2 Crowd Violence in East Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971–1972

Introduction

Some recent scholarship links violent persecutions in the 20th century to the rise of mass political participation. This paper substantiates this claim by exploring part of a country’s history of crowd violence. Such acts constitute a specific form of participation in collective violence and shaping it. There are others such as forming local militias, small informal violent gangs or a guerrilla, calls for violence in petitions or non-violent demonstrations and also acting through a state apparatus, meaning that functionaries contribute personal ideas and perceptions to the action of a bureaucracy in some persecution. Therefore it seems to make sense to investigate specific qualities of participation in crowd violence. Subject to this inquiry is violence against humans by large groups of civilians, with no regard to other collectives of military or paramilitary groups, as large as they may have been.

My approach to this topic is informed by my interest in what I call “extremely violent societies.” This means social formations in which, for some period, various population groups become victims of mass violence in which, alongside state organs, many members of several social groups participate for a variety of reasons. Aside from the participatory character of violence, this is also about its multiple target groups and sometimes its multipolar character. Applied here, this means to compare the different degrees to which crowd violence was used by and against different groups and why.

It is evident that the line between perpetrators and bystanders is especially blurred within violent crowds. I have expressed doubts about the usefulness of both terms, “perpetrator” and “bystander,” before and prefer to speak, more broadly defined, of “persecutors” rather than “perpetrators,” among other


things to avoid that responsibility is only placed on (often inferior) executors. However, this does not solve the thorny problem of assigning responsibility concerning crowd violence. Crowds are not one collective agent. Usually not all members of a crowd, and not even all of its armed members, hurt other people with their own hands. Nonetheless, these seemingly non-violent people in an armed crowd may encourage others, directly or indirectly, to commit physical attacks, may intimidate people that become victimized and may prevent the victims by physical or psychological means from escaping. Thus it may be less interesting to assign a term like “perpetrator” to people than to describe responsibilities, concluding from observations of a sufficient number of cases of crowd violence as will be presented here. As spontaneously emerging collectives, crowds have especially little cohesion, which makes motives particularly difficult to identify even though people more or less volunteered to come and institutional and longer-term factors such as subordination to orders and rules and group pressure were less intense.

Thus my contribution will address the following questions: In what situations, where and when was there crowd violence? And when was it relegated to the background, perhaps being replaced by other collective violence? What groups used it against what other groups? What were the discursive contexts of the violence and the intentions of the gatherings? What can be said (even if information is limited) about the relationship between individuals and the crowd? What was the relationship between actors and the regime? And what pre-existing traditions of violence played a role?

East Pakistan/Bangladesh in 1971/72 serves as a case study. This may be useful because of the multitude of victim groups, including many attacked by crowds, and because of the abundance of incidents. Conflicts in East Pakistan erupted in the wake of the first nationwide bourgeois-democratic elections in Pakistan. This paper may lead to some insights into the relation between mass participation in politics and mass violence in general. After some initial observations regarding traditions of political militancy in East Pakistan before 1971 I trace the occurrence of physical violence from among crowds through different phases from early 1971 to the spring of 1972.

4 A recent collective volume on crowd violence is Axel Paul and Benjamin Schwalb, eds., Gewaltmassen: Über Eigendynamik und Selbstorganisation kollektiver Gewalt (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2015), though only parts of that book address non-organized violence by large collectives. The chapters relevant here are by the editors (pp. 7–18, 383–408), Paul Dumouchel (pp. 103–123) and Ferdinand Sutterlüty (pp. 231–256).
Historical Context

At this point, a brief survey of events in East Pakistan in 1971 is at place. After partition in 1947–48 there emerged the state of Pakistan consisting of two wings that were 1600 kilometers apart and differed widely culturally and economically. A little more than half of the population lived in largely rural East Pakistan (from December 1971: Bangladesh), dominated by a peasant rice economy. Most inhabitants there were Bengali-speaking Muslims. The most important minorities consisted of about 10 million Hindus and between one and two million Urdu-speaking former Muslim refugees from India, dubbed Biharis. The elites in the East that was economically stagnating and in the grip of deepening poverty protested, above all, the marginalization of the Bengali language and culture in the 1950s and economic discrimination in the 1960s. This led to demands for strong autonomy for the eastern part of the country that were championed by the Awami League, a political party under the chairman Mujibur Rahman. In the end of the 1960s, this merged with protests against the military dictatorship that ruled Pakistan since 1958. After the Awami League won the first all-Pakistani bourgeois-democratic elections in the end of 1970, open conflict erupted in March 1971. The military tried to crush the autonomy movement in a bloody crackdown, and, together with supportive local Muslim militias – including Biharis, but also Bengali conservatives – killed, arrested or expelled Awami League functionaries, students, pro-Bengali intellectuals and Hindus. In April, the army also started with massacres in villages, trying to defeat an emerging guerrilla movement with bases in India. Ten million people, mostly Hindus, fled to India, and even more people, largely Muslims, were displaced within East Pakistan. The army and their helpers also committed mass rapes. The number of killings reached hundreds of thousands. But mass violence of different kinds was also committed by civilians, including Bengalis who turned against Biharis and other non-Bengalis as well as Muslims persecuting Hindus, particularly in the countryside. Many rapes occurred also between neighbors and within families. Pakistani rule in Bengal was terminated by an Indian invasion together with Bangladeshi independence fighters in December 1971. Afterwards attacks on Biharis and rapes continued, as did a famine that may have caused more victims than direct violence, especially among returning refugees.

