Spinoza ’ s Miracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics

laws of human of of pose of that manifestation. God did not want to teach the Israelites the absolute attributes of his essence. (He did not reveal any of them at that time.) He wanted to break their stubborn heart and win them over to obedience. So he addressed them with the sound of trumpets, with thun-der, and with lightning, not with arguments. ( TTP , 14 [36]; my italics)

ieved by using his literal sense method, i. e. deciphering the meaning of biblical prophecyr equires us to studyt he prophetic statement taking its linguistic use as a starting point.I fw ek now how ap articularl anguagew as useda tt he specific time of the prophecy,wec an reconstruct the its meaning.S pinoza posits his critical hermeneutics in stark contrast to dogmatic hermeneutics, which he defines as anyinterpretation which deciphers meaning accordingtothe interpreter'sown alreadyestablished philosophical opinions rather thand eriving it from the biblical text itself.⁷ Spinoza'sh ermeneutics is compatible with his separation thesis; theologya nd philosophyare two distinct domainsthat should not be conflated. Thus, aprophet's claim should not be explicated by means of aphilosophicalclaim, and aphilosophical claim should not be addressed in at heological manner.A ccordingt ot he separation thesis,regardlessofwhatever philosophicalthesis the prophet holds (even an entirelyf alse one), it does not implyt hath is prophecy contradictso rc onflicts with the true philosophical view;the prophet'sopinion is as little apart of the theological aspect of his prophecy as, for instance, the length of his hair; the onlyp rophetic teachingi st heological, and theological teaching has nothing to do with philosophical teaching. Now,here is the question that puzzlesscholars: when analysed philosophically, Spinoza argues, miracles are absurd and impossible; we would not have expected him to formulate it anyd ifferently. However,s trangelye nough, Spinoza claims that because miracles are impossible, we have to interpret the biblical miracles in such away thatthe biblical text does not implyanything which is not in accordance with reason. Moreover,S pinoza claims that miracles are, in fact,aphilosophical issue, and hence that we should explain the meaning of ap rophetic statement in aw ay which would not resulti nacontradiction between the philosophical view of miracles and the prophet'sv iew of miracles.
Hence, the riddle that Spinoza'sr eader is faced with is this: what reason could Spinoza have that would explain his deviation from critical hermeneutics, namely what reason could he have for applying dogmatic hermeneutics to the biblical miracles?Although the riddle focussesonmiracles, Harvey claims, in aStraussian spirit, that Spinoza deliberatelyp resented this contradiction in order to teach the reader how the TTP should be read as awhole. Harvey compares Spinoza'smanner of composing ac ontradictory text to thato fM aimonidesi nh is Guide. Other scholars have offered other resolutions,⁸ but they all agree that 1) Spinoza'sanalysis of miracles is  Is kip the important discussion concerning Spinoza'sh ermeneutics, as it is not essential for the purpose of this paper. Fort he sake of the main argument in this paper,Idistinguish between literal sense method and critical hermeneutics as follows: literal sense method concerns the meaning of specific phrase or passage,whereas critical hermeneutics ascertains the prophetic/philosophic natureof the biblical expression or passage.  Fora ni nterestingd iscussion of the different approaches,s ee Harvey, "Spinoza on Biblical Miracles," 672ff.; Harvey names three types of resolution: the biographical (Strauss and Fraenkel), the harmonizing (Nadler), and the dialecticalo ne (Harvey). dogmatic to some extent,a nd 2) the dogmatic interpretationo fm iracles stands in contrast to his critical hermeneutics, which requires us to studyt he prophet'sv iew in light of the literal sense rule.
In contrast to this widelyshared agreement,Iwould like to suggest an alternative interpretation which consists of the following theses: 1. Spinoza'sanalysis of miracles is, in fact,anexpression of his anti-dogmatic commitments. 2. Spinoza'sclaim that the prophets were, in fact,committed to the same Spinozian view of miracles is the result of his critical hermeneutics. 3. Spinoza'sanalysis of miracles can contributetoanunderstanding of the biblical conception of miracles.
This alternative interpretation willh elp in resolving the puzzle. Theorder of presentation Iw ill take in this paper will be: 1. The puzzle: Spinoza'sanalysis of miracles as aviolation of his critical hermeneutics. 2. Miracles as ap roblem for Spinoza'sh ermeneutics. 3. ShowingSpinoza'sway out-Spinoza'shermeneutics actuallyinformsour understanding of biblical miracles. 4. Claiming thatSpinoza'sa nalysis of miracles is, in fact,aclear expression of his commitment to anti-dogmatic hermeneutics.
The Puzzle: Spinoza'sA nalysiso fM iracles as aV iolation of his Critical Hermeneutics Forthe sake of clarity,Iwill brieflypresent the link between Spinoza's separation thesis and his literal sense method. Then, Iwillpresent the puzzling deviation of Spinoza'sa nalysis of miracles from his critical hermeneutics.

Critical hermeneutics and the separation thesis
Spinoza'sc ritical hermeneutics can be crudelyexplained as consistingoft wo parts: 1. Application of the separation thesis-theologya nd philosophya re two distinct domains, distinguishedi nt he following way: I) Each has its own sourceofknowledge:the sourceoftheological knowledge is prophetic revelation, whereas the sourceo fp hilosophical knowledge is the natural light of reason. II) Theology'smedium for thinking the world is imagination, whereas philosophy'si sr eason. III) The aim of philosophyi st ruth, whereas the aim of theologyi so bedience and piety.
