

**Annemieke Drummen**

## **2 A construction-grammar analysis of ancient Greek particles**

**Abstract:** Our understanding of ancient Greek particles can be illuminated by adopting a construction-grammar perspective. This framework helps clarify which interpretation of a particle is the most appropriate for a given context by identifying the specific co-textual features that determine each particle's constructions (and thus possible meanings). That is to say, a constructional approach makes it clear that the different uses of a single particle are actually different constructions, which include both the particle itself and certain specific feature(s) of its co-text. I analyze the multifunctional particles *kaí*, *te*, and *dé* in this way, taking my material from classical tragedy and comedy (fifth century BCE).

**Keywords:** ancient Greek, comedy, tragedy, particles, conjunctions, construction grammar, discourse markers, multifunctionality, pragmatic markers, pragmatics

### **2.1 Introduction**

Across languages, words that are generally labeled “discourse markers” or “pragmatic markers” are notoriously difficult to interpret, describe, and translate. They tend to be multifunctional, and it can be hard to decide which function to assign to them in a particular instance. Moreover, such words are usually more relevant to pragmatics than to syntax or semantics, even though they may simultaneously carry a syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic value. In this paper, I apply an approach developed in the context of cognitive linguistics, namely Goldbergian construction grammar, to the description of such function words in ancient Greek. I focus on three lexical items in particular – *kaí*, *te*, and *dé* – and their usage in a corpus of dramatic texts from Athens of the fifth century BCE. In classical philology, the words in question are often referred to as “particles”, although no consensus exists around the definition of this category.

The goals of my study are twofold. First, I argue that construction grammar can be highly illuminating for our understanding of Greek particles, since this framework can clarify which interpretation of a given particle is the most appropriate one in a specific instance, by identifying the contextual features that determine the constructions each particle participates in. That is, a constructional approach makes it clear that the different uses of a single particle are actually different constructions, which include both the particle itself and some specific features of its context, and which are associated with conventionalized meanings. The different contextual features make the constructions recognizable in particular instances. My results therefore advance research on the specific texts in which they occur. Second, ancient Greek

particles form a good testing ground for the insights and methods of construction grammar, which makes my results relevant to cognitive linguistics in general, and to researchers of particles and similar words in other (especially written) languages. Greek particles are interpreted differently in different contexts, just as their functional correlates in other languages. In addition, they have been extensively studied over the centuries, which gives us the opportunity to clarify earlier descriptions by using a modern linguistic method. If my findings are helpful to readers of ancient texts, this will support the potential of construction grammar as a tool for understanding pragmatic function words.

## 2.2 Construction grammar

Construction grammar assumes that words and other linguistic structures are learned and interpreted in context. Though methods and assumptions vary among the different sub-branches of construction grammar, in general linguistic knowledge is described in the form of “constructions”, that is, conventional, symbolic pairings of form and meaning (see Bybee, 2010; Croft & Cruse, 2004; Goldberg, 2013; Hoffmann & Trousdale, 2013). No level of language is autonomous: phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics can all be combined in a construction. Because of this holistic view, there is no sharp boundary between grammar and lexicon; lexemes are considered constructions as much as abstract syntactic structures or even longer stretches of text, associated with certain genres. Since construction grammar assumes that words are interpreted and learned in concrete usage contexts, it follows that specific contextual features are used to select appropriate forms (for speakers) or meanings (for hearers). For a certain construction involving a particle, the “form” pole includes the lexical item itself, but possibly also information on co-occurring words or features. The “meaning” pole includes semantic as well as pragmatic (including discourse-organizational) information. Related constructions are connected in networks involving “daughter” constructions that “inherit” features from their more general “parent” constructions (e.g., Traugott & Trousdale, 2013: 8–11 on networks and construction grammar). For example, in English, a question starting with “how” carries a certain meaning, whereas a question starting with “how could you” carries the same meaning with some additional meaning. If a “how could you” question conveys a slightly different meaning than the sum of its constituents’ meanings, or is sufficiently frequent to be entrenched separately, then we can speak of a separate (daughter) construction.

Identifying constructions means, then, specifying the features of form and meaning that are unique to a construction. In this way, we can explain how hearers and readers arrive at a specific interpretation of a multifunctional word or phrase. Such words or phrases participate, in other words, in several constructions: each interpretation is connected to a specific combination of form features. That is, if the

lexical item concerned does not change, different contextual features will belong to the form pole. The multifunctional word or phrase may thus constitute a parent construction for several more specific daughter constructions.

Since most Greek particles are multifunctional words, they can usually not be captured in one construction per lexical item. Instead, a particle may be part of many constructions, each of which includes specific contextual features in its form pole. Identifying these features for selected particles, as well as the specific interpretations to which they lead will be the main task of this paper. First, however, let us consider the words under discussion in more detail.

### 2.3 Ancient Greek particles

The lexical items in ancient Greek usually considered “particles” tend to be short, uninflected words without their own propositional meaning; many of their various functions fall in the realm of pragmatics. A clear definition, however, does not exist, and several of the lexical items are also often called conjunctions or adverbs (see Drummen, 2016a). In this respect, Greek particles resemble words in modern languages that are called “discourse markers” or “pragmatic markers”: the boundaries of all these categories are fuzzy.<sup>1</sup> In English, for example, *well*, *so*, and *and* are often considered to belong to this class, at least in some of their uses. This caveat is crucial, because another recurring characteristic of the Greek particles, and of functionally similar words in other languages, is that they are multifunctional. Often it can be challenging to decide which function to assign to any particular instance, and this is especially the case for a language with no native speakers available anymore.

The Greek particles and their functions have been the subject of a great number of studies. Since the sixteenth century no fewer than fifteen monographs have appeared, along with hundreds of descriptions in articles, grammars, thesauruses, and lexica.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, modern linguistic research can still provide new insights, because most previous research tends to focus exclusively on syntax and semantics, and as a result remains muddled about how to distinguish between the different uses of a single lexical item. I argue, by contrast, that it is useful to describe these uses of particles in terms of “constructions” that include the particle as well as certain contextual features. Apollonius Dyscolus, a grammarian of the second century CE,

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<sup>1</sup> For terminology and definitions used concerning “discourse markers” and “pragmatic markers”, see Drummen, 2016a.

<sup>2</sup> Monographs on ancient Greek particles are, in chronological order: Devarius, 1588; Hoogevenen, 1769; Hartung, 1832; Stephens, 1837; Bäumllein, 1861; Paley, 1881; Des Places, 1929; Denniston, [1934] 1950; Labéy, 1950; Thrall, 1962; Blomqvist, 1969; Thyresson, 1977; Sicking & Van Ophuijsen, 1993; Redondo Moyano, 1995; Bonifazi, Drummen & de Krej, 2016. Other important books are Vigerus, 1627; Kühner, 1835; Klotz, 1835–1842; Ruijgh, 1971; Bakker, 1997; Rijksbaron, 1997; Bakker & Wakker, 2009.

had in fact already made a similar point, when he claimed that the particles – what he calls *súndesmoi*, literally “combiners” – can only “co-signify” (*sussemainein*) together with other words (see de Kreij, 2016a for discussion). That is, Apollonius recognizes the importance of context to the interpretation of particles. This is a fundamental idea, and in line with modern usage-based linguistics such as construction grammar. However, Apollonius’ insight is usually not taken up in modern analyses of particles.<sup>3</sup> Often several functions are discussed without specification of the contextual features that lead to different interpretations.

## 2.4 Interpreting particles with constructions

This paper illustrates the explanatory power of a constructional approach for our interpretation of Greek particles by analyzing three words in this way: *kaí*, *te*, and *dé*. I have selected these particles in particular because they are highly frequent, and because they appear to overlap to some degree in meaning, making a comparative study beneficial. In addition, like most Greek particles, they have been widely discussed in the literature, which presents an opportunity to show what a constructional approach can add to the picture.

My analysis is based on classical Greek tragedy and comedy, written in the fifth century BCE in Athens: the authors comprising my corpus are Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides for tragedy, and Aristophanes for comedy.<sup>4</sup> Since these authors wrote in a poetic, highly stylized language, my observations may only relate to this particular corpus. Without further study, I would not claim their validity for other ancient Greek texts, let alone Attic Greek as it was spoken. However, I do posit that this method of describing particle constructions can help elucidate other corpora and other languages as well.

