Reidian Common Sense: An Antidote to Scepticism?

Scepticism is in most cases disliked. Much of contemporary epistemology can be construed as a response to the modern incarnation of scepticism, i.e. the view that justification is impossible or that nothing is known, either in general or about a certain area of discourse (say, unperceivable objects).1 In contrast to this, its ancient relative did not preach theory or rely on dubitable premises. The Pyrrhonists2 were concerned with a way of life, the aim of which was ataraxia—tranquility of mind—and its method epoché—suspension of judgement. Whereas it had much influence in the early modern period (due to translations that made the works of Sextus Empiricus, the Pyrrhonist’s chief author, available to scholars at the time), it had not been taken seriously by contemporary scholars of ancient philosophy until a few decades ago, ‘because it was regarded as a patently absurd or far-fetched form of skepticism,’3 and the attention it received outside the ancient philosophy classroom was practically non-existent. One reason for the neglect of Pyrrhonian scepticism is the apraxia objection,4 which states in its evidential mode that sceptical life is impossible and in its pragmatic mode that sceptical life is impractical. The pragmatic mode presupposes that sceptical life (i.e., life without opinion or beliefs) is possible, but argues that

we should not be sceptics,onthe grounds that it would be imprudent,dangerous,or bad to be so. Accordingtothe evidential mode, sceptical life is impossible. It claims that in order to act,weneed beliefs. Forexample, the action of reachingfor my mug requires belief in it beingthere, or,toecho acommon accusation, alludingtofellow philosophers requires the belief thatthey exist.The idea is that addressing, quoting, or meetingpeople requires belief in their existence, theirqualities, and so on.⁵ Given that the self-proclaimed sceptic does drink his coffee and does arguewith otherphilosophers, the evidential mode concludes that we aren ot and that we cannot be sceptics.⁶ As readerso fS extus' works will know,t his objectionm isses its targetb y miles. Givent hatw ew ill discuss his replyi nd etail below,avery short summary of the Pyrrhonian replyt ot he apraxia objection is adequate.A ccordingt oS extus, the sceptic acts in line with thosea ppearances that forcet heira ssent upon him. That is, he drinks because he is thirsty, but suspends anyo pinion as to whether the mugi sreally there, or whether it is justa ni dea, an illusion and so on.
In this paper,Idiscuss Thomas Reid's(1710 -1796)common-sense-based version of the apraxia objection, because it appears to be immune to Sextus' replya nd so still has ac hance to succeed. It is much more radical, in that it is not based on action, but on life and the human condition. Thus, it is not onlybyactingthat the sceptic betraysh is philosophy, but in fact merelyb yb eing human.
Basing his objection on common sense, Reid makes his objection far more threatening by comparison with other attackso n( ancient and modern) scepticism. Most philosophical arguments against scepticism make use of heavy-weight assumptions which are easy for the sceptic to avoid.⁷ The common-sense strategypurports to overcome this by shifting the discussion to apre-theoretical point.Aswith the sceptic, the common-sense-based attack depends on no theoretical assumptions, and so it appears the sceptic is forced to agree. If scepticism is ruled out by something thatis ap reconditionf or the discussion, for action in general, or even more broadly, life, and we onlyneed common sense to see this, there appears to be no wayout for scepticism.⁸ And while this seems like the version of the apraxia objection we justd is- This polemic accusation is made by George E. Moorei nh is discussiono fp hilosophers whod isagreewith his list of common sense propositions.Healso mentionsthat their use of 'we' betrays their position, because clearlys uch usage implies the existenceo fo ther human beings.C f. George E. Moore, "AD efenceo fC ommonS ense," in Philosophical Papers,M uirhead Library of Philosophy, ed. George.E .M oore( London: George Allen &U nwin Ltd., 1958):4 0-41.  Cf. Suzanna Obdrzalek, "From Skepticism to Paralysis," Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012): 370.  Afittingexample for apopular heavy-weight defenceagainst scepticism is externalism, both in its semantic form or as ac laim aboutm ental content.F or semantic externalism, see Hilary Putnam, "The Meaningof'Meaning'," Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science 7( 1975): 131-193. Forexternalism about mental content, see Colin McGinn "Charity,i nterpretation, and belief," Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977): 521-535.  The similaritiestoWittgenstein and contemporary hinge-epistemology are no surprise,given Reid's influenceonMoore, and Moore'sinfluence on Wittgenstein. Forthe presenceofReid in the circles of carded, it has to be observed that it did not fail for structural reasons,but for making an assumption Sextus did not share. As Reid'sv ersion is grounded on common sense, the idea is that therei sn oa ssumption involved that Sextus cannot share. So, if we find something that reallyi saprecondition for discussion, action or life (and accordingt oS extus therea ppear to be such things: without appearances that forceo ur assent we would be inactive, see section 3), thatc ontradictss omething to which Sextus is committed, the apraxia objection would be successful.
