Reality as Resistance: The Concept of the Will in Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799)

Ansgar Lyssy

Abstract

Friedrich Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799) is a lengthy defense of the core claims of Kant’s first Critique against different types of skeptical criticism. Bouterwek argues that Kant’s presupposition of knowledge is vulnerable to skeptical attacks and he suggests shifting the apodictic and hence foundational commitment to reality from the domain of theoretical knowledge towards that of practical agency. Reality is not represented in our knowledge, but instead experienced directly as resistance against our will. The will is not a mere idea within a transcendental framework of theoretical speculation, but a proper force, a real entity that we can experience directly and that dissolves the abstract distinction between reality and thought.

Reality as Resistance: The Concept of the Will in Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799)

From the book The Concept of Will in Classical German Philosophy

Abstract

Chapters in this book (19)