Today’s ever-increasing antisemitism confronts politicians, legislators, and other decision makers with unique challenges. The ADL Global 100 survey, which began in 2014, has shown that around twenty-six percent of the inhabitants of all surveyed countries harbor antisemitic attitudes in a variety of forms, from politically influenced anti-Israel sentiments to openly expressed Jew-hatred. It has also documented that antisemitic sentiments are on the rise in all countries of the world in which surveys have been conducted between 2014 and 2019. This means that a total of more than one billion people around the globe from any side of the political spectrum foster negative attitudes against Jews as individuals, Jews as a community, the State of Israel, or Zionist movements.¹ This increased number of antisemitic views and antisemitic behavior that manifests itself in hate speech and hate crimes directed against Jews all over the world cannot be ignored. Jews and non-Jews alike are faced with new forms of antisemitism that demand the attention of all human beings more than ever. To understand the transformation of antisemitism and its various manifestations in the modern world, one needs to deal with a set of questions. We need to ask ourselves: What are the reasons for the shocking and seemingly surprising explosion of Jew-hatred? In which parts of our societies do we encounter antisemitism today? What role do the internet and modern media play? How can antisemitism be combatted effectively, both on a national and international scale? Are there countries, cultures, and religions that are particularly prone to Jew-hatred? If so, how and why do their views regarding Jews and Judaism differ from those of other communities? How can Jews, Jewish communities, and Jewish institutions be protected? The answers to these and other questions will help to address what can only be described as one of the humanitarian crises of our times.

With the exceptions of the State of Israel as well as Jewish organizations and communities outside of Israel, decisions makers worldwide were often and largely reluctant to properly acknowledge the explosion of Jew-hatred. For more than a decade, little to nothing has been done to address, discuss, and counter it. Only in recent years did some transnational organizations and states begin to address the issue of rising antisemitic beliefs and manifestations. Others still ignore it, are ambivalent to Jew-hatred, openly support antisemitism, or employ antise-

mitic sentiments. For instance, only a few years ago, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán, in a national election campaign of his Fidesz [Hungarian Civic Alliance] party, described the Jewish billionaire George Soros as a grinning Jew using a classic antisemitic stereotype in his polemics against the philanthropist.²

Scholars, decision makers, and activists disagree about the causes of contemporary Jew-hatred, its nature, and how to combat it effectively. In the academic world, such controversies often lead to productive discourses that facilitate a better understanding of Jew-hatred and help to develop strategies to combat it. However, outside the academic discourse, the fight against antisemitism suffers from disagreements as each state and organization not only understands the nature of antisemitism differently but also sometimes employs even contradictory strategies in fighting it. For instance, when antisemitic hate speech is prohibited in some countries but not legally persecuted in others, antissemites can simply broadcast their agitation via websites from states that have a very far reaching interpretation of freedom of speech into states that have a much stricter policy with regard to hate speech. An example for this practice can be found in the German Neo-Nazi band Volkszorn. When listed by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the band distributed its music via a US music label keeping it thus accessible not only for German Neo-Nazis but for antissemites around the world.³

Acknowledging the current deteriorating situation and in an effort to raise awareness to the fight against antisemitism, the conference “An End to Antisemitism!” has developed a catalogue of policies to combat antisemitism.⁴ This catalogue offers strategies for decision makers in different parts of society and provides suggestions for how to effectively combat Jew-hatred in a coordinated and long-term approach. The present volume of our conference proceedings does not want to reiterate these strategies but rather to shed light on the discourse out of which these recommendations developed for the realm of the modern media, the legal, and political worlds.

As a proven academic approach, the conference organizers consciously invited academics, decision makers, and activists who hold different and sometimes even conflicting opinions about the nature and causes of antisemitism as well as about the proper way to fight it. The discourse between such contradictory opinions allowed for constructive criticism out of which policy recommendations for fighting antisemitism were developed. The present volume does not only document these disagreements for reasons of scholarly productivity, but it also wants to present its readers with the broad scope of opinions regarding the rise of and fight against antisemitism present at our conference and wants to thus invite readers to draw their own conclusions.

Because the nature of antisemitism is as diverse as the many forms in which Jew-hatred expresses itself, the conference participants of “An End to Antisemitism!” were and are committed to a wide spectrum of different theories explaining it. Social, philosophical, and psychological theories about the nature of antisemitism are the conceptual focus of volume 4 of the present series. Nevertheless, the theoretical approach to understanding antisemitism also determines the practical recommendations a given scholar might or might not provide for effectively combatting antisemitism. If scholars are committed to an economical explanation of antisemitism, their recommendations for combating it might include the growing precariousness of the world’s population in both its developing and developed societies. If scholars are committed to a social psychological approach, their recommendations might focus more on the causes of patterns of hatred in a given societal community. However, given the diversity and longue durée of antisemitism, a single theoretical framework falls often short of explaining it. The contributions to the present volume are therefore committed to a whole range of theories of antisemitism depending on which aspect of Jew-hatred they focus on in their studies. What unifies them is neither a shared theoretical approach nor that they reflect antisemitism from a scholarly or activist perspective. As in all other volumes of “An End to Antisemitism!”, the guiding principle is to reflect both the plurality of theoretical approaches to antisemitism and the plurality of different ways to confront it in practice.

Therefore, the present volume consists of three parts that each address different aspects of Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal, and Political Worlds. The first part is dedicated to the theoretical reflection of antisemitism in political, legal, media, and other contexts. The second part engages with var-

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ious manifestations of antisemitism. Together, the first two parts shed light on the modern and contemporary evolutions of antisemitism from the twentieth century onwards. Herein, they cover a crucial part of the history of antisemitism and serve as complement to volume 3 of the present series which focuses on the historical continuity of antisemitism prior to the twentieth century. The third and last part of the present volume gives a voice to activists who combat antisemitism in their everyday work. This part points to the need of a globally coordinated approach on the political and legal levels as well as with regard to the modern media to effectively combat and, hopefully, put an end to antisemitism.