Given that few official Pakistani and Bangladeshi documents are available to scholars, this study is mainly based on observations and statements by East Bengalis, Pakistani army personnel and foreign missionaries, journalists and diplomats. An additional problem is that accounts by Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are often bequeathed in publications where lines between facts and propaganda are blurred and that sometimes convey rumors that are also conveyed in reports.
by foreign observers. In a sense, my analysis is merely based on assertions about the occurrence of crowd violence. And yet, these sources are meaningful since it is characteristic how often and in which cases crowd violence was claimed to have taken place. In part of the cases, cross-checking allows for the verification of reports. Unclear language in the sources is another problem. As there is often no exhausting description or analysis of an event, only certain terms used, such as “mob” or “riot,” indicate that it involved masses. By contrast, denominations like “gangs” or “goondas” rather point to small groups of actors. Unfortunately, most of the material is insufficient for in-depth micro-studies. In particular, one cannot say much about the identity of the people in those crowds—except that by far most were men—and who within a crowd turned violent. And at this point, little can be said about the important inner dynamics within those gatherings. But the material seems comprehensive and dense enough to identify some patterns, including the situations in which crowd violence came about.

**Traditions of Political Militancy**

Nationalist scholars from Bangladesh have spread the impression internationally that East Pakistan was peaceful and homogenous, except for Pakistani army violence. Nothing could be further from historical reality. Bitter conflicts between social groups and between the sexes, the frequency of riots, aggressive practices of political struggle and repeated occurrences of mass violence in the quarter of a century before 1971 testify to the contrary.

Large parts of the agrarian population of East Pakistan (and thus the overall majority of inhabitants) suffered from lack of land, and land conflicts divided villages and families. Comprehensive serious discrimination against women was common before 1971 and domestic violence widespread.

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5 A critical evaluation of some of these rumors is in Sarmila Bose, *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War* (London: Hurst, 2011).


antagonisms led to almost constant unrest. From 1958 to 1966, the number of officially registered riots was at about 5,000 annually, or 14 per day, and they were on the increase. This level was even surpassed by far from 1972 to 1974.\textsuperscript{9} From a picture of almost everyday civil disturbances, some periods of mass violence stood out. Between 1946 and 1950 as well as in 1964–1965, many pogroms took place, victimizing mostly Hindus but also other groups such as the small Christian communities. Since 1946, at least four million Hindus fled East Bengal (and in the year of 1970 alone, 248,158 reached West Bengal in India), tens of thousands were murdered.\textsuperscript{10} Politics in East Pakistan knew little regard for minorities.\textsuperscript{11} Other waves of collective violence included the language riots of 1951, hunger riots and several cumulations of student unrest.\textsuperscript{12}

All of these included violence committed out of crowds. From 1946 on, there were mutual collective assaults between Muslims and Hindus in the context of decolonization and partition also in East Bengal. By early 1948, this had forced 800,000 Muslims from India to flee to East Pakistan and one million Hindus in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{13} These conflicts reached their peak in 1950. Masses of angry Muslims torched Hindu houses or entire neighborhoods and/or looted them, especially if Hindus had refused to convert to Islam. Sometimes crowds ransacked all stores run by Hindus. Crowds also attacked steamboats, trains and buses in order to slaughter Hindus. Many Hindu girls and women were raped or abducted. As a result, the refugee wave to India rose.\textsuperscript{14} In 1964–1965 there were similar pogroms. This time, Muslims among the work force of factories, including Biharis, were also incited to turn against Hindus and massacred them in some cases. Hundreds of thousands of Hindus lost their homes, more than 667,000 took refuge in India in 1964.\textsuperscript{15} Unlike in 1950 and 1971, all political parties formed a committee that stopped the riots relatively quickly.\textsuperscript{16}
followed in 1968/69 were months of student unrest that was joined by
violent protests of workers and peasants that claimed the lives of some local
elites. Through this history of violence certain patterns of assault against
some groups had emerged, as had patterns of response. Locally, events
had repeated themselves in some places before 1971. It was also known
how to avoid fatalities: as a meticulous study of a rural confrontation be-
 tween over 10,000 Muslims and Hindus in 1954 demonstrates, there was
no spontaneous fighting, but after deliberations among local leaders, and
in the fighting, the many sickles, knives and spears were used only
against arms and legs of opponents. However, past events could also
precipitate serious political misjudgments, as the U.S. Consul in Dacca
concluded in a telegram in 1971:

> With benefit of hindsight it [is] now evident AL [Awami League] tragically miscalculated
its position in its post-1 March confrontation with MLA [Martial Law Authority]. Mujib
und AL believed they dealt from position of strength, based not only from overwhelming
victory at polls which legitimized position vis-a-vis MLA, but also blind faith in “people
power.” Strongly held myth here is that masses in 1968–69 anti-Ayub agitation not only
successfully confronted police and EPRs [East Pakistan Rifles], but also had the regular
army cowed.

Two widely used tactics of political struggle in East Pakistan deserve special
mentioning. Relatively often was a hartal (general strike) called, locally or re-
gionally, and rigorously enforced, down to stopping car traffic. For a gherao,
businesses, authorities or residences were surrounded by a crowd in hostile
posture in order to get concessions by those encircled before they were given
back their freedom of movement. Both tactics took large, aggressive groups of
people to the streets.