According to the separation thesis,the prophetic aspect of the Bible should consist of teachingsi nw hich the medium of thinkingi si magination. The kind of teachingo rk nowledge thatp rophecyc onveys has to do with piety and obedience.⁹ 2. Literal sense method-the literal sense method enables the reader to separate the theological content of the prophet'se xpression from its philosophical content.Thus, the critical reader is not bothered by the truth or falsityofthe prophet'sexpressions;the philosophical value of the prophet'sopinion does not affect the theological value of prophetic expression,e .g., the prophet'sv iew of God mayb ei nvalid philosophically, but entirelyv alid theologically.

Miracles: aD eviation from Critical Hermeneutics
Iwill now focus on two central discussions: the first is Nadler'sdiscussion of Spinoza'sdeviation and the second is Harvey'sdiscussion of Spinoza's apology. Letmejust brieflye laborate on them.
Nadler'sQ uestion: Spinoza'sD ogmatic Deviation Nadler'sdiscussion bringsthe reader directlytothe heart of the problem. Summarising it,h es ays: The issue is whyS pinoza believes that Scripture'sa uthenticallyp rophetic authors cannot possiblya ssert anythinga bout miracles that is 'contrary to reason.'¹⁰ Let us now examine Spinoza'sdogmatic thesis, the argument he provides to support it,a nd Nadler'sq uestion. Concerningt he biblical view of miracles, Spinoza says: If anythingshould be found [in scripture] which can be conclusively demonstrated to be contrary to the laws of nature, or to have been unable to follow from them,w em ust believew ithout reservation that it has been added to the Sacred Texts by sacrilegious men. Forw hatever is contraryt on aturei sc ontraryt or eason; and what is contraryt or eason is absurd,a nd thereforet o be rejected. (TTP,6[51]; my italics) Spinoza'sc onclusionh ere is that anyp assagef ound in the Bible which conveys the opinion that something happens which is 'contrary to the laws of nature' must be  Iwill skip the discussionastohow the mind'spossession of revealed knowledge and the person's disposition to obey this knowledge areactuallyone and the same according to Spinoza. Spinoza does have an argument in store in favour of this equation, but it is beyond the scopeo ft his paper.  Nadler, "Scripturea nd Truth: AP roblem in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," 639. considered ac orrupt passage. He supports this claim by arguingt hat 'whatever is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; and what is contrary to reason is absurd.' Now,does the argument support the thesis?Itseems that according to Spinoza's own objection to dogmatic interpretation, his argument does not support his conclusion, since the fact that from the perspective of reason nothing can be contrary to nature does not necessarilyentail thatthe prophet cannot believethat this is exactly the case. Nadler puts this question very convincingly,s aying: Giveneverythingthat Spinoza has said about the natureofprophecy,the content of the prophetic writings,and the interpretation of Scripture, it is very surprising to see him sayw hat he does in passage C.¹¹ In fact,i tw ould seem to be preciselyw hath es hould not say, sincei ti si nconsistent with his overall accountofthe interpretation of Scripture. His remarks in this passageare somethingthat we might expect from MaimonidesorMeijer,but not from Spinoza.According to Spinoza'sc onsidereda ccount of Scripture, it is perfectlyr easonablet oe xpect the Bible'su ntutored authors to regardevents as havingsupernatural causes and thus sincerely to narratethem in such away that they 'contravene the laws of Nature,' or to possess an understanding of things that is 'contrary to reason' and, from reason'sp erspective, 'absurd'.B ut the prophets weren ot intellectuallygifted individuals,much less Spinozist philosophers who identify God with Nature. Thus,there is no reason to expect,asamatter of principle, that the prophets believed that every event has an atural cause or can be explained throught he laws of nature. Why, then, should it not at least be possible to find 'somethingi nS cripturec ontrary to the light of Nature' without suspectingt he piety of its author?A sS pinoza himself says,i nh is objections to Maimonides's view that 'thereisnothinginScripturewhich contradicts reason,''Iinsist that Scriptureexpressly affirms and teaches that God is jealous [. .. ]t his is contrary to reason.'¹² Spinoza'st hesis here is apparentlyadogmatic one; however,his argument does not seem to support his thesis. Moreover,the reason for his deviation is quite puzzling: what could have been his reason for introducing such adogmatic thesis that explicitlycontradicts his own critical hermeneutics and possiblyjeopardizes the aim of the TTP,n amelyt he separation thesis?
Harvey'sQ uestioning of Spinoza's Apology In apassagethatHarvey describes as Spinoza's apology,Spinoza explicitlyaddresses our question. YetHarvey claims that instead of offering an answer,Spinoza's apology onlye xpands the question. Accordingt oH arvey,S pinoza's apology is so puzzling that we must assume that Spinoza was playing agame which needs to be explained in ad ifferent way. Letu sf ollow Spinoza's apology and Harvey'sq uestion. Spinoza's apology reads: BeforeIend this chapter, there'ss omethingelse Iwant to note.I ' ve proceeded regarding miracles according to am ethod completely different from the one If ollowed regarding Prophecy. ConcerningP rophecyIaffirmed nothingb ut what Ic ould infer from foundations revealed in the SacredTexts.But here I've elicited the main points onlyfromprinciples known to the natural light.Idid this deliberately. ForsinceProphecysurpasses man'spower of understanding, and is apurelyTheological question, Icould affirm nothingabout it,nor even know in what it chiefly consisted,e xcept from the foundations which have been revealed. Iw as compelled to put together ah istory of Prophecy, and to formulatec ertain doctrines from it,w hich would teach me the natureand properties of Prophecy,asfar as this can be done.
