Boyd Taylor Coolman

The Comprehensive Trinitarianism of the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The Trinitarian theology of the *Summa Halensis* is both a remarkable achievement in its own right (synthesizing a growing stream of traditional sources, including Augustine, Dionysius, John of Damascus, and Richard of St Victor), as well as a significant influence on later scholastic luminaries, especially St Bonaventure. Some of its signature features include the important role of *inascibilitas* in the understanding of the person of the Father, the emphasis on emanational modes of origin as constituting each of the divine Persons, the importance of self-diffusive goodness as the fundamental ground of Trinitarian plurality, and lastly, its comprehensiveness, its inclination to think trinitarianly about all of reality, from the divine nature itself, to divine activity in creation and salvation, to the transcendental properties of all being, including the human person, to its original theory of trinitarian beauty.

Introduction: St Francis, the Trinity, and the Early Franciscans

‘You are three and one, the Lord God of gods; You are the good, all good, the highest good’—so St Francis near the beginning of his ‘[The] Praises of God’.¹ The Poverello was devoted to the Three-in-One, not as a speculative doctrine, but as a Reality to be worshipped. He begins his *Rule*, accordingly, with this Trinitarian doxology:

Wherever we are, in every place, at every hour, at every time of the day, every day and continually, let all of us truly and humbly believe, hold in our heart and love, honor, adore, serve, praise and bless, glorify and exalt, magnify and give thanks to the Most High and Supreme Eternal God Trinity and Unity.²

1 Francis of Assisi, ‘The Praises of God,’ in *Early Documents*, vol. 1, *The Saint*, ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and William J. Short (New York: New City Press, 2001), 109. St Francis composed this prayer of praise on Mount La Verna in September 1224, when he received the stigmata. The prayer was written on a parchment which also contains the blessing that Francis gave to brother Leo. The parchment with the autographs of Francis is conserved as a relic in the Basilica of St Francis in Assisi.

2 ‘The Early Rule (The Rule Without a Papal Seal)’ [= *Regula non bullata*], c. 23, in *Early Documents*, vol. 1, *The Saint*, 85. See William J. Short, ‘The Rule of the Lesser Brothers: Earlier Rule, Fragments, Later Rule, The Rule for Hermitages,’ *The Writings of Francis of Assisi: Rules, Testament and Admonitions*, ed. Michael W. Blastic, Jay M. Hammond, and J.A. Wayne Hellman (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2011), 31.

Three things are noteworthy in Francis' Trinitarian devotion: the emphasis on divine goodness; the attention to both unity and trinity; the subtle progression from interior, heart-felt faith ('believe, hold in our heart and love, honor, adore (...)') to external, doxological confession ('(...) praise and bless, glorify and exalt, magnify and give thanks'). Shortly after his death, when his brothers did begin to speculate on matters Trinitarian, all three aspects figured centrally. As expressed in the *Summa Halensis* (*SH*), that massive summary of early Franciscan theology prior to Bonaventure, the early Franciscan intellectual tradition (EFIT) grounded its trinitarian theology in divine goodness, strove to hold one and three together, and organized its textual expression according to this progression from belief in the heart to confession with the mouth. In short, early Franciscan trinitarian speculation seems to derive from the spiritual impulse of St Francis, even as it pursues a scholastic *intellectus fidei* never attempted by the Poverello.³

The Trinitarian theology of the *SH* was pioneering and innovative in its time,⁴ and proved influential among subsequent scholastics. There are several signature features of this account that will be noted below, but the most important overarching characteristics are two: first, the *centrality* of the Trinity within Halensian theology as a whole and second its *comprehensive scope*. The *SH* signals the centrality of the Trinity in its General Prologue:

The whole discipline of Christian faith (*fidei disciplina*) pertains to two things: to the faith and understanding (*fidem et intelligentiam*) of the Creator and to the faith and understanding of the Savior. Hence, the prophet Isaiah, speaking in the person of the Lord, said (43:10–11): "Believe and understand that I am he: before me no God was formed and after me there will not be. I am, I am the Lord, and there is no Savior apart from me." For the faith of the Creator principally contains two things, namely, the cognition (*cognitio*) of the substance of the Creator and cognition of the works of the Creator. The cognition of the substance of the Creator consist in the cognition of the divine Unity and of the same most blessed Trinity (...).⁵

Here, all divine activity in history reduces to the acts of creating and saving, and both are acts of a single triune Agent. The whole *disciplina fidei* pertains ultimately to that single Reality.

³ Cf. Bert Roest, 'Religious Life in the Franciscan School Network (13th Century),' in Bert Roest, *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission (c. 1220–1650)* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 51–82.

⁴ Hence, the title of Lydia Schumacher's ERC project.

⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, Prologus Generalis: 'Tota christianae fidei disciplina pertinet ad duo: ad fidem et intelligentiam Conditoris et fidem atque intelligentiam Salvatoris. Unde Isaias Propheta, in persona Domini loquens, dicit, 43:10–11: "Credatis et intelligatis quia ego ipse sum: ante me non est formatus deus et post me non erit. Ego sum, ego sum Dominus, et non est absque me Salvator." Fides enim [Conditoris] principaliter continet duo, scilicet cognitionem substantiae Conditoris et cognitionem operis Conditoris. Cognitionis substantiae Conditoris consistit in cognitione divinae Unitatis et eiusdem beatissimae Trinitatis.'

