5 Love in Friendship

In this final chapter, I discuss love in friendship. Over the past twenty years or so, a fair amount of discussion has gradually accumulated around the notion of friendship in Kant. In the previous treatments, three basic propositions concerning love may be detected. First, some hold that friendship in Kant is always based on the feeling of love (Wood 2015, pp. 12, 16). Second, the majority of scholars take the view that for Kant, friendship essentially or ideally includes a union, or a balance, between love and respect (Paton 1993, p. 137; Denis 2001b, p. 4; Filippaki 2012, p. 35; Moran 2012, p. 170; Baron 2013, p. 381; Wood 2015, p. 4). And third, there are those who posit that for Kant, love is even opposed to the concept of friendship, or at least bracketed from what Kant calls ‘moral friendship’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440; Van Impe 2011, p. 137).

What is common to the previous approaches is that they tend not to offer a very detailed or systematic account of how the word ‘love’ actually operates within the framework of friendship.\(^1\) In particular, there is relatively little uniformity in the literature concerning the logical relations that obtain between the basic components of love’s general division within this context, that is, relations between love of benevolence and love of delight. Some accounts leave the love at issue in friendship relatively unspecified (Marcucci 1999; Moran 2012; Van Impe 2011; Baron 2013)\(^2\), some equate love with benevolence (Denis 2001b, p. 7; Moran 2012, p. 173), and some equate it with both benevolence and delight (Paton 1993, p. 138; Wood 1999, pp. 278, 280; Wood 2015, pp. 12–15). Some view the love at issue as practical love (Denis 2001b, p. 7), whereas others see it as the feeling of love (Moran 2012, pp. 197–198; Wood 2015, p. 16).

In what follows, I will offer a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s mature philosophy of friendship from the perspective of the concept of love. The basic question to be asked is simply: what does it mean to love one’s friends, according to Kant – or how does love function in the context of Kantian friendship? Against the backdrop of the previous discussions, a number of more specific problems must be highlighted: what is the relationship between love and respect in friend-

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1 With the possible exception of Wood (1999; 2015), whose account nevertheless has some problems, to which I will return below.
2 Marcucci and Baron do not discuss the components of the general division. Kate Moran notes that mere ‘well-wishing love’ in the Vigilantius notes seems weaker than the love at issue in friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals (Moran 2012, p. 173), but she doesn’t connect this to delight in terms of love (see Moran 2012, pp. 197–198). Van Impe recognises the distinctions between different types of love in the Vigilantius notes but does not analyse their connection to love in friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals.
ship? Is friendship based on love or rather on respect, or does it rest equally on both? What role does the general division of love play in loving friendship? Is the love at issue in friendship love of benevolence, love of delight, or both? Is love opposed to the concept of friendship, or at least somehow bracketed in some kinds of friendship? And finally, what is the role of love and friendship in humanity’s ascent toward the ideal ethical community?

In general, I will argue that if the systematic or architectonic role of friendship in Kant’s philosophy is taken into account and an exegetical interpretation of how the word ‘love’ operates within the context of friendship is provided, it becomes clear that love (conditioned by respect) marks the path towards the highest good in equal and reciprocal human relationships. Kant is not out to deny the relevance of love but views both love and respect as the necessary conditions of friendship (even though respect has a morally grounding function). Together, love and respect form the relatively sufficient condition of friendship. In friendship we cultivate benevolence (*Liebe des Wohlwollens*) and openheartedness while enjoying each other intellectually (*Liebe des Wohlgefallens*) and respecting appropriate distance. Friendship also serves a mediating role in humanity’s ascent toward the ideal moral community (see Wood 2015, p. 6): by cultivating personal friendships, and as friends of humanity in general, we strive to bring about a cosmopolitan community of love and respect. I call this overall interpretation (for which I am indebted to Moran and Wood) the ascent view of love in Kantian friendship. When taken alongside analysis of the general division of love in friendship and the previous chapters of the study, the ascent view of love in Kantian friendship serves to corroborate the main claim of this study as a whole: that the general division approach and the ascent view of love are plausible and defensible general notions regarding Kant on love.

I will begin by summarising Kant’s discussion of love in friendship prior to *The Metaphysics of Morals*. I will then reconstruct the ‘official’ mature position in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, paying special attention to the distinction between love and respect and the question of how to interpret the general division of love in this light. Finally, I show how an ascent towards a community of ‘cosmopolitan love’ may be detected in Kant’s accounts of friendship.

### 5.1 Love in Friendship Prior to *The Metaphysics of Morals*

Depending on which textual source one emphasises, there is more than one possible way to construct the basic taxonomy of friendship in Kant. The three main sources that scholars commonly use in this context are the Collins/Kaehler notes on ethics, the Vigilantius notes on ethics, and the section on friendship at the
end of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ of *The Metaphysics of Morals*. I think it is very important to note that the discussion in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is the only published account of Kant’s conception of friendship. Admittedly, the lecture notes give a much richer and more nuanced picture of the topic, and it is not at all surprising that scholars have been keen to draw interpretations on their basis. However, I believe that for an accurate ‘official’ account of Kant’s mature position, one has to emphasise the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, even though one should also use the lectures as auxiliary tools for interpretation insofar as they can be harmonised with the published work. I will begin my discussion by considering how the notion of love works in the lecture notes on friendship, before turning to *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

In the Collins notes’ discussion of friendship, the basic distinction is between the motives of self-love and morality. Friendship is about overcoming the motive of self-love: it is chosen on moral grounds and involves an inter-individual, reciprocal mode of caring about another’s happiness (LE, 27:422–423). In the idea of friendship, ‘self-love is swallowed up in the idea of generous mutual love.’ (LE, 27:423.8–9) Kant makes clear that friendship is an unattainable idea or ideal that marks ‘the maximum of mutual love’ [*Das Maximum der Wechselliebe*] (LE, 27:423.37–38), which is a state where one loves the other as oneself.

He divides friendship into three forms or types: those of ‘need’ [*Bedürfniß*], ‘taste’ [*Geschmack*], and ‘disposition’ [*Gesinnung*] (LE, 27:424.38–39). The friendship of need is the ‘lowest’ or most rudimentary form of friendship and is about mutual help in the satisfaction of material needs. It occurs, for instance, ‘when savages go hunting’ (LE, 27:425.5). Every friendship presupposes the friendship of need, which means that friends can rely on each other’s help if necessary, even though they should avoid asking for help, because this would threaten the equality of the relationship (LE, 27:425.27–426.21). The friendship of taste is not real friendship but its ‘analogue’ [*Analogon*] and occurs when persons of different occupations (e.g. a scholar and a soldier) take pleasure in each other’s company, perhaps without a view to each other’s happiness (LE, 27:425.27–426.21).