17 Van Schendel, History, 123; Kalim Siddiqi, Conflict, Crisis and War in East Pakistan
Hill, 1971), 32–33.
18 Marian Olson, Bangladesh: Tears and Laughter (Willmar, MN: Willmar Assembly of God,
2002), 104–106 sketches the example of Gopalganj.
20 Telegram from about April 1971, quoted in Archer Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh:
Khan was military dictator in Pakistan in 1968–69.
21 See for example Blood, Birth, 165.
General Elections and the Consequent Political Crisis, 1970–1971

The nationwide unrest of 1968–69 forced the military government to change its frontman. The new leader of the junta, General Yahya Khan (1917–1980), promised general elections and actually organized them in November 1970. The Awami League won 75 percent of the votes in East Pakistan, which, through the majority voting system, made her claim 160 out of 162 seats from the East (the party did not run in the western part of the country) and, thus, the absolute majority in the Constitutional Assembly in Pakistan. This was an outstanding political victory, but it did not mean that the East Bengalis sided united with one peaceful party. The turnout in East Pakistan was 57 percent of eligible voters, and during the election year, activists and supporters of the Awami League had attacked supporters of other parties also physically in order to intimidate them, and killed some of them.

The leaders of the Awami League deduced from this election victory a claim to speak for, as it was called, the 75 million people in the East, and, as they took the election result as support for their party’s platform, also a hardly veiled claim to sovereignty for the East. The will of 75 million was not to be and could not be suppressed. This argument persuaded also Henry Kissinger (b. 1923), the advisor for security affairs of the President of the USA, although Kissinger was not known as a friend of the founding of the state of Bangladesh. The U.S. Consul in Dacca called the Awami League’s chairman Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975) by appearance and character a power-hungry man who derived his power from the masses.

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22 Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 127.
24 See newspaper reports about speeches and interviews by Mujibur Rahman of 1, 21, 22 and 24 March 1971 in: Bangla Desh Documents (Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs n.y. [1971]), 189, 257, 261, 267; Peter Hess, Bangladesh: Tragödie einer Staatsgründung (Frauenfeld and Stuttgart: Huber, 1972), 57.
26 Blood, Birth, 47.
When Yahya Khan postponed the meeting of the Constitutional Assembly indefinitely on 1 March 1971 due to discord between the political parties, many Bengalis suspected that fraud was intended. According to pro-Bengali narratives, this triggered an unarmed movement of passive resistance, but in reality it was not peaceful.\(^{27}\) Mujibur Rahman called the Bengalis to arm themselves and take on the struggle. After the movement had already suffered bloody losses, one could also sustain more of them.\(^{28}\) Already on 30 December he had announced that “any attempt to delay or thwart [the realization of the] wishes of the people would be resisted to [the] bloody end.”\(^{29}\) During one of the biggest meetings with him on 7 March, where Mujibur Rahman spoke of peaceful non-cooperation, slogans called for the destruction of Pakistani troops.\(^{30}\) After the military had shot at spontaneous, sometimes violent, demonstrations and killed several demonstrators, Mujibur Rahman declared a **hartal** on 2 March that paralyzed public life, was modified on 7 March and then transformed to a parallel rule by the Awami League in East Pakistan including the control of media and financial institutions.\(^{31}\)

This did not stop at rhetorics. Directly after Yahya Khan’s indefinite postponement of the Constitutional Assembly meeting on 1 March, masses of angry Bengalis took to the streets. Many were equipped with bamboo sticks and iron rods. For days, they smashed and looted stores and restaurants run by Biharis and Western Pakistanis, set several places ablaze and attacked opponents of East Pakistani autonomy as well as foreigners. Cars were torched and bricks thrown. Some groups, especially university students, tried to procure firearms, mostly by plundering arms stores. Some manufactured Molotov cocktails.\(^{32}\)

\(^{27}\) Unarmed according to: Jahan, *Genocide*, 375. Bose, *Reckoning*, 18 and 24 argues the opposite way.


From 2 March onward, violent clashes between demonstrators and the military took place, especially when civilians tried to storm certain public offices or blocked objects. According to the military, 172 persons died from 2 to 4 March, though most in clashes between Bengali and non-Bengali civilians and through police (not army) fire. Such incidents started on 1 March.\textsuperscript{33} The Awami League called these numbers grossly understated, and all victims were blamed on the military shooting at unarmed civilians.\textsuperscript{34}

In several places there were pogrom-like mass conflicts between Bengalis and Biharis with victims on both sides, but more among the latter. The most lethal happened on 3 and 4 March in the port city of Chittagong, when Bengali demonstrators marched through a Bihari settlement in order to enforce the \textit{hartal}, which was answered by shooting from Biharis. 200 people died on both sides, especially in neighborhoods inhabited by Bihari workers, sites that suggest that Bengalis were on the attack.\textsuperscript{35} Other deadly clashes between Bengalis and Biharis in Chittagong followed shortly before 25 March when Biharis wanted to unload a ship of military goods shortly and Bengalis attempted to prevent that.\textsuperscript{36} This time it was (at least according to Bengali sources) armed non-Bengali crowds who moved against Bengalis under the wrong assumption that the army would immediately come to their help. Many non-Bengalis were killed instead.\textsuperscript{37} In several neighborhoods and suburbs of Khulna, crowds killed at least 57 non-Bengalis with improvised bombs, sickles and spears, mutilating them.\textsuperscript{38} Angry crowds also appeared at highways and attacked, among others,
cars that did not carry black flags as demanded by the Awami League.\textsuperscript{39} Trains were either stopped by crowds between stations or passengers encircled at stations and alleged or real opponents of political autonomy threatened. According to some sources, passengers of a local bus in Dacca were murdered by a crowd.\textsuperscript{40} Violence from amidst crowds originated at several places from the attempt to enforce the general strike, which in turn was supposed to protest anti-democratic measures by the military junta, but also served as vehicle for a creeping political takeover. Such violence built up incrementally.\textsuperscript{41} However, it has to be added that witnesses attributed violence against non-Bengalis also often to small armed groups (“gangs”), instead of crowds.\textsuperscript{42}

