Cartographies of the ‘Eastern Question’: Some Considerations on Mapping the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea in the Nineteenth Century

The Sea of Marmara, the Black Sea, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits have always been geographically and, therefore, politically crucial for the state ruling Istanbul. Centuries of intermittent warring between the Ottoman Empire and their enemies often pivoted on the quality of naval knowledge of this region. In this article, I aim to give an overview of how cartographical developments progressed alongside the geo-political struggles in this area, and sometimes played a role in them. I suggest that map-making was particularly important during the ‘long’ nineteenth century of the ‘Eastern Question’, which can be dramatized as a play entitled ‘The Balance of Power’, in which the Ottomans, France, Russia and Britain were the main actors to take the stage. This period was full of struggle and conflict, treaties and alliances, and ended in 1895 with establishment of the first modern cartography unit within the Ottoman military.


Introduction
Historically, the Sea of Marmaraa nd the Black Sea constituted an integralg eographical unit,a long with the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.M ost importantly, the state ruling Istanbul always needed to control this unit for its food supplies, security and commerce.I ndeed, the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire werea ware of this phenomenon and acted accordinglytoseek control of the entire unit (İnalcık1 979, p. 74).
Ottomans had begun to settle around the Bosporus and the Dardanelles soon after their emergenceo nto the stageo fh istory.T hey began to populate the eastern shores of the Bosporus duringt he Battle of Pelekanon in 1329,a nd around Dardanelles through the conquests of Gallipoli in 1354 and Adrianapoli in 1361( İ nalcık2008a, p. 65). They then initiated af ortificationprocess in order to maintain their existenceinthese areas.A lthough these activities and the fate of the region preoccupied Byzantine-European alliances, the dominance of the straits by the Ottomans after as eries of conflicts,b rought this era, inevitably, to an end with the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by Mehmed II (1451-1481. The conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans dramaticallyc hanged politics in the west.Upon realizingthat Europe would not liketoleave Istanbul and its environs to the Ottomans,M ehmed II hurried to consolidateh is power to impede probable attacks from enemies. To this end, his navy sets ail in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea in 1454a nd 1455r espectively.I ts venturesome campaign in the Aegean Sea resultedi nt he captureo fs ome crucial northern Aegean islands. In response, the Venetian endeavor to establish ac rusade against Ottoman expansion actualized on 1M arch 1456. In the earlyy ears of this crusade, Western allies captured some islands in the Aegean Sea. However,the Ottoman navy strengthened its presencei nt he region by the conquest of Midilli in 1462 and by the construction of fortresses on boths ides of the Gallipoli Strait in 1463 -1464 (İnalcık2 008b, pp. 45 -49). Ottoman expansion continued in the Black Sea.They imposed aduty on Genoese colonies in 1454 and on the Pontus Empire in 1456.Bythe conquest of Amasra and Trabzon in 1459and 1461 respectively, theyd ominated the southern part of the Black Sea.T hus, the Ottoman State secured the protection of Istanbul and emergedasanimperial power within ten years ( İ nalcık2 008b, pp. 51-52) In the face of this Ottoman success, the Venetians constituted an alliance in 1463 with Uzun Hasan, sultan of the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty-enemies of the Ottomans in the east.That started anew war that lasted almost16y ears, and ended with the resoundingdefeat of the Venetians in 1479(İ nalcık2008b, pp. 50 -51). Meanwhile, Mehmed II continued to struggle for control in the Black Sea. Having closelym onitored the problems between the Crimean Khanate and the Golden Horde Empire,a nd the emergence of Russia as ap ower,h ee ventuallys ent the navy to conquer Caffa and annexedt he Crimean Khanate in 1475( İ nalcık 1944,p .2 06). Even though the conquest of Caffa rendered the Ottomans the most powerful actor in the Black Sea, they continued to expand by capturing Copa and Anapa in Circassia in 1479, and Akkerman and Kilia in Moldavia in 1484.F inally, the conquest of Southern Bessarabia (Budjak) in 1538 rendered the Black Sea an Ottoman lake (İnalcık1 979, p. 108).

The emergenceo fR ussia
This Ottoman dominance over the Black Sea region threatened Poland and the emerging power Russia.Therefore, these twostates tacitly(and sometimes overtly)s upported Kazakh tribes consistingo fT atarians and Circassians against the Ottomans and the Crimean Khanate from the seventeenth century onwards (İn-alcık2 008c, pp. 60 -61). Assaultsb yt hese tribes forced the Ottomans to war with Poland and Russia in the second half of the seventeenth century.These attacks and wars burdened the Ottoman Empire, causing the failureo fi ts Vienna Campaign in 1683.