### 2.4.1 *Kaí*: From connecting to clarifying to indignation

*Kaí* is variously labeled a conjunction, adverb, and/or particle; since these labels are not mutually exclusive, and no single, clear definition of “particle” exists (see the discussion above), it is no surprise that *kaí* appears in handbooks on particles, such

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<sup>3</sup> Construction grammar itself has so far been applied to the study of ancient Greek particles in Koier, 2013 on the particle *pou*, and Drummen, 2016b: III, 2 on distributional patterns of particles in Greek drama.

<sup>4</sup> The editions from the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Online* have been used: Page, 1972 for Aeschylus; Lloyd-Jones & Wilson, 1990 for Sophocles; Diggle, 1984; 1994 for Euripides; Wilson, 2007 for Aristophanes. For Aeschylus, the newer edition by West, 1990 has been consulted in many cases.

as those by Hartung (1932), Denniston ([1934] 1950), and Labéy (1950).<sup>5</sup> It is usually translated as ‘and’, but in certain cases it may mean ‘also’, ‘even’, ‘and in particular’, ‘to be precise’, or ‘really’.<sup>6</sup> But are these merely different options for translating a single function of the word, or can these in fact be called different constructions? Let us begin with the clearest use of *kaí* in the corpus: i.e., as a syntactic coordinator of two explicitly mentioned items of similar syntactic and morphological shape.<sup>7</sup> In such ‘A *kaí* B’ structures, conjunct A and B are two noun phrases, two finite verbs, or two entire clauses. Here is an example with noun phrases:

- (1) KHO. *epaggeílētō*<sub>IMP.PRS.3SG</sub> *pâs*<sub>NOM.M.SG</sub> *anêr*<sub>NOM.SG</sub> *kaí* *gunē*<sub>NOM.SG</sub>. (Ar. *Lys.* 1048–49)  
 ‘CHORUS Let every man **and** woman announce’.

The contribution of *kaí* as ‘and’ to this utterance seems straightforward, but in fact we need the conjuncts themselves, too, before we can arrive at this interpretation of the particle. The description of this construction should thus include this contextual information in its form pole, as well as the information that *kaí* is placed between the two conjuncts. The meaning pole, that is, the interpretation ‘and’ associated with the combined information from the form pole, tells us that the two conjuncts are closely linked together.<sup>8</sup> It also shows that the conjuncts simultaneously imply a certain similarity and a certain difference – an interpretation suggested for the meaning of English *and* by Sköries (1999: 52–60). To clarify: the conjuncts have to be somehow similar in order to be suitable for connection. Thus, with *kaí*, it is possible to say ‘man and woman’ as well as ‘he raged and shouted’, but not ‘man and shouted’ – at least not without envisioning some very specialized context. At the same time, the

<sup>5</sup> As an anonymous reviewer has observed, in other literature *kaí* is not labeled as a particle. However, it is not the category label that is relevant for my constructional analysis, but the functions that the word arguably fulfils in various contexts.

<sup>6</sup> Canakis, 1995: 14, writing mainly on Modern Greek *kaí*, cites research on the ancient Greek particle, and notes that “*kaí* has a very long history of multifunctionality in Greek”. He undertakes a cognitive linguistic analysis of Modern Greek *kaí*, which shows similarities to the approach taken here (185–261).

<sup>7</sup> See Muchnová, 2014: 385 on the difference between coordinators and connectors: the former mark syntactic relations and link clauses, whereas the latter mark only semantic relations, and link larger units than clauses. I here discuss a use of *kaí* as coordinator, but it can also be used as a connector; see Bonifazi, 2016: IV.2 §§ 106–113 on the different scope that *kaí* may have. On the frequency of *kaí* in several Greek authors, see Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij, 2016: I.5.13. In Aeschylus *kaí* forms 2.3% of all words, in Sophocles 1.9%, in Euripides 1.9%, and in Aristophanes 2.9%. This is a much higher frequency than those of most particles.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g., Hartung, 1832: 153, who describes *kaí* as marking a union (*Vereinigung*) between two elements, and Bäumléin, 1861: 145, who writes that *kaí* marks the addition of something new “under the same viewpoint as before [ein Weiteres unter gleichem Gesichtspunkt]”. As the primary force of *kaí*, Hoogveen, 1769: 278 considers a connective one (“copulative”), Denniston, [1934] 1950: 289, “addition”.

conjuncts also have to be distinct, that is, they have to refer to different entities or actions in order for the ‘and’ connection to make sense.<sup>9</sup>

Notably, our interpretation process does not stop at recognizing this instance as instantiating a particular construction. After all, Aristophanes may use each construction for specific reasons. In (1), hostilities between men and women are a central theme in the play; the fact that these words are linked together by *kaí* at this (late) moment of the play underlines the crucial event of reconciliation. This is reflected, moreover, in an unusually high frequency of *kaí* throughout the song that constitutes the overall context of this expression.<sup>10</sup>

If the two conjuncts are noun phrases, as in (1), *kaí* usually does no more than connect them. In the case of verb phrases, however, a connection often implies a temporal sequence: not merely ‘and’, but more specifically ‘and then’ or even ‘and therefore’.<sup>11</sup> For example:

- (2) οἱ. *kagō*<sub>NOM.SG</sub> *tòn ektréponta*<sub>ACC.SG</sub> *tòn trokhēlātēn*<sub>ACC.SG</sub>  
*paíō*<sub>IND.PRS.1SG</sub> *dī’ orgēs· kaí m’*<sub>ACC.SG</sub> *ho prēsbus*<sub>NOM.SG</sub> *hōs horāi,*  
*ōkhous parasteikhonta tērēsas, méson*  
*kára díploīs kéntroisí mou kathíketo*<sub>IND.AOR.3SG</sub>. (Soph. *Oed. Rex* 806–9)  
 ‘OEDIPUS And I struck the one who had turned me aside, the driver, in anger. **And then** the old man, when he saw it, watched for me to pass by the chariot and hit me on the middle of my head with his double goad’.

Oedipus relates his worrying experiences of many years earlier to his wife Jocasta. The separate events in this excerpt – ‘I struck the driver’ and ‘the old man hit me’ – are part of a narrative in which the described actions follow each other temporally as well as causally. We can thus paraphrase ‘I struck the driver *and then* the old man hit me’ or ‘I struck the driver *and therefore* the old man hit me’.<sup>12</sup>

The fact that we can interpret *kaí* in this way does not mean that the particle itself has suddenly become different. Rather, it participates in a different construction,

<sup>9</sup> Other examples of this *kaí* construction ‘A and B’ are found in Aesch. *Ag.* 314, 704; *Lib.* 1058; Soph. *Aj.* 447 (both *kaí* instances; here they do not form a ‘both A and B’ connection, on which see (3) below with discussion), 505; *El.* 619; Eur. *Bacch.* 185; *Med.* 550, 809; Ar. *Av.* 973; *Ran.* 143, 929.

<sup>10</sup> In the choral song in *Lys.* 1043–1071, there are 12 occurrences of *kaí* in 123 words in total, a frequency of 9.8%. The average frequency of *kaí* in Aristophanic choral songs is 4.1% (based on a corpus of 1,715 words).

<sup>11</sup> See e.g., Canakis, 1995: 152–153 on the temporal interpretation of Modern Greek *kaí* for a possible explanation of this implication. See e.g., Bonifazi, 2016: IV.2 § 11 on such “enrichments” conveyed by English *and*; later in the chapter she discusses various enrichments of ancient Greek *te* and *kaí*.

<sup>12</sup> Other examples of the *kaí* construction ‘A and then B’ are found in Aesch. *Ag.* 590; Soph. *Aj.* 288 (first *kaí*); *OT* 952 (here connecting imperatives); Eur. *Bacch.* 1117; *Hec.* 243, *Hipp.* 1445 (here connecting imperatives); *Med.* 1394 (here connecting imperatives).

which includes specific features of the context. In this case, we are dealing with a daughter construction of the one mentioned earlier: ‘A and then B’ is a particular type of the more general ‘A and B’. This daughter construction has the following form features, apart from *kaí* appearing between two conjuncts: the conjuncts need to be verbs, and to refer to different actions that can both hold true, but not simultaneously (at least in the context at hand); in addition, the action mentioned second has to be the one occurring later.<sup>13</sup> If the context allows for a causal link between the two conjuncts, we may translate ‘and therefore’, but I do not consider this a separate construction, since in these cases, an interpretation as no more than a temporal sequence (‘and then’) is always possible as well, and a speaker could deny having claimed any causality.<sup>14</sup> Thus, I see the interpretation of a temporal sequence as part of the construction, whereas a potential causal link will remain implicit.

