DS Mayfield

Rhetorical Ventriloquism in Application

we must make another speak in our place.

Aristotle¹

et voluptate ad fidem ducitur[.]

Quintilian²

In Book VIII of his *Confessions*, at the crucial moment of the entire endeavor – as regards the literary composition, the life and self it is to reflect – Augustine introduces “Chastity [‘continentiae’]” personified as having “appeared [‘aperiebatur’]” to him.³ Twice the orator ventriloquizes in writing what she

1 Aristotle. *The ‘Art’ of Rhetoric*, edited and translated by John Henry Freese. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006, 1418b.

2 Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria / The Orator’s Education*, edited and translated by Donald A. Russell. 5 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, 4.2.119.

3 Aurelius Augustine. *Confessions: Books 1–8*, edited and translated by Carolyn Hammond. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014. In a context referring to a (previously) prodigal use of his God-given “intellectual ability” (“de ingenio meo, munere tuo,” I.17.27), Augustine refers to performing a *prosopopoiia* during his student years, detailing the resp. rhetorical process as follows: “A task [‘negotium’] was assigned to me [...]. It was to perform the speech of Juno when she was angry and hurt [...], words that I had never heard Juno utter. Instead we were obliged to go astray by following the footsteps of poetical inventions [‘figmentorum poeticorum’], and to declaim in prose something similar to what the poet [sc. Virgil] had written in verse. The one who was displaying a

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Note: For an extended version of this article, detailing its theoretico-conceptual foundation and discussing *sermocinatio* and related concepts in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Quintilian, see the publisher’s website: <https://www.degruyter.com/view/product/505530>

might say (“quasi diceret,” iterated) – and is then careful to clarify (in forensic terms): “ista controversia in corde meo non nisi de me ipso adversus me ipsum” (“[t]his debate took place within my heart; it was myself arguing against myself”).⁴ That envisioned *prosopopoeia* with interior *sermocinatio* causes

more realistic [‘similior’] impression of anger and hurt in defending the honor of the character being delineated [‘adumbratae personae’] (using appropriate words to clothe the ideas [‘verbis sententias congruenter vestientibus’]) was the one whose speech won the most praise” (ibid.). Cf. Carol D. Lanham. “Writing Instruction from Late Antiquity to the Twelfth Century.” *A Short History of Writing Instruction: From Ancient Greece to Modern America*, edited by James J. Murphy, 2nd edition. Mahwah: Hermagoras Press, 2001, pp. 79–121, here p. 85. The young Augustine outperformed everyone – an accomplishment for which the mature writer has only contempt, albeit rather ostensibly so (cf. *Confessions*, I.17.27). Seeing that the basic procedure outlined for the Greek goddess is here repeated in the personification of an abstract entity equally ‘inexistent’ from the Church Father’s perspective, it is not the technique itself that is at issue, but the (intended) use to which it is put – with *Continentia* personified serving a moral, and (more importantly) Christian purpose, here; in terms of motive, Augustine’s craving for personal glory is reallocated to disseminating the Deity’s.

4 Augustine, *Confessions*, VIII.11.27. – Cf. p. 406n. Concerning the Church Father’s relationship to rhetoric, including as to passages under consideration here, see Wendy Olmsted. “Invention, Emotion, and Conversion in Augustine’s *Confessions*.” *Rhetorical Invention & Religious Inquiry: New Perspectives*, edited by Walter Jost and Wendy Olmsted. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 65–86, passim, spec. 79–80. See Arnaldo Momigliano (referring also to Augustine): “this effort of explaining oneself and one’s own purposes to a personal audience, if not to one’s own direct accusers, may well have been a decisive contribution to the recognition of the self as a person with a definite character, purpose and achievement. After all, in so far as they express a relation to gods or God, confessions have an element of self-defence which links them to judicial speeches” (“Marcel Mauss and the Quest for the Person in Greek Biography and Autobiography.” *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, edited by Michael Carrithers et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 83–92, p. 90, cf. p. 91). Cf. “It is Christians who have made a metaphysical entity of the ‘moral person’ (*personne morale*), after they became aware of its religious power. Our own notion of the human person is still basically a Christian one” (Marcel Mauss. “A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self,” translated by Wilfred D. Halls. *The Category of the Person*, pp. 1–25, p. 19). The rhetorico-dramatic view of the *persona* is at variance therewith. As to the Christian refunctionalization, see Manfred Fuhrmann. “Persona, ein römischer Rollenbegriff.” *Identität*, edited by Odo Marquard and Karlheinz Stierle, 2nd edition. Munich: Fink, 1996, pp. 83–106, spec. pp. 102–104; Peter L. Oesterreich. “Person.” *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, vol. 10 [Nachträge A–Z], edited by Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2012, pp. 862–872, here p. 865; Jean Yves Boriaud and Bernard Schouler. “Persona,” translated by Martin Steinrück and Thomas Zinsmaier. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, vol. 6 [Must–Pop], edited by Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2003, pp. 789–810, spec. p. 799; Christopher Gill. “Particulars, selves and individuals in Stoic philosophy.” *Particulars in Greek Philosophy*, edited by Robert W. Sharples. Leiden: Brill, 2010, pp. 127–145, here p. 129; generally thereto, see DS Mayfield. “Interplay with Variation: Approaching Rhetoric and Drama.” *Rhetoric and Drama*, edited by DS

emotional upheaval (a form of auto-*movere*, to be experienced vicariously by the reader), the tension of which the speaker feels he must “let [...] all pour out, in words as well [‘cum vocibus’]” – wherefore he leaves his silent (“tacitus”) interlocutor Alypius, sensing “that the business [‘negotium’] of weeping was better suited [‘aptior’] to solitude.”⁵

In an even “remotius” place – somewhere (albeit inevitably “sub quadam fici arbore”) and “somehow” (the speaker stresses his ignorance, “nescio quomodo”) – he addresses himself to the Deity twice, thus paralleling the structure of the utterances put in Chastity’s mouth moments ago.⁶ In this case, however, the qualification differs: given his spatial isolation, the speaker writes that he actually voiced himself “non quidem his verbis, sed in hac sententia” (“not in these actual words, but along these lines”).⁷ After having imagined a personified *Continentia* address-

Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017, pp. 3–52, p. 21n. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-002/9783110484663-002.xml>. Accessed 25 July 2018.

5 Augustine, *Confessions*, VIII.12.28.

6 Concerning ‘fig trees’ as familiar settings, vivid mental (and nominal) anchors in various parables and related encounters within the *New Testament* (partly of highly significant import), see, e.g., the narrative of Jesus ‘cursing a fig tree’ (*Mt* 21:18–22; *Mk* 11:12–14, 20–24; the analogous parable in *Lk* 13:6–9), with its (figurative) foci both on ‘bearing fruit’ and on ‘faith alone’; the tree’s leaves are also referred to as a seasonal indicator, and functionalized as an anticipative sign of coming things (*Mt* 24:32; *Mk* 13:28; *Lk* 21:29–31); finally – and arguably most importantly for Augustine’s case (from his point of view) – see the fig tree’s (apparently incidental) nexus with men (and sinners) being called into the Lord’s service (*Lk* 19:4–5, plus context; especially also *Jn* 1:48–50).

7 Augustine, *Confessions*, VIII.12.28. Petrarch – emulating Augustine in many matters literary – also uses the device of putting words into his own mouth: “and [I] addressed myself in words like these” (Francesco Petrarca. “The Ascent of Mount Ventoux,” translated by Hans Nachod. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, edited by Ernst Cassirer et al., 9th edition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965, pp. 36–46, here p. 39), “talibus me ipsum compellabam verbis” (Francesco Petrarca. *Epistole*, edited by Ugo Dotti. Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1978, p. 122, 9*[IV, i]); the following also features an embedded *sermocinatio* (“they say,” “ut aiunt”), with the added piquancy that he is here quoting *Scripture*, while treating beatitude nominalistically: “The life we call blessed” (“Mount Ventoux,” p. 40), “vita, quam beatam dicimus” (*Epistole*, pp. 122–123, 9*[IV, i]). The process of auto-*sermocinatio* (metapoetically speaking) is repeated further down: “and I said to myself” (“Mount Ventoux,” p. 42), “Dicebam [...] ad me ipsum” (*Epistole*, p. 126, 9*[IV, i]) – with the ensuing remarks featuring an embedded citation from Augustine (cf. “Mount Ventoux,” p. 42; *Epistole*, p. 126, 9*[IV, i]); again: “and asked myself” (“Mount Ventoux,” p. 43), “et querebam ex me ipse” (*Epistole*, p. 128, 9*[IV, i]). Then, of course, he reenacts the Augustinian ‘tolle lege’ scene in a sort of intertextual *mise en abyme* (explicitly so: “The same had happened before,” “Mount Ventoux,” p. 45; “Quod iam ante [...] acciderat,” *Epistole*, p. 130, 9*[IV, i]) – and from on high, Petrarch being on a mountain at this (at least physical, temporal) turning point (the imposing setting might be part of the

ing him in the interiority of his mind with words he attributes to her, Augustine here confesses to be ‘writing words into his own mouth’ (so to speak).⁸ The envisioned interlocutor is silent.⁹

Then – accentuated by the crucial indicator “ecce,”¹⁰ by a change to the present tense (“audio”) for purposes of vivid immediacy (*evidentia*), and couched in ignorance (“nescio”) once again – the decisive *sermocinatio* occurs, which everyone knows:

et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis et crebro repetentis, quasi pueri an puellae, nescio: ‘tolle lege, tolle lege’. statimque mutato vultu[.]

And look! – From the house next door I hear a voice – I don’t know whether it is a boy or a girl – singing some words over and over: ‘Pick it up and read it, pick it up and read it!’ Immediately my expression transformed.¹¹

aemulatio, given the trouble taken to describe it in vividmost detail, while Augustine is just ‘out there in the nowhere under some fig tree’): “I thought it fit to look into the volume of Augustine’s *Confessions* [...]. I opened it with the intention of reading whatever might occur to me first” (“Mount Ventoux,” p. 44, cf. p. 45; cf. *Epistole*, pp. 128–130, 9*[IV, i]); “Aperio, lecturus quicquid occurreret” (*Epistole*, p. 130, 9*[IV, i]). Before the passage is read out, Petrarch’s brother is said to stand “beside” him, “intently expecting to hear something from Augustine on” the speaker’s “mouth” – the Humanist envisions himself as, writes himself into the role of, the Father’s mouthpiece (“Mount Ventoux,” p. 44): “per os meum ab Augustino aliquid audire” (*Epistole*, p. 130, 9*[IV, i]). As to the persistence of the aforesaid reading *praxis*, cf. Hans Blumenberg, *Arbeit am Mythos*, 6th edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2006, pp. 587–588 and 587n.

8 This being possible or plausible due to the temporal (and notional) distance between the narrating (and refining) *persona* – the *auctor* called ‘Augustine’ – and the protagonist of the *Confessiones* (by the same name), whose previous experiences are said to be rendered in narrative form. As to chronology, Hammond suggests “AD 354–386” in terms of the events referred to in the *Confessions* overall, “AD 397” as “the time when Augustine composed this account,” while it was not until “AD 426 or 427” that “he looked back [...] at what he had written and evaluated it” (Carolyn Hammond, “Introduction.” *Confessions: Books 1–8*, pp. xiii–xl, here p. xv).

9 Cf. “videshaec, domine, et taces [...] numquid semper tacebis” (Augustine, *Confessions*, I.18.28) – see *Ps* 82:2 (*Vulgate*; i.e. *Ps* 83:1; *NIV*); “habitans in excelsis in silentio, deus” (*Confessions*, I.18.29); cf. the gloss: “A[ugustine] repeatedly associates silence with God” (*Confessions*, p. 52n.). Regarding Petrarch’s *Secretum*, and the ‘silence of Truth personified,’ see Joachim Küpper: “die Allegorie der Veritas, hinter der sich niemand anderes als der christliche Gott selbst verbirgt, jener Gott, der zu Zeiten des fiktiven Interlokutors [sc. Petrarch’s ‘Augustinus’] noch gesprochen hatte (‘tolle, lege’), schweigt in diesem von Anfang bis Ende kontroversen Gespräch” (*Petrarca: Das Schweigen der Veritas und die Worte des Dichters*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002, p. 52).

10 See *Jn* 19:5; *Vulgate*.

11 Augustine, *Confessions*, VIII.12.29. Cf. Küpper, *Schweigen der Veritas*, pp. 32 and 52; as well as *Discursive Renovatio in Lope de Vega and Calderón: Studies on Spanish Baroque Drama. With an Excursus on the Evolution of Discourse in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and*

The face turns first – owing to the outward sign – quasi ‘prefiguring’ the inner conversion resulting from the perusal of the message within the book subsequently opened.¹² Standing in for the tacit Deity, a child – see “parvulos,”¹³ “pueros,”¹⁴ and “pueri”¹⁵ (in the plural, hence no matter which gender) – is heard to utter the above, with the writer (decidedly) putting them into the mouth of those with respect to whom it is written that “talium est enim regnum Dei.”¹⁶

Mannerism. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017, pp. 174 and 285. <https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/491780>. Accessed 25 July 2018. Given the context – it being a passage from Paul’s *Letter to the Romans* (“codicem apostoli”) that effects Augustine’s ‘conversion’ (*Confessions*, VIII.12.29) – a comparison with the words that bring about Saul’s volte-face is meet: “Saule, Saule quid me persequeris” – the situation having been specified as “audivit vocem dicentem” (*Acts* 9:4; *Vulgate*; resp. “audivi vocem dicentem” in *Acts* 22:7, “loquentem” in 26:14). For the expediency (hence durability) of this pattern in the Christian tradition, see Küpper on Constantine’s ‘conversion’ as per Eusebius and Lactantius (*Discursive Renovatio*, pp. 171–176, spec. 173–174). Augustine not only accommodates his own version to the intentional structure and significance of the situation that is to prefigure his own, but also ‘ties in with’ (sc. *hypólepsis*) the precise wording (“audio vocem”), and even with the ‘tonality’ of the prefiguring statement – the iterated vocative “Saule, Saule” being comparable to the twofold imperative repeated (“tolle, lege”). As a bilingual *synkrisis* will render patent, the translation here is likely to seem infelicitous; there appears to be no (linguistic, grammatical) reason for not rendering the dictum (trochaically) as ‘take it, read it’ – or even (less gently and euphoniously, while entirely in line with the imperative): ‘take! read!’ The formula is repeated and varied (as per the resp. rhetorical precept) in the following paragraphs: “ut aperirem codicem et legerem quod primum caput invenissem” (*Confessions*, VIII.12.29); “arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum quo primum coniecti sunt oculi mei” (*ibid.*) – here a paronomastic tricolon, featuring a (continued) density of <ι>. As to the above semiotic marker (‘ecce’), see Hammond, “Introduction,” p. xxxvii. Concerning references to ‘not knowing’, cf. that the writer takes care to intimate his being unable to remember what his earlier self had done precisely at that point in time: “Then I put my finger [‘aut digito’], or some other marker [‘aut nescio quo alio signo’], into the book and closed it” (*Confessions*, VIII.12.30); in the next sentence, Augustine describes his not having known at the time (“quod ego nesciebam”) what had been going on in Alypius all the while the aforesaid was taking place with(in) himself (*ibid.*). On the concept of ‘*hypólepsis*’ (‘taking up and tying in with’), see DS Mayfield. “Variants of *hypólepsis*: Rhetorical, Anthropistic, Dramatic (With Remarks on Terence, Machiavelli, Shakespeare).” *Poetics and Politics. Net Structures and Agencies in Early Modern Drama*, edited by Toni Bernhart et al. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018, pp. 233–274. <https://www.degruyter.com/view/product/486170>. Accessed 25 July 2018.

