Globalization and Crisis of Values: Promise and Total Disappointment

What should be called (at least according to the views supported by modern moral philosophy schools) the ‘modern moral world’ can be depicted nowadays as an environment in which we consider relations to the community to be morally significant, even when the individuals within the reach of these duties are in fact unknown. So we can blame or we can praise, even in the notorious absence of any identifiable subject of ‘moral obligation’. The fundamental difference is in perceived obligations, not in entitlements: duties versus rights. At first glance, moral entitlement is nothing but an abstract right seeking recognition. Not so the obligation, as the ‘right-bearer’ is waiting for the commitment to be honored. The work of Onora O’Neill, Charles Fried and Thomas M. Scanlon rounds out the argumentation of the normative frame that operates in today’s strongly supererogatory moral world. Men may seem detestable as joint stock-companies and nations; knaves, fools, and murderers there may be; men may have mean and meagre faces; but man, in the ideal, is so noble and so sparkling, such a grand and glowing creature, that over any ignominious blemish in him all his fellows should run to throw their costliest robes. That immaculate manliness we feel within ourselves, so far within us, that it remains intact though all the outer character seem gone; bleeds with keenest anguish at the undraped spectacle of a valor-ruined man [...] To meanest mariners, and renegades and castaways, I shall hereafter ascribe high qualities, though dark; weave round them tragic graces; if even the most mournful, perchance the most abased, among them all, shall at times lift himself to the exalted mounts. (Melville 1988, pp. 117– 118) This text has been made possible and inspired by the following research projects: Philosophy of History and Globalisation of Knowledge. Cultural Bridges Between Europe and Latin America: WORLDBRIDGES (F7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES: PIRSES-GA-2013-612644); Prismas filosófico-morales de las crisis: Hacia una nueva pedagogía sociopolítica (FFI2013-42395-P); the NEW TRUST-CM. Programa en Cultura de la Legalidad (GITcP), led by Prof. Dr Jose María Sauca (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); and last but not least, the Proyecto de Innovación Educativa (Innova-Docencia) at Universidad Complutense entitled Emociones políticas y virtudes epistémicas en el siglo XVIII: Innovación en la enseñanza de Humanidades (PIMCD-60), with Prof. Dr Nuria Sánchez Madrid as Lead Researcher. The methodology, sources and contents have all been enriched by regular collaborations with the members of these research groups and their invaluable help. Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar, Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (IFS-CSIC) OpenAccess. © 2018 Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-022 Introduction: The Hero with a Thousand Faces Let me, for argument’s sake, recall here a treasured memory of a prolonged and enjoyable research stay in Berlin. I landed there in the early winter of 2010, when journalists were especially attached to the term außergewönlich (‘extraordinary’) —‘an extraordinary winter’. A born-and-raised Berliner (let alone a German columnist) would not dare to use these words lightly. I remember leaving my apartment in the frigid morning, flakes drifting here and there, to find my dorm’s threshold clearly isolated from the world by means of a vast snow blanket. Flabbergasted, I looked around in search of help. Then I looked down—and there they were, those thin layers of snow-soaked paper at my door that promised the first solid step out of the cave. Day after day, the brochure left almost unnoticed on my doorstep helped me out into Berlin life, clearing the initial path to tackling the day’s meetings and readings. That very stitched-together set of pages constitutes to this day—or so they tell me, as I’m now far from Berlin—the Boulevardzeitung (BZ). But don’t be fooled by its described weight. A quick view of its history points out to those of us who don’t yet know, that even in its slenderness we have before us a hundred-and-forty-year newspaper in its prime. The BZ was awarded ‘Paper of the Year 2016’—a well deserved prize, considering its half-million readership. On 12 October 2009, the merry people of Berlin woke up to a brand new social initiative within the pages of the 132 anniversary edition: the Berliner Helden [Heroes from Berlin], devoted to good deeds and to be featured six times a week.1 The one-page feature is an homage to all those citizens who render service to the Berlin community, who it names Ehrenamter (‘honorary civil servants’). It offers particular cases of unselfish civilian management, educational