In some cases, *kaí* is repeated in close proximity, even though there are still only two conjuncts. We then translate ‘both A and B’, taking the first *kaí* as announcing the connection.<sup>15</sup>

(3) *xo. toutōn léxas’ hó ti kaí dunatōn*<sub>NOM.N.SG</sub>  
*kaí thémis*<sub>NOM.SG</sub>. (Aesch. Ag. 97–98)

‘CHORUS Of these things, after you have said whatever is **both** possible/ **and** right’.

The presence of the second *kaí* thus leads to a different interpretation of the first one than it otherwise could have had, being placed before its conjunct. The repetition of *kaí* puts emphasis on the connection itself.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Such constraint on the iconic order of events is cross-linguistically attested in various constructions. See e.g., Dancygier & Sweetser, 2005: 170 on this constraint in the use of English *then* in conditional as well as temporal constructions: as they point out, “if/when P, then Q” is acceptable, but not “then Q, if/when P”.

<sup>14</sup> I do not find any examples with an imperative, conveying a conditional nuance, as in English “do that and I’ll smash your face”, see Comrie, 1986: 85.

<sup>15</sup> Bäumlein, 1861: 148 describes this use as follows, citing the same example: we find *kaí* . . . *kaí* “expressing a mutual connection between two concepts or thoughts, so that the first term refers to the following, and the second, to the first [um eine gegenseitige Verbindung zweier Begriffe oder Gedanken auszudrücken, so dass bei dem ersten Glied auf ein folgendes, bei dem zweiten auf das erste hingewiesen wird]”. See also Hartung, 1832: 143–144.

<sup>16</sup> Raeburn & Thomas, 2011 also paraphrase ‘both possible and right’. Other examples of the *kaí* construction ‘both A and B’ are found in Soph. *Ant.* 573; *El.* 522; Eur. *Alc.* 141; *Med.* 777; Ar. *Lys.* 1046–1047 (first *kaí*; see Drummen, 2016b: III, 2 §37).

In other instances, the two conjuncts both refer to the same situation, action, or entity in the described world. This leads us to interpret *kaí* as marking a specification or reformulation:<sup>17</sup>

- (4) TE. *xúnapte*<sub>IMP.PRS.2SG</sub> *kaì xunōrízou*<sub>IMP.PRS.2SG</sub> *khéra*. (Eur. *Bacch.* 198)  
 ‘TEIRESIAS Grab (my hand), **that is**, join your hand (with mine)’.

The second conjunct can be considered more precise, as it includes the joining of two hands, not only the grabbing of one. *Kaí* can here be translated with ‘that is’, ‘in other words’, ‘better to say’, or ‘to be precise’. Whether one conjunct is a specification of another one (‘that is’), or in fact refers to a different entity (‘and’) involves a subjective judgment (see below).<sup>18</sup> The following example occasioned much debate already in antiquity:

- (5) OR. *hēkō*<sub>IND.PRS.1SG</sub> *gār es gēn*<sub>ACC.SG</sub> *tēnde*<sub>ACC.F.SG</sub> *kaì katérkhomai*<sub>IND.PRS.1SG</sub>. (Aesch. *Lib.* 3)  
 ‘ORESTES For I come to this land, **that is**, I am returning’.

This Aeschylean line is quoted in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* (1128), where it meets with harsh criticism from Euripides (lines 1154–57). He claims that *hēkō* ‘I come (back)’, and *katérkhomai* ‘I am returning’, are the same thing. Aeschylus defends his choice (1160–65) on the grounds that anyone can ‘come back’ to a country, but only an exile can ‘return’. In other words, there is a subtle difference between the two conjuncts. An interpretation in terms of specification works well in this case: ‘coming (back)’ and ‘returning’ may refer to the same action, but the second description has more specific implications than the first: it does not only imply that the referent has been to the mentioned place before, but also that it is his or her native soil.<sup>19</sup>

In another construction, our interpretation of *kaí* is determined by the presence of only one explicit constituent that could be modified by the particle. Usually the context will give information about a relevant parallel constituent, so that *kaí* can be

<sup>17</sup> This use of *kaí* is specifically described by Hartung, 1832: 145 and Humbert, 1960: 412. See also Bäumlein, 1861: 146, who speaks of *kaí* marking the second element in a combination as a “more specific qualification [nähere Bestimmung]” of the first element. On *kaí* marking a specification in other Greek authors, see Bonifazi, 2016: IV, 2, esp. n. 157 and 158, with further literature.

<sup>18</sup> The paraphrase of Dodds, 1960 seems to imply an interpretation as ‘and then’: ‘There, take it in yours and make a pair of them’.

<sup>19</sup> Other examples of the *kaí* construction “A (and), that is, B” are found in Aesch. *Ag.* 294; *Lib.* 903, 1062; *Pers.* 190; *Soph. Aj.* 87, 288 (second *kaí*), 496, 808; *Ant.* 711, 718, 746, 1193; *El.* 368; *OT* 58, 265; Eur. *Bacch.* 198, 246; *Hec.* 50, 384; *Hipp.* 680; *Med* 903; *Ar. Av.* 378, 499; *Ran.* 836; *Lys.* 227, 529, 1047 (second *kaí*; see Drummen, 2016b: III, 2 § 37).

interpreted as marking, if not a connection, still an addition of one element to another one that is somehow similar and different at the same time.<sup>20</sup> Thus, for instance:

- (6) *xo. eí pote **kaí** protéras átas huperornuménas pólei  
 énúsat'*<sub>IND.AOR.2PL</sub> *ektopían phlóga pématos, élthete*<sub>IMP.AOR.2PL</sub> ***kaí** nún.* (Soph. *Oed. Rex*  
 165–67)  
 ‘CHORUS If ever you turned **also** earlier doom away, hanging over our city, a flame  
 of disaster, come now **also**’.

Here, the chorus of old Theban men prays to several gods, asking them to come and bring help to their city. The presence of *kaí* makes it clear in both cases that ‘earlier doom’ and ‘now’ as instances of divine help do not stand on their own, but belong to a list of several occasions. That is, the chorus members juxtapose the current occasion to earlier occasions in which their city needed help.<sup>21</sup>

As (6) shows, appropriate translations for *kaí* in this construction are ‘also’, ‘too’, and ‘as well’. The rendering with ‘even’ likely also belongs here, although I do not consider the idea of an unexpected extreme on some scale (‘even’) to be explicitly conveyed by the *kaí* construction.<sup>22</sup> Rather, it is a possible implication of the idea of addition (‘also’), and therefore not a necessary part of our interpretation.

Only slightly different in its form *pole*, but leading to a clearly distinct meaning pole is the construction exemplified by (7). In occurrences of this type, as well, there are no two conjuncts connected by *kaí*, but here the context does not even provide information about a relevant implicit parallel constituent. An interpretation in terms of an addition is therefore impossible:

<sup>20</sup> Canakis, 1995: 138 describes modern Greek “intensifying *kaí*”, translated as ‘also’, in very similar terms. On the use of ancient Greek *kaí* as ‘also’, see e.g., Hartung, 1832: 125–134; Bäumllein, 1861: 149–153; Denniston, [1934] 1950: 293–294.

<sup>21</sup> As Dawe, 2006 notes, one of these two *kaí* instances could already have made clear the addition, but it occurs more often that the particle is found in such duplication (so he implies, by citing one example). This is more explicitly and more generally described by Bäumllein, 1861: 153. Other examples of the *kaí* construction ‘also B’ are found in Aesch. *Ag.* 1035, 1040; *Lib.* 252 (see example (12) below), 976; *Hept.* 657, 716; Soph. *Ant.* 710, 719, 1256; *El.* 62; *OT* 557; *Phil.* 1268; Eur. *Bacch.* 39, 190; *Hec.* 228; *Med.* 584; Ar. *Nub.* 357; *Ran.* 888; *Vesp.* 457.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Denniston, [1934] 1950: 293, who also considers the difference between the ‘also’ and ‘even’ interpretations of *kaí* to be unexpressed in Greek.

- (7) AGG. *toiád' ep' autoîs êlthe sumphorà páthous,*  
*hōs toîsde*<sup>DAT.PL</sup> ***kaî*** *dîs*<sup>ADV</sup> *antisêkôsai*<sup>INF.AOR</sup> *rhopêid*<sup>AT.SG</sup>. (Aesch. *Pers.* 436–37)  
 ‘MESSENGER Such a misfortune of suffering came upon them, that it counterbalances the weight (of what I told you before) **really** twice [*literally*: so as to compensate really twice for these things in weight]’.

