Global Responsibility in a Historical Context

Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history. This is surprising, because ‘globalization’ is essentially a historical term, describing as it does a historical process. There is less mention still of the philosophy of history, especially given that it has been discredited. And yet, if one probes the accounts in question more deeply, there is no overlooking that nearly all of the relevant discourses operate more or less explicitly with patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophy of history. The authors speculate upon which general tendencies of globalization are recognizable, and whether it is more indicative of ‘progress’ or of the ‘downfall’ of human civilization. Moreover, the questions of when globalization actually began,what is ‘new’ about the state of globality achieved thus far and what developments can be expected in future cannot possibly be answered without reflecting on history. After all, the ethical problem of global justice, which demands compensatory measures to alleviate historic harms, requires us to take into account the course of history thus far. Such topics underline that recourse to history, with all of its historico-philosophical implications, is essential if we are to resolve the problems resulting from globalization. Globalization and history Considering the phenomenon of globalization from a philosophical viewpoint, one must first note that the global has always been a theme in philosophy (Figuera 2004, p. 9; cf. Negt 2001, pp. 42; Toulmin 1994, p. 281). The search for universal concepts and principles that could claim validity for all of humankind is part of the philosophical tradition. From the (early) modern period onward, philosophically grounded human rights were intended to apply to all of the earth’s inhabitants equally and universally. In particular, the history of philosophy as it has developed since the Enlightenment proclaimed the existence of a universal or world history in which all peoples and cultures participate (Rohbeck 2010, p. 54; Brauer 2012, p. 19; Roldán 2012, pp. 83–84). This also applies to subsequent philosophies of history that distanced themselves from the ideas of progJohannes Rohbeck, Technische Universität Dresden (TUD) OpenAccess. © 2018 Johannes Rohbeck, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-014 ress and teleology, and even to the later position of posthistoire, which posits the ‘end’ of history. Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history. There is less mention still of the philosophy of history, especially given that it has been discredited. And yet, if one probes the accounts in question more deeply, there is no overlooking that nearly all of the relevant discourses operate more or less explicitly with patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophy of history. The authors speculate upon which general tendencies of globalization are recognizable, and whether it is more indicative of ‘progress’ or of the ‘downfall’ of human civilization (Scholte 2005, p. 49; versus Hardt / Negri 2003, p. 296; Kehoane / Joseph 2005, p. 76; Baudrillard 2007, p. 22; Groß 2007, p. 16). This shows that globalization is largely understood as a historical process. The very questions of when globalization actually began, what is ‘new’ about the state of globality achieved thus far, and what developments can be expected in future cannot possibly be answered without reflecting upon history. This global history perspective in turn changes the way history is viewed. In traditional theories of history, the focus was on historical time, whose concepts and structures the authors explored (Koselleck 1979/2004; Ricœur 1984). History was equated with ‘temporalization’, and corresponding studies focused on historical times with their continuities and ruptures, as well as changes in the tempo of history such as stagnation and acceleration. In the context of globalization, the focus is increasingly on historical spaces, so that history is not merely ‘temporalized’ but also ‘spatialized’ (Osterhammel 1998, p. 374; Schlögel 2003, pp. 12– 13).When we analyze how economic, political, social and cultural spaces are created with time, history comes to appear as a spatial-temporal construct. My thesis is that the ethics of globalization, too, could benefit from the reflections of historiography and the philosophy of history. For there can be no doubt that catastrophic climate change and global poverty, which are to some degree connected, were ‘made’ by human beings in the course of their history. From this we may draw the ethical conclusion that the harms caused should be rectified through compensatory measures. The current debate over such measures shows what a central role the treatment of history plays. Those who generally reject the industrial nations’ moral duty towards the poor countries already consider the historical context to be irrelevant. But even those who believe that rich countries have an obligation to help make their arguments independent of history. A farther-reaching responsibility that includes compensation for the effects of harmful behavior, in contrast, can only be justified with reference to the course of history thus far. For that reason, I call this type of responsibility ‘historical responsibility’. It follows, in turn, that the recourse to history, with all of 180 Johannes Rohbeck


Globalizationa nd history
Considering the phenomenon of globalization from ap hilosophical viewpoint, one must first note that the globalh as always been at heme in philosophy ( Fig-uera2004,p.9;c f. Negt 2001, pp. 42;Toulmin 1994,p.281). The search for universalc oncepts and principles that could claim validity for all of humankind is part of the philosophical tradition. From the (early) modern period onward,philosophicallygrounded human rights werei ntended to applyt oa ll of the earth's inhabitants equallyand universally. In particular, the history of philosophyasit has developed since the Enlightenment proclaimed the existenceo fauniversal or world history in which all peoples and cultures participate (Rohbeck2 010, p. 54;B rauer 2012,p .1 9; Roldán2 012,p p. 83 -84). Thisa lsoa pplies to subsequent philosophies of history that distanced themselvesf rom the ideas of prog-ress and teleology,and even to the laterposition of posthistoire,which posits the 'end' of history.
Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history.There is less mention still of the philosophyo fh istory,e speciallyg iven that it has been discredited. And yet, if one probes the accounts in question more deeply, there is no overlooking that nearlyall of the relevant discoursesoperate more or less explicitlyw ith patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophyo fh istory. The authors speculate upon which general tendencies of globalization are recognizable, and whether it is more indicative of 'progress' or of the 'downfall' of human civilization (Scholte2 005,p .4 9;versus Hardt/N egri 2003,p .2 96;K ehoane /J oseph 2005,p .7 6;Baudrillard 2007,p .2 2;Groß 2007,p .1 6). This shows thatg lobalization is largely understood as ah istoricalp rocess. The very questions of when globalization actuallyb egan, what is 'new' about the state of globality achievedthus far,and what developments can be expected in future cannot possiblyb ea nswered without reflectingu pon history.
This global history perspective in turn changes the wayhistory is viewed. In traditionalt heories of history,the focus was on historicalt ime, whose concepts and structuresthe authors explored (Koselleck 1979(Koselleck /2004Ricoeur 1984). History was equated with 'temporalization',a nd corresponding studies focused on historical times with their continuities and ruptures,a sw ell as changes in the tempo of history such as stagnation and acceleration. In the context of globalization, the focus is increasingly on historicalspaces,sothat history is not merely 'temporalized' but also 'spatialized' (Osterhammel 1998, p. 374;Schlögel 2003, pp. 12-13). When we analyze how economic, political,social and cultural spaces are created with time, history comes to appear as as patial-temporal construct.
My thesis is that the ethics of globalization, too, could benefit from the reflections of historiography and the philosophyo fh istory.F or there can be no doubt that catastrophic climate changea nd globalp overty,w hich are to some degree connected, were 'made' by human beingsi nt he course of their history. From this we mayd rawt he ethical conclusion that the harms causeds hould be rectified through compensatory measures.The current debate over such measures showswhat ac entral role the treatment of history plays.Those who generallyr eject the industrial nations' moral duty towards the poor countries already consider the historical context to be irrelevant.B ut even thosew ho believet hat rich countries have an obligation to help make their arguments independent of history.Afarther-reaching responsibility that includes compensation for the effects of harmful behavior, in contrast,can onlybejustified with reference to the course of history thus far.F or that reason, Ic all this type of responsibility 'historical responsibility'.I tf ollows, in turn,that the recourse to history,with all of its historico-philosophical implications, is indispensable for ar esolution of the problems resulting from globalization.

Historical responsibility
Leaving aside extreme libertarian and nationalist positions,there is aconsensus that people living in rich countries have an obligation to help the needyinpoor countries.Thisexpresslyalso applies to states on aglobal scale. To be sure, one can distinguish between certain degrees of remedial responsibility,a llowing for special obligations towards members of one'so wn family or nation, which produces ag raduated conception of justice (Walzer 1999,p .3 8;Zurbuchen 2005, p. 139;Nida-Rümelin /Rechenauer 2009,p.314,319).Itdoes not follow,however, that there is no basis for farther-reaching obligations towards people who live in distantparts of the world. The objection thatsuch aredistribution of goods from rich to poor countries presupposes a 'world state',with all its potential for abuses (Nusser 1997, p. 92), is alson ot convincing,b ecause,a sw as explained, individual states and transatlantico rganizations are also in ap osition to do this.
Nevertheless,weneed to ask whypeople are obligated to help otherpeople. Opinions on this question differ: on the one side, we have the position of socalled remedial duties,b ased on the argument that human beingsa ss uch are obliged to help others to the extent that they are able (Previous cooperation or even historic connections between these people expresslyp layn or ole here.); and on the other side, we find the position of outcomer esponsibility,which assumes that the plight of individuals in poor countries should be viewed as the 'consequence' of acts performedbythe inhabitants of rich or powerful countries (Atthis point the historical aspect comes into play, for such an outcome responsibility is, after all, rooted in ahistorical process that led to great injustices in the past.). Ip ropose thatg lobal responsibility for unjustlyt reated people and peoples is, in turn, in need of bothhistorical and historico-philosophical reflection.