Yet, the Halensian doctrine of the Trinity is not *merely* one, even the first, among the Christian doctrines; nor is it *simply* the central one.⁶ In continuity with the earliest Christian reflection on this mystery,⁷ it functions rather as a ‘meta-doctrine’,⁸ structuring ‘all Christian reflection on’⁹ everything else, including, among other things, divine causality, creation, anthropology, theological aesthetics, and even the divine essence itself. What follows, accordingly, is both an introduction to the doctrine of the Trinity in the *SH* as well as a cartographic survey of the terrain of this ‘comprehensive Trinitarianism’.¹⁰

Preliminary Observations

First, two preliminary observations, one structural, the other methodological, are in order.

The *SH* divides into four books, roughly mirroring the Lombard’s *Sentences*. After two introductory questions that consider the nature of theology and the possibility of knowledge of God in this life, respectively, Book 1 turns to the ‘Unity and Trinity of the divine substance’. The Prologue begins:

Assisted by the graces of Jesus Christ, we proceed to the proposed inquiry concerning the Unity and Trinity of the divine substance with all reverence. This inquiry has two parts, in accord with the words of the Apostle in Rom. 10:9–10: “with the heart one believes unto righteousness, with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” There is thus a bipart inquiry concerning the Unity and Trinity of the deity: first concerning the reality itself, which is the Unity of the Trinity, ordered to belief of the heart; second concerning the names, ordered to the confession of the mouth. In this way, we may know (*sciamus*) what we believe and confess [it] with true and catholic expressions.¹¹

6 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Logic*, vol. 3, *The Spirit of Truth*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 23: ‘Christian truth is trinitarian.’

7 Khaled Anatolios, *Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 8: ‘(...) orthodox trinitarian doctrine emerged as a kind of meta-doctrine that involved a global interpretation of Christian life and faith and indeed evoked a global interpretation of reality.’

8 Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 335: ‘The doctrine of the Trinity is an anticipatory sum of the whole content of Christian dogmatics.’

9 Justin Shaun Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*’ (PhD thesis, Boston College, 2018), 41.

10 Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘A Cord of Three Strands Is Not Easily Broken: The Transcendental Brocade of Unity, Truth and Goodness in the Early Franciscan Intellectual Tradition,’ *Nova et Vetera* (English Edition) 16 (2018): 555–80.

11 *SH* I, Prologue to First Inquiry, p. 39: ‘Adiuvante gratia Iesu Christi, ad propositam inquisitionem circa divinae substantiae Unitatem et Trinitatem cum omni reverentia procedamus. Cuius inquisitionis duae sunt partes, secundum verbum Apostoli, Rom. 10:20: “Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem, confessio fit ad salutem.” Est igitur inquisitio bipartita de Unitate et Trinitate deitatis:

Surprisingly, perhaps, the *SH* uses Paul's text from Romans as its structural conceit, dividing Book 1 into two halves, the first treating what is to be believed 'in the heart' regarding the Unity and Trinity, the second treating how one speaks of it 'with the mouth'. So, the overarching organizational trajectory arcs from belief to confession, from knowing to naming, from theology to doxology. The parallel with St Francis' prayer to the Trinity, noted above, is striking. Note also that Part 1 considers the divine essence or unity first, and then proceeds to the plurality of the persons. Part 2 is organized around the three kinds of names used in divine predication: essential, personal, and notional names.

A second preliminary point concerns method. In the first two questions, the *SH* concedes that the Trinity is a mystery lying beyond the ken of discovery by created rationality.¹² While the *SH* likens speculative Trinitarian theology to what it calls 'first philosophy or metaphysics', both of which consider the 'cause of causes', it notes that the comparison 'limps'. In contrast to the metaphysician, the theologian does not have the benefit of an essential definition of God, with regard to 'the mystery of the Trinity'.¹³ Regarding 'the very divinity and Trinity of persons', therefore, theology must take a different tack, namely, the inverse of the philosophical. The theologian must begin with revealed characteristics and reason back to the divine essence: in relation to 'the divinity and trinity of persons itself, there is another mode of cognizing, namely, that through operation we cognize power, through power we cognize the substance of divinity.'¹⁴ Divine operation or activity occurs in history, especially in the Incarnation: The philosophers failed to arrive at knowledge of the Trinity, in part 'because they did not recognize the most powerful effect of goodness, namely, the incarnation and redemption.'¹⁵ For the *SH* 'salvation history'

prima de ipsa re, quae est Unitas Trinitatis ordinata ad credulitatem cordis; secunda de nominatione ordinata ad confessionem oris, ut sciamus quod credimus, confiteri locutionibus catholicis et veris.'