However,the shift to ap re-theoretical point is faced with ad ilemma.E ither the ability to engagewith the sceptic is lost,orthe strategyrisks forfeitingits advantage. If the sceptic refusest oa cknowledge thatw hich is impossiblen ot to acknowledge (accordingt oc ommon sense), there is no common ground left between the disputants. Historically, this leads either to ignorance towards or ridicule of the sceptic. On the other hand, anyb it of theory that is endorsed can be used by the sceptic again. Later in the paper (section 4) we will see av ersion of this dilemma, and how it endangers Reid'sa rgument against the sceptic.
Another reason for discussingR eid in this context is thatc ommon-sense-based arguments are still being performed to this day. The following passagefrom Kit Fine's article "The Question of Realism" published in 2001 is avivid example of the relevancy of common sense as as trategya gainst scepticism: However,inthis ageofpost-Moorean modesty,manyofusare inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinelys ervet ou nderminew hatw eo rdinarilyb elieve. It mayp erhaps be concededt hat the arguments of the skeptic appear to be utterlyc ompelling; but the Mooreans amongu sw ill hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason enough for supposingthat theremust be somethingwrong in the skeptic'sarguments, even if we areunable to saywhat it is. Insofar,then, as the pretensions of philosophytoprovide aworld-view rest upon its claim to be in possession of the epistemological highg round, those pretensions had better be givenu p.⁹ Accordingt oF ine (who echoes what has become dogma in some circleso fp hilosophy),¹⁰ no matter how good or convincing the sceptic'sargument is, we should retain all our ordinary beliefs in response, even if we are unable to find anyf ault in the sceptic'sa rguments due to the highp lausibility of our ordinary beliefs.T he term 'common sense' does not appear in Fine'sproclamation, but both his talk of ordinary beliefs and his reference to George E. Moore to refuteidealismbymerelyholding up his hands, and wrotethe DefenceofCommon Sense in 1925-suffices for us to taket his as an instance of ac lassic appeal to common sense.
Reid, in contradistinction to Moore, developed atheory that attempts to put this attack on firm ground. In other words, Reid attempted to movet he appeal to common sense away from ar hetoricald evice (used as al ast resort in the face of glaring objections) to as ensible and philosophicallys ound method.
The paper proceeds as follows. Iwill show in section 2that we can plausiblyassume that Reid did in fact put forward ac ommon-sense-based apraxia objection in the evidentialm ode against Pyrrhonian scepticism (and one that goes beyond mere polemics). Section3explores the relationship between Reid'sn otion of belief and Sextus' notion of assent and finds that they are closelyc onnected. Givent his close connection, in the fourth section, after dealingw ith two objections, Iw illa rgue that Reid's apraxia objection is either not threateningP yrrhonian scepticism or not sharing enough common ground with Pyrrhonian scepticism to be successful. In section 5, Ic onclude that Reid'sc ommon-sense-based apraxia objection fails.

