2 Herder vs. Goethe in Egypt: East and West German Language Courses in Cairo and the Evolution of “ German as a Foreign Language ” (DaF)

On February 27, 1965, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Nureddin Tarraf along with Lotte Ulbricht, the wife of East German head of state Walter Ulbricht,1 opened the East German Cultural Institute (Kulturund Informationszentrum, KIZ) in Cairo.2 It was situated near Cairo University in a spacious villa with a lush garden. This garden villa at the Western bank of the Nile competed directly with the West German Goethe Institute, which had been established just a few meters from the Tahir Square seven years earlier. In the memories of Egyptians, the East German cultural institute is still called the Herder Institute, although it never officially bore this name. However, it was closely related to the Herder Institute at Leipzig’s Karl Marx University which offered language training to international students and other groups of foreigners arriving in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).3 The opening of the East German cultural institute KIZ


Introduction
was part of Ulbricht'ss emi-official state visit to Egypt.⁴ This visit was as ignificant political success for East Germany in its efforts to gain international diplomatic recognition and thereforep rovoked outragei nW est Germany. Because of this violation of the conditions of the Hallstein Doctrine, which sawt he establishmento fd iplomatic relations with East Germanya sa n" unfriendlya ct", West Germanp oliticians had threatened to cut economic aid for Egypt or even to break off diplomatic relations to prevent the visit.B ut Egyptian politicians, in particularp resident Gamal Abdel Nasser,w ereu nimpressed by the threats and in February 1965U lbricht and his wife traveled at the invitation of Nasser from Dubrovnik to Alexandria on the ship Völkerfreundschaft (Peoples' Friendship).⁵ In this chapter we examine the East German culturalinstitute KIZ in Cairo as as pace for encounters and entanglements between Egyptian and German protagonists and as an experimentalf ield for East German culturald iplomacy in the 1960s. Ac entral part of this culturald iplomacy in the 1960s was language teaching. In the 1950s and 1960s, the teachingofGerman in Egypt gained importance as hundreds of youngE gyptians underwent engineering education and technical training at West German universities and colleges. From 1956 onwards, young Egyptians studied in East Germany as well. It was against this background that the Goethe Institute opened abranch in Cairo in 1959. At the time,itwas the largest branch of the Goethe Institute in the world and, alongside London, Paris, and New Delhi, one of the most important foreign branches.⁶ When East Germany openedi ts cultural institute in Cairo and offered German languagel essons, the KIZ entered into direct competition with the West GermanG oethe Institute. We arguet hat the German-Germanc ompetition in Egypt,a nd Egyptian actors pursuing theiri nterests while navigating this conflict,n ot onlyi nfluenced and shaped the teachingofG erman in Cairo. It also playeda ni mportant role in the institutionalization and scientification of German as aforeign language(Deutsch als Fremdsprache DaF), afield thatexists until today, but has its roots,partially, in Cold Warc ompetition over influencei nw ooingt he postcolonial world.
Largera nd inter-German Cold Warr ivalries and the West German Hallstein Doctrine are considered here as the decisive background of the events. However, we will show thatd evelopments surrounding the East German KIZ cannot be evaluated against this background alone. From an Egyptian point of view the German-German competition and the question of whethero rn ot to fullyr ecognize the GDR werelessimportant. The issue was rather atactical question for the Egyptian side.⁷ Nasserism as asocialist Arab political ideologydid not automaticallymean that Egypt preferred socialist East GermanytoW est Germany.Rather, developments in the Middle East conflict playedadecisive role in the GDR'srelatively successfulc ulturala nd languagep olicy in Egypt.E gyptian politicians, notablyG amal Abdel Nasser,d emonstrated anti-imperialist sovereigntyt hat did not relye xclusivelyo ns ocialist countries,b ut included them as important partners.⁸ Drawing primarilyo nG erman archival sources,⁹ we show how Egyptian agency influenced the teaching practice in the East German cultural center and back home in the GDR.T he actions of Egyptians can be seen in reports from protagonists from both German states onlyi nd ouble refraction because East Germana nd West German reports followed theirr espective ideological guidelines. Since the special constellation of German-German competition in Egypt brought about a "triangular relationship",W est German agency has to be taken into account as well. In the end, however,E gyptian interests determined the scope that the two German states had for their competing cultural diplomacy in North Africa.
In the first part,w ew ill outline the international political background as well as regional and nationalc onstellations and motivest hat werer elevant for decisions on cooperation on the Egyptian sidea nd in bothG erman states. We then return, secondly, to Cairo and zoom into the practice of German-German  Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalenS ystem 1949-1989(München: Oldenbourg, 2007, 172 -173.  The wayinwhich the German-German sensitivities in relations with Egypt weredealtwith fits into this model. The construction of the Aswan Dam with Soviet help is certainlythe moreprominent example.  This chapter is based on archival sourcesf romt he German Federal Archives (BArch), the Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR (SAPMO-BArch),and the Leipzig University Archive (UAL).

2H erder vs. Goethe in Egypt
languageteachingafter Ulbricht′sstate visit in 1965. Herewetrace the effects of political turmoil, such as the diplomatic crisis between West Germanya nd the Arab states in 1965, the Six-DayW ar in 1967, and finallyt he recognitiono ft he GDR by Egypt in 1969onthe practice of languageteaching. Thirdly, we will outline how these earlyexperiences with languageteaching in Egypt influenced the institutionalization and conception of languaget eachingi nE ast Germany. Our research shows thatt he turning of languaget eaching into an academic subject, and thus the invention of the subjectG erman as af oreign language( DaF), was spearheaded by East Germany-rather than West Germany-in aprocess of interactionswith non-native speakers.LanguageteachinginEgypt was an important experience in this respect and serves as an example for the impacts of relations between Africa and the GDR despite the KIZ'srelatively short "mooring" in Cairo. Egypt werei nadifficult position because Nasser feared their political influence at that time,Nasser emphasized that he was not an anti-communist and that he wanted to further develop relations with the socialist states.¹⁵ So while Egypt did not pursue ad eclared socialist policy,i tw as one of the countries that took up socialist ideas and was interested in closer relations with the socialist stateso f Eastern Europe.