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3 ‘die Selbstliebe verschlungen ist in der Idee der großmütigen Wechselliebe.’
4 The ideal nature of the idea of friendship remains consistent throughout Kant’s discussions. For analysis of the idea/ideal distinction in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, see Baron (2013, p. 375). Victoria Wike (2014) provides a helpful account of the notion of ‘practical idea’ in this context. For my purposes, it is sufficient to note that for Kant, moral or practical ideas come with regulative ideals for action and the cultivation of character, and the idea of friendship means just that: that friendship has an ideal nature we ought to strive to approximate in practice or in some actual human relationships.
5 ‘Wenn daher Wilde auf die Jagd gehn’.
27.426.21–37). The third form is the friendship of disposition or sentiment [Sentiment]. Friendship of disposition is based on the human need to communicate thoughts and feelings to others. In society, our prudential mistrust of others places constraints on the openness of communication, and the friendship of disposition is about establishing the trust required for confiding in another individual, in order to be ‘fully in companionship’ (LE, 27:427.13)⁶. This sort of friendship is only possible with one or two people (LE, 27:427.20–21), but it may help to open our hearts more generally (LE, 27:428.12–23). It is about ‘dispositions of feelings, and not those of actual service.’ (LE, 27:426.39–427.1)⁷ A condition for the possibility of this ‘highest’ form of friendship is that the friends share a similar moral outlook: ‘They need to have the same principles of understanding and morality, and then they can fully understand each other’ (LE, 27:429.6–7)⁸.

This brief summary of Kant’s early account reveals the unwavering importance of love in Kantian friendship. Friendship is contrasted with self-love, and the idea of friendship is defined as the maximum of mutual love. In a tone reminiscent of Kant’s approach to (moral) sexual love in the same lectures, in the idea of friendship one gives oneself (or one’s love) to the other and gets oneself back through the other’s love. In this way, one may love one’s friend ‘as oneself’, or as much as oneself. (LE, 27:423.37–424.6; cf. 27:388.23–37; see ch. 2.2.3; Korsgaard 1996, p. 195; Langton 2009, pp. 319, 363) The account in Collins also brings with it certain questions that are useful to keep in mind as we proceed towards Kant’s later discussions. While the general division of love is already given a formulation in the Collins notes (LE, 27:417–418), Kant does not elaborate on the ‘mutual love’ [Wechselliebe] referred to in the context of friendship in terms of the general division. Indirect evidence suggests that in Collins, the love at issue in friendship is at least love of benevolence, for with regard to the extension of friendships Kant states: ‘People do not favour everyone with their benevolence, but would sooner confine themselves, in that respect, to a small circle.’ (LE, 27:427.37–39)⁹ But I don’t see anything to exclude the possibility that friendship in Collins could also include love of delight. Recall that in Col-

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⁶ ‘gänzlich in Gesellschaft.’ Translation modified. The German Gesellschaft is ambiguous between society at large and more restricted companionship or company. Kant might be implying that by harbouring close special bonds we are also better able to participate in society in general (see ch. 5.3).

⁷ ‘Gesinnungen der Empfindung und nicht der wirklichen Dienstleistungen.’

⁸ ‘Sie Müssen gleiche Principia des Verstandes und der Moralität haben, denn können sie sich complet verstehn’.

⁹ ‘Die Menschen machen sich nicht allgemein mit ihrem Wohlwollen, sondern mögen sich gern darin restringiren auf einen kleinen Zirkel.’
lins, *intellectual* love of delight for another’s humanity is defined as a duty (see LE, 27:418), and in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, love of delight is a necessary natural predisposition for receptivity to duty (see ch. 4.2.1), and further, one may feel pathological delight in response to the physical perfections of one’s friend. Another interesting fact in comparison with Kant’s later treatments is that the notion of respect is a lot less prevalent in Collins than in Vigilantius or the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. This is explained at least in part by the fact that Kant’s theory of moral autonomy, which relies largely on the notion of respect for the moral law, is not yet in place. We do find the notion of respect in Collins¹⁰, and regarding friendship in particular Kant proposes: ‘The name of friendship should inspire respect, and even if our friend has somehow become an enemy, we must still venerate the previous friendship’ (LE, 27:429:27–29)¹¹. This is an isolated instance of *Achtung*, however, and in the Collins notes friendship is defined nearly exclusively in terms of love.

The Vigilantius notes from 1793–1794 explicitly anticipate the publication of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, and they are particularly interesting when it comes to figuring out the details of Kant’s mature conception of love in friendship. As in Collins, the notion of friendship in Vigilantius still involves an ideal that we cannot realise and can only strive for and approach (LE, 27:680.34–35). However, the previous threefold distinction (between friendships of need, taste, and disposition) is no longer explicitly visible, and it is somewhat unclear whether Kant still relies on the previous taxonomy. What is clear is that in Vigilantius friendship is defined explicitly in terms of the general division of love, and the notion of respect now plays a much more important role than it did in Collins. The basic (ideal) definition of friendship in Vigilantius is: ‘A complete love of benevolence and delight among equals, in regard to their moral disposition and inclinations.’ (LE, 27:680.28–30)¹²

As in Collins, the basic definition of the concept of friendship is here given exclusively in terms of love. It is striking that the ideal of friendship in Vigilantius unites the two aspects of love’s general division in a relationship between equal persons. Kant explains that the concept of friendship actually involves five elements, which are combined in the (ideal) definition of friendship: 1) recip-

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¹⁰ See e.g. LE, 27:302.33–34, where pure ethics involves respect.
¹¹ ‘Man muß Achtung vor dem Namen der Freundschaft haben, und wenn auch unser Freund wodurch Feind geworden ist, so müssen wir doch die vorige Freundschaft veneriren’.
¹² ‘eine vollständige Liebe des Wohlwollens und Wohlgefallens gleicher Personen in Ansehung ihrer moralischen Gesinnung und Neigungen.’
rocal love of benevolence; 2) equality; 3) reciprocal possession of each other; 4) reciprocal enjoyment of each other’s humanity; and 5) reciprocal love of delight.

Kant describes love of benevolence, the first component of friendship, in a way that is similar to how he depicts it in the context of love of neighbour in *The Metaphysics of Morals*. It is ‘the universal duty of love, which we owe to every human being’ (LE, 27:675.36–37)\(^3\). Kant also notes that in comparison with love of delight, this love is ‘more closely and strictly coupled with the idea of friendship’ (LE, 27:676.10)\(^4\). Interpreted in terms of the official account of love of benevolence in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, this love would have to be practical love, as it is defined as a duty. But there are interesting differences between Vigilantius and *The Metaphysics of Morals* in terms of how Kant elaborates on the duty. In Vigilantius, ‘we must absolutely make it our maxim to promote goodness in others.’ (LE, 27:675.38–39)\(^5\) In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, however, love of benevolence is directed to promoting the happiness of others, not their goodness. In the context of friendship, we can understand this in terms of Kant’s idea that it is a duty in friendship to point out our friends’ flaws, even though this is always risky and must be done cautiously, without loss of respect (MM, 6:470.21–28; LE, 27:685.4–19). In general, benevolence in the intimacy of friendship also involves promoting the moral progress of the other.