2R eid'sA ttack on Pyrrhonian Scepticism
Most of Reid'swork is directed against the wayofi deas and its proponents,s uch as Hume, Locke, Berkeley or Descartes.Accordingtothe wayofideas, the direct objects of perception are ideas, rather than external objects. From this point on it is but a short step before one descends into sceptical concerns that knowledge of external objects is impossiblei fi deas are our onlys ourceo fi nformation. According to Reid, Hume deservesc redit for having exposedt he scepticism that was alreadyi mplicit in the wayofideas' first formulations. Both Berkeley and Reid found this scepticism to be unacceptable. But whereB erkeley preserved the wayo fi deas, and instead rejected the external objects, Reid preserved the external objects and rejected the wayo fi deas.
Nevertheless,Ishall arguethat we can also find arguments in Reid against other forms of scepticism, such as Pyrrhonian scepticism. Although Id ot hink that Reid was aware of Pyrrhonian scepticism and that he aimeda tr efuting it on some occasions, Idon'tw ant to relyonahistoricalargument,nor do Iaim for apurelyhistorical claim.¹¹ Rather, Ithink that Reid appears to have atheory thatsustains his argument against Pyrrhonian scepticism, and so we should read it as such (even though  Hume scholars have long sinces oughtt of ind out which editions,i fa ny,ofS extus' writingwere available to scholars in the earlymodern period and to Hume in particular.Agood summary of these findings arep resentedi nP eter S. Fosl, "Skepticism and the Possibility of Nature," in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy,e d. DiegoE .M achuca (Dordrecht: Springer,2 011): 145 -170. he ignored, or perhaps wasnot aware,ofsome of the subtleties of Pyrrhonian scepticism).
Forus, the most relevant discussion of Reid'santi-sceptical arguments is thatof Philip de Bary.DeBary claims the four arguments he discusses (labelled A-Dbelow) are mere polemics, however,IfeelAand Bare serious and threatening,while onlyC and Dc an be termed polemics. The four arguments are as follows:¹² A. Inever heardthat anysceptic run his head against apost,orstepped intoakennel, because he did not believeh is eyes. (EIP 234a) B. If aman pretends to be asceptic with regardtothe informationsofsense, and yetprudently keepso ut of harm'sw ay as other men do, he must excuse my suspicion, that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon himself. (IHM 170) C. Pyrrho the Elean, the father of this philosophy, seems to have carried it to greater perfection than anyofhis successors […]And therefore,ifacart run against him, or adog attacked him, or if he came upon aprecipice,hew ould not stir afoot to avoid the danger, givingnocredit to his senses.But his attendants,who, happilyfor him, werenot so great sceptics, took careto keep him out of harm'sw ay;s ot hat he livedt ill he was ninety years of age. (IHM 20)¹³ D. If asceptic should build his scepticism upon this foundation, that all our reasoningand judging powers arefallacious in their nature, or should resolve at least to withhold assent until it be proved that they aren ot,i tw ould be impossible by argument to beat him out of this stronghold. And he must even be left to enjoy his scepticism. (EIP 447b) De Bary argues thata ll these should be read as mere polemics, because (i) Reid's chief aim is Hume,a nd (ii) these arguments mischaracterise Hume. Additionally, (iii) it is implausible that Reid is serious here, giventhatelsewherehegives acorrect picture of Hume.¹⁴ From the viewpoint of de Bary,R eid is either inconsistent or the arguments are polemics, and so he chooses the latter option. Iagree with the second and third claim, the arguments do mischaracterise Hume and Reid is aware of this.F or example, right before the first argument (A) Reid ac- knowledgesthat Hume agrees that doubt with regard to the senses cannot be upheld (EIP 234a).But with regard to the first claim, Idisagree with de Bary.A sLouis Loeb pointed out,w hen Reid discusses the figures of the wayo fi deas, the chapter on Hume is the shortest.¹⁵ Loeb also shows that onlysome passages of Hume are quoted by Reid (throughout his works) and that Reid ignored manyfeatures of Hume'stheory,a cknowledgement of which would have broughtR eid-too close for comfort-to Hume. In place of viewing Reid mainlyasano pponent of Hume, we should instead read him as an opponent of the wayo fi deas. Thisi ss upported by Reid'so wn selfperception, gained from sources such as the following letter from Reid to Dr.J ames Gregory (date unknown), in which he sums up his philosophicala chievement as workinga gainst the wayo fi deas: The merit of what youa re pleased to call my philosophy, lies,Ithink, chiefly, in havingc alled into question the commont heory of ideas, or images of things in the mind, beingt he onlyo bjects of thought.