Goethe and Herder Go South
However,t he most important orientation thatE gypt shared with the GDR was not so much ad eclared socialism, but rather as trong anti-imperialism. This anti-imperialism shaped Egyptian international policy.Egypt was an important playeri nT hird World movements of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, it was one of the leading powers in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and at the samet ime ah ub of Pan-Arabism, a "sanctuary of 'revolutionists' from all over the Arab world,"¹⁶ as well as as upporting power of political Pan-Africanism.¹⁷ At the same time, Nasser initiated an ambitious domestic development program. Therefore, Egypt had as trong economic interest in entertainingg ood relations with both Germans tates,h oping for expertise and technology as well as foreign exchangea nd loans.
Since Egypt was ac enter of political pan-Arabism and at the same time a center of the political decolonization movement in Asia and Africa, relations with Egypt wereimportant for both German statesaswell. East Germanofficials sawEgypt as an important diplomatic gatewaytoAfrica and the Arab world¹⁸ but werea lso interested in economic relations,p articularlyt he importo fc otton for its textile industry.D espite the Hallstein Doctrine, East Germanys ucceeded in establishing economic relations with Egypt,which laid the foundation for further  Kilian,114.  Osman, Egypt on the Brink,6 5-66.  ForEgypt as ahub of decolonization and acenter of the Afro-Asianmovement see Eric Burton, "Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam",i nSouthern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War "East":Transnational Activism 1960-1990,e d. Lena Dallywater,H elder A. Fonseca, and Chris Saunders (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019; Reem Abou-El-Fadl, "BuildingE gypt'sA fro-Asian Hub: In-frastructuresofSolidarity and the 1957CairoConference," Journal of WorldHistory 30 (2019). For an overview over the Non-AlignedM ovement (NAM) see JürgenD inkel, The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis,O rganization and Politics, 1927-1992(Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018. ForE gypt in the NAMs ee LorenzL üthi, "The Non-AlignedM ovement and the Cold War, 1961-1973," Journal of Cold WarS tudies 18 (2016.  In East Germany, however,Egypt,like the entireMaghreb, was mainlycategorized as belonging to the Arab world, although it is located on the African continent and had close ties to African states, especiallyi nt he 1960s.S ee Martin Praxenthaler, Die Sprachverbreitungspolitik der DDR. Die deutsche Sprache als Mittel sozialistischer auswärtiger Kulturpolitik (Frankfurt,B erlin: Peter Lang, 2002), 50 -51.
2H erder vs. Goethe in Egypt culturala nd laterd iplomatic relations.The initiative for trade relations initially came from Egypt.A nE gyptian delegation visited East Berlin in July 1950 in search of new markets for cotton. The first trade agreement between the GDR and anon-aligned country was signed with Egypt in 1953and aGDR trade agency subsequentlyo pened in Cairo in 1954.¹⁹ In October 1958 the German-Arabic Society (DAG)w as founded in East Berlin.²⁰ The foundation of the society was af irst stept oi nstitutionalize the culturalc ooperation of the GDR with the Arab countries.The aim was to support the "Arab peoples' struggle against imperialism".²¹ West Germanyw anted to maintain its economic relations with Egypt and at the same time prevent diplomatic success of East Germanybyall means, fearing that ab reak with Egypt over the Hallstein Doctrine would compel other Arab governments to follow the Egyptian example. Acrucial issue in Egypt'srelations with Bonn was the question of the diplomatic recognition of Israel.²² The relations of both Germans tates with Egypt remained relatively stable until 1965, when the West German and Britishp ress publisheda rticles on arms deliveries from West GermanytoIsrael. The reports triggered aseries of events that became known as the "Middle East crisis"²³ of West Germanf oreign policy. It led to the invalidation of the Hallstein Doctrine,a nd eventuallyt od iplomatic recognition of East Germanyb ys everal Arab states. Aftert he West German-Israeli treaties had become known President Nasser sawEgypt'ssecurity interests threatened.²⁴ The Egyptian government now decided to restrict relations with West Germany and to develop ac loser cultural and economic relationship with East Germany instead. Egypt suffered from al ack of foreign exchanged uring this period, and East Germanyoffered government loans, commercial credits,a nd experts.²⁵ Walter Ulbricht was invited to Cairo. In an interview with the West German news magazine Spiegel,N asser replied to the question of whyheh ad invited Ulbricht to Cairoa fter letting him wait for almostt wo years: "We felt betrayed by West Germany."²⁶ West German politicians wereu nsure how to react to Ulbricht'sC airov isit, discussingo ptions of ignoringa nd punishing throughout February. "Stalingrad at the Nile",a saWest German magazine called the disaster in ar ather shrill headline, causeds ome turbulence.²⁷ It was feared that Egypt would ultimately recognize East GermanyifW est Germanyexerted too much pressure. Eventually, this diplomatic confusion was the beginning of the end of the Hallstein Doctrine as West Germanycould neither afford to break off relations nor act accordingto the doctrine.²⁸  Gray,Germany′sColdW ar,172. The credits weregrantedinthe East German convertible currency Valuta Mark (VM)and included VM 200million (approximatelyUS$50 million) in government credits and VM 130 million in commercial credits.S ome of the credit commitments contained old credits froma1958 agreement that had not been exhausted (VM 40 million). Amongo ther things,t hese loans had been used to buy GDR machines for cotton processing and to set up at extile combine in Shibin el-Kom.  Interview by DieterSchröder and Conrad Ahlers with Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Sie können sich doch nicht ewigerpressen lassen!" in Der Spiegel 9, February 25,1965, 34.Inthis interview,Nasser also made it clear that Egypt would probablyrecognize the GDR if West Germanywas to cease its economic aid because of the visit of Ulbricht to Egypt.Healso stressed that Egypt would generallyn ot reactt oW estern threats.  Christ und Welt,February 5, 1965, quoted in Amid Das Gupta, "Ulbricht am Nil: Die deutschdeutsche Rivalitätinder DrittenW elt," in Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz, ed. Udo Wengst and Hermann Wentker (Berlin: Ch. Links,2 008).  Gray, Germany′sColdW ar, 173 -176; Kilian, Hallstein-Doktrin,153.For an analysisofthe West German discussions around the Ulbricht visit and its impact on the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine see also Hong, Cold WarG ermany,2 45 -249.