The Recent Transformation of Antisemitism

Most if not all contributions to the present volume identify a transformation of antisemitism in recent decades that resulted in what is now often described as “New Antisemitism.” After the Shoah, open and blatant Jew-hatred became taboo in most Western states and was more or less marginalized toward the radical right of the political spectrum. In the last decades, however, antisemitism became socially acceptable again in the Western world. In many Muslim countries, on the other hand, antisemitism was never socially unacceptable which points to a different societal development in the Arab world. Today, antisemitism seems to even form a pan-Islamic ideology that wants to form a common pan-Arabic group identity or—beyond the Arab world—a pan-Islamic identity by attacking an alleged “Zionist imperialist enemy.”

To cover all manifestations of New Antisemitism would of course go beyond the possibilities of a single collected volume or even all volumes of this miniseries. The essays of the present volume focus thus on select topics and emphasize especially the systemic aspect of New Antisemitism. Their three main topics are (1) the internet as a main communicator of Jew-hatred that makes antisemitism socially acceptable again all over the world; (2) antisemitism in the world of Islam; and (3) anti-Zionism, especially in Muslim countries and the left-wing political spectrum in the Western world as an expression of New Antisemitism. The

editors and authors of the present volume are keenly aware that other expressions of Jew-hatred are virulent today as well—such as racist right-wing antisemitism—but regard the mentioned three expressions of Jew-hatred as particularly neglected in the last decades and therefore as all the more dangerous.

Most states of the world of Islam either do not address the rampant antisemitism in their societies or even actively support Jew-hatred and anti-Zionism. In these societies, Jew-hatred draws on traditions that reach back to the beginnings of Islam. This pre-colonial Muslim antisemitism was transformed before, during, and after World War II by the influence of Western antisemitism. The colonial powers communicated Western Jew-hatred into many Muslim countries even before the twentieth century. Especially Nazi propaganda played a significant role in transforming Islamic antisemitism during and after World War II contributing thus to its current shape. In this way, Muslim anti-Zionist antisemitism became one of the new faces of Islamic Jew-hatred already during the Nazi period. Nowadays, this transformed Muslim Jew-hatred influences in turn the Western world both through Muslim immigrants and anti-Zionist propaganda that meets especially open ears in the left part of the Western political spectrum.

Anti-Zionism is therefore a second important theme addressed and discussed in various essays in all three parts of the present volume. Hatred and demonization of the State of Israel links Western left-wing antisemitism with the Jew-hatred of the Muslim world. The BDS movement builds bridges between anti-colonialist groups of the Western hemisphere that depict the Palestinian peoples in particular or even the Arab world in general as a victim of Israel as an alleged colonial apartheid state. Palestinian and other Muslim organizations that form a pan-Islamic and/or pan-Arabic group identity in applying earlier antisemitic traditions of the Muslim and Western worlds to the Jewish state is another important factor. In both hemispheres of the world, the State of Israel was turned into the figurative “New Jew” subjected to New Antisemitism. Through anti-Zionism, Muslim antisemitism had and has a significant impact on the Western world, contributing to the increased social acceptance of anti-Zionist attitudes in the West. Here, Muslim anti-Zionism found receptive ears as it met with earlier anti-Zionist and antisemitic traditions in all parts of the political and religious spectrum of its societies. At least in part, the acceptability of Jew-hatred is thus due to the Muslim influence on the Western world as communicated through the BDS movement and other manifestations of Western anti-Zionism. A particular danger in the Western world is the coded (anti-Zionist) Jew-hatred in left and center parts of its political spectrum. This form of antisemitism is not easily identified by the untrained eye.

Many essays of the present volume are concerned with the question of what enabled the transformation of antisemitism into a form of Jew-hatred that, once
again, became acceptable in the societies of the Western world. They identify the
internet in general and social media in particular as a crucial factor. By way of its
global reach and its uncontrolled spread of false information and slander, the
internet in general and social media in particular have contributed to freeing
the political and general public from their inhibitions with regards to Jew-hatred
and thus helped antisemitism become socially acceptable again. The internet is
thus one of the most important and main multipliers of contemporary Jew-
hatred.

All of the above as well as the arguments made in the essays of the present
volume point to a need for a globally coordinated approach in which the deci-
sion makers and influencers of the political, legal, and media worlds could
and should play a significant and decisive role. Suggestions and recommenda-
tions how to counter antisemitism on an international and intergovernmental
level are given in the third part of the present collection. Together with others,
these suggestion were developed into the systematic approach outlined in the
first volume of the present miniseries.⁸

Confronting Antisemitism through Critical
Reflection/Approaches

Antisemitism is a hydra with many heads. As in the ancient myth, when one of
these heads is cut off, that is, when one form of antisemitism is eradicated, two
new ones grow in its stead. The reason for this seeming imperishability of antise-
mitism is the pluralistic nature and longue durée of antisemitism. Antisemitism is
a quasi-religious ideology that is employed by a whole range of different groups,
religions, and cultures which are often even hostile to each other. Antisemites
and antisemitic groups use the religious symbols, stereotypes, and prejudices
of antisemitic thought to interpret not only the Jewish “Other” but, even more
importantly, their own reality. In this way, various crises are conceived in light
of antisemitic cultural memories.⁹ This versatility of antisemitism is the reason
why no single theoretical approach is sufficient to understand its nature. De-

⁸ Cf. Lange, Mayerhofer, Porat, and Schiffman, Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism.
⁹ For more information on antisemitism as a form of system of religious symbols and its role in
the formation of religious and cultural identity cf. A. Lange and K. Mayerhofer, “Introduction,”
in Confronting Antisemitism from Perspectives of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, vol. 2 of An End
to Antisemitism!, ed. A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman, (Berlin: De Gruyter,
pending on the historical, cultural, and religious contexts, antisemitism’s character varies as much as the causes that trigger it. Therefore, the essays in the first part of the present volume employ a whole range of different theory-driven approaches to understand the nature of contemporary antisemitism. Among these approaches, the critical theory as founded by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno and as developed in post-colonial thought plays a significant role (see in particular the contributions by Ljiljana Radonić, Jan Rathje, and to a lesser extent, by Stephan Grigat).