ventures for disadvantaged children, or social inclusion projects. In 2016, for example, the lists of awards were crammed with references to the Syrian refugees. Other mentions include recycling and sustainability initiatives, the implementation of new green areas in the city’s neighborhoods. and people who out of sympathy help others in need of medical aid, not to mention those who find animal shelters for our four legged friends. The awarded are always among the aforementioned ‘merry people of Berlin’—private citizens with some extra motivation and implication in what makes a city a shared space. Space creates a ‘shared life’ beyond the matter of simply occupying it. Rather than a matter of mere presence, it is a space thought to be administered in common, jointly—and these are its ‘heroes’.  The project can be checked on-line at http://www.bz-berlin.de/berliner-helden (visited 23 December 2017). 302 Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar


Introduction: The Herow ith aT housand Faces
Let me, for argument'ssake, recall here atreasured memory of aprolongedand enjoyable research stayinBerlin. Ilandedthere in the earlywinter of 2010,when journalistswereespeciallyattached to the term außergewönlich ('extraordinary') -'an extraordinary winter'.Aborn-and-raised Berliner( let alone aG erman columnist)would not dare to use these words lightly. Iremember leaving my apartment in the frigid morning,f lakes drifting here and there, to find my dorm's threshold clearlyisolatedfrom the world by means of avast snow blanket.Flabbergasted, Il ooked around in search of help. Then Il ookedd own-and there they were, those thin layers of snow-soaked paper at my door that promised the first solid stepo ut of the cave.D ay after day, the brochureleft almost unnoticed on my doorsteph elpedm eo ut into Berlin life, clearing the initial path to tackling the day'sm eetingsa nd readings.
That very stitched-togethers et of pages constitutes to this day-or so they tell me, as I'mn ow far from Berlin-the Boulevardzeitung (BZ). But don'tb e fooled by its described weight.Aquick view of its history pointso ut to those of us who don'ty et know,that even in its slenderness we have before us ah undred-and-forty-year newspaper in its prime. The BZ wasa warded 'Paper of the Year 2016'-aw ell deservedp rize, consideringi ts half-million readership. On 12 th October 2009,the merry people of Berlin wokeuptoabrand new social initiative within the pages of the 132 nd anniversary edition: the Berliner Helden [Heroes from Berlin], devoted to good deeds and to be featured six times aweek.¹ The one-page feature is an homagetoall those citizens who render service to the Berlin community,who it names Ehrenamter ('honorary civilservants'). It offers particular cases of unselfish civilian management,e ducational ventures for disadvantagedc hildren, or social inclusion projects.I n2 016,f or example, the lists of awards werecrammed with references to the Syrian refugees. Other mentions include recycling and sustainability initiatives, the implementation of new green areas in the city'sn eighborhoods. and people who out of sympathyh elp others in need of medicala id, not to mention those who find animal shelters for our four leggedf riends. The awarded are always among the aforementioned 'merry people of Berlin'-privatec itizensw ith some extram otivation and implication in what makes acity ashared space. Space creates a 'shared life' beyond the matter of simply occupyingi t. Rather thanamattero fm ere presence, it is as pace thoughtt ob ea dministered in common, jointly-and these are its 'heroes'.
In German, this type of engagement is called Aktion(-en),i nawayt hat would have made Hannah Arendt herself proud.² An action merits beingc alled an Aktion when it has as its aim ac ertain type of social or communal commitment in which not necessarilyd isinterested altruism, but rather what could recall the phrase 'the greatest good for the greatest number of people',i sa ccomplished. This tension between 'private-public obligations' is keyh ere: not entitlement,b ut obligation. Whyd ow es ometimesb ear such ab urden for the fashion of an impersonal need;avoluntary obligation to an allegedlyj oint stock-company; and furthermore, one with whom we are not acquainted in the least?F or in most of the stories in Berliner Helden,t he local heroes do not know their beneficiaries. The supposed normative content carried on their shoulders is intended to symbolize the living community in which they are immersed. Publicity and transparency are virtuest ob ec ounted on, of coursebut they are not emblematic of the common behavior. 'Knaves, fools and murderers' can equallylivethereinthe imperium of homo homini lupus if they please, in the open, recognizing that they live in the junglea nd knowing that the game is like that.