2H erder vs. Goethe in Egypt
German-German Kulturkampf ²⁹ in Cairo 1965 -1967: "Sprechen Sie Deutsch?" The First Yearso f Direct Competition Competition between the two Germans tates in Egypt was carried out through means of culturald iplomacy.B etween 1957 and 1960,t he Politburoo ft he East German ruling party,the Socialist Unity Party (SED), had passed several resolutions stipulating that culturalcenters focusing on languageinstruction should be openedinnon-socialist countries.³⁰ From 1965on, languageteachingbecame an importantp art of on-sitec ulturald iplomacy in Cairo.³¹ Set up in av illa near Cairo University,t he newlye stablished East German culturali nstitute KIZ had five large classrooms,s everal offices,a nd al ibrary.Aconcert grand pianow as handed over to the staff at the ceremonial opening.T he grand piano later stood in the event hall, which was solemnlyc alled the "grand hall."³² The first director of the KIZ was the orientalist Klaus Timm, while the first chief instructor was the linguist Gerhard Helbigf rom Leipzig'sK arl Marx University.
When Gerhard HelbigarrivedinCairotogether with his wife Agnes Helbigat the end of December 1964-two months before Ulbricht'sstate visit to Egypt-he encountered a "completelye mpty,p oorly maintained house." He spent the first few months supervising the preparation of classrooms and providing the complete equipment so that German lessons could take place there. At the beginning of February 1965, advertisements for aG erman course were placed in several Egyptian newspapers. More than 110 Egyptians personallyr egistered with Agnes Helbigi naprovisionallyf urnishedo ffice at the center.³³ Paradoxically, the high number of registrations was ar eason for concern rather than joy.The head of the KIZ,Klaus Timm, was originallyopposed to admitting so manyE gyptians to German lessons in the new institute. Due to a shortageo fp ersonnel, he onlyw anted to approves mall courses with am aximum of six to ten participants. Gerhard Helbig, who was the onlyG erman in- Originallythe German term Kulturkampf (cultural struggle or culture war)referstoChancellor Ottovon Bismarck'ssanctions against (political) Catholicism in 1870sGermany, but it is used for culturalc onflicts in other times and places as well.  The first of these centers was opened in Helsinki in 1960. structor at the KIZ duringt he first few months, however,m anaged to keep the German courses open for al argern umber of interestedp eople by referringt o the competition with West German culturald iplomacy in Cairo. "Fort he displacement of the Goethe Institute, the effectiveness of the languagei nstitutei s very important.S of ar,t he Goethe Institute has held all these positions in its hands," Helbige xplained his commitment to the East German Foreign Office (MfAA)and the Herder Institute. German lessons should be offered at morefavorable conditions than at the Goethe Institute but not free of charge,asotherwise, Helbiga ssumed, "the value of teachingw ould be reduced in Arab eyes."³⁴ The classess tarted in March 1965. Apart from regular German classes, the KIZ also offered individual lessons for Egyptian personalities considered as especiallyi mportant,i ncludingn ot onlyp rospective engineers or other specialists who weret os tudyi nt he GDR but alsom embers of the Egyptian elite who wereinterested in (East) German lessons.³⁵ Twostate secretaries of the Egyptian Ministry of Education attendedprivatelessons. Another visitor was Mahmoud El-Hefny, the brother-in-lawo fD eputy Prime MinisterN ureddin Tarraf. El-Hefny was one of Egypt'sm ost respected musicologists and chaired ac lub for Egyptians that had graduated in Germany (Klub der in Deutschland graduierten Ägypter)from 1963to1973. In the 1920s, El-Hefnyhad studied medicine and musicol-ogyinRostock and Berlin. He had receivedhis doctorate in musicology from the Friedrich Wilhelm University³⁶ of Berlin in 1931. Obviously, El-Hefnya lready spoke German and wanted to refresh or deepen his knowledge and invested in the maintenanceo fasocial network.³⁷ The German courses werea ne ssential part of the KIZ,a nd they shaped the imageo ft he institute to the outside world. The coursesw eret echnicallyg ood, which the West German competitors readilya cknowledged. Additionally, like the Goethe Institute, the KIZ offered its visitors exhibitions and concerts, and subtitled East German films as well as scientific and political lectures and discussion evenings.