12 See the parallelism with the above: “Immediately [‘statim quippe’], the end of the sentence was like a light of sanctuary poured into my heart; every shadow of doubt [‘dubitationis’] melted away” (*Confessions*, VIII.12.29). The translation does not render the emphatic “quippe.”

13 *Mt* 19:14, *Mk* 10:14.

14 *Lk* 18:16.

15 *Confessions*, VIII.12.29.

16 *Mk* 10:14, *Lk* 18:16; *Vulgate*. Cf. *Mt* 19:14, which has “caelorum” in lieu of “Dei.” Consistent with his gestures signaling doubt, uncertainty regarding knowledge prior to the ‘conversion’ – “nescio,”

It seems entirely unlikely that the ‘momentaneous evidence’ effectuated by this Augustinian *sermocinatio* could have escaped anyone living in a prevalently Christian community pertaining to Late Antiquity, medieval times, or the early modern period.¹⁷ By making various other, personified voices speak in his place, the Church Father is acting on the rhetorico-‘ethopoietic’ assumption *par excellence*: ‘self sells.’

While its indisputable impact has tended to go unnoticed in modern times (and the latter’s study of literature), the practice of rhetorical *ethopoia* – ‘the making (*poiein*) of *ethos* by way of descriptive and actual speech (*sermocinatio*)’ – decisively molded and dominated the Western literary tradition (*sensu lato*) from Antiquity to the early modern age, and remains a sustained, if latent influence in the present.¹⁸

“nescio” (*Confessions*, VIII.12.28–29), “nescio,” “nesciebam” (VIII.12.30) – Augustine immediately tries (hence fails) to apply reason to the situation: “I started to ask myself eagerly whether it was common for children [‘pueri’] to chant such words when they were playing a game of some kind. I could not recall ever having heard anything quite like it. [...] I understood it as nothing short of divine providence that I was being ordered to open the book and read the first passage I came across” (VIII.12.29). This course is induced by recalling an occurrence heard about (or read) that seems to quasi ‘prefigure’ (sc. with repeatable ‘fulfillments,’ here; generally thereto, cf. Küpper, *Discursive Renovatio*, pp. 89–90 with p. 174) Augustine’s own case at hand: “I had heard [‘audieram’] of Antony, how he had been challenged by a reading from the gospel which he happened to [‘forte’, sc. by chance] encounter, as if what he was reading was being spoken for himself [‘tamquam sibi diceretur quod legebatur’]” (*Confessions*, VIII.12.29) – *Scripture* itself acts as a ‘speaker,’ the word *kat’ exochén* (for a Christian) is quasi personified. The basic structure of the passage that follows seems similarly formulaic (being likewise paronomastic, memorable): “vade, vende [...] et veni, sequere me” – the result of which is an ‘instantaneous conversion’: “et tali oraculo confestim ad te esse conversum” (*Confessions*, VIII.12.29).

17 On the concept of ‘*momentane Evidenz*,’ here employed *mutatis mutandis*, see Hans Blumenberg “Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Möglichkeit des Romans.” *Nachahmung und Illusion*, edited by Hans Robert Jauß, 2nd edition. Munich: Fink, 1983, pp. 9–27, passim, spec. pp. 10–12, 15, 26; for further references and applications, cf. DS Mayfield. *Artful Immorality – Variants of Cynicism: Machiavelli, Gracián, Diderot, Nietzsche*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015, pp. 48n., 92, spec. 92n., 256n.

18 This sentence is indebted to a formulation on the part of Prof. Eden, urging a reaccentuation and “foreground[ing]” of “the central place of ethopoetic construction in the literary tradition [...] as a way to account for the peculiar shape of at least some of its most well known texts” (email to the author, 26 June 2017). Generally, see Guido Naschert. “Ethopoeia.” *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, vol. 2 [Bie–Eul], edited by Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994, pp. 1512–1516, here p. 1515; cf. William Fortenbaugh, Christian Mouchel, and Franz-Hubert Robling. “Ethos,” translated by Andrea Merger and Susan Nurmi-Schomers. *Ibid.*, pp. 1516–1543, spec. p. 1541. As to medieval “exercise in prosopopoeia,” see Charles S. Baldwin associating (or equating) such with “imaginary adaptations” in his *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400): Interpreted from Representative Works*. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959, pp. 141n., 215; referring to a letter

by Sidonius Apollinaris, he gives “Ethicam dictionem” as “prosopopoeia” (ibid., pp. 83, 83n.); and “prosopopoeiae” as “imaginary addresses” (*Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice: Classicism in the Rhetoric and Poetic of Italy, France, and England 1400–1600*, edited by Donald Lemen Clark. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1959, p. 40). Scaliger handles *ethopoia* under the header “EXPRESSIO PERSONARVM,” praising Vergil for his “*varia genera personarum*” (Julius C. Scaliger. *Poetices Libri Septem: Faksimile-Neudruck der Ausgabe Leipzig von Lyon 1561*, edited by August Buck, 2nd edition. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1987, p. 83, III.ii); the most significant line for the present purpose occurs at the end of the section: “Humilem quoque personam, atque eius officium nō sine Ethopoeia, & Oeconomia” (ibid., p. 85, III.ii; the former term reappears in the Greek at p. 227, V.iii; as to “OECONOMIA,” cf. pp. 103–104, III.xix). Scaliger then refers to “personae fictae” under the header “QVASI PERSONAE,” giving, *inter alia*, the following examples: “apud Maronem Fama: apud Ouidiū Fames [...] apud Plautum Inopia, Luxuria, Lar, Arcturus. apud Aeschylum, Vis, Neceffitas. apud Aristophanem, Fas, Nefāque” (pp. 85, III.iii). As to *prosopopoiia* in conjunction with *ethopoia* and *sermocinatio*, see Mary Carruthers on “[a] courtly French treatise on rhetoric (1463)” (“The Concept of *ductus*, or Journeying through a Work of Art.” *Rhetoric Beyond Words: Delight and Persuasion in the Arts of the Middle Ages*, edited by Mary Carruthers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 190–213, here p. 205). Cf. Marvin T. Herrick. *Comic Theory in the Sixteenth Century*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964, pp. 132, 134. Charles O. McDonald speaks of “[t]he phenomenal popularity of Aphthonius in the English Renaissance,” calling him “the mentor of practically every Renaissance schoolboy trained up in the arts of composition” – here with specific reference to “*ethopoeia*” (*The Rhetoric of Tragedy: Form in Stuart Drama*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966, pp. 75n., 124.; cf. pp. 75, 87). See Thomas O. Sloane and Walter Jost: “Ciceronian tactics drawn from judicial rhet[oric] seemed to fire the poets’ imaginations [...] arguing in *utramque partem* [...] became a kind of lawyerly embracing of contraries [...] reappearing in the argumentative [...] fabric of Tudor poetry and drama; *qualis sit*, or individuating a phenomenon by setting it within a thesis-to-hypothesis (or definite-to-indefinite-question), suffuses Boccaccian fiction and Sidneyan critic[icism]; *ethos* and *ethopoiesis* [...] pervade dialogues, mock encomia, and most discussions of courtliness. Schoolroom *imitatio* [...] brought fictiveness itself well within rhetorical exercises” (“Rhetoric and Poetry.” *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics*, edited by Roland Greene et al, 4th edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, pp. 1175–1181, here p. 1179). See the extensive sense of “*ethopoeia*” employed by McDonald (*Rhetoric of Tragedy*, pp. 18, 49, 165, 166 with 243, 173, 182, 190, 223, 234, 239, 257 with 258, 274, 289, 288–289 with 274 and 297, 291 with 195). While present in the title of Lorna Hutson’s essay, “*Ethopoeia*, Source-Study and Legal History: A Post-Theoretical Approach to the Question of ‘Character’ in Shakespearean Drama” (*Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism*, edited by Martin McQuillan et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp. 139–160), it may remain unclear how the use of the term – “the historical legacy of Shakespeare’s ethopoetic dramatic tradition,” “the rhetorical persuasiveness of Shakespeare’s *ethopoeia*” (pp. 145, 157) – ties in with Hutson’s claims (not affected thereby); her references to progymnastic terms are problematic (pp. 140–141), possibly due to the manuscript used (cf. p. 158n.). Heinrich F. Plett stresses: “Die Prosopopoiie erlangt während des 16. Jahrhunderts in der Dichtung eine [...] [große] Popularität” (“*Theatrum Rhetoricum*: Schauspiel – Dichtung – Politik.” *Renaissance-Rhetorik / Renaissance Rhetoric*, edited by Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993, pp. 328–368, here p. 356; cf. p. 359). “Im Rhetorikunterricht der englischen Renaissance nehmen [...] Rollenübungen [sc. re *prosopopoiia*] nach antiken Vorbild

Various forms of ventriloquism having featured prominently in the “*praeexercitamenta*,” Heinrich Lausberg notes that it is particularly also in this fashion that *sermocinatio* “enters into poetry” (qua literature), so providing a nexus between history, drama, and rhetoric: “This complete merging of the practicing orator into the represented persona and into the social and historical situation brings the practice of [rhetorical] exercises into proximity with the theater.”¹⁹ Another link to the stage is provided by the rhetorical practice of ‘vivid description’ (*evidentia*) – producing ‘a mimetic effect’ of “simultaneity,” ‘eye-’ or ‘earwitnessing,’ ‘putting something before the eyes of someone.’²⁰ This rhetorical *desideratum* is evidently

einen so großen Raum ein, daß praktisch jeder Schüler zum Schauspieler-Dichter ausgebildet wird” (p. 355). For the *Progymnasmata*’s impact on German schooling practice, see Bernhard Asmuth. “Die Entwicklung des deutschen Schulaufsatzes aus der Rhetorik.” *Rhetorik: Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung*, edited by Heinrich F. Plett. Munich: Fink, 1977, pp. 276–292, spec. pp. 280–287. Asmuth inveighs against the elimination “der sich situationsgebunden gebenden Ethopoiee” in twentieth-century German schooling practice – itself a symptomatic effect of a “depragmatization,” a widespread “undervaluation of partisan argumentation,” and loss of a “relation and reference to the situation, the other, the person” (p. 286; trans. dsm).

19 Heinrich Lausberg. *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, 4th edition. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008, here (resp.): pp. 532–533, §1106 (cf. p. 543, §1131–1132); p. 548, §1146; and p. 549, §1149; trans. dsm (cf. p. 409, §823). For a précis of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*’s terms in this regard (and references to the *Progymnasmata*), cf. McDonald, *Rhetoric of Tragedy*, pp. 44–46, spec. “*Sermocinatio*, or dialogue, introduces the problem of *decorum* in composing fitting dialogue for a character” (p. 45); “in all of these figures can be seen the close affinities of rhetorical teaching to the exigencies of dramatic composition, and in the majority of the figures the examples given are clearly based upon dramatic practices” (p. 46). See Oesterreich: “der schulrhetorische Übungsbetrieb [...] ‘widmet’ der Prosopopoiee (*fictio personae*) besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Die Kunst der rhetorischen Persondarstellung wird hier durch die artifizielle Simulation von sozialen Charakteren [...] trainiert. Innerhalb dieser spielerisch inszenierten Schulübungen studiert der Redner [...] eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher personaler Rollen und nähert sich darin dem Schauspieler an” (“Person,” p. 863); cf. Mayfield, “Interplay,” pp. 11, 11n.–12n., and passim. The devices of *ethopoia*, *dialogismós*, *prosopopoia* seem tailored to the *rhétor*’s *actio*, while also evincing a considerable affinity to the dramatic actor’s performance (in all its physical aspects: face, gesture, movement, etc.). As to the nexus of ‘*hypókrisis*’ (*actio*, here rendered “impersonating”) and the preservation of *ethos* and *decorum* (cf. “accommodating [‘tò eikénai’] themselves to the rôles [‘prosópois’] which they assume, so that what they say is not inappropriate”) with regard to “dancing” and the “exercises” on the part of “the rhetoricians,” see Lucian. “The Dance (Saltatio / ΠΙΕΠΙ ΟΡΧΗΣΕΩΣ),” edited and translated by Austin M. Harmon. *Lucian*, vol. 5. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 209–289, here pp. 268–269, §65; with Charles S. Baldwin. *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic: Interpreted from Representative Works*. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1959, p. 74n.