'Berliners' are not,onthe other hand,called 'heroes' for nothing,since it is implied thattheir endeavor is as private and as personal as that of the 'knaves', but does not seek an outcomefor the self. Forsome, this is justaspecial case of craziness; their interest in the commonwealth ends here. Melville'sd iagnosis (quoted above) is perhaps apt for our times. It impliest hat as common individuals, we live in some sort of 'joint-stock company'.Wea re laden by our private motivations, but none of them points to the particularfellow on the other side of the table. If we getfrustratedinour privategoals, 'with mean and meagrefaces' we always feel like we have at least the right to moan. Onlyinwhat we envisage as 'the ideal' case are our better angels moved-an außergewönlich event,inany  In TheHuman Condition (1958), Arendt displays her ontologyofagencyr egarding human activities in their various forms. 'Labor' is the craft by means of which we takecare of our biological needs,a nd ultimatelys ervet he chain-of-beingi ncarnated in reproduction. The genus,t he species,o verlaps the individual. Therei sn oe nd to it as activity;w ea re talkinga bout 'work' if our labor has an end; ab eginningi mpregnated by an idea, ap urpose, some disposed means and lastlya ne nd. Here, the human world comesi nto play, as productiont ransforms the inertia of the natural realm.The genus is slowly substituted by individuality and its teleology; 'action' is the highesta nd most significative activity ah uman can endeavort ou ndertake. Forbyan'action',weare individuals among other individuals, and for the sake of individuals in acommunity.By'action',wemake aplacefor us as unique members of ashared respublica and seek to recognize and be recognized. The 1998 edition of TheHuman Condition (University of Chi-cagoPress), with substantial text additions and an introduction by Margaret Canovan, is worthy of consultation.
Globalization and Crisis of Values: Promisea nd Total Disappointment case. In contrast, for Berliner Helden, 'wheres ome simplym oan, they geti nvolved' ('Wo anderen nur jammern, packen sie an'), as the BZ chief board urges. It is something of an ironic trope to use such amotto, since Berlin citizens are famous indeed for their special wayofmoaning.They gripe so earnestlythat they have created their owns pecial term for it: jammern. Itso rigins are in the dumb gesticulations of the jawwhile complaining-no word, all pose. Of course, if you jammerst,you are playing the Berliner.
"The question of who must blame[versus] the question of who has standing to do so" is atricky one (Scanlon 2008, p. 175). As an analogy, consider the similar question: who is entitled to praise and who is not? "Ajudgment of blameworthiness is an impersonal one. It is aj udgment that anyone can make, whatever his or her relation to the agents in question, while blame, as Iinterpret it,ismore personal" (Scanlon 2008, p. 175). Both cases contemplate the presenceo fc onceptual judgment.T here is ac riterion to be held up against in order to judge, and the judgesw ield it in cases of bothp ersonal and impersonal blame. You can blame, in T.M. Scanlon'sv iew, if and only if youa re first assuming the possibility of an identifiable 'blameworthiness'.Equally, youcan praise if and only if youare assumingthe possibility of an identifiable qualitythat makes something or somebody 'praiseworthy'.
Ia gree with Scanlon thata nyone can make such judgmentsa sa' privateo r public citizen',but my views differ on the conceptual independence of personal bias. This is the very view in which the abovementioned Berliners are seen as 'heroes' for getting involved personally in something taken to be impersonal; they went the proverbial extra mile. But is it not an assumption central to Scanlon'sa rgument that 'whatever his or her relation to the agent in question is', what has changed is in fact a 'morally( committal) binding' relation of some kind?W hether the situation seems personal or impersonal,wea re affected by our sense of the relation changing. If by 'personal' we mean 'intimate',t hen Scanlon'sr easoning is well understood. If not,t hen he or she who shares the judgment assumes they share ac ommunal relation as well-something gewönlich ('customary'). The difference regarding changei sn on-existent. Berliner Helden consider morallysignificant their relation to the community,evenwhen the individuals comprisingthe 'stock' are unknown. So they can blame and they can praise-but so tooc an Jammerers. The cognitive judgment always comes with a performativee ffect,b ecause it judgesahuman relation, with persons and subjects. The fundamental difference is in perceivedobligations, not in entitlements.
