnocentric and hegemonic, of modernization is doomed inevitablytoproduce an extension and deepening of conflicts.Thus, an adequate policy towards the 'others' cannot be the 'exportation of freedom',b ut should instead be ap olicy favoring the emergence of processesf osteringr ights and democracy,o nt he basis of autonomous paths and methods: […]weshould be moreopen to what an old and illustrious anthropology called 'functional equivalents',t akinga so ur program as ubsequent,d ecisive theoretical task: to graduate from the method of comparison to the politics of translation… We should be capable of detecting in other cultures principles,values, normative criteria, of equal value although defined in different ways from our own: without yieldingtothe temptation of imposingupon them our own definitions,onceagainfraudulentlypositingthe old Manicheandivision between good and bad. (Marramao 2009,p p. 29 -30) The principal contemporaryconflicts and injustices, therefore, demand that historical dynamics be oriented towards ap atht ranscendingi dentities postulated as closedo rh omogeneous. Ap olitics of translation and ac osmopolitanism of differencec ould make the globalization process as pace for negotiation and cooperation oriented towardst he construction of al ess unjust world.