[66] But concerning miracles what we area skingi sc ompletelyp hilosophical:c an we grant that somethingh appens in naturecontrary to its laws,orsomethingwhich couldn'tfollow fromthem?SoIdidn'tneed anythingl iket hat. ( TTP, Spinoza is thus completelya ware that in his analysis of miracles, he deviates from the critical hermeneutics which he used for the analysis of prophecy.H arvey boldly questions Spinoza'sd istinction between miracles and prophecy, saying: The apologiabegins with Spinoza'sadmission that he has treatedthe subject of biblical miracles completelydifferentlyfromthat of biblical prophecy.Heexplains that in discussing prophecyin chaptero ne he had based himself on 'foundations revealed in Sacred Writ,' for prophecy is a 'purelyt heological' subject,b ut in discussing miracles he has based himself on 'foundations known by means of the lumen naturale,' for the subject of miracles is 'plainlyp hilosophical.' The petitio principii herei ss of lagrant that it must be supposed to be intentional. Spinoza is playingagame-but what?O ne would have thought that the subjects of prophecy and miracles aref or Spinoza very similar.P rophecy mayb eu nderstood as beingr ational and natural (e. g., the natural knowledgeofthe intelligent individual) or imaginary and supernatural (e. g., the visions of the biblical prophets which ares aid to be 'beyond the limits' of natural knowledge and inexplicable by 'the laws of human nature'); and so toomiracles maybeunderstood as beingr ational and natural (e. g.,t he extra light at Gibeon was caused by the hail) or imaginary and supernatural (e. g., the light was caused by the sun'ss tandings till in the heavens). Spinoza claims that the subject of prophecyi s' theological' because it 'surpasses human knowledge' (captum humanum superat), whereas that of miracles is 'philosophical' because it involves the philosophical question of 'whether we can concede that somethingm ay happen in Naturet hat contravenes its Laws.' However,h em ight just as easilyh aves aid: the subject of prophecy is 'philosophical,' for it involves the philosophical question of whether there can be suprarational knowledge,whereas that of miracles is 'theological,'¹³ Harvey'sp uzzlement assumes that Spinoza'sc ritical hermeneutics provides no reason to explicate miracles and prophecydifferently; if what is at stake is the difference between natural light and supernatural light (reason or imagination), then both prophecyand miracles can be addressed either philosophicallyortheologically. Spinoza'sc laim that miracles are the object of philosophyw hereas prophecyi st he object of theologyi sa sa rbitrarya si tg ets.
Ithink we are now in ap osition to summarise the different aspects of the main problem, which is Spinoza'sinconsistency:despite his strongcommitment to his own  Harvey, "Spinoza on Biblical Miracles," 666 -667. critical hermeneutics, his analysis of miracles is committed to dogmatic hermeneutics. More specifically, there are two issues: 1. That the prophet'su nderstanding of miracles is compatible with the philosophical one. Thus, in cases wherew ec annot explain ab iblical paragraph concerning miracles in ap hilosophicalw ay,weh avet oc ensor this paragraph. 2. Spinoza'sdistinction between miracles and prophecy on the basis of reason and the prophetic kind of cognition does not make anys ense.

Miracles as aP roblem forS pinoza'sH ermeneutics
In this part,Iwill suggest the following thesis: am iracle-when interpreted according to Spinoza'sliteralsense method-is apparentlyasignificant problem for Spinoza'scritical hermeneutics, if we suppose that the latter assumes thatthe literal sense method and the separation thesis are compatible.
In his apology,S pinoza states: 'Ia ffirmedn othing but what Ic ould infer from foundations revealedi nt he Sacred Texts' (TTP,6[65]). It might be helpful to review the lastp aragraph of chapter 2, in which Spinoza summarises the thesis he infers from his analysis of prophecy: Although onlythe thingswehavesaid about the Prophets and Prophecypertain particularlyt o my purpose of separating Philosophyf romT heology, nevertheless,b ecause Ih avet reated Prophecygenerally, Iwant to ask now whether the gift of Prophecywas peculiar to the Hebrews or whether it was common to all nations.Wealso need to ask whatwemust maintain about the callingo ft he Hebrews.That'st he object of the followingc hapter. (TTP,2[58]) Spinoza'sclaim is quite explicit: the literal sense analysis of prophecyisintended to support the separation thesis. Now,how does it achieve this?Spinoza brieflyexplains the separation thesis in the preface: Havingshown the fundamentalsoffaith [in chapter1 4], Iconclude finallythat revealed knowledge has no object but obedience, and indeed that it is entirely distinct from natural knowledge, both in its object and in its foundation and means.R evealed knowledgeh as nothing in common with natural knowledge,b ut each is in charge of its own domain, without anyc onflict with the other.[In chapter15Ishow that] neither oughttobethe handmaid of the other. (TTP,preface [27]; my italics) The separation thesis,t hen, stipulates that the distinction between revealedk nowledge and natural knowledge (theologya nd philosophy) is clear-cut: these are two completelyd istinct domains of knowledge which have 'nothing in common' with each other and cannot conflict.The first twoc hapters on prophecy and the prophet are rich in content.However,accordingtoSpinoza'sclaim, all of the discussions concerningp rophecyw ered esigned to support his separation thesis. How do they support it?Skipping adetailed analysis,Iwill point out two kinds of discussions which do so: 1. The analysis of prophecys hows that the foundationso fr evealed knowledge are different from the foundations of natural knowledge.Thus, since revealed knowledge is knowledge of the imagination, one should not takethe prophet'sphilosophical opinions to have anyt heological validity.F or instance, regardingt he revelation to Cain, Spinoza says: Forexample, the revelation to Cain [Genesis 4:6 -7] teaches us only that God warned him to lead atrue life, for that was the onlyintent and substanceofthe revelation, not teach the freedom of the will or Philosophic matters. So even though the freedom of the will is contained very clearly in the wordsand reasonings of that warning, we arepermitted to think the will is not free, since those words and reasonings wereonlyaccommodated to Cain'spower of understanding. (TTP,2 [53]; my italics) 2. Critical hermeneutics can disclose the meaningi nwhich revealed knowledge is a domaininand of itself. Thus, for instance, by disclosing the manner in which ar evelation is validated, we see that revealed knowledge does not appeal to reason.