If one examines the argumentation on remedial dutiesm ore closely, its position on history appears paradoxical. One argument is that human suffering and death is something fundamentallyb ad thatn eeds to be overcome in all cases, without creatingapractical-historicalr elationship between the givers and seekers of assistance (Singer 2007,p.39;Schlothfeld 2007,p.77;Schaber 2007,p.139). Those with aduty to assist function merelyaswitnesses capable of helping,who observethe needyfrom afar.Because what is at stake is ultimatelyananthropological principle (and thus the unity of the human species, which has ad uty to assist) this is ac ase of abstract cosmopolitanism. The meta-ethical approach of universalist morality,which calls for general assent to the moral norm of reme-dial measures from an impartial perspective,o ffers as imilar argument (Birnbacher 2007,p.139).Accordingtothis approach, the globalmoral community assumes responsibility, as efficientlya sp ossible, for the well-being of all human beings, whose standard of living must not fall below the minimum subsistence level.
Af urther argument states thatp eople are obligated to prevent or alleviate suffering, whatever its origins,a sf ar as possible. The pragmatic boundary consists in limiting remedial duties to preventing the bad rather than promotingthe good, so as to demandn oe xcessive sacrifices.R epressed history reappears in this argument; for the power to assist even distantp eople is largely dependent on the technological means of communication and transporta st hey have evolved( Singer2007, p. 40). It is therein that the real conditions for the possibility of global remedial duties exist.And because these conditions changeoverthe course of history,t he position of the remedial duty assumesa nu nanticipated historical dimension. In contrast to traditional ethics, which was limited to the narrow circleso ff amily, regiono rn ation-state, an ew ethics of global remedial duty is emerging.
Reversing this argumentation,o ne could also formulate it as follows: because people have access to novel technological meansfor assisting very distant people, theyshould do so. To the extent that one assumes that the alleviation of sufferingi sd esirable in general, this entails no naturalistic fallacy,b ut it does implyr ecognition thatt he new technological instruments create new moral aims or historicallyc onditioned norms, which amountst oatechnologically mediated transformation of values.Thus, from this position, the historical refers not to the previous history of the sufferer'sp light,b ut rather to the historically evolvedp ower of the helper.
The second position of outcomeresponsibility raises the question of whether the argument of pure remedial dutiesissufficient,and whether farther-reaching duties cannot be justified.
On the side of the helpers, the problem alreadyexists in the subjects who are obligated to assist.The impression ariseshere thatitisprimarilyindividuals who decide to provide assistance without anyprevious agreement.Moreover,there is no social differentiation among the affluent or assignment to social systems. One could object that collective actorsh avef ar greater significancei ng lobal aid actions. Even an appeal for donations to which individuals spontaneouslyrespond represents ac oordinated action (Schlothfeldt 2007,p .7 7). This applies all the more to states and trans-state organizations, which take action as social institutions.
On the side of those requiringassistance, the problem is that the needya ppear solelya sv ictims. They remain passive and anonymous sufferers (moral strangers), to whom no particularrelationship of responsibility exists (Birnbacher 2007,p.132). They figure as mere objects of ad onation, which therefore risks becominga uthoritarian and arbitrary.I ti ss triking abovea ll that while this assigns particular obligations to the wealthy, it accords no rights to the poor.Duties are thus accompanied by no rights thatc ould be asserted in the form of legitimate demands. There is in fact no preceding interaction between givers and takers. This also cancels all criteria of commutative justice.
If, however,o ne insistst hat the poor have certain rights beyond universal human rights,one is referred to concrete contextsassociated with the social imbalance that standstoberemedied or alleviated. People frequentlyspeak of cooperation here, which can establish ag lobal obligation (Nida-Rümelin /R echenauer 2009,p.316). Those who baulk at referringtointeractions with the poor as cooperation (Birnbacher 2007,p .1 35) can speak neutrallyo fa na ction context that preciselye ncompasses discrimination against foreign peoples, including their exploitation. Positive or negative cooperation forms the basisofrich, industrialized nations' moral responsibility towards poor,d eveloping countries.