After some hesitations following Ulbricht'sv isit to Cairo,t he West German government finally decided to impose sanctions against Egypt.W est Germany announced that it would cease providing economic aid to Egypt.When Chancel- 2H erder vs.G oethe in Egypt lor LudwigErhard on March 7, 1965announced thatW est Germanywas willing to fullyr ecognize Israel, Egypt and nine other Arab statesb rokeo ff their relations with the FederalR epublic of Germany( FRG). As ar esult, West Germanyw as forced to close its embassy in Cairo and recall the ambassador.³⁸ "Nowherei n the world have Is een such an impudentp eople as the West Germans",N asser declared in aspeech one dayafter Erhard'sannouncement to recognize Israel.³⁹ Despite the breakdown of relations, the staff of the embassy'sc ulturald epartmentr emained in Cairo.⁴⁰ The Goethe Institute and the (West) GermanA cademic ExchangeA gency DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst)w ere able to continue their work for the time being.The (West German) Federal Foreign Office hoped that the Goethe Institute would be able to take on some of the diplomatic tasks of the embassy that no longer existed.⁴¹ Although West Germanyh ad lost its embassy in Cairo, East Germany was unable to open its own. ForNasser,political pan-Arabism was central and he refused full diplomatic recognition of East Germanynot because of West Germansensitivities, but to avoid conflict between the Arab statesw hich wered ivided over this issue.⁴² Thus, the cultural diplomats of bothGerman competitors werefinallyateye level. Without diplomatic representation for both German states,c ultural diplomacy became more central. This constellation with a "downgraded" West Germany at diplomatic eyelevel with East Germanyishistoricallyunique. It shows that southern agency, in this case Egyptian diplomacy, could influencea nd limit the scope of action of the northern partners considerably.
Although thereweresignals from the Egyptian side not to obstruct the work of the Goethe Institute and the DAAD,the political situation nevertheless led to restrictions. The Egyptian government banned Egyptian civil servants from visiting the Goethe Institute withoutm inisterial permission. Appointments that the Goethe Institute had alreadym ade with ministry civils ervants werec ancelled at shortn otice, Egyptian officials rejected invitations, and the "previouslya pproved use of venues was prohibited."⁴³ In the months following the diplomatic withdrawal, it became increasingly difficult for the staffo ft he Goethe Institute and the DAAD to obtain visas and work permits for their stayi nE gypt.⁴⁴ Intra-German competition in languagepolicy created asituation thatvarious actors on the Egyptian side could use to theiradvantage. They sometimes played both German sides off against each other in order to getf ree German lessons or instructor positions for Egyptian universities or colleges.⁴⁵ Some examples might illustrate how the competition could be exploited for personal ends. In order to keep the Egyptians close to the West German side, the Goethe Institute decided to soften the positions of some state secretaries with small favors. Among others, State Secretary Mustafa Hassan wasinvited to alonger trip to Germany at the expense of the Goethe Institute, and at wo-years cholarship wasp rocured for the son of State Secretary SayedM ohamed Roha. In addition, they promised af ree additional holidayc ourse for Egyptian Germant eachers in Munich. In another case the Goethe Institute responded to the GDR'so ffer to the Egyptian Ministry of Education for 12 teachers of German at secondary and highs chools in Egypt and 20 training scholarships for German teachers in Leipzigb yo ffering the Egyptian Ministry of Education atwo-year training course for four German teachers in Munich and additional further training measuresfor all Egyptian German teachers with the possibility of taking part in asummerlanguagecourse in West Germany.⁴⁶ In the summer of 1965, the dean of the Germandepartment of the language school in Zeitoun, Antoum Chalaby Maher,approachedthe Goethe Institute and demanded two additional teachers for his institute. Otherwise he would fall back on the offer of East Germany, which had already, he claimed, promised him two teachers.The Goethe Instituter esponded favorablyt othe demand.⁴⁷ The fear of an East German breakthrough was deep-seated. The executive board of the  Several lecturers reported that the granting of visas was subject to harassing conditions. Large quantities of bribe (baksheesh)had to be paid and manyforms signed by different authorities had to be submitted. The waitingt ime, begging, and errands now tooks everal weekso f workingt ime.

2H erder vs. Goethe in Egypt
Goethe Institute agreed to do everythinginits power to fend off the East German advances: "If the SBZ [Soviet Occupation Zone]⁴⁸ had succeeded in making a major slump in this direction, the consequences would not be foreseeable. That'sw hy every effort must be made to send as manyg ood people as possible in sufficient numbers."⁴⁹ When aposition as alanguageinspector for German lessons at the Egyptian Ministry of Education became vacant,E ast Germanyp roposed to fill it.U ntil then, three inspectors of the Goethe Instituteh ad been closelyi nvolvedi nt he professional supervision of the Egyptian German instructors.Since the Egyptian Ministry of Education postponed the decision for some time,two KIZemployees offered Egyptian Germaninstructors jobs at the KIZ in Cairo and distributed symbolic awards such as "knowledge medals" to the course participants.⁵⁰ When the Goethe Institute protested that the previous supervision of Germanl essons at Egyptian schools was no longer guaranteed and that on the other hand the awardingof"FDJ[Free German Youth]⁵¹ medals" by non-authorized East German citizensatEgyptian schools was equivalent to the GDR'srecognition under international law, Egyptian state secretaries replied that the West German arms deliveries to Israel had not been forgotten.⁵² Herea gain the Egyptians dealt with the case without showing much interesti nt he complicated details of German-German competition and rather bluntlya sserted their focus on the Israeli case.
The existenceo ft wo German languagei nstitutes in Egypt and the ideologicallyc harged competition led to the close observation of each other'sw ork. In their Kulturkampf, Germans occasionallytried to instrumentalize Egyptians as informers and cultural saboteurs.The Goethe Institute, on the instructions of the Federal Foreign Office, encouraged its Egyptian staff to attend KIZ events in order to reporto nt hem and carry out "possible countermeasures."⁵³ On the  SowjetischeB esatzungszone (SBZ) was the term used for the sector of Germanyw hich was occupied by the Soviet Union since1 945. Even after the foundingo ft he GDR in 1949,t he term was often used in West Germanyi nstead of the abbreviation GDR,s incet he GDR was not recognized as as overeign state. other hand, East German languaget eachers visited Goethe Institute events and wroted etailed reports on them. In May1 966,t he Federal Foreign Office completelyp rohibited the German staff of the Goethe Institute and the DAAD from contactingm embers of the GDR Cultural Center.I nstead, their own Egyptian local staff was chosen to obtain information. They should apparentlyr espond to the East Germano ffer for af urther training course for Egyptian Germani nstructors,i no rder to learn more about the structures and workingm ethodso f the East German Institute.⁵⁴ The Egyptian instructors later stated thatt he East German chief instructor Peter Schumann wasapproaching them with special offers. He offered them to changet ot he East German Institute for ab etter salary and promised the possibility of free further training at the Herder Institute in Leipzig.T he Egyptian instructor Samir Boalos, for example, reported that East Germans told him that the KIZ had excellent relations with Egyptian civil servants and secretaries of state, which would certainlyb enefit the professional career of German instructors.⁵⁵ Whether this East German offer reallye xisted can onlyb ei nferred from the reports of the Egyptian instructors,b ut not from the documents of the GDR.I ti sa lso possible that the Egyptian instructors,i np laying Germans off against each other,t ried to increase theirw ages at the Goethe Institute and hoped for invitations to languagec ourses in West Germany.