The second ideal component says that the friends must be equally capable of promoting each other’s well-being in terms of ‘powers’ [*Kräfte*], ‘wealth’ [*Reichtum*], and ‘influence’ [*Einfluß*] (LE, 27:676.29–31). Third, the friends possess each other intellectually or morally, which means that ‘each mutually shares in every situation of the other, as if it were encountered by himself’ (LE, 27:677.13–14)\(^6\). Interestingly, Kant here explicitly compares this mutual possession with marriage, but unlike marriage, where the foundation of the union is sexual love, in friendship the ‘reciprocal possession is founded [...] on moral principles and a mutual love derived from that’ (LE, 27:677.4–5)\(^7\). This suggests that the sharing and sympathetic concern [*teilnehmen*] are based on rational love of be-

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\(^3\) ‘die allgemeine Pflicht der Liebe, die wir jedem Menschen schuldig sind.’

\(^4\) ‘Näher aber und stricte verbindet sich mit der Idee der Freundschaft’.

\(^5\) ‘wir das Gute in andern zu befördern uns schlechthin zur Maxime Machen müssen.’

\(^6\) ‘wechselseitig an jeder Lage des andern teilnehmen, so als wenn es ihm selbst wiederfahren wäre’.

\(^7\) ‘wechselseitige Besitz ist aber auf moralische Grundsätze und eine daher abgeleitete Wechselleibe gegründet’. Another obvious difference in comparison with marriage is that according to Kant (in Vigilantius), the marriage relation is not equal and is instead a relation of ‘*superioris erga inferiorem*’ (LE, 27:683.9), such that the husband is superior to the wife (see ch. 2.2.3). For an elaborated list of six differences between friendship and marriage in Kant, see Denis (2001b, pp. 13–16).
nevolence or intellectual love of delight. The fourth component is ‘the reciprocal enjoyment of their humanity’ (LE, 27:677.23)\(^8\), which occurs through openhearted communication [Mitteilung], where the friends ‘communicate not only their feelings and sensations to one another, but also their thoughts.’ (LE, 27:677.26 – 27)\(^9\) It is thus clear that the friends enjoy each other through both the sensory-aesthetic and the rational parts of their humanity. That is, the communication that brings about this enjoyment involves both humanitas practica and humanitas aesthetica (see MM, 6:456 – 457; ch. 4.2.2.C) and relates both to rational and to inclination-based loves in accordance with the general division. Kant points out, however, that our friends might become our enemies in the future, and in contrast to the ideal he expresses a significant amount of prudential caution with regard to actually opening up one’s heart to another: ‘Trust him with caution only, and disclose to him nothing which he might be able to misuse, to the detriment of your respect.’ (LE, 27:679.11 – 13)\(^{20}\)

The fifth component is ‘love for mutual delight’ (LE, 27:680.22)\(^{21}\). The description of this component is very brief. In the definition, we are told only that it ‘lies solely in the intellectual disposition of the friends, engendered through the material of reciprocal esteem, and on this rests the intellectual need for friendship.’ (LE, 27:680.23 – 25)\(^{22}\) The notion that the love of delight belongs exclusively to the ‘intellectual disposition of the friends’ must clearly be understood in terms of the Collins notes distinction between sensuous and intellectual delight: ‘The love of delight is the pleasure we take in showing approval of another’s perfections. This liking may be either sensuous or intellectual.’ (LE, 27:417.21 – 24)\(^{23}\) I think what is ruled out in Vigilantius is (ideal) friendship’s being based on, for instance, sexual inclination, or more generally a delight in the physical perfections of another (since we are, however, dealing with a ‘complete love’ also with respect to inclinations, the possibility of sensuous delight is not ruled out of the framework altogether – it might be irrelevant, but it is not ‘prohibited’). The ‘intellectual need’ [das intellectuelle Bedürfnis] seems to refer to a

\(^{18}\) ‘Der wechselseitige Genuß ihrer Humanität’.

\(^{19}\) ‘sich nicht allein ihre Gefühle und Empfindungen, sondern auch ihre Gedanken einander mitzuteilen.’

\(^{20}\) ‘Traue ihm nur mit Vorsicht, entdecke ihm nichts, wovon er mit Nachteil deiner Achtung Missbrauch machen könnte.’

\(^{21}\) ‘Die Liebe zu dem wechselseitigen Wohlgefallen.’ Translation modified.

\(^{22}\) ‘liegt aber blos in der intellectuellen Gesinnung der Freunde, durch den Stoff wechselseitiger Werthschätzung erzeugt, und darauf beruht das intellectuelle Bedürfnis zur Freundschaft.’

\(^{23}\) ‘Die Liebe des Wohlgfellens ist das Vergnügen, welches wir haben, den Vollkommenheiten des andern Beyfall zu beweisen. Dieses Wohlgfellen kann sinnlich und intellectual seyn.’ See ch. 4.1.
special kind of reciprocal desire to take delight in the moral perfections or the humanity of another. This moral love of delight is not mere respect, for the effect does not seem to be described as essentially humbling, and Kant’s use of the word ‘need’ implies the idea of approaching each other or coming together in communion. Recall that in Collins, the object of intellectual love of delight is at bottom the sheer humanity of another human being (see LE, 27:418.19–20; ch. 4.1). We may thus take it that in friendship 1) reciprocal intellectual love of delight has the humanity of the other person as its object. And, since the definition of love of delight includes pleasure or satisfaction [Vergnügen] in the perfections of another (MM, 6:449.17–20; LE, 27:417.21–24), 2) there can be a greater or a lesser amount of intellectual love of delight, depending on the actual moral dispositions of the agents involved.

It seems that this is exactly what Kant has in mind when he speaks of intellectual love of delight in the context of friendship in the Vigilantius notes. The above considerations map very closely onto the fourth ideal component of friendship, where the reciprocal enjoyment of the friends’ humanity is brought about by comprehensive communication. In other words, when, as friends, we come to appreciate each other’s moral standing or disposition through various acts of communication, we love each other by approving of each other’s humanity. The more morally perfect we become, the more complete our intellectual love of delight for each other.²⁴ In this sense, we may speak of an ascent of love in this context. Our moral ascent has a correlate in the love we experience when we observe each other’s moral attributes as unifying through sympathetic communication:

So when friendship demands a reciprocal love, in that it is based on unity of the moral disposition, this is not a natural inclination, but rather an intellectual unification of the feelings and thoughts of the parties, and the well-being that springs from this constitutes reciprocal love. (LE, 27:682.16–20)²⁵

²⁴ Wood goes so far as to say that mutual love of delight ‘is the characteristic of friendship that makes it the final end of morality.’ (Wood 2015, p. 15) I think Wood is right, if we can take the Vigilantius notes as truly capturing Kant’s final position. The reciprocal delight human beings would take in view of each other’s moral disposition in the state of the perfect moral community is perhaps best expressive of what Kant might mean by ‘moral happiness’ as an ideal cosmopolitan notion. (See also Korsgaard 1996, pp. 193–194.)