In what follows, Iwill address the problem intrinsic to that vision encapsulated in the BZ'smotto. It seems to make plausible adiscrepancy between 'innocuouslymoaning/praising' and 'being compromised' by that moaning/praising.It is adifferencethat passes almostunnoticed, but that Iholdtohaveasignificant normative drive.While both activities are personallydriveninasense, Iwill advocate for as trongn ormative drive,t hough one diffused into the community. That is, Iwill defend aposition in which there is in fact some means of explaining what kind of moral forceweassumeorattribute to an Aktion,and how it can be conceptuallya rticulated. Onora O'Neill will have the floor in the first place; Charles Fried and Thomas M. Scanlon will round out the argumentation.
'Entitlements',r ightsa nd utter suspicion Apparently, we have and will always have as overeign right to moan-or so we are told. It is ap erk attachedt ot he position, unassailable, and perhaps even an ontological fact of being individuals. If therei sashared space, or shared life, it begins with the mattero fo ccupyingi ta nd claiming one'sp resencei n it.B laming and moaning are the expressions of noticing someone trespassing -the defense and call to order of the owned ontologicaln iche. The trespassers are also privatepersons with expectations that can be deceivedbynone but personally attributed entities. We perceive that their actions damageo ur rights.
In Berlin, whenever neighbors are tooloud for our taste when brushing their teeth, the oft-anthropomorphized U-Bahn or S-Bahn commits the sin of being late (the außergewönlich Verspätung), our charcoal heating breaks on the coldest of the evenings, or the local ice-hockeyt eam (another type of 'joint stock-company')l oses an easy match against the eternal rival, we feel like moaning.A lways in the mood for blaming,wea re triggered by these events. We gladlyg oa long with the game; it is so simple. The mere detection of ap ossibler ights infringement is enough to satisfy the cognitiven eed to jammern. This 'epistemic judgment'-of 'what should not be done' and thus, in earnest, 'what must not be done'-is allowed to anyone. This creates an aggravated state of righteousness, in which we defend what we think is and should be gewönlich ('customary'). Anye xplanation or verbal expression comes later-detection and reaction comes first,a nd is sometimes overeager.
However,thingsbeing as they are, "by what metric are we to determine the 'size' of ar ight [or of its far-reachingv iolation,] or of the 'territory' that is constrainedb yt he counterpart obligations the right imposes?" (O'Neill 1995, p. 196) Aright is defined accordingtothe duties it imposes on others, indirectly, on the basis of constraints and obligations. Both sides of the equation are blurred. Furthermore, we must also ask: who is the one that freelya nd voluntarily picks up the imposed commitment,a nd why? The journey towards the exalted amountst ot he ideals of pretendedw arrants, and of due 'entitlements'.A ' right' is here apositive interpretation of liberty that entails some kind of posses-sion: property.Its breach constitutes theft.But on what basis is this property recognized? Such avision "construes rights as entitlements[ and entitlements as a contractedd ebt] to whatever goods or services [that is, promised and then expected actions], as well as forbearances [when][…]n eeded." (O'Neill 1995, p. 196) Property is in our right,a nd constitutes it,i nt he form of either goods, services,orour merryfellows' indulgence-matters in which we entertain expectations. We must then ask: was therea ny promise made to begin with?P erhaps. There must be; or at least whenw es truggle to find it,wes hould try to explain wherethe error lies in that assumption. Forapromise-asocial contract-is what seems implied in the demand.
The scope of the domain is uncertain, though; its description unclear.F rom wheres hould we draw the perimeter,t he circumference:f rom the inside out, positively;o rf rom the outside in, basedo nc onstraints and counterpart obligations?What is the 'size' to such aright-thing (asks O'Neill), and how do we measure it in view of building frontiers,a part from out of complaints?