The East German KIZ managed to establish itself in Cairo within af ew months. By fall 1966,m oret han1 00 languages tudents had enrolled in the courses.I ni nstructor Gerhard Helbig'sv iew,o ne reason for this was am odern, fullye quipped electronic classroom, with television, film projector,a nd record player. It was not awidespread practice at the time to include these media in languaget eaching. Accordingt oH elbig, the East German classroom was looked upon with envy by West German competitors.⁵⁶ If that was the case, this might be one of the rare occasions where East German technicalequipment in development cooperation was superior to West German one. From March 1967, the West German television course Guten Tag was broadcasted on Egyptian television.⁵⁷ The broadcastingw as discontinued in the spring of 1968 and replaced by the

2H erder vs. Goethe in Egypt
East Germantelevision course Sprechen Sie Deutsch? Thecourse was meant to be apilot project for GDR TV courses in the Arab world and other countries and was givena sagift to the Egyptian television. Foraperiod of three years, this East German course ranweeklyonthe Egyptian State ChannelF ive.⁵⁸ Accompanying the course, the KIZ offered consultations in its own cultural center as well as in the Egyptian culturalcenters in various cities. ⁵⁹ The rapid successes encouraged the GDR leadership to strengthenits culturalpolicy work in Egypt on the basis of adecision from the GDR'sCouncil of Ministers in summer1966 to expand foreign information activities (Auslandsinformation), as the propaganda work was called, in the Arab countries.T he decision provided for the opening of two new cultural centers in Aleppo and Alexandria.⁶⁰ In addition, the training and further education of Egyptian and Syrian German teachers was intensified.⁶¹

1967: Teaching German after the Six-Day War
The Six-DayW ar in June 1967⁶² was aturning point for the Egyptian-German triangle relationship. Since West Germany supported Israel, the political mood and the opinion of the Egyptian authorities and in institutions quickly changed from suspicioustohostile. Politicians frequentlyreferred to the "anti-Arab FederalRepublic" in public.⁶³ West German instructors wrotea bout a "hostilea ttitude" of the Egyptian population in theirr eports.The staff of the Goethe Institutee ven reported that they felt a "climate of fear."⁶⁴ Egyptian authorities began to put pressureonthe Goethe Institute and the DAAD as residencepermits werenot extended and work permits could onlybeobtained with great effort.The Egyptian secret service began to openlymonitor employees of the Goethe Institute.⁶⁵ After Egyptian protesters in Alexandria had set the American and Britishc onsulates on fire in the name of anti-imperialism and tried to do the samea tt he Goethe Institute, which was protected by the police, the Goethe Institute decided to  Praxenthaler,Sprachverbreitungspolitik,3 1967-30.06. 1967, July 13,1967.  BArch, B3 07/233,F erkinghoff, 1. Halbjahresbericht 1967 close the offices in Cairo and Alexandria temporarily. Languagecourses werediscontinued and the upcominge xaminations postponed until furthern otice. The head office in Munich was firmlye xpecting both branchest ob ep ermanently closed by the Egyptian government and was alreadyp lanning to transfer the staff to other countries.⁶⁶ East Germany'sculturald iplomats took advantage of this situation immediately. TheKIZ remained open and classes continued duringthe war. Just one day after the closure of the Goethe Institute, the East GermanKIZ advertised in Egyptian newspapers thatthe examinations planned by the Goethe Institute would be held by the "German Cultural Centre of the GDR -Arab-German-Society".⁶⁷ As a result, manyo ft he Goethe Institute'sl anguagec ourse participants, especially from the intermediatea nd advanced levels, moved to the KIZ.⁶⁸ In late 1967, abrochureentitled "In the Name of Goethe -The Goethe Institute, aW eapon of West German Imperialism" appearedi nE gypt.The brochure, written entirely in Arabic, was printed in East Berlin by Panorama, apublisher of the GDR'sF oreign Press Agency.I tw as distributed freeo fc harge in large numbers to state authorities, ministries, and the press.E xcerptsf rom the brochure werea lsop ublished in the Egyptian magazine Al-Magalla. The GDR obviously wanted to use the anti-imperialist,a nti-Western mood and hoped to convince the supposedlycommunist,GDR-friendlyoranti-imperialist minds in ministries, authorities, and the press of the danger represented by the Goethe Institute.⁶⁹ The campaign was seemingly successful, but this was probablydue to the political circumstances rather thanthe persuasiveness of the East Germanpropaganda. In away the disaster of the Six-DayW ar achieved what the GDR propaganda had not in the previous years: to demonize West Germanya sa ni mperialist power.