One of Spinoza'smain discussions revolves around the sourceofcertainty.Literal sense hermeneutics,heargues, helps us to decipher the inner criteria for certainty with regards to revealedknowledge.Spinoza concludes the first chapter with the following tellingp assage: As ar esult, we're now forcedt oa sk how the Prophets could have come to be certain of things they perceivedo nlyt hrough the imagination, and not from certain principles of the mind. But whatever we can sayabout this,wemust seek from Scripture. As we have alreadysaid, we do not have true 'knowledge of this matter,orwecannot explain it through its first causes. What Scripture teaches concerning the certainty of the Prophets,Ishall show in the followingc hapter, where Ih aved ecided to treat of the Prophets. (TTP,1[48]) Certainty,a ccordingt oS pinoza, accompanies anyp iece of knowledge which is deduced by reason. [See TTP,[2][3][4][5][6]] There is no need for anyf urther act of the mind in order to become certain of the truth of anypiece of knowledge which is derivedb yr eason. In contrast, knowledge achieved by imagination requires an additional element in order to be endowed with certainty.
It is important to note here that Spinoza'sc omment-'we're now forced to ask how the Prophets could have come to be certain of thingst hey perceivedo nly through the imagination, and not from certain principles of the mind' (TTP,1[48]) -turnsout to be very telling.Why are we forced to ask this when the certainty is coming from the imagination, but not when it comesf rom the principles of the mind?If we weret od erive this certaintyf rom our principles of reason, then the separation thesis could not be as stronga sS pinoza claimedi tw as,n amelyw ec ould not claim that 'revealedk nowledge has nothing in common with naturalk nowledge, but each is in charge of its own domain, without anyc onflict with the other' (TTP,preface[ 27]). Thus, being committed to the strongv ersion of the separation thesis, Spinoza has to reject the premise that prophecy obtains its certaintyf rom certain principles of the mind. To summarize: Spinoza'sstrong separation thesis is intimately linked with his view thatt he certaintyo fp rophecy cannot originatei nr eason.
Yett oc ome to our point now:S pinoza claims that in order to determine the sourceo fc ertaintyw hen it comes to revealed knowledge,w em ust read the Bible using his method.

Certainty and Revealed Knowledge
In the lastsection, we showed the significance of Spinoza'shermeneutics to his separation thesis. Moreover,weh aves een that Spinoza is committed to the strongv ersion of the separation thesis,namelythatrevealedknowledge should not be supported by means of reason. Accordingt oS pinoza, it is part of the task of chapter 2t o show that the certainty which accompanies revealedk nowledge is not being informedt hrough reason. If we fail to make this distinction, we will not be able to abide by the strongv ersion of the separation thesis.
So, what is it indeed that endows revealed knowledge with certainty?
But first Im ust treat the certainty of the Prophets,b oth because it concernst he theme of this chapter, but also because it will help in some measuretoget to the conclusionweintend to demonstrate.
[4] Unlike ac lear and distinct idea, as imple imagination does not,b yi ts nature, involvec ertainty.S ot ob ea ble to be certain of things we imagine, we must add somethingt o the imagination-viz., reasoning.I tf ollows that,b yi tself, Prophecyc annot involvec ertainty. As we've shown, it depended onlyo nt he imagination. So the Prophets were not certain about God'sr evelation by the revelation itself, but by some sign. (TTP,2[ 3-4]) The certainty which accompanies revealedk nowledge is not revelation, but as ign. Indeed, the certaintyw hich accompanies revealed knowledge is inferior to the certainty which accompanies natural knowledge.Y et Spinoza has successfullys hown that this certainty does not come from reason. The certaintytowhich the prophet aspires is achieved through as ign which is as imaginary as prophecyi tself.
To summarise: accordingtoour explication,the onlyway we can account for the certainty of revealed knowledge without violating the strongv ersion of the separation thesis is by pointingo ur the exact role of the sign plays in endowing certainty to prophetic knowledge;wecan understand the role of the sign onlybycloselycriticallys tudying the biblical text.

Signsa nd Miracles
But what is the kind of sign thatendow prophetic revelations with certaintyaccording to Spinoza?I nterestingly enough, at least in certain cases, Spinoza identifies miracles as signs.F or instance, in chapter 2, it reads: Indeed, this Prophetic certainty was not mathematical, but onlymoral, as is evident from Scripture itself. Fori nD euteronomy1 3[:2] Moses warns that anyP rophet who wants to teach new Gods should be condemned to death, even though he confirms his teachingwith signs and miracles. Fora sM oses himself goes on to say, God also uses signs and miracles to test the people. (TTP,2[7])¹⁴ Moreover,l ateri nt he chapter Spinoza says: Similarly, the sign of the backwardmotion of the shadow was revealed to Isaiah according to his power of understanding, viz. as ab ackwardm otion of the sun [cf. 2K ings20:8 -12 with Isaiah 38:7-8]. Forhetoo thoughtthat the sun moves and that the earth is at rest.Asluck would have it,henever thought of parhelia,not even in adream. We arepermitted to maintain this without anyh esitation because the sign could reallyh appen, and be predicted to the kingb yI saiah, even though the Prophet did not know its true cause. (TTP,2[28]) Spinoza notes that having to explicate 'the backward motion of the sun' in terms of imagination does not necessarilym ean that it could not be explained by reason. However,i nc hapter 6, Spinoza refers to the samee vent,s aying: We ought not doubt that manyt hings arer elated as miracles in the Sacred Texts whose causes can easilyb ee xplained according to known principles of natural things.Wea lreadyh inted at this in Ch. 2w hen we spokea bout the sun'ss tandings till in the time of Joshua, and its going backwardi nt he time of Ahaz. But we'll soon treat this moref ully, when we discuss the interpretation of miracles,a sI ' ve promised to do in this chapter. (TTP,6[15]) Here, Spinoza discusses the same event,but in terms of miracle. So, if miracles can be as ign, Isuggest we turn now to discuss the place of miracles in revealed knowledge.