In the days after 1 March, boycotts prevented army units in East Pakistan from the purchase of fresh food and crowds blocked unit movements, often without the military responding violently. The most bloody incident that did happen occurred in the town of Jodevpur on 19 March when there was shooting out of a crowd blocking a railway crossing at army troops which killed several people when returning the fire.\textsuperscript{43}

All in all, there were many violent actions out of gatherings and demonstrations in several towns and cities from 1 to 25 March, not only during clashes with the army. Transitions between common practices of political struggle and mass violence were fluent. From about 22 March – three days before the army crackdown – mass assaults on Biharis began on a larger scale than in the weeks before. This can also be read from warnings of Bengali politicians which also indicate that the Awami League started to lose control of the events.\textsuperscript{44} In one of the largest riots, 8,000 civilians, many of them armed, attacked residential neighborhoods in or around Saidpur on 24 and 25 March.\textsuperscript{45} The excitement and readiness for violence of those assembled sprung from their outrage because of political injustice and oppression, but often it was not directed against functionaries of the state but minorities that were considered alien, even though these were vaguely seen as linked with government and West Pakistani interests.

\textsuperscript{39} Jim McKinley, \textit{Death to Life: Bangladesh as Experienced by a Missionary Family} (Louisville: Highview Baptist Church, n.y.), 9.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{White Paper}, 38; Aziz, \textit{Blood}, 30.
\textsuperscript{41} In this point the \textit{White Paper}, 29–39, appears realistic.
\textsuperscript{42} Aziz, \textit{Blood}, 25–43.
\textsuperscript{44} See various articles in \textit{Bangla Desh Documents}, 271–274.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{White Paper}, 39.
Crowd Violence in March/April 1971 and Its Suppression

The most common violence committed out of crowds in March and April 1971 were massacres against Biharis. Tens of thousands were killed. The most lethal incidents happened in Chittagong, Khulna, Jessore, Santahar (6,000 to 15,000 dead), in ten settlements in Mymensingh, where the crowds were armed with rifles, swords, spears and daggers (500 to 5,000 dead), and in Dinajpur. Frequently this included the murder of women and children or the abduction of children. In other places, only male adults were targeted. Such events may have been exaggerated in Pakistani propaganda or postwar pro-Pakistani studies (but see the partial confirmation by witnesses from the opposite side mentioned on the following pages). Nonetheless such (pro-)Pakistani reports are significant in that they hold crowds, mostly called “mobs,” responsible for attacks on non-Bengali civilians because they attest mass support to the political opponent, which undermines the idea that one should have kept a united state of Pakistan that is usually at the basis of these publications. This lends such reports some credibility.

The slaughter of Jessore on 30 March and its results were observed by foreign journalists. Civilians armed with spears, rifles and other weapons hacked Pakistani soldiers and non-Bengali civilians to death. A crowd of Bengalis was also about to lynch a U.S. missionary as alleged "Punjabi" in a coastal area until a functionary of the Awami League clarified his identity. The Pakistani authorities set up camps for about 25,000 Bihari widows and orphans.

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48 For the latter point, see Saikia, *Women*, 84 (Saidpur).


50 Hefley and Hefley, *Christ*, 20.

Pogroms against non-Bengalis have not only been described by Bihari survivors, Pakistani army officers, foreign media reporters and missionaries; they also appear in collections of postwar Bengali memories, such as the mutual pogroms in Khulna with, at least, hundreds of fatalities.⁵² A crowd’s attack at the Kabuli building in Chittagong, where supporters of the Pakistani government had barricaded themselves (some of them armed) led to them being killed, to looting and to the rape of women by the crowd.⁵³ In the town of Ishurdi, large groups of people hunted down scattered Pakistani soldiers and Biharis and killed them. Similar things happened in villages close to Lamonirhat near Rangpur.⁵⁴ Bengali student Najmul Ansar fled the Pakistani army from Dacca to Comilla, but there he was surrounded by a hostile crowd as alleged Bihari.⁵⁵ These reports show also how distrust grew on both sides, many people armed themselves, protective steps were taken, rumors circulated and finally hostile crowds from both sides attacked civilians, as happened in Chittagong.⁵⁶

Military attacks could lead to bloody riots by Bengalis who accused Biharis of signaling to the Pakistani air force.⁵⁷ In Lamonirhat (Rangpur district), the local Bengali pogrom against non-Bengalis took place after Major Ziaur Rahman’s (1936–1981) radio speech in which he declared a state of Bangladesh on 26 March. Local Bengalis succeeded to burn down a Bihari neighborhood, but they had severe losses and were afterwards attacked by non-Bengali prisoners freed by the military.⁵⁸

Some sources say that functionaries of the Awami League were responsible for anti-Bihari pogroms. Even a Bangladeshi historian accuses “Awami League volunteers” of a six-day riot against Biharis in Chittagong at the end of March 1971.⁵⁹ But there are a number of counter-examples, when Awami League functionaries prevented or stopped riots and mass murder.⁶⁰ Already in March 1971, Mujibur

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⁵² Account by Mustafa Kamal in Firdousi, Year, 489; see also White Paper, 66.
⁵³ A detailed description can be found in the account by Waliul Islam in Firdousi, Year, 17–24.
⁵⁴ Accounts by Arief Razzaque and Golam Sarwar in Firdousi, Year, 330, 389–391.
⁵⁵ Account by Najmul Ansar in Firdousi, Year, 406–407.
⁵⁶ Account by Mohammad Ishaque in Firdousi, Year, 25–27; Yaqub Zainuddin’s account in ibid., 513–514 portrays probably events in Chittagong as well.
⁵⁷ Blood, Birth, 276–278 (Mymensingh, April 1971).
⁵⁸ Account by Golam Sarwar in Firdousi, Year, 389.
Rahman had repeatedly warned of rioting against Biharis, albeit in ambivalent statements. Accusations by the Pakistani justice authorities against Awami League functionaries concerning violence against non-Bengalis, West Pakistani and “non-conformists” were mostly vague, and, above all, largely not related explicitly to directing violent crowds. Either this was rare, or the Pakistani authorities wanted to avoid the impression of mass support for such violent acts. If the role of representatives of the leading political party was more conciliatory, this would mean that crowds, and individuals in them, acted rather autonomously.