This relationship yields obligations that extend beyond mere remedial duties. To be sure,w ealthyc itizensa nd states have the positive moralo bligation to assist people in conditionsoflife-threatening poverty.A tthe same time, however,they have the negative obligation to minimize the harms they cause (Pogge 2003,p.243). Because the world order is not just,the poor must be compensated for the disadvantagest hey suffer.S uch compensation is not aid,but the lessening of harm; it is not redistribution from the rich to the poor,but ac orrective to an unjust social structure between poor and rich. Not helping the disadvantaged is less reprehensible than denying them justified profits by exploiting their disadvantaged condition (Pogge 2003,p .2 44).
This conception of outcomer esponsibility,h owever,h as historical implications-so Iwould liketospeak of ahistoricalresponsibility;for behind this argument is the recognition that world poverty is the consequenceo fa nh istorical process, which since colonialization has included enslavement,g enocide,a nd exploitation (Pogge2003,p.222).Tolimit oneself, in contrast,tomere assistance, is to overlook the roots of the West'senormous economic superiority over centuries of common history that devastated four continents (Nida-Rümelin /R echenauer 2009,p .3 00). The great majorityofp roperty rights came about in an unacceptable manner, through violence, conquest and oppression. From this derivesthe call to demand farther-reachingduties to compensatefor the injustices suffered. The legal principle of fault-based liability applies here: thosew ho actively cause distress are responsible for alleviating it,f or the creation of an evil generates ap articularlyh ighd egree of responsibility.
An umbero fo bjectionsh aveb een raised to the historicala rgument in particular.T he scope of the duty to compensatei sa llegedlyl imited. On the one hand, it presupposes thatt he previous harmsa re actuallyd emonstrable. On the other, it must be proven that past damages continue to affect the present. The first objections tates thatp resent-day governments in the developing countries are as much to blame for current poverty as past colonialists.Moreover,the duty to compensatefor harmful behavior applies onlytothose statesthat actually participatedi nt he injustices committed at an earlier time (Birnbacher 2007, p. 136). Finally, there is the problem of moral subjects, if one holds onlyindividuals and not collective actors accountable.
Ap articularlyw idespread objection cites so-called internal causes, stating that the essential factors for global poverty should be sought within presentdayd eveloping countries and thus in domestic difficulties.T his objection seems to be underlined by the significant differences between the developing countries stemmingfrom local factors, so that in the end the entirety of local factors weret he cause of global poverty (quoted in Pogge2 003,p .2 24,2 29;R awls 2002,p.134;N agel 2005,p.123). This appears to be confirmed by the frequency of brutal and corrupt regimes in developing countries today. By implication, the successes of some developing and newlyi ndustrialized countries seem to demonstrate thatt he harmful effects of past colonialization have since faded. Aside from the fact thatt he thesis of 'internal causes' serves as an excuse for the rich countries,this impression is also the product not least of historians' and sociologists' tendencyt of ocus moreo nn ational and regional factors than on worldwide developments.
Conversely, the duty to compensateisjustified by the fact that local circumstances cannot adequately account for global poverty.The world economic order, with all its inequities, remains responsible for the failuret othrive of economies in developing countries.T hus, even with continuous economic growth, Africa todayhas no chance of catchingupwith Europe'slead of 30 to 1. Giventhis massive advantage,c urrent inequality is not simply the effect of free choice.I na ddition,s o-called domesticf actors are themselvesc onditioned by the global order,b ecause the current world order contributes significantlyt oc orruption and oppression in developing countries (Pogge2 003,p .2 33). This includes the international resource privilege, the disequilibrium between rich natural resources and economic growth, as well as dependence on the globalr ealm (Pogge 2003,p .2 35;K esselring 2005,p .4 8). The consequencei st hat it is not merely amatter of distributing goods fairly, but aboveall alsoofeliminating unfair conditionso fp roduction.
If nothing else, we need to repudiatethe fallacy that the duty to compensate calls remedial responsibilities into question, as if the two typeso fd uties were mutuallyexclusive.Naturallyall rich countries have aduty to help, even if they feel no guilt,ordonot accept the concept of outcomeresponsibility.But according to the farther-reachinga rgument,t hoses tatest hat werei nvolvedi np ast harm have ap articulard uty to compensate in the present.