As critical theory informs many of the more theoretically oriented contributions to the present volume, a few words about this particular theoretical approach will support the reader in accessing these essays. Critical theory’s understanding of antisemitism is based on a combination of economic criticism, psychology, and cultural theory. It perceives Jew-hatred as a projection of reality and as a constant criticism of power. Horkheimer and Adorno do not claim to provide a universal theory explaining the history of Jew-hatred. Instead, their critical theory is interested in the contradictions of society and thus derives the object of criticism from the circumstances and relations of power and domination. The antisemitism of the modern period differs and, consequently, needs to be distinguished from earlier forms of Jew-hatred that were more religiously motivated. This change goes hand in hand with the rise of capitalism and the immense social developments that ensued with it. The conflation of Jews with money and usury in pre-modern times laid the foundation based on which not only everything inherently negative but even the abstraction of capitalism could be projected onto the Jews perceived as a collective providing thus simple explanatory patterns for complex phenomena. Examples for this perceptive shift include the fiscal Jewish world conspiracy theory claiming that Jews would manipulate the monetary system to secretly rule the world.

According to the critical theory, provoked by changing social conditions, the “biologization of capitalism” added a new dimension to modern antisemitism. This biologization can only be understood in terms of its manifestations in an abstract way. Jews are no longer seen as individuals but rather as belonging to a communal group, that is identified as “International Jewry,” projecting any antisemitic stereotype onto the Jews in a wholesale approach. The Nazi extermination camps, like Auschwitz, are interpreted as factories that would destroy

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12 Ibid.
general social and cultural values of this communal group, that is, they destroyed “the personifications of the abstract.”¹³

Critical theory emphasizes, on the other hand, that this new dimension of modern antisemitism was not an invention of the Nazis. Adorno notes that “antisemitism was not first injected into German culture by Hitler from outside, but rather this culture was permeated with antisemitic prejudices right up to the point where it appeared to be most cultivated.”¹⁴ Critical theory’s approach to antisemitism is thus limited in its theoretical reflection to a particular form of Jew-hatred and neither intends nor is it suited to guide the study of all forms and aspects of antisemitism. Critical theory rightly emphasizes the impact that the birth of capitalism had on antisemitism, but it is, for example, not suited to take the religious aspect of contemporary Islamic antisemitism into consideration.

Therefore, other theoretical frameworks employed by the essays in this part include intersectionality (Karin Stögner), the idea of a clash of cultures (Andreas Benl) as well as a conceptual history approach (Dan Michman). A special focus of all these papers is the antisemitism and anti-Zionism of the Muslim world and its reflections in western societies. Other essays (Jan Rathje, Dan Michman) view contemporary antisemitism with a long-term perspective pointing to the changed attitude toward Judaism in European societies and the transformed nature of antisemitic hatred as compared to medieval and early modern times.

In his essay, Dan MICHMAN presents the Jews as a Problem for Modern European Political Logic. He describes the historical situation of the Jews in Europe by means of a conceptual history of Jewish identity. Beginning with the European Middle Ages, Michman argues that Judaism has a unique position: Jewish identity was considered as religious and ethnic and as posing no problem to existing norms. Jews were tolerated but were nevertheless perceived as a religious and cultural “Other” opposed to the Christian majority society. This situation changed in the early modern period with the gradual emergence of modern states. With the enlightened idea of individualism, the Jewish ethnic or national identity was no longer tolerated. Modern antisemitism, finally, provided an answer for how to deal with Jewish identity, namely to see the problem in “Jewishness” itself. In the nineteenth century, following the rise of Zionism, the conceptualization of the “Jew” was increasingly replaced by the “Israelite” to emphasize the special character of the Jews as one nationality. By the end of

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¹³ Ibid., 114.
the nineteenth century, “new racial theories provided antisemites with a tool that could put all the different Jews into one basket—the Jews as a race, or better, as a counter-race” (39). Michman concludes that hatred of Jews is a simple answer to a complex situation based on pseudo-scientific concepts that generalize Jewish identity.

Conspiracy theories played a significant role in contemporary antisemitism at least since the 9/11 terror attacks. In his essay “Money Rules the World, but Who Rules the Money?” Antisemitism in post-Holocaust Conspiracy Ideologies, Jan Rathje demonstrates how antisemitism and conspiracy theories are connected. In the first part, Rathje compares the structures and functions of conspiracy narratives and antisemitism and points to striking similarities: “Antisemitism is ultimately defined by Horkheimer and Adorno as a ‘pathische Projektion’ (pathological projection), which implies a projection without reflection of the Self within the object of consideration; antisemitic conspiracy ideologies and myths are a part of this process” (51). Rathje further corroborates his argument by pointing to the historical continuity from the Middle Ages through The Protocols of the Elders of Zion until today. In particular, he discusses the linguistic vehicle of “detour-communication” (52), which means that antisemitism is no longer expressed explicitly but implicitly. In a qualitative analysis of two hundred postings on German conspiracy-ideological Facebook pages, Rathje shows how the myth of a “Jewish World Conspiracy” is coded. It becomes clear that even today, elements of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are still being used in conspiracy-ideological communications on the internet. A larger public needs to be educated about antisemitic conspiracy theories to be able to identify and combat conspiracy narratives and antisemitism.

The papers by Karin Stögner, Andreas Benl, and Ljiljana Radonić discuss various aspects of reception of Muslim antisemitism in the Western world and are guided in their approach by critical theory as well as by other approaches.