²⁵ ‘Daher wenn die Freundschaft eine wechselseitige Liebe erfordert, indem sie sich auf Einheit der moralischen Gesinnung stützt, so ist dies nicht natürliche Zuneigung, sondern es ist dies eine intellectuelle Vereinigung ihrer gefühle und Gedanken; und das daraus entsprießende Wohlbefinden macht die Wechselliebe.’
Here, the reciprocal love must be love of delight since the love at issue is defined as well-being that is an effect of intellectual communion. In the context of friendship, love of delight is thus intellectual pleasure rooted in the friends’ reciprocal openhearted moral approval of each other (this cannot be directly commanded, since it cannot be a direct duty to be delighted by another’s existence).

In the Vigilantius notes, Kant clearly makes use of love’s general division, which now lies at the heart of his concept of friendship. Whether Kant still implicitly relies on the threefold taxonomy found in Collins is not clear (nor is it essential to my argument), but it seems that what Kant is mainly talking about in Vigilantius is a kind of ‘moral friendship’ that matches roughly what in Collins is called ‘the friendship of disposition’. In contrast to the Collins notes, respect is now also given a fundamental role. Kant emphasises that in friendship, mutual love must be accompanied by ‘mutual respect for humanity in the person of the friend’ (LE, 27:683.23–24), and hence respect must restrict reciprocal love. This means that we should not force ourselves on our friends, neither in terms of our beneficence nor in terms of our needy demands, since this will always pose a threat to the equality of the friendship.

5.2 Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals

I will now move on to investigate love and friendship in Kant’s mature moral philosophical work. This discussion appears as the ‘Conclusion of the elements of ethics’ (MM, 6:469.13), and, as mentioned above, it is the only published source for Kant’s conception of friendship. I will try to understand the relation between love and respect by first aiming to identify the love at issue in Kant’s official account and then taking a careful look at the claims made by Silvestro Marcucci (1999) and Stijn Van Impe (2011), according to whom love is in fact opposed to the concept of friendship, or at least bracketed from what Kant calls ‘moral friendship’. The section will show 1) that the love now at issue in friendship is (at least) love of benevolence, and 2) that love is not opposed to the concept of friendship. In fact, the available evidence does not even seem to support the claim that love is bracketed from (any kind of) friendship.

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26 This link seems to be taken for granted by Moran (2012, p. 170) and Wood (2015, p. 7).
27 ‘wechselseitiger Achtung für die Menschheit des andern’.
28 ‘Beschluß der Elementarlehre’.
5.2.1 Identifying the Love at Issue

In the Collins and Vigilantius notes, (ideal) friendship is defined solely in terms of love. In Collins, it is ‘the maximum of mutual love’ (27:423.37–38); in Vigilantius, ‘the complete love of benevolence and delight among equals’ (27:680.28–30). In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, the definition is different to the extent that it now explicitly includes respect. First, the heading of Kant’s discussion is ‘On the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect in Friendship’ (MM, 6:469.14–15)²⁹. The definition given immediately under the heading is: ‘Friendship (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect.’ (MM, 6:469.17–18)³⁰

To understand what love Kant is now talking about, it will be helpful to take a closer look at what he says generally about the interplay of love and respect in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. In the introductory section on the duty of love, Kant explains that the laws of duty are analogous to the laws of physical nature. This nature is governed by the Newtonian forces of attraction and repulsion, and by analogy similar forces operate in the moral realm, where love functions as attraction and respect as repulsion³¹:

> The principle of MUTUAL LOVE admonishes them constantly to come closer to one another; that of the RESPECT they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another; and should one of these great moral forces fail, ‘then nothingness (immorality), with

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²⁹ ‘Von der innigsten Vereinigung der Liebe mit der Achtung in der Freundschaft.’
³⁰ ‘Freundschaft (in ihrer Vollkommenheit betrachtet) ist die Vereinigung zweier Personen durch gleiche wechselseitige Liebe und Achtung.’
³¹ For more detailed analysis of the relation between Kant’s natural philosophy and moral theory with regard to these Newtonian commitments, see Filippaki (2012). Note that Filippaki correctly distinguishes between the duty of love and the feeling of love. But then she divides the feeling of love into ‘aesthetic’ and ‘moral’; she apparently thinks that the ‘aesthetic’ feeling of love is love of delight, whereas the ‘moral’ feeling of love is the natural predisposition to love one’s neighbour as described in ‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (Filippaki 2012, pp. 31–32). But in ‘Introduction XII’, the latter (Filippaki’s ‘moral love’) is explicitly defined as aesthetic. There, love of neighbour is one of the Ästhetische Vorbegriffe. A logically less cumbersome interpretation is that ‘Introduction XII’ speaks of love of delight as an aesthetic predisposition to be subjectively affected by the duty of love (even though Kant’s distinction between the feeling of love and the aesthetic capacity (of love) to be affected by duty is not clear). A position similar to mine, which identifies the love in ‘Introduction XII’ as love of delight, is held by Schönecker (2010; see ch. 4.2.1 above). In the broadest sense, the ‘feeling’ [Empfindung, Gefühl, Neigung] of love can refer at least to 1) the sexual impulse, 2) love of benevolence from inclination, 3) sensuous love of delight, and 4) intellectual or moral love of delight, which includes both the aesthetic predisposition and the actual feeling.
gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water’ (if I may use Haller’s words, but in a different reference). (MM, 6:449.8–15)\textsuperscript{32}

The next paragraph goes on to explain that the mutual love now at issue is the duty of love (or practical love) and not the feeling of love. On this basis, it is safe to say that when Kant speaks of love as a moral force (which brings human beings closer to each other) and contrasts this love with respect, the love he is talking about is love of benevolence. The general point is the same as that found in Vigilantius: although we should approach each other through active rational benevolence, our actions must be limited by respect, by means of which we are (ideally) able to secure proper limits of intimacy and to preserve the equality of the relationship. This point is made explicitly in the section on friendship in the ‘Doctrinae of Virtue’: ‘For love can be regarded as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other.’ (MM, 6:470.4–7)\textsuperscript{33} Connecting these two passages in the ‘Doctrinae of Virtue’, we are now in a position to identify the love that is contrasted with respect in the context of friendship as the practical love of benevolence. At issue is the ‘principle’ [Princip] of love. Now I do not want to claim that this is the complete picture of love in friendship, and feelings of love do figure in the framework, but the finding does have consequences with regard to previous research.