The whole debate underlines how essential the historicalaspect is. Afterall, it rests on the elementaryinsight that globalpoverty was 'made' by certain people in the course of history.A nd ultimately, it is preciselyt his mannero f' making' history thati ss ubject to debate. Even historical details about which global and local factors should be weighted to what extent and with which spatial and temporals cope playarole here. This harnesses the entire arsenal of historical research, down to methodological questions about the explanatory function of certain data. Even the method of counterfactual explanation comes into play, for example in discussions of whether people in developing countries are better off todaythan they would have been had they persisted in afictional state of nature, and had colonialization processes never taken place (Pogge2 003,p .2 37).
Finally, there is the pragmatic question of to what extent referringtothe past produces quantifiable compensatorymeasures.With respect to actual assistance, it is far removed from anyp ractical dimension wheret he theoretical distinction between remedial and outcome responsibilities might playarole. But in fact,the historical aspect is important in the discourses because it leads to payments that,while not trulycompensations,can still be understood as partial acknowledgementso fi njustices suffered. This is clearlyc onnected with the intention to heighten awareness of specificallyhistorical responsibility.Evenifsuch an argument is not directlyr eflected in appropriatef igures, it can contribute to doing more for the poor countries than strictlyr equired in ag iven situation. Above all, the historical argument calls upon us not justt oa lleviate suffering, but also to attack its causesb yp romotingamore just world than the one that has evolvedo vert he course of history.Thisp resents us with the task of seeking alternative possibilities for globald evelopments in the future.

Conclusion
The problem with most ethics devoted to the problem of global poverty is that they are conceivedw ithout reference to history.T hisl ack of history represents ad ouble difficulty.O nt he one hand, universalp rinciples provide no sufficient argument for the remedial duties invoked. On the other,these principles remain so abstract that it is impossiblet od ifferentiateb otht hose who need help and those who have ad uty to provide it.T he fight against globalp overty should not be mistaken for universalism. Rather,t oa ssume the global ethical stand-point is to analyze the historical processofglobalization, and to deriveconcrete and differentiated responsibilities from the conditions in which global poverty arises.
As we have seen, the globalization process takesp lace in diverse historical spaces and times. In the field of the world economy, this meansenvisioning the new spatial economyo fc apitalism with the developmento fn atural resources, the increase in sales markets, and the search for favorable conditionsofproduction in distant lands. While it is legitimate to point to local factors as well when making international comparisons,t his should not tempt us to underestimate the influenceo ft he world economic system. In the political arena, this means that the role of nation-states needsdifferentiation. This also applies in particular to developing countries,which werea nd still are dependenti ns pecific ways on the old colonial powers.Thus, if one points to the inadequacies of these states in order to shift the blame for global poverty onto them, one should equallyr ecall that these domestic deficiencies are also conditioned by the global order.I n order to overcome hardship, associations of states are increasinglye merging within the groups of developing and newlyi ndustrialized countries thatf ulfill as imilar functiont ot he European Union. In these cases, too, the national and transnationallevels overlap to form asupra-territorial space-time structure. It is preciselyt hese new assemblages that requires pecial support from the old industrial nations.
Thus when we consider the history of globalization, we no longer need only to enquire into the historical beginningso ft he process, but also to determine more preciselyw herea nd when to seek the roots of global poverty.I ft his question is in the foreground, we can surelyplace the beginning of globalization earlier-if not alreadyinthe earliest phases of colonialization from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries,then at least in nineteenth-century colonialism. And if we declare the emergence of electronic networks in the twentieth century as the birth of modernglobalization, we need to ask to what degree these networks promote or hinder development in the poor countries.There is no question that this development,too, disadvantageso re xcludes entire regions.
Finally, addressingt he long-term effects of these developments on living conditions in poor countries raises the historico-philosophical question of the continuities and discontinuities in the globalization process. It makes sense that postulatinghistorical responsibilityi sp ossibleo nlyi fo ne assumes am inimum of historicalc ontinuity,f or those who treat the ruptures in the globalization process as absoluter un the risk of underestimatingt heirl ong-term effects and playing into the handso ft hose who denya ny historical responsibility.A dhering to sustained development in no waym eans naively believingi nalinear processofmodernization, let alone in homogeneous progress.Affirming ahisto-ry with shared responsibility is perfectlycompatible with criticism of the downsides of the course taken by history.Ultimately, the struggle against global poverty presupposes aconviction that living conditions can be improved in the long term. The world'sp oor are not the onlyo nes who consider such improvements 'progress'.A ne thics of globalr esponsibility is quite inconceivable without this regulative idea. These considerations show the fundamental natureofhistorical patterns of interpretation, and demonstrate just how indispensable historical and historico-philosophical reflections on globalization are.