 Cf. TTP,6[31]: 'Forh es ayst hat (even if)asign and aw onder he has predictedt oy ou should happen, etc., do not (nevertheless) assent to the wordso ft his Prophet etc., because the Lord your God testsyou etc. (Therefore) let that Prophet be condemned to death etc.From this it clearlyfollows that even false Prophets can performm iracles,a nd that unless men arew ell protectedb ythet rue knowledge and loveo fG od, miracles can lead them to embrace false Gods as easilya st he True God. ForM oses adds sincet he Lordy our God is testing you, to know whether youl oveh im with all your heart and all your soul.'

Miracles as Signs: the First Problem
Amiracle can serveasasign, but what is amiracle? Ithink we are now in aposition to see the difficulties thatm iracles createi nS pinoza'sd ual commitment,n amelyt o both literal sense hermeneutics and his separation thesis.
If we return to the scholars previouslydiscussed, Ithink we can saythatamiracle is an event perceivedb yb oth the Bible and the prophet as violating the lawo f nature. Now,i fw es ay that as ign is am iracle, how does it contributet ot heology? To answer this question, we would have to explore how am iracle can endow the prophet'srevelation (or his audience) with certaintythat the sign is indeed amiracle. Amiracle shows thatprovidence can violate the natural order;providence'sinterference with the natural order is asign that adds certainty to the content of revelations.
If we are correct in our interpretation of Spinoza as being committed to astrong version of the separation thesis,which requires (as we have suggested) arevelation to be explained without anyr eference to reason, then am iracle qua sign willn ot be very helpful. Afterall, the prophet'sentireconviction is based on an argument of reason which roughlyclaims: youhaveseen an event,and youknow that events generallyfollow the natural law, the laws of reason. However,what youhaveseen here is a miracle, which means that providence can bend the laws of nature; this is asign telling youthat prophetic revelation is true. If we accept this explicationofmiracle and sign, we see that miracles-when interpreted according to the literal sense methodpresent as erious difficulty to Spinoza: this kind of certaintyw ould be explicitlyi nformedb ya na rgument from reason.
However,there is one good reason to reject my interpretation, because by adopting dogmatic hermeneutics, Spinoza falls down yeta nother pit.L et me elaborate: if we accept Spinoza'sposition on miracles, then the Bible and the prophet agree with him and miracles are not events which are bent by providence to violate laws of nature. So, what is the contribution of non-existent miracles to prophetic certainty? Let me suggest ar evised version of this refuted interpretation of mine.

The Sceptic and the Dogmatic
Spinoza posits his critical hermeneutics in opposition to two hermeneutical schools. We have alreadyd iscussed the opposition to dogmatic hermeneutics. In chapter 15, Spinoza posits critical hermeneutics against sceptical hermeneutics.
Spinoza depicts the sceptic'sr eadingo ft he Bible in the following way: The desire to 'oppose those who cultivatethe natural sciences' is quite similar to the depiction of the sceptic'sm adness in chapter 15: Who but someone desperate and mad would want to recklesslys ay goodbyet or eason, or to scorn the arts and sciences, and denyt he certainty of reason? ( TTP,15[ 38]) In fact,the sceptic'sresemblancetothe miracle advocate comes up in acontext that is more significant to our discussion. In chapter 15,S pinoza says: Who but someone desperate and mad would want to recklesslys ay goodbyet or eason, or to scorn the arts and sciences, and denythe certainty of reason?[…]They want to call upon reason to repudiatereason,and by acertain reason make reason uncertain. While they're tryingtoshow the truth and authority of Theology by mathematical demonstrations,a nd to take away the authority of reasonand the natural light,all they're doingisdraggingTheologyunder the control of reason. They clearlys eem to suppose that Theologyh as no brillianceu nless it'si lluminated by the natural light. ( TTP, The sceptic in chapter 15 is actually the one who 'calls upon reason to repudiatereason.' If we return to Spinoza'sm iracle adversary,wes ee that he meets the sceptic's criteria. In chapter 6, Spinoza depicts the miracle advocate: Next,weknow that nothingagrees with nature (or is contrary to it) except whatwehaveshown to agreewith those principles (or to be contrary to them). So if we could conceive that by some power (whatever in the end it was) somethingc ould happen in naturew hich was contrary to nature, that would be contrary to those first notions,a nd we would have to reject it as absurd-either that,orwewould have to doubt the first notions (as we have just shown) and consequently, doubt God and all things,h owever they might have been perceived. (TTP,6[18]) Thus, Spinoza states here that anyone who claims that miracles are events that violate the laws of nature (i. e. the miracle advocate) is actuallyclaiming that reason refutes reason (i. e. the sceptic). We see, then, thataccording to Spinoza, when someone claims that miracles are contrary to the natural order,what he is saying is actuallya statement about knowledge.