Wood holds both that love of benevolence is a feeling and that friendship is based on the feeling of love: ‘But friendship is nevertheless based on love as feeling. The feeling of love as benevolence or well-wishing takes the form of friendship when it is reciprocal’ (Wood 2015, p. 13). Wood bases his interpretation on the Collins and the Vigilantius notes. When he reaffirms that ‘[t]he basis of friendship is always love as feeling’ (Wood 2015, p. 16), I think he is not sensitive enough to the fact that in the Groundwork (GW, 4:399.27–34), the second Critique (C2, 5:83.3–12), and The Metaphysics of Morals (MM, 6:449.17–22), the practical

\textsuperscript{32} ‘Vermöge des Princips der WECHSELLIEBE sind sie angewiesen sich einander beständig zu nähern, durch das der ACHTUNG, die sie einander schuldig sind, sich im Abstande von einander zu erhalten; und sollte eine dieser großen sittlichen Kräfte sinken, “so würde dann das Nichts (der Immoralität) mit aufgesperrtem Schlund der (moralischen) Wesen ganzes Reich wie einen Tropfen Wasser trinken” (wenn ich mich hier der Worte Hallers, nur in einer andern Beziehung, bedienen darf).’

\textsuperscript{33} ‘Denn man kann jene [Liebe] als Anziehung, diese [Achtung] als Abstoßung betrachten, und wenn das Princip der ersteren Annäherung gebietet, das der zweiten sich einander in geziemendem Abstande zu halten fordert’.
love of benevolence is consistently distinguished precisely from love as feeling.\textsuperscript{34} Perhaps Wood thinks that practical love is also a feeling, but he doesn’t argue for this controversial position (what seems to be missing from Wood’s discussion is a distinction between love of benevolence from inclination and love of benevolence as practical love, which distinction can only be grasped by careful comparative analysis of the earlier lectures and the mature published works; see ch. 4). Korsgaard, too, thinks that Kant’s discussion of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is about feelings (Korsgaard 1996, p. 191), and, like Wood, she does not take into account that the principle of love can only be rational love of benevolence (as distinguished from love as feeling). In possible contrast with Wood and Korsgaard, Denis (2001b, p. 4) holds that the love at issue in friendship is indeed practical love, but she does not problematise this view.

The basic difficulty in establishing the operation of the general division of love in the context of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is that in the published work, love of delight is not directly mentioned even once. But Kant does (at least indirectly) speak about the feeling of love in this context. He notes that one reason for the unattainability of the ideal of friendship is that it is difficult to account for ‘what relation there is in the same person between the feeling from one duty and that from the other (the feeling from benevolence and that from respect)’ (MM, 6:469.32–34)\textsuperscript{35}. In this passage, benevolence is clearly viewed as a duty, so if it is love of benevolence, it must be practical love. The syntax makes clear that the feeling connected with the duty cannot be identified with the duty: it is a feeling from [aus] benevolence. We also know that, in effect, practical love (as benevolence leading to beneficence) will also bring about the feeling of love in the broad sense, which can be identified as either love of benevolence from inclination or the pleasure of love of delight (see MM, 6:402.14–21; cf. LE, 27:417.11–19; 27:419.4–7). So it is perhaps implied that love

\textsuperscript{34} See ch. 4.1; cf. ch. 4.2.2. One reason for Wood’s seemingly odd view might be that he thinks that love of benevolence is caused by love of delight (Wood 2015, p. 4). It is difficult to make out what Wood bases this claim on since the passages he refers to (LE, 27:416; C3, 5:276; MM, 6:449) do not contain any such idea. The evidence we do have suggests that the feeling of love or inclination-based love can at least sometimes be brought about by practical love (love of benevolence) (MM, 6:402.14–21; cf. LE, 27:419.4–7), even though love of delight is indeed the aesthetic predisposition for the subjective receptivity to the duty of love (MM, 6:399–402). It is also the case that there is such a thing as love of benevolence from inclination (which is not moral). As I have just shown above, however, the love in friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ must be identified at base as practical moral love of benevolence.

\textsuperscript{35} ‘noch mehr aber, welches Verhältniß das Gefühl aus der einen Pflicht zu dem aus der andern (z.B. das aus dem Wohlwollen zu dem aus der Achtung) in derselben Person habe’.
of delight also figures in friendship, but in the mature work this love does not seem to be the basis of friendship.

Kant also explicitly denies that the love in friendship could be an ‘affect’ (MM, 6:471.22–24), but we know from elsewhere that affects are particularly rash emotional states that arise suddenly, drastically hindering one’s reflective capacities, and then die out quickly (MM, 6:407.29 ff.; AP, 7:252–253). Kant’s rejection of love as affect cannot be taken to imply a general rejection of love as feeling in the context of friendship.

One further place to look for the feeling of love in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ account of friendship stems from Kant’s distinction between ‘moral’ friendship and ‘aesthetic’ or ‘pragmatic’ friendship36: ‘But that (pragmatic) friendship, which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of love, can have neither the purity nor the completeness requisite for a precisely determinant maxim; it is an ideal of one’s wishes37’ (MM, 6:472.27–30)38. Here, the love cannot be the moral love of benevolence since that belongs to moral friendship. But since the love ‘burdens itself with the ends of others’, it is very likely love of benevolence from inclination. The probable interpretation is that the pragmatic friendship here is roughly equivalent to the earlier friendship of need, but this

36 It is not entirely clear whether ‘aesthetic friendship’ and ‘pragmatic friendship’ are the same, but I would argue that they are. The clue comes from Wood, who takes it for granted that ‘pragmatic friendship’ corresponds to the friendship of need (Wood 2015, p. 7). We must remember that in Kant’s original formulation in the Collins notes, the friendship of taste is only an analogue of friendship, whereas the ‘friendship of need’ is presupposed in every friendship (LE, 27:425.27–28), and the ‘friendship of disposition’ is very close to his later discussions of moral friendship. So there are actually only two friendships in the original classification, and in the mature philosophy this arguably maps onto the phenomenal-moral or the nature-freedom dualism. If we then look at the distinctions in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ – first between ‘moral friendship’ and ‘aesthetic friendship’, and only a moment later between ‘moral friendship’ and ‘pragmatic friendship’ – we may plausibly conjecture that ‘pragmatic friendship’ and ‘aesthetic friendship’ mean the same thing and that the distinction between ‘aesthetic-pragmatic friendship’ and ‘moral friendship’ corresponds roughly to the previous distinction between ‘friendship of need’ and ‘friendship of disposition’. This merely assumes that ‘aesthetic’ is here read in the sense of ‘pertaining to’ or ‘arising from’ natural sensory experience. My identification of ‘aesthetic’ with ‘pragmatic’ friendship is highly conjectural and very uncertain, and the main points of the chapter stand or fall regardless of its success.