Since West Germanydid not want to leave the field to the Eastern competitors,the Goethe Institute re-opened its doors just after afew weeks. But Ludwig Erhard'sp ublic support for Israel had taken its toll. The number of participants in languagecourses at the Goethe Institutedropped rapidlyafter the war.InSeptember 1967, more than 30 studentsm oved from the Goethe Institute to the KIZ. An Egyptian languagestudent wrotetothe Goethe Institute explaining his decision: "Irefuse to continue taking languagelessons with you. It would be embarrassing and painful for me if Icontinued to studyinyour institute which belongs to the West German government,agovernment that clearlyp articipated in the dirty,a rmed hostilities against the great Arab homeland."⁷⁰ Egyptian authorities now stipulatedthatall West Germancultural events required ap ermit from the Egyptian Ministry of Interior and could not takep lace outside the premises of the Goethe Institute.⁷¹ Additionally, West Germanyn ow had to paysocial insurance to all local Egyptian DAAD and Goethe Institute employees which resulted in enormous bureaucratic effort and financial costs.The Goethe Institute, the DAAD and the West GermanCultural Departmentsuspected that this compulsory insurance had been introducedu nder pressuref rom East Germany.⁷² Thisshows acharacteristic pattern that shaped German-German perceptions:i nt he bipolar logic of system competition, both sides assumedt hat their (German) rivalso rchestrated the restrictions and Egyptians were nothing but puppets. Egyptian initiatives and motives, such as anti-imperialism or anti-Zionism, rarelya ppear in the reports of both German sides. Once more, the intra-German rivalry provided severaladvantagesfor Egyptian course participants. With some skill, it was possibletoget free languagelessons. The director of the Egyptian Cultural Centre in Zagazig receivedf reeG erman lessons at the East German KIZ by mentioning that the Goethe Institute had offered him free lessons. Other German learnerss ucceeded in enrollingl ate in courses of the KIZ,arguing that languagecourses could also be taken at the Goethe Institute.⁷³ EastG ermanya ttemptedt oe xploitt he weak position of West Germanyi n Egypt as aresultofthe Six-DayW ar to gain afootholdinthe Egyptianuniversity landscape. In additiont othree West German instructors,the Language School at Zeitouna lso hired an EastG erman instructort or un its language laboratory in September 1967. Thisc aused problems,b ecause thes hift in Egyptian politicsi n favoro ft he GDRd id notm eant hata ll Egyptians welcomedt hisc hange.T he Egyptian head of the languages chool, Antoum Chalaby Maher, did notc onceal his sympathy for the Goethe Institutea nd askedt he EastG erman instructor Klaus Neubert to stick to the (West German)c urriculum and teachingm aterial. However, since Neuberthad beeninstructedbyhis superiors not to use West German materialfor political reasons, he had to producehis own teachingmaterial.⁷⁴  BArch, B3 07/223,E nclosurei nH albjahresbericht Goethe-Institut Kairo, 1. 07-31.12.1967

1969: Recognition
Egypt turned closert ot he Soviet Union and Eastern European States after the Six-DayW ar.This promotedt he diplomatic aims of the GDR.C ultural relations werea lreadydeepeneda tt he end of 1968. To this end, aj oint cultural commission was founded and an ew joint "Working program for culturala nd scientific cooperation" was concluded.⁷⁵ One of the most important goals of the program was the promotion of GDR German teachingi nE gypt.T he aim was to replace West Germany from its traditional positions in the field.A bdul Wahab El-Borolosy,E gyptian Minister of Research and Higher Education, and representatives of the Egyptian Ministry of Education promised at am eeting with the Cultural Department of the Consulate General and the KIZ to support the ideas of the GDR.⁷⁶ On July 10,1969, the Egyptianand EastGerman governments announcedthe establishment of diplomatic relations.T he West German Government'sr eaction did not contain the threat of countermeasures, which was tantamount to achange in thepolicyofnon-recognitiontowards the GDR.The recognitionofthe GDR was still described as ah ostile act by West German officials,b ut no retaliatory measures suchasthe breakingoff of trade relationswereused.⁷⁷ The breakthrough at the diplomatic levelwas also the breakthrough in the field of German as aforeign language(Deutschals Fremdsprache,DaF)for the GDR in Egypt.With the opening of the embassy, the DaF working group was immediatelyfounded,which further determined and coordinated the tasks of thecultural center and the work of East German instructors at Egyptianu niversities.⁷⁸ Some West German instructors were replaced by EastG erman instructors.A so ne of the firstm easures,t he EastG erman instructors introduced GDR teachingm aterial.⁷⁹ The changeofmood in Egypt also led to asignificant increase in the number of applicants for languagecourses at the KIZ.Inthe spring of 1970,the enrolment

2H erder vs. Goethe in Egypt
for the courses had to be stopped after onlytwo days due to the large number of applicants.S ince East German officials demanded to enroll preferablyt hose Egyptians who "appear to be important for the foreign information objective," the tuition fees for "studentsand housewives" wereincreased by 50 percent because the DaF workingg roup considered these to be of little relevance.⁸⁰ It becomes clear here that the main objective of the languagecourseswas to achieve political goals. Propaganda for the GDR,the abovementioned "foreign information," was amandatory part of the languagecourses.⁸¹ The aim was to convince Egyptian society of the advantageso ft he socialist GDR over the "imperialist" FRG.I nc ontrast, "housewives" and "students" wereo bviouslyn ot regarded as importantm ultipliers and weret hereforee xcluded as fara sp ossible.
In the 1970s, however,E ast German propaganda became less important in languaget eachinga nd madew ay for am ore pragmatic approach. Alreadyi n spring 1970,the KIZ begantooffer the opportunity to acquirelanguagediplomas which served to "enable the holder to takeu pas cientific qualificationi nt he GDR without further linguistic preparation."⁸² The course load for the language diploma comprised 480 hours and was to become mandatory in the future for an entry visa to studyi nE ast Germany. During av isit to East Germanyb yA bdul Wahab el Borolosy,t he Egyptian minister of higher education, it was agreed that languaget raining at the KIZs hould be concentratedo nt hose who would studyinthe GDR.Inthe future, languagetraining should also focus on technical disciplines.