20 Lausberg, *Handbuch*, p. 400, §810; trans. dsm. Cf. “In antiquity, *prosopopoeiae* were school exercises in which writers took on the persona of a famous historical or mythological figure [...]. At times, [...] rhetorical and poetic theoreticians use *prosopopoeia* [...] more expansively to

indicate the vivid presentation of something absent or imaginary before the eye and ear” (Terry V. F. Brogan, Albert W. Halsall, and Jeffrey S. Sychterz. “Prosopopoeia.” *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics*, pp. 1120–1121, here p. 1121). On *evidentia* generally, see Heinrich F. Plett. “EVIDENTIA: Zur Rhetorik der Präsenz in den artes der Frühen Neuzeit.” *Norm und Poesie: Zur expliziten und impliziten Poetik in der lateinischen Literatur der Frühen Neuzeit*, edited by Beate Hintzen and Roswitha Simons. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013, pp. 255–273, passim. Cf. these synonymous, affine terms: ‘*enárgeia*,’ ‘*hypotýposis*,’ ‘*demonstratio*,’ ‘*descriptio*,’ ‘*ékphrasis*’; *evidentia* is vital qua effect of *sermocinatio*, to which generally desirable rhetorico-theatrical end (see Mayfield, “Interplay,” pp. 15–17, spec. pp. 16n.–17n.; with further references) the latter conduces significantly (as does *ékphrasis*); *evidentia* is particularly interactive. Cf. in “Ocular Demonstration [‘*Demonstratio*’] [...] an event is so described in words [‘*ita verbis res exprimitur*’] that the business [‘*negotium*’] seems to be enacted [‘*geri*’] and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes [‘*res ante oculos esse videatur*’]” (*Rhetorica ad Herennium*, edited and translated by Harry Caplan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, IV.lv.68). The notes add the terms “ἐνάργεια [...] *evidentia*, *repraesentatio*, *sub oculis subiectio* [...] ὑποτύπωσις [...] *descriptio*” (p. 405n.). For a spec. application, Quintilian suggests: “A considerable contribution to the effect [‘*multum confert*’] may be made by combining [‘*adiecta*’] the true facts [‘*veris*’] with a plausible picture of the scene [‘*credibilis rerum imago*’], which, as it were, gives the impression [‘*videtur*’] of bringing the audience [‘*perducere audientis*’] face to face with the event [‘*in rem praesentem*’]” (*Institutio Oratoria*, 4.2.123); Quintilian here speaks of a “*descriptio*” (cf. “*dilucida et significans descriptio*,” *Institutio*, 9.2.44, specified as “of places”; see *Rhetorica*, IV.xxxix.51 and 356n.). In the Latin, the sentence structure permits immediately ‘juxtaposing’ the terms performatively: “*adiecta veris credibilis*” (*Institutio*, 4.2.123). When treating it as a so-called ‘figure of thought,’ Quintilian echoes Cicero’s definition of “*evidentia*” as “‘putting something before our eyes [‘*sub oculis subiectio*’],” while mentioning the Greek term (“ὑποτύπωσις”) also (*Institutio*, 9.2.40); he speaks of the “mode of vivid description [‘*in diatypōsi*’]” as being typically hedged by formulae such as “‘Imagine that you see [‘*credite vos intueri*’]’”, or (like Cicero) by referring to ‘the mind’s eye’ (“*haec, quae non vidistis oculis, animis cernere potestis*,” *Institutio*, 9.2.41; with pp. 56n.–57n.). See: “In my mind’s eye, Horatio” (William Shakespeare. *Hamlet*, edited by Harold Jenkins, 2nd edition. London: Thomson, 2003, I.ii.185). On the whole, the “Figure” is said to have “something particularly vivid [‘*manifestus*’] about it” (*Institutio*, 9.2.43). For the quasi equivalent use of the terms ‘*tractatio*,’ ‘*diatýposis*,’ ‘*hypotýposis*,’ see Scaliger, *Poetices*, p. 122, III.xxxiii; he links these to ‘*ethología*’: “Eft autē Tractatio, quum rem sub oculis ponemus, luculenta narratione persequentes eas partes, quae ἠθολογίαν maxime comprehendunt in personis: in locis autem notabiles quasdam dispositiones” (ibid.); to ‘*notatio*’: “M. Gallio διατύπωσιν, personae accuratam admodum ac festivam posuit in quarto, quam appellavit Notationem” (ibid.). Having handled ‘*hypo*-’ resp. ‘*diatýposis*,’ he turns to ‘*demonstratio*,’ ‘*descriptio*,’ ‘*effictio*’ (with respect to ‘*prosopopoeia*’): “De descriptionem, quam M. Gallio definit, perpicuam rei expositionem. Quae verò minutius circa personam verfaretur, Effictionem. Non quòd fit ficta, id est falsa: sed quasi effigiationem. Effictio enim est pars fictionis in Prosopopoeia” (ibid., pp. 122–123, III.xxxiii). A brief subchapter on “SERMOCINATIO” ensues, which Scaliger links to the preceding: “Huius adiuncta est Sermocinatio, quum certus attribuitur fermo personae [...] Orationes enim quodam modo picturae sunt animorum. & qualis quilibet est, ita loquitur. & in obliquo” (p. 123, III.xxxv). The aforesaid nexus to ‘*diatýposis*’ is reaffirmed for ‘*attributio*,’ ‘*prosopopoeia*’: “Attributio [...] fit quoties Rei aut Personae attribui re, aut personam,

accomplished on the stage, seeing that – in terms of “mimesis” – “drama” features “the maximal degree of immediacy.”²¹

Focusing on artful ventriloquism in application, the present *essai* takes up the exploratory approach detailed with regard to (auto)biography, extending it to other genres, specifically historiography, poetry, and philosophy (the latter two *sensu lato*).

Rhetorical economy (“*dispositio*”) signifies the expedient “selection and arrangement”²² of the (verbalized) matter at hand: “it is not only what we say and how we say it that matters, but also in what sequence: Disposition is therefore essential [‘opus ergo est et dispositione’].”²³ The practice of *oikonomía* applies to

aut modum, aut orationem. Rei res, vt anno sterilitas, aeri tempeftas, nocti filentium, faxo asperitas” (p. 126, III.xlviii); ‘*prosopopoeia*’ is given as “duplex”: “Primus modus, vbi ficta perfona introducit, vt Fama à Virgilio, & Fames ab Ouidio. [...] Alterum genus Profopopoeiae, vbi non perfona fingatur eo modo, fed orationis attributione. quæ adeò pertinet ad διατύπωσις, vt suprà eius partem fecerimus Sermocinationem. [...] nânque si attribuam Æneæ orationem, erit fermocinatio: propterea quòd vera perfona est. quòd si extra argumentum introducatur: veluti quum Æneas ait fefe à patre per fomniū obiurgari: fanè est Profopopoeia. [...] præfertim si rei mutæ fermo attribuitur [...] Est & alius modus, quo non oratio, fed fensus rei brutæ assignatur. ex re enim, quæ non est perfona, fit perfona [...] quando alloquimur brutam rem, quæ non intelligit, quasi intelligat. [...] Quintilianus scribit, oportere eius personæ cui attribuitur oratio, habitum describi: alioqui non effe Profopopoeiam, fed διαλογισµόν. Mihi videtur omnis oratio effe διαλογισµός: Personæ verò habitum nequaquam pingi debere, fed orationem per se fatis posse ad personam illam declarandam” (ibid.). In concluding the subchapter, Scaliger notes the affinity of ‘apostrophe’ (‘addressing those absent’) in this context of ‘attribution,’ ‘allocution’: “Similes illis superioribus attributionibus sunt alloquutiones, quæ ad absentes diriguntur: qualis Æneæ ad Palinurum iam non exaudientem. & Apoftrophæ quædam” (ibid.).

21 Lausberg, *Handbuch*, p. 565, §1185; trans. dsm; cf. p. 560, §1171. Re Plato’s *Republic*, George Grube notes that “any direct speech” is “counted as impersonation” (thus his translation of “μμήσει”), and “[d]rama proceeds entirely by impersonation” (*The Greek and Roman Critics*. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995, p. 51; cf. pp. 70n.–71n.); he adds: “the rhapsodes must have dramatized the speeches in recitation” (p. 51n.). With reference to Giambattista Vico, see Chaïm Perelman. *The Realm of Rhetoric*, translated by William Kluback, edited by Carroll C. Arnold. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982, p. 176, §42; cf. p. 176n.

22 Heinrich Lausberg. *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*, 10th edition. Ismaning: Hueber, 1990, p. 27, §46; trans. dsm.

23 Quintilian, *Institutio*, 3.3.2. Cf. “Dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum” (*Rhetorica*, I.ii.3); “dispositio est per quam illa quæ inuenimus in ordinem redigimus” (III.ix.16; cf. pp. 184n.–185n.) – the guiding directive being expediency (“commodum,” “si commodum erit,” III.ix.17). Cf. Quintilian, stating “that it is [...] not always expedient to be lucid [‘nec dilucida semper sit utile exponere’]” (*Institutio*, 4.2.32; cf. p. 236n.); regarding narrative arrangement, the orator likewise accentuates utility: “I prefer to narrate events in the order that is most advantageous [‘eo malo narrare quo expedit’]” (4.2.83). Any arrangement will be ‘economical,’ all *dispositio* being artful. On “*oeconomia*” in Quintilian, see ibid., 3.3.9 and p. 26n.; prior, and with respect to drama, the

all written and delivered genres: given a substratum heuristically encountered during the phase of *inventio* – whether factual and historical, or already based on a literary rendering, on (*ex tempore*) fabrication – no text or speech, nor any other work of art, could do without the procedures of selecting, assembling, arranging, organizing, framing, and displaying (in terms of ‘layout’) the material at hand in a manner deemed conducive to the respectively present case, the mode of treating it, and the desired effect: be it dissuading or accommodating, competitive and conflictual, pondering and assessing, or vituperative and laudatory (or again otherwise).²⁴ That it is always significant rhetorically into whose mouth words are being put – at what time, in which context and whose presence – marks a decisive nexus between *dispositio* and *sermocinatio*.²⁵

rhétor states: “The old Latin poets [...] are also more careful [‘diligentior’] about organization [‘Oeconomia’] than most of the moderns, who have come to think that clever phrases (*sententiae*) are the only virtue in any work” (ibid., 1.8.8–9); cf. Herrick, *Comic Theory*, p. 102; Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp. 94–106, spec. 103n.

24 Cf. Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, p. 106: “Ammonius [...] quotes Theophrastus as saying that every speech has two aspects, the content and the effect upon the audience; the philosopher is mainly concerned with the first, the poet or rhetorician mainly with the second: they *choose* their words for effect and *arrange* them harmoniously.”

25 Contrast Nicolaus (“The *Preliminary Exercises* of Nicolaus the Sophist,” edited and translated by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata*, pp. 129–172, here p. 166, §10.67), who does not seem to grant rhetoric’s general polyfunctionality, or that of its devices; thereto, cf. Mayfield, “Interplay,” pp. 5, 5n.–6n., 8n., 14n., 33n.; with further references. Rhetorical ventriloquism (in all its variants) cannot be restricted to a matter of *elocutio*, *ornatus*. On the efficacious placement of *sententiae*, Pierre Corneille’s “Discours du poème dramatique” states: “il faut les placer judicieusement, et surtout les mettre en la bouche de gens qui aient l’esprit sans embarras, et qui ne soient point emportés par la chaleur de l’action” (quoted in: Bernhard Asmuth, *Einführung in die Dramenanalyse*, 8th edition. Stuttgart: Metzler, 2016, pp. 166–167); while that is counseled and performed with a view to *docere*, other functionalizations are conceivable – and perhaps more prevalent. In a Theophrastan context, Jeffrey Rusten remarks that Menander’s “philosophizing passages [...] are often given an ironic turn when put in the mouths of unsuitable characters” (“Preface. Introduction.” *Theophrastus: Characters. Herodas: Mimes. Sophron and Other Mime Fragments*, edited by Jeffrey Rusten and Ian C. Cunningham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 3–44, here p. 17); as to the “affinity” between the aforesaid philosopher and the poet, see Manfred Fuhrmann, *Die Dichtungstheorie der Antike: Aristoteles – Horaz – ‘Longin,’* 2nd edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992, p. 157; trans. dsm. Rusten also notes that “Lucian [...] shows a direct knowledge of the [Theophrastan] *Characters*” (“Introduction,” p. 18). In a context of paradoxography, burlesque, and “cynicism,” Ulrich Schulz-Buschhaus speaks of François Rabelais’ “putting in the mouth of Panurge” an “encomium of creditors and debtors” (*Moralistik und Poetik*. Hamburg: LIT, 1997, p. 8; trans. dsm). In artful texts, inadvertency as to in whose mouth an utterance is put may lead to problematic views on what is supposed to be ‘the text’s meaning’ or ‘the author’s intention.’ Generally in

With respect to poetics, any writer (including philosophers) will select and (dialogically) situate specific characters, putting convenient words into their mouths – or (often at once) citing their apparently ‘historical’ counterparts in a manner advantageous to the respectively present purpose and context (this being the Platonic *praxis* generally), sometimes so as to speak specifically in the extra-textual writer’s stead (as received by the audience or reader).²⁶

Concerning the intratextual economy, Lausberg adduces “the poet’s conversation with the muse” as “a special variant” of *sermocinatio*; on the stage, or in autobiography, it may tend to take the form of a “monolog” or “soliloquy,” and include a speaker’s auto-*sermocinatio* – putting words into his own mouth (so to say) – for instance with a view to (imagining himself in, preparing for) a future situation.²⁷

this respect (via specific applications), see DS Mayfield. “‘Against the Dog only a Dog’: Talking Canines Civilizing Cynicism in Cervantes’ ‘Coloquio de los perros’ (With Tentative Remarks on the Discourse and Method of Animal Studies).” *Humanities* 6 (2017), pp. 1–39, here pp. 14n., 19, 19n., 22, 22n., 29, spec. 32n.–33n.; with further references. <http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0787/6/2/28/pdf>. Accessed 25 July 2018. See also below; and Mayfield, *Artful Immorality*, pp. 91n., 128, 182n., 184, 273. As to the Machiavellian (and Livian) practice, see Leo Strauss. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 10, 42 and 137–167; using the metaphor “mouth-piece,” as in p. 139; cf. Harvey C. Mansfield. *Machiavelli’s Virtue*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 132, 320n. On the nexus of *dispositio* and *actio*, cf. Cicero: “Aeschines [...] thought that the same speech with a change of speaker would be a different thing [‘qui orationem eadem aliam esse putaret actore mutato’]” (“On the Orator: Book III,” edited and translated by Harris Rackham. *On the Orator: Book III*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, pp. 1–185, here: III.lvi.213); similarly: “Multa fiunt eadem, sed aliter” (Quintilian, *Institutio*, 2.20.10). Cf. Karlheinz Stierle: “Wiederholung ist prinzipiell vom Wiederholten unterschieden” (“Was heißt Moralistik?” *Moralistik: Explorationen und Perspektiven*, edited by Rudolf Behrens and Maria Moog-Grünwald. Munich: Fink, 2010, pp. 1–22, here p. 2).