Taking advantage of the situation, Russia attendedthe HolyLeagueinorder to realize its ambitions over the Black Sea. Sixteen years of war ended in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed in 1699.However,R ussia did not accede to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire. The two empires decided to continue peace talks in Istanbul, wheret hey signed at reaty in July of 1700 leaving the castle of Azov,i ts dependent castles and the bodyof water between them to Russia. In return, the Ottomans imposed their conditions regardingt erritorial issues and rejected Russia'sd emand for free trade in the Black Sea (Özcan 2001, pp. 504-507).
That Russia'sf irst attempt to rule the Black Sea was blocked by diplomacy did not eradicate its ambitions. From then on, Russia built ac omprehensive plan for the Black Sea and,accordingly,the Mediterranean Sea. Anew war started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1735.During the four-year course of the war,the Russianforeign minister Heinrich Andrei Ostermann (1686 -1747) elaborated aprogram to install Russia'spresenceinthe Black Sea, and its expansion towards Moldavia and Wallachia. Although Russia'sf ailurei nt his war denied them the chance to realize it duringhis lifetime,Ostermann'sprogram later bore fruitinthe 1768 -74 war (Ledonne 2006,pp. 3 -4, 8). This six-year,intermittent war endedwith Russia'striumph and constituted al andmark regarding the destinyo ft he so-called 'Eastern Question'.
Accordingt othe Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed in 1774 at the war'se nd, Russian commercial shipswould be able to sail the Black Sea and the Straits (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). These developments prompted indignation throughout the West and a 'play' called the 'Balance of Power' begunt ob ee nacted upon the stageofthe aforementioned historicallyand geographicallysignificant unit comprising the Sea of Marmaraa nd the Black Sea. Russia'sd estruction of the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme in 1770 had turned the tables on the Ottoman Empire (Aktepe 1993, p. 288-289). Thiso verwhelmingd efeat prompted the Ottoman court to carry out radical reforms in education, as well as in the navy.

ExplicitF rance, implicit Russia
In this context,Isuggest this turning point as the beginning of a 'long' nineteenth century for the Ottoman Empire, which endedi n1 895 with its establishment of am odern unit for cartographyw ithin the ministry of war.I nf act,t he Ottoman Empire had alreadyi nitiated am odernization project within its army in the second quarter of the eighteenth century,b ut was unable to maintain it due to diverse political and economic reasons,a nd the lack of aq ualified labor force ( Kaçar 2008, p. 71). The Ottomans undoubtedlyn eeded help in order to realize the modernization of their armyand education system. An opportunity thus arose, and the first actor to take the stagew as France. They lent a hand to theiro ld friend in organizinga nd servicingt he institutions needed to prevent Russia from emerging as ap ower.T hey deployed French engineers and cartographerstothe newlyestablished military schools in Istanbul, and provided thoses chools with educational materials and instruments (Günergun/ Üçsu 2016,p .1 48).
One of the first outcomes of this new collaboration was am ap of Princes' Islands, which was made by copyingaTurkish map acquired in 1772 (BnF,G E SH 18 PF 98 BIS DIV 6P6D). In the samey ear,aFrench engineer named Bellin produced amap of the Black Sea in which its southern part is excessively distorted (BnF,G ES H1 8P F9 9D IV 0P18). It appears that he had not used Turkish maps,s ince one thatr epresented the southern region and the Sea of Azov far more preciselyh ad alreadyb een publishedb yI brahim Muteferrikaa lmost 50 years earlier,i n1 724. In fact,M üteferrika'sm ap had alreadyb een copied and translated into French in 1768 by aFrench dragoman namedChabert,inthe service of aN eapolitan diplomatic envoy( Ucsu 2017). Apparently, apatron of Müteferrika named Mehmed Said Pasha did not give this map as apresent to the royal library of France duringh is mission to Paris in 1742,p resentingi nstead the 'officially' publishedb ooks, includingK atip Çelebi's Cihannüma (Aubaile et al. 1999,p p. 326 -327).
