Standard-bearers of Hussitism or Agents of Germanization? Czech Jews and Protestants as Political Allies and Avant-garde of Czechness

In 1932, the “Svaz Čechů-židů v Ceskoslovenské republice” (Union of Czech-Jews in the Czechoslovak Republic) published a small booklet on the history of its movement. The text opened with the common ground of Jews and Czechs in the Bohemian land: both were heirs of the Czech reformation, struggling against Catholic Habsburg rule and its attempts at Germanization. Even more than the Czechs, the author claimed, the Jews had to overcome German influences to find their place within the nation. In the end, he concluded, they succeeded, and the democratic and tolerant Czechoslovak republic exemplified this successful Czech-Jewish trajectory. It was strikingly obvious to the author that, although heavily referencing the Czech reformation as an overall concept of the national history, this path did not end in the emergence of a Protestant nation, but in an entirely new religious and national entity.1 In a similar vein, František Žilka (1871– 1944), a prominent Czech Protestant clergyman, praised the republic’s founding president, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850– 1937), calling him the embodiment of the religious foundations of the Czechoslovak state. Guiding Žilka’s religious vision was “humanity,” an idea at once Protestant and universal.2 Only by being religious in this way could a nation succeed.3

In the present article, Id on ot wish to dwell on the peculiarities of Czech-Jewishassimilation.⁴ Taking adifferent course, Iseek to signal the strongparallels between the positions of two influential groups,o ne consistingo fC zech Protestants and one of Czech Jews, when faced with the question of integration or assimilation into aC atholic or secular vision of society without repudiating one'sr eligious and cultural identity.A tt he turn of the twentieth century, the two communities were similarlypressured to assimilate into mainstream society, and they formulatedanalogous answers to the question of their place in afuture Czech nation. Thus, they werenot onlyallies out of necessity in thatthey represented religious minorities in an overwhelminglyC atholic society;r ather,t hey successfullys haped ap rogressive religious counter-narrative of the modern Czech nation, opposing the position thatmelded traditionalist religion with secular nationalism.⁵ Ultimately, Czech Protestants and Jews drew on avision of religious progress that could incorporate different identitiesw hile remainingC zech in its essence. In doing so, theyjoined forces with other progressive activists. Givenits size, this religious-political coalition was surprisingly successful in the 1907Austrianelection, the first under universal male suffrage. Moreover,i tm anaged to critically shape the discourse of the new Czechoslovak republic in 1918.

The Czech NationalN arrative in the 19 th Century
The Czech national movement of the nineteenth centuryprided itself on being a large tent.U nlikeo ther contemporary collective narratives, proponents of the Czech "national rebirth" did not tie theirnational identity to an existing religious Vydání, MasarykůvS borník 4( Prague: Čin, 1930): 106 -19,h erea t1 08 -9. Of course, therei sa multitude of similar sourcesb etween 1918 and 1938.  This had alreadyb een done in comprehensive fashion by several scholars.S ee Hillel Kieval, The MakingofCzech Jewry:National Conflict and Jewish Society in Bohemia, 1870-1918(Oxford and New York: OxfordU niversity Press, 1988; Martin J. Wein, History of the Jews in the Bohemian Lands (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015); Michal Frankl, "Prag ist nunmehr antisemitisch": TschechischerA ntisemitismus am Ende des 19.J ahrhunderts,S tudien zum Antisemitismus in Europa 1( Berlin: Metropol, 2011); Kateřina Čapková, Czechs,Germans,J ews?N ational Identity and the Jews of Bohemia (Oxfordand New York: Berghahn Books,2012); for an earlier account, see also Martina Niedhammer,N ur eine "Geld-Emancipation"?L oyalitäten und Lebenswelten des Prager jüdischen Großbürgertums 1800 -1867, Religiöse Kultureni mE uropa der Neuzeit 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &R uprecht,2 013).  To acertain extent,this was an attempt to incorporate the vision of the first Czech awakeners, from ac entury earlier,i nto modern society. denomination, but rather to ah istoricalo ne. They managed to do so by pitting themselvesa gainst adecidedlyCatholic monarchyand invoking aunique Czech tradition of religious tolerance, dating backtothe Czech reformation and its martyr JanH us (c. 1370 -1415). At the same time, there remained an abiding tension between this vision of an historicallyt olerant nation and moree xclusivist notions of the Hussite past,w hich could at times be virulentlya nticlerical and anti-Semitic. Still, until the late nineteenth century,n ationalist ideologyw as restricted largely to the upper strata of society,making it amatter of asmall elite.
Alongsidet he Czech languagea nd the historical rights of the Bohemian estates,H us and the community of Czech brethren, as well as the whole period of the Bohemianr eformation through the battle of White Mountain, became symbols of the growingn ational consciousness. While the Czech nationali magery -like manyo thers -had ad istinctlyr eligious ring to it,i td id not align with as ingle religious denomination. In the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, members of the reformed Church had seen themselvesa st he embodiment of aP rotestant nation, but Lutherans stayedw ithin at ransnationalf rameworku pu ntil 1900.⁶ And although manyo ft he fatherso ft he Czech national rebirth had indeed been Protestants of either the reformed or the Lutheran church,t he bulk of the Czech-speaking population remained Catholic.⁷ Thee merging nationalist framework of the late nineteenth century, therefore, was not that of aProtestant, but rather an on-Catholic (and non-German) nation.⁸ This allowed not only Czech-speaking Lutherans and reformed Protestants,b ut alsoC zech-speaking Jews, to portray themselvesaspart of the nation and to craft asingular spiritual  The Czech-speakingL utheran community nationalizedi tself much later than the reformed church because the latter encompassed most of the Czech Protestants.I twas also the reformed church several nationalist intellectuals convertedto. Nonetheless, the notion of one existingnational denominationnever gained much traction. See Ondřej Matějka, "Čeští luteráni 1861-1918: od emancipace kunii," in Luteráni v českých zemích vp roměnách staletí, eds.JiříJ ust,Z deněk R. Nešpor,a nd Ondřej Matějka (Nakladatel: Lutherova Společnost,2 009), 219 -309;Z deněkR . Nešpor, "Evangelickéc írkve," in Náboženství v1 9. století: Nejcírkevnějšís toletí nebo období zrodu českého ateismu?, eds. ZdeněkR.Nešpor and akol. symbiosis under the banner of arather vaguea nd purposely ahistorical Hussite tradition.⁹ The liberalgovernments in the 1860s had provided legal security and emancipation to both Protestants and Jews in the Habsburgm onarchy.¹⁰ Religious communities werestrengthened and showed signs of what could be called 'confessionalization,' when attemptingt ou nify (and nationalize) their services in churches and synagogues as well as establishing control over more outlying communities in the Bohemianl ands.¹¹ It was the situation in these smaller towns that might be said to have drivent he changes within each community. This was particularlyt rue for the Protestant and Jewishm inorities, whose more progressive wingse stablished themselvesi nt owns like Kolín and Pardubice. In both Czech Protestant and Czech Jewish communities,this development originated within similar socio-cultural groups of intellectuals, whose vision was to integrate into the Czech mainstream nationali dentity by retaining their own spiritual identity.