12 *SH* I, Introductory Treatise, Prologue to Question II, p. 14: 'Volens autem se manifestare humanis cordibus superessentialis substantia, Deus in latrone Legis praecipit Moysi, Exod. 19:21: "Contestare populum, ne forte velint transcendere terminos ad videndum Deum", ponens limites humanae rationi in inquisitione divinatorum et maxime in perscrutatione abditissimae et sacratissimae divinae Unitatis et Trinitatis' [Wishing to manifest himself in his super-essential substance to the human heart, God in the giving of the Law commanded Moses [in] Ex. 19:21: "Contest the people, lest perhaps they try to transcend the boundaries in order to see God", placing limits on human reason in the investigation of divine things and maximally in the investigation of the most hidden and most holy Unity and Trinity].

13 *SH* I (n. 2), p. 5: 'Item, 'de Deo' dicitur esse ista scientia et non sicut aliae scientiae, velut Prima Philosophia, quia non agunt de Deo secundum mysterium Trinitatis vel secundum sacramentum humanae reparationis' [Again, concerning God there is that science and not as the other sciences, such as first philosophy, since the other sciences did not consider God according to the mystery of the Trinity and according to the sacrament of human reparation].

14 *SH* I (n. 1), p. 4: '(...) ipsa divinitas et trinitas personarum, est modus cognoscendi alius, ut per operationem cognoscamus virtutem, per virtutem ipsam divinitatis substantiam.'

15 *SH* I (n. 10), p. 19: 'quia non cognoverunt potissimum effectum bonitatis, scilicet incarnationem et redemptionem.'

thus becomes the theatre in which knowledge of the Triune God is acquired.¹⁶ Theological science,¹⁷ thus, has as its ‘formal object’ (*ratio*) the Christ-centered, self-revelation of the Trinity in salvation history, as recorded in Scripture.¹⁸

Strictly speaking, then, proper knowledge of the Trinitarian persons is available only through revelation and grace:¹⁹ ‘(...) according to the *Glossa*, [the philosophers] did not have, nor were they able to have, cognition of the Trinity through the proper attributes of the persons, except through teaching or inspiration (...).’²⁰ A lengthy passage gives the rationale:

(...) cognition of the Trinity, with respect to its proper nature, cannot be had through natural reason on its own; it can, nevertheless, be had through natural reason, with the assistance of grace, either given freely or sanctifying (*gratis datam aut gratum facientem*). And the reason is this: because our intellect, darkened by the original corruption, fails in those things which are most true. And therefore it fails concerning the most intelligible things and also concerning those things which are least and therefore are least intelligible—such as is the existence of motion and time, which have the weakest existence—just as the [physical] sense fails at the extremes, that is, in what is maximally and minimally sensible. So it is thus: since the existence of the divine persons in unity of essence is greatest and truest, our darkened intellect fails.

16 Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis* (Alexander of Hales) (Munich: Max Huber Verlag, 1964), 25: ‘Thus is the salvation-historical dimension taken directly into the definition of theology (*Gegenstandsbestimmung*). It provides knowledge of the divine essence, not in the modest way of Aristotelian *prima philosophia*, but rather in its Trinitarian fullness.’

17 Cf. Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘On the Subject Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis* and St. Thomas Aquinas,’ *The Thomist* 79 (2015): 439–66.

18 Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 25: ‘Theology, according to the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, deals thus with the knowledge of the divine being (*Wesenserkenntnis*) of the Trinitarian God, known through Christ in his saving work (*Erlösungswerk*), though one must take the *opus restorationis* more in the broad sense that Hugh of St Victor gave it (...).’ The topic of this investigation falls within a larger question, often dubbed ‘the nature of theology’ and in particular its scientific and sapiential status, much discussed by medieval scholastics and even more by their subsequent commentators and researchers. On this topic, M.-D. Chenu’s classic *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1957) considers the relationship between the *SH* and Aquinas on the issue of the scientific character of theology, but does not treat the particular comparison pursued here; the case is similar with Adriano Oliva, *Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra doctrina* (Paris: Vrin, 2006).

19 See *SH* I (n. 15), p. 25. Alexander himself stressed this point in his *Disputed Questions*: ‘sed ad comprehendendum Trinitatem vel incarnationem nullus potuit per operationem aliquam pervenire sine gratia; ratio enim habet ad hoc posse’ [but for the comprehending of the Trinity or the Incarnation, no one can arrive [at cognition] through some [divine] operation without grace; for reason does not have the power for this] (Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae “Antequam esset frater”* 13.17, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:167).

20 *SH* I (n. 10), p. 19: ‘Respondeo, secundum Glossam, quod “cognitionem ipsius Trinitatis per propria ipsarum personarum non habuerunt nec habere potuerunt, nisi per doctrinam aut inspirationem (...)”.’