In several areas, crowds, defying death, but also with the intention to kill, turned also on troops identified as supporting (West) Pakistan (after 25 March 1971, some units supported Bangladesh’s independence). Before the army crackdown on 25 March, popular action was directed against the supply and movements of all units, also of those that consisted mainly of supposed Bengalis. Afterwards this changed. Locally, this was organized by a “Liberation War Committee” headed by an Awami League member-elect of the National Assembly in Satkhira. Allegedly, 8,000 people moved against the military base in Saidpur already on 24 March. On 31 March, about 50 Bengali police officers, 100 students and 5,000 peasants attacked an army unit in Kushtia. Instead of a suicidal frontal attack, they surrounded the troops and shot at them with hundreds of previously captured rifles. Peasants hacked those soldiers to death that tried to drive away in panic. 134 military personnel died, 13 were captured. On 2 April, 5,000 people armed with sticks, bows and arrows, spears and firearms stopped an army platoon on the way from Rajshahi to Nababgunj and captured a tank. In Jessore, peasants armed with hoes, truncheons and bamboo spears held a barrack under siege in order to kill the soldiers located there. A crowd

61 See for example Blood, Birth, 162 and note 29 in this chapter.
62 “Charges against 16 more MNAs”, in: Pakistan Times, August 18, 1971, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (PA AA), B 37/629.
63 Salik, Witness, 56–57.
65 Massa, Bengale, 178.
66 “Pakistan. The Battle of Kushtia”, in: Time, April 19, 1971, printed in: Quaderi, Bangladesh Genocide, 72–75. A unit of 300 men was annihilated in Pabna: Qureshi, War, 33.
68 “Pakistan. Death of an Ideal”, in: Newsweek, April 12, 1971, in Quaderi, Bangladesh Genocide, 50.
hacked nine soldiers in Bogra to pieces on 6 April; at about the same time, armed groups moved against local Biharis. Similarly in Ishurdi in the end of March: thousands of village residents made a stand against Pakistani troops, captured three soldiers and killed them later. Then Biharis were murdered and their property looted.69 In Mymensingh, pro-Bengali troops overpowered their circa 50 West Pakistani comrades, masses of civilians streaming into the base hacked those West Pakistanis to death who tried to flee, murdered their children and wifes and kidnapped some of the women.70 In the town of Feni, an armed crowd attacked a West Pakistani unit which had barricaded itself in a large building, holding Bengali soldiers prisoner. Many West Pakistanis, but also Bengali soldiers and many civilians died. South of the town, civilians held up a military column in fighting for several days.71 West Pakistani soldiers and officers who lived outside closed quarters became an easy prey of crowds who massacred them and often also their wives and children.72 Some Pakistani military personnel moving around alone were also killed by armed groups or crowds between 3 and 25 March.73 Many of the sites of these actions indicate that the posture of these crowds was not necessarily defensive, but that they pursued military units or men and/or confronted them at a favorable place for an attack. The passionate approach with no regard of one’s own life, the low number of prisoners kept and the brutal ways of killing, all of this points to how much people in those crowds felt that their way of action was justified because it was for a just cause. It was widely held that Biharis and West Pakistanis deserved death, a view that was also adopted by some foreign missionaries. One of them wrote in late July 1971: “I became a Bengali ... I revised my theology on the grounds that this business about loving your enemy needs rethinking. It was based originally on the supposition that the enemy is human.”74

In turn, crowds of non-Bengalis turned against perceived opponents, especially in the wake of brutal army attacks like on 27–28 March in Dacca.75 In some instances, the Pakistani military distributed arms among Biharis.76 Large

69 Accounts by Arief Razzaque and Mazudur Rahman in Firdousi, Year, 330, 449–450, 453.
70 Bose, Reckoning, 83–84; Blood, Birth, 276.
71 McKinley, Death, 12–13.
72 For an example from Chittagong or Rangamati, see the account by Naseem Rahman in Firdousi, Year, 465; see also Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 151.
73 Bose, Reckoning, 32–33.
74 Letter by U.S. missionary Goedert quoted in Hefley and Hefley, Christ, 50. See also Hess, Bangladesh, 148.
75 Hefley and Hefley, Christ, 18–19.
groups of Biharis acted in hostile ways against Bengalis trying to escape military violence. Violence by Bihari crowds occurred in particular where many Biharis lived, like in (or close to) certain towns and suburbs, and in railway settlements where they often formed the majority of residents. As mentioned before, in Chittagong and its suburbs, there was mutual collective violence between Bihari and Bengali demonstrators. This resembled events in the Khalishpur neighborhood in Khulna and, to a degree, of the Mohammedpur area in Dacca. A rare example of a late lethal pogrom organized by Biharis on Bengalis is known for Chittagong. But overall it is striking that, though Biharis were accused then and in the historiography of having committed atrocities, there is relatively little concrete evidence for Bihari crowd violence.