By the late nineteenth century,amodern society with all the signs of social differentiation and amasspublic had begun to emerge in the region. Czech elites had long agoe mancipatedt hemselvesf rom what they perceiveda sa ne ffort to Germanize theirculturewithin the HabsburgEmpire. By the late 1880s, within an expanding public, abourgeois liberal national party -Česká strana svobodmyslná,referred to as the 'Young Czech Party'-started to dominate the national discourse as well as elections to the Vienna chamber of deputies.¹² Jews and Protestants alike perceivedt heirf atel inked to that of liberaln ationalism. This  Kateřina Čapkováa nd Michal Frankl, "Diskussionen über die 'Judenfrage' in den böhmischen Ländern," in Die "Judenfrage" in Ostmitteleuropa: Historische Pfade und politisch-soziale Konstellationen,e ds.A ndreas Reinke et al., Studien zum Antisemitismus in Europa 8 ( Berlin: Metropol, 2015): 183 -247, here at 184-6.  Although the main Protestant churches were recognized by the Austrian statealreadyinthe latee ighteenth century,i tw as the "Protestantenpatent" of 1861w hich restrictedt he (renewed) legal influenceo ft he Catholic church in religious matters for good.  The use of the term "confessionalization" in this contexti srightfullydisputed. Forthe sake of this argument,itshould simplydefine attempts of intensified institutionalization and homogenization of religious communities.See Wolfgang Häusler, "Die österreichischen Juden zwischen Beharrungund Fortschritt," in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848 -1918, vol integrative nationalist consensus held until the late 1890s, despite the increasingly overt anti-Semitism and anticlericalism of an influential wing of the Young Czechs.¹³ By the turn of the century, the two Protestant churches found themselvesin parallel positions. Although by and large they had nationalizedthemselves, they remained minority denominations. Moreover,a dvocating aP rotestant nation placed Czech patriots uncomfortablyc lose to pan-German nationalism and its attacksagainst the Catholic Habsburgmonarchy. In response to this political climate, ag roup of younger clergymen, advocating an independent,u nified, and politically active Czech Protestant church, became increasingly influential. In 1919,this unified "Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren" (Českobratrskácírkev evangelická)b ecame ar eality.¹⁴ Amongst Jews in the Bohemianlands, aCzech-Jewish assimilationist movement appeared during the late 1870s. They likewise appealed to the national symbolism of the Czech nation and condemned anti-Semitism as aG erman, rather than Czech, trait.W ithin the Jewishc ommunities,t hese "Czecho-Jews" called upon others to speak Czech and integrate into the Czech nation, whose historical character was one of tolerance. At the turn of the century,this movement could claim success in turningagrowingn umber of Bohemiana nd Moravian Jews towards assimilation:the Czech languagebegan to overtake Germanin virtuallyall rural and small-townJewishcommunities,Pragueasthe largest city being something of an exception to this trend. Accordingt ot his assimilationist movement,J ews werei ndebted to the Czech nation and should strive to be as Czech as possible.¹⁵  Alreadyin1873,shortlybeforehis death, František Palacký (1798 -1876), doyen of the Czech national movement,had to reacttogrowing tensions in the national movement and stressed his Lutheran background against anticlerical attacks from Národníl isty,the most influential newspaper of the national movement,which was accusinghis denomination of illoyality;see Ondřej Matějka, "Čeští luteráni 1861-1918:o de mancipacekunii," in Just,N e š por,a nd Matějka, eds., Luteráni v českých zemích vp roměnách staletí, 219-309,h erea t2 66.  Seeingasseveralleaders in both churches advocatedaunified church long before,Iwill use the term "Protestant" in arather indiscriminateway,whenspeakingofprogressive Lutheran and Reformed Protestants alike. Standard-bearerso fH ussitism or Agents of Germanization?
The National Consensus FallsA part By the late 1890s, however,the fledgling massp ublic threatened to outstrip the liberal nationalists themselves. In the Bohemianl ands, but alsot hroughout the whole of Cisleithania, the liberal partiesw eret hrown into crisis. Existing discourses on collective identitys hattered.
