Who Are the Subjects of Justice in a Globalized World? From the ‘ Unidimensional Identity ’ to the ‘ Diversity of Identities ’

: This article states that the idea of national citizenship, bound to rights and duties circumscribed to a State, is no longer fit to reflect upon the political challenges of a globalizing world. Instead, I argue in favor of the ‘ diversity of identities ’ as a ‘ political heuristic ’ that offers an alternative frame to the question about who is the subject of justice. Our current understanding of the political and social action lacks of something: the concept of a citizen that we inherit from Modernity — the citizen as the subject of rights and duties — doesn ’ t let us explain its current dynamics in a globalizing world. Problems such as migration, refugees and contemporary social movements, among others, have led us to problematize two ideas associated with that concept: a) citizenship is defined based on exclusively national rights and duties, that is, those which are circumscribed to a politically and geographically well limited territory; and b) a State ’ s citizens are the only subjects for whom justice is understood as the equal distribution of those rights and duties. But the paradigms of national citizenship and just distribution are being undermined by globalization ’ s dynamics, since we are shown that their effects are transna-tional and that the expressions against these effects can also have a global character. This context rushes us to find new forms of understanding for those transformations, as well as the political action of people. To meet this challenge, this work argues in favor of the idea of the ‘ diversity of identities ’ as a way to understand people close to their concrete experiences of injustice, and as a ‘ political heuristic ’ that lets us offer an alternative frame to national citizenship as an answer to the question about who are the subjects of justice in a globalizing world.

Our current understanding of the political and social action lacks of something: the concept of acitizen that we inherit from Modernity-the citizenasthe subject of rights and duties-doesn'tlet us explain its current dynamics in aglobalizing world. Problems such as migration, refugees and contemporarys ocial movements, among others, have led us to problematize two ideas associatedw ith that concept:a )c itizenship is defined based on exclusively national rights and duties,thatis, thosewhich are circumscribed to apoliticallyand geographically well limited territory;and b) aState'scitizensare the onlysubjects for whom justice is understood as the equal distribution of those rights and duties.B ut the paradigms of national citizenship and just distribution are being undermined by globalization'sd ynamics, since we are shown that their effects are transnational and that the expressions against these effects can also have aglobal character.Thiscontext rushes us to find new forms of understanding for those transformations, as well as the political action of people. To meet this challenge, this work argues in favorofthe idea of the 'diversity of identities' as away to understand people close to their concrete experiences of injustice, and as a 'political heuristic' thatlets us offer an alternative frame to national citizenship as an answer to the question about who are the subjects of justiceinaglobalizingworld.

Af irst answer: the 'national who'
The concept of citizenship has al ong tradition, from its formulation until its most recent criticisms. It is not my intention to make ac ritical balance of this long tradition or its different meanings.I nstead, Iw ill adopt as ar eference point the political idea of 'person' developed by John Rawls (who interprets citizenship in as pecific way, which Iwill hereafter call 'unidimensional identity'), to arguet hat such an interpretation contributes to the theoretical impasse in which we currentlyfind ourselves: having to reflect upon the political dynamics of globala nd diverse effects using homogenous concepts from nationalf rames; or,a sB enhabib would write, discovering ourselvesa s" travelers sailing an unknown territory,with the help of oldm aps,m ade in different moments and in response to different needs." (Benhabib 2005,p .1 17)T hose 'old maps' are the concepts of citizenship and the Nation-State as the frames through which people'spolitical action has been interpreted, and on which the struggles for justice have been staged. Letussee then the distinctivenotes of the person as citizen in the Rawlsian theory.
Within Rawls'sw ide conceptual plot thatp uts togethert heory of justicea s equity,t he political conception of the person is key,b ecause its characteristics enable political agreementa bout basic justiceq uestions that consolidatet he construction of ar easonablyfair society.A ccording to this purpose, Rawls models his political understanding of the person as "someone who can be ac itizen, that is, an ormal and cooperative memberofs ociety through al ifetime." (Rawls 1996,p.18) Rawls tells us thatthis is aconception that starts in the public political culture, impressed on the fundamental texts of ademocracy, and also comes from our daily notion of people as basic units of thought,c hoice and responsibility.Whatt urns it into an ormative conception is thati te mphasizes certain characteristics that allow making people as citizens ak ey elementt oa chieve ar easonablyf air society.One of these characteristics is the distinction between 'public identity' and 'moral identity'.The former is conceivedofonlyinreference to the political rights and duties accordingt oi ts shared statuso fc itizenship, whereas the latter includes deeper commitments in people bound to values and principles of areasonable, comprehensive doctrine (religious, moral, philosophical).