Critical Hermeneuticsa nd the Sceptic'sA rgument from Miracles Is Spinoza'st hesis regarding the compatibility between literal sense hermeneutics and the separation thesis in danger,ifSpinoza'smiracle adversary is indeed the sceptic?A sS pinoza grants, the sceptic'sa pproach is quite similar to his own when it comes to the literal sense interpretation. (TTP,15[8]) So, let us reconstruct the sceptic'sa rgument and review Spinoza'sa nswer. Let us first acompareSpinoza'sanswer to the sceptic concerning prophecywith his answer concerning miracles. In the case of prophecy,t he sceptic'sa rgument would be the following:the literal sense impliesthat prophecyistrue, and since prophetic knowledge is different from natural knowledge,accepting prophetic truth implies that naturalknowledge is subordinatetonatural knowledge.Spinoza'sanswer to this is thatc ritical hermeneutics indeed confirms thatp rophetic knowledge is valid. However,i ta lso confirms that revealed knowledge is made valid by imagination; hence it does not implyanything concerning reason. As long as we can keep the domains of theologyand philosophyseparate, namelyaslongasthey do not inform each other,then therei sn ob asis for the sceptic'sp osition, justa st here is no basis for the dogmatic one.
What is the case for miracles?The sceptic'sargument would be that the certainty of the revelation is endowedb yt he sign or the miracle. If we go back to Spinoza's claim that am iracle is an action on the part of providence against the order of nature-which is tantamount to the claim that reason refutes reason-then the biblical teachings upportss cepticism.
Can Spinoza refute the sceptic'sargument by arguing from the separation thesis? In contrast to the case of prophecy,i nt he case of miracles, the answer seems to be no. It seems to be the case that theological knowledge is informed by reason, and since certainty of revealedk nowledge is dependento nt he insight that knowledge of reason is invalid, the separation thesis cannot hold. Now we can return to our original difficulties: does Spinoza have ar eason to adopt dogmatic hermeneutics in his interpretation of miracles?T he answer is yes; if he does not adopt this kind of hermeneutics, the literal sense method is in support of the sceptic.
-Does Spinoza have areason to claim that the prophets hold the sameviews as he does concerning miracles?Y es: if theologyadmits that miracles implyaninterruption of the natural order,t hen the separation thesis is disproved (remember thati n order to refute the separation thesis,weo nlyn eed to show that theologyi sn ot supported by its own means).
-Does Spinoza have agood reason to distinguish between miracles and prophecy,s tating thatt he question of miracles is philosophical, whereas the question of prophecyisapurelytheological?Y es: prophetic knowledge can be entirelyexplained as proceeding from the foundations of theology, hence investigatingi ts teachingi n accordancewith the literalsense method makessense; however,since miracles cannot explain theologyw ithout relying on natural knowledge,t hey cannotq ualify as revealed knowledge.
-Does Spinoza have ag ood reason to suggest applying censorship in case the Bible impliesthat miracles support theology? Yes, otherwise we would have to agree with the sceptic that biblical teaching is dependent on knowledge of reason.
Should We Accept that Spinoza'sA nalysiso fM iracles is a Dogmatic One?
Our interpretation challenges the scholars' claim thatSpinoza had no good reason to adopt adogmatic hermeneutics in his interpretationofmiracles.Incontrast,our interpretation shows that he had very good reasons for adopting dogmatic hermeneutics. Contrary to the scholars' claim that the reason for adopting ad ogmatic hermeneutics has nothing to do with Spinoza'so wn hermeneutics,w eh aves een that Spinoza'sr eason for doing so was his own literals ense method.
As appealing as our interpretation maybefor explaining Spinoza'sreason for his deviation from the literal sense method,i tr emains very weak: what kind of answer would that be on Spinoza'sp art?M erelyc laiming thatt he literal sense method should not be usedi nt hat particularc ase just because it violatesa nother thesis is an interpretation which could perhaps sound convincing to certain historians of philosophy, but would Spinoza qua philosopher also be convinced?
If we wish to interpret Spinoza qua philosopher,weh avet oa ddress the following two challenges to our interpretation: 1. Can Spinoza'sexplication of biblical miracles be supported from his critical hermeneutics? 2. Does Spinoza have an answer to the sceptic'sc hallengef rom miracles which does not suspendt he literal sense method when it comes to miracles?

Spinoza'sE xplication of Miracles Reconsidered
Up until now,wehaveaccepted the scholars' premise thatSpinoza'sinterpretation of miracles is indeedadogmatic one. Yetour interpretation,which identifies Spinoza's miracle adversary as the sceptic, can servea st he pivotalp oint for turning our perception of Spinoza'sview of miracles upside down. Iwillargue that using our inter-pretation, we can show that Spinoza'sa nalysis of miracles does not necessitate the suspension of the literal sense method;r ather,S pinoza has ag ood answer to the sceptic which keeps the literal sense methodi ne ffect. The philosophical challenget hatS pinoza faces is how to show thatam iracle can support the certaintyofrevealedknowledge from its own domain. Another question is: how can miracles support theologyifwedonot assume that they violate the natural order?

Miracles and Certainty of Revealed Knowledge
Philosophicallyspeaking,our interpretation of Spinoza will be more solid if we show that miracles can be signs which endow prophetic knowledge with certainty. Now, even if we accept the common reading,namelythat Spinoza'sinterpretation of miracles is adogmatic one, we still have to explain how miracles qua signs createcertainty in the prophet's( or the believer's) mind. Now,evenifwedoaccept this view,weshould keep in mind Spinoza'sfirm theses that 1) the prophets themselvesbelieved that miracles werenot an interruption to the natural order,a nd 2) biblical teachingort heologya grees with philosophyi nr ejecting miracles (assuming that the meaningoft he latter is an action of providence which interruptsthe natural order). Yetwhat could amiracle be, if we reject the latter understanding of miracles?Can amiracle have anytheological meaning (in terms of imagination) which would not implyaviolation of the natural order?