The most visiblec hangew as the decline in influenceo ft he Young Czech Party,w hich had won several landslide victories in elections between 1889 and 1891 and had become the undisputed representative of Czech bourgeois nationalism. Itsp roponents struggled to competew ith the rising massm ovements of the workingclass and rural political Catholicism, and the integrative narrative of an anti-Catholic nation started to lose traction. As the Czech publicitself grew, so did the realization that most Czechs were, after all, Catholic. At the same time, German liberalism was supplanted by ag rowinga nd aggressive pan-German movement,t hus making new formso fc ooperation in the Vienna chamber of deputies an ecessary political movef or Czech liberals.¹⁶ The leadership of the Young Czech Club in Vienna had to navigate among Catholics, socialists and pan-Germans. Some concessions to Catholic partiesw erer equired, ac onsequence of the obstructionistp olitics of the German nationalists and the intransigence of the workers' movement.¹⁷ Beginning in 1891, the Young Czechs had to strike ab alanceb etween their integrative position as the dominant Czech party and their need to compromise with the government.This led to criticism of the party from both within and without,a nd weakened its grip on the Czech intellectuals cene as the onlyo ption for political action.¹⁸ In 1897, the political landscape of Bohemia sawseveral new currents.Mostly originating in the Young Czech Party,these currents wereappalled at the latter's compromise position vis-à-vis the monarchy. These "progressives" (pokrokáří), mostlyyoungintellectuals from the small towns of Bohemia,never formed asingular party.I nstead, they adhered to ac ommon political framework thatp erceivedp olitics as ag eneral culturala ctivityb eyond elections and parliament,  The anti-Semitic and anti-Habsburg "Alldeutschen" movement led by GeorgR itter von Schönerer  weres harplyc ritical of the Catholic Church, and had ad eep interest in the socalled social question.¹⁹ At the same time, the consensus on what defined Czech history (and therefore Czech identity) was becomingincreasinglyfragile. Starting with adebate on supposedlyh istorical Czech manuscripts, which proved to be fabrications from the earlyn ineteenth century,t he intellectual public contested the historical meaning of the "Czech question." This sparked ad iscourse that lastedf or decades. Basically, the issue boiledd own to that of historical truth versus the historical meaning of the Czech nation.²⁰ Embedded in this controversy was the question who belonged to this nation and who could enter it.²¹ The rural masses, who heretofore had been little more thano bjects of intellectualn ationalist visions, started to enter the public sphere. As the nation grew,s od id the pressureo nm inorities to assimilate. The rise of anti-Semitic movements across the monarchyw as one reaction to the crisis of liberalism and political mass mobilization through ag raduallye xpanding electorate.²² The anti-Semitism was furthered by the peculiarp lace Jews found themselves in several Bohemian and Moravian cities, wheret hey could tip the electorate to either aG erman or aC zech majority.A to ne moment they might be viewed as coveted keyst ol ocal majorities, and at the next traitors to the national cause.²³ The Czech nationalist movement,hoping to overcome Austrian-German supremacy, put pressure on BohemianJews to fall in line with the national cause and was quick to scapegoat themincase of political defeat.²⁴ However,these demands allowed onlyfor completeassimilation and neglectedthe possibilityofa Czech-Jewisha gency. While the Czech milieu did not see af ull-blown racially chargeda nti-Semitism liket he German-Austrian one, it did develop am oree xclusive visionofCzechness. Whether the anti-Semitic undertones centered on political accusations of Jews as agents of Germanization or on popularC atholic stereotypes, the effect was the same: ag rowingn umber of Czech elites denied that Jews could be apart of the nation. Consequently, Czech anti-Semitism eventuallydid develop into apolitical forceofits own.²⁵ Moreover,several of the parties thatemergedi nt he late 1890s were -like the National Social Party -quite willing to use anti-Semitics logans as an electoralr allying cry.The rise of political Catholicism dealt another blow to the political influenceoftraditional liberal nationalism.
Protestants, of course, werei namuch strongerp osition. Still, the quest for the meaning of Czech history started to reframe the narrative of "Hussites vs Catholics." Anew generation of historians pointed to the importance of the Catholic phases in Czech history,claiming thatone oughttoaffirm Czech history as a whole or refrain from claiming historical truths about the nation.²⁶ This approach jeopardized the privileged position of Czech Protestants,w ho could arguef or aP rotestant interpretationo fh istory more openlyt han Czech Jews, but nonetheless had to face ag rowingC atholic Czech nationalism.

Convergencea tt he Turn of the Century, 1897 -1904
By 1897, some Czech Jews and Protestants had entered ac onverging trajectory with the progressive movement: they all resisted the emerging alliance between the Young Czech Party and the Catholicr ural masses, and countered the vision of an agnostic, but practicallyC atholic, nation with that of as econd Czech spiritual awakening,a kint ot he national rebirth in the first half of the nineteenth century.Y et,atrue political alliance between these groups remained unlikely: Jewisha ssimilationists werea ware of the anti-religious stance of most progres- sives, includingb orderline anti-Semitica ttacks on "Mosaic clericalism";P rotestants -especiallym embers of the reformed church -still sawt hemselvesa s the one and onlyt rulyCzech denomination; and, apartf rom theirv irulent anticlericalism, most progressivesw ereu nconcerned with questions of religion and felt satisfied with av aguen eed for ac ulturalr enaissance.²⁷ As uccession of events that took place between 1897a nd 1904,h owever, changed everything.I nt his period, progressivel iberal thought was linked with religion, creating am ovement,w hich -although small in numbers -catered specificallyt or eligious minorities and proved influential. Additionally, ap rogressive framework and its proponents became dominant within each religious community,t ranscendingt raditionaln otionso fi nstitutionalized religion.