Karin Stögner employs the concept of intersectionality in her essay Antisemitism and Intersectional Feminism: Strange Alliances and uses antisemitic “pinkwashing” polemics against the state of Israel as a test case for her theory. Intersectionality describes how social and political categories of an individual or social group (such as race, class, and gender) might combine to modes of discrimination. Stögner shows, on the one hand, that antisemitism is the blind spot in intersectionality concepts and how Queer feminism increasingly allies with global antisemitism. In particular, Stögner addresses the anti-Israel accusation of “pinkwashing,” that is, the practice of shifting the focus away from the Israeli-Palestine conflict to Israel’s exemplary tolerance of LGBTQ+ people. Stögner then analyzes the reasons for why the concept of intersectionality is instrumentalized for the expression of latent or manifest antisemitism. She identi-
fies antisemitism as inherently intersectional and "anti-identity," with other social determinations like race, class, and gender greatly influencing antisemitic manifestations. However, antisemitism claims a special role since it does not correspond with clear-cut divisions such as blackness/whiteness or female/male. Rather, Jews serve as figurative representations of either side of a socio-political spectrum as well as surpassing classic categories of socio-cultural determination. They are seen as symbols of both capitalism and communism, they are neither clearly male nor female, and overall can be regarded as social and cultural misfits with regards to their wholesale artificiality and unauthenticity. Therefore, in her analysis, Stögner aims at a new concept of intersectionality, with which she wants to describe the relationship between antisemitism and other ideologies and which she calls “intersectionality of ideologies” (69).

Andreas BENL engages with Cultural Relativism and Antisemitism: History, Encounters, and Consequences of Ethno-Religious Identity Politics in the Orient and the West. He explains how the “Clash of Cultures” came to be the leading explanation for the religio-political problems in the Middle East, proposed by actors of the political left and right alike. His main thesis is that political Islam was favored in its rise by the increasingly dominant cultural relativism in Western states. Using the historical development of Iran since 1905 as an example, Benl demonstrates how political Islam could finally become a state ideology. With the Islamic revolution, antisemitism and the destruction of the Jewish state became one of the guiding principles of the Iranian regime. Benl sees the decisive link between left cultural relativists, right ethnopluralists and Islamists in their antisemitism or anti-Zionism. For a better future in the Middle East, Islamist identity politics need to be confronted. Solidarity with Israel needs to be created as much as a situation in which antisemitic regimes will fear the consequences of their actions.

Ljiljana RADONIĆ investigates New Antisemitism and New Media: Leftist De-realization of Islamist “Emancipation.” Similar to Benl, Radonić assumes that there is a common ground across different political camps on the left, the right, and Islamism in anti-Zionism and antisemitism. She describes modern antisemitism as a response to the rise of capitalism and social changes throughout the twentieth century. The Jews were identified as the evil and juxtaposed with the capital in an abstract way. Opposing them were the symbolic good deeds—such as labor and commodity. Antisemitism could thus be interpreted as a camouflage of capitalist criticism. On this basis, Radonić investigates this form of "New Antisemitism" on discussions in leftist new media. Before doing so, however, she describes a form of left-wing antisemitism that only developed after the Holocaust and establishes a connection to the so-called "New Antisemitism." Therein, Radonić describes “a far-reaching ideological convergence of antisemit-
ism since 9/11 and the ‘Second Intifada’ across a range of ideologies and milieus that traditionally had precious little in common” (111). In a second empirical part, she examines reactions to the Hamas policy paper of 2017 and recognizes a whitewashing of Hamas’ Islamist antisemitism, especially apparent in the new media, on the internet, in online fora, and on various social media platforms. At last, Radonić collects and analyzes forum postings in the Austrian center-left daily paper Der Standard at the time when the Hamas Charta was published. This evidence provides examples for Radonić’s concluding claim that the existence of Islamic antisemitism is denied and is instead replaced by staging Muslims as the ”new Jews.”

Islamist antisemitism has increased dramatically in recent years. Tracing *Islamic Radical Movements and Anti-Semitism: Between Old and New*, Meir Litvak offers explanations for why antisemitism is so successful in Islamism. Antisemitism is rooted in Islamism in two ways. First, because in modern Islamism Jews are identified with “the West” which in turn is seen as the ultimate threatening “Other.” Second, in a conflation of religious and historical tradition and ideology, it is conceptualized as a result from the battles the Prophet Muhammad fought against the Jewish tribes of Medina. Litvak names three reasons why antisemitism is so successful in Islamism compared to other radical currents. First, there is a difference between desire and reality in Islam: the desire that Islam is the only and best religion and “the gloomy reality of the Islamic world’s weakness and lagging behind most other regions in the world” (136). Secondly, the longing for the glory of period of the Prophet Muhammad who defeated all his enemies and died as a ruler. “Thus, for Islamists the conflict of the Prophet Muhammad with the Jews serves as the model that must be reenacted in order to restore history to its proper course” (137). And third, Litvak identifies a clash of universalism: the universalism of the West stands against the universalism of Islam where the West is seen as the ultimate evil. This is accompanied by the conspiracy theory that Western universalism is a tool to propagate interests of an imagined Jewish world conspiracy. This conspiracy theory is virulent in Islamism because it reduces complex interrelationships of modern society to a single actor. Litvak concludes that antisemitism is so widespread in Islamism because its roots lie in Islam itself, both on a theological and socio-cultural as well as socio-political level.

In his essay, *Antisemitic Anti-Zionism: Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah*, Stephan Grigat studies the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah and their anti-Zionism in a comparative approach. He examines the antisemitisms of the mentioned Islamist groups and states and establishes similarities with the National Socialists (also direct influenced by Radio Zeesen). Grigat concludes that both Nazi and Islamist antisemitic ideologies see the greatest enemy in
“communism and materialism, liberalism and Western ‘plutocracy,’ individualism, emancipation, and Zionism” (150). Conspiracy-theorizing and projective worldviews, Holocaust denial and relativization are also commonplace. The State of Iran serves as an example for Grigat, because since the “Islamic Revolution” in 1979, it can be considered as fundamentally antisemitic, and is one of the main promoters of global antisemitism. Grigat identifies three main points of the regime’s antisemitism: firstly, the traditional Jew-hatred, secondly, the denial and relativization of the Holocaust and, lastly, the explicit threats to destroy Israel as a Jewish state. The Modern Islamic antisemitism “is decoded as a projective repudiation of a new, ambivalent and potentially emancipatory form of society” (151). Following his identification of a continuity of the Jew-hatred in the Middle East, Grigat calls for a new policy toward Iran, especially from the EU with a special focus on the nuclear agreement of 2015. Only in this way can antisemitism be effectively combated in Iran as well.