²⁶ This phenomenon seems pervasive (and elusive); it may also apply to a spec. citation-al practice; cf. “au nom du dieu! [...] ne me parlez pas de cet-homme-là!” (Voltaire ventriloquized, or quoted, in: Friedrich Nietzsche. *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887–1889: Kritische Studienausgabe*, vol. 13, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 2nd edition. Munich/Berlin: dtv/de Gruyter, 1999, p. 44, 11[95]347). It matters who is cited – when, in what context (and whose presence). Manfred Pfister notes that “das [...] produzentenbezogene Phänomen der Verwendung einer Figur als ‘Sprachrohr’ für die Meinungen und Ansichten des Autors” frequently determines the process of reception (*Das Drama: Theorie und Analyse*, 11th edition. Fink: Munich, 2001, p. 149).

²⁷ Lausberg, *Elemente*, p. 143, §433, and §432; trans. dsm. Rhetorically, such pertains predominantly to the deliberative genre: “Die Fingierung von Selbstgesprächen beruht auf der *coniectura animi*” (*Handbuch*, p. 410, §823) – i.e. vicariously putting oneself (anticipatingly, prudentially, deliberatively, purposively) in the position of an (and potentially any) *alter*. Cf. John T. Shawcross, referring to a poem by Thomas Wyatt (“Patience, though I have not”): “While the

From a poetico-hermeneutic perspective, the above procedure might also be taken to apply to an (extratextual) author anticipating his readership intratextually, (tacitly or explicitly) putting words into their mouths (*sermocinatio* functioning qua *subiectio*), so as to reply immediately on the page.²⁸ Dynamizing the

poet seems to address a personified Patience, it is clear that he is counselling himself" ("The Poet as Orator: One Phase of His Judicial Pose." *The Rhetoric of Renaissance Poetry: From Wyatt to Milton*, edited by Thomas O. Sloan[e] and Raymond B. Waddington. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 5–36, here p. 15). For predominantly dramatic realizations, cf. Plett, "*Theatrum Rhetoricum*," pp. 354, 356; generally in this respect, cf. Wilfried Barner. *Barockrhetorik: Untersuchung zu ihren geschichtlichen Grundlagen*, 2nd edition. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2002, pp. 103–104 (spec. "Rollentrieb," p. 103; "Lust zur Rolle," "Spieltrieb," p. 104).

28 In Antiquity, the practice of declamations was crucial in this respect – performed (emphasizing *actio*, delivery) not only in schools, but also later in life; it is present in medieval scholastic disputations, and Renaissance Humanist dialogues; cf. Jan Bloemendal. "Rhetoric and Early Modern Latin Drama. The Two Tragedies by the 'Polish Pindar' Simon Simonides (1558–1629): *Castus Ioseph* and *Pentesilea*." *Rhetoric and Drama*, pp. 115–134, spec. pp. 115–117. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-006/9783110484663-006.xml>. Accessed 25 July 2018; Martha Feldman. "The Castrato as a Rhetorical Figure." *Rhetoric and Drama*, pp. 71–96, here p. 75. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-004/9783110484663-004.xml>. Accessed 25 July 2018; with Mayfield ("Interplay," pp. 23, 24n., 29, 29n.). See Nancy L. Christiansen: "examples for imitation came from all disciplines (poetry, history, philosophy, oratory, and scripture) and from all genres (*sententiae*, dialogues, epistles, verses, themes, and orations proper), all texts were treated as 'declamations'" ("Rhetoric as Character-Fashioning: The Implications of Delivery's 'Places' in the British Renaissance *Paideia*." *Rhetorica* 15 (1997), pp. 297–334, here p. 316). As to the aspect of anticipation qua linked to the latter, cf. Nicolaus, "*Preliminary Exercises*," p. 166, §10.66–67. In various formulations, the import of the latter is accentuated in the *Progymnasmata*: "Throughout the exercise [sc. of characterization] you will preserve what is distinctive and appropriate to the persons imagined as speaking and to the occasions" (Hermogenes. "The *Preliminary Exercises* Attributed to Hermogenes," edited and translated by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata*, pp. 73–88, here p. 85, §9.21). "Speeches [...] need to fit the places and occasions [...]. We shall [...] give what is appropriate to each" (John of Sardis, and Sopatros. "Selections from the Commentary on the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius Attributed to John of Sardis, Including Fragments of the Treatise on *Progymnasmata* by Sopatros," edited and translated by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata*, pp. 173–228, here p. 214, §11.196; cf. p. 217, §11.209). Similarly, Alberic stresses *decorum* in virtually every phrase concerning "*ethopoeia*" with respect to "letter writing" (Alberic of Monte Cassino. "Flowers of Rhetoric," translated by Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*, edited by Joseph M. Miller et al. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 131–161, pp. 150–151, here p. 151, VII.1; cf. Lanham, "Writing Instruction," pp. 115–116, with p. 115n.). See Demetrius on the links to the epistolary genre: "the letter [...] is like one of the two sides to a dialogue" ("On Style," translated by Doreen C. Innes and William R. Roberts. *Aristotle: Poetics. Longinus: On the Sublime. Demetrius: On Style*, edited by William H. Fyfe et al. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 309–525, p. 481, §223) – a statement given to Artemon. "Like the dialogue, the letter should be strong in characterisation

discourse, Hans Blumenberg uses this technique in the following formulation: “Maybe someone [will] say.”²⁹ One also encounters it as a sequentialized structuring device in Seneca (conspicuously with a view to *dispositio*): “Now some person [...] will say [...] Again, the objector mentioned above wonders at our saying [...] Again, this same objector wonders at our saying” (“Hoc aliquis [...] ait [...] Deinde idem admiratur, cum dicimus [...] Deinde idem admiratur, quod dicimus”).³⁰

[‘tò ethikòn’]” (pp. 482–483, §227). Cf. “Humanists [...] taught letter-writing as if letters were a kind of conversation” (Thomas O. Sloane. “Rhetorical Education and Two-Sided Argument.” *Renaissance-Rhetorik / Renaissance Rhetoric*, edited by Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993, pp. 163–178, here p. 171). See Lanham, “Writing Instruction,” pp. 110–111 (and George Kustas quoted therein, p. 110).

29 Hans Blumenberg, *Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit*, edited by Anselm Haverkamp. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2007, p. 38; trans. dsm.

30 L. Annaeus Seneca. *Epistles* 66–92, translated by Richard M. Gummere. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920, LXXXI.11–12. The above may be seen as both fictionalizing an other for his present purposes, and simultaneously ‘taking up and tying in with himself’ (so to speak). One frequently encounters *sermocinationes* in the imagined objector, who is preventively inserted (also in direct speech) into a treatise or essay – a useful technique for stealing an opponent’s thunder, and for dynamizing (what would otherwise seem) a monolog by adding other voices. Cf. Hermogenes, “*Preliminary Exercises*,” p. 85, §9.20–21. With preventive purpose, Seneca puts this objection into Lucilius’ mouth: “‘Epicurus’ inquis, ‘dixit. Quid tibi cum alieno?’” (*Epistles* 1–65, translated by Richard M. Gummere. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917, XII.11) – only to invalidate it; or rather, to anticipate and so defuse the conceivable objection, placed in the mouth of a protagonist equally functionalized. This dialogic rendering of the letter or essay has affinities to an ‘internal debate’ – the *persona* ‘Seneca’ might be said to be externalizing a notional ‘Lucilius’ (*prosopopoiia*), interacting with him by putting words into his mouth (*dialogismós*): “In secretum te meum admitto et te adhibito mecum exigo” (XXVII.1). In the above, the *sententia* had not been ascribed previously (as far as is assessable); hence Seneca synergizes its possible functionalizations: he first names an authority for a certain *dictum*, then appropriates it: “Quod verum est, meum est [...] quae optima sunt, esse communia” (XII.11). As suggested, it would probably not have been beyond the writer’s *persona* (cultivated as ‘Seneca’) to have posited ‘Lucilius’ as a fictional addressee *tout court*, functionally standing in for his own *persona*; the diction often yields the impression of the sender of a message addressing himself; this circularity is then reproduced in (or by) the reader, who vicariously finds – or (deliberately) puts – himself in the position of the addressee and (if they are taken to be the same) the emitter of the message; such circuitousness seems particularly effectual in terms of auto-persuasion. Conversely, another writer might choose to reply implicitly to a friend (Michel de Montaigne to Étienne de La Boétie); or to a teacher, often tacitly (Aristotle to Plato). As to the aforesaid technique, see Blumenberg, noting an affine employment in René Descartes: “Wahrscheinlich war es einer der fiktiven Antwortbriefe, die von ihm in Umlauf gesetzt wurden, um auf gedachte oder indirekt übermittelte Einwände einzugehen” (*Höhlenausgänge*. 1989. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996, p. 450). In exploring a familiar, then current genre, the latter also serves for tying in with

With respect to ‘(famous) last words,’ *sermocinationes* are often encountered (and likely the rule) qua attributing apposite, pregnant, laconic, prophetic utterances to the departing – as, emphatically, their ‘last word.’ Blumenberg’s *Die Sorge geht über den Fluß* ends with the ensuing *sententia*, wryly put into the dying Martin Heidegger’s mouth (hypothetically): “*Kein Grund mehr zur Sorge.*”³¹

(and thus implicitly legitimizing) a resp. present utilization. The functions of *sermocinatio* are polyvalent, Protean.

31 Hans Blumenberg. *Die Sorge geht über den Fluß*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1987, p. 222. Approximately: ‘no longer any grounds for caring’ – the discursive implications can hardly be retained in translation. The section is entitled ‘Ein noch unbestätigtes Schlusswort.’ With respect to Blumenberg himself, Odo Marquard ties in therewith; cf. “Hans Blumenberg: Entlastung vom Absoluten.” *Du: Die Zeitschrift für Kultur* 51 (1991), pp. 25–26, spec. p. 26. This *sermocinatio* (the philosopher putting apt last words in Heidegger’s mouth) is itself a (partial) citation of a (putative) Roman epitaph (given the telling caption “DAS DASEIN”): abbreviated as “N F F N S N C,” it is said to signify “NON FUI; FUI; NON SUM; NON CURO” (Blumenberg. *Begriffe in Geschichten*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1998, p. 29); as to a quotation serving as last words, cf. Blumenberg. *Goethe zum Beispiel*, edited by Manfred Sommer and Hans Blumenberg-Archiv. 1999. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014, p. 88; *Matthäuspassion*, 3rd edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1991, pp. 225–230. In “Ein Dementi,” and with respect to the ‘future of reception,’ Blumenberg gives his motives for inventing “ein angemessenes Sterbebettfaß” for Heidegger as ‘not having wished to let him take his leave from Time and Being wordlessly’ (*Die Verführbarkeit des Philosophen*, edited by Manfred Sommer. 2000. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2005, p. 107); at once, Blumenberg notes that “Walter Bröcker” had (himself notified by Heidegger’s wife) sent him the supposedly actual last words: “*Ich bleibe noch liegen*” – roughly ‘I will stay in bed a while longer’ (ibid.); also cited in a more assertive, quasi-non-temporal variant (as far as change or action in the future is concerned): “*Ich bleibe liegen*” (*Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne*. 1997. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2011, p. 224). Blumenberg expressly identifies himself as a “lover of ‘last words,’” justifying his having previously ‘crafted the apposite for lack of the factual ones,’ and declaring his ‘confidence that fiction will prevail over fact’: “Trotzdem bin ich zuversichtlich, daß meine Fiktion – weil Fiktionen doch immer stärker sind als Fakten – überleben wird” (*Verführbarkeit*, p. 108; trans. dsm). See another of Blumenberg’s characteristic statements to this effect: “Letzte Worte dürfen erfunden sein, wenn sie gut erfunden sind, da sie ohnehin zumeist erfunden werden müssen” (*Höhlenausgänge*, p. 386n.; cf. Mayfield, *Artful Immorality*, p. 42n.). For such legitimization as per the (effectuality of the) *aptum*, cf. Blumenberg. *Lebensthemen: Aus dem Nachlaß*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1998, p. 152. With respect to Theodor Fontane, Blumenberg suggests a short poem on the former’s part as his plausible ‘last word’: (*Vor allem Fontane. Glossen zu einem Klassiker*. Frankfurt a. M.: Insel, 2002, p. 38). Cf. also the short essay “Letzte Worte Wielands,” which commences: “Not everyone gets the chance to die as he deserves. Death is simply the precise opposite of a chance. This has an effect on [‘färbt auf (...) ab’, sc. ‘dyes’] the circumstances. Also on the last words, for which there still is time. Or on those, who have conveyed them to us” (*Goethe zum Beispiel*, p. 101; trans. dsm). Moreover, Blumenberg suggests: “Ein Buch möchte ich noch fertig machen, das sollte mir vergönnt sein’. [...] Als letztes Wort Edmund Husserls wäre das eines Gelehrten würdig” (Husserl quoted, and commented on, in: *Lebensthemen*, p. 136); cf. “Daß es

Referring to concepts treated in more detail in the extended digital version, the present *essai* offers instances of rhetorical ventriloquism as occur in various genres and discursive contexts. To facilitate the reader's tying in with the ensuing examples, the latter are drawn from what are likely to be more or less familiar sources and authors.³² Moreover, they are emphatically comparatist – diachronic, trans-generic, interdisciplinary, diverse (contentwise, discursively) – precisely with a view to describing the functions and applications of various ventriloquistic devices in their specific context, as well as more generally and *de re*, the latter as ‘universally’ (in terms of the Aristotelian ‘*kathólou*’) as possible.³³

In historiographic genres, such as the Thucydidean, Sallustian, Livian, or Tacitean corpus, one encounters the nexus of *dispositio* and *sermocinatio* at every

eine ‘unendliche Arbeit’ sein würde, war nicht nur eine Phrase” (p. 137). With respect to Gottfried Benn, Blumenberg writes a short essay entitled “Letztes Wort des Zynikers” (pp. 170–172; here p. 170), which commences: “Letzte Worte spielen im Bestand des Überlieferten eine eigene Rolle. Der sie gesprochen hat, ist in absoluter Weise der Belangbarkeit für sie entzogen. Er erfährt nicht mehr und kann nicht mehr bestätigen, was ihm zugeschrieben wird. Der sie gehört hat oder haben will, ist in singulärer Weise für sie verantwortlich. Die Intimität der Situation, in der sie gesprochen oder geschrieben sind, verleiht Bedeutung auch dem, der dabei oder ihr Adressat war. Der Zeuge ist dem Bild dessen verpflichtet, der danach zu ihm nichts mehr gesagt hat” (p. 170; cf. Blumenberg. *Der Mann vom Mond: Über Ernst Jünger*, edited by Alexander Schmitz and Marcel Lepper. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2007, p. 148). Similarly, the initial words of the essay entitled “Das eine letzte Wort”: “Letzte Worte werden von den anderen überliefert, die sie gehört haben oder gehört haben wollen. Sie fallen sehr verschieden aus, sonst wäre es nicht interessant, sie zu berichten noch sie kennenzulernen” (p. 143). The editors of this posthumously published volume also grouped further essays with said theme in the resp. section (“IX. Letzte Worte,” pp. 143–151) – among them a miniature entitled “Letztes Wort,” giving that on the part of “Ernst Robert Curtius” (via Rolf Hochhuth, then Ernst Jünger) as “*Aufmachen!*”; Blumenberg’s comment: “Kann man das ausdenken?” (p. 147). In the same essay, he refers to “Jünger” as a ‘collector of last words’ (cf. p. 149), which might also be thought to apply to Blumenberg’s own practice. Generally, see Ahlrich Meyer. “Nachwort des Herausgebers.” *Rigorismus der Wahrheit: ‘Moses der Ägypter’ und weitere Texte zu Freud und Arendt*, edited by Ahlrich Meyer. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015, pp. 105–130, here p. 115. With respect to Johann W. Goethe’s (supposed) “*Mehr Licht*,” see Jünger’s quote, cited in Blumenberg, *Jünger*, p. 148; plus his appropriation thereof in *Höhlenausgänge*, p. 55.