The Hilsner Affair and the Emergenceo fa Progressive Czech-JewishM ovement
The first event that rattled traditionalpolitical allegiances was the Hilsner affair of 1899.Since the early1890s, the publicmood in Bohemia was prone to anti-Semitic outbursts. Followingabroad campaign of nationalists for Czechs to patronize Czech businesses (svůjksvému), Jewish businesses weret argeted for public violence. The situation in Prague was especiallyv olatile, as the city had become the focalp oint of the Czech-German conflict.A lreadye arlyi n1 897, the Young Czech Party had fielded an openlyanti-Semitic candidatefor the upcomingelections to the chamber of deputies, hoping to absorb the expanded electorate.²⁸ As aconsequenceofthe introduction and subsequent retraction of the languageordinancesb yt he Badeni governmenti n1 897, first Germans, and then Czechs in Prague had rioted. Jewish businessesa nd buildingsb ore the brunto ft hese assaults.²⁹ The peak of this anti-Semitic wave was probablyt he well-known Hilsner affair,which marked at urning point in the relations of Czech Jews and the Czech national movement.³⁰ In 1899,after ayoung girl was found dead in the East Bo- Under the manifest of "Českámoderna" (Czech modernity), several influential writers of the young generation had decried the lack of culture in the Czech liberal establishment.  Hillel Kieval, "Nationalism and Antisemitism," 216-7. Thereare,ofcourse, obvious parallels to the rise of Karl Lueger  in Vienna.  Kateřina Čapkováa nd Michal Frankl, "Diskussionen über die 'Judenfrage' in den böhmischen Ländern," 224-7.  To put it into context, alreadyatthe time therewas talk of it as the "Austrian Dreyfus affair," with several obvious parallels in how both cases were beingt reated in the public. As T. G. Ma-Standard-bearerso fH ussitism or Agents of Germanization? hemiantown of Polná, the local authorities arrested aJewish vagabond, Leopold Hilsner, and accusedh im of murderingh er in line with Jewishr ituals. Accusations of ritual murder weres till quite common in the region, particularlyi n rural Catholic areas.What made the Hilsner case special was that the authorities seemed to endorse the blood libel.³¹ Subsequently,t he whole trial became an anti-Semitic showcase, with not onlyH ilsner but all Jews on trial, as it were.³² One of Hilsner'sf ew public defenders was aC zech university professor named Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who was awell-known public intellectual and supporter of the progressive cause. He intervened afterHilsner was alreadyconvicted of the murder,but accomplished the reopening of the case mainly by attackingthe idea of ritual murder as scientifically absurd.³³ As the Young Czech Party showed no sign of reining in its more anti-Semitic members or condemningthe affair, the Czecho-Jewish assimilationist movement was thrown into crisis. Afterits main newspaper,the Českožidovské listy, continued to support the nationalist movementeveni nt he face of the latter'ss upport of anti-Semitic tendencies,agroup of young Czech Jewish intellectuals, led by EduardL ederer (1855-1944), Viktor Vohryzek (1864-1918, and Bohdan Klineberger(1859Klineberger( -1928, brokeaway. The breakaway group called itself "Rozvoj" (Advancement)and publishedajournal of the samename.³⁴ Based in the Bohemian town of Pardubice, Rozvoj stilla dvocated Czech-Jewish assimilation, but reconfigured it by speaking of the acculturation of aseparate Jewish identity within a national framework.³⁵ It also pointed to the need for new and more modern political allies: Czech liberals had betrayed the teachings of Husa nd abandoned the path to enlightenment that these teachings had provided. The solution was the strengthening of progressivism: anti-Semitism, after all, was essentially saryk,one of the main protagonists of the affair,noted, it had an international impact that none of the participants foresaw. Foradetailed reconstruction as well as the historical contextofthe affair,see the articles in Miloš Pojar,ed., Hilsnerova aféra a českáspolečnost 1899 -1999.Sborník přednášek zkonference na Univerzitě Karlově vPraze ve dnech 24.-26.listopadu1999 (Prague: Židovském uzeum vP raze, 1999).  As Kovtun points out,such cases did show up in courtperiodicallybut wereusuallyrejected by the authorities. JiříK ovtun, "Historickád imenze Hilsnerovap ř ípadu," in Pojar, ed., Hilsnerova aféraač eskás polečnost 1899 -1999,1 7-23,e sp. 17-8.  Without further proofi tw as assumed that Hilsner had been helped by two -supposedly Jewish -accomplices, strengtheningt he anti-Semitic natureo ft he case.  Tomáš G. Masaryk, Nutnost revidovatiprocess Polenský (Prague: Cǎsu, 1899). Masarykwent so far as to actuallyt ake some lessons in anatomy, travelling anonymouslyt oV ienna.  Vondrášková, "The Czech-Jewish Assimilation Movement and its ReflectionofCzech National Traditions," 151-2.  Weiglová, "Barometer," 94-5. areligious problem, born of reactionary clericalism.³⁶ As Vohryzek argued in the inaugural edition of the Rozvoj journal, the key to assimilation (or rather,acculturation) for Czech Jews wasr eligion.³⁷ The "Realist" Partya saReligious-political Project and itsP rotestant Supporters Masaryk'sd efense of Hilsner made him an outcast in most nationalist circles. Apart from the Czech-Jewish movement,o nlyt he socialists and as mall but determined group of loyalists stood by his side. With the Hilsner affair still in full swinginthe spring of 1900,Masaryk and his followers founded yeta nother progressive party under the name "Česká strana lidová" (Czech People'sP arty), known as "Realists." Although plans for such ap arty had existed for some years, its founding was inevitablyt ied to the Hilsner case.³⁸ Masaryk'sp rominence in the affair and his leading role in the Realist party earned them the anti-Semitic moniker "the Hilsner Party" among the nationalist press.T his was at least true insofar as the progressive Rozvoj group enthusiasticallyw elcomed its arrival.³⁹ The Hilsneraffair,however,tends to overshadow two other important factors in the foundingo ft he party.There was ad istinct Protestant influencep resent, with progressive Protestant clergys uch as the Calvinist ČeněkD u š ek (1843 -1918)  Standard-bearerso fH ussitism or Agents of Germanization? 1936), Žilka, and Masaryk himself, werek nown to be members of the reformed church.⁴¹ The party presented an elaborate program which stood out in one main respect: it stressed the need for au nifying,e ncompassing religious reform that would overcome existing traditionalb eliefs not onlyi nascientific but also more moral way. While the program conceded thatthe party had acertain affinity to the progressivem ovement and Protestantism, it pointed emphaticallyt o the failureo fa ll positive religions and denominations. Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism were all full of "halfness" (polovičatost), unfit for modernsociety.E venm orei nteresting,a lthough the program stressed the religious freedom of the individual, it paradoxicallyd emanded ak ind of modernr eligious politics.⁴² Masaryk, who wrotet he program himself, had expanded on these ideas in as eries of programmatic books publishedd uringt he 1890s. They all came down to an interpretation of Czech history as an attempt to live according to "humanist" principles. Theembodiment of those principles was the Czech reformation; as such, the Czech question was not onlyo ne of language, culture, and political power,b ut at its heart religious in nature. Czechs, then, should strive to become religiouslyenlightened. Masaryk'sn otiono fH us and the reformationwas ahistorical and universal.⁴³ Nonetheless, he claimed to have distilled the scientific coreofmodernreligion. He demanded aCzech version of the "Los vonR om" (Awayf rom Rome) movement,w hich saws ome success in Germanspeakinga reas of Bohemia, insistingt hat the new church must be religious, albeit not identical to the existing Protestant churches.⁴⁴ This paradoxical demand makes sense if it is understood as an attempt to craft an ew majority discourse based on religious convictions without referringt oe xisting denominations and religions.