Unfortunately, without an idea of the metric or an awareness of its build,we have problems with its accommodation of the rights of an imagined 'fellow'.I n the ideal, one individual'sr ights are an unsatisfactory abstraction, because "therei sn ou nique wayo fa ccommodating different rights" within this understanding of the issue (O'Neill 1995,p.196). We can overwriteany possible conflict by redefining the traits involved in the description to accommodate the tensions, just as we can look for conflict by means of the sames trategy: There areindefinitelymanywaysofdescribingpossible actions [and deducingcounterpart obligations], and hencei ndefinitelym anyw ayso fp ickingo ut sets of copossible, equal[ly valid] rights. ( O ' Neill 1995, p. 196) These rights maycollide (or not), as in the caseofour 'moaner'. "Without ametric for rights we could count aset of rights maximal [regarding liberties] onlyifit dominateda ll other sets of rights" (O'Neill 1995,p .1 96). As we are still talking about 'cognitivej udgment',t he countingi sn othing but a( rights) pretensionabrute exercise of demanding recognition. It is no big surprise that the 'moaner' feels that his or her cause is just-the ideal immaculate one-and should be recognizedassuch. How could we dare to refuse? Who else can layblame? Who has the standing necessary for blaming?Onlyheorshe who feels entitled to. Hence, it approaches the 'maximal'.
The negative expression of moaning,orofblaming, is the visible counterpart of the metric we seek-ap articular pole for the fence; the constraint. It is ap rivaten ormative drive,a scribed regardless of adoption. But for what alleged reason can we ascribea no bligation to af ellow? 'Meno we'; 'society owes'-these are the basic assumptions of the 'moaner'. "People is [sic]v ery angry… Believe me, very angry",p ronounced Donald Trump in one particularlyb elligerent speech before Election Dayi nN ovember 2016.H es et himself up as au nique spokesman for 'the people'.H eadopted the most prevalent position of domination: symbolic representation of the extension of all possibles ubjects of rights. His voice was the meansb yw hich 'we the people' moaned, and by which they blamed. Trump provided the standing for their blaming,feelingentitled and establishinga n' us-them' divide, with the right-holdersf acing the right-bearers with contempt.P eople weres overeignlye ntitled, and someone had to be held accountable for pressingt hatl ogic further.E xpectations had been let down and amendments and retribution wered emanded in response.
OnoraO'Neill controversiallydescribes this situation as generalized. Society wanders on the higher planes of morality,onthe exalted mounts-in the ideal. Of the common yearning for retribution, O'Neill asks: "is it true thatw ehaves topped trusting? Hasu ntrustworthya ction made trust toor isky?I st rust obsolete?" (O'Neill 2002,p.vii) And what about its constrainingcounterpart?Are we prone to cast doubt on the expected actions of others, so severelya st oc reate ac onstant expectation of failure? We are told constantlyt hat we are living through as o-called 'revolution in accountability',i nw hich measures against mistrust are set in motion. Control reaches all spheres of public life nowadays.The era of evaluation and immediate feedback is in full flow.
Sadly, the fact is thatw ed on't "know whether we have ac risiso ft rust or onlya[promoted] cultureo fs uspicion" (O'Neill 2002,p .1 7). Suspicion leads to blame, and blame leadst oi ndignation and outrage-the usual reaction to a damaged right. 'Moaners' do not run to their fellows to 'throw their costliest robes' over their ignominyi nt he service of deeply-felt, 'sparkling' nobility.I nstead, they enterprise an ascension of standards, ar aising of the bar-indeed, ap retended 'moral ascension'.They do so by an escalation of both 'moral obligations' and 'moral duties'-that is, the deduced counterpartc onstraint.These obligations are thus transformed. They suffer from supererogation both in quality and quantity,i ni ntension and extension-but it is as pecial type of supererogation. No one can bestow upon me anyobligation beyond what is meant in my positive duties,whatever they mayb e. Letu ss ay that they have ac ertain content,a nd thatt hey have as ize. Supererogatory actions are (as theirL atin name pointso ut) actionsi nw hich we 'overpay'-supererogare. Goods, services, and forbearances have a 'price',and we 'pay' over and abovei t, to whatever extent we deem proper.S upererogatory actions are and must always be voluntary ones. Otherwise, they are compulsory by definition-they fall within our positive duty or obligation, and are thus not supererogatory at all. As we might infer,this subtle differencei sw hat makes the extra mileapraiseworthym erit.When we walk the extram ile, we are praised for being 'so noble and so sparkling';f or being honorable. There is no counterpart here-no blaming if the supererogatory action is not initiated-for it is necessarilyc onsidered as separate from due rights.