Comprehending Contemporary Manifestations of Antisemitism

From more theoretically guided studies of the present volume’s first part, the essays in the second part move to the analysis of contemporary manifestations of antisemitism. This second part documents how antisemitism is a social and cultural constant that underwent a paradigm shift in the almost eight decades since the Shoah ended. An important trigger of this transformation is the internet as it provides uncensored and unfiltered opportunities for antisemites to reach widespread audiences from various cultural, social, and national backgrounds. The internet contributed thus to a spread of Jew-hatred on an unprecedented scale since the mid-twentieth century and the Nazi era.

One of the reasons why the increase of contemporary Jew-hatred was ignored outside of Judaism for such a long time is its understanding as a particular expression of a form of racism of the radical right only. This understanding ignores the contemporary and historical plurality of antisemitism. Today, as much as in the past, antisemitic sentiments can be found on all sides of the political spectrum—on the right and on the left, as well as in the middle of the society. Antisemitism is and was at home in Islam and Christianity as much as in secular groups. It was never restricted to the political right, neither today nor in previous times. What changed in contemporary antisemitism is thus not its ideological and/or religious affiliation. Rather, it is the unprecedented outreach that Jew-hatred has today which could only be achieved with the help of the internet.
as mass medium. By providing it a global audience, the internet legitimized an ideology that after the Shoah was mostly ostracized by social consensus.

As a second aspect, the importance of Islamic antisemitism for the exploding Jew-hatred in today’s global village is highlighted. It reaches the Western world through the internet, immigration from Muslim countries, and the BDS movement. In the world of Islam, antisemitism is particularly active in its anti-Zionist expression. While anti-Zionism existed already before the founding of the State of Israel in both the Western and Muslim worlds, today, anti-Zionism is particularly important as a pan-Arabic ideology that is intended to unite the Arabic countries in a fight against an alleged common enemy, namely Israeli and diaspora Jewry. Antisemitism in general and anti-Zionism in particular serve thus as an ideology that is instrumentalized to construct a pan-Arabic identity in delegitimizing the Jewish state as the demonic Jewish “Other.” Beyond this pan-Arabic aspect, the BDS movement functions as a bridge between Arabic and western anti-Zionism that carries the Jew-hatred and anti-Zionism of the Muslim word to Europe and the Americas were it found and finds “open ears” due to already existing anti-Zionist and antisemitic sentiments in their cultural memories.

Anti-Zionism, however, now has a new target: next to the individual Jew and the collective Jewish cultural and religious “Other,” now also Israel as the Jewish state becomes an object of antisemitic hatred. Nevertheless, the age-old religious symbols, stereotypes, and prejudices of Jew-hatred remain the same in anti-Zionist agitation. Next to individual Jews and the collective Jewish “Other,” they are now simply also applied to the Jewish state.

The studies of the second part of the present volume largely do not point to a misguided social critique of capitalism as the root cause of today’s Jew-hatred today. Rather, they focus on the internet and onto a pan-Arabic anti-Zionist ideology as those factors that triggered the contemporary explosion of Jew-hatred. The growing precariousness of the world’s population might have made it more receptive to the resurgence of Jew-hatred but should not be regarded as its sole cause. After a general study concerned with social media, several case studies on antisemitism in Poland, Turkey, as well as on Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Germany engage with this subject in more detail.

Marc NEUGRÖSCHEL examines Antisemitism and Anti-Americanism in Social Media as a form of online redemption. He presents a review of respective social media content which combines antisemitic and anti-American narratives. Both are linked through common notions and theories of Jewish world conspiracy, manipulation of humanity, and control of the media. Neugröschel compares classical antisemitic and anti-American worldviews by focusing on their semantics which can be interpreted as a quest for enlightenment. Online discussion of an alleged Jewish world conspiracy claims to open the eyes of their audience and
aims at an acknowledgement of both the Jews’ and the United States’ “oppression and deception of humanity by a clandestine but powerful ruling circle” (196). Sometimes, antisemitic and anti-American ideas even intersect, identifying American Jews as the source of the utmost evil. They are furthermore conceptualized as a form of emancipation in what Neugröschel identifies as an anti-Jewish victim-perpetrator inversion. Neugröschel claims that the general public needs to free itself from their purported Jewish “oppressors.” Herein, the notion follows the historical process of Jewish strive for freedom from political during the Enlightenment period. Confronting the special form of antisemitism intersecting with anti-Americanism is especially difficult since its adherents do not see themselves as reactionary and racist discriminators and continue to claim righteousness in their belief in emancipation. Herein, Neugröschel also identifies one of the bases for contemporary antisemitism that is no longer a phenomenon of the political right. Hence, he calls for a halt to the reductive perception of antisemitism as an authoritarian and conformist worldview alone.