37 The fact that pragmatic friendship is defined as an ideal of one’s wishes shows (perhaps) that the ideal of friendship includes not only moral perfection and an idealised balance between the dispositions of the friends and all the moral components of the friendship but also a kind of maximum of the sensory-aesthetic elements of friendship.

38 ‘jene aber mit den Zwecken anderer Menschen sich, obzwar aus Liebe, belästigende (pragmatische) kann weder die Lauterkeit, noch die verlangte Vollständigkeit haben, die zu einer genau bestimmenden Maxime erforderlich ist, und ist ein Ideal des Wunsches’.
is uncertain. My point is merely that we do find at least some kind of notion of the feeling of love or pathological love in Kant’s official account of friendship, but it seems that this cannot be the proper basis of moral friendship. Of course, the aesthetic predisposition of love of neighbour as love of delight must still be assumed to be generally operative as the *subjective* ground for receptivity to the moral benevolence required for friendship (even though the predisposition is not the *objective* ground of moral benevolence; see ch. 4.2.1).

We are now in a position to make the general claim that if one accepts the Vigilantius notes as a reliable source, the general division of love is strongly present in friendship, such that love of benevolence (as active rational benevolence) is the primary basis of friendship in terms of love, and intellectual love of delight is pleasurable moral approval, which is brought about by intimate sympathetic sharing and communication of feelings and thoughts. But if only the published work is accepted as a source, the existence of love of delight in this specific context looks doubtful, and it is fairly clear that the love which ought to unite with respect in friendship is rational love of benevolence (and not so much love as feeling, though we know generally that the feelings of love are related to, and will also be brought about by, rational love of benevolence).

### 5.2.2 Can We Bracket Love from Friendship?

Given that Kant’s general definitions of friendship always include the word ‘love’, it is somewhat difficult to understand how love could be ‘opposed’ to friendship, or ‘bracketed’ from moral friendship. However, precisely these claims have been made in the literature, and since the claims have not yet been discussed critically by other interpreters, I think it is important to analyse them here (Marcucci 1999; Van Impe 2011). Doing so will also clarify the logical relationship between love and respect in friendship in light of *The Metaphysics of Morals* and the Vigilantius notes.

In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, Kant’s emphasis on what he calls ‘moral friendship’ becomes increasingly clear. As already mentioned, the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ contains a division between ‘moral’ friendship and ‘aesthetic’ friendship [*ästhetischen*] or ‘pragmatic’ friendship. Here, Kant defines moral friendship as ‘the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgments and feel-
ings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect.’ (MM, 6:471.27–29)³⁹

It is the above notion of moral friendship that supposedly warrants Marcucci’s claim, according to which respect becomes ‘very important’ and ‘love is put between brackets’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440). First, Marcucci seems to think that this is obvious given the definition of moral friendship. Supposedly, if love is not mentioned in the definition of moral friendship, then it does not belong to the concept. But if we unpack the definition, three elements can be recognised within it: 1) complete confidence or trust [das völlige Vertrauen]; 2) revealing intimate thoughts and feelings; and 3) respect. Now if we understand moral friendship as a special relationship between individuals, a relationship that does not automatically obtain between all human beings, we must also ask how such a relation is possible – that is, how it can occur. What can it be that draws some individuals closer to each other in such a way that they are able to form this special bond? It might be self-love, but then the relationship would not be moral at heart. Even though Kant does not mention love in the definition cited by Marcucci, he is very clear that there are two forces operative in the moral sphere: respect and love. Now the basis for trusting one another, and sharing intimate thoughts and feelings, might well be respect rather than love. As Kant explains, however, in the moral sphere between individuals respect is a force of repulsion: respect keeps individuals at a distance from each other. It seems that on this definition of the moral forces as analogous to Newtonian natural forces, respect cannot be responsible for bringing individuals into an intimate union with each other. But (moral) love as attraction establishes just that: ‘The principle of MUTUAL LOVE admonishes them constantly to come closer to one another’ (MM, 6:449.8–10⁴⁰; see 6:470.4–5). Without love, there is no intimate relation to begin with, as the principle that draws individuals closer together is lacking. I do not see anything in the definition of moral friendship that would make it the case that love of benevolence is no longer a necessary condition of friendship. Further, revealing intimate thoughts and feelings and being responsive to our friend’s disclosures are dependent on a kind of principled empathy, which Kant elsewhere discusses in terms of ‘sympathetic participation’ or ‘communication’ [Teilnehmung, Mitteilung]. According to Kant, this ‘sympathetic participation’ is actually a duty of love, and thus it systematically belongs to the concept of love (see MM, 6:456–457; ch. 4.2.2.C). It can also be argued that the

³⁹ ‘das völlige Vertrauen zweier Personen in wechselseitiger Eröffnung ihrer geheimen Urtheile und Empfindungen, so weit sie mit beiderseitiger Achtung gegen einander bestehen kann.’
⁴⁰ ‘Vermöge des Princips der WECHSELLIEBE sind sie angewiesen sich einander beständig zu nähern’.
trust or confidence required for moral friendship gradually comes about via the
pleasure taken in mutual moral approval, which in the Vigilantius notes is dis-
cussed by Kant in terms of love of delight. It does not follow from the mere fact
that love is not mentioned in the definition of moral friendship that love is brack-
eted from its concept, since the conceptual components of moral friendship (ex-
cluding respect) seem to assume or presuppose the presence of love. However, if
the notion of love is qualified to mean merely the pathological feeling of love,
then one may say that love is bracketed from moral friendship – but Marcucci
does not analyse the divisions of love.⁴¹

Marcucci’s second point is that ‘Kant even opposes love to the concept of
friendship itself’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440). How does he argue for this? As evi-
dence for his point, Marcucci quotes the following passage from the ‘Doctrine
of Virtue’: “the relation between the protector as benefactor, and the protected,
as obligated to gratitude, is [...] a relation of mutual love, but not of friendship,
because their mutual respect is not the same in both parties.” (Marcucci 1999,
p. 440; citing MM, 6:473.5–8; Marcucci’s italics) Unfortunately, other than citing
the passage, Marcucci does not elaborate on the rationale for his conclusion.
Kant’s point in the passage is that a friend of human beings [Freund der Men-
schen]⁴² not only loves human beings but also takes into account ‘the equality
among them’ [der Gleichheit unter Menschen] (MM, 6:473.1–2). The reason for
this is that the relationship between a mere benefactor and the person being pro-
tected is not one of friendship, since even though love is present, respect is not
equal. It appears to me that Marcucci’s argument is a non sequitur: from the
premises that 1) equal respect is a necessary condition of friendship and 2)
not all relations of love are relations of friendship, it does not follow that 3)
love is opposed to the concept of friendship.