[…]Ithink thereishardlyanythingthat can be called mine in the philosophyof mind, which does not follow with ease fromt he detection of this prejudice.( Letters 88b) If we take de Bary'sc laim that the arguments misrepresent Hume along with Loeb's findingst hat Hume is not ac entral figure in Reid'sw ritings, we are no longer required to see these arguments to be directed against Hume. As aresult, Iamrejecting de Bary'sf irst claim that Hume is the primaryt arget, and instead propose that the primary targeti st he alleged Pyrrhonian sceptic, for the following two reasons.¹⁶ Firstly, arguments A, Ba nd Ca re instances of the apraxia objection (A and Bo f the evidential, Cofthe pragmatic mode), which Pyrrhonian scepticism has been confronted with from its inception. The apraxia objection and its twomodes has already been discussed, so we can content ourselvesw ith this rough reconstruction of the evidential apraxia objection (to be referred to later): (1) If youa re as ceptic, youh aven ob eliefs.
(2)I fy ou have no beliefs,you cannot act.
(4) It is not the case that youh aven ob eliefs. (5) It is not the case that youa re as ceptic.
The first premise sums up the sceptic'sc laim that he livesw ithout beliefs (PH I8 ), while the second premise is the coreo ft he apraxia charge,n amely, thatb eliefs are necessary for action. Coupled with the observation that sceptics do act and conduct their livesi na no rderlyf ashion (3), we can reason via modus tollens and conclude that the sceptic must have beliefs (4) and is thereforen ot as ceptic at all (5). Secondly, there is an inconsistency between the four arguments and between some of the arguments and Reid'sbroader work. The last argument (D) recommends not to engagewith the sceptic, while the first three (A-C)doengagewith the sceptic. The story about Pyrrho suggests sceptical life is possible, while arguments Aa nd B suggest that scepticism is actuallyi mpossible and every self-proclaimed sceptic a fraud. This could be takenasevidence for the claim that his attitude is merelypolemical, but the other inconsistency is, It hink, more important,i .e.that between arguments Ca nd Da nd Reid'sp hilosophyo fm ind. Givent his inconsistency,Isuggest that onlyarguments Cand Dare polemics and that Aand Bremain as serious attacks on alleged Pyrrhonian sceptics.
If we take Reid'swriting at face value it seems thathedeniesthe actual and possible existenceofP yrrhonian sceptics.With regard to the modality in play, Iassume Reid would saythat God could have constituted us in such amanner that we are able to live without beliefs, but he has not and therefore such sceptics cannot exist.P yrrhonian sceptics live without beliefs,b ut accordingt oR eid'sp hilosophyo fm ind there are at least two sources of beliefs we cannot resist: Immediate beliefs caused by our constitution and beliefs that arise from the workings of our mental faculties. In terms of the first category,Reid postulates that our constitution forces some beliefs upon us e. g. the belief that we are conscious: Can anym an provet hat his consciousness can'td eceive him?N om an can: nor can we give a betterr eason for trustingt oi t, than that every man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it,a nd to laugha t, or pity the man whod oubts its testimony. (IHM 17) An example for the other sourcei sp erception, whereR eid holds that: [W]e shall find in [perception] these three things:First,Some conception of notion of the object perceived; Secondly, astrong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; and, Thirdly,That this conviction and belief areimmediate, and not the effect of reasoning. (EIP 258a) Both our mind and the employmentofour senses alreadyforcebeliefs upon us. This, Itake it,r ules out the Pyrrhonian life without beliefs, as does the conclusion of the evidential apraxia objection. Thus, it makes no sense for Reid to engagew ith the sceptic by using arguments thatpresuppose thatthe sceptic can act (as do arguments Cand D). The 'stronghold' of argument Disapaper castle at best,because as soon as the sceptic becomes hungry,h eh as to crawlout.A ll thati sl eft to Reid is to engage with those who still claim to be sceptic and rub it into their faces how life involves immediate beliefs forced upon us by nature (and Reid rarelym isses out on such an opportunity).