The transformation of Jew-hatred that Neugröschel recognized as a general tendency in the world of the internet is also observed in studies focusing on individual countries. Yochanan ALTMAN et al. investigate the Online Trade and Consumption of Jewish Figurines and Pictures of Jewish Figures in Contemporary Poland and discuss the question of whether and how this phenomenon can be understood in the frame of an antisemitic discourse. The buying and selling of figurines depicting Orthodox Jews is widespread in contemporary Poland since they are supposed to bring good luck and wealth to their owners. While until the 1990s these figurines could be purchased mostly as souvenirs at fair markets, their online trade is flourishing in present times. The paper examines not only this internet trade but especially the verbal descriptions and notions surrounding these figurines which corroborate a symbolic image of “the Jew” in Poland. The authors’ findings show that what is discussed broadly is not only these artefact’s potency but also the treatment they require in order to deliver prosperity. Concluding, the authors call for reading the discourse surrounding this phenomenon “in relation to the broader historical and contemporary socio-political context, which grounds its understanding and helps to uncover the undertow of what seems at first glance to be neutral or even positive disposition but altogether continues and enshrines the well trodden path of anti-Jewish sentiment” (201).

In another case study, Rifat BALI scrutinizes Antisemitism in Turkey as a New Phenomenon or More of the Same? Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, a discourse was established which ought to present Turkey in the light of tolerance and following its predecessor the Ottoman Empire in its example of serving as a refuge for “all manner of refugees throughout its history” (223). Turkey was sub-
sequently glorified as a state in which antisemitism did not exist. However, Bali shows that the purpose of this glorification was a political one. Armenian-Americans had been trying to lobby the US government to officially acknowledge the Armenian genocide of 1915–1916, and Turkey was preoccupied to shore up its national image among the US public. Leaders of the country’s Jewish community were instrumentalized to support the Turkish public relations campaign to convey a clear message: “a nation that could behave with such tolerance toward its Jewish minority could not have committed the crimes against humanity that it has been accused of” (224) such as the Armenian genocide. Having disclosed this political intention, Bali traces Turkish antisemitism during the twentieth century and the history of Turkish government’s relationship with its Jewish community. Therein, he shows that while during the present period, antisemitism in Turkey is indeed on the rise, this phenomenon can only be understood in connection with the “explosion of communication [...] as Turkey has entered the digital age” (232). With increased online access, the visibility of antisemitism too has grown and with it, a second problem has arisen. The Turkish public and political establishment do not see antisemitism as a social problem to be solved. This makes combatting it very difficult and Bali calls out for a thorough information and action plan to raise general awareness for the problem. Only if the Turkish public recognizes the problem of rising antisemitism in their country and will no longer hesitate to overcome their fear of being accused as “Zionist” or “Israel lovers” and speak up against antisemitism, sufficient pressure can be generated to get the country’s decision makers to act on a political and legal level too.

Günther Jikeli, in his essay, traces Attitudes of Syrian and Iraqi Refugees in Germany toward Jews. Antisemitism is on the rise in present-day Germany and while different factors contribute to this rise, immigration is an important aspect. Many people who take refuge in Germany come from countries where antisemitism is politically and culturally institutionalized, such as in Syria or Iraq. Often enough, culturally inherent antisemitic attitudes intersect with Islamism and sexism which in turn fuels racist intolerance, both from immigrants and from German indigenous population itself. Jikeli’s study shows that attitudes of refugees from Syria and Iraq in Germany toward Jews range from “pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli positions, to tolerance or lack of interest, to accordance with individual antisemitic stereotypes [...] and antisemitic conspiracy theories with genocidal tendencies” (247). While Jews are generally accepted as a religious community, a Jewish nation state is ignored or explicitly denied. Religiously motivated antisemitism is also widespread among the examined cohort. Islamist antisemitic stereotypes such as the ideas of Jewish forgery of the Holy Scripture and attempts to kill Muhammad are linked with notions of modern antisemitism like the “rich” and “conspiring” Jews, as well as with the presumption of general
hatred between Jews and Muslims. Based on his investigation, Jikeli extracts six social or ideological factors that influence antisemitic positions among Syrian and Iraqi refugees: the prevalence of antisemitism in their indigenous countries, especially also in the form of public propaganda, the widespread prevalence of antisemitism in old and new media and their uncritical consumption, an identification of Palestinians with hatred of Israel and Jews, a pan-Arab ideology opposing a common “Zionist imperialist’ enemy” (266) and the antisemitic interpretation of the Qur'an and its related scriptures. All of these factors cannot be separated and often reinforce each other which makes them particularly dangerous.

Jikeli’s case study pointed already to the importance of Muslim antisemitism for the global explosion of Jew-hatred. The essays by Küntzel and Shavit, therefore, address important aspects of this problem.