Values and principles that form moral identitya re so importantt op eople that they could even represent an obstacle to the agreement upon apolitical conception of justicef it to ad emocracy.Too vercome this hurdle, Rawls states that public identity has apriorityfunction to reach such an agreement,because only from its perspective could we make the distinction between our commitments derivedfrom areasonable, comprehensive doctrineand those that we acquireas citizens. This doesn'tmean that we are supposed to be two different persons; we all are at the same time am oral person within ac omprehensive doctrine and a citizen in the public environment-but to Rawls: […]wecan onlyhope to achieveaconstitutional liberal democracyifwemanage to distinguish between aprivatesphereand apublic sphereor, as he says,between the shared culture (background culture)and the public environment (public forum). (Dreben 2002,p.325) Out of the priority of public identity abovem oral identity,t he political conception of the person is akey elementtoagreeing upon apolitical conception of justice, because people, as citizens, by prioritizing their public identity assure the fulfilling of their freedom and political rights, as well as the freedom to practice their own understandingofg ood. This priority guarantees,onthe one hand, the full preservation of their person irrespective of anyalleged wellbeing and, on the other hand, thatt heiri deas of good mayh avet he samec onsideration and respect as those of anyo ther.T he fact of reasonable pluralism alsof orces them to privilegep ublic identity,b ecause in the same measure they are not able to reach an agreement on anyb ase or moral rank (and even doing so would bring undesirable consequences)-onlyt heir goals and political commitments would allow the finding of ap oint of shared agreement.T his doesn'tm ean that people as citizens must abandon all comprehensive doctrines in the quest for agreement.P riority states thatt hey must be framed inside the limits of the political conception of justice, to promotethat the social order guarantees adiagram of liberties and equal rights for all, and to avoid that their comprehensive doctrines can gett oe xercise ac oactive power through the State. Distinguishing the field of influenceofbothidentities, and giving priority to the public identity, is astrategythathelps guarantee ashared status as freeand equal citizens within the frame of aN ation-State that will be in charge of solving every conflict of basic justice, by meansoft he political idea of justiceagreed by the people conceivedo fa scitizens.
The political conception of the person and its emphasis on publicidentityis thus ap aradigmatic example of citizenship as the 'national who' of justice, because the latter,u nderstood as am easure of distribution( of income, liberties, rights among others), is exclusivelya ddressed to those on the inside of the Nation-State, which in due time becomes the legitimate scale for expressing and solving possiblec onflicts of justice-even if aw idening of rights and liberties is demanded or the current measure of distribution is questioned. The onlyr elevant subjects of justicei nb oth cases are the people conceivedo fa sn ational citizens. Further,t his 'national who' not onlyd etermines the rights and duties of the people considered citizens, but also the languagewith which these people express themselvesand formulate their demands for justice, so that an argument between people thus conceivedofand theState is valid onlyifthey interrogate it about the measurement of distribution; that is, the current conception of justice. Whatever is found outside this environment,such as the cultural dimensions of acknowledgement,the problems of economic inequity, or the political exclusion due to gender reasons, are not conceivedo fa sm atters of basic justice. John Rawls'sp olitical conception of person justifies itself within his theory of justice, but we must admit that it was created in apolitical and social context that wasalreadyintransformation. Beforetaking on its criticism and stating the need for new categories, we will take ashortstroll through the characteristics of that transformation.
Nevertheless,i t ' ss uitable to depict that even the characterization made of those who compound the old and the new social movements was in consonance with the 'nationalwho'.Inthe so-called old social movements, even though they had international repercussions (Tilly2009), the workingclass had as arangeof action and protest the Nation-State, and the paradigm of justicea sdistribution. And in the caseo ft he so-called new social movements( ecologists,p acifists, among others),a lthough their objectivesa nd vindications (world peace, preservation of nature) soughtr epercussions outside the Nation-State,what is true is that they didn'ta chievet he level of global coordination required to leave that range, and hence their actions or protests stayedinside the Nation-State, refuting more the symbolic terrain than the political (Melucci 1999). We must look to the transformations surroundingt he national frame to explain how the movements that followed let through to what is global and contributed to the theoretical impasse.