More recently, Marcucci’s arguments have been repeated by Van Impe (2011).
Van Impe derives the bulk of his discussion on love in friendship directly from
Marcucci’s article, and the only new consideration that he adds is the claim
that ‘Kant already seemed to consider this bracketing of love in the late Lectures
on Ethics by arguing that “only a reciprocal love based on [gebaut]⁴³ respect can
secure a lasting friendship”’ (Van Impe 2011, p. 137; citing LE, 27:683.16–18; Van
Impe’s italics). Even though Van Impe does not say it, I gather that he thinks that

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⁴¹ He is especially unaware of the existence of love of benevolence and its operation in friend-
ship.
⁴² I discuss the notion of a ‘friend of human beings’ in more detail in ch. 5.3.
⁴³ The verb Kant uses to describe the relationship between love and respect in that passage is
bauen, to build, and thus a more appropriate translation might be ‘a reciprocal love built on re-
spect’.
if love were somehow reducible to respect or based on respect, then love would be bracketed, and friendship would essentially be about respect. The context of the passage cited by Van Impe is Kant’s idea that friendship is similar to marriage because both involve a unity of persons, but that unlike marriage, where the wife respects the husband more than the husband respects the wife, in friendship the parties are obligated to equally ‘preserve the other’s respect’ (LE, 27:683.15). From this the passage quoted by Van Impe above follows as a conclusion. But does it follow from the passages that love is a mere effect of respect or that we should think that love ultimately only about respect?

Elsewhere in Vigilantius Kant describes the appropriate relationship between love and respect by noting that love must be ‘coupled’ with or ‘tied to’ [verbunden seyn] respect (LE, 27:682.24–25), or that respect must impose a ‘restriction’ [Einschränkung] on love (LE, 27:682.35). It is also the case that intellectual love of delight is grounded in a moral ‘esteem’ [Schätzung] (see 27:680.23–25) for another person’s characteristics. Further, in ‘The End of All Things’, Kant holds that respect is a necessary condition of ‘true love’ [wahre Liebe] (8:337.33–34; see Wood 2015, p. 4). Thus it is indeed the case that, for Kant, respect plays a crucial and fundamental role in any kind of moral love. From a moral perspective, respect (for the moral law, for the humanity of the other) forms the ground level on which subsequent moral relations are then built. But if we think of the basic distinction between (moral) love and respect in The Metaphysics of Morals, we see that love is still attraction and respect is still repulsion: the two are clearly different. We must also remember that through the aesthetic predisposition of love of delight, even the duty of love retains a special connection to love as a sensory-aesthetic phenomenon: the bond between love of benevolence and love of delight is close and complicated, and the interrelations between the elements of the general division of love cannot be thought of in terms of mere respect. It therefore seems to me that even though respect is morally primary (as Wood (2015, p. 4) correctly notes), love cannot be reduced to respect. The identification or equation of love with respect would go against one of the most fundamental distinctions of Kant’s moral philosophy. Therefore, love cannot be bracketed this way.

The last thing to remember is that during Kant’s mature period, the basic definitions of friendship are ‘the complete love of benevolence and delight among equals’ (LE, 27:680.28–30) and ‘the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect.’ (MM, 6:469.17–18) If Kant thought that love (in general) was opposed to the concept of friendship or bracketed from some

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44 ‘des Andern Achtung zu erhalten’.
kind of friendship, this would introduce a fairly dramatic contradiction between Kant’s definitions and his actual position.\^ As I have shown, the evidence does not support this interpretation. The exegetical stance favours the view that in Kant’s philosophy of friendship, love and respect must be balanced.

5.3 Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’s Ascent Toward the Ideal Moral Community

Throughout his discussions, Kant makes clear that friendship is an intimate and special bond between a very limited number of individuals: friendship is usually held between two people. In such relationships, the friends embark on a joint journey of moral progress, sharing their personhood, correcting each other’s faults cautiously (through love of benevolence limited by respect), and taking intellectual pleasure (love of delight) in each other’s improving moral attributes. They help each other to cultivate virtue and to approach moral happiness in an openhearted union (see Moran 2012, pp. 168 ff.). As they become more virtuous, their active rational benevolence (Liebe des Wohlwollens) for each other grows stronger and more consistent, and the more virtuous they are, the greater the delight (Liebe des Wohlgefallens) they take in their friendship. In this way, friendship, and the love that grows as the friends make progress, marks a path towards the highest good between two people (see Moran 2012, p. 203). We may therefore speak of an ascent of love in friendship, which means that by attending to the duty of friendship, the friends’ love becomes greater and more perfect.

But there is another notion closely interwoven with friendship that is more general and that points towards an ascent of love as a more communal or even cosmopolitan notion. This is the notion of being a friend of human beings [Menschenfreund], not in an intimate relationship with someone in particular but with regard to humanity as a whole. I will end my discussion with an investigation of what it means to be a friend of human beings from the perspective of love.

In the Collins notes, Kant points out that as society arises from natural crudity or ‘savagery’ to civilisation, people tend to have fewer intimate friendships: ‘The more civilized men become, the more universal their outlook, and the smaller the incidence of special friendships. The civilized man seeks a general friend-

\^ Neither Marcucci nor Van Impe addresses this point.
ship and amenity, without having special ties.’ (LE, 27:428.30–33)¹⁶ This sort of ‘universal friendship’ [Die allgemeine Freundschaft] does not mean that the civilised person would be friends with everyone, but rather concerns a capacity for establishing friendship with anyone. Such people are few in number: they are optimistic and possess benevolence, good-heartedness, understanding, and taste. Kant calls them ‘world citizens’ [Weltbürger]. (LE, 27:430.11–27)

In the Vigilantius notes, Kant’s attitude toward universal concern or affection is more ambivalent. Here he warns that ‘the friend to all humanity […] cannot fail to dissipate his inclination through its excessive generality, and quite loses any adherence to individual persons, […] though there is no denying that the great value of human love rests in the general love of humanity as such.’ (LE, 27:673.25–31)¹⁷ So while we should aim for a generalised attitude of love, in doing so we risk losing proper sight of particular individual relationships. Kant explains further that in contrast to intimate reciprocal friendship, which involves amor bilateralis, being everyone’s friend is a unilateral disposition of love: amor unilateralis. This unilateral love, which we ought to cultivate, is here clearly love of benevolence: ‘being everyone’s friend; it does no more than formulate the duty to harbor love of benevolence for the happiness of others, and is quite different from the term: to make friends with everyone.’ (LE, 27:676.19–22)¹⁸

Kant’s definitive account of what it is to be a friend of human beings is given at the very end of his discussion of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. This brief discussion serves as important evidence for Kant’s cosmopolitan outlook as a part of his philosophy of love. On this basic definition, a friend of human beings [Menschenfreund] is ‘one who takes an affective interest in the well-being of all human beings (rejoices with them)’ (MM, 6:472.34–35)⁵⁰. Kant

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¹⁶ ‘Je mehr die Menschen gesittet werden, desto allgemeiner werden sie, und desto weniger finden die besonder Freundschaften statt. Der Gesittete sucht eine allgemeine Freundschaft und Annähmlichkeit, ohne besondere Verbindung zu haben.’