³² Cf. Erving Goffman’s statement, tying in with Georg Simmel’s method: “The illustrative materials used in this study are of mixed status [...]. The justification for this approach [...] is that the illustrations together fit into a coherent framework that ties together bits of experience the reader has already had” (*The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Penguin, 1990, pp. 9–10).

³³ Aristotle. “Poetics,” translated by Stephen Halliwell. *Aristotle: Poetics*, pp. 27–141, here §9, 1451b.

turn.³⁴ Any historian will inevitably choose the specific material to be modeled from a vast corpus of contingent particularities – few of them based on his own experience, the far greater share gathered from various sources already extant, frequently amplified, varied, and reaccentuated by personified collectives, dead men revived, attributed speeches and envisioned dialogues, verbally sketched appearances, studies in *ethos* (*prosopopoia*, *eidolopoia*, *dialogismós*, *charakterismós*, *ethopoia*); moreover, he will be likely to aim at arranging actualities and pragmatic fabrications (such as conceivable speech acts or probable portrayals of

34 Cf. “Außer bei Lysias findet sich die E[thopoeia] besonders häufig in der rhetorisch beeinflussten *Historiographie*. Thukydides etwa setzt bewußt Reden und Charakterisierungen berühmter Politiker und Feldherren zur Darstellung von Geschichte ein” (Naschert, “Ethopoeia,” p. 1514). In a Theophrastan context, Rusten speaks of “the famous sketches of historical figures in Sallust and Tacitus” (“Introduction,” p. 19) as inspired by the rhetorical tradition of “Character sketching” – which he refers to as ‘*charakterismoí* or *ethologíai*’ (p. 18; cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero. “Topics,” edited and translated by Harry M. Hubbell. *On Invention. Best Kind of Orator. Topics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949, pp. 375–459, here p. 446, xxi.83; Quintilian, *Institutio*, 1.9.3 and p. 210n.): *de re*, he must mean ‘*ethopoia*’ – with ‘*charakterismós*’ (‘*effictio*’) typically referring to the externals only. Rusten also notes that Christopher Gill “slights rhetorical influence” in this respect (“Introduction,” p. 19n.; cf. Gill. “The Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus.” *The Classical Quarterly* 33 (1983), pp. 469–487, *passim*); in fact, the same holds true for the latter’s other publication on the concept at hand (Gill. “Personhood and Personality: The Four-*personae* Theory in Cicero, *de Officiis* I.” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. VI, edited by Julia Annas. Oxford: Clarendon, 1988, pp. 169–199, *passim*; for a brief reference to rhetoric, cf. p. 194). As to the function of the Theophrastan *Characters*, Rusten notes (but cannot confirm) that a “suggested purpose is rhetorical instruction. There is no doubt that this is the use to which the work was eventually put; indeed it owes its very survival to its inclusion among the handbooks of the schools” (“Introduction,” p. 22; cf. pp. 29, 33; see Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, p. 103). Contrast Gill’s unrhetorical view on “Theophrastus’ *Characters*,” speaking of “the relative triviality of this work” (“Question,” p. 469n.). On “Charakterzeichnung” in Horace, see Fuhrmann, *Dichtungstheorie*, p. 135; referring to Horace, “*Ars Poetica*,” edited and translated by Henry R. Fairclough. *Satires. Epistles. Ars Poetica*. 1926. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 442–489, here pp. 462–465, v.153–178; cf. spec. “notanda sunt tibi mores,” p. 462, v.156; “*décor*,” v.157; “*morabimur aptis*,” p. 464, v.178. Fuhrmann notes the nexus with “Hellenism, especially [...] Theophrastus, who [...] had given considerable attention to characterology” (*Dichtungstheorie*, p. 136; trans. dsm); as to a “Rhetorisierung der Poetik,” he logs “die bedeutende Rolle [...] die [...] dem Konventionellen und Typischen zukommt. Die Kategorie der Angemessenheit, des Passenden und Schicklichen (prepon, harmotton; *decorum*, *aptum*) entstammte der Rhetorik” (p. 156). “Beide Bereiche, das Konventionelle und das Typische, scheinen in dem Aristoteles-Schüler Theophrast den für die hellenistische Zeit wichtigsten oder gar maßgeblichen Theoretiker gefunden haben” (p. 157). Cf. Baldwin: “Ancient poetic was [...] rhetoricated” (*Ancient Rhetoric*, p. 240); “most of the *Ars Poetica* applies equally to *ars rhetorica*” (p. 246, with p. 245).

character) in a plausible and appositely expedient manner, always being – in his way, and as a matter of course – ‘economical with the facts.’³⁵

In a procedural passage, Thucydides explicates the professional guidelines for the economy of *sermocinationes* within his historical narrative:

As to the speeches that were made by different men [...] it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy [‘akríbeian’] the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports [‘apangéllousin’]. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion [‘peri ton aiei parónton tà déonta málist(a)’], though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.³⁶

The notion and practice of *dispositio* will per se signal that chronology does not tend to be the primary concern (even more so in other genres). In this respect, rhetorical economy is the *téchne*’s foremost task – especially with a view to employing it so effectually as to go unnoticed (‘*celare artem*’). Moreover, any historian will seek to vary his subject matter and its treatment (*tractatio*) to avoid tedium, precisely by producing an intense and dynamic effect in the reader’s experience

35 Hayden White refers to Jules Michelet’s conception of “the historian” as “writing on behalf of the dead,” and as “also writing *for* the dead” – as a “Prometheus,” who “will bring to the dead a fire sufficiently intense to melt the ice in which their ‘voices’ have been ‘frozen,’ so that the dead will be able to ‘speak once more’ for themselves”; moreover, “[t]he historian must be able to hear and to understand ‘words that were never spoken [...]’”. The task of the historian, finally, is ‘to make the silences of history speak[.]’ (*Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 158–159). In rhetorical terminology, the above formulations would primarily refer to *eidolopoíia*. White also mentions Karl Marx’ putting words into the mouths of “[t]he French bourgeoisie” (cf. “has them say,” p. 325) – a *sermocinatio* with a view to a collective (hence also a *prosopopoíia*). While diachronically and dependably central to historiography – as well as to White’s own project *de re* – he does not seem to focus on such ventriloquistic processes, and in one instance explicitly recants their interpretive function: “The protagonist of *The Old Regime* was the old regime itself [...]. It is too strong to say that Tocqueville actually personified the old regime and made of it the Tragic hero of his story, but there is a certain Lear-like quality about its dilemma” (p. 215).

36 Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War: Books I and II*, edited and translated by Charles Forster Smith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, I.xxii.1. Cf. Jacob Burckhardt. *Griechische Kulturgeschichte III. Gesammelte Werke*, vol. VII. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962, pp. 413–414; Wesley Trimpi. *Muses of One Mind: The Literary Analysis of Experience and Its Continuity*. Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2009, p. 57n. Smith notes that Thucydides’ “readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it” (“Introduction: Bibliography,” *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*, vol. 1, pp. vii–xxiii, p. xvii): “He dramatises history” (p. xviii).

(*enárgeia*); to this end, he provides vivid descriptions of certain scenes, or puts (striking) words into the mouths of familiar, (supposedly) historical or mythological protagonists (*sermocinatio*) – brings the dead to life, in (and by) speech (*eidolopoíia*), drafts distinctive portrayals with a characterizing function (*ethopoíia*), personifies collectives or abstract entities (*prosopopoíia*).

Tacitus deploys the ventriloquistic technique most efficaciously – typically for terse sentences, and at crucial or climactic moments.³⁷ In a context relating the mutinies in the largely unsubdued area known as ‘Germania,’ he presents them as worse than any “civil war” in the ensuing vivid description, which culminates in a distinctive *sermocinatio*:

The yells, the wounds, and the blood were plain enough; the cause, invisible [‘causa in occulto’]: chance ruled supreme [‘cuncta fors regit’]. [...] No general or tribune was there to restrain: licence [‘licentia’] was granted to the mob [‘vulgo’], and it might glut its vengeance to the full [‘satietas’]. Before long, Germanicus marched into the camp. ‘This is not a cure, but a calamity’ [‘non medicinam (...) sed cladem’], he said, with a burst of tears, and ordered the bodies to be cremated.³⁸

The entire scene seems to be disposed like the climax and (cathartic) *dénouement* of a tragedy; the pathopoietic words here put in Germanicus’ mouth are clearly functionalized with a view to *movere*.

One noted instance from Livy – being incomparably feckful also in generating myriad adaptations, reworkings, similarly floating in virtual cultural networks – is the ‘rape of Lucretia,’ her consequent suicide, and the establishing of the Roman Republic by Lucius Junius Brutus: initially, two short sentences are put into Sextus Tarquinius’ mouth, prior to his violation of the archetypal Roman lady; they commence: “Tace, Lucretia.”³⁹ The female protagonist is

³⁷ Baldwin notes that “*ethopoeiae*” (qua exercises) typically dealt with what “some [...] character of history or fiction [‘must have said’] on a critical occasion” (*Ancient Rhetoric*, pp. 71–72; cf. p. 218) – here with emphasis on the latter phrase.

³⁸ Tacitus. “The Annals: Books I–III,” translated by John Jackson. *The Histories: Books IV–V. The Annals: Books I–III*, vol. III, edited by Clifford H. Moore and John Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931, pp. 225–643, l.xlix. The translation accentuates the centrality and effectuality of the *sermocinatio* by a proximate, alliterative paronomasia in the parallelism (adapted to the needs of an analytical language).

³⁹ Livy. *History of Rome: Books 1–2*, edited and translated by Benjamin O. Foster. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, l.lviii.2. “‘Tace, Lucretia,’ inquit; ‘Sex. Tarquinius sum; ferrum in manu est; moriere, si emisieris vocem.’” As to the sustained intertextuality thereof, see Ian Donaldson. *The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and its Transformations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, passim; as well as Pavel Sokolov’s article in the present volume. On the concept of ‘(virtual) cultural networks,’ see Joachim Küpper, *The Cultural Net: Early Modern Drama as a Paradigm*.

later given a longer sequence of direct speech, reporting Tarquin's physical transgression to her husband. From the descriptive narrative, Livy transitions into a plausible dialogic sequence: "to her husband's question, 'Is all well?' she replied, 'Far from it'" – the Latin being even more dynamic, with question and answer immediately succeeding one another in Livy's textual economy: "'Satin salvae?' 'Minime.'"⁴⁰ Needless to say, the writer was not present, nor does it seem likely that he had at his disposal documents giving a verbatim account of Lucretia's precise wording; yet such a quasi 'historicism' notion is unlikely to occur (irrespective of its irrefutability), seeing that momentaneous *evidentia* – effected by *descriptio* and the verbal highpoint of the *sermocinatio* – is so effectual that the recipient's *ratio* (whatever its valence otherwise) will here be suspended.

By contrast, Augustine treats this event delegatively, in that he refers to an unspecified orator: "A certain declaimer develops ['declamans ait'] this theme admirably ['Egregie'] and accurately ['veraciterque']: 'A wonderful tale ['Mirabile dictu']! There were two and only one committed adultery ['duo fuerunt, et adulterium unus admisit'].'"⁴¹ Discursively, the Church Father requires this particular superstructure, his 'moral of the tale' – not Lucretia's direct speech (evoking her paganly inflected *ethos*, for which Augustine has no use). Since the declaimer is not known, while being all but tailored to the Christian *rhétor*'s purpose, the latter might as well have thought him up, using said *sententiae* as a pretext for the discursive needs in the economy of this particular context.⁴² When words are being put into the mouth of what is deemed a deity at a given point in time (as per the respectively prevalent language regime), cases like these have a tendency to turn particularly problematic

Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018. <https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/486166>. Accessed 25 July 2018; "Rhetoric and the Cultural Net: Transnational Agencies of Culture." *Rhetoric and Drama*, pp. 151–175. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-008/9783110484663-008.xml>. Accessed 25 July 2018; Mayfield, "Proceedings." *Rhetoric and Drama*, pp. 220–222. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-010/9783110484663-010.xml>. Accessed 25 July 2018.

⁴⁰ Livy, *History of Rome*, I.lviii.7.

⁴¹ Aurelius Augustine. *The City of God Against the Pagans: Books I–III*, translated by George E. McCracken. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 84–85, I.xix; with p. 84n. (concerning the declaimer).

⁴² Nor would it be beyond that *rhétor malgré soi* to be drawing on his own oratorical schooling, while discriminating between his rhetorical 'self' prior to, and after, the '*tolle lege*' (see above).