3R eidian Belief and Pyrrhonian Assent
Thus far,wehaveseen that Reid'sengagement with scepticism can be taken seriously by his formulating an instance of the apraxia objectioninthe evidentialmode that is anchored in his theory of the mind (which, in turn, is based on his methodologyof common sense). In this section, Iwish to consider the potentiallyu nderminingp arallels between Reidian belief and Pyrrhonian assent.¹⁷ Reid's apraxia objection does not functionw hen Pyrrhonian assenti st aken as the keym ental state. But it is not clear whether there reallyi sasubstantial difference between Pyrrhonian assent and Reidian belief. Both Reid and Sextus characterise their mental state phenomenologicallya nd functionally. By showing how these characterisations are almost identical, Ihope to cast doubtonthe idea that Reidian belief differs (sufficientlyenough) from Pyrrhonian assent.
Reid'sphilosophyofmind is revolutionary in manyways, and it is what trulydistinguisheshis attack on the wayofideas. Instead of merelyconcluding thatthe way of ideas is wrong( givent hat it leads to scepticism), he puts something in its place that,a ccordingt oR eid, comprises less flaws and greater explanatory power.T he first notable feature of Reid'sp hilosophyo fm ind is his faculty psychology. Instead of trying to reduce all mental activities to as ingle source, Reid finds, basedo nh is own introspection, manymental faculties that exist independently, although closely connected with each other.B elief is mostlya ssociated with the facultyo fj udgement,¹⁸ but accompanies manym ental processes.
On the Reidian philosophyofm ind, belief is simple and cannot be defined any further.¹⁹ Although there is no systematic discussion of belief, givent hat it plays an importantr ole in perception and in his replyt ot he sceptic, we can still reconstruct his theory of belief from the relevant passages. The feature he givesthe most credit to is its irresistibility.For example, Reid citesthis feature in response to the sceptic who advises suspending judgement on the existenceofthe external world, for objects can exist without perception, just as perception can exist without the object.Reid replies: [I]t is not in my power [to getrid of my belief in external objects]: whythen should Imake avain attempt?Itwould be agreeable to flytothe moon, and to makeavisit to Jupiter and Saturn; but when Ik now that Natureh as bound me down by the lawo fg ravitation to this planet which I inhabit,Irest contented, and quietlys uffer myself to be carried alongi ni ts orbit.M yb elief is carried alongb yp erception, as irresistiblya sm yb odyb yt he earth. And the greatest sceptic will find himself to be in the same condition. (IHM 169)  Forthe time being, I'monlyfocussingonSextus' notion of forcedassent.AsKatja M. Vogt points out,there is also 'akind of assent […]that is not necessitated but is yetsufficientlypassive in order to differ froma ssento rj udgement as the dogmatists envisage it.I nvoluntarya nd non-doxastic assent playthis role;' see Katja M. Vogt, "Appearances and Assent: Sceptical Belief Reconsidered," Classical Quarterly 62 (2012) Turning to how belief originates, Reid alternates between belief being suggested by sensation or being created by naturals igns.T he reason whyb elief arisesi nt hese cases is unknown to us, or it happens 'by an aturalk ind of magic.'²⁰ Alternatively, and this has both ap henomenological and an abductive reading,i ti sar esult of our constitution or of nature.²¹ It might be thatthese are stillexpressions of the irresistibilityo fb elief, in the sense that it feels as if nature, or our constitution, forces the belief upon us. If thati sn ot the case, however,t hese expressionsc ould also be inferences toward the best explanation. It mayb ealawo fh uman nature that when we perceive an apple, ab elief thatt he apple exists, as we see it,i sc reated alongside the perception. This law, togetherw ith the information that as ubject perceivesanapple, permits us to deducethat the subject also has the corresponding belief. Athird optionhere is Reid distinguishing speculation from proper science.