This is no wonder, since, as Aristotle says, in the *First Philosophy*: “Our intellect is related to the most evident things of nature as the eye of an owl [is related] to the sun.”^{21/22}

Historical Context: *Status quaestionis*

The trinitarian theology articulated in the medieval schools, especially at Paris between 1250 and 1300, has received significant scholarly attention in recent decades;²³ the preceding developments, however—those occurring between the mid 12th century (after the Lombard’s *Sentences* and Richard of St Victor’s *De trinitate*) and mid 13th century (before Aquinas and Bonaventure)—remain understudied.²⁴ Broadly speak-

21 *SH I* (n. 10), p. 19: ‘Respondeo quod per naturalem rationem de se non potest haberi cognitio Trinitatis secundum propria; tamen per naturalem rationem, adiutam per aliquam gratiam aut gratis datam aut gratum facientem, potest. Et ratio huius est: quia intellectus noster, obtenebratus per originalem corruptionem, deficit in iis quae verissime sunt; et ideo circa maxime intelligibilia deficit et etiam de iis quae minime sunt et ideo minime intelligibilia sunt—sicut est esse motus et temporis, quae habent debilissimum esse—quemadmodum sensus deficit in extremis, id est maxime sensibilibus et minime. Hinc est: cum esse divinarum personarum in unitate essentiae sit maxime et verissime, intellectus noster obtenebratus deficit. Nec hoc est mirum, quia, sicut dicit Aristoteles, in *Prima Philosophia*: “Intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima naturae sicut oculus noctuae ad solem”.’

22 Again: *SH I* (n. 21), p. 32: ‘Sicut enim visus noster deficit in maxime lucidis et minime, ita intellectus in maxime lucidis, ut in cognitione Trinitatis, propter immensitatem luminis; similiter deficit in minimis, scilicet in tempore et motu’ [For just as our sight fails in the greatest and in the least light, so the intellect in the maximum of light, as in the cognition of the Trinity, on account of the immensity of light; similarly it fails in the smallest things, as in time and motion].

23 See most recently J.T. Paasch, *Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

24 Theodore de Régnon, *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, 4 vols (Paris: Victor Retaux, 1892–8); Albert Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura: Eine systematische Darstellung und historische Würdigung*, vol. 1, *Die wissenschaftliche Trinitätslehre* (Münster: Aschendorff-Verlag, 1923); Michael Schmaus, *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Angelicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, vol. 2, *Die Trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930); Fanny Imle and Julien Kaup, *Die Theologie des hl. Bonaventura: Darstellung seiner dogmatischen Lehren* (Werl: Franziskus-Druckerei, 1931); Alejandro de Villalmonste, ‘Influjo de los PP. Griegos en la doctrina trinitaria de San Buenaventura,’ in *XIII Semana Española de Teología*, 14–19 Septiembre 1953 (Madrid, 1954), 553–7; Titus Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in Creaturis Refulgente: Doctrina S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, 1959); Olegario González, *Misterio Trinitario y existencia humana: estudio histórico teológico en torno a San Buenaventura* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1966); Russell L. Friedman, ‘Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325,’ *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999): 13–25; Russell L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*, 2 vols, *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 108 (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Maria Calisi, *Trinitarian Perspectives in the Franciscan Theological Tradition* (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Insti-

ing, following the lead of de Régnon's original thesis in this regard,²⁵ scholarship continues to distinguish two major approaches to the Trinity in the high-scholastic era, both of which draw deeply from the trinitarian theology of Augustine, yet in different ways and with distinct emphases, in part as a function of other non-Augustinian sources, such as Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus, that are incorporated into them: one, associated with Anselm, Peter Lombard, and especially Aquinas and then the Dominican tradition more broadly; the other, initially formulated by Richard of St Victor, enriched by Thomas of St Victor (i.e. Gallus),²⁶ given definitive expression in the writings of St Bonaventure, and subsequently associated with the medieval Franciscan tradition.²⁷

Since de Régnon and until relatively recently, scholarship narrated the provenance of this 'Victorine-Franciscan axis' of medieval trinitarianism as follows: in his mature thought, Richard's innovation was twofold. First, he extended and deepened an initiative begun by his teacher, Hugh of St Victor, of incorporating the Neoplatonism of the 6th-century Dionysian corpus. De Régnon characterized the results of Richard's Dionysian turn quite starkly. In contrast to the dominant Augustinian medieval tradition, which in its later Dominican appropriation operated with a 'static' Aristotelian metaphysic of being (*esse*), Richard introduced a dynamic, Dionysian neoplatonism of the good (*bonum*) into this Victorine tradition. In this account, then, Richard of St Victor was 'a deserter from the camp of Augustine who drank deeply from Greek streams and thus developed a style that was truly competitive to the Augustinian tradition.'²⁸ As Zachary Hayes pointed out, this narrative profoundly shaped historiography for nearly a century, including the work of Stohr, Schmaus, Imle-Kaup, Villalmonete, and Szabó, 'even influencing the Quaracchi-editors of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*'.²⁹ Second, Richard took the 'psychological intuition' of Augustine in a new direction, toward the interpersonal and moral, wherein the primary orientation seems to be not through the analysis of human cognitional experience, but through an analysis of the nature of love. As Wilhelm Gössmann put it, where Augustine's focus is on the psychological experience of an individual, Richard sought trinitarian analogies in the psychological experience of interpersonal love. Richard thereby

tute Publications, 2008); Boyd Taylor Coolman, *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 34–7.