At first,the Realists werealoose collection of groups preoccupied with progressive religious and culturalt opics.A part from the party founders, intellectuals from Prague, this included progressive Jews and Protestants but also Free  Emanuel Chalupný( 1879-1958, af oundingm ember of the party and later its sharp critic, noted how it consisted of three groups, each one of which viewed the party as avessel of its specific ideas: Protestants, Jews, and "original" Realists with ac ultural interest in progress.F or Chalupný, the party lacked anyconsistent ideology, and was united onlyinmutual interest and an almostr eligious belief in its own notion of progress.⁴⁵ Although his perception of the party'sm ost important wingsw as accurate, Chalupnýw as nonetheless motivated by as tronga nti-Protestantb ias, and underestimated the religious content of the party'sp rogram. Earlyon, Protestant Realists tried to push for an official allegiance to the reformed church, arguingt hat being ar eformed Protestant was the closest one could come to asynthesisofreligion and progress in the absence of at rue future religion.⁴⁶ Echoing the party'sp rogram, one Realist argued that simple political parties could not succeed in moderntimes. Only movements with an "ideal" (like Social Democracy) had af uture.T he Realist party,then, should work as an avant-garde movement to the "Protestantization" (poprotestantštění)o ft he people.⁴⁷ Other ProtestantR ealists opinedt hatp arty members should at least leave the Catholic church if not outright join one of the Protestant denominations. Thisi dea clashed not onlyw ith the JewishR ealists but alsow ith thosec lose to the Czech Free Thought (Volná myšlenka), such as Chalupný, who favoredt he legal statuso f" withoutc onfession" as most closelya pproximating religious enlightenment.⁴⁸ In turn, Lederer,o ne of the leading JewishR ealists, pointed out thath ea nd other progressive Jews werep erfectlyc ontent with conversion to at rulyp rogressive religion, but so should be the Protestants, as their belief was similarlyu nfit to capturet he religious spirit of the Czech nation.⁴⁹ In this remark, Lederer rehearsed the charge Both Lederer and Vohryzek went so far as to put Judaism abovethe Christian creeds in the ranking of progressive beliefs.S ee also Vohryzek, "Několik slov úvodem":2 ;I nterestingly,c onversions from Judaism to Protestantism wereapparentlymuch morecommon in Austria (especially Vienna) than in the Czech lands.S ee Astrid Schweighofer,R eligiöse Sucher in der Moderne: Konversionen vomJ udentum zum Protestantismus in Wien um 1900,A rbeiten zur Kirchenge-schichte1 26 (Berlin, Munich, and Boston: de Gruyter,2 015), 64-74.

Standard-bearers of Hussitism or Agentso fG ermanization?
made by other progressives who complained about the Protestant goal of transforming every belief but their own.⁵⁰

The Hus Affair of 1903: Protestantsa sN ational Outcasts
The year 1903 witnessed the Protestants' own excommunication from the Czech nation, thwarting theirs elf-perception as an avant-garde of Czechness.B eing part of an integrative narrative of progress was not the samea sd ictating it,a s the Czech Jews werea ll too aware.The Protestants,h owever,h ad to learn this lesson the hard waybysquaring off against the majority discourse of Czech nationalism, which so far had paraded them as progressive paragons of the anti-Catholic nation.
When, on 6J uly1 903,the foundation stone of al ong-planned statue of Jan Huso nP rague'sO ld Town square was laid, aY oungC zech speaker celebrating the occasion tried to affiliate the Hussite tradition with Catholicism. The statue of Husw as being erected right across the Marian column,t he symbol of Catholic reign in Prague -af actt hat in his view signaled am utual belonging. Both the Protestant press and the Realists responded with fury,c laiming that the Young Czechs had abused the Czech reformation and made ap olitical pawn out of its martyr.Asimultaneous celebration of Realists and leading Protestants was lauded as the true embodiment of the spirit of JanH us.⁵¹ Six days latert he nationalist press struck back, remarkingont he proximity of the Realists to the "Los vonRom," apan-German Protestant movement led by German nationalists and advocating ag reater Germane mpire. "Národní listy," the main organ of the YoungC zech Party,a ttacked the Realists as traitors to the national cause. Although the charge itself was ridiculous, Masaryk and espe-ciallyD u š ek had been in close contact with German Protestants from organizations liket he "International Committee for the Evangelization of the Bohemian Lands," owingt ot heir prioritization of religious cooperation over nationalc onflict.⁵² When aleadingRealist Protestant,Jan Herben, was seen enteringthe German "casino" in Prague to meet with aGerman Protestant activist,the nationalists finally found him caught in the act: behind the Realists'"religiousness," they  GustavT ichý: "Etickák ultura, náboženství am ravnost," Rozhledy1 4( 1904): 966 -9.  Čas, "Husovy oslavy,",J uly8 ,1903.  Lothar Albertin, "Nationalismusu nd Protestantismus in der österreichischen Los-von-Rom-Bewegung um 1900" (Diss. Phil. University of Cologne: 1953), 123 -51. alleged, was ap lot to luret he Czechs to German Protestantism. Gleefully, they pointed to the hypocrisyofcriticizing the Young Czechs' political efforts to compromise with Catholic partiesb ut at the samet ime embracing ap an-German Protestant plot to subvert the monarchy.⁵³ Anti-Protestantism further fueledthe already-raginganti-Semitic blaze ignited by several Catholic nationalist authors. In one striking example, the writer Rudolf Vrba (1860 -1939) linked the Protestant "Away from Rome" to an international Jewishp lot and sawA ustria besieged by both German-Protestant infiltrators and Jewish intellectuals.⁵⁴ In the eyes of the Catholic-nationalist consensus, Protestants and Jews alike weree xcluded from the true Czech nation, although both groups -and especiallyt he progressiveC zech-Jewishm ovement -were clearlyw orkinga gainst the Germanization of their communities.S till, the imageo fJ ews as an avant-garde of Germanness in the Bohemianl ands, dating back to the middle of the century, persisted. Vrba'se xploitation of prejudices against supposedlyf oreign agents who sought to undermine the Czech nation from within is an interesting example of the fluidityofa nti-Semitic stereotypes, with Protestants joining Jews as national traitors.