²² All that can be said is that it is caused by our constitution, and nothing more can, or should, be said. This line of interpretation is supported by the following passage in which Reid talks about the information that is suggested by vision,namelycolour and position, and nothing else: Now,t his material impression, made upon ap articular point of the retina, by the laws of our constitution, suggests two things to the mind, namely, the colour,a nd the position of some external object.Noman can give areason, whythat same material impression might not have suggested sound, or smell, or either of these along with the positiono ft he object.That it should suggest coloura nd position, and nothinge lse, we can resolveo nlyi nto our constitution, or the will of our Maker. ( IHM 100) The next feature of Reidian belief is its immediacy.Belief is often not aresult of reasoning but occurs immediately: When Ihear acertain sound, Iconclude immediately, without reasoning,that acoachpasses by. There arenopremises from which this conclusion is inferred by anyrules of logic. It is the effect of ap rinciple of nature, commont ou sw ith the brutes. (IHM5 0) Howasensation should instantlym ake us conceive and believet he existenceo fa ne xternal thinga ltogether unliket oi t, Id on ot pretend to know;a nd when Is ay that the one suggests the other,Imean not to explain the manner of their connection, but to express af act,which every one maybeconscious of; namely, that by alaw of our nature, such aconception and belief constantlya nd immediatelyf ollow the sensation. Finally, Reid maintains that belief plays ap ivotal role in guiding action. Further to the point that we cannot suspend judgement,headds that even if we could suspend judgment,wes hould not: Ir esolve not to believem ysenses.Ibreakm yn ose against apost that comesi nm yw ay;Istep into ad irty kennel; and, after twenty such wise and rational actions,Iam takenu pa nd clapt into amad-house. Now,Iconfess Iwould rather make one of the credulous fools whom Nature imposes upon, than of those wise and rational philosophers whoresolve to with-hold assent at all this expence. (IHM 170) Besides this being an instance of the pragmatic mode of the objection, we can see what role belief plays in action. Belief keeps us out of harm'sw ay and it guides our actions. In his Essays on the Active Power of Man,R eid distinguishesb etween three kinds of action: voluntary,i nvoluntary and mixed actions. There are three classes of principles of action, which belong to the three kinds of action. Mechanical principles determine the involuntary actions, animal principles determine the mixed actions, and rational principles determine the voluntary actions.²³ In contemporary parlance, we would onlycall the voluntary actionsproper actions (whereinvoluntary sneezing,s leep-walking and breathinga re not considered actions at all).
Belief is essentialf or voluntary actions( that are guided by the rational principles), but even the animal principles require associated beliefs. Without the beliefs that are formedinperception (that the perceivedobject is like it seems to be) we cannot explain whysomeone moves towards the perceivedobject.IfIknow that there is merelyt he illusion of an apple in front of me, Iw ould not,d espite my hunger,a ttempt to eat it (and here we can also arguet hat it is my belief that the apple is an illusion that forms part of my refusal to grab the apple). But if Ib elievet hati ti sa real apple, Iw ould reach for it,a nd so we see that belief plays an important role for action.