Even more than in the 1950s and 1960s (when also many Hindus were killed), factories and related settlements became the scene of brutal Bengali-Bihari infighting. In many places, Biharis formed a large part of the management, but also of foremen, specialists and other workers. After 25 March, it was often non-Bengalis, and especially superiors among them, who were slaughtered by Bengali workers who sometimes did not spare their opponents’ families. People acting out of crowds killed many Biharis and Western Pakistanis, military and civilians plus their families, at the Kaptai power station in the remote Chittagong Hill Tracts on 25 and 26 March. The most deadly of these incidents happened in two jute plants in Khulna around 27 March, when both Bengalis and Biharis armed themselves and barricaded themselves in, the latter lost and many of them were killed, as well as some Bengalis. Even before

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77 See Akhtar et al., Rising, 17–18, 154.
78 Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, Events, chapter IIb.
79 Account by Ferdousi Priyobashinee in Tormenting Seventy One: An account of Pakistan army’s atrocities during Bangladesh liberation war of 1971, ed. Shariar Kabir (Dhaka: Nirmul Committee, 1999), n.p.; this was portrayed as one-sided violence in “Khulna’s Says of Terror”, in: Bangladesh Observer, February 4, 1972. For Mohammedpur, see Qurratul Ain Tahmina, “Zabunessa Begum: A Mother’s Struggle for Her Family”, in: Akhtar et al., Rising, 14–16.
81 This is emphasized in Aziz, Blood.
82 Sen, “Refugees”, 631; account by Naseem Rahman (steel workers settlement near Chittagong) in Firdousi, Year, 466; account by Premankur Roy (brickworks near Phalpur close to Mymensingh) in ibid., 379. For the 1950s and 1960s, see Sen, “Refugees”, 628; Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1990), 13; for attacks on Hindus, see Roy, Genocide, 40–41, 48.
83 Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, Events, chapter IIb.
26 March, there were apparently massacres by crowds targeting non-Bengalis in factories and factory settlements.\textsuperscript{85} Long after the end of the war, on 10 March 1972, thousands of Biharis, including women and children, fell victim to another mass attack by Bengali civilians.\textsuperscript{86}

After the Pakistani army had prevailed with brutal means and had all towns again under its control from about 20 April 1971, Bengali crowds apparently no longer dared to turn openly against non-Bengalis (as it had still happened even in Dacca in the night from 25 to 26 March\textsuperscript{87}). In Dacca, army fire also stopped further revenge pogroms of Biharis against Bengalis in late April, fueled by stories by refugees from the anti-Bihari pogrom in Mymensingh. Now the troops shot several Biharis,\textsuperscript{88} after violent Muslim demonstrations starting from different points and converging at quarters with a population consisting mainly of Hindus and supporters of independence had been permitted on 13 April which led to arson and murder.\textsuperscript{89} It seems that the army moved, though reluctantly, against violent Biharis on some other occasions after 25 March. Some killers from their ranks received mild prison sentences.\textsuperscript{90} Thereby the military stifled violent crowd action for the time being. Internationally, it wanted to show that it kept law and order, domestically the regime somewhat intensified its efforts to find Bengali allies after 18 April and even university students and certain Awami League members, although without notable success.\textsuperscript{91}

To be sure, violence in cities and suburbs continued on a high level, but for the most part as small operations by the army and the militias and “peace committees” supporting the regime who arrested or abducted individuals en masse, tortured and murdered them, abused women and robbed enemy property. Supporters of independence, in contrast, focused on tightly organized guerrilla attacks and bombings, refraining from violent mass demonstrations.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{85} Aziz, Blood, 44 und 47 (Narayanganj).
\textsuperscript{86} Bose, Reckoning, 159.
\textsuperscript{87} See Robert Payne, Massacre (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 22.
\textsuperscript{88} Blood, Birth, 277 mentions that the army shot seven Biharis on 28 April; see also Imam, Blood, 68 und 70 (diary entries of April 23 and 25, 1971).
\textsuperscript{89} Ahmed Sharif et al., eds., Genocide ’71: An Account of the Killers and Collaborators (Dhaka: Muktijuddha Chetana Bikash Kendra, 1988), 41–42.
\textsuperscript{90} Account by Yaqub Zainuddin in Firdousi, Year, 514.
\textsuperscript{91} Blood, Birth, 280; FRG Consulate General in Dacca, report, October 28, 1971, PA AA, B37/629.
\textsuperscript{92} A rare counterexample is mentioned in the account by Masudur Rahman in Firdousi, Year, 455 (date and place are unclear). A crowd demanded from three Mukhti Bahini to kill some alleged Pakistani collaborators under their control. The guerrillas only beat and humiliated the prisoners.
In the countryside, the lack of Pakistani government control resulted in possibilities for crowd violence, especially when targeting Hindus. The historiography blames violence there, too, usually on the Pakistani army in connection with local militias (razakars) and especially on Bihas. For villages, responsibility is also attributed to Muslim neighbors or Muslims from the area, but the forms their action took is often unclear. One author speaks of “oppression,” others of looting, assault and burning down of Hindu neighborhoods, sometimes apparently carried out by large collectives. Between 1 and 25 March 1971, people from among crowds in the countryside are supposed to have killed political leaders loyal to Pakistan and other persons dubbed as anti-social and to have burned their houses. Given the high density of the rural population, large gatherings were not uncommon. But all in all, there is little information about crowd violence in rural areas. According to one report, in the large village of Sherpur, crowds of Muslim locals went on a pillage of houses by Hindus after being asked by Pakistani troops to do so in late April 1971. After an army massacre at a nearby river, a crowd of villagers from other places coerced relatives of those executed to leave the site because they were afraid of army reprisals if the dead bodies were taken.