Although Herben defended himself, the damagew as alreadyd one and the Realist party struggled to distance itself from the perception of being the political arm of the Protestant churches.Anofficial declaration by the executive committee proclaimed aC zech "Away from Rome" with no association to anye xisting church. Furthermore, the party stressed its independence from anyreligion. It repeated its programmatic hostility to anyform of "clericalism," explicitlyincluding Protestant,J ewish, and even Orthodox types.⁵⁵ This official distancing from organized religions belies its internal discussions, in which the Protestant'soveridentification with the party constituted the main problem.

AP olitical Coalition of Religious Dissent
It came down to Masaryk to settle questions of ideology, as no other Realist matched his authority.Alreadyin1901, Masaryk seemed keenlyaware of the Realist party'sp osition as ap olitical beacon for incompatible religious dissent: when aP rotestant supporter complained thatt he party'so fficial paper, Čas, was too "Philo-semitic" and not Protestant enough, Masaryk repliedthat indeed  Hoffmann, T. G. Masaryk, 253-5.  Rudolf Vrba, Österreichs Bedränger:D ie Los-von-Rom-Bewegung.S tudien über politische, religiöse und sociale Zustände der Gegenwart (Prague: Selbstverlag, 1903), 632.  "Řím aB erlin," Přehled 1:33 (1902)(1903): 533 -6. it was sometimes unbalanced in its polemics, but more importantly, it was the onlyplace in the Bohemianlands whereone could talk seriouslyabout religion. Slyly, he added that for Protestants there was no other political newspaper anyway. Even more interestingly,h ep ointed to the main editor of Čas,H erben, a known Protestant Realist,asproof of the paper'sreligious sincerity,while simultaneously distancing his own conviction from thato fH erben.⁵⁶ As the annual Huscelebrations of 1904 approached,Masaryk felt the need to clarify the party'sposition on religion, lest there be another scandal. Expanding on the paradoxical formula of religion being aprivatematter but not an individual one, he delivered as peech at ag atheringo ft he Realists' political club (its de facto executive committee) on 25 April 1904.I ni t, he stressed the demand for political freedom as fundamental to the Realist program. Further explaining his ownconviction, he affirmedthe need for religion, but for the first time openly deniedt he scientific possibilityo fC hristian revelation.⁵⁷ This speech was receivedwith marked ambivalence: while ayounger group of activists with adecidedlyatheist stance was unsatisfiedthat Masaryk did not outright advocate atheism,⁵⁸ the 'religious' Realists seized the moment to fuse the party'sv ague religious-political program with their owng oals, thus completingt he party's transformation into ap olitical conduit for religious dissent. Overall, they expressed relief that Masaryk had finallys poken openlyo nt hese issues, even if his denunciation of biblical revelation was in no waya cceptable to believers.⁵⁹ Interestingly,w hile the whole Husa ffair placed into question the Realist-Protestant alliance, in the long run, the pact was strengthened. Protestants such as Dušek had long realized that Masaryk'si nchoate religious convictions werenot actuallyProtestant.Masaryk himself was at times highlycritical of Protestantism, once claiming to feel emotionallym orel ikeaCatholic.⁶⁰ Dušek and other Protestants clergymens harplyd isagreed with him from at heological point of view,while stressingt hat the Realist party remained the onlyp olitical possibilityf or Protestants -the culturally "Catholic" Young Czechs and their shallowa nti-clericalism wereh ardlya no ption.⁶¹ As one progressive (and later  AÚTGM( Archiveo ft he Masaryki nstituteP rague), fond TGMK or I, kr.2 9, l. 44.  Čas, "Pro svobodus v ě domí," June 26,1904.  Hoffmann, T. G. Masaryk, 261-2.  Čas, "Pro svobodus v ě domí".  See Čas, "Prof. MasarykvK atolických listech," January 30,1 902. Masaryk was born intoa devout Catholic family.  Matějka, "Čeští luteráni 1861-1918," 283. Realist) paper commented, the affair led to the "full emancipation of the Czech Protestants from the Young Czechs."⁶² Fort he progressive Czech Jews, Viktor Vohryzek commented on the speech: he, too, claimed relief that the party'sleader had finally spoken up on the "religious question." Although he conceded thatM asaryk still had not provided the "promised religious-philosophical thesis, the basiso fanew and pure religion, scientificallyw orked out and reasoned," he nevertheless waso ptimistic about the matter.I nh is view,b ys trippinge xisting religion of its non-scientific, nonmoderne lements, the religious progressiveso fe ach denomination, and with them even monists and atheists, would end up together.
Additionally, Vohryzek rightlyobserved the split between an agnostic notion of progress,w hich was content to criticize the church and religion in general, and the "trulyp rogressive" Realists, who went beyond simple negativity and for whom traditional beliefs like Christianity and Judaism remained historical, if flawed, vessels of true religiosity.Todrive home his point,Vohryzek approvingly quoted the evangelical "Hlasy ze Siona" (Voices from Zion) that af uture religion still had to include some kind of formal confession (konfesse). To be (in a strictlylegal sense) "without confession," therefore, was no indication of positive progressiveness; one had to think and act in its spirit as well. And, turning the tables on Protestants and atheists alike,h en oted that Judaism, with its lack of clericals tructures and its everydaya dherencet om oral laws, was alreadyv ery close to such ar eligion of the future. Forp rogressivesl ike him, "Mosaism" was neither ab elief nor ac onfession in the accepted sense. "We will defend our Realism against old denominations and new ones, if they are not in agreement with it," he finished.⁶³ In this respect,progressive Czech Jews werec loser to the coreo ft he Realist movement than manyCzech Protestants. Like Masaryk and his disciples, and despite stressinga"positive" spirituality, figures such as Lederer and Vohryzek displayeda ni ntellectual and utilitarian understandingofr eligion. As Hillel Kieval notes,their pronounced "anti-secularism" came with adistinctlycasual attitude towarda ctual religious practice.⁶⁴ This was true for some Realist Protestant intellectuals like Herben as well. In contrast,i tw as mostlyclergymen, likeH rejsa and Dušek, who promoted progressive and political Protestantism. As such, these Protestants had amoreambivalent relationship with the Realists, grasping the need for this cooperation but aware thatt he religious-political vision of the

Standard-bearerso fH ussitism or Agents of Germanization?