The context of globalization
At dawn of the twenty-first century,A lbert Melucci described the political and social arena as ag lobal stage, based on a 'hypothesis of discontinuity' (Melucci 2001). To him, we were being witnesses of structural phenomena thatwould radicallymodify social and political life on aplanetary scale. That hypothesis stated that while the global mapwas changingbased on new phenomena, the modern categories we used to attempt to describe them remained the same. So there was adiscontinuity between the tools of analysis and the phenomena that they tried to explain, such that to him those were "crucial years that see emerge,ataplanetary scale, unforeseen actors and struggles,but that have alsoshown the inadequacy of the instruments [allegedly] capable of catchinga nd interpreting the emergent forms." (Melucci 1999,p.176)Those structural phenomena and the theoretical discontinuitya ssociated with them are collectively what todayw eh ave agreed to call globalization.
Beginning at asimple definition, we can saythat globalization is aphenomenon of history in which relationships among countries,s ocieties and people have soared, and time-space boundaries have been reduced through the flux of goods, services, products, knowledge and financial capital. Of course,globalization as ac oncept is am uch more complex phenomenon, but thatb asic description allows us emphasize the fact that its effects have been so widespread that we face adouble challenge: 'how to understand the globalsociety' and 'how to think of the global society' (Campillo 2015); in other words, how to elaborate a philosophical and political reflection that enables us to comprehend the current world, and how to reflect upon the impact thatthis kind of society is having on our understandingofintellectual philosophicalwork and its role in such asociety.W ithout trying to exhaust the complexity of globalization, but hoping to build an understanding of the same that adds to the purposes of this work, I will brieflye xpose three characteristic dimensions.
Firstly, one of the factors that stimulated this phenomenon wast he revolution of information and technology that lets us stand in ad igital space from which we can establish relations regardlesso fp hysical or time barriers.The Internet is the main tool of this revolution, because its most important technological innovation was turning that digital space into aplatform from which almost anybodycan produce and publish content in asimple way, using basic technical knowledge and skills. This innovation allowed digital applications to thrive in almostevery dimensiono fl ife, keepingusi nanon-synchronized but nevertheless coordinated state of interconnection. That innovation created aw hole new processo f" hypersocialization [byw hich the] new technologies of information createt he possibilityo fa ction detaching from space and time, thus letting through to the appearance of time and the virtualization of space" (Melucci 2001, p. 32), and introducing to our actions botht he global dimension and simultaneity,b ys eparating them from lineal space and time. In the samew ay that content on the Internet can be hypertextual (audio, video and text all at the samet ime), so too can human action, by occurringi nv arious spaces and times simultaneouslyt hrough its global dispersion on the great digital spider web.
Secondly, besides the interconnection, globalization also implies interdependence at different scales, because decisions made within aS tate can come to have an influenceo nt he life of thosew ho are not part of it.F or example, the economic measures thatacountry undertakes related to agriculture could affect the migrant workers and the families in theircountry of origin; or if acoun-try decides to close its borders to legal or illegal migration, this would have consequencesi nd iverse regionso ft he world. Interdependence is also part of the inter-, trans-and supranational organizations that thrust agendas with objectives and actions that are framed beyond anyone Nation-State. Fore xample, the implementation of certain economic politics that the International Monetary Fund demands in exchangefor loans has regional and global repercussions; or in the case of organizations such as Reporters Without Borders that champion freedom of speech worldwide, we are shown the shared responsibility we have regarding such topics as ecological disasters, refugeec rises or famine. Interdependence created by globalization points out how impossible any 'reversibility' (Bauman 2004) of our mutual dependence appears.
Thirdly, interconnection and interdependence also reveal to us that globalization is built upon as eries of relations marked by the exercise of power that entail the generation of deep inequity among and within countries.While it is true thatw ith globalization the positive flow of capitals towards developing countries has thrived, it is also true that with the globalc onsolidation of financial elites and the supranational institutions thatbackupand take care of their interests, less developed governments and local markets exhibit their inability to recover from economic crises and their incapacity to fix the inequities that result from beings ubordinated to the benchmarks dictated by those elites.While the number of countries with prosperous economies that develop astrongerimmunity to crises diminishes, the number of countries with poorer welfare and greater political uncertainty soars. This uncertainty increases theiri nternal inequityb y increasingt he gapb etween those who have access to social benefits and those who don't, those who can access education and thosew ho cannot,e tc. The inequityspawned by these global relations of power makes visible the constitutive injusticeo fo ur world.