(qua ‘speaking in the name of’). For lack of competence in that field, one may leave such aside, here.⁴³

Being human, however, a scholar could seem qualified with respect to what is thought by some to be the other side, the Humanities – wherefore one might adduce these words, which John Milton aptly places in the mouth of his protagonist: “Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven!”⁴⁴ They are particularly pertinent here, since that assertion is a variation on a Homeric *sermocinatio*, which had long been floating in various cultural networks – the source context being the *Odyssey*’s hero meeting Achilles in Hades.⁴⁵ The latter is made to say:

43 Cf. “*Deum autem velle*” (Hans Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt: Typologie der frühen Wirkungen. Der Stillstand des Himmels und der Fortgang der Zeit*, vol. II, 3rd edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996, p. 406). This piece of writing is attributed to “Menippus the Cynic”: “Epistles artificially composed as if by the gods [‘apò tou ton theon prosòpou’]” (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. II, edited and translated by Robert D. Hicks. 1925. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 104–105, VI.101). Similarly, when a writer or *rhétor* is said to speak for – to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of – another entity envisioned (vice versa, *de re*): “et Xenophontis voce Musas quasi locutas ferunt” (Marcus Tullius Cicero. “Orator,” translated by Harry M. Hubbell. *Brutus. Orator*, edited by George L. Hendrickson and Harry M. Hubbell. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, pp. 295–509, here p. 350, xix.62). Cf. a *sermocinatio* of “God” in Seneca: “Put a itaque deum dicere” (*Moral Essays*, edited and translated by John W. Basore. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928, p. 42, VI.3); at the outset: “the task is not difficult, – I shall be pleading the cause of the gods” (p. 3, I.1); plus the (quasi theodicy-like) setup or pretext: “You have asked me, Lucilius, why, if a Providence rules the world, it still happens that many evils befall good men” (ibid.). See Horace’s *sermocinatio* for the goddess Juno concerning Troy and Rome (*Odes and Epodes*, edited and translated by Niall Rudd. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012, III.3). Horace interrupts or ends his *sermocinatio* for Juno with the words (externalizing and personifying the Muse by addressing her): “non hoc iocosae conveniet lyrae; / quo, Musa, tendis? Desine pervicax / referre sermones deorum et / magna modis tenuare parvis” (III.3.69–72). See also Augustine’s *prosopopoiia* treated above.

44 John Milton. *Paradise Lost: Authoritative Text. Sources and Backgrounds. Criticism*, edited by Gordon Teskey. New York: Norton, 2005, I.263.

45 For a figurative reapplication to (actual) political life, cf. Cicero’s citation (or *sermocinatio*) of part of a letter by Atticus, (implicitly) equating Odysseus with Caesar, and the ghosts with the latter’s followers (see the keyword “νέκυια”; Marcus Tullius Cicero. *Letters to Atticus*, edited and translated by David R. Shackleton Bailey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, §17.IX.10; cf. p. 60n.); one might say that Atticus (as cited by Cicero) is inverting the procedure of *prosopopoiia* (resp. *eidolopoiia*), seeing that he quasi de-personifies (or ‘ghostifies’) human beings along the lines of a paradigmatic segment of a traditional, arch-familiar text.

Never try to reconcile me to death, glorious Odysseus. I should choose, so I might live on earth, to serve as the hireling of another, some landless man with hardly enough to live on, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have perished.⁴⁶

While varied, the context remains similar, hence recognizable; but the Homeric *eidolopoia* (Achilles being defunct at this point) has been transferred to an altogether different discursive setting in Milton.⁴⁷

When inserted into a chiefly narrative context, likely ventriloquisms will often be realized as individual *sententiae* only – for instance, when Suetonius recounts Caesar’s arrival in Africa: “No regard for religion ever turned him from any undertaking, or even delayed him. [...] Even when he had a fall as he disembarked, he gave the omen a favorable turn by crying: ‘I hold thee fast, Africa’ [‘Teneo te’, inquit, ‘Africa’].”⁴⁸ Given the context and its economy, the words put in Caesar’s mouth here also serve an ethopoietic purpose.

From a metapoetical perspective, *sermocinationes* are at times embedded in anecdotal exchanges or dialogues. This typically occurs when (allegedly) historical figures meet, and celebrated or clever utterances are being put into their mouths for maximum effect (disposed with a view to an especially vivid immediacy, functioning as ‘momentaneous evidence’); some may have already been floating in virtual cultural networks in certain variants, while others are crafted for, and disposed to suit, the particular (discursive) purpose at hand. In a context concisely exemplifying Spartan “terseness” (‘laconism’) – and also with an ethopoietic agenda – Plutarch attributes words to the respective parties:

46 Homer. *Odyssey: Books 1–12*, translated by Alan T. Murray and George E. Dimock, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, XI.488–491.

47 For the reference, cf. Scott Ellege’s note: “An ironic echo of *Odyssey* 11.489–91, where the shade of Achilles tells Odysseus that it is better to be a farmhand on earth than a king among the dead” (quoted in: John Milton. “Paradise Lost. Second Edition (1674).” *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*, vol. I, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, and Meyer H. Abrams. New York: Norton, 2006, pp. 1830–2055, here p. 1838n.) – whether or not there is ‘irony’ in play here would depend on the sense attached to that concept in this context. In Milton, the term *eidolopoia* would arguably no longer be applicable, since Satan is not dead and cannot die (dogmatically speaking).

48 Suetonius. *Lives of the Caesars: I–IV*, translated by John C. Rolfe, edited by Keith R. Bradley, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, I.lix. For an early modern refunctionalization of said fall in Pedro Calderón de la Barca, see Küpper, *Discursive Renovatio*, pp. 342–343, with n. “[V]eni•vidi•vici” – the most notorious words on Caesar’s part – are not actually put in the victor’s mouth in Suetonius, but “displayed among the show-pieces” of the triumph as “an inscription of but three words” – with this comment: “not indicating the events of the war [...], but the speed with which it was finished” (*Lives of the Caesars*, I.xxxvii.2).

when Philip wrote to them, ‘If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out,’ they wrote back, ‘If.’ And when King Demetrius was annoyed and shouted, ‘Have the Spartans sent only one envoy to me?’ the envoy replied undismayed, ‘One to one.’⁴⁹

In the second instance, a delegate – functionally standing in, and actually speaking for, a collective – demonstrates that the device of *prosopopoiia* might be replaced (with a view to verisimilitude, for instance) by referring to (an otherwise abstract political institution typically represented by) actual persons such as emissaries, ambassadors, etc.

In other genres, such as the Platonic or Lucianic dialogue, one frequently encounters protagonists that ‘everyone knows’ from similar renderings: these are familiar *personae* floating in the vast virtual networks of a culture’s oral and written tradition, with characteristic sayings, dialogic anecdotes, or exemplary feats (at times rather loosely) attached to them (*dialogismoí, ethopoiiai*).⁵⁰ In such cases, there is a need to maintain a certain recognizability (as per the *aptum*), but also a considerable leeway in precisely this respect; hence a writer might produce the desired effects of both recognition (formally, an effect of repetition) and novelty (unfamiliarity) or variation in the recipients.⁵¹

49 Plutarch. *Moralia*, vol. 6, translated by William C. Helmbold. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 445, 511A. Cf. “the words of a Laconian, sparse and clear, differ from those of a man of Attica, which are voluble” (Aelius Theon. “The Exercises of Aelius Theon,” edited and translated by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata*, §8.116); “the words of a Laconian will be ‘few and clear’, and those of a man of Attica garrulous” (John of Sardis/Sopatros, “Selections,” §11.196).

50 “Exemplum est alicuius facti et dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio” (*Rhetorica*, IV.xlix.62). Cf. “A style without contrivance fits ethopoeias; for the speaker will say what is acknowledged universally in a scattered fashion, in short phrases and without connectives. And it ought to be wholly consistent with the character and the subject. Concise (*syntomos*): Vigorous, forceful; for that is the style of commonly accepted ideas and what each person knows” (John of Sardis/Sopatros, “Selections,” §11.208,4; emphasis removed from “concise”). Cf. Gill, “Personhood,” p. 181.

51 With respect to effectually using something ‘*xenikòn*,’ see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1404b. As to the *aptum* in the above respect, cf. Asmuth: “The ties between the poetics of drama and rhetoric are even closer with regard to the *characters* and their style of speaking. When Aristotle introduces *appropriateness* (πρέπον, [...] ἀρμόττον [...]) as a stylistic principle in his ‘Rhetoric’, he is thinking of diction as adequate to the situation and case at hand, but especially to the speaker’s social status. Accordingly, the conceptions of his ‘Poetics’ concerning characters (Greek *êthê*, singular: *êthos*) in drama entirely adhere to the principle of appropriateness: the character of a dramatic persona is to be in accord with its social role, with the historical tradition, and with itself” (Bernhard Asmuth. “Drama,” translated by DS Mayfield. *Rhetoric and Drama*, pp. 179–201, here p. 185. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-009/9783110484663-009.xml>. Accessed 25 July 2018. On variation with a view to the audience, see Cicero: “Consequently it is necessary to choose [‘est eligendum’] the style of oratory [‘Genus (...) dicendi’] best calculated

This ties in with Aristotle's *Poetics*, stating that a well-known 'historical' or mythological character must be rendered according to the tradition – for the most part:

Now, one cannot break up the transmitted stories (I mean, e.g., Clytemnestra's death at Orestes' hands, and Eriphyle's at Alcmæon's), but the poet should be [rhetorically] inventive ['heurískein'] as well as making good use of traditional stories.⁵²

To some degree of probability, a *persona*'s remodeling must proceed within certain limits set by custom, and be in keeping with what may be familiar to – hence deemed apposite by – a given audience regarding a particular (mythologico-historical) protagonist.⁵³ Aristotle habitually counsels to initially tie in with what 'everyone knows or might know' – with what is likely to be literally 'plausible' – since such evokes and effects a 'universal' common ground, on which to simultaneously draw and build for utmost impact: "With character, precisely as in the structure of events, one should always seek necessity or probability ['tò anankaion hèn tò eikós']."⁵⁴

The Aristophanic *Clouds* – staging 'Socrates' in a manner somewhat dissimilar from other renderings – may be the most notorious example in this respect:

to hold the attention of the audience ['quod maxime teneat eos qui audiant'], and not merely to give them pleasure ['delectet'] but also to do so without giving them too much of it ['sine satietate delectet']" ("On the Orator," III.xxiv.97) – i.e. 'variation without satiety for maximum efficiency'; the context being the *ornatus* (cf. III.xxv.99–100; Quintilian, *Institutio*, 4.2.118).

52 Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1453b. See also Joachim Küpper's article in the present volume. The fact that today many of the (mythological, historical) names given by Aristotle (perhaps spec. 'Eriphyle,' 'Alcmæon') will be recognized only by specialists (in contrast to, say, 'Achilles' or 'Helen') may seem to prove the point the philosopher is making (see the note below).

53 This links to the rhetorical directive of always reckoning with, and adhering to, *decorum* (*tò prépon*) – meaning, suitability not only in subject matter, but also in terms of being credibly in accord with the common knowledge floating in virtual cultural networks at a given time. Cf. Wesley Trimpi, connecting *aequitas* and the *aptum*: "Equity gains its freedom from (written) statutes and poetry its freedom from (recorded) history by concentrating on qualitative issues. Equity seeks the proper relation between the individual controversy to be judged and the body of statutes to be applied to it, while poetry seeks the proper relation of given particular events, historical or imaginary, to a principle by means of which they may gain significance" (Wesley Trimpi. "Reason and the Classical Premises of Literary Decorum." *Independent Journal of Philosophy* 5/6 [1988], pp. 103–111, here p. 104).

54 Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1454a. Naturally, one might as well claim to be referring to a general consensus or common ground that does not obtain (or no longer); generally thereto, see Mayfield, *Artful Immorality*, pp. 80, 80n.–81n., 115, 187. Cf. "for this is already common knowledge, and there is nobody who does not agree ['homologeí'], both from what he has been told ['akoe mathèn'] and from personal experience ['peíra']" (Dionysius of Halicarnassus. "Lysias [ΛΥΣΙΑΣ ΣΥΠΑΚΟΥΣΙΟΣ ΠΑΤΡΟΘΕΝ]," edited and translated by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*, vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 20–99, pp. 36–37, §10, here infinitized).

when contrasted with Plato's variously nuanced versions, the play evinces both a certain set of overlapping characteristics being attributed to the *persona* 'Socrates,' and a considerable scope as regards the tendency of the overall, ethopoietic 'image' conveyed. In a dialogic exchange with the would-be student Strepsiades, the latter asks: "tell me [...] what you're up to"; and the Aristophanic 'Socrates' replies: "I tread the air and scrutinize the sun."⁵⁵ With regard to the dramatist's poetics, these words represent a *sermocinatio* specially suited to the context and its economy.

Generally (and metapoetically) speaking, rhetorical ventriloquism may also serve as an (implicit) pretext for writing in the first place. With regard to Plato's delegated prolixity, Blumenberg wryly remarks: "Of course, only someone who lets Socrates speak is permitted to write that much" – while spiriting away his own philosophical *persona*.⁵⁶ Robert Branham suggests that one discern "Plato's

55 Aristophanes. *Clouds*, edited and translated by Jeffrey Henderson. *Clouds. Wasps. Peace*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 1–211, here v. 224–225.