Realists did not necessarilya lign with their ownvision of au nifiedC zech Protestant church. Moreover,t he progressive wing of the Czech-Jewish movement could not claim to represent the majority of Jews in the Bohemianl ands, while the combined Protestant churches' membership did indeed form am ajority of Czech Protestants.
In the end, just as Vohryzek observed, thosew ho splitf rom the party were Free Thinkers and atheists such as Chalupnýa nd other so-called "Young Realists," centered around the journal Přehled,who weredisappointed that religious influences remained strong. Other progressivesa ttacked both the Realists and the Protestants for their purportedlyu nfoundeda lliance.⁶⁵ Unsatisfied with Masaryk'se ternallyo bscure answers,t hey demanded to know the specifics of the Realist program of af uture religion.
AF utureR eligion as an Inclusivea nd Transformative Political Program: Jews and a United Protestantism as Standard-bearerso f " Hussitism" It is worth taking acloser lookatwhy the Realist party program, in all its opacity, was so attractive to religious dissent.The peculiari nsistencet hat societal problems stemmed from religious ones seemed out of place in the other progressive parties, most of which were content with aggressive anticlericalism. However, in maintaining that while existingd enominations and religious beliefs were flawed, religion itself was not,the Realists extended an irresistible offer to religious minorities to become part of an ew religious whole. To frame the Czech question in terms of modern man and religion, as Masaryk did, offered an ew option of joining the nation by transformingit. This contrasted with his quite exclusive vision of the nation, as expressed in an interview with Rozvoj, whereh e declared thatt he Jews' religious identity was an obstacle in them becoming Czechs.⁶⁶ It ought to be borne in mind, however,t hat the most salient feature of Masaryk'sa nd the Realists' vision of the nation was its exclusion of average  See Karel J. Rohan, "Moderní stoupenci Husovi," Rozhledy. Revue umělecká, sociální apol-itická1 4( 1903Revue umělecká, sociální apol-itická1 4( -1904: 1-7; 31-40;5 9-66.  See Michael A. Riff, "The Ambiguity of Masaryk'sAttitudes on the 'Jewish Question'," in T. G. Masaryk( 1850G. Masaryk( -1937,v ol. 2; Thinker and Critic, ed. Robert B. Pynsent,S tudies in Russia and East Europe (Basingstoke:M acmillan, 1989): 77-87,h erea t8 3.
Czechs and even the reformed church, thus levelling the playing field for all. As Masaryk himself said, the Realists weren ot ap arty of the massesa nd could never become one; nonetheless, they served as an avant-garde to the whole nation.⁶⁷ At the same time, the fusion of religious convictions with political action allowed the progressivew ingso fC zech Protestantism and Judaism to surmount traditionali nstitutions, if for conflictingr easons. Progressive Czech Jews and Protestants agreed that the battle for ar enewed religiosity was not being fought in the churches and synagogues, but in the political arena. Both felt -albeit for different reasons -the need to overcome institutionalized religion.
The leaders of the Protestant churches,D u š ek and Hrejsa, understood that their visionofaunified churchwhich called for the fusion of existingcommunities did not go far enough.Asthey aspired to become atrue Czech church, they needed to address the non-Protestant masses. The Protestantization of the Czechs would happen, in their view,not through preachingbut through political action.Unified Czech Protestantism, then,was at its coreapolitical project that required apolitical entity.The appeal of the Realists in turning people away from old beliefs and towards am ore modern religion seemed to suit the bill.
Similarly,p rogressive Czech Jews perceivedt he politicizingo fm odernr eligion as am eans for Jews to integrate into mainstream society on their own terms.F or Vohryzek, it was the Czechs who had strayed from their national ideals of progress as embodied by people like Husa nd Comenius. The Christian Czechs needed their Jewishbrethren to completethe journey to their true national character.T or each this stage, aC zech-Jewish accommodation was inevitable.⁶⁸ Masaryk seemed to accept this conflation of the historical meaning of the Czech reformation and aC zech-Jewishp ath towards it.A sh ew rote Vohryzek, he was particularlyp leased to see the progressiveC zech Jews propagating the reform movement.⁶⁹ This unique vision of the progressive meaningo ft he Czech reformation thereforem anaged to include ap rogressive Judaism not by accepting Jews as they were but by escalatingits demands for Jews and Czechs alike.AsV ohryzek and other progressiveJ ews recognized, the hazy notion of atrue Czech reformation could be expressed in terms that conveyedequidistance between Jewishand Protestant (or for thatmatter, Catholic and Free Thinking) visions of afuture re- Česká stráž.L idovén ovinyp okrokové, "Zt áboru českés tranyl idové" January 20,1 906,3 .  Vohryzek, "Několik slov úvodem," 3.  The Czech term "reformní hnutí" conveys the semantic appeal to the protestant reformation much stronger.S ee Tomáš G. Masaryk, "Dopis vr edakci," Rozvoj: Týdenník českých pokrokových židů 1:1( 1904): 3. ligion. Consequently, the Czech-Jewishposition went from being indebtedtothe benevolent and tolerant Czech nation⁷⁰ to guiding the very same nation back to its lost ideals.⁷¹ Last,the notionofareligious avant-garde was areaction to societal changes. When the rise of political Catholicism threatened to marginalize non-Catholics, the idea thatt he fundamental social transformationwas just the cusp of af undamental spiritual transformation wasparticularlyattractive to projections of future majorities. Commenting on political Catholicism, BohdanKlinebergernoted, "Ac hangei nt he war tactics[ of the Catholic church, J.G.] has happened. [It points, J.G.] into politics:t he abstract fight is cast aside, the fight for political power is happening." And he continued, "The political fight has priority over the scientific. While this uses arguments and reason, that uses feelings and power."⁷² Klinebergerh ere used an argument endorsed by atheist Free Thinkers. This argument exposed how the politicization of progressive religiosity served as an integrating moment for al oose coalition of progressives ubgroups.T heological differencesa side, they had ac ommon enemy: clericalism, which held the Czech nation back, whether by fomenting anti-Semitism or promotingg eneral backwardness. Astrongturnout of Catholic voters was expected in the upcoming elections, thus making the political battle for the spirit of the Czech nation areal one indeed. Klinebergeralsoformulated acentral insight: the struggle for anew scientificr eligion was always ap olitical one, if it was to be more than am ere intellectual exercise. Liberalism, for Klineberger, had done more than overlook the real economic damagepeople in rural areas had experienced: its proponents had neglectedt on otice how this damagep rovoked anti-Semitism, particularly among small rural businesses. An anti-liberal movementhad arisen by addressing this common feelingo fb eing left behind, and from this common feeling a common ideologyf ollowed. Such an anti-liberal party,p erforce, had to be an anti-Semitic one as well. It was the Christian Social and Catholic peoples' parties that united these voices and imbued them meaning.