Each of the threed imensionsp ointed out impliest he need for reckoning both its specific complexity and also their communicating links, because it is in them thatthe fight for justiceist aking place. The wide rangeofp olitical languages by means of which that fight is expressed represents aproblematic horizon of reflection. Because the space of our actions is broader,t he common objectivesa re restated, the distinction between what is global and local stops being clear,a nd the involved and affected actors increase in number.A saconsequence, "globalization is changingour wayofspeaking about justice" (Fraser 2010,p.12),bybeing the stageofthe political and social battles of our time, and demanding new strategies that enable us to explain and analyze avariety of languages and vindications in the social and political environment thatcan'tbeapproached through ah omogenizing lense.
In the previous section, Istated that the old and the new social movements didn'tr each ag lobal impact because,a mong other things, they didn'ta ccount for the digital toolst hat could allow them to overcomet ime-space barriers. But it is important to also point out that the sociological and philosophical theories thate xplained them conceivedo ft hem within the frame of Nation-State, and refuted justicei nt erms of the distribution, either of labor or symbolicbut always within that frame and without consideringt heir possible effects on awider scale. That is the reason whywhenever the alterworld and networked social movements following the former first appear,the need for restatingour modern conceptual diagramsa rises, because in their protests they involved aw ide rangeo fv indications and actions that are onlyu nderstandable without the tight frames of the Nation-State and citizenship-preciselybecause the dynamics of their action and the content of their protest had ag lobal character thatw ent beyond those frames and those theories. Thus, before proposingn ew forms of understanding,w em ust first undertake ac riticism of the 'national who' and thereby identify the milestone for remakingt he map.
The 'unidimensional identity' of the 'national who' The conception we have inherited of people as citizens framed by the Nation-State is 'unidimensional' insofar as it emphasizes their 'political identity' to turn them into subjects of justice. But under the circumstances of ag lobalizing world, this unidimensional conception of people producesm ore questions than it ever offered certainties. Letu sc onsider the caseo ft he aforementioned social movements.
There was at ime in which we could clearlyi dentify who demanded some vindication of justiceand theiropponent: the struggle of the workers' movement (mainlyf ormed by the workers themselves) fought against capitalism and the educated property owner (bourgeois) State;t he feminist movements gathered persons, without gender distinction, who shared the diagnosis of the patriarchy represented by the State as an oppressive power; and to these can be added manyecological or peace movements. It can also be said that,despite their global repercussions, these struggles werea lwaysf ramed within the Nation-State. But with the emergenceo fantiglobalization movements (Juris 2004) and subsequently, of networked social movements ( Castells 2015), that break with the Nation-State frame, "the movements lose their condition as acharacter [giving] individuals and groups abenchmark to rebuild divided identitiesa mong different Who Aret he Subjects of Justicei naGlobalized World? memberships, functions and timeso ft he social experience." (Melucci 1999, p. 118) 'Unidimensional identity' no longer seems to be the adequate category to conceive of people, nor to explain their social action, because in those movements the opponent was no longer the Nation-State but,f or example, supranational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. Additionally, the members of each movementnolonger conceivedofthemselvesjust as workers or feminists or ecologists,but all of theirp articularb elongings gatheredi nacommon indignation due to the negative effects of the world politics or economy, and, in some cases, not onlyd id they refute the conception of justicea sa scale, but also demanded a 'radical democracy' that implied ac hangei no ur conception of justice. Iwill return to this topic later.Iwillnow explain the errors of the inheritedc onception of the 'national who',t os how the reason whyt his response cannot help us deal with the contemporary challengeofsimultaneously managingthe differenceand the integration within the frame of globalization, and hence our need for an alternative point of view.
In her book Scales of Justice,N ancy Fraser tells us thatt he contemporary philosophical theories in matters of justice( such as Rawls's) are basedo nt wo giveni deas, which she identifies with the images of as cale and am ap. The first imagee vokes the intention of impartially, assessing different vindications of social justice basedo na' distributive' measure that makes them measurable; whereas the imageoft he map sends us back to the metric resource of the geographer,with which it is possible to limit and represent spatial relations through which thosesocial demands would take place. (For the case of such theories the adequate scale or frame is the Nation-State and its citizens.) But giventhe problematic context of globalization, we must ask ourselvesw hat is theirp ertinence as normative categories: because in the case of the scale, the complexity and variety of the current political languageonwhich the vindications of justice are formulated take to trial the paradigm of distribution; and,concerning the map, because cases like the ones Ih avem entioned regardings ocial movementsr efute the frame of Nation-State, since their demands of justicesucceeded to transcend the national scale thanks to their dynamics and the content of their protest.