Before turningtoSextus' account of assent,Iwill summarise the findings. On the phenomenological side of the Reidian account of belief, belief is irresistible and immediate. On the functional side of his account,b elief is an ecessary constituent of action.The samet hree features are present in the following passages from Sextus, in which he repliest oa ccusations not dissimilar to those Reid has voiced against him in his apraxia objection: Those whos ay that the Sceptics reject what is apparent have not,Ithink, listened to what we say. As we said before, we do not overturn anythingw hich leads us,without our willingi t, to assent in accordance with ap assive appearance-and these things are preciselyw hati sa pparent. When we investigatew hether existingt hings ares uch as they appear,weg rant that they appear,a nd what we investigatei sn ot whati sa pparent but what is said about what is apparent-and this is different from investigatingw hati sa pparent itself. (PH I1 9)  EAP 543. Thus, we find thatSextus' key mental state is assent to the appearance, which we can neither control nor resist.A lthough not expressed verbally, the assent is alsoi mmediate, rather than the product of reasoning. Sextus' entire point is that suspensionof judgement is not exercised over the appearances.Ifassent to them werethe product of reasoning,o ne would be able to reason against them to reach epoché again. I thereforec onclude thatP yrrhonian assent is bothi rresistible and immediate.²⁴ Does it thus also playarole similar to Reidian belief with regard to action? Thus,a ttendingt ow hat is apparent,welive in accordance with everydayobservances, without holdingopinions-for we arenot able to be utterlyinactive.These everydayobservancesseem to be fourfold, and to consist in guidanceb yn ature, necessitation by feelings,h andingd own of laws and customs, and teachingofkinds of expertise. By nature'sguidanceweare naturallycapable of perceivinga nd thinking. By the necessitation of feelings,h unger conducts us to food and thirst to drink. By the handingd own of customs and laws, we accept,f roma ne veryday point of view,t hat piety is good and that impiety is bad. By teaching of kinds of expertise we aren ot inactive in those which we accept.A nd we saya ll this without holdinga ny opinions. (PH I2 3,24) Itakethe answer to be 'Yes'.This, in effect,fits neatlywith Reid'saccount of action, and even goes beyond the mere minimum by includingthe acknowledgement of custom, laws and expertise. It can be concluded that all three features which characterise Reid'smental state, that he calls 'belief',namelyirresistibility,immediacy and its role in action, are also true of Sextus' mental state, which he calls 'assent'.²⁵ Now turning to the apraxia objection and applying it to Sextus' notion of assent in the place of Reidian belief, it is clear Sextusw ould disagree with (1): Being as ceptic does not mean resistinga ssenting to the appearances that are forced upon us. But he would agree with (2): If we wereable to resist assenting,wewould have no guidance for our actions. Something crucial would be missing for living life, sceptical or otherwise. Sextusa lso agrees with (3), naturally, because he thinks that he can act. The first conclusion, that it is not the case that we do not assent,f ollows. Onlyt he second conclusion, which hingesonthe first premise (the one Sextus disagrees with), does not follow,f or in Sextus' account the sceptic does assent to the appearances.
In order not to equivocate, the otheroptionistoread the argument in such away that (1) is true on Sextus' account,a nd as ac onsequencet he rest of the argument fails-(2), (4) and (5) would be rendered false. On the other hand, if we want (2)t o be true, ap art of the argument can function, namely (2)t o( 4), but that only  An objector might cite PH I9 ,i nwhich Sextus says that the sceptic opposes what appears to be both with what appears to be and what is thoughto f, but PH I1 9m akes clear that the arguments against the appearances servethe aim to 'displaythe rashness of the dogmatics,' and not to suspend judgement about the appearances.  This is also supported by the other passages in which Sextus discusses assent,see PH I1 13,193, 230, 233a nd PH II 10,2 51-2.
shows how important the mental state is that Sextus calls 'assent'.I tdoes not demonstrate that scepticism is impossible.

4T wo objections
Before moving to the conclusion and determining wherethese parallels leave Reid's apraxia objection, twoobjections are to be considered. Both of which depend on features of Reid'sa ccount of belief which have hitherto not been touched upon.