We also do not know much about crowd counter-violence by Hindus. Refugees who often moved in large groups – consisting of up to 300,000 people – tried to protect themselves against attacks by small groups, inter alia, by taking women and children in the middle and place men on the sides. It is possible that some of these men were armed. In one case, a local peace committee forced refugees to pay a toll and disarmed them for this purpose. However, if a group of hundreds of thousands accepted such treatment, it was either not disposed toward violent behavior or its members did not feel to be in a position to use violence.

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93 Bose, Reckoning, 117.
95 Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, 65.
A Restricted Return to Crowd Violence in Late 1971

When Indian troops attacked together with Bangladeshi independence fighters in December 1971, again there was a power vacuum, chaotic scenes and persecutions of civilians. But who acted was often small groups of armed men who searched neighborhoods for Biharis and alleged collaborators of the Pakistani side, shot men, raped part of the women and plundered, especially at night.98 Several observers, however, reported also crowd violence in which Biharis were hunted down and their houses burned, but this was often weeks and months after the end of the war in early 1972 and even still in April.99 Afterwards, Biharis stayed in many places in their own camps or neighborhoods for protection. In the middle of December, an incident was rather exceptional in which armed independence fighters together with a crowd armed with sickles, spears, axes and firearms moved against non-Bengalis; some people were already massacred by the crowd whereas it was smaller groups who later killed women and children that were held captive. The number of dead seems to have run at least into the hundreds. Indian troops liberated the survivors.100

One event appears symptomatic. An armed commando under leftist guerrilla leader Kader Siddiqi (b. 1948) presented four alleged collaborators, who were accused of having attacked Bengalis, having looted and tried to abduct two women, to 5,000 in a sports stadium in Dacca on 18 December 1971, tortured and bayoneted them to death for half an hour in front of the cheering crowd. Foreign media representatives filmed and photographed the scene, which was later shown by some Western European TV stations.101 On a symbolic level, this can be interpreted in a way that the victorious guerrilla fighters who had risked their lives in the fight for independence, which lend them some legitimacy, took the law into their own hands, acting on behalf of the people in a way that was perceived as just. Viewed from another angle, the

99 Hefley and Hefley, Christ, 86; Ben Whitaker et al., The Biharis in Bangladesh (London: Minority Rights Group, n.y. [1977]), 9, 14 und 16 (Dacca and Khulna); Bose, Reckoning, 159–160 (Khulna, March 10, 1972); Peter Hazelhurst, “Hundreds of non-Bengalis Slaughtered in Bangladesh”, in: The Times, May 8, 1972 (Mirpur near Dacca).
100 See the account by Mohammad Jafar Al Khan in Firdousi, Year, 521–525.
101 See Hess, Bangladesh, 146 and photograph after 144; photographs in Aziz, Blood, ix–xii; Bose, Reckoning, 156–157; Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 152.
others left the reckoning to the armed fighters. Such a procedure reduced the active role of crowds in the violence to being supportive onlookers. It is also characteristic that these atrocities of December 1971 are rarely questioned in Bangladesh collectively until today, whether in the historiography or in public memory, unlike by some, or even quite a few, murderers individually – including Kader Siddiqi, whose pangs of conscience led him, according to his own version, to adopt a traumatized baby orphaned by the war that is perhaps a child of Biharis.\textsuperscript{102}

Beyond this single case and phase, in Bangladeshi public memory, Bengali people in violent crowds of 1971/72 were not perpetrators, but victims and heroic resisters. Their violence is being viewed as legitimate as that by Biharis was illegitimate – just like it was apparently viewed then. What prevails is still the “narrative of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{103} To my knowledge there was no prosecution of this violence in Bangladesh at all (probably not even against Biharis or Bengali supporters of the Pakistani government, because the cases I read of pertained to gang violence and more direct service to the Pakistani army); and, as mentioned, Pakistani prosecution of such cases up until December 1971 was extremely limited. Crowd violence was a crime that went unpunished, mostly due to a fundamental lack of sense of guilt, resulting in lacking will to prosecute and probably only secondarily because it was impossible to identify responsibility.

\section*{Conclusion}

In East Pakistan/Bangladesh, massive, often deadly violence was committed in many cases out of crowds in 1971/72. How many people were killed this way is hard to tell but the numbers ran probably into the tens of thousands. Such incidents accumulated in specific phases of contested rule with weakened government authority: in March to April 1971 and Dezember 1971 to April 1972. In the meantime this happened only in the countryside where the Pakistani military, with just a few tens of thousands of troops, and the public administration exerted no full control.


\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 481.
Imaginations about irrational crowds are, to a degree, disclaimed by the evidence for East Pakistan. The incidence of crowd violence was closely related to the overall political situation and mass mobilization and/or self-mobilization during intense political polarization. People responded to confrontations revolving around current questions of oligarchic power vs. democratic system and procedures, national unity of an Islamic state vs. regional popular sovereignty and West vs. East Pakistan concerning the distribution of resources. Both found their demands highly legitimate and near-sacred. Links were also made to traditional social divisions and stereotypes which led to collective ascriptions such as that Hindus (and secular intellectuals) supported Bangladeshi autonomy/independence and Biharis the Pakistani government. Either side found collective violence highly justified and tended to dehumanize the “enemy.” The strong emotions involved were expressed in cruel ways of killing, mutilations, the murder of children and few criticisms of such action. But as far as crowd violence is concerned, there were several, but fairly clear conflict lines.