This changei nt he orientation of Germant eachingc an be seen as an East German paradigm shift in the teachingo fD aF.I nt he 1970sl anguaget eaching became more and more at ool to support educational programs. The aim was now ap ragmatic preparation for universitye ducation in East Germany. Propaganda was no longer in the foreground, although the indoctrination of Egyptian instructors did not disappearc ompletely. Fore conomic reasons,m oreE gyptian instructors wereh ired for the teachingo fb eginners' and basicc ourses,b ut for political reasons they weret ob e" regularlyi nstructed and controlled by East German instructors,a sw ell as politically and methodicallys upervised." These  SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022d, 1. Tätigkeitsbericht des Lektorats Kairo,S tudienjahr1 969/70, February 20,1970. We found no explanation in the sourcestowhom the term "housewives" refers and how manyofthem wanted to enroll in the courses. Unfortunately,thereisageneral lack of informationi nt he sourcesa bout gender of Egyptian students and teachers.  SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/2020, Beschlussprotokoll der Sekretariatssitzung der Deutsch-Arabischen Gesellschaft,A ugust 3, 1966.  SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022c, Tätigkeitsbericht des Lektorats am Kulturzentrum in Kairo, August 12, 1969. instructors had to attend af urther training course in East Germanye very two years in order to report on the GDR from their own experience.⁸³ East Germany'sr elative superiority vis-à-vis West Germanyi nt he realm of culturald iplomacy was quickly ended by another changei nE gypt'sp olitical scene. After Nasser'ss udden death in 1970,E gyptian foreign policy under Anwar Sadat changed fundamentally. Egypt moved closer to the West without giving up cooperation with the socialist countries.⁸⁴ 1972 sawt he resumption of diplomatic relations between West Germanya nd Egypt.With Egypt'sd iplomatic recognition of the GDR,c ulturald iplomacy in North Africa became less central for the two Germans tates. The situation reversed, and less and less visitors wered rawn to the East German cultural center.⁸⁵ Germanl essons continued, but while the Goethe Institute in Cairo still exists today, the GDR closed its culturaland informationcenters in Cairo and Alexandria in 1977.The closure of the centers was probablynot onlyrelated to the diplomatic recognition of the GDR,which led to adecline of investmentsincultural diplomacy,but also to the deterioration in relations between Egypt and the socialist countries under Anwar al-Sadat.F rom 1974,S adat clearlym oved closer to the West and, among other things, withdrew from the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1976.⁸⁶

German Language Courses in Egypta nd the Emergenceo fD aF
The German-German Kulturkampf in Egypt playedanimportant role in the emergence of the academic subject German as af oreign language( DaF). Egypt was the second non-socialist country afterF inland in which the GDR experimented with the teaching of Germana saforeign languagea broad with its owni nstructors at its own languagecenters. Until then, there had been little experience with 2H erder vs.G oethe in Egypt teachinginanon-German-speakingenvironment.⁸⁷ The GDR'sGermanclasses in Egypt were also successful and attractive because they werecarried out by welltrained instructors.
East German instructors werecarefullyselectedtoensure that they had languageskills in the host country.Aguideline of the East GermanMinistry of Higher and TechnicalEducation (MHF) for the selection of instructors stated that they should have sufficient foreign languages kills "in order to be able to carry out foreign information at ah ighl evel in beginners' lessons."⁸⁸ In Egypt,t his meant that almost all East German instructors weree xperiencedl anguagei nstructors or German studies expertsw ith knowledge of English and in most cases also with Arabic languageskills. Almost all the instructors had previously studied or taught at the Herder Institute in Leipzig. Egyptian authorities often pointed out to West Germanr epresentativest hese qualitative differences between East and West.The Federal Foreign Office thereforeinsistedthatW est German instructors should have acquired knowledge of the national languageb efore their assignment.I nr eality,t his could rarelyb ei mplemented. There were simplyt oo few West German instructors with knowledge of Arabic who would have been willing to go to Egypt,e ither out of concern for their careers or out of fear of crisis situations flaring up again and again.⁸⁹ In September 1966,the East GermanCouncil of Ministers decided to "establish ac omprehensive system of German languaget eachingf or foreigners." This decision formedt he basis for further developmentofl anguagep olicy as af ocal point of the GDR'sculturaldiplomacy in order to counter West Germanlanguage policy.Accordingtothe Council of Ministers of the GDR,West Germanyonlyused languagec ourses to "gain political influencei nt he developing countries and to bind the leaders in these countries to the FRG." The resolution clearly states how the influenceo fW est Germanyw as to be reduced. The aim, accordingt ot he Council of Ministers,should be "to graduallyreach firm contractualagreements […]a nd political and culturalc enters […]t hrough the secondment of individual instructors."⁹⁰ The decision of the Council of Ministers therefored irected that  ForG DR cultural policyi nF inland see Olivia Griese, AuswärtigeK ulturpolitik und Kalter Krieg.D ie Konkurrenz von Bundesrepublik und DDR in Finnland 1949-1973(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006 German as af oreign languages hould be underpinnedt heoretically and practicallya nd had to be developed into an "independent scientific discipline."⁹¹ In aconceptual paper on the development of German as aforeign language, the director of the Herder Institute in Leipzig, JohannesRößler,stressed that the quantitative superiority of West Germanyinthe field of DaF could be countered by the qualitative superiority of the GDR.AccordingtoRößler,this lead should be maintained at all costs.⁹² It becomes once again clear at this point how much languaget eachingw as used as as trategic weapon under the conditions of ubiquitous system competition.
Herew ec an see several factors that influenced German languaget eaching. The paradigm shift in languagee ducation from ideological to technical madei t necessary to scientificallyu nderpin languaget eaching. At the same time, East German party and state leaders noticed that languagep olicy enabled them to competew ith West Germanyw ith relatively scarcer esources.