The first feature is that '[b]elief admits of all degrees,from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance.'²⁶ At the same time, Sextus appears to directlyn egatet he corresponding thesis of degrees of assent,w henh es ays 'that appearancesa re equal in convincingness or lack of convincingness' (PH I2 27). Although this is far from af ull answer (which would requirea ne ntire paper in itself), Id on ot think this to be Sextus' final position on this matter.The passagethatmost clearlyspeaks against this is the very last section of the Outlines titled "WhydoSceptics sometimes propound arguments that are of feeble plausibility?" Here, Sextus, comparingt he sceptic with ad octor,s tates that,f or philanthropic reasons,t he sceptic will use weighty arguments for some 'patients',but weak arguments for others, for everyone to reach ataraxia. That is, this section presupposes that arguments differ in convincingness.Having established that adifferenceinconvincingness is possible at all, the next stepw ould be to subsume arguments under appearances to conclude that at least some appearances differ with respect to convincingness. As econd line of defence can be basedo n( at least,m y) psychological reality.I fa ssenti st ob eas tate that does not allow for degrees,Ihavenoidea what Sextus' assent is. The onlynotion one can be aware of introspectivelythatcomes close to Sextus' assent is forced upon one with various degrees of strength, depending on the phenomena, time, place, and so on. Thirdly, if all thingsare equallystrong with regard to forcingassent to them, it trivialises the ability of the sceptic Sextus is talking about in the fourth section of the first Book, i. e. the ability to 'set out oppositions of thingsw hich appear and are thoughto fi na ny way' (PH I8 ). He himself says that by 'ability' he means nothing fancy,b ut still, it seems it would make thingsm uch tooe asy.The worst counterexample could endanger belief in the best theory,for 'worst' and 'best' are alreadycategoriesthat presuppose thatsome thingsare more convincing than others. As this is far from sufficient as an argument,Ichoose to read PH I8asspeaking of the ability to have,e venf or belief in very convincing theories, the right countermeasure.
The second feature of Reidian belief thatismissing from Pyrrhonian assent is the content of Reidian beliefs. While Sextus' assent is supposed to be non-committal in every conceivable sense,Reidian beliefs are,among other things, beliefs that the perceivedobjects are in reality as they seem to be, existing mind-independentlyand ex- EIP 327b. ternallyfrom us, and so on.²⁷ This goes far beyond Sextus' account of assent and also seems to contradict it.D oest his mean that Reid's apraxia objection is successful after all?
Although we have seen that there is adifferencebetween Reidian belief and Pyrrhonian assent in terms of its alleged content,S extus could actuallyb et oo close to Reid for the objectiontobesuccessful. Consider the situation from the point of view of Sextus. He hears of this mental state that feels acertain way, it is forced upon us, we cannot resist it,i to ccurs immediately, it guides our actions, it helps us crossing the street. 'All this,' Sextus mays ay, 'If ind, too, when Ii ntrospectively observet he goingso no fm ym ind. Surely, he must speak about that assent that is forced upon us by the appearances.' Onlya tt his point does Reid say: 'No, because this belief is ab elief in the mind-independent existenceo ft he external objects of our perception.' It is onlyt his lasts tep that Sextus cannot take. But Sextus is not constituted differently. Hence, the dilemma from the introduction appears again. Either Sextus agrees to everythingt hat is found in introspection or not.I fh ed oes, then therei s no belief in the external existenceo ft he objects of perception, for this does not appear to Sextus, and we have to read Reid differently. Perhaps it is not actuallyt he content of the beliefs, but an expression of how the appearances feel. Surelythe appearances are such thatthingsappear to be independent of our minds and in acertain distance from us (i. e., they seem to be external). In this case, Reid's apraxia objection fails, as in this interpretation it does not contradict Pyrrhonian scepticism. A successful apraxia objection requires at heory of belief that goes beyond what we find in introspection. According to the other horn of the dilemma,S extus and Reid disagree about what is found in introspection. In this caset here is no more room for debate. The common ground the apraxia objection requires does not exist. Thus, Reid, in this reading,t hinkss cepticism is wrong,b ut there is no wayt oe ver communicatet his to the sceptic successfully. Additionally, we all have the power of introspection, and Ipersonallydonot find my perceptual beliefs to be committed to mind-independent objects. We also would have to explain the attractiveness of non-realist philosophies, when everyone always believes, as part of how perception works,thatthese non-realist philosophies are wrong. Be that as it may, both options have their problems, and so this qualifies as at rue dilemma:E ither one is forced to perform mental gymnastics in our interpretation of Reid,o rw ea re left with an implausible and problem-burdened view of beliefs.
 Reid'sf irst principle number five captures this: 'That those things do reallye xist which we distinctlyp erceive by our senses,a nd arew hat we perceive them to be' (EIP 445).