Consider the notorious (to use an epithet alreadyl adenw ith bias) caseo f Justine Sacco. It is December 2013.Sacco, a(now,alas, former) Public Relations Consultant is about to board af light to South Africa. Before boarding, she feels like tweetingi nt he meager hundred and forty characters the app allows. Soon, the ill-thought-out tweet passes from her 170f ollowers to almostf ifteen thousand: "Going to Africa. Hope Id on'tg et AIDS. Just kidding.I ' mw hite!" (Waterlow 2015,p ar.2 ). During the eleven-hour flight,a ne motional breeding ground under the hashtag '#HasJustineLandedYet' prepares al ess than warm welcome in Africa for the thirty-year-old publicist.T he news spread rapidly, and by the time Sacco'sf light landed, her job, reputation and privacy had been blown up -worldwide. "It houghtt here was no wayt hata nyone could possiblyt hink it was literal," (Waterlow 2015,par.12) Saccol ater claimed. The reverenceo fl iterality-the suspicion and prohibition of anyindirect use of language, of anytrope -amounts to ac all for strictness. We are that serious: youwill be held accountable for the literality of your words. Joking or not,n on-literal uses of language have no moralquality. Formany, chastisingSaccoseemed amatter of 'moralobligation' (Ronson 2015). Her humiliation became ag lobalt ask. Among the consequencesw eren ot onlyt he loss of her professional and personal credibilitythe foundations of anyp ossiblet rust that could have been bestowed on herbut also the forbidding of anya ttempt to characterize Sacco, at anys tageo f the process, as av ictim. Being deprivedo ft he status of victim amountst oa n elimination of the rights thatg ow ith it,a sw ell as of anyr ight to appeal.
Indirect uses in speech, humor and even orthographic mistakes can become statements bound to personal and impersonal 'off the record' legal claims. The literal is equated with the positive-but it simultaneouslyinvites suspicions, demands and requirements. We are living an erar eadya nd ripe for the newlycoined term that some intellectuals alreadyu se as common currency: 'post-censorship' (Soto Ivars 2017). Global justicehas agloomysidewhenitcomes to reprimanding.What is supererogatory has its counterpart concept in ap retended 'compulsory supererogation'-this being an obvious oxymoron. Escalating obligations imposed on others lead to the hypertrophyo ft he size of positive rights on the part of the right-holders.The scope of entitlement has reached global proportions, of which there is no 'outer' part: no one is apartf rom it; there are no limits. Nothinge scapes the reach of that right,a nd so everything can be made an obligation and everyone is obliged by its total nature.F or some claims (and some blames), there is then ac orrect wayo fb ehaving.There is ac orrect wayinwhich one conducts his or her life and thus astrong recommendation implicit in such practices.Actions deemed exemplary function as aform of 'advice' that,h owever blurry,h ad better be taken into account.
The boundaries between justicea nd animositya re alsou ncertain. Political correctness is requireda nd in social media instruments, 'triggerw arnings' are becomingmore and more popular. They are letters of safe-passage; they are cautionary posts at the beginning of articles, blog entries and other social networkbased forms of expressing personal opinions in public. These 'warnings' are intended to preparet he reader,b ased on the assumption of particular paradigms of moral correctness, and in this wayend up criticizing them. They assume adisproportionate 'triggereffect' of anger and self-righteous wrath that the expressed opinion could cause. It is not hard to do the math and conclude the ageof'postcensorship' goes hand in hand with the ageo f' auto-censorship':t he cognitive judgment of the watchful global agoraisassimilated and internalized. Of course, no individual is off limits when pertaining to the universal community.T he 'world wide entanglement'-the so-called 'revolution of accountability'-raises doubts about whether we are not really in an 'inquisitorial revolution'.I nquiry and inquisition ask for responses.Thati sw hat we have here: the requirement of an 'all-encompassingr esponsibility'.
Morallyspeaking, when no one should be entitled to the supererogatory action of other,a nd having no right to expect it,h ere this logic shatters.The last frontier in responsibility is thati nw hich one is unable to label him or herself as avictim, or as ahurtable being,meaning a 'being in an unassailable (sacred, respected at all costs) position'-his or her lastr esort.One cannot adopt such a label for her or himself, nor occupy such aposition, nor be the recipient of that right.And it is afundamental right! 'Man in the ideal' can follow aslippery slope to abstraction. Abstraction is sometimes tantamount to the vanishment of one's importance,a nd of one'sr eal position. In such an abstraction, no one merits consideration as worthyo ft he terms 'human being' or 'person',m eaningt hat communities emerge as the real winnersofthe old 'social ontology' debate:communitiesa nd not individuals are the main constituents,t he real right-holders and the real right-claimers. Men are those who are detestable, with 'unbearably mean and meagre faces';j oint-stock companies,o nt he other hand, are such grand and glowingc reatures as to be considered sacred entities. Juridically, they are in fact the only right-retainers in these cases-they behave as real persons, 'real beings'.