56 Hans Blumenberg. *Ein mögliches Selbstverständnis: Aus dem Nachlaß*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997, with the context: "Dialoge können nicht geschrieben, allenfalls nachgeschrieben werden, wie fiktiv auch immer. An der sokratischen Verweigerung des Schreibens rechtfertigt Plato den sokratischen Dialog: So viel darf eben nur schreiben, wer Sokrates reden läßt" (ibid.). To this extent, Plato – ostensibly keeping silent about 'himself' – puts 'Socrates' (qua *persona*) into the notional (and semantic) position that would be labeled 'god' in other (usually religious) contexts. As to such silence with another accent, see Immanuel Kant, citing Bacon's "*Instauratio magna. Praefatio. / De nobis ipsis silemus: De re autem*" (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Werkausgabe*, vol. III, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 13th edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 7) – in other words: still letting the resp. prevalent 'god' speak (be it called 'res,' or 'Reason,' or otherwise); see Blumenberg: "*De nobis ipsis silemus* [...]. Es ist ein Schlüsselwort der Epoche" (*Schriften zur Technik*, edited by Alexander Schmitz and Bernd Stiegler. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015, p. 74); "Ohne alle transzendente Phraseologie wird fast zwanglos ihr identisches Ergebnis fällig, daß wir über uns schweigen: *De nobis ipsis silemus*" (*Beschreibung des Menschen*, edited by Manfred Sommer. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2006, p. 15). Such silence (e.g. as a result of the state of transmission) may lead to attempts at personifying an author from the text. Sappho might be a particularly elucidating example. As to "the complex relation between face and voice in fragment 31" and "the mutual implication of speaking and not speaking in this poem," see Yopie Prins. "Sappho's Afterlife in Translation." *Re-Reading Sappho: Reception and Transmission*, edited by Ellen Greene. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996, pp. 36–67, p. 43; with "Sappho: Testimonia. Text," edited and translated by David A. Campbell. *Greek Lyric*, vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 2–205, here pp. 78–81, §31; Longinus, "On the Sublime," pp. 198–199, §10.2.; cf. Elizabeth D. Harvey. *Ventriloquized Voices: Feminist Theory and English Renaissance Texts*. London: Routledge, 1995, p. 124; "Ventriloquizing Sappho, or the Lesbian Muse." *Re-Reading Sappho*, pp. 79–104, here pp. 88–89. Prins notes: "Through [...] personification[,] Longinus is able to conflate poem and poet: Sappho is fragment 31" ("Sappho's Afterlife," pp. 49–50; generally, cf. pp. 42–43, 45–46, 53).

comic technique” in “presenting thinkers as personified expressions of their theories, as comic instantiations of their own dominant ideas.”⁵⁷

Many dialogues – such as Plato’s *Symposium*, or Lucian’s artful pieces – might be seen as virtually giving themselves to being put on stage, certain elaborate diegetic frameworks notwithstanding. Branham, also referring to Lucian’s use of *prosopopoeia*, states:

Where New Comic or classical tragic poets appear to have constructed their plays from the plot up, Lucian’s procedure is just the opposite: he begins by selecting a recognizable voice or set of voices and then projects them into a provocative situation, whether in Hades, on Olympus, or in ancient Athens. Here his rhetorical training in imitating the masters serves him well. In fact, Lucian’s protean ability for imitation and parody brings him into contact with every major genre from Homer through Theocritus.⁵⁸

Plato and Lucian might be taken as expedient examples with a view to suggesting that the temporal distance to the ‘actual life’ of the historical individual is only of secondary import: once a recognizable *persona* is floating in the vast virtual networks of various (interwoven) cultures, it may take on – or relinquish en route – many different ‘masks’ or ‘public images’; the latter suggest what will be deemed appropriate for that *persona* at a given point in time, and relatively regardless of genre (*de re*). Ventriloquistic techniques are of universal application, the same as the *rhetoriké téchne* on the whole – whether applied in historiography, drama, philosophical dialogue, or otherwise.

D. Laertius represents a *copia* in this regard: with rather few references to sources, and all but indiscriminately as to the emitting discourse or context, his *Lives* collect and assemble myriad instances as are likely to have been *sermocinationes* (stand-alone, embedded in *ethopoíai*, part of dramatic works, etc.). Frequently

⁵⁷ Robert B. Branham. *Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 72.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5. This reverses Aristotle’s recommended procedure: “A plot is not unified, as some think, if built round an individual” (*Poetics*, 1451a); Halliwell glosses: “unity of ‘hero’ is not a sufficient (or even necessary) condition for unity of plot” (p. 57n.). This links to the accentuation of the ‘*kathólou*’ in ‘*poíesis*’ (*sensu lato*), as contrasted with the emphasis on “particulars” in “history” (1451b): “In comedy [...] the poets construct the plot on the basis of probability, and only then supply arbitrary names; they do not, like iambic poets, write about a particular person. But in tragedy they adhere to the actual names. The reason is that the possible seems plausible [...]. Yet even in some tragedies there are only one or two familiar names, while the rest are invented; and in certain plays no name is familiar[.] [...] adherence to the traditional plots of tragedy should not be sought at all costs. Indeed, to seek this is absurd, since even the familiar subjects are familiar only to a minority, yet nonetheless please everyone” (p. 57n.).

(or even typically), the reader of anecdotes is probably facing rhetorico-*enargic* fabrications crafted with a view to effecting strikingly vivid scenes, specifically by putting words into the mouths of particular *personae*. The *Lives* may thus be seen as a rhetorical arsenal of effectual attributions (*sermocinationes*) and characterizations (*ethopoïiai*) – a depot that might serve as a sort of ‘checklist’ as to what may be thought to have been aptly hence plausibly attached to certain supposedly historical figures. Multiple ascriptions of similar sayings or anecdotes to different protagonists point to overlaps in the ‘personating’ (typifying, characterizing) process – this being one of the necessary results of any ‘image’ floating in virtual cultural networks: once a rhetorical ‘self’ is found to ‘sell,’ it will inevitably be recycled, leading to further *sermocinationes* (a dynamics remaining fairly stable to this day).⁵⁹ The ensuing set of layered statements might serve as a sample:

Sotion [...] says that he [sc. Anaxagoras] was indicted [...] on a charge of impiety [‘asebeías’] [...] and that sentence of death was passed on Anaxagoras by default. When news was brought him that he was condemned and his sons were dead, his comment on the sentence was, ‘Long ago nature condemned both my judges and myself to death’; and on his sons, ‘I knew that my children were born to die’. Some, however, tell this story of Solon, and others of Xenophon.⁶⁰

The latter signals that, metapoetically, the reader is here facing the characteristic floating of *sententiae* qua *sermocinationes*. As Blumenberg notes, Johann

⁵⁹ For Plotinus’ (discursive) refunctionalization of a *dictum* on the part of the *Iliad*’s Agamemnon by ‘putting it into the mouth of’ the *Odyssey*’s hero, see Blumenberg, *Arbeit am Mythos*, pp. 87–88; in line with his overall thesis in that volume, the philosopher explicitly deems this “work on myth” (p. 88; trans. dsm). Cf. Harald Weinrich’s formulation: “Sokrates [...], dem Plato die [äso]pische Fabel in den Mund legt” (“Thales und die thrakische Magd: allseitige Schadenfreude.” *Das Komische*, edited by Wolfgang Preisendanz and Rainer Warning. Munich: Fink, 1976, pp. 435–437, here p. 435).

⁶⁰ D. Laertius, *Lives*, pp. 142–143, II.12–13. See Cicero: “the words Euripides has put into the mouth of Theseus [‘a Theseo dicta’] [...] [‘]this lesson from wise lips I learnt, / Within my Heart I pondered ills to come: [...] that [...] / No sudden care should rend me unprepared [‘Ne me imparatum cura laceraret repens’]’]. By the lesson which Theseus says he learnt from a wise man, Euripides means a lesson which he had learnt himself. For he had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, according to the story, said when he heard of his son’s death, ‘I knew that I had begotten a mortal [‘Sciebam me genuisse mortalem’]’. This saying shows that such events are cruel for those who have not reflected upon them” (Marcus Tullius Cicero. *Tusculan Disputations*, edited and translated by John E. King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, III.xiv.29–30). For other variants, see Seneca’s *sermocinatio* of ‘Demetrius’: “Do you [‘immortal gods’] wish to take my children? – it was for you that I fathered them” (*Moral Essays*, p. 37, V.5); cf. “Good men lose their sons; why not, since sometimes they even slay them?” (p. 43, VI.2) – with the note referring to “Lucius Junius Brutus and Manlius Torquatus” (p. 42n.).

Wolfgang von Goethe refunctionalized the above aphorism, applying it to the (factual) demise of his own son: “*Non ignoravi me mortalem genuisse.*”⁶¹

From a pragmatic perspective, D. Laertius’ *Lives* demonstrate the degree to which the various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism are in fact effectual: its techniques conduce to producing a vivid, characteristic, and probable image of certain *personae* (*ethopoïa*, with respect to *eikós* and a view to *enárgeia*); and to crafting sayings (also in verbal exchanges) to be put into the mouth of these characters (*dialogismós*). So as to effect plausibility, attention is paid to remaining in accord with their *ethos* as generally understood, while a certain flexibility obtains as to what will be deemed apposite in terms of such attributions. Negotiating this tension in his textual economy – navigating with respect to the *aptum* – delineates the scope and leeway for the writer (dramatist, philosopher, orator, historian) as regards making his particular point (including where ‘universal’ by implication). The same as the overall *téchne*, the rhetorico-poetic device of *sermocinatio* is trans-generic in terms of application.⁶² Whereas the specific

61 Blumenberg, *Goethe zum Beispiel*, p. 225. See Goethe’s refunctionalization of the statement vis-à-vis his own son (August) as related by Blumenberg: “auf die Nachricht, das einzige von ihm [sc. Goethe] bewirkte Leben sei erloschen, erwiderte er ohne Zweifel oder Verzweiflung, ausweichend in die lateinische Sprache, was zuerst von einem Griechen gesagt worden war, er habe gewußt, nur einen Sterblichen gezeugt zu haben: *Non ignoravi me mortalem genuisse*” (ibid.). Frequently, similar remarks ascribed or attributed to specific philosophers, or other *personae*, will actually derive from dramatic, dialogic, or comparable renderings – sometimes even explicitly, e.g. in D. Laertius: “Menippus in his *Sale of Diogenes* tells how, when he was captured and put up for sale, he was asked what he could do. He replied, ‘Govern men [‘andron árchein’]” (*Lives*, vol. II, pp. 30–31, VI.29); or, a case without direct speech: “Through watching a mouse running about, says Theophrastus in the Megarian dialogue [...], he [sc. ‘Diogenes’] discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances [‘peristáseos’]” (pp. 24–25, VI.22). As of early modern times, the source will often be novels; since the beginning of the twentieth century, they predictably derive from motion pictures – and from comparable forms of immediate, ‘enargic’ virtuality in the twenty-first. As to the ‘floating of *sententiae*,’ see the following phrases on the part of D. Laertius: “Sotion, however, [...] makes the Cynic address this remark to Plato himself” (p. 29, VI.26); “Others give this retort to Theodorus” (p. 45, VI.42); “But others attribute this remark to Diagoras of Melos” (p. 61, VI.59).

62 In a genealogical argument, David Sansone wishes to reverse dependences: “we are willing to believe, on the authority of Aristotle and others, that the earliest dramatists needed to learn from the earliest rhetoricians how to put persuasive words into the mouths of their characters. [...] on the contrary, it was the revolutionary innovation represented by the development of the drama that inspired the creation of rhetorical theory” (*Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, p. 20). For Lysias’ “comic characterization” (“*ethopoïa*”) of an “*alazon*” and the staging of “an upside-down world (*mundus perversus*),” see Phillip Harding. “Comedy and Rhetoric.” *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, edited by Ian Worthington. London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 196–221, spec. pp. 202–206, here pp. 202–203; he précises: “Lysias [...] used many of the

disposition (selection and placement, hence function) in a work with historical claims will typically be a highpoint or a climax (not least for reasons of variation in the textual economy), dialogic works featuring familiar *personae* consist of sequential, contextualized *sermocinationes* (with narrative elements reduced in keeping with generic conventions); in an equally metapoetic perspective, this ventriloquistic device proves especially expedient in drama, where the words have actually been put into various mouths, speech is dynamically enacted on the stage, and performed with a high degree of vivid immediacy and intensity.⁶³

In (apparently) referential works, citations may take on a character similar to *sermocinationes*, specifically if the respective ‘authority’ is overtly or subtly recontextualized, overstated, misquoted, or fabricated altogether.⁶⁴ As Leo

techniques of the comic dramatist – exaggeration, incongruity, parody, absurdity, the impossible and, [...] as he makes his own character admit, he has masterfully taken the comic hero off the stage and put him in court” (p. 206). Cf. Mayfield, “Interplay,” pp. 10n.–12n.; with further references.

63 Such accommodates the audience’s delight in, and gusto for, ‘special effects’ – and is thus conducive to effecting an unreflected persuadedness, an only apparently ‘informed consent.’ See Quintilian: “etiam credit facilius quae audienti iucunda sunt, et voluptate ad fidem ducitur” (*Institutio*, 4.2.119). Cf. Augustine’s “*dilige et quod vis fac*” (as quoted in: Carolyn Hammond. “Timeline: Life of Augustine. The Wider Church and the Empire.” *Confessions: Books 1–8*, pp. lx–lxxv, here p. lxii); in Lawrence D. Green’s words: “Once your auditor thinks you love him, you can tell him anything” (“Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and Renaissance Views of the Emotions.” *Renaissance Rhetoric*, edited by Peter Mack. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 1–26, here p. 7); he gives a mediated version as “Ama, & dic quod vis” (*ibid.*, p. 22n.; cf. Mayfield, “Interplay,” pp. 18n.–19n.).

64 Cf. “Thales is quoted verbatim by Seneca, although he left nothing written behind” (Hans Blumenberg. *Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer: Paradigmen einer Daseinsmetapher*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1979, p. 10n.; trans. dsm). See Grube’s formulations (here as regards gleaned fragments to form a tentative notion of lost works): “Theophrastus is quoted as saying,” “Ammonius [...] quotes Theophrastus as saying” (*Greek and Roman Critics*, p. 106); “a passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus [...] quotes Theophrastus as saying” (p. 108); “attributes to Theophrastus a statement” (*ibid.*). Grube also cites “Gellius quot[ing] Varro as saying” (p. 163); these might as well be *sermocinationes*. Jorge Luis Borges often uses such devices, most notoriously in his “Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*” (“Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*,” edited and translated by Andrew Hurley. *Collected Fictions*. New York: Penguin, 1998, pp. 88–95, *passim*). Mikhail Bakhtin stresses “the transmission and re-processing of another’s word [...] the speaker introduces into the other’s words his own intentions and highlights the context of those words in his own way” (*The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002, p. 355). “Rhetorical genres possess the most varied forms for transmitting another’s speech, and for the most part these are intensely dialogized forms. Rhetoric relies heavily on the vivid re-accentuating of the words it transmits (often to the point of distorting them completely) [...]. Rhetorical genres provide rich material for studying a variety of forms for transmitting another’s speech, the most varied means for formulating and framing such speech” (p. 354); “in the makeup of almost every utterance spoken by a social person [...] a

Strauss notes, Niccolò Machiavelli arguably outperformed all in the art of rhetorical ventriloquism: he often slightly alters traditional *dicta* by Livy or Tacitus (partly fictive, to begin with), but also *Scriptural* passages.⁶⁵ The manipulation of the source text or author is effective both in terms of the resulting statement, and with a view to readers able to discern the difference – hence that Machiavelli has, in point of fact, put words into the mouths of ‘Livy,’ ‘Tacitus,’ or the *Biblical* ‘David,’ while seemingly ‘just’ citing.⁶⁶ Whereas such changes are typically tacit,

significant number of words can be identified that are implicitly or explicitly admitted as someone else’s, and that are transmitted by a variety of different means. Within the arena of almost every utterance an intense interaction and struggle between one’s own and another’s word is being waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically interanimate each other” (ibid.).