Likewise, Müteferrika'sh ad not reached the Russians either.T hus, Bellin's chart was probablyt he one in greatest use among the Russian navy too (Schokalsky 1907, p. 632). When war erupted in 1768, Catherinet he Great (1729 -1796)ordered her ambassador to obtain maps.Thereupon, the Russianambassador in London, Count Ivan G. Chernyshov (1726 -1797), had af amous Londonbased map seller called Andrew Dury prepareamapo ft he Black Sea in 1769, using the maps Chernyshov provided him (Zaytsev 2000,p.114;Bulatov /D elano-Smith /Herbert 2001, pp. 72-76). Although we do not know which maps the ambassadorg aveD ury to work with, we can conclude from the resulting map's inadequacy thatt hey did not include Müteferrika's.
Towards the end of the war, in 1773,R ussia sent asmall squadron to survey the northern Black Sea, of which amap did not reach their Admiralty until 1782. While serving in the Russian navy duringthe war,Dutch officer Jan-Hendrik van Kinsbergenp roduced am ap of the Crimean peninsula and the Sea of Azov, which was then the most reasonable map of the related aread espite its lack of detail concerning the baya nd inlets west of Balaklava, wheret he harbor of Sevastopol would later be located (Zaytsev 2000,p p. 114-116).
Meanwhile, Russia began in 1769 an expedition in the Aegean Sea, which was their "first large-scale strategic naval campaign conducted at ad istance from Russians hores" (Bulatov 2000,p .1 01), lasting until 1774.This expedition was of great importance in terms of the ongoing war and the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme; it also "laid the foundation of the future Black Sea fleet".R ussia most probablycould not chart the Straits and the Sea of Marmarad uring this expedition, since they lacked sufficientt ime to do so (ibd.). Nevertheless,immediatelyfollowing the signingofthe Treaty of KüçükKaynarca, Russia madeaconsiderable number of charts of the Sea of Marmaraa nd the Straits, which contravened the terms of the treaty. Itsd isguiseds urveying activities until late 1778,when their output was published as the Atlas of the Archipelago (Bulatov 2000,p .1 08). Over the course of these voyages, as well as using French and English charts, Russian surveyors acquired and used Ottoman charts unhesitatingly,despite theirAdmiralty'scontempt for Ottoman scientists (Postnikov 2000,p .8 6).
Out of gratitudet ot he French government for their aid duringt he war and for the foundation of new schools, the Ottomans provided French scientists with the privilegeofsurveying the Straits and the Sea of Marmara.Choisseul Gouffier (1752 -1817) in particular was employed as ambassador to Istanbul in 1784,a nd the officers he patronized made manymeasurements and maps of those waters. The scientists in his team-most notablyA chille Tondu, Jean François Truguet (1752 -1839), Jean BaptisteL echevalier (1752 -1836) and François Kauffer (c1751-1801)-taught at the new Ottoman engineerings chools and published works in Turkish as well (Vagnon /H ofmann 2016,p p. 39 -47;Z orlu 2011, pp. 79 -80).
François Kauffer merits special mention here for the sake of this paper.H e had come to Istanbul in 1776 for no more thanamonth in the entourageofGouffier'sfamous Voyage PittoresquedelaGrèce. From his map of Istanbul published in 1786,itcan be understood that he had alsoprepared amap in 1776.However, consideringt he limited duration of his visit,t he earlier one must have been a cursory map. His second venture to Istanbul occurred in 1784,w hen Gouffier was appointed ambassador.This time,Kauffer conductedasix-monthtriangulation surveyofIstanbul in collaboration with Lechevalier,beginning in December 1785.Asaconsequence, arevised version of abovementioned 1776 map was published (Pedley2012,pp. 32-36) In 1788 he published amap for the Ottomans of the northern part of their territory,a nnotated in both French and Turkish.
When his patron returned to France due to the French Revolution in 1789, Kauffer was stuck in ad ifficult situation. In 1792,a fter losing the Grand Vizier's letter to his patron, he was arrested and imprisoned for some time. Upon his release, he returned to Istanbul to servethe Ottoman court.However,according to recentlydiscovered information, it appears that Kauffer served not onlythe Ottomans: he alsos old spatial knowledge about Ottoman domains to the Russian ambassadori nI stanbul for six times more than his Ottoman court earnings. Kauffer'ss ervice to Russia was not limited to his ownm aps and surveys-he also used his position to offer Turkish government maps and surveying reports to the Russian Empire (Frumin 2016,p p. 95 -102).M eanwhile, Kauffer'sf ormer patron Gouffier was exiled to Russia, where he was warmlywelcomed by Russian officers in St.P etersburg. Their excessive hospitality has raised suspicions that Gouffier maya lso have provided Russians with spatial knowledge.T aking into consideration that Russia and the Ottoman Empire formed an alliance in reaction to the invasion of Egypt by France in 1798, it is hard to sayw hether these activities constituted espionageo rd iplomatic maneuvers (Pedley 2012,p .3 7, note 23).