This contextual situation leads to an interpretation of pinning down instead of adding or connecting.<sup>23</sup> The speaker marks a “zooming in” on a particular element. Suitable English translations of *kaî* in this construction can be ‘really’, ‘actually’, ‘exactly’, ‘absolutely’, ‘indeed’, or by emphasis on the relevant word (“as much as *twice!*”).<sup>24</sup>

So far, we have seen constructions independent of the dramas’ dialogic context. If *kaî* marks a connection across utterances by different speakers, however, this interactional setting – fictional and artificial though it may be – plays a role in our interpretation of the particle.

- (8) XO. *kaî dédrakas*<sup>IND.PRF.2SG</sup> *toûto tóurgon;*  
 EP. ***kaî*** *dedrakôs*<sup>PTCP.PRF.NOM.M.SG</sup> *g' hêdomai*<sup>IND.PRS.1SG</sup>. (Ar. *Av.* 325)  
 ‘CHORUS You have really done this thing?  
 HOOPOE **Yes, and** (what’s more) I’m glad I’ve done it!’

By starting his new utterance with *kaî*, the speaker, the Hoopoe Tereus, does not so much connect two items, but marks that he will further pursue some element from a preceding utterance. In this case this is explicitly signified by using the same verb as in the previous turn, *dedrakôs*, even in the same tense stem as before. The literal echo is highlighted by *ge* after it, which is often used in such contexts to mark that a speaker puts a new spin on repeated linguistic material (see Drummen 2016b: III.3.3.1.1). The particular interpretation of *kaî* in this passage stems from its position in the dialogue, and the link between the two utterances: they are thus part of the form pole of this construction.<sup>25</sup> In some instances, the earlier utterance that a speaker connects to is her own previous stretch of talk, instead of one by an interlocutor.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> I take over the term “pinning down” as a description of one of *kaî*’s functions from Bonifazi, 2016: IV, 2.4.2, who discusses this function of the particle and its combinations in several Greek authors, mainly Herodotus and Thucydides. She also cites further literature on this function.

<sup>24</sup> Hall, 1996 translates ‘at least twice’, which fits this instance due to the numerical reference. Groeneboom, 1930 suggests the apt Dutch paraphrase ‘wel tweemaal [two times]’. Other examples of the *kaî* construction ‘really A’ are found in Aesch. *Lib.* 892; *Pers.* 1045; *Hept.* 760; *Soph. Ant.* 726, 772 (on this instance, see Bonifazi, 2016: IV, 2 § 104), 1253; *Phil.* 297; *Eur. Med.* 526, 901; *Ar. Eq.* 342.

<sup>25</sup> Other examples of the *kaî* construction ‘(Yes) and (to go on with what you said) B’ are found in Aesch. *Lib.* 500, 503, 911; *Pers.* 236; *Soph. Aj.* 527; *Ant.* 322, 443; *OT* 1170; *Eur. Hipp.* 724; *Med.* 608; *Ar. Av.* 1349; *Ran.* 568; *Lys.* 752.

<sup>26</sup> An example of this is found in *Ar. Ran.* 568, discussed in Drummen, 2016b: III, 3 § 92.

A more specific case of *kaí* starting a question is given by the immediately previous exchange:

- (9) EP. *ándr' edexámēn*<sup>IND.AOR.1SG</sup> *erastà têsde tês xunousías*.  
 XO. *kaí dédrakas*<sup>IND.PRF.2SG</sup> *toûto touírgon*; (Ar. Av. 324–25)  
 ‘HOOPOE I have received two men who adore this society here.  
 CHORUS (**What?!**) You have **really** done this thing?’

Because of their natural enmity towards humans, the chorus of birds reacts with surprise, disbelief, and indignation to the Hoopoe’s statement. As in (8), here the speaker “zooms in” on something previously said. Combined with the questioning illocutionary force of the host utterance, the interpretation of this daughter construction becomes more specific: it signals that the speaker casts doubt on the credibility of the preceding utterance, or is even indignant about it.<sup>27</sup>

There is an even more specific daughter construction. This is a *kaí* question that does not simply express disbelief at the preceding utterance, but implies that what the previous speaker said is actually impossible: e.g.,

- (10) SU. *kaí pôs àn lógois*  
*ándra pteróseias*<sup>OPT.AOR.2SG</sup> *sú*; (Ar. Av. 1437–38)  
 ‘INFORMER **And (just)** how (**do you think**) could you wing a man with words?’

The form pole of this construction includes, in addition to the aspects mentioned for the parent construction of the skeptical question, *pôs* “how?” and a potential optative. The potential optative generally expresses that a certain event is possible in some circumstances.<sup>28</sup> Asking how something would be possible in some circumstances, rather than merely how it could take place in a concrete situation, usually implies that

<sup>27</sup> On this use of *kaí*, see e.g., Hartung, 1832: 146–147 (such questions are asked “to show the inconsistency or contradiction of the terms [um die Inconsequenz oder den Widerspruch der Glieder darzustellen]”); Hancock, 1917: 29; Denniston, [1934] 1950: 309–310. Dunbar, 1995 speaks of *kaí* marking a “surprised or indignant question”, referring to Denniston. Other such skeptical questions starting with *kaí* are found at e.g., Aesch. Ag. 280; Lib. 122, 179, 776; Pers. 438; Soph. Ant. 548; Eur. Med. 1398; Ar. Av. 326, 976; Nub. 210; Ran. 1019, 1049.

<sup>28</sup> For a constructional description of the potential optative in ancient Greek drama, see Drummen, 2013.

the event is in fact impossible in all circumstances. In this way, the speaker conveys that the addressee has made a ridiculous suggestion.<sup>29</sup>

Up to this point, I have discussed nine constructions with *kaí*, none of which contains another particle in the form pole. Yet particles are often combined, and it is well-known that these combinations may carry additional nuances on top of the semantic and pragmatic contributions of their parts (see Denniston, [1934] 1950: li-iv; Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij, 2016: I, 4 § 8). *Kaí*, in particular, frequently occurs together with *allá*, *dé*, *dê*, *dêta*, *ê*, *gár*, or *mên*. However, there are two problems complicating the description of particle combinations beyond that of single particles. First, two contiguous particles may be intended to convey a more complex meaning together (a “cluster”), but they may also be juxtaposed accidentally, each providing their own semantic and/or pragmatic contribution (see Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij, 2016: I.1 §19). Moreover, since clusters develop out of “accidental” combinations, where the two single particles are simply compatible with the same context, borderline cases remain.

The second problem is the multifunctionality of many individual particles. Even though not all particles participate in as many different constructions as *kaí* does, most do occur in several different contexts leading to different interpretations. A form element such as “*kaí* directly followed by *dê*” can therefore potentially be found in many more constructions than simple *kaí* or *dê*.<sup>30</sup> Its meaning could be any combination of the meaning pole of one *kaí* construction, plus that of one *dê* construction, plus some additional meaning of this cluster. Because not all constructions of each particle will be compatible – some may, for instance, only occur at the beginning of speaking turns, whereas others avoid this position – and not every particle participates in as many as nine constructions, the actual number of constructions will be lower than 81, but it is clear that interpretation possibilities expand rapidly in the case of particle combinations.

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**29** On *kaí pōs* questions in tragedy, see e.g., Hancock, 1917: 29. Other *kaí pōs* questions with potential optatives, implying that (some element of) the content of the previous utterance is impossible, include Aesch. *Ag.* 1198 (here it is a presupposition that is challenged); *Suppl.* 509; *Soph. El.* 1189; *Trach.* 1210; *Eur. Alc.* 142; *Phoen.* 1348; *Ar. Av.* 829, 1437; *Nub.* 1333; *Ran.* 582; *Lys.* 912; *Pax* 1076a. The questions in Aesch. *Lib.* 776 and *Soph. OT* 1019 do not contain a verb, but a potential optative would fit the contexts, and the implication of impossibility is present.

**30** For descriptions of several uses of *kaí dê*, see (in chronological order) Hoogeveen, 1769: 298–300 (with temporal, additive, confirmative, or transitional meaning); Hartung, 1832: 263–266 (marking a connection, increase, specification, or indifference concerning a hypothetical situation); Kühner, 1835: 388 (marking a connection, specification, or surprise); Devarius in Klotz, 1835–1842: 115 (with a supposedly temporal interpretation); Bäumlein, 1861: 147 (emphasizing a new, but connected point); van Erp Taalman Kip, 2009 (especially marking entrances in drama).