Globalization, especiallybecause of the three dimensionsIhave highlighted, is then the stageonwhich the vindications of justiceand the claims of injustice demand us to discuss yetagain the question: who are the subjects of justice? The 'national who' reassured by theories like Rawls'sw as the agreed answer for a long time, but since todayt he negative or positive effects of political decisions are global, dynamics of protest and political action that can be carried out by people are global too. Based on this certainty,Iadd to Fraser'ss tatement-according to which those theories of justicec an'to ffer ag uide for analyzingt he problems derivedf rom these challenges for having falleni nto a 'dogma of egalitarianism' (Fraser 2010,C hapter 3)-that the Nation-State is the correct frame for the reflection of justice, and that its citizens are the subjects to whom it is addressed. In democracies based on the idea of the Nation-State, the arguments about justicea greed that distribution was the measurement to solve justice demands. Although they debated what should be equallydistributed (rights, liberties, capacities,c ulturali dentity), they agreed on the who: the national citizens to whom distribution was addressed. Giventhe challenges of globalization, both coincidences are being questioned and the nationals cale with the citizens bound to it no longer seems fit to set justice the relevant questions. Having assumed the 'national who' dogma, theories like Rawls'sc an'th elp us determine who should count as ar elevant justices ubject in ag lobalizingw orld, because the dynamics of political subjects,aswella sthoseofsocial movements, escape from their theoretical diagrams; they set sail from the experience of injusticeo f both the ones on the inside and the ones on the outside of the national frame, which recoils in ad ynamic of global protest and starting from different identities.
But besides having fallen into this dogma, the point of view both traditions offer about the 'national who' is also limited. In Rawls,the conception of identity is 'unidimensional' by limiting it to its political aspect,i nw hich it is onlyp ossible to takep art of the public affairs and formulate vindications of justice from the languageo fr ights and duties,f orgetting that those same vindications can onlyb em adef rom concrete positions of exclusion, and that expressing them just in political terms can implyi ts perpetuation when not taking into account their specificity. In this way, Rawls'sp olitical conception of person as the 'national who' of justicel eavesv oiceless those who demand the amendment of an injusticethat has had globaleffects. In this sense, the theory of Rawlsianjustice not onlyhas assumed withoutreckoning the idea of the 'national who',but also offers us alimited understandingofitbypresentingitinterms of apolitical identity that enclosures people within the same interests and the samen eeds, renderingt he political dialogue unnecessary.
From the challenges before us in ag lobalizingw orld, those 'monological theories' of justice ( Fraser 2010,p .2 7) lack the necessary concepts to analyze and understand the political dynamic of those who are both on the inside of the national scale and on the outside of it,a nd who need to express their demands in another languagew hich is not thato fd istribution. When blindlya ssuming the framing of the Nation-State and of national citizenship, this dogma turns into an instrumento fm anipulation of the public space, because from it the rules of political decision unfairlye xclude people who belong to the community,and because the boundaries of community exclude thoseaffect-ed by the inner decisions. This phenomenon, which Fraser (2010) calls a 'misrepresentation',denies people the possibilityofdenouncing an injusticeand participating in its amendment; by conceiving of them from a 'unidimensional identity' perspective,a nu njustified exclusion is performed and we are left with a conceptual gapt hat appears unavoidable.