The invasion of Egypta nd new mapping activities
The French invasion of Egypt alsogaveanopportunity to the British,who sent a military mission to Istanbul in 1799 to assist the Ottomans.During this mission, the British navy examined the defensive capacity of the Dardanelles (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005,p.50). Accordingtothe report filed by Major M. Hope, the situation was quitepoor to defend the Dardanelles and, accordingly, Istanbul (Hope 1918, pp. 118 -119).
The Ottoman-Russianc oalition against Franced id not last long,a nd an ew war between them erupted in 1806.R ussia and France came togethert on egotiate plans to share the Ottoman domains. The Ottoman Empire in turn approached Britain, and signed the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809.With this treaty,Britain accepted that the Ottoman Empire had the right not to permit warshipst o pass through these straits (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). This treaty granted Britain its invitation to appear onstage-and their entry heraldedF rance'se xit.F rench expeditions in Ottoman territoriesdramaticallydiminished. One of their few important mappingactivities that warrants mention here is Antoine François Andreossy's( 1761-1828)b ook,w hich was translated into English in 1818 (Lebouteiller 2016,p p. 85 -87).
Meanwhile, Russia'skeen interest in the area continued apace. The Ottoman Empire had abolished its Janissaries in 1826a nd had been trying to reorder its army. Sultan Mahmud II (1808 -1839) was thus inclined to make an agreement with Russia, so as to gain time and to prevent ap robable Russian assault.The Akkerman Convention treatyw as signed in this context,r e-asserting the right of Russians hips to pass through the Straits and sail on the Black Sea for commercial reasons (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). Russia launched an expedition under the command of Captain Egor Pavlovich (1796 -1859) in the Black Sea in 1826, which lasted ten years. This expedition'soutput,titled Atlas of the Black Sea, was published in 1842, and was subsequentlyusedfor more than 30 years thereafter (Grinevetsky et al. 2015,p .5 9, 511-512;Komaritsyn /M iroshnikov 2002,p .105).
In the meantime, Britainw as eager to survey the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea after establishing their presenceonthe region'sstagebytheir alliance with the Ottomans.Britishintellectual Edmund Goodenough, writing of the British expedition conducted in 1829 on the Black Sea, noted that "Of all the waters of the deep which have been penetrated by the enterprise of British sailors, there are none so little known to us, by actual observation, as the Black Sea" (Goodenough 1831, p. 101). The situation was slightlyb etter regardingt he Sea of Marmara. In 1833, aB ritishe xpedition had started in the northo ft he Aegean Sea under the tutelage of Thomas Graves (1802-1856). Among its team was Thomas Abel BrimageSpratt (1811-1888), who was later chargedwith acrucial survey of the Dardanelles and of Troy in 1840,which resulted in amap published in 1844 (Chasseaud /B oyle 2005,p .5 0).