PoliticalS uccessa nd Demise
When, in 1906,the Realist party mergedwith another Progressive splinter group to form the "Česká strana pokroková" (Czech Progressive Party), the policy of religious progressivism reachedi ts zenith. This time round, the Protestant party members had learned their lesson: several speakers stressed that the reactionary wave (i. e., the political successes of Catholic parties) could onlybeabated by the progressive elements makingc ommon cause. The party'sp ress also spotlighted the mistakes of the Young Czech Party,which had ignored religion as ac entral topic of contemporary politics.⁷⁴ In the 1907e lections to the Vienna chamber of deputies, the party was remarkablys uccessful, givent hat it represented onlya tinyminorityofvoters.Itmanaged to gettwo deputies, František Drtina and Masaryk himself, elected. Drtina, however,was elected by acoalition that included Catholic parties. It wasm ainlyM asaryk, the charismatic leader of the Realists, who successfullyc ampaigned on ar eligious program and managed to defeat his Catholic opponent in his East Moravian voting district.T his put an end to the longstanding campaign against the Catholic church thatt he party had waged almost from its inception. Once elected, Masaryk'sattempts to debate religion in politics fell flat.His critique of the Catholic church led once again to an alliance with the pan-Germann ationalists, which he then quicklya bandoned.
Alreadybefore the war,duringthe next electionsin1911, the Realists drifted back into mainstream liberalism. An alliance of progressive forces seemed to be apolitical necessity,thus reducingthe importance of religious topics.During the war,t he remainingl eadership of the party surrounding Herben joined forces with the other bourgeois parties to form as ingle nationalist block, overlooking the virulenta nti-Semitism of several of its proponents.I np rotest,L edererl eft the party,w hich subsequentlys plit up, disappearings hortlya fter the end of the war.⁷⁵

Conclusion
The present chapter makes the claim for as imultaneous changei nd iscourses about nation and religion on the one hand,a nd the structural conditions of the national public on the other. As the focus of Czech politics shifted away from the center and the bourgeois milieu to the smaller towns and their specific socio-cultural environment,its integrative framework changed as well. Although the Bohemiant owns had long featured in national mythologya st he preservers of Czech culture, it wasthe actual expansion of the voting franchise that placed them in the midst of ab attle for the mobilization of am ajority. The Czech-German conflictr eceded into the background of these debates. The question of who among the Czech speakers was also Czech in as piritual wayb ecame more and more prominent.N ot onlyd id the liberal nationalists abandon their tolerant vision in order to woo the Catholicp opulation, but the minorityp ositions alsoc hanged. The new direction of the Czech-Jewisha ssimilation movement,t hen, was not onlyareaction to the anti-Semitic wave of the 1890s. In the Czech context,r eligiosity became political,a st he question of what it meant to be Czech seemed to spark an increasinglydiverse rangeofanswers.Masaryk and his followers openlya dvocated ar eligious and spiritual reawakening of the nation, something that neither Catholic nor secular nationalists had ever done. The main fault line had been moved from between political Catholicism and the anti-clerical national movement to one between a "religious" and a "non-religious" vision for society.A nd curiously, the "clerical" partiesf ell into the latter camp, at least from the perspective of the religious progressives.
Comparison of the Jewish and Protestant positions reveals how bothc ommunitiesw erep art of al argers hift in Czech society.The motivating factor was the changingnational discourse, which had to address alargerpublic by becoming narrower and more exclusive.M oreover,i tw as oftentimes unclear who would represent the rural masses that had now entered politics. In this way, religious communities came to see their owni dentities as increasinglyt ied to the political discourse, promptingt he idea of ap olitical and spiritual awakening within Czech society.They countered the apparent new consensus with an integrative vision of their own, addressing -at least in theory -adifferent national collective themselves. Even if their vision was narrower from as ocio-cultural point of view,itstill offered an interesting and alternative discourse thatstressed the religious natureo fC zechness in order to make it more inclusive.While, by definition, this national religion of the future had to remain indeterminate, it nonetheless displayedp olitical power.T oacertain extent,i tw as at ransitional phenomenon on the road to modernity,responding to the question of nationality but alsot ot hat of collective identity in modern times.⁷⁶ When the (male) mass public finallyb rokef ree from restrictions in 1907, this alternative could claim ap lace for itself. And when the Czechoslovak republic came into existencei n 1918, this religious vision loomed large in the republican raison d'être.
Within as mall window of opportunity,a ll these shifts could be broughtt ogether by aunifying vision of aprogressive religious future. While its immediate political impact was ultimatelyn egligible, it did provide af ramework for Czech national discourse thatr eappeared after the war,a gain presentingthe Czech reformationa saprism of Czech universality.