65 Cf. Strauss, *Thoughts*, pp. 35–36, 42, 106–107, 137–167; spec. “Machiavelli’s Livy is a character of Machiavelli” (p. 141); “Tacitus is less Machiavelli’s model than his creation” (p. 165); see Mansfield, *Machiavelli’s Virtue*, pp. 132, 320n.; Mayfield, *Artful Immorality*, pp. 83n., 91n. As to the refunctionalizations of *Scripture* and Tacitus, cf. Niccolò Machiavelli. *Il Principe*, edited by Giorgio Inglese. Turin: Einaudi, 1995, pp. 93–96, XIII; thereto, see Strauss, *Thoughts*, pp. 329n.–330n.; Mayfield, *Artful Immorality*, pp. 180–182). Cf. these formulations in Trimpi (infinetized here with a view to demonstrating universal applicability): “In referring to [...] [he] makes certain important, though inconspicuous, changes. [...] Each time [...] [he] cites this passage [...], he omits the qualifying phrase [...]. The omission is probably not accidental”; with context: “Plotinus has changed Plato’s ‘to become like God (ὁμοιωσις θεῷ)’ [...] into ‘to be god (θεὸν εἶναι)’” (*Muses*, p. 170).

66 It also applies to scenes dramatizing the exploits of the otherwise historical ‘Cesare Borgia,’ whom the factual author ‘Machiavelli’ is known to have met; in such cases, an intratextual ‘Machiavelli’ (with the *ethos* of a counselor) puts words into the mouth of his textual *persona* ‘Cesare’ so effectively that the ventriloquism might go unnoticed, and be taken at face value (sc. ‘historically’). Cf. “Multum refert etiam quae sit persona suadentis” (Quintilian, *Institutio*, 3.8.48); *de re*, see this collocation: “auctoritate personarum” (10.1.97). Rhetorical ventriloquism is similarly utile in terms of this subtle device: “Hase de hablar a los presentes en los passados” (Baltasar Gracián. *Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia*, edited by Emilio Blanco, 9th ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2011, p. 217, §210) – with the gloss: “referir la censura a un personaje de la historia” (p. 217n.); “Y es [...] el arbitrio empleado por los tacitistas [...] que se sirven de personajes de la antigüedad para verter sus juicios en sus libros” (ibid.); another statement is glossed: “que lo pone en boca de” etc. (ibid., p. 133n.). With regard to Shakespeare, see Julie Maxwell. “How the Renaissance (Mis)Used Sources: The Art of Misquotation.” *How To Do Things with Shakespeare: New Approaches, New Essays*, edited by Laurie Maguire. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, pp. 54–76, passim, spec. the central claims: “In scholarship, misquotation is vexing. In literature, it is an art” (p. 56); “Misquotation occurs in [...] verbal inexactness [...] quoting out of context, in ways that are recognizably transgressive: irreverent, self-serving, devious [...] ‘The devil can cite scripture for his purpose’ [...] *The Merchant of Venice* (1.3.98)” (p. 57–58); “Renaissance readers and writers [...] were taught to misquote creatively. Renaissance England was a quoting culture” (p. 58); “The New Testament is full of quotations from the Old, used mainly to justify arguments. So to quote or misquote the Bible, argumentatively, is to imitate its strategies” (p. 63); “Shakespeare’s misquotations often economize” (p. 67); “Misquoting is an art” (p. 71).

the ensuing ‘twisting of words’ in a highly ‘floatational,’ frequently quoted and apparently recycled Ancient example makes a point of the distortion:

when Aristotle observed that Isocrates succeeded in obtaining a distinguished set of pupils by means of [...] devoting his discourses to empty elegance of style [‘ad inanem sermonis elegantiam’], he himself suddenly altered [‘mutavit repente’] almost the whole of his own system of training, and quoted a line from *Philoctetes* with a slight modification [‘paulo secus’]: the hero in the tragedy said that it was a disgrace for him to keep silent and suffer the barbarians to speak, but Aristotle put it ‘suffer Isocrates to speak’; and consequently he put the whole of his system of philosophy in a polished and brilliant form[.]⁶⁷

It will always be decisive, which words are being put into the mouth of whom, at what time, in which setting and whose presence – a matter of rhetorical *dispositio*; and ventriloquistically discrediting someone is not just a political, but also a literary and philosophical phenomenon.⁶⁸

The polyphony constitutive of dialogues allows much leeway in the textual economy of *sermocinationes*.⁶⁹ It will be no accident that Plato perfected this

⁶⁷ Cicero, “On the Orator,” III.xxxv.141; cf. 110n. See also: “Aristotle [...] under the stimulus of the fame of the rhetorician Isocrates, began like him to teach the young to speak and combine wisdom with eloquence [‘prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere’]” – with “dicere docere” adjoined in the Latin (*Tusculan Disputations*, I.iv.7); the gloss reads: “Isocrates, ‘that old man eloquent’ [...]”. With reference to his rivalry with Isocrates[,] Aristotle made, it was said, constant use of the line, αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσοκράτην δ’ ἔαν λέγειν” (pp. 8n.–9n.). Quintilian gives this version: “Isocrates’ pupils distinguished themselves in every branch of study, and when he was an old man (and he lived to be 98), Aristotle began teaching rhetoric in afternoon lectures, often parodying (we are told [‘ut traditur’]) the well-known line [‘versu (...) frequenter usus’] in the *Philoctetes*: [‘]Shame to keep quiet, and let Isocrates speak [‘turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere’][’]” (*Institutio*, 3.1.14; cf. p. 14n.).

⁶⁸ To say nothing of statements such as “The devil speaks in him” (William Shakespeare. *The Tempest*, edited by Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan, 3rd edition. London: Thomson, 2005, 5.1.129). Even so, an epideictic functionalization with a different tendency is also conceivable; in this respect, see the assorted words put into Lichtenberg’s mouth by Blumenberg as an *hommage* (“‘Wie geht’s, sagte ein Blinder zu einem Lahmen. Wie Sie sehen, antwortete der Lahme.’” *Lichtenbergs Funkenflug der Vernunft: Eine Hommage*, edited by Jörg-Dieter Kogel et al. Frankfurt a. M.: Insel, 1992, pp. 21–23.). Ascribing an entire book to a particular authority might be seen as something like an editorial *sermocinatio*, with (potentially) far-reaching consequences in terms of (the history of) reception; a notorious case would be the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*; Harry Caplan states the needful: “The fact that the treatise appeared, from Jerome’s time on, as a work by Cicero gave it a prestige which it enjoyed for over a thousand years” (“Introduction.” *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, pp. vii–lviii, here p. vii–viii). See also *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric*, edited by Anne King and Helen North. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1970, p. 2.

⁶⁹ Cf. Sloane: “humanist prose is [...] always many voiced” (“Rhetorical Education,” p. 175). For Galileo Galilei’s writings in this genre, several analyses on Blumenberg’s part demonstrate a functional process of dialogic distribution (rhetorical *dispositio*); in one instance, the censor(s)

particular art of discourse, seeing that *dialogismós* is also a delegative device, enabling the distribution of otherwise (self-)contradictory statements, the enactment of argument *in utramque partem*; most importantly, it conduces to an effectual practice of *parrhesía* in permitting one's saying anything one cannot – or does not wish to – say in one's own name even so.⁷⁰

had demanded that a certain formula be included in the text – and Galilei puts it into the mouth of Simplicio, the very protagonist who does not prevail in the dispute: “Anstoß sollte erregen, daß Galilei diese ärgerliche Formel dem Simplicio in den Mund legt, also der Figur des Dialoges, die am Ende Verlierer ist” (*Legitimität der Neuzeit*, 2nd edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1999, p. 461; cf. pp. 64, 459; also: “Das Fernrohr und die Ohnmacht der Wahrheit.” *Sidereus Nuncius: Nachricht von neuen Sternen*, edited by Hans Blumenberg, 2nd edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2002, pp. 7–75, here p. 64). As to the formulations used to express the process of *sermocinatio* generally, see also: “läßt Galilei den Salviati sagen” (Blumenberg, *Legitimität*, p. 465); “[Giordano] Bruno läßt seinen Teofilo sagen” (“Einleitung: Das Universum eines Ketzers.” *Das Aschermittwochsmahl*, edited by Hans Blumenberg. 1969. Frankfurt a. M.: Insel, 1981, pp. 9–61, here p. 42); later also in literary adaptations of the former's *persona*: “Der Ausspruch, den Brecht Galilei hier in den Mund legt” (*Legitimität*, p. 463). In an epistolary context, cf. “Lambert läßt seinen Korrespondenzpartner schreiben” (Blumenberg. *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt: Der kopernikanische Komparativ. Die kopernikanische Optik*, vol. III, 3rd edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996, p. 647); including a ventriloquized reaction: “Das ist nun wieder ein Punkt, an dem Lambert seinen Korrespondenzpartner empört und verwirrt reagieren lassen kann” (p. 650); “läßt Lambert seinen fiktiven Partner resigniert fragen” (p. 652). For further variants of describing the act of ventriloquism, cf. “Cicero [...] makes Appius Caecus and Clodius [...] address [‘adloquitur’] Clodia” (Quintilian, *Institutio*, 3.8.54). “Cicero has Antonius suggest” (Christiansen, “Rhetoric as Character-Fashioning,” p. 307). See Gill's formulation (infinitized): “Cicero [...] engages in debate [...] with imagined spokesmen” (“Personhood,” p. 198). Blumenberg notes: “[J]ünger] läßt [...] den Bruder Otho [...] sagen” (*Schriften zur Literatur: 1945–1958*, edited by Alexander Schmitz and Bernd Stiegler. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2017, p. 28; cf. Blumenberg, *Jünger*, p. 12) – such a metapoetical formulation presupposes an (extratextual) author. Cf. also the phrase indicating the recipient of the *sermocinatio* in place of the (‘unknown’) emitter: “Hercules [...] dem ein unbekannter Tragiker [...] jene [...] Worte geliehen hat” (Rudolf Hirzel. “Der Selbstmord.” *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 11 [1908], pp. 75–104, 243–284, 417–476, here p. 284n.).

70 Generally thereto, see DS Mayfield, “Otherwise: Rhetorical Techniques of Contradiction (With Remarks on Quintilian, Augustine, Machiavelli, Shakespeare, Gracián).” *Contradiction Studies*, edited by Gisela Febel, Cordula Nolte, and Ingo H. Warnke. Wiesbaden: Springer, forthcoming. Cf. the ventriloquistic variant found in Emporius: “There is a third kind of *ethopoeia*, which is introduced only on account of the thing to be done; [...] this approach is called the attorney's (*pragmaticus*)” – with the glosses adding: “Emporius means by this creating an imaginary agent for a desired action” (“Concerning Ethopoeia,” translated by Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*, edited by Joseph M. Miller et al. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 33–36, here pp. 35, 35n.). The orator continues: “It is brought in once in a great while so that a certain attitude will not appear at all or will appear very vaguely” (p. 35) – with his example implying a mode of indirection as the function of this device, where one artfully delegates responsibility,

Performing its constitutive vicariousness in the meta-rhetorical play *Words made visible*, Samuel Shaw's personified *Sermocination* may have the last word:

Sermo. I am that Figure, Sir, by whom men recite the words of another in their discourse. I am that Author of that ingenious Art of *Quotation*, whereby men may speak as much *Herefie*, *Blasphemy*, *Treason*, as they will, and yet not be guilty of any thefe. The Author of that pleafant Divertifement of *Tale-bearing*, *Detraction*, *Mifpriffion* and *Mifrepresentation*: the Author of that profitable Trade of *revealing fecrets* and *betraying Counfels*. I have taught the *Teachers* themselves to fteal a whole Goofe, feathers and all; and yet this is not felony but a large Quotation; and fo that paffes for *Sermonizing*, which is nothing but *Sermocination*. [...] more men live and act *Sermocination* than fpeak it; feeing with other mens eyes, *acting* by other mens policy, and *flaunting* with other mens wit and money.⁷¹

or deflects attention to another (hence away from oneself). As to delegation in an affine sense, see Mayfield, "Talking Canines," pp. 13n., 22n., spec. as regards Ilse Nolting-Hauff's remark with respect to Cervantes (cf. "Pikaresker Roman und menippeische Satire." *Die Pluralität der Welten: Aspekte der Renaissance in der Romania*, edited by Wolf-Dieter Stempel and Karlheinz Stierle. Munich: Fink, 1987, pp. 181–200, here p. 194).

71 Samuel Shaw. *Words Made Visible: Or Grammar and Rhetorick Accommodated to the Lives and Manners of Men. Represented in a Country School for the Entertainment and Edification of the Spectators*. London (at the Flying-Horse near St. Dunstons Church in Fleetstreet): Daniel Major, 1679, p. 170. In this witty, parrhesiastic, and highly political school play, the *persona* of *Sermocination* is preceded by *Apofiopefis* (pp. 168–169; with reference to the Jesuits, p. 168); and followed by *Profopope* (pp. 170–171) and *Sarcafm* (pp. 172–176). The former gives the ensuing exposition of itself – featuring another anti-Catholic invective, here by way of paronomastic punning on the early modern English spelling of *prosopopoiia*: "I am that *Figure*, Sir, whereby men act fome other perfon living or dead. I need not take much pains to difcover to you, what fucces my pains have had. The very laft fyllable in my name is greater than all the names of the Monarchs upon Earth; and I have given him the power to be fo, by teaching him to act the perfon of one that died fixteen hundred years ago. I raife the dead as familiarly as any *Conjurer*: I make the vileft *Ufurper* upon earth to pafs for a *Reformer*, the falleft *Traytors* to be efteem'd as faithful *Counfellors*, a meer *Afs* to pafs for a *Lion*, and a *Carrion Crow* for a *Peacock*; and all this without any change of natures at all" (p. 171); when asked whether its name not rather be "*Hypocriefie*," *Profopope* replies with an accentuation of pervasive representative action and life by proxy in human affairs similar to *Sermocination*'s aforesaid statement, thereby linking the two figures via the vicarious: "Men call me fo fometimes, Sir, but alafs that name is too narrow for my nature. For in one word, all men act over again the lives of other men, and whatever is done in the World is done by *Profopope*" (ibid.). For an analysis of this school play staging and enacting rhetorical figures themselves, see Brian Vickers. "Some Reflections on the Rhetoric Textbook." *Renaissance Rhetoric*, pp. 81–102, spec. pp. 92–98; on *prosopopoiia* in Shaw, see Vickers, p. 94; Christiansen, "Rhetoric as Character-Fashioning," p. 332.