In his essay, Matthias Küntzel poses the question: How to Challenge Islamic Antisemitism? Islamic antisemitism is especially dangerous as it links the Arab countries in a fight against a common enemy, namely Israeli and European Jewry. It lies at the core of the Islamist’s war against Israel and the modern world. Küntzel engages with the foundations of Islamic antisemitism which differ greatly from European antisemitism. The phantasm of the Jewish world conspiracy is foreign to Islamist antisemitism. Instead, a religious hostility based in the Qur’an and related scripture, accompanied by a general devaluation of Judaism, forms the basis for contemporary antisemitism in Muslim and, especially, Islamist communities. However, Küntzel sees Islamic antisemitism not simply as “a continuation of tradition or a response to injustice,” rather, he considers it “the product of a process of deliberate fusion of old Islamic scriptures and new conspiracy theories” (272). According to Küntzel, these theories date back only to the period of World War II. They are nevertheless not easy to combat since they are today connected to the Muslim creed. Another factor is the continuous downplaying, ignorance, and denial of Islamism and Islamic antisemitism in the politics and media of the West. Islamic Jew-hatred is often regarded as “antisemitism of the oppressed,” (275) thus claiming Israeli’s liability for an unstable political situation in the Arab world. According to Küntzel, factors like these can only be countered by a “political movement against right-wing populists and against appeasers of the Left; a movement which brings together those Muslims, ex-Muslims, and non-Muslims, who want to fight Islamic antisemitism and Islamism and who want to change the attitudes of governments and media in this respect” (277). Of course, Küntzel recognizes the challenges of this enterprise. However, it is crucial to challenge Islamic antisemitism, not only as a means of protection for the Jewish communities in Europe and in the Middle East but also because it threatens the peace in the world altogether.
A particular part of Muslim propaganda claims that Muslim can be identified as the “new Jews” thus comparing Israel with the Nazi persecution of Jews. This trope is part of a typical antisemitic argumentation strategy in anti-Zionist Jew hatred, that is, that Israel would treat the Palestinians as the Nazis treated the Jews. Beyond such polemics, Uriya Shavit reflects on contemporary parallelisms which claims that “Muslims are the New Jews” in the West. He examines a canon of contemporary Muslim texts by essayists, scholars, and activists in the Arab world, in Europe and in the United States. Based on Jewish experience in the West, conclusions can be drawn and lessons learned for Muslim minorities too. Antisemitism and the struggle to combat it, segregation from and integration into surrounding major societies as well as political lobbying are Shavit’s focus. He argues that “the diversity of Jewish realities, past and present, and the general sense that Jewish minorities in the West ultimately found ways to preserve their religious identity while amassing social-political influence, have rendered comparisons between Muslims and Jews an essential aspect of different (and at times contesting) arguments about the future of Muslim minorities in the West” (283). However, Shavit also acknowledges that comparisons are often intended to convey a certain ideological discourse, are often reductionist and simplistic and sometimes even entirely ignore “the complexity of different aspects of Jewish and Muslim experiences” (302). Still, a sense of comfort can be found in a shared experience: learning that someone else has already experienced similar difficulties and still prevailed can encourage others to withstand, unite in action, both educational and political, to counter both antisemitic and anti-Muslim sentiments and to protest against common Western perceptions of Jews and Muslims alike. Being a Jew in Europe always has been a challenge, today, being a Muslim is too. Shared experience and comparison, reflected in another minority, can thus help to strengthen self-value and identity as a religious, cultural, and social minority so often threatened by social and economic marginalization, religious, and cultural demonization and general racism.

The BDS movement is not only the most prominent anti-Israel association active in present times it also builds bridges between Arab and Western anti-Zionism. In his essay, Alex Feuerherd asks the question Why Israel? To answer this question, he traces the BDS movement’s history and shows how it targets all fields of culture, from the general public, to the political sphere and from music and the arts to university campuses. The core element of BDS is the perception and denunciation of any of Israel’s political and social actions as a breach of human rights. In reverse argumentation, any act against the Jewish state is interpreted and welcomed as a vindication for human rights. Herein, the BDS movement is clearly antisemitic because it follows age-old strategies to diminish Israel as a Jewish state and the Jewish people in general in the same way that medieval
Christian polemics, Nazi ideology, Social Darwinism or post-colonialism did. However, the BDS movement goes further insofar as it tries to infiltrate every aspect of society and even collaborates with non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or the United Nations. The charges that were brought against Israel at the “World Conference against Racism” in Durban 2001 served and continue to serve as the basis for BDS’ calls for boycott, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation of the Jewish state. All of this, according to Feuerherdt, is done “with the goal to demonize Israel and to cast it as an illegitimate state which has no right to exist but has to disappear” (314). The BDS movement has thus “successfully” managed to morph antisemitism “from targeting the individual Jew to turning against the Jewish state as a collective subject” (314) while still reiterating age-old antisemitic imagery and ideologemes. Attacking Israel is their primary goal and any claim of serving the purpose of human rights, civilian society or humanitarian causes are nothing but “rhetorical gimmicks” (317).

**Activist Perspectives on Combating Antisemitism**

The seven essays collected in the third and last part of the present volume enrich the scholarly perspectives brought together in the previous parts with the practical experience of activists who stand at the forefront of the fight against all forms of contemporary Jew-hatred, discrimination, and persecution. The first three essays provide national, global, and internet perspectives regarding the frightening increase in and changed character of antisemitism in Europe and worldwide.

The British Labour party is an example for a national perspective on the changed character of antisemitism and the increase of Jew-hatred. In his essay, Dave Rich asks *Why is the British Left Anti-Israel, and Why Does it Matter?* He engages with the origins of antisemitism in the political left of Britain in general and the Labour Party in particular. From a firm commitment to stand against antisemitism, the Labour Party developed into a haven for anti-Zionist Jew-hatred in particular and other forms of leftist antisemitism in general. Rich points to the anti-colonial discourse of the late sixties which polemized against Israel as an alleged colonial power, and he traces the antisemitic thought of the British left back to the identification of Jews with capitalism in the political left of the nineteenth century. Drawing into existing conspiracy theories that associated Jews with capitalism, the emerging left increasingly argued “that the working classes were oppressed by a specifically Jewish network of power and wealth” (328). Similar nineteenth-century roots can be identified for left wing
anti-Zionism, which “has never been comfortable with the idea that Jews form a nation or that Zionism is an authentic movement of national liberation.” Rather, Marxist theory denied Jews the status of an “authentic national people,” and regarded Zionism as “counter-revolutionary,” and that “both will become redundant with the onward march of history” (326). Resulting from these age-old views is an identification of Israel by the British left as “embodiment of Western domination, racism, and colonialism,” whereas the Palestinians “have come to represent all victims of Western power and militarism” (324).

A global as well as a national Australian perspective on the changed character of antisemitism and the increase in Jew-hatred is provided by Jeremy Jones in his essay Thinking Locally, Acting Globally. Jones traces the history of so-called ‘non-antisemites’ who commit acts of Jew-hatred while publicly denying any antisemitism. He understands non-antisemitism as a reaction to the Shoah and the taboo of antisemitism that developed after World War II as a response to this taboo. Only in countries or groups that were not affected by the shock of the Shoah, undisguised antisemitism is active today. For the past, Jones regards the Australian approach to combat antisemitism as a role model. Widespread education combined with a reappraisal of antisemitic thought in Christian traditions and their eradication contributed as much to the purging Jew-hatred from Australia as did legal restraints that quelled antisemitism in the media, political parties, religious institutions and civil society. However, the global nature of online communication made this strategy insufficient. To develop a new strategy in combating antisemitism building on the Australian model, Jones suggests as a first step “to map the universe of anti-antisemitism” and “to identify role models, inspirational figures, with standing and/or celebrity” (340).