Today'sp olitical and social conflicts are the resulto fm anyf actors,a nd the struggles for justicea re no longer onlyf or the widening of rights and liberties; hence, political action of protest by people is alsot he resulto fm ultiple inner and outer factors.C onceiving of people as having au nidimensional identity has made us think that what is importanti se xplaining,a nalyzinga nd solving conflicts,s ince the actorsa re alreadyg iven-but in reality,t he multiplicity of the actors that appear at alocal and (sometimes simultaneously) global level demands us paying attention to the diversity of people. Amartya Sen has pointed out this samen eed by demonstrating that beginning at au nidimensional identity (or a 'singular affiliation' of the identity,ashecalls it) opens an unbridgeable abyss between the ideal conception and the real behavior of people (Sen 2009), because the 'singular affiliation' of identity mistakes its perspective about people by putting them in very tight circumstances for their action. In his opinion, only the acknowledgement of our different commitments and adhesions could allow us "ab iggeru nderstanding of the plurality of human identity and the acknowledgement that such needs overcomea cross and act against as trict separation along au niquer igid line of impregnable division." (Sen 2006,p .x iv)T he conception of unidimensional identity createsa ni dealized vision of people, and consequently, leavesu sw ithout ap roper guide for thinking the dynamic of the conflicts and people in theirp olitical action.A saresult of this conceptual gap, the 'right to the word ( Melucci 2001, p. 57) and to 'parity of participation' (Fraser 2010,p .2 8) of groups of individuals to decidew hat they are and what they want to be, has been limited. These authors consider this to be an injustice, both within and beyond the frame of Nation-State, and contemplate what it takes to remediatei t.
To geto vert he conception of unidimensional identity,w em ustu ndertake the following challenge: provided that people don'te xhaust their identity nor their action under the idea of citizenship,wem ust be able to find ac onception of the same that transcends that conceptualization through analytical instruments that describe and analyze what people are or can be and what people do or can do. The person as citizen within the Nation-State is no longer the starting point,a ss upposedb yt heorieso fj usticel ikeR awls's. Instead, within the frame of the challenges that ag lobalizingw orld presents,i ti saphenomenon to be explainedb ys ome dynamic model that facilitates catchingt he complexities of the actors and the conflicts derived from them.
As econd answer: the 'diversity of identities' as 'politicalh euristic' In ow return to the aforementioned social movements, to exemplifyt his challengea nd to derivef rom their experience the idea of 'diversity of identities'.
Digital interconnection allowed the creation of adifferent dynamic in social movements from the last years of the twentieth century until the movements of the outraged. Internet,text messagesfrom mobile phones and digital social platforms like Facebook or Twitter made possible awider diffusionofprotest,which allowed other networks and people to support protest speeches that might be territoriallydistant,but brought emotionallyn ear thanks to digital interconnection. Pioneers in this dynamic werethe EjércitoZapatista de Liberación Nacional and the so called 'Battle of Seattle',s ince in both cases they used the digital communication tools of their time to broadcast their messagea nd coordinate their owna nd third parties' actions. But the ones who maximized the usage of those toolsw eret he social movementst hat occurred between 2009 and 2012 in Iceland, the movement of the Outraged in Spain,the occupation of Wall Street in New York and the movement #YoSoy132 in Mexico. Each of these has its specificity and would require ap articulars tudy, but from the common characteristics that Castells (2015) has proposed, we can abstract one that helps the purposes of this research: the identity of the people who took part in those movements.
Since mobilization was organized through communication and coordination networks to which anybodyc ould materiallyo rv irtuallya ccess, participants didn'th avet ob ei dentified exclusively as workers, feminists, ecologists, globaliphobes, pacifists or anyother discretegroup. In the context of these networked social movements, people could assume demands, protests or indignation as their own, even though they didn'tbelong to theirimmediate context,and without having to compromise theirown identity or goals in caseofbelongingtoanother movement.Characterization of earlier movementsh ad at endencyt oc entralize the identity of theirm embers, but in these new movements, each individual gets involved from a 'diversity of identities' that favors union around acommon objective.The global injusticepresent in our world affects us in different areas of our lives-we don'tn eed to see ourselvese xclusively as workers or ecologists to mobilize. It waspreciselythe confirmation of that injusticethrough the diversity of identities that we acquireda nd affirmed as persons that led the participants of these movements to mobilize and protest.