25 De Régnon, *Etudes*, 2:448–51. Note that de Régnon had two major claims: one, now largely discredited, about the difference between eastern and western Trinitarian theologies (the former, going from nature/essence to persons, the latter from persons to essence/nature); the other, still intact, regarding the two medieval strands of western trinitarianism.

26 See Coolman, *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus*.

27 Russell L. Friedman distinguishes these two traditions in *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham*, 5–29, describing them as 'relation' and 'emanation' accounts of the Trinity, respectively.

28 Zachary Hayes, 'Introduction,' in *Saint Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Zachary Hayes (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1979), 18–9.

29 Hayes, 'Introduction, 18–9.

chose an element that was marginal in Augustine and placed it in the center of his own thought.³⁰

More recently, however, the work of Olegario González and Dumeige drastically revised this narrative, arguing that Richard was not in fact significantly influenced by the Dionysian corpus, and that his predilection for the Dionysian notion of the good was less central than previously assumed, since it is subsumed into the more dominating idea of love or charity, analyzed psychologically and experientially, and that whatever the role of the good is, its presence can be sufficiently explained in relation to his Latin sources, Augustine and Anselm.

But this development has generated new questions. First, if Richard is not the source of Bonaventure's appropriation of Dionysianism into his Trinitarian theology, is there another intervening source? I have suggested elsewhere that Thomas Gallus must be considered a possibility in this regard, but that is uncertain. Second, if Richard does not himself produce a synthesis of Victorine and Dionysian thought, as clearly occurs in Bonaventure, where the Victorine terminology is animated and conditioned by the Dionysian dynamics of fecundity, does that synthesis have an intervening precedent? The most obvious and plausible answer to both of these questions is Bonaventure's teacher, Alexander of Hales. Both his undisputed works and the *SH* make extensive use of both Dionysius and Richard. Many of the Dionysian notions that will figure centrally in Bonaventure, moreover, including fontality, fecundity,³¹ the good as self-diffusive (*bonum diffusivum sui*) and divine love as an eternal circle, are found in these texts. At the same time, the *SH* cites Richard's Trinitarian theology extensively. Yet, earlier scholarship, especially that of Zachary Hayes, has tended to minimize the importance of this Halensian moment, suggesting that none of the 'Alexandrian works' develops these ideas to any great extent. Hayes concedes Bonaventure's dependence on Alexander, but argues that Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology 'transcends that of the *Summa* [*Halensis*] in unity and coherence of thought', and 'bears the mark of a single, keen mind that has appropriated the tradition in a personal way'.³² The scholarly consensus, then, is as follows: in the early 13th century a distinctive style of Trinitarian theology emerged, whose primary author was Bonaventure, who created a 'highly personal synthesis' (Hayes) out of a variety of elements, including the theology of St Augustine, the Dionysian and Victorine traditions, the religious experience of St Francis, and the philosophy of Aristotle.³³ But does this narrative do justice to the pre-Bonaventurean

30 W.E. Gössmann, 'Die Methode der Trinitätslehre in der Summa Halensis,' *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 6 (1955): 256; cited in Hayes, 'Introduction,' 15, n. 6.

31 See *SH* I (no. 481), pp. 683–4. But they may also come from William of Auxerre. See the William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* I, tr. 8, c. 5, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribaillier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 1:134–40.

32 Hayes, 'Introduction,' 21–3.

33 Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, 188–9: 'Certainly Bonaventura faithfully traced many, many individual features of the African father's masterpiece. I only recall the doctrine of ves-

Franciscan achievement, especially that found in the *SH*? Only a comprehensive and careful treatment of that text can answer that question.

Trinitarian Unity: Inquiry I—‘On the Substance of the Divine Unity’

The interpreter of Halensian Trinitarian theology faces a dilemma. She might be tempted to turn directly to the *SH*’s explicit treatment of the three persons, skipping over the discussion of the one essence; to leap, that is, over the *de Deo uno* (Inquiry I—‘On the Substance of the Divine Unity’) to get to the *de Deo trino* (Inquiry 2—‘On the Plurality of the Divine Trinity’).³⁴ Though tempting, this would risk missing a crucial and distinctive part of the *SH*’s comprehensive trinitarianism. Strikingly, the *SH*’s treatment of the essential divine attributes has an unmistakable trinitarian stamp and is thus integral to the *SH*’s Trinitarian theology.

Inquiry 1, ‘On the Substance of the Divine Unity’, begins with two treatises that consider the essential attributes of immutability and simplicity (Treatise 1) and divine immensity (Treatise 2), the latter an important Halensian innovation.³⁵ The third tractate, though, treats the triad of unity, truth, goodness as a unit, while the remaining three treatises (Treatises 4 to 6) consider a second triad, namely, power, knowledge, and will. These two triads are quite clearly trinitarian units for the *SH* and they reflect the fact, put bluntly, that the *SH*’s account of the divine essence is Trinitarian. How? In a word: by the use of Trinitarian appropriations.³⁶

tigium and *imago*, of the son as *verbum* and *imago*, of the Holy Spirit as *Amor* and *Donum*, of *missio* and *appropriatio*. But at certain points, and indeed at the foci of his work, Bonaventura’s work shows a very different character. It is a bend, no break is visible. This is where the influence of Richard comes in, which perhaps just because of this, could take up so little space, because there is a certain spiritual affinity between Augustine and Neoplatonism, which is effective in Dionysius. From this source originate all, more or less as variations of the Dionysian *bonum diffusivum sui* to be judged “proofs” for the Trinity, the idea of *primitas*, *condignus* and *condilectus*, *amor gratuitus*, *debitus* and *mixtus*. The mediators of these rich goods are our Saints William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales.’