Spinoza suggests ac ertain mental affect caused by miracles.I nc hapter 1, the text reads: That'salso whythey called miracles works of God, i. e., works to be astonished at.For of course, all natural things areG od'sworks, and exist and act onlyt hrough the divine power.I t ' si nt his sense that the Psalmist calls the miracles of Egypt God'sp owers, because in as ituation of extreme dangerthey opened up the waytodeliverance for the Hebrews, whowere expectingnothing liket hem, and hencew ere amazed by them. (TTP,1[30]) Thus, astonishment or amazement are affects that can be triggered by miracles. Yet the fact thatamiracle causesa stonishment and amazement does not bring us much further: it is possible thatthe effect of amazement is actuallythe resultofreasoning that providence is interferingwith the natural order.But if we can show that miracles can be understood to support theologywithout having to depend on reason, our interpretation will not violate the separation principle.
In fact,S pinoza explicitlyclaims thatw hen we refert o'amazement',weare not in violationo ft he separation principle. In chapter 6, he says: Though the voicethe Israelites heard[on Mount Sinai] could not give them anyphilosophical or mathematical certainty about God'sexistence, still, it was enough to makethem wonder at God, insofar as they had previouslyknown him, and to motivatethem to obedience. That was the pur-pose of that manifestation. God did not want to teach the Israelites the absoluteattributes of his essence. (Hed id not reveal anyo ft hem at that time.) He wanted to break their stubborn heart and win them over to obedience. So he addressed them with the sound of trumpets,with thunder,a nd with lightning, not with arguments. (TTP,1 4[ 36]; my italics) Spinoza'sa rgument here givesu ss everal clues which could be helpfuli no ur analysis of miracles. He begins by noting thatweshould not assume that arguments play anyr ole in the wayi nwhich miracles are related to revealed knowledge.I na ccordance with the latter claim, Spinoza is using 'amazement' to mean 'that which connects the imaginary mind to revealed knowledge.' In addition, Spinoza explains the role of miracles on Mount Sinai in the following way: the people alreadyk new God, namelym iracles werei nn ow ay supposed to conveyt he knowledge of God. However,t he fact that they alreadyk new that God existed did not make them readyt oa ccept the knowledge revealedo nM ount Sinai or to follow it; the miracles on Mount Sinai, then, weres upposed to connect the people to the revealed knowledge. ¹⁵ To recapitulate what we have just unpacked from chapter 6: we can keep the domains of philosophyand theologyentirely distinct if we understand miracles onlyin terms of imagination (the affect of wondering). Miracles connect ap erson'sm ind to the content of the revelation by the affect of amazement( imagination). Now,l et us see how the aforementioned insight can help us to understand the prophet'sc ertainty in revealed knowledge.C ertainty,o rt he prophet'sr eadiness to commit himself to the knowledge revealed to him, is achieved through the amazement which accompanies the miracle.
We still have to account for two points: 1. What is it about the affect of amazement which accompanies miracles that connects the beholder to revealed knowledge? 2. Can we account for the role of miracles in achieving certaintyw hen the prophet conceivesamiracle as merelyanatural event (as we explained with reference to Nadler,S pinoza states thatt he prophets agreed with him that miracles are natural events).

Is the Mind Capableo fP erceiving an Event as Both Natural and Miraculous?
Spinoza claims thatmiracles are events which cause us to be amazed, yetthe prophet can wonder at the event and simultaneouslyhold the view that it is entirelynatural. However,isthis not an emptyformula?Can we reallywonder at an event,see it as a sign, and the same time perceive it as being entirely natural?
 Spinoza'sp referencef or the term 'sign' over 'miracle' will also getc learer by our interpretation.
In fact,Iwould arguet hatS pinoza is referring to avery common state of mind. Think of the following two examples. In the first case, Iwin the lottery,Ifeel really fortunate, and Is ay: 'God reallyl oves me. Ia mb lessed.' Now consider the second case, which conveys an opposite view of myself: Iamanacademic and all my efforts over manyyears to obtain aprofessorship at the university have been futile. Iamunemployed and Is ay: 'Ia ms ou nlucky,God reallyh ates me, Ia mc ursed.' Can In ot think, in the first case, both that my winning the lottery mayb ee xplained by the laws of causality which govern the lottery machine and yeta tt he samet ime feel that Iamlucky,that Iamblessed, and thatGod loves me? Consider now the second case: can Inot admit that the reason Idid not obtain aprofessorship is because-in accordancew ith the natural order-onlyt hosew ho are endowed with professorial wisdom obtain this position, and Ia mn ot one of them?A nd can In ot think at the same time that Ia mu nlucky,unfortunate, and cursed by God?
Let us now apply thatstate of mind to the prophet: knowledge is revealedtothe prophet through imagination, but he still lacks certainty.Hethen wins the lottery;he sees it as asign that God is in direct contact with him, that God is interested in him, that God loves him, that he is very special to God, etc. If this is the prophet'sstate of mind, it is possiblefor him to consider the event as both something which does not violate the natural order and yeta sasign thatG od has as pecial relationship with him.

Re-examination of Spinoza'sD ogmatism
Let us now proceed to re-examine Spinoza'sanalysis of miracles in chapter 6inlight of our interpretation. Spinoza'st heses-1) that the prophets consider miracles to be natural events and 2) that the Bible must teach that miracles are natural events-are defendable if Spinoza is committed to the strongversion of the separation thesis;accordingly,the contribution of miracles qua signs to the certainty of revealed knowledge can be accounted for onlyf rom the realm of imagination. Thus, if we account for the certaintyofprophecy by assumingthat amiraculous event provides evidence for the superiority of revealed knowledge over natural knowledge,weviolate the separation thesis.