¹⁷ ‘der Weltliebhaber […], da es nicht fehlen kann, daß er seine Neigung durch die zu große Allgemeinheit zerstreut und eine einzelne persönliche Anhänglichkeit ganz verliert, […] obgleich nicht zu leugnen ist, daß der große Wert der Menschenliebe in der allgemeinen Menschenliebe als solcher beruht.’ Note that the word Kant uses in this passage is not Menschenfreund but Weltliebhaber.

¹⁸ ‘jedermanns Freund seyn: er drückt nichts mehr, als die Pflicht aus, Liebe des Wohlwollens für anderer Menschen Glück zu hegen, und ist ganz verschieden von dem Ausdruck: mit jedermann Freundschaft stiften.’

¹⁹ Translating ästhetisch as affective with Baron, who follows Gregor’s 1991 translation (Baron 2013, p. 366). Note that Gregor’s Cambridge translation contains a typo: she uses ‘effective’ for ästhetisch when she clearly means ‘affective’.

⁵⁰ ‘der, welcher an dem Wohl aller Menschen ästhetischen Antheil (der Mitfreude) nimmt’.
then introduces a distinction between being a *Menschenfreund* and a *Freund der Menschen* (both of which translate to ‘friend of human beings’), such that being a friend of human beings [*Freund der Menschen*] also involves ‘thought and consideration for the equality among them’ (MM, 6:473.1–2; see 6:450.19–22). It is this concern for equality that in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ prevents us from equating a friend of human beings with someone who merely possesses love of benevolence. The beneficence of a friend of human beings [*Freund der Menschen*] includes ‘a necessary humbling of oneself’ [*eine nothwendige Herablassung*] (MM, 6:473.8–9). It is also noteworthy that the interest described is affective or sensory-aesthetic, which might include love of benevolence from inclination or even pathological love of delight in the love of the friend of human beings.

In an appendix immediately following the discussion on being a friend of human beings, Kant explicitly connects the cosmopolitan outlook with the cultivation of virtue in reciprocal relationships, suggesting that, indirectly, this cultivation of reciprocity will lead to what is best for the world. I wish to quote this passage at length:

> It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself [...] but to use one’s moral perfections in social intercourse [...]. While making oneself a fixed center of one’s principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world – not exactly to promote as the end what is best for the world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity – agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect [...]. (MM, 6:473.16–24)

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51 ‘die Vorstellung und Beherzigung der Gleichheit unter Menschen’.
52 The notion of *Menschenfreund* is similar in the *Groundwork*, in that in the first instance the interest the *Menschenfreund* has for the well-being of others is aesthetic – or to be precise, based on inclination (GW, 4:398.20–34). It is unclear whether the concept of *Menschenfreund* in the *Groundwork* is also supposed to cover the case where the agent lacks sympathy but is nonetheless beneficent from duty (see GW, 4:398.32–399.2).
53 The references to *Menschenfreund* in the *Groundwork* point in this direction (GW, 4:398.20–34).
54 ‘Es ist Pflicht sowohl gegen sich selbst, als auch gegen Andere, mit seinen sittlichen Vollkommenheiten unter einander Verkehr zu treiben [...], sich nicht zu isolieren [...]; zwar sich einen unbeweglichen Mittelpunkt seiner Grundsätze zu machen, aber diesen um sich gezogenen Kreis doch auch als einen, der den Theil von einem allbefassenden der weltbürgerlichen Gesinnung ausmacht, anzusehen; nicht eben um das Weltbeste als Zweck zu befördern, sondern nur die wechselseitige, die indirect dahin führt, die Annahmlichkeit in derselben, die Verträglichkeit, die wechselseitige Liebe und Achtung’.

50 Love in Friendship
The passage contains a sweeping vision from the narrowly circled individual to ‘what is best for the world’ [das Weltbeste]. Since Kant obviously thinks that the highest good is what is best, I take it that his notion of ‘what is best for the world’ can here be identified as the complete highest good (moral happiness of all rational beings) with regard to humans. However, Kant seems to think that this communal notion of ‘what is best for the world’ can only be approached indirectly, through social intercourse. The basic components of friendship are explicitly operative in this cultivation of sociality: reciprocity as disposition and mutual love and respect (alongside agreeableness and tolerance). It seems that by cherishing and cultivating love and respect in friendships, and by gradually opening our ‘narrower circles’ to people who are not yet our friends, we ascend towards the ideal ethical community. As Langton reminds us, friendship unlocks ‘the “prison” of the self’ (Langton 2009, p. 319; see MM, 6:472.12–13).

Its concept provides us with an ideal model of what human relationships in general ought to be like. Wood suggests that it is friendship ‘that is ultimately to encompass the entire human race’ (Wood 1999, p. 316). Of course, cosmopolitan friendship will not contain the level of intimacy characteristic of certain exclusive relationships, but we may say that close to the end of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, Kant clearly gives the elements of friendship a decisive role when describing the ascent to what is best for the world. In the words of Moran, friendship is crucial for ‘our progress toward the highest good’ (Moran 2012, p. 203).\footnote{55 At this stage, I do not feel a need to distance myself from the basic positions formulated by Wood and Moran with respect to the relationship between friendship and the highest good. I don’t feel the urge for ‘scientific dissensus’. I take it that their generic propositions are viable and can be adopted by my ascent account of love in friendship. What remains novel in my approach is the relatively detailed analysis of the concept of love in this context, as well as the more general ascent model of love, to which the ascent of love in cosmopolitan friendship belongs – as the final element of the general model.}

We are now in a position to appreciate the place of love in friendship in the overall structure of love in Kant’s philosophy. We have come far from the crude natural impulses of self-love and have temporarily bracketed love of God because we are now considering human moral relations. We now know that love of neighbour alone is not able to bring about the highest communal good – since love of neighbour as such is not necessarily properly conditioned by respect. Only the profound acknowledgment of the equality of all human beings can make one a friend of human beings – one in whom the disposition of love towards the whole race is conditioned by respect for the humanity of all. By becoming friends of human beings, we gradually ascend toward a cosmopolitan community of love and respect. But most of us may only become friends of
human beings by engaging in particular friendships, where we approach moral happiness by cultivating intimate love of benevolence conditioned by intimate respect. In order to ascend toward the highest communal good, we must gradually open up our love and extend it to those who are not yet our friends. This we can only learn to do while loving our friends and by striving to love people around us more wisely.