³⁴ Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 163–82.

³⁵ Cf. Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, 163–82. But see Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 3, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 1:68–77, for perhaps the deep source of the introduction of divine eternity/infinity into the discussion of the divine attributes.

³⁶ Trinitarian appropriations *associate* certain essential divine attributes, which are shared by all three persons, with one of the Persons, in order to foster certain theological insights, especially about the Trinity’s activity, *tout court*, in salvation history. An appropriation is *not* a unique, proper attribute of a divine person *ad intra*, but an attribute of divine activity *ad extra*, linked to one of the Persons.

At the very outset of Treatise 3, the Halensist indicates explicitly that divine unity, truth, and goodness are three essential attributes not lumped together haphazardly, but rather conceived of as an integrated triad, having a particular ordering among them: ‘coordinated one to another’.³⁷ An initial analysis of the one, true, and good in all created things shows how these three notions—the ‘transcendentals’ in modern parlance—build upon each other, beginning with the one, and proceeding through the true, to arrive at the good. The treatise continues by next linking these three transcendentals to the three non-material Aristotelian causes: ‘those intentions [one, true, good] also differ according to their relation to their cause, namely: “one” in the *ratio* of the efficient cause, “truth” in the *ratio* of the formal [cause], “goodness” in the *ratio* of the final cause.’³⁸

This link between these three divine attributes and the three Aristotelian causes produces a particular triadic ‘watermark’ on all of created reality: ‘for this reason, *esse* in creatures, which flows from a cause, receives a threefold impression, in conformity to its cause.’³⁹ As one, true, and good, created being has a threefold transcendental structure that reflects its Uncreated Source: ‘These intentions thus are not separate from the essence of a thing, as a vestige of the first cause, which is the Trinity of one essence.’⁴⁰ Later, the text will correlate the one-true-good triad with a threefold *vestigial Dei* in all of creation, on one hand, and the power-knowledge/wisdom-will triad with the *imago Dei* in all rational creatures, on the other:

in God there is a certain triad, which shines forth and is represented in every creature, and in this way a creature is called a *vestige*, and this is noted in three ways: one, true, good. There is another [triad] in which the rational creature abounds, by reason of which it is called the *image* of God, which shines forth alone in it, and is noted in relation to these: power, wisdom, and will (...).⁴¹

37 *SH* I, Prologue to Tractate 3, p. 112: ‘sunt unius coordinationis’. Note that the *SH* does not predicate one, true, and good of both created and uncreated being in a univocal way, but rather insists on their analogical relation. See *SH* I (n. 21), p. 32: ‘Dicendum ergo quod non est convenientia Dei et creaturae secundum univocationem, sed per analogiam: ut si dicatur bonum de Deo et de creatura, de Deo dicitur per naturam, de creatura per participationem. Similiter omne bonum de Deo et de creatura dicitur secundum analogiam’ [Therefore, it should be said that, univocally speaking, there is no *convenientia* between God and creatures, but only through analogy, such that if good were predicated of God and creatures it is said of God by nature (*per naturam*) and of creatures by participation (*per participationem*). Similarly, every good [predicated] of God and of creatures is said according to analogy].

38 *SH* I (n. 88), p. 140: ‘differunt intentiones istae secundum relationem ad causam, quae est: ‘unum’, principium in ratione efficientis, ‘veritas’ in ratione formalis, ‘bonitas’ in ratione causae finalis.’

39 *SH* I (n. 73), p. 115: ‘Secundum hoc, esse in creatura, quod fluit a causa, triplicem sortitur impressionem, ut in conformatione ad causam.’

40 *SH* I (n. 88), p. 140: ‘Istae ergo intentiones non separantur ab essentia rei velut vestigia primae causae, quae est Trinitas unius essentiae.’

41 *SH* I (n. 110), p. 172: ‘Dicendum quod in Deo quaedam est trinitas, quae relucet et repraesentatur in omni creatura, et secundum hoc dicitur vestigium, et haec attenditur secundum haec tria: unum,

The *SH* thus conceives of all of created reality, as well as the divine essence itself, in this triadic way.