But the real question here is: who has standing to label?InJ une 2015,Spain witnessed the makings of one of these ideological crowds intent on defending publiclyvia Twitter the honor of avictim-in spite of her own attitudes. In October 1991, twelve-year-old Irene Villawas severelywounded by acar bomb in Ma-drid planted as at errorist attack by Basque nationalist terrorist group ETA. Now awell-known journalist and writeri nS pain and professionallya ctive in numerous media, Villa participatedi na2015 Twitter debate on the limits of humor, which ended with her in the role of protagonist.P ublic personalitiesm ade some jokes,i ntended as black humor,a bout Villa'sw ounds,i nciting outrage among certain crowds of public opinion. Villa herself participated in an effort to end the controversy for good: "My favorite joke is that which defines me as an explosive woman" (La Vanguardia 2015,p ar.2 ). Personally, she had not felt dishonored or offended at all. Furthermore, she did not want others to represent her as if in her absence. Nevertheless,s ome Twitter users thought otherwise. They seized the opportunity to chastise the jokers and contested the validity of theirh umor. Consider O'Neill'sa ssertiont hat: [w]ithin an account of justice it mayseem unimportant whether we adopt the perspective of agents and their obligations,orofr ecipients and their entitlements. The set of obligations and the set of entitlements will presumablybereciprocallydefined. […][But] the perspective of recipienceand entitlement has other difficulties that obstruct the project of construction. (O'Neill 1995, pp. 214-215) She further states that even when, ideally, justice would guarantee reciprocity: [i]n the tradition of the social contract theory but not in its contemporary descendants, principles of justice define obligations rather than entitlements. Areturn to this perspective is, Ibelieve, requiredfor anonidealizing constructivism because obligations of justice, unlikee ntitlements,can be constructed without assumingametric either for liberty or more generallyf or actions. ( O ' Neill 1995, pp. 214-215) 'Obligations',r ights and trust Are we building up and living in aglobal society populated onlybyfellows who are not reallyfellows, but rather mere 'recipients and their entitlements'?Isthere any 'agent',with his or her obligations, attentive enough to replenish the content of such demanding rights?I fn ot,i ti sd ubious at best what the content if any could be for the thing designated by the word 'right'.R ight-holders reciprocally entail right-bearers-Hohfeld's salva veritate.³ The perspective constructed from  In the domain of classical rights theory,the work of Wesley NewcombHohfeld is paradigmatic. ForHohfeld, rights areinfact entitlements to perform certain actions and to be positioned in certain legal states; and also for the contrary-to not perform certain actions and to avoid certain states. His theory highlights the reciprocity between rights and duties, and proposes al ogic of the easy-to-handle position of the right-holder leads to problems arising from the would-be forbidden operation of idealizing, inviting gluttonous receivers with no apparent duties to others. Thisf undamental idealization happens in the determining of 'size'.Construction from this perspective grants accesst oanunprecedented unleashing of rights, and permits a 'maximal set of copossible entitlements'-one which, sadly, would reveal itself to be sometimes contradictory, since no metric has been established to limit the reach of those rights. "Abstraction, taken strictly, is unavoidable and in itself innocuous" (O'Neill 1995, pp. 214-215). It is aformal operation of selection for the purpose of highlighting certain traits, and is dependentonthe simple selection of characteristics.Onthe other hand: Idealization is another matter.O bjections to supposedly 'abstract' ethical principles and reasoning areo ften objections to idealization.The objection is not to reasoningt hat is detached from certain predicates that are true of the objects discussed, but to reasoning that assumes predicates that aref alse of them. Reasoningt hat abstracts froms ome predicate makes claims that do not depend on the predicate'seither beingsatisfied or not beingsatisfied by the objects to which the reasoningapplies. Reasoningthat idealizes makesclaims that applyo nlyt oo bjects that live up to ac ertain ideal. (O'Neill 1995, p. 209) The 'metric' being soughtisdisappointingly 'ideal' in this case. The predicatesin question -'supererogatory predicates', 'higher duties' and 'shortly-expected predicates'-are ideal: they do not yete xist; are imagined, pretendeda nd (in most cases) desired. Thisi st he positive moment that reciprocallyu rgesf or the consideration of its counterpart obligation-the 'entitlement'.B ut beyond this point,this construction is founded on ah ouse of cards,a pplieda nd attributed -'attribute' here meaning thate ssentialp redicate ascribed in ontology,w hich functionsa sc onstitutive of the being-by force, independent of satisfaction.