Another map of the Sea of Marmara,with the inletso ft he Dardanelles and the Bosporus marked, was printedon29August 1840 by the publishing house of the Ottoman Navy (Günergun /Üçsu 2016,p.154). Considering that, accordingto the extant records,the Ottoman navy did not conduct an independent expedition on the Sea of Marmara at that time, and thatthe Sea of Marmara had then yetto be adequately surveyed, we could infer either that some Ottoman officers had participatedi na forementioned British expedition, or thatt hey had acquired its results immediatelythereafter and compiled this map. The Ottomans' first independent expedition on the Sea of Marmara took place under the command of Ahmet Hoca in 1841and was completed in three years, resulting in amap in 1844 (Algül 1985, p. 64). Immediatelyfollowing this expedition, Russia made an offer to the Ottoman Empire to survey the Sea of Marmarat ogether.T his survey,o f which the commander was E. P. Manganari, began in 1845and lasted three years. The results of this expedition werepublished in the MarmaraGuide and used by seamen and navies for ac onsiderable time thereafter (Aygün 1936,p p. 63 -64). (Fig. 1a and 1b)

Mapping during the Crimean War
This quiet period came to an end in 1853.R ussia declared war against the Ottoman Empire on the pretext that they would protect the Christian people living in the Balkans.The deterioratingOttoman State would not have been able to resist Russia alone. Thus, Britain and France began preparingtosupport the Ottomans against Russia once more. At the beginning of 1854,a llied navies began surveying the Gallipoli Peninsula with the thought thatt hey would stop Russia there. However,they wereunaware of maps made previouslybyFrench and British cartographers,and made no request for Ottoman maps,since they did not appreciate the Ottoman surveyors' work. In fact,thosewerequite good pieces of workthus, the allied navies' ignorance and arrogance caused them to repeat work unnecessarily ( Débarre 2016,p p. 141-142).O ttoman officers,o nt he otherh and, werek een to acquiret he maps that theira lliesh ad made. Fori nstance, during the Crimean Wart hey immediatelya dapted aB ritish map into Turkish, and translated an atlas showing the Bosporus and the fortresses along it (Istanbul UniversityLibrary,92688 and 92924). They alsoordered cartographic instruments from Vienna,with av iew to mappingC rimea( BOA, A.} AMD6 0.12.01).
British seamen playeda ni mportantr ole duringt he Crimean War. Thomas Spratt and his team surveyed Balaklava and noted the positions of the allied fleet for the bombardment of Sevastopol (Chasseaud /B oyle 2005,p p. 50 -51). Since the Russians assault on Varna instead of the Gallipoli peninsula was contrary to expectations, the surveying work finished earlier.R ussia was defeated with the aid of France and Britain, and at reaty was signed in Paris in 1856.A ccordingly,t he Black Sea became neutral. The political atmosphere was again calm, despite Russia'sd issatisfaction.
On the occasion of this peace, the Ottomans fortified the Straits and produced new maps.Amanuscript map made by senior captain Nuri Efendi in the military schoolin1863combined all the cartographical resourcesIhave mentioned so far (BOA, HRT 706). (Fig. 2a and 2b) Evidently, this map showing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, along with Tenedos Island and Troy,i sacopy of the map produced after the Ottoman-Russianjoint expedition of the Marmara Sea. The depths are giveninthe Russian measurement unit sazhen as in the original map-an unusual choice since theire quivalent values in British feetw as more useful. In the legend, some symbols are also written in French. As it turns out,N uri Efendi did not want to lose time by calculatinga ll of the depth values in another unit,soheinsteadstated the foot equivalent of one sazhen. This was probablyintended to ease the map'sreadingand comparisons for Ottoman navalofficers, who were presumablyusing British maps,since they had their education from British officers.A sf or the French symbols in the legend, this is likelyb ecause the first modern cartographyt eachers of Ottoman officers wereF rench, and as such they had learned the basicr ules and technical terms of map-making from them.   (Andrusoff 1893, p. 49). In 1892t he Ottoman government sent at eam to survey and fortify the Straits under the direction of Henri Alexis Brialmont,aBelgian general-but this mission producedn om aps (Kış 2015,p p. 365 -373).

Concluding/opening remarks
The year of 1895 was another landmarkf or Ottoman cartography:a ni ndependent cartographyo ffice was foundedw ithin the army. Additionally, the political atmosphere changed in aw ay that would eventuallyl ead to the First World War. These two phenomenac ombined to herald ad ifferent erai nc artographic production (Özkale ve Şenler 1980,p .5 1).
In essence, the 'long' nineteenth century that Ih aveh ighlighted here witnessed manyalliances, treaties and enmities in the context of the 'Eastern Question'.A ll of the actors taking part in the 'Balance of Power' playt hat dealt with this question needed profound knowledge of the Marmara Sea, the Black Sea and the Straits. Motivated by al ack of knowledge of this geographical unit, and powered by progress in modern science and technology, ahefty production of cartographical knowledge was accomplished throughout this period. However,these productive map-making activities entailed theirshare of coalitions and hostilities. The production outputo fe ach country fluctuateda ccordingt ot heir relations with the othera ctors.Therefore, even though Ihavegiven an overview of this 'long' nineteenth century by touchingupon its essential activities and the fruits it bore, this period in history nevertheless serves to corroborate Yves Lacoste'sfamous statement 'La géographie, ça sert,d'abord, àfaire la guerre' ('Geographyi su sed, first and foremost,tom ake war').