The aforementioned theses are in perfect accordancewith Spinoza'sliteral sense method.Aswehaveseen, at the end of chapter 2, Spinoza claims thathis analysis of prophecyi nc hapters 1and 2s upports the separation thesis. We therefore concluded that the separation thesis is derived from the biblical text in accordance with the literal sense method.¹⁶ Forthat very reason, the certainty of the sign must be accounted for from theological theses only. We have shown that Spinoza indeed accounts for the certainty as ign lends to revealed knowledge exclusively from the principles derived from prophetic revelation.
In his apology,S pinoza states that miracles are the object of philosophya lone and thatthereforethey should be addressed with reason alone. We reviewed two difficulties: 1. Nadler'sobjection:-is thatthesis not aviolation of Spinoza'sliteral sense method? 2. Harvey raised the following difficulty: Spinoza claims that the subject of prophecy is 'theological' because it 'surpasses human knowledge' (captum humanum superat), whereas that of miracles is 'philosophical' because it involves the philosophical question of 'whether we can concede that somethingm ay happeni nN ature that contravenes its Laws.' However,hemight just as easilyhavesaid: the subject of prophecyis 'philosophical',for it involves the philosophical question of whether therecan be suprarational knowledge,whereast hat of miracles is 'theological'.¹⁷ Ac areful examination of Spinoza's apology in light of our interpretation resolves both Nadler'sa nd Harvey'sq uestions. It is worthwhile to quoteS pinoza's apology once again: I've proceeded regarding miracles according to amethod completely different from the one Ifollowed regarding Prophecy. ConcerningProphecyIaffirmed nothingbut what Icould infer from foundations revealed in the Sacred Texts.B ut hereI ' ve elicited the main points onlyfromp rinciples known to the natural light.Idid this deliberately. Fors inceP rophecys urpasses man's power of understanding,a nd is ap urelyT heological question, Ic ould affirm nothinga bout it,nor even know in what it chieflyconsisted, except from the foundations which have been revealed. Iwas compelled to put together ahistory of Prophecy, and to formulatecertain doctrines from it,which would teach me the natureand properties of Prophecy, as far as this can be done.
[66] But concerningmiracles what we are askingiscompletely philosophical: can we grant that somethingh appens in nature contrary to its laws, or something which couldn'tf ollow from them?SoIdidn'tneed anythinglikethat.Indeed, Ithought it wiser to unravel this question according to foundations known to the natural light,a sthose which aremost known. Is ay that I thought it wiser,for Icould easilyhaveresolveditsolelyfromthe doctrinesand foundations of Scripture. (TTP, We have shown that 1) Spinoza'sc laim that am iracle is the result of providence'si nterruption of the law of nature is actuallyt he sceptical claim that natural knowledge is inferior and should therefore be corrected by revealedk nowledge.W eh avea lso claimed that2 )t he sceptic'sa rgument is to use reason to counter reason. Now,i n the apology,Spinoza says: 'But concerning miracles what we are asking is completely philosophical: can we grantthat something happens in nature contrarytoits laws,or something which couldn'tfollow from them?' (TTP,6[66]; my italics). Thus, the thesis  Harvey, "Spinoza on Biblical Miracles," 666 -667. of Spinoza'sadversary regarding the 'interruption of the natural order' would indeed be the sceptic'st hesis. As we have shown, the sceptic'st hesis is one that is derived from reason, and hence Spinoza is entirelyjustified in claiming that such an understanding of miracles-'thats omething happens in naturec ontrary to its laws'should in fact be approached and answered from reason. This is preciselyw hat Spinoza is doing when he examines the theses which are apparentlyd erived from this understanding of miracles.
Our interpretation ultimatelyr esolves both Nadler'sa nd Harvey'so bjections: Spinoza does not violate the literal sense method,but rather refutes the sceptic'stheses with philosophical arguments,a nd this approach is in fact the proper one, because the sceptic'su nderstanding of miracles is derived 'from reason.' This would also explain whyhesaysthat in this respect,the issue of miracles is aphilosophical matter,whereas the issue of prophecyi satheological one.
The interpretations we have reviewed and rejected consider Spinoza'ss tance on miracles to be adogmatic one. Ithink we have explained our objections. As amatter of fact,our interpretation yields an interesting result: Spinoza'se xplication of miracles in chapter 6i sa nti-dogmatic. His argument against the sceptic shows that the sceptic'sexplication of miracles onlymakes sense if we assume that 'something happens in nature contrary to its laws,' but in Spinoza'st erms, this would be ap hilosophical claim. Thus, the sceptic is, in fact,t he one who is committed to dogmatic hermeneutics. This might seem like apurelyformal claim, but Ithink that our interpretation proves that this is exactlythe case in terms of actual biblical interpretation. The sceptic'sdogmatic understanding of miracles actuallyimposes an anachronistic interpretation of the Bible. In other words, by adopting the dogmatic view that miracles are 'something thathappens in nature contrary to its laws,' the sceptic subjects the Bible to ap hilosophical problematic which is mostlyamedieval one; from the critical point of view thereisnoreason to attribute such aviewtothe prophets.Conversely, we have shown that Spinoza'sclaim that the prophets are in agreementwith the view that miracles are not an interruption of the natural order is what ultimately liberated him from the view that miracles should be regarded as biblical teaching. Once free from this view,w ea re able to grasp the differenceb etween prophecy and miracles; onlyt hen is it possible to examine the role miracles playi nt he Bible, to understand the differenceb etween signs and revealedk nowledge,e tc.