Therefore victims of this violence were mostly members of easily identifiable and located minority groups that were perceived as ethnically, religiously or culturally different. Non-Bengalis (so-called Biharis) and Hindus lived often in separate settlements, neighborhoods or houses. There were relatively weak ties between groups, and ideas about the otherness of certain groups widespread, having in part solidified during former conflicts. Non-Bengalis and West Pakistanis were recognized on the basis of their broken Bengali, West Pakistanis by their fair skin color, male Hindus because they were not circumcized and female ones through their clothing and body painting. Interwoven with ethnoreligious difference was socioeconomic conflict: by the Bengali majority, Biharis and Hindus were still identified with wealth and power although many of the latter groups had lost their elite status before, or their elites had left the country, and many members of these groups had been poor all along.

Those who used the specific form of violence out of crowds, by contrast, belonged mostly to the majority. First of all, for them (Bengalis, Muslims) it was easier to gather masses of people. Moreover, the majority of the population also derived legitimacy from their numbers. The will and demands of the majority played an important role in public discourse. In this context, to belong to

105 This is so although the majority of those killed in the conflicts of 1971 by all kinds of violence were Bengalis.
a crowd reinforced the impression that one’s actions were admissible, and violence was very much rationalized by presumed fulfilling a collective will (that reached beyond the crowd in which one was situated). Many participants of mass gatherings acted with an unshakable feeling of entitlement. Accordingly, violence was often used in brought daylight and in public spaces. It was not by accident that violence came about when the course of action was contested after democratic elections. From this developed a particular idea of *Volksgewalt* (a German term that can mean both “people’s power” and “violence by the people”). Tajuddin Ahmed (1925–1975), the Prime Minister of Bangladesh’s government when it was not yet internationally recognized, said when he took office in a radio speech on 11 April 1971 that “Quislings . . . will be destroyed by the people themselves.”

Mass gatherings and collective action also served to enforce unity or at least establish social delimitation and subordination – on the path to a national state. In the short run, such violence prompted millions to flee; in the longer run, it forced Biharis to barricade in refugee camps and drove Hindus into an inferior social position. The political leadership played a considerable role in this process involving crowds. Accordingly, the Awami League used intimidation for their election victory in November 1970, and Muslim notables in the countryside forced many Hindus to convert to Islam under the threat of collective action (but most revoked their Islamification in 1972).

Though not much can be said about the mechanisms within the crowds it is likely that violence added some cohesion to them as well. This is supported by the infrequency of information, according to which not only individuals but also groups within crowds in East Pakistan opposed violence. Earlier violent mass gatherings tended to solidify collective identity and trained according behavior, which was the intention of

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107 For the latter point Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*, 146.
108 See for the example of a Bengali neighbor who saved a Bihari girl from a crowd that was about to rape it, from the perspective of one of the girl’s abductors, in Yasmin Saikia, “Beyond the Archive of Silence: Narratives of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh,” in: *History Workshop Journal* 58 (2004): 285; another example is in the account by Golam Sarwar, in: Firdousi, *Year*, 390.
109 See the account by Yaqub Zainuddin in Firdousi, *Year*, 516. Zainuddin relates that he and other Biharis continued to stab Hindu women and children despite objections expressed by other Biharis, abusing the latter in Urdu as “enemies of our nation”. Tahmina, “Zabunessa,” 17–19 is also about varying behavior of a Bihari crowd in which some wanted to kill Bengalis, others wanted save them, and some of the rescuers nonetheless looted Bengalis’ property.
some of the instigators and organizers of these shows of force.\textsuperscript{110} But again, whatever the degrees of intentionality of various actors, it is likely that, much more than consolidating this specific collective (the crowd), the violence sent out political messages to broader audiences, restructuring social and geographical spaces and visibly occupying the public sphere. Personal greed resulting in direct plunder played a secondary role.

Minorities mobilized violent crowds only if they felt supported or tolerated by the political regime. This was especially the case for the Biharis until the Pakistani army moved against such mass attacks. Afterwards, Biharis could still denounce adversaries and form militias or informal gangs for violence. Usually it was more the defense of a united Pakistan than of Islam as such that was used as justification of this, in close connection with the defense of the own group as well as its status.

Violence committed out of crowds was a kind of political participation. It was also open to the lower strata of society – many peasants and workers are reported to have taken part in many events. But this was not necessarily about weapons of the weak but rather about the exertion of power. In a strict sense, these were often no peaceful demonstrations. Many participants were armed which points to much readiness for violence from the start. On the one hand, heavy and automatic weapons were not carried which meant that the crowds were clearly inferior to the weaponry of army troops; on the other hand, the arms at hand had a great lethal potential such as knives, axes, sickles, spears, sharpened bamboo sticks, iron rods, hunting rifles, shot guns, self-made bombs and Molotov cocktails. Through these weapons, the violence was rooted in the everyday (and the means were common and easy at hand) and in tradition. In many cases, men were experienced in their use and in their production, also from past civil strife.

It would appear that the subject matter of this paper belongs in the context of a long tradition of political militancy involving masses in East Bengal that stretches to the present. Instead of being restricted to a transitional period to democracy,\textsuperscript{111} this specific regional tradition has lasted and evolved over many decades and different political systems: late colonialism, West Pakistani dominance, independent Bangladesh, military dictatorships and formal democracy.

\textsuperscript{110} This is suggested by the microstudy of Roy, \textit{Cows}, concerning events in 1954.
\textsuperscript{111} This is the context within which Mann, \textit{Dark Side}, places participatory violence.
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