Example (11) illustrates both problems:

- (11) IP. *ólōla*<sub>IND.PRF.ISG</sub> ***kai dê*** *nertérōn*<sub>GEN.M.PL</sub> *horô*<sub>IND.PRS.ISG</sub> *púlas*<sub>ACC.PL</sub>. (Eur. *Hipp.* 1447)  
 ‘HIPPOLYTUS I have perished **and – look!** – I see the gates of the Underworld’.  
 or ‘I have perished – **yes, look!** – I see the gates of the Underworld’.  
 or ‘I have perished, **that is, I really** see the gates of the Underworld’.

In the literature, there is disagreement whether *kai dê* here is a cluster or merely two juxtaposed particles, and about its resulting interpretation. Barrett (1964: 414) writes that “normally in Attic the [*kai*] is non-connective, and the particles simply stress (more or less vividly) the actuality of an event or state of affairs . . . but occasionally, as here, they carry a connective sense as well”. This seems to imply that he interprets this instance as the ‘and’ or ‘and afterwards’ construction, because *kai* is surrounded by two verbal conjuncts. Barrett considers an asyndeton here, as suggested by Denniston ([1934] 1950: 249), “impossibly artificial”.<sup>31</sup> Translations of this line also vary in their rendering of the two particles: from ‘and indeed’ to ‘yes’ to no translation at all.<sup>32</sup> A connective interpretation of *kai* seems likely because two items are present that could very well be combined with ‘and’ or even ‘that is’. In fact, as we have seen, there are more functional possibilities for *kai* itself than only “connective” and “non-connective”. In other cases, however, *kai dê* clearly does work as a cluster. Van Erp Taalman Kip (2009) on *kai dê* and *kai mên* in drama, for example, shows that a single particle cluster can have various interpretations, depending on small contextual differences. She also convincingly describes the pragmatic differences between *kai dê* and *kai mên*, two seemingly synonymous particle clusters. However, a constructional approach could bring even more clarity to the analyses of van Erp Taalman Kip, because she does not always make it clear what her interpretations of sets of examples are based on, that is, on which contextual features exactly. For entry-marking *kai dê* and *kai mên* (112–121) it seems clear why they receive this label, but for the other instances, interpretations seem to be based more on Denniston’s descriptions ([1934] 1950) than on identifiable patterns in the contexts.

<sup>31</sup> Denniston does not explain why he considers an asyndeton “perhaps better” in this instance. Van Erp Taalman Kip (2009: 13–31), with n. 21, also cites this instance in her discussion of *kai dê*. While she does not explicitly decide on a specific interpretation, she certainly does not exclude a connective interpretation of *kai*.

<sup>32</sup> Here are examples of English translations of this line. Coleridge, 1891: ‘I am a broken man; yes, I see the gates that close upon the dead’. Murray, 1911: ‘I see the Great Gates opening. I am gone’. Halleran, 1995: ‘I’m dead, and indeed I see the gates of the dead’. Kovacs, 2005: ‘I’m gone. I see the gates of the Underworld!’. The exclamation mark might be his rendering of the particles. Theodoridis, 2010: ‘Father, I am gone. I see the gates of Hades!’.

### 2.4.2 *Te*: connecting and shared knowledge

The particle (or conjunction) *te*, though usually translated by ‘and’ as well, is clearly functionally different from *kaí*. For a start, *te* does not share any other meaning of *kaí* beside ‘(both ...) and’: it does not mean ‘and then’, ‘that is’, ‘also’, ‘really’, and so on. It is also only very rarely found at the beginning of speaking turns (see Drummen, 2016b: III, 4 § 27). Furthermore, *te* adds a nuance of its own that *kaí* does not carry: that of traditional, shared knowledge. This meaning is often connected to rituality or allusions to epic or lyric.

In virtually all cases in tragedy and comedy, *te* marks a connection of some element to another, whereby one of these elements includes at least the word preceding *te*.<sup>33</sup> This may be the first of two conjuncts, as in ‘A *te* B *te*’ or ‘A *te* *kaí* B’, or it may be the second, as in ‘A *te* B *te*’ or ‘A B *te*’ – we may consider these options two syntactically different constructions. On top of signaling a connection, the particle marks the items it connects as belonging to shared or traditional knowledge (see Bloch, 1955: 147; Bonifazi, 2016: IV, 2 IV, 2 § 54–57; § 58–60, § 65–69; de Kreij, 2016b: II, 4 § 32–37, § 54–68; Gonda, 1954: 207; Wentzel, 1847: 2).

For the dramatic corpus, the particle’s distributions across dialogues, monologues, and choral songs illuminate its function. In Aeschylus, it is the most frequent in monologues, and in the other authors in choral songs (see Drummen, 2016b: III.2 § 39 for details). In Aristophanes, the average frequency of *te* in songs is more than eleven times as high as in dialogues (2.6 *versus* 0.2% on average). Such striking frequency differences of *te* across the parts of the plays show that also in these texts there must be more to its use than the simple connecting of items. Consider the following example:

(12) OR. *hou̓tō*<sub>ADV</sub> *dè*<sub>PTC</sub> *kamè*<sub>ACC.SG</sub> *ténde*<sub>ACC.F.SG</sub> *t'*, *Ēléktran légō*,  
*ideîn párestí soi*. (Aesch. *Lib.* 252–53)

‘ORESTES And so thou canst also see me **and** her here, I mean Electra’.

Orestes has addressed Zeus and asked him for help, comparing himself and his sister Electra to the orphaned offspring of an eagle. That he connects ‘me’ and ‘her here’ with *te* is not only metrically useful, preventing hiatus; it also highlights that the natural connection between the siblings, and/or their fate after the death of their father Agamemnon, is well-known to Zeus, as well as to the audience. In other words, the knowledge associated with these two conjuncts is shared between speaker and addressee(s). Usually this nuance cannot be translated into English; my use of “thou canst” is meant to reflect the traditional, solemn tone associated with *te*.

<sup>33</sup> Only in the idiomatic, fossilized construction *hoiós te*, which means ‘able (to)’, ‘capable’, *te* does not mark a connection.

What is shared is often traditional, such as encyclopedic information about the past, humankind, or nature. An example from a gnomic statement may clarify the type of context meant (though I do not see this as a separate construction):<sup>34</sup>

- (13) xo. *aiaî· tò doûlon hōs kakòn péphuk'*<sup>IND.PRF.3SG</sup> *aeî*  
*tolmâi*<sup>IND.PRS.3SG</sup> **th'** *hâ*<sup>ACC.N.PL</sup> *mê*<sup>NEG</sup> *khre'*<sup>IND.PRS.3SG</sup> *têi bíai nikômenon.* (Eur. *Hec.* 332–33)  
 'CHORUS Oh no! What bad thing slavery always is, **and** how it doth suffer what it ought not, overcome by force'.

In reaction to Odysseus' rejection of Hecuba's supplication for her daughter's life, the chorus of Trojan women utters a general remark. Because of the general applicability of both descriptions of a slave's life, it is appropriate to connect them with *te*.

The singing of a choral song, moreover, is a traditional and ritual activity. This rituality makes choral songs an ideal context for the frequent use of *te*, regardless of the specific elements that the particle connects. I do not consider *te* in choral songs, or its generally high frequency there, to be a separate construction, that is, a different conventional form-meaning pair. The association with shared knowledge that the particle always carries is sufficient to explain its affinity to ritual contexts. Such contexts include choral songs, but also prayers, oaths, supplications, and official statements.<sup>35</sup> While they would also have been rituals without *te*, the particle highlights the rituality: we can think of it as adding a solemn tone to its utterance. The following example is illustrative:

- (14) OI. *humîn*<sup>DAT.PL</sup> *dê taûta*<sup>ACC.N.PL</sup> *pânt'*<sup>ACC.N.PL</sup> *episképtō*<sup>IND.PRS.1SG</sup> *teleîn,*  
*hupér t' emautoû*<sup>GEN.SG</sup> *toû*<sup>GEN.M.SG</sup> *theoû*<sup>GEN.SG</sup> **te,** *têsdé*<sup>GEN.F.SG</sup> **te**  
*gês*<sup>GEN.SG</sup> *hōd' akárpōs kathēōs ephtharménēs.* (Soph. *Oed. Rex* 252–54)  
 'OEDIPUS And I command you to fulfill all this because of myself **as well as** the god **as well as** this land, which has been destroyed so barrenly and ungodly'.