Throughout this transcendental analysis of creation and of the causality that created it, the *SH* consistently observes that these triads ‘are appropriated to the Trinity’.⁴² As here: ‘(...) truth (...) is appropriated to the Son, just as unity [is] to the Father (*unitas Patri*) and goodness to the Holy Spirit (*bonitas Spiritui Sancto*) (...)’.⁴³ And here: ‘this causality, since it is common to the whole Trinity, is *appropriated* as the efficient cause to the Father, exemplar cause to the Son, final [cause] to the Holy Spirit.’⁴⁴

Similarly, the Halensist executes a trinitarian appropriation with the three essential attributes treated in Treatises 4 to 6: ‘power to the Father (Treatise 4), wisdom to the Son (Treatise 5), and will or *benignitas* to the Holy Spirit (Treatise 6).’⁴⁵ In these three treatises, the Halensist focuses specifically on divine action in the history of creation and salvation. All of the one God’s acts in the economy are powerful, wise, and good; yet each of these attributes common to the essence is aligned or associated with one of the Persons.

Recalling that the entire First Inquiry, which treats the divine essence as such, entails just these six treatises, it is abundantly clear the discussion of the divine essence ‘already performs trinitarian theology’.⁴⁶ Schematically, beginning with the divine persons and the divine nature, and then, ‘descending’, as it were, through divine causality, into all of creation and into the rational creature, this comprehensive trinitarianism appears thus:

verum, bonum. Alia est in qua abundat ipsa rationalis creatura, ratione cuius dicitur imago, quae solum relucet in ipsa et attenditur penes ista: potentia, sapientia et voluntas; in rationali enim creatura dicimus potentiam volendi et potentiam diligendi. Cum igitur processus creaturarum respiciat omnem creaturam et non solum rationalem, constat quod non debet determinari ratio processus penes istam trinitatem in qua abundat creatura rationalis, sed potius penes primam’ [(...) for in rational creatures we refer to the power of willing and the power of loving/choosing. Since therefore the procession of creatures [from God] pertains to every creature and not only to the rational creature, it is clear that the *ratio* of the procession ought not be defined according to that triad in which the rational creature abounds, but rather according to the first triad].

⁴² *SH* I (n. 88), p. 140: ‘appropriantur Trinitati’.

⁴³ *SH* I (n. 89), pp. 143–4: ‘Alia vero de veritate increata secundum quod accipitur personaliter et appropriatur Filio, sicut unitas Patri et bonitas Spiritui Sancto (...).’

⁴⁴ *SH* I (n. 73), p. 115: ‘Quae quidem causalitas, cum sit communis toti Trinitati, appropriatur ut causa efficiens Patri, exemplaris Filio, finalis Spiritui Sancto.’

⁴⁵ *SH* I (n. 450), p. 646: ‘Ratio appropriationis potentiae Patri, sapientiae Filio, voluntatis Spiritui Sancto, sive benignitatis, facta est duplici ratione (...).’

⁴⁶ Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 78.

1. Divine <i>Persons</i> :	Father	Son	Holy Spirit
2. Divine <i>Nature</i> :	One	True	Good
3. Causal triad:	Efficient	Formal	Final
4. Transcendental triad:	Unity	Truth	Goodness
5. Agential triad:	Power	Wisdom	Will

In sum, by a thoroughgoing application of the ancient practice of trinitarian appropriations, revived in the high Middle Ages, especially within the Victorine tradition,⁴⁷ the *SH* offers an explicitly trinitarian account of the divine nature itself.⁴⁸ At the same time, evincing the above-noted ‘comprehensive trinitarianism’, it also espies a trinitarian ‘signature’ on divine action *ad extra*, on divine causality, on the transcendental properties of being,⁴⁹ and on the soul, even on the definition of created beauty.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ In *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* 1.2.22, Hugh of St Victor used the triad of power, wisdom, goodness, analogously, as a set of properties of all reality, essentially as transcendentals: ‘These [power-wisdom-goodness] are the eternal foundations of all causes and the first principles, which are ineffable and incomprehensible to every creature’ (PL 176:216C; *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De Sacramentis)*, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Eugene, Oregon, Wipf & Stock, 2007), 41).

⁴⁸ Cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.6.2, trans. Dominic V. Monti, *Works of St Bonaventure*, 9 (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2005), 45–6: ‘Since the First Principle is most exalted and utterly perfect, it follows that in it are found the most noble and most general properties of being (*conditiones entis*) to the highest degree. These are one, true, and good, which are not associated with being in its individuals (*supposita*) but with its very principle (*ratio*). (...) This triple indivisibility has a logical ordering in that the true presupposes the one, and the good presupposes the one as well as the true. Thus it follows that these three properties, as being perfect and transcendental, are attributed to the First Principle to the highest degree, and, as having an orderly reference, are attributed to the three persons. It follows then, that supreme oneness is attributed to the Father; supreme truth, to the Son, who proceeds from the Father as his Word; and supreme goodness, to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from both as their Love and Gift.’

⁴⁹ This Trinitarian account of the transcendentals seems to be a unique feature of the EFIT. As Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 88, notes: ‘Conceiving transcendentals as trinitarian appropriations remains mostly distinctive to the *Summa halensis*. It is absent the *Summa*’s predecessors (William of Auvergne, William of Auxerre), contemporaries (Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great), and many of its inheritors alike—Bonaventure excepted.’ As for Thomas Aquinas, Norman Kretzmann comments: ‘I have not found Aquinas himself ever presenting or developing this trio of appropriated attributes unmistakably in his own voice.’ See Norman Kretzmann, ‘Trinity and Transcendentals,’ in *Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays*, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 91.