Evidently, attributed responsibility is ap recondition for blaming (Holgado González 2015,p .7 9). The 'moaner',t he 'blamer' and the 'hater' in social networks all feel an entitled urge for satisfaction aftert he targeto fh is or her anger fails to honor their commitment.F or Scanlon,a s' rational beings' we are in an ecessary 'relationship' with each other.I ti saclass of shared responsibility in as hared ideal community,i nlight of all that we have the capability or possibility of reasoning. This relation among recognizedp eers is described in terms of care. There is ap reference, concern and care for those identified as legal relations orderedi nto eight categories: jural opposites -'right-no-right', 'privilege-duty', 'power-disability' and 'immunity-liability';a nd jural correlatives -'right-duty', 'privilege-noright', 'power-liability' and 'immunity-disability' (Saunders 1989(Saunders -1990 fellow members. We care in some sense for each other.Thus, recognition is comprehension, allowing in oneself attitudes, emotions, feelingsand reactions-and assumptions. In fact,itgives rise not onlytoassumptions, but to anticipation as well. "Ar elationship, in the sense Ia mc oncernedw ith, is am atter not onlyo f what one does,orintends to do, but alsoofthe reasons for which one does these things" (Scanlon 2008, p. 173). Iwould changethe order of elements. Arelationship impliesaset of facts about the parties in it,which involveashared experience: desire and its instance in intentions;e xpectations; and finallyt heir justification in the form of reasons (Scanlon 2013,p .8 6). The expression of this relationship is justt he propositional form; its explanation is constituted by the very attitudes and dispositions involved. These are indeed the forms of 'care' in which Scanlon is interested. Relationships of this naturehaveanormative character,which is reciprocal. From shared facts in the past to expectations of the future,there is an assumed standard of continuity., which is 'prospective'. Cognitive judgment is rooted in the moment at which the relationship has changed-something expected does not happen, reciprocity fails and recognition is broken. From what is gewönlich,wehavemoved to what is außergewönlich. 'To blame' is nothing but the blunt restatingofthe old standards in the face of new events, once the formerbalanceofwhat is expectedhas been disrupted. Blaming is areaction calling for the modificationofthe intention (reciprocal balance) and disposition (future forbearances) of the affronted. Scanlon borrows an expression from Peter F. Strawson: blaming-as is moaning-'is the partial withdrawal of good will' (Scanlon 2008, p. 227).
And what about 'impersonal blaming'?What type of conceptual articulation are we constructingwhen it comes to fellows who do not have adirect or personal acquaintancewith us?Let'skeep it simple: what standard is in playw hen we blame, moan, or jammern every time neighbors are tool oud, the U-Bahn is delayed, our heating breaks in winter,o rt he local ice-hockey team loses?
It mays eem to make no sense to speak of our havinga ttitudes towardp eople we have no knowledge of, or about whatt heir attitudes maybet oward us,ofwhomt hey aresimilarly unaware. But when we do become awareofothers and areinactual or potential interaction with them, we generallya ssume that even if they ares trangers they will manifest at least the basic elementsofthis ideal concern. We assume that this defaultrelationship of mutual regardand forbearanceholds between us and the strangers we pass on the roadorinteract with in the market.When someone does not manifest this concern, it is this relationship that is the standardr elative to which our actual relation with them is seen as impaired. (Scanlon 2008, pp. 140 -141) Scanlon calls it a 'moral relationship'.F or him, this type of relation is 'inescapable'.I ti safundamental condition: just as there is no explicit act by which we