<sup>34</sup> De Kreij, 2016b: II, 4 § 22 discusses *te* in *gnōmai* in Homer: the particle, he writes, “serves to mark the statement as referring to a large body of shared knowledge, which we might term tradition”. Other examples of *te* in gnomic statements include Aesch. *Ag.* 322 (two instances).

<sup>35</sup> Examples of *te* connecting traditional knowledge in choral songs include Soph. *Ant.* 350, 352; Eur. *Andr.* 475, 476, 481; *Hipp.* 535, 536; *Med.* 827, 835. In prayers: Aesch. *Ag.* 509 (two instances), 513, 514, 516, 519 (two instances); *Lib.* 124a (=165), 128, 130, 131 (two instances in Page 1972, one in West 1990); Soph. *Ant.* 1200 (reporting a prayer); *El.* 67, 69; Eur. *Med.* 764; Ar. *Nub.* 265 (two instances). In oaths: Aesch. *Ag.* 1433; Eur. *Med.* 746, 747, 752, 753. In supplications: Soph. *Aj.* 492, 493; *Phil.* 469, 469, 472; Eur. *Hec.* 276 (two instances); *Med.* 710 (two instances). In official statements: Soph. *Ant.* 1016, 1017; *OT* 995 (reporting a prophesy); *Phil.* 390 (a wish, resembling a prayer), 1428 (two instances; a prophesy); Eur. *Alc.* 343–344 (a promise, resembling an oath; three instances in total); *Her.* 1325 (a promise; two instances); Ar. *Av.* 1232, 1233 (reporting an official message from Zeus).

Oedipus urges his fellow Theban citizens to help him find the murderer of Laius. By using the particle *te* to connect the items ‘for me’, ‘for the god’, and ‘for this land’, Oedipus marks his utterance as an official one: his citizens should consider his proclamation very important. The nuance of shared knowledge is also present: his listeners know that the proclamation is based on information from Apollo’s oracle (‘the god’), and that this decision is meant to save Thebes (‘the land’). They also know that Oedipus is personally involved in saving the city (‘myself’), although of course the spectators possess more knowledge about this than the characters.<sup>36</sup>

Even if the utterance as a whole is not a ritual or official activity, *te* still marks the items it connects as such:

- (15) PR. *humîn*<sub>DAT.SG</sub> *dè póthen*<sub>Q</sub> *perì toû*<sub>GEN.M.SG</sub> *polémou*<sub>GEN.SG</sub> *tês*<sub>GEN.F.SG</sub> *t’ eirénēs*<sub>GEN.SG</sub>  
*emélēsen*<sub>IND.AOR.3SG</sub>; (Ar. *Lys.* 502)  
 ‘MAGISTRATE And how come you started to care for “**War and Peace**”?’

The Athenian magistrate asks the women why they are meddling with war issues, which he considers men’s affairs only. Connecting the items ‘war’ and ‘peace’ with *te* here marks them as concepts linked to traditional knowledge, and, by implication, as official themes.<sup>37</sup> I have rendered this in the translation with capital letters and quotation marks. We can detect irony in this formulation: the magistrate considers it outrageous that women deal with war and peace exactly because these are such important and traditional concepts.

Beside associations with shared knowledge, tradition, and rituality, *te* may, if it occurs in sufficient frequency, trigger or strengthen an allusion to epic or lyric. These are genres characterized by traditional and shared knowledge, and which employ the particle in high frequencies.<sup>38</sup> In the case of Aristophanes, such allusions may include a reference to tragic lyric. Because it is conventional knowledge for hearers, an allusion to these genres can be seen as part of the meaning pole of a daughter construction of *te*, including as form pole a strikingly frequent occurrence and/or the co-presence of other alluding elements. We can see a parody effect in this song from Aristophanes, where several *te* instances are combined with epic-sounding nouns:

<sup>36</sup> Also in 244–245 in the same monologue we find two *te* instances underlining the official nature of Oedipus’ promise, as well as the shared knowledge. Other clear examples of *te* conveying a solemn tone and a link to shared knowledge in this play are the three instances in 1184–1185.

<sup>37</sup> As Henderson, 1987 remarks, ‘war and peace’ are “generic despite the articles”; he does not comment on *te*.

<sup>38</sup> See Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij, 2016: I, 5.21 for the frequencies of *te* in eight Greek authors. It is very high in Homer (2.01% of all words) and especially Pindar (2.11%). Muchnová’s (2014: 389) remark that “[t]he most abundant use of *te* is found in Homer” is thus not entirely correct.

- (16) XO. *éstai*<sub>IND.FUT.3SG</sub> *d' hupsilóphōn te lógōn korutháiola neikē*  
*skindálamoi te paraxonión smileúmatá t' érgōn.* (Ar. *Ran.* 818–819)  
 ‘CHORUS And there will be helm-glancing battles of high-crested words **as well as**  
 linchpin splinters **as well as** cuttings of artworks’.

Stanford (1958: 142) remarks in his commentary: “This is a brilliant piece of pseudo-elevated diction (parody of any particular piece is unlikely), superbly contrived to make the spectators view the coming contest between Aeschylus and Euripides as a mock-epic conflict”. Although he does not comment on the presence or high frequency of *te*, this surely contributes to the epic style as well. Beyond the identification of the alluding construction, we can in this case detect that the solemn tone and the allusion to epic are meant in a non-serious way; this is not part of the conventional knowledge within the construction itself.

The particle *te* is frequently combined with *kaí*, but it is not necessary to posit a separate construction for *te kaí*, because both particles carry out their own function. The only restriction on their potential interpretations is that *te kaí* is always surrounded by two conjuncts; those constructions in which *kaí* modifies only one item (see above) are thus cancelled. However, it may still carry the nuance of closer specification:

- (17) AGG. *Xérxēs*<sub>NOM.SG</sub> *mèn*<sub>PTC</sub> *autòs*<sub>NOM.M.SG</sub> *zēi*<sub>IND.PRS.3SG</sub> *te kaí pháos*<sub>ACC.SG</sub> *blépei*<sub>IND.PRS.3SG</sub>.  
 (Aesch. *Pers.* 299)  
 ‘MESSENGER Well, Xerxes himself is alive **and, that is to say**, he looks on the  
 light’.

Speaking of “being alive” in terms of “seeing the light (of the sun)” is a traditional formulation in tragedy as well as epic (see Broadhead, 1960; Groeneboom, 1930; Hall, 1996; Italie, 1953). Hence *te* suits the connection. Because of this traditional synonymy, both descriptions actually refer to the same content, and we may interpret *kaí* as marking a specification or reformulation.

### 2.4.3 *Dé*: From a new step to epic style to hostility

Like for *te*, we can identify a “parent” construction also for the particle *dé* in tragedy and comedy: in all cases, *dé* marks a new step in the discourse (see Bakker, 1993: *passim*; 1997: 62–68; Bäumllein, 1861: 89; Bonifazi, 2016: IV, 2 § 26–46; IV, 3 § 89, § 107; § 113–15; de Kreij, 2016b: II, 2 § 31–36; II, 3 § 65–67). This general description already makes it clear that this particle differs from *kaí* and *te*, even though *dé* too may often

be translated by ‘and’.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to the other two particles, *dé* does not signal a connection; instead, it signals a transition to something new. The instance in (18) illustrates this general construction.

- (18) ἘΛ. *taútēi khorou̅s hístēsi*<sub>IND.PRS.3SG</sub> *kai̅ mēlosphageĩ*<sub>IND.PRS.3SG</sub>  
*theoĩsin émmēn’ hierà tois sōtēriois.*  
*egō̅*<sub>NOM.SG</sub> *d’ horōsa*<sub>PTCP.PRS.NOM.F.SG</sub> *dúsmoros katà stégas*  
*klaĩō̅*<sub>IND.PRS.1SG</sub> (Soph. *El.* 280–83)  
 ‘ELECTRA On that day she (sc. Clytemnestra) sets up dances and slaughters sheep as monthly sacrifices for the gods, her saviors. **But I**, unhappy one, seeing (the feast), cry inside the house’.

Bäumlein (1861: 90) mentions this example of *dé* as involving a contrast (*Gegensatz*). In this case the contrast is between Clytemnestra’s actions, mentioned earlier, and Electra’s own actions. However, the particle itself does not signal this contrast, but merely marks the new step in the discourse. Jebb (1894) renders this in his translation not only with ‘but’, but also by starting a new paragraph.