Based on what has been exposed about the context of globalization, the mistakes of theories of justice such as Rawls's, and the dynamic of social movements as an example of the political and social challenges of that context,t he conception of the citizen now appears before us as ar eductionist vision of people'sidentity within democratic societies. In particular, Rawls'stheory of justice created ac onception of the person based on a 'public identity' that favored the languageo fr ights and duties to express demands that at the same time were valid onlywithin the frame of the Nation-State. Nevertheless, this conception entails singularizingits identity to certain needsorinterests valid in resolving questions of basic justice-but that cannot include the demands of justicethatpeople make based on theirs ocial position, their economic situation or theirc ultural identity at ag lobals cale, because the effects of globalization transcend the national frame. Therefore, we can sayt hat no philosophicalr eflection of politics that alleges a 'unidimensional identity' in people conceivedo fa scitizensc an be au seful guide for reflectingu pon the conflicts of globalc haracter,b ecause conceiving of people as a 'national who' doesn'tt akei nto account thatp eople act from different positions, adhesions and indignations thatg ob eyond the political languageexclusive to rights and duties, nor that they are even aware that the formalityofsuch languageisnolonger adequate to expresstheirdiscontent. In consequence, the unidimensional identity keeps us from understanding that "contemporary individuals act in the confinement of diverse systems and have the increasingn eed of pregnable identities that allow them to transit through the different regions of meaning and the different institutional frames." (Melucci 2001, p. 47) To overcome this conceptual gap, it is necessary to factor in aconception of people'sidentities that reflects the 'diversity of identities' that constituteus, and which are built from the influencet hat the different adhesions, loyalties and commitments-both political and moral-that set up our demands of justice and that encourageu st om obilizea gainst some kind of injusticeh avei nt he course of our lives. Thisi dea of the diversity of identities appears as a 'political heuristic' that could serve, on one hand, to make possiblec ritical reflection on the categories of the political philosophyw eh avei nherited, and, on the other hand, as an alternative point of view about the people opposite to the 'national who' that could help us break out of the rigid conceptual structurest hath ave been passed on to us, so that we could design am ap to guide us accurately through ag lobalizing world.
By 'political heuristic',Iunderstand aknowledge that appears as an alternative method to solve ap roblem whena ll the other existingm ethodsg enerate more confusion than solutions (Navarro2 015).R egarding the question about who counts as as ubjecto fj ustice, the answer of the 'national who' generates more problems than satisfactory explanations when we try to approach global phenomena like networked social movements. Fort his reason, Ip ropose using the idea of the diversity of identities as apolitical heuristic to redesign arelevant and reliable starting point; to help us determine who counts as as ubjectofj ustice in each case-but not in such as ingular wayt hati nt he long term would generate more uncertainty rather than options to think about the conflicts.The heuristicIam trying to build from this idea of the diversityofi dentitiesispolitical because it would onlyapply to the analysis of subjects thatrefutethe frames of Sate-Nation and citizenship from the global perspective of injusticeand inequities; thus it justifies its characterization as atool for the creation of new knowledge concerning the political problems of ag lobalizingw orldb ya ssuming, on one side, that inherited political philosophydoesn'tg uide us correctlyi ni ts examination, and,onthe otherside, that that world is complex, interactive and interdependente nough to elaborate exhaustive analysis or seek exact solutions.
The wayi nw hich the question about who counts as as ubject of justice is answered is crucial, because by doing so from the perspective of the diversity of identities, we are set on the inverse course within the map;i no ther words, while inherited theories of justiced etermined monologues like the goal and the path to reach it,s etting sail from the diversity of identities means instead to begin with the concrete experiences of the people (such as the ones we find in social movements) to determine the steps to take towards justice. Beginning from the diversityo fi dentitiesw ould mean acknowledging thatt he different spheres within which we define our actions, responsibilities and additions represent adifferent political languagethatwehavethe right to vindicate, because it is preciselythis diversity of identities-national citizens, workers, defenders of animal rights, or all of these at once-that favors and sustains collective actionin ag lobalizing world. Those "multiple identitiesg et past national frontiers,a nd the people do thingst hey feel they really 'have' to do, instead of accepting them by virtue." (Sen 2009,p .129).
Of course, none of the problems that the three dimensions of globalization entail can be solvedj ust with ac hangeo fp erspective about the people-but I think it would be much more difficult to propose an adequate view if we don't incorporate ac onception of the person based on theird iversity of identities, and which reflects the variety of commitments and adhesions thata re part of their interpretation of the injustices that could affect them in one or more aspects of such avariety.The diversity of identities seems to be ag ood starting point to reflect upon the refutations of justicea taglobal level because, on one side, it lets us bear witness of the injusticeo ft he current system in different ambits, and, on the other side, it also lets us associate with common actionsd erived from injustice, such that we can experimenti nd ifferent aspects of social life. Itsp ertinence as ap olitical heuristici st hat,i no ppositiont ot he 'national who',i ta llows us to "open aw ay for the acknowledgement of the pluralityo f meaningsa nd forms of action present in the concrete collective phenomena."