In general, teaching German in Egypt was an important step for East German instructors,intheir career and at the same time an opportunitytoexperiencelife abroad, as can be seen in the caseo fG erhard Helbig. It was either as tarting point for an international career or ao nce in al ifetime opportunity.S ome used this opportunityf or am orer adical change. Although authorities took care to ensurethat onlywell-established "cadres" wereallowed to travel abroad, it was not possibletoprevent the "Republikflucht" [desertion from the republic, i. e. GDR] of instructors completely.⁹³ Fore xample, am arried couple of instructors who had been employed in Egypt as well as the GDR instructor in Conakry in Guinea used their stayabroad to "defect" to the West.⁹⁴ Thissparkedadebate between the Herder Institute, the MHF, and the Foreign Office on how to prevent similar events in the future.⁹⁵ The success of the GDR in Egypt promoted the emergence of DaF as an academic subject in the GDR.F rom apractice increasinglyneeded duringthe 1950s  SAPMO-BArch, DC20/I/4/1412, Beschluss Aufbaue ines umfassenden Systemsf ür den deutschen Sprachunterricht,J une 8, 1966.  UAL, HI 028, Johannes Rößler,P roblemskizze zur Entwicklungd es Gegenstandes "Deutsch als Fremdsprache," August 28,1973, 140.  SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022e, Günther Hänse and Horst Nalewski, Halbjahresbericht über die Arbeit an der Universität Kairof ür die Zeit vom1 0. Februar bis 10.J uni 1970, June 10,1970.  The names of the couple aren ot mentioned.The lecturer from Conakry, however,b ecame lecturer at the Goethe Institutei nM unich and later Professor for DaF in Saarbrücken.  SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1426d, Brief Leiter des Referats für Wirtschaftliche Auslandsbezie-hungenMLU Halle an MHF, January 27,1969. Howmanylecturers exactlyused their assignment in Egypt as an opportunity to turn their backs on the GDR cannot be determined from the available sources.
2H erder vs.G oethe in Egypt and 1960s it developed into an independent scientific discipline in the GDR,several years before it was established in West Germany.Ont he one hand, the aim was to offer better German lessons thant hoseo ft he Goethe Institute or the DAAD in countries like Egypt and thus to convince the studentst hat the GDR was the "better Germany".Ont he other hand,s cientific research was meantt o improvea nd shorten the obligatoryG erman lessons for foreign students in the GDR.A tt he center of these efforts wast he Herder Institute in Leipzig,w hich from the beginning of the 1950s was the training center for the obligatory preparatory Germanl essons for foreign studentsw ishing to study in the GDR.H erea t the Institute, the foundations were laid for the academic subjectofGermanasa foreign language. In 1967, ar esearch department was foundeda tt he institute, and in 1968, GerhardH elbig, the former first instructor in Cairo, was appointed as the first chair for German as af oreign language.⁹⁶

Conclusion
Cultural cooperation between Egypt and the two German states duringt he Cold Warp eriod was an ew chapter in the long-standing Egyptian-German relations, which affected the institutions in both German states.Thisisparticularlyevident in languagep olicy and in the genesis of the subject German as af oreign language. The debate on languaget eaching in Egypt had ap articular influence on East German languagep olicy, and shaped pioneering institutions liket he Herder Institute and Goethe Institute in the Global North on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
The competition of the East German and West German cultural institutes in Cairo shows that Egyptian actorsand institutions wereincharge and shaped the discourse. ForE gyptians,G erman-Germanc ompetition was sometimes ignored but,i nm ostc ases, instrumentalized or usedf or tactical maneuvers in the conflict over Israel. Learning German had al ong tradition in Egypt⁹⁷ and German was also needed by Egyptians who wanted to studyi noneo ft he two German countries.Inthis respect,teachingGerman in Cairo wasasmall piece of the puzzle in the great development project of socialist modernization under Nasser.
Egypt under Nasser wasonits own path of socialist development and maintained close relationships with the USSR and other socialist countries.Like many non-aligned Third World countries it carefullyavoidedtochoose one side in East West Cold Warcompetition but rather followed its own agenda and interests. The increasinglystrongrelations with the socialist GDR fit into this pattern. From the Egyptian side they might have been ar esulto fp ractical and strategic considerations rather than an expression of deeplyf elt socialist solidarity.I deological consensus with the GDR wasm ost likelyt ob ef ound in Egypt'sp ronounced anti-imperialism.
Solidarity between the GDR and Egypt is perhaps betteru nderstood if it is seen not so much as political or economic altruism. Both states were interested in meeting at eyelevel and wanted to benefit from the exchange. This anti-imperialist win-win situation maynot always have existed in practice.Nevertheless, it shaped the decisions on both sides. TheEast-West side of the triangular relationship described in this chapter was not central for Egypt,but system competition between East and West Germanyw as used by Egyptian actors to deal with both sides successfully. This is also reflected in the German-German struggle for sovereignty over the teachingofGerman and the changingreactions of Egyptian actors,b et hey learners, teachers or political functionaries, which determinedt he scope of action of the two German states.
In retrospect, however,t he decisive question is not whether "Herder" or "Goethe" won the German-German competition in Egypt.R ather,w ea re challenged to examine af acet of the conflicts in the Cold War. We see the economicallyu nequal two German states competingi no ne of the leading countries of the ThirdW orld movement,w ithoutd iplomatic recognition by this country and at eyel evel to each other.Wes ee theme ngaging in their tough and sometimes seemingly ridiculousc ultural struggle over who should be allowed to teach German to Egyptian interested parties. German-German competition had an important side effect on the genesis and institutionalization of the subject of Germana saforeign languagei nE ast Germanya nd subsequentlya lsoi n West Germany. Thiss hows that external missions of projectingc ulturals oft power in the Global South sometimes had strongere ffects on the northern cultural missionaries themselvest han on their southern counterparts.