Given the significant role of the internet as the main cause of the increased spread of antisemitism globally, André Oboler suggests a global approach to local action in his paper Solving Antisemitic Hate Speech in Social Media through a Global Approach to Local Action. Such a global approach to local action is necessary to counter the worldwide spread of “Antisemitism 2.0,” that is, the “normalisation of antisemitism in society through the use of social media” (343). Currently, antisemitism is among the most widespread and common forms of hate speech on the internet, however, given its versatility, it is all the more difficult to counter and combat. Antisemitism is no longer a right-wing worldview, but rather it has become accepted largely in the general public as valid point of view, as legitimate and a form of vindication of human rights especially when it intersects with anti-Zionism. As the internet provides a forum for open and free speech, antisemitic hate speech is difficult to identify especially when looking at social media. Still, the Global Fora for Combating Antisemitism have made a solution to this problem as their top priority. A thorough monitoring process on
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube is as much needed as an overall transparency which can be achieved through global cooperation. However, local actions and cooperation are equally important as they support community resilience and accountability. All of these methods, which Oboler describes in clear detail, can result in the development of responses to counter common and new narratives and symbols of antisemitism alike. Only in this way, technological gaps, languages barriers, and cultural differences can be bridged and both civil society and governments can be empowered to “tackle the rising, global problem of Antisemitism 2.0” (363).

Both Jones and Oboler demonstrate the need to respond to the globalized character of antisemitism on a transnational scale. Transnational organizations play a key role in successfully combating any form of Jew-hatred, discrimination, and persecution. Therefore, the following four contributions by Michael Whine, Talia Naamat, Simone Dinah Hartmann, and Giovanni Quer engage with what transnational and intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations could and should do to successfully combat antisemitism.

Michael Whine reflects on Europe’s Undertakings to Combat Antisemitism and examines the role of European intergovernmental organizations in combating antisemitism as well as their successes and limitations. For this purpose he investigates European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CoE). Whine observes that all these institutions were slow in recognizing “that rising antisemitism was coming from new and different directions at the end of the twentieth century” (384). The resolutions and statements which these European institutions have agreed upon and which they released, resulted in recognizing the need to become active. The specific character and dangers of antisemitism “required both more holistic and focused responses than those required to combat other forms of racism” (385). Only when barriers that remain on a national level can be overcome and when the individual states prioritize the fight against antisemitism, effective measures are possible and more informed and efficient protection of Europe’s Jewish communities will become feasible.

Talia Naamat addresses the legal aspect of the transnational fight against antisemitism in her contribution Are the New Forms of Antisemitism Prohibited in the European Legal Systems? She detects a shift in how antisemitism manifests itself. While Jew-hatred originally targeted Jews and Jewish institutions, common-day antisemitism expresses itself as anti-Israel propaganda and as actions against the State of Israel, often hidden in the rhetoric of human rights. In the legal arena, today, Naamat identifies two central question pertaining to antisemitism: “when speech ostensibly targeting the State of Israel may [...] be consid-
ered unlawful ‘hate speech’,” and “when actions against Israel violate the principle of non-discrimination” (398). While each European country varies in its approach to the new antisemitism that targets Israel, a general trend emerges nevertheless that may lead to a more nuanced approach to applying non-discrimination and hate speech laws. It needs to be thus assured that “one may no longer safely hide behind political sounding speech if it is tainted with antisemitism, or when [...] it affects the security of Jewish people, or incites to hatred against them” (398).

Simone Dinah HARTMANN demands a transnational paradigm shift in the European Union’s fight against antisemitism in her paper What the EU Should do against Antisemitism: Toward a Strategic Paradigm of Prevention, Containment, and Deterrence. She asks for an “effort by the whole of society and its institutions” that “encompass[es] confronting Islamism and the cultural-relativist Left, in addition to the traditional racist Far Right” (401). Based on the earlier neglect of the EU to combat antisemitism effectively, Hartmann suggests a strategy of prevention, containment, and deterrence. For prevention, she suggests the empowerment of secular Muslims to confront political Islam and Muslim antisemitism. For containment, Hartmann asks for a “European-wide cordon sanitaire” that would enact prohibitions for “governments and political parties, civil society, the media, and influential companies in Europe from seeking partnerships and cooperation with organizations and individuals involved in promoting and spreading antisemitism” (408) and pertain to the EU’s foreign policy as well. For deterrence, “the law must be enforced consistently and the legal framework on hate crimes and those spreading hate speech needs to be expanded” (409).

With his paper Antisemitism and the UN, Giovanni QUER moves the discourse from the European Union to the United Nations and hence from a European to Global perspective. He points out that the United Nations and its organizations either condemn antisemitism “as a form of Holocaust denial” or relegate it to be “a phenomenon existing merely in extreme right-wing and racist speech” (413). Quer provides a survey of the UN’s reports about and actions against antisemitism and their lack, respectively. In relation to antisemitism, Quer identifies three tendencies with US agencies: (1) A focus on Holocaust denial and Nazi glorification that seldom mentions its connection with antisemitism. Even the word “Jew” seems to be avoided. In this way the Jew-hatred that is inherent in Holocaust denial and Nazi glorification is obliterated; (2) “[A]ntisemitism is mostly associated with forms of hate speech typical of the Western extreme right’s rhetoric” (425) and UN agencies would therefore overlook Jew-hatred in other parts of the world as well as in different cultural contexts; (3) While contemporary forms of antisemitism targeting the state of Israel are recognized, they are conflated with islamophobia and christianophobia. “This trio of separate forms of
hostility, however connected they may be, is not further explored and, consequently, they are ambiguously diluted without any clear stance against antisemitism” (425). Quer therefore calls for a structural change that brings antisemitism “back to the center of the human rights discourse in its entirety” (426).

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