One daughter construction involves a *dé* clause or phrase somehow reacting to an earlier clause or phrase with the particle *mén*. Though it would be wrong to consider this construction the main one for *dé*, especially in poetry and archaic literature, in fifth-century Attic it is established enough to view it as a separate construction also in drama texts.<sup>40</sup> Sophocles is the author fondest of *mén . . . dé*, especially in *Antigone* (see Drummen, 2016b: III, 5 § 38–39, with further literature).

- (19) KR. *kai̅ tou̅ton*<sub>ACC.M.SG</sub> *àn*<sub>PTC</sub> *tòn*<sub>ACC.M.SG</sub> *ándra*<sub>ACC.SG</sub> *tharsoiēn*<sub>OPT.PRS.1SG</sub> *egō̅*<sub>NOM.SG</sub>  
*kalōs*<sub>ADV</sub> *mèn* *árkhein*<sub>INF.PRS\*</sub> *eũ*<sub>ADV</sub> *d’ àn*<sub>PTC</sub> *árkhesthai*<sub>INF.PRS</sub> *thélein*<sub>INF.PRS</sub>. (Soph. *Ant.*  
 668–669)  
 ‘CREON And about this man I would have confidence that he would, **on the one hand**, rule properly, **and on the other hand**, would well be willing to be ruled over’.

Kreon here juxtaposes two sides of proper citizen behavior. In this construction, the *mén* clause somehow announces the *dé* clause, and the *dé* clause somehow reacts

<sup>39</sup> I thus do not agree with Denniston’s [1934] 1950: 162 remark that in many cases “there is no essential difference between [*dé*] and [*kai*]”.

<sup>40</sup> Therefore, there is no reason to speak, as Denniston does, of an “omission of [*mén*]” ([1934] 1950: 165). See de Kreij, 2016b: II, 2 § 43–58 for discussion of *mén* and *mén . . . dé* in archaic Greek poetry.

to the *mén* clause. Often, but not always, this involves a contrast.<sup>41</sup> In many cases it remains ambiguous whether we are dealing with this *mén* . . . *dé* construction, or both particles in fact carry out a function of their own, and do not refer to each other.<sup>42</sup>

If *dé* occurs in a strikingly high frequency within narrative discourse (especially in messenger speeches in Euripides), or in choral songs (especially in Aeschylus), a specific element can be added to our interpretation, and therefore another daughter construction identified. In these cases, namely, the style of the Homeric narrator is evoked.<sup>43</sup> The following example comes from a messenger speech that is particularly rich in instances of *dé*:<sup>44</sup>

(20) AGG. *hē*<sub>NOM.F.SG</sub> *d'*, *hōs eseīde*<sub>IND.AOR.3SG</sub> *kósmon*<sub>ACC.SG</sub>, *ouk ēnéskheto*<sub>IND.AOR.3SG</sub>. (Eur. *Med.* 1156)

‘MESSENGER **And** she, when she saw the adornment, did not resist’.

The messenger elaborately tells Medea about the death of Jason’s new bride. One event in this story is the girl’s reaction to the poisoned presents. She is referred to with *hē*, which is usually a demonstrative pronoun in Homer, but the definite article in later literature. The particle *dé* marking this new step in the narrative is typical for the Homeric poems as well. Indeed, tragic messenger speeches resemble epic narrative in many aspects (Page, 1938; J. Barrett, 2002; Mastronarde, 2002; Rutherford, 2010: 444). The frequent use of *dé* in this environment fits in with this overall allusion.

Since a new turn of speaking is already a new step in the discourse by virtue of the speaker change, we can infer that the newness of the utterance is somehow especially relevant when *dé* occurs at the beginning.<sup>45</sup> Since this interpretation follows directly from the *dé* parent construction and the context, it is not necessary to call it a separate

<sup>41</sup> See e.g., Stephens, 1837: 74–75 for a similar description of *mén* . . . *dé*, in terms of the hearer “being forewarned” by *mén* “that some statement is about to follow which ought to be considered in connection with” the *mén* part. Other examples of the *mén* . . . *dé* construction include e.g., Aesch. *Eum.* 585; Soph. *Ant.* 78, 93–94; *El.* 73, 370–371; *Phil.* 279–280; Eur. *Alc.* 182; *Med.* 726–727; *Ar. Lys.* 17–19.

<sup>42</sup> On ambiguity, see below, and see the reminder at the end of the *kai* section that both particles involved in a combination are in fact multifunctional, that is, participate in several constructions; this also holds for *mén*. On ambiguity involved in instances of *mén* followed by instances of *dé*, see e.g., Stephens, 1837: 78–79.

<sup>43</sup> In Homer, the average frequency of *dé* is 5.4% of all words, see Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij, 2016: I, 5.9. It is roughly twice as frequent in narrator text as in direct speech: see de Kreij 2016b: II, 1 § 14.

<sup>44</sup> The entire messenger speech, 1136–1230, contains 32 *dé* instances in a total of 558 words, a frequency of 5.7%. The average frequency of *dé* in Euripidean monologues is 3.7%. See Drummen, 2016b: III, 2 § 24 for the distribution of *dé* in the four dramatists.

<sup>45</sup> As a postpositive particle, *dé* cannot occur at the very start of utterances. I consider its position nevertheless “turn-initial” when it is found in the first discourse act of an utterance. See Drummen, 2016b: III, 4 § 11. On discourse acts, see especially the elaborate discussion in de Kreij (2016b: II, 2).

construction. A *dé* turn is thus marked as starting something new that is partially independent, instead of as pursuing further some element from the preceding. For questions, this means that it is presented as asking about a new point, often within a series of questions, rather than as going on with the preceding. For utterances directly following a question, *dé* signals that these are not answers to these questions, but somehow independent (see Drummen, 2016b: III.4 §§ 34–38).

A combination that I do consider a separate daughter construction is *dé ge* (contiguous or with words in between) at the beginning of utterances, in contexts of resonance. Resonance refers to the echoing of words or structures of a previous utterance, in order to achieve some pragmatic goal; such echoes are particularly frequent in hostile situations (Drummen, 2016b: III, 3; § 80–83; see also Denniston, [1934] 1950: 153; Hartung, 1832: 382; Paley, 1881: 17). In the following passage, Menelaus and Peleus are arguing about the fate of the slave Andromache, whom Menelaus' daughter wants to kill.

- (21) ME. *heílōn*<sub>IND.AOR.1SG</sub> *nin*<sub>ACC.F.SG</sub> *aikhmálōton*<sub>ACC.F.SG</sub> *ek Troías egṓ*<sub>NOM.SG</sub>.  
 PĒ. *houmòs*<sub>NOM.M.SG</sub> *dé g' autèn*<sub>ACC.F.SG</sub> *élabe*<sub>IND.AOR.3SG</sub> *país*<sub>NOM.SG</sub> *paidòs*<sub>GEN.SG</sub> *géras*<sub>ACC.SG</sub>.  
 (Eur. *Andr.* 583–84)  
 'MENE LAUS It was me who seized her as a captive from Troy.  
 PELEUS **But it was my grandson** who received her as a prize!'

Both men claim authority over Andromache. In doing so, Peleus mirrors several aspects from Menelaus' utterance: the syntactic structure of the turns is very similar, their objects refer to the same person, and the descriptions of this person are semantically similar. Such mirroring is a common strategy in conflict stichomythia (see Collins, 2004; Hesk, 2007; Pfeiffer-Petersen, 1996). The particles *dé* and *ge* in this environment together signal that the new utterance reacts to the previous one (resonance) as a juxtaposed, independent step (*dé*) and as a hostile twist on the earlier utterance (*ge*).

## 2.5 Summary

The following constructions have been identified for *kai* in the corpus. Although I see all of these as connected, only some can be considered daughter constructions, that is, as inheriting all aspects of form and meaning of the parent construction while also adding certain specific aspects.

### 2.5.1 *Kaí*-construction<sub>1</sub>

<b>A <i>kaí</i> B</b> → close linkage, implying similarity and difference ('and', 'as well as')		
<b>A<sub>verb</sub> <i>kaí</i> B<sub>verb</sub></b> → close temporal and/or causal linkage ('and (then)', 'and (afterwards)', 'and (therefore)')	<b><i>kaí</i> A <i>kaí</i> B</b> → close linkage, connection highlighted ('both ... and', 'as well as')	<b>[/]<i>kaí</i> B</b> → an earlier mentioned, resonant element is to be pursued further in the new utterance ('(And) to go on with what you said', 'Yes, and')
		<b>[/]<i>kaí</i> B;</b> → surprised, skeptical, or indignant questioning ('What? ... Really?!', 'Really? And ...?', or a surprised tone and 'And ...?')
		<b>[/]<i>kaí</i> pōs</b> + potential optative → questioning of possibility ('And (just) how (do you think) ...?')

### 2.5.2 *Kaí*-construction<sub>2</sub>

<b>A1 <i>kaí</i> A2</b> → specification of same entity ('that is (to say)', 'in other words', 'to be precise')
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### 2.5.3 *Kaí*-construction<sub>3</sub>

<b>[A] <i>kaí</i> B</b> → the mentioned conjunct is added to an implicit conjunct ('also', 'too', 'as well', 'even')
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### 2.5.4 *Kaí*-construction<sub>4</sub>

<b><i>kaí</i> B</b> → validity highlighted ('really', 'actually', 'exactly', 'absolutely', 'indeed')
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### 2.5.5 *Te*-construction

For *te* the following constructions have been distinguished. The two constructions on the first level only differ from each other syntactically, not in their pragmatic contribution; therefore, the “allusion” construction is connected to both of them.

<p><b>A B <i>te</i></b> → close linkage, in discourse marked as referring to shared or traditional knowledge ('and (as thou knowest)', 'as well as')</p>	<p><b>A <i>te</i> B (te) or A <i>te</i> (<i>kaî</i>) B</b> → close linkage, in discourse marked as referring to shared or traditional knowledge ('both . . . and (as thou knowest)')</p>
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<p><b>A B <i>te</i> or A <i>te</i> B (te)</b> (<i>te</i> in a strikingly frequent occurrence and/or other alluding elements close to <i>te</i>) → close linkage, in discourse marked as referring to shared or traditional knowledge; the style of epic, non-tragic lyric, and/or (in the case of Aristophanes) tragic lyric is imitated ('(both . . . and')</p>
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### 2.5.6 *Dé*-construction

The particle *dé* can be described with one parent construction and at least three daughter constructions:

<p><b>[A] B <i>dé</i></b> → a new step in the discourse ('and', 'but', 'now', or untranslated)</p>		
<p><b>A <i>mén</i>, B <i>dé</i></b> → a new step in the discourse, reacting to the <i>mén</i> clause or phrase ('and', 'but', 'one the one hand . . . on the other hand', or untranslated)</p>	<p><b>B <i>dé</i></b> (in a strikingly high frequency within a short stretch of discourse, and/or other alluding elements close to <i>dé</i>; a narrative context (especially in Euripides) or a choral song (especially in Aeschylus)) → a new step in the discourse; an allusion to Homeric style, especially of narrator text ('and', 'but', 'now', or untranslated; the Homeric allusion cannot be translated within the translation of <i>dé</i>)</p>	<p><b>[A] B <i>dé ge</i> or <i>dé</i> . . . <i>ge</i></b> → the new utterance is presented as a juxtaposed, independent step and as a hostile spin on the preceding utterance ('(Yes,) but' or '(Yes,) and' and emphasis on the item marked with <i>ge</i>, or an exclamation mark after the entire utterance)</p>

Note that these constructions do not describe *all* uses of the three particles in the corpus (notably not those of particle combinations with *kaî*). Moreover, the constructions are subjective, as they involve judgments concerning the relevance of form aspects, as well as concerning the interpretation of these features, that is, their meanings. Thus,

this overview merely illustrates one possible constructional description of these three particles. Nevertheless, it reveals what elements a reader of the Greek texts might take into account when interpreting a particle, as well as what a constructional description might look like for similar words in other languages.

Let me end the analysis part with an example that incorporates all three particles:

(22) EP. *autíkh'*<sup>ADV</sup> *hai*<sup>NOM.F.SG</sup> *póleis*<sup>NOM.PL</sup> *par' andrôn*<sup>GEN.PL</sup> *g'*<sup>PTC</sup> *émathon*<sup>IND.AOR.3PL</sup>  
*ekhthrôn*<sup>GEN.M.PL</sup> *kou philôn*<sup>GEN.M.PL</sup>  
*ekponeîn*<sup>INF.PRS</sup> *th' hupsēla*<sup>ACC.N.PL</sup> *teikhē*<sup>ACC.PL</sup> *naūs*<sup>ACC.PL</sup> *te kektêsthai*<sup>INF.PRF</sup> *makrás*<sup>ACC.F.SG</sup>  
*tò*<sup>NOM.N.SG</sup> *dē*<sup>NOM.SG</sup> *máthēma*<sup>NOM.SG</sup> *toûto*<sup>NOM.N.SG</sup> *sôizei*<sup>IND.PRS.3SG</sup> *paídas*<sup>ACC.PL</sup> *oîkon*<sup>ACC.SG</sup>  
*khrēmata*<sup>ACC.PL</sup> (Ar. Av. 378–80)

'TEREUS Promptly cities learn from *men*, who are enemies, **that is**, not friends, **both** to work hard on high walls **and** to acquire long ships. **Now** this lesson saves children, household, money!'

Tereus, the Hoopoe, argues to the other birds that they can actually learn from humans, even though they are enemies. The *kai* in 378 can be interpreted as marking a specification or reformulation: 'from enemies, *that is to say*, not from friends'; he urges his addressees to change their mind on this important point. In 379, two *te* instances connect two items and mark them as shared, traditional, and official knowledge: building walls and ships are conventional elements of founding and protecting a city, as he presumes his addressees know. The particle *dē* in 380 marks a new step in Tereus' argument, in this case a return to his main point at the end of his six-line speech. Finally, the elements 'children, household, money' are presented in asyndeton, to emphasize their importance.

## 2.6 Beyond constructions

A constructional approach clarifies our understanding of the different functions of Greek particles, since their different interpretations can be shown to follow from the combination of conventionalized form-meaning pairs with specific contextual features. That is, the multifunctionality of Greek particles is best explained through the participation of each particle in several distinct constructions. This does not mean, though, that our interpretation should stop at identifying constructions. It is helpful for discussing a passage if we are clear about the contextual features on which we base our reading, but disagreement can still exist about which contextual features exactly are relevant to a certain construction, and why we interpret these features the way we do. Thus, for example, determining whether the two conjuncts that may surround an instance of *kai* actually refer to the same entity (*kai*-construction<sub>1</sub>) or to two different ones (*kai*-construction<sub>2</sub>) involves subjective judgment. Describing the different interpretations of a particle in terms of constructions, with clearly determined

form and meaning poles, does not (and should not) make these interpretations less subjective, but it does make them less arbitrary.

Ambiguity can also still arise, even if the particular contextual features belonging to the form poles of a particle's different constructions are clearly defined. This is the case when the contextual features are such that the form pole cannot be assigned to one and only one construction. For example, some *kaí* instances that fit the constructions of resonance or skeptical questioning (i.e., [ ] *kaí* B) are simultaneously compatible with the 'also' construction.<sup>46</sup> Such ambiguity is to be expected, of course, because new constructions develop out of previously existing ones.<sup>47</sup>

Constructional descriptions of Greek particles, then, are a useful tool in our interpretation of texts. In a theoretical perspective, too, these descriptions illustrate how we might decide which contextual features end up in constructions. They also show that even in written texts, there are more elements that may determine our interpretation than only co-occurring words: some constructions, after all, include relations between different (fictional) speaking turns, an utterance's illocutionary force, or a hearer's experience of an item's frequency of occurrence. Finally, they show that the subjectivity involved in the interpretation of a multifunctional word depends on the interpretation of specific, identifiable contextual features.

In general, my analysis illustrates that cognitive linguistics can throw new light on well-studied phenomena in ancient languages, and can therefore enrich classical philology. In doing so, previous interpretations need not be overthrown entirely, but are expanded and made more consistent. It becomes clearer how we arrive at certain interpretations, how these are related to others, and why they fit their respective contexts. As cognitive analyses are based on the workings of the human mind, it is only logical to include the ancient Greek mind, too.

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<sup>46</sup> Examples of ambiguous *kaí* instances are Aesch. *Lib.* 223; Soph. *Ant.* 751; Ar. *Av.* 980.

<sup>47</sup> Compare Canakis, 1995: 203–250 for a similar description of modern Greek *kai* as having a network of related senses.

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