⁵⁰ For the Halensist, beauty is best defined as the ‘sacred order’ (*ordo sacer*) among the divine persons and among their appropriations (cf. Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 97–101).

Unified Plurality: Inquiry 2—‘On the Plurality of the Divine Trinity’

The Second Inquiry into what is to be *believed in the heart* about God turns to divine plurality—‘the divine being is a unity existing in a plurality of persons.’⁵¹ Over the course of five questions, the *SH* treats the plurality, the truth, the number, order, and equality of the Persons, respectively. Here, it considers the generation of the Son from the Father, and the procession of the Spirit from both. Here too it both examines the very basis/*ratio* of plurality in the divine nature, namely, goodness and offers a specific account of the very constitution of the persons. In both of these, the *SH* pioneers avenues in Trinitarian theology that will be influential in the next generation of scholastic masters, and beyond.

Arguments for Divine Plurality

Already in the discussion of divine unity in Treatise 4 of the First Inquiry, the *SH* anticipated the issue of divine plurality, offering two arguments for why there must be plurality in God:

Let the self-evident (*per se nota*) proposition be supposed that the divine *esse* is the exemplar of all created *esse*;⁵² let another self-evident proposition be supposed, namely, that unity cannot be the cause of multitude, unless repetition is understood (*intelligatur repetita*) [in that unity];⁵³ again, let another be supposed, namely, that the divine *esse* is one in nature.⁵⁴ From all this, the following is asserted: in created *esse* there is a difference between one and many; therefore the divine *esse* is the exemplar of one and of many, which is clear from the first supposition; but the divine *esse* is unity, which is clear from the third supposition; therefore the divine *esse* is the united exemplar of the one and of the many; but unity is not the exemplar of many, unless repetition is understood [there], as is clear from the second supposition; it follows therefore that the divine *esse* is a repetitive unity; but there is no repetition in any plurality of natures (*aliquibus pluribus naturis*); it remains then that there is repetition in some plurality of persons.⁵⁵

51 *SH* (n. 81), p. 132: ‘(...) quod divinum esse est unitas existens in pluralitate personali.’

52 Cf. *SH* I (n. 80), p. 130.

53 Cf. *SH* I (n. 76), p. 120.

54 Cf. *SH* I (n. 77), p. 124.

55 *SH* I (n. 81), p. 132: ‘Supposita propositione per se nota, scilicet quod divinum esse est exemplar omnis esse creati; item, supposita alia propositione per se nota, quod unitas non potest esse causa multitudinis, nisi intelligatur repetita; item, supposita alia, scilicet quod divinum esse est unum in natura, ex iis arguitur: in esse creato est differentia unius et multorum; ergo divinum esse est exemplar unius et multorum, quod patet per primam propositionem; sed divinum esse est unitas, quod patet per tertiam propositionem; ergo divinum esse est unitas exemplaris unius et multorum; sed unitas non est exemplar multitudinis, nisi intelligatur repetita, sicut patet per secundam propositionem; relinquatur ergo quod divinum esse est unitas repetita; sed non est repetita in aliquibus pluribus naturis; relinquatur ergo quod est repetita in aliquibus pluribus personis.’

In effect, the *SH* claims here that the classical problem of ‘the one and the many’ can only be solved if there is plurality in the uncreated Cause that corresponds to the created many. Since that plurality cannot be essential, it must therefore be personal.

While this first argument invokes the force of rational necessity, the second appeals more to a sense of fittingness (*convenientia*):⁵⁶

Likewise, this is clear from the connection of the perfection of the universe (*connexionem perfectionis universi*). There exists [diverse] natures of several persons, as is clear in the example of one human and one angel; there also exists a plurality of natures in one person, as is clear in one human [possessing body and soul]. If therefore there are two extremes in the nature of things, it also [should be] accepted that there is one [reality] in the middle, which similarly by necessity is understood between the extremes, namely one nature of a plurality of persons; but such is not found in created *esse*; it remains therefore that it exists in the divine *esse*.⁵⁷

This appeal to the symmetry and balance of perfection is redolent of the Victorine-Franciscan tradition, at least as it extends through Bonaventure.

Metaphysics of the Good, *ad intra*

Whatever the force of these arguments, when the *SH* turns to explaining *why* (not just *that*) there is indeed plurality in God, it turns to the concept of goodness.⁵⁸ Tracing a particular genealogy will afford insight into how the notion of goodness functions in the *SH*. From Augustine and the Damascene, comes first of all a basic (neoplatonic) notion of God as good; from the Dionysian corpus comes the principle of the good as by nature *diffusivum sui*, as self-diffusive. From Richard of St Victor, comes the lexical precision of *plenitudo*, of God as the *fullness* of good; from William of Auxerre, comes the notion of good as *perfecta communicatio*, of perfect self-communicating goodness. All these streams merge into the *SH* with the notion of the *bonum* as flow-

⁵⁶ While for moderns logical necessity and sapiential fittingness are very different kinds of arguments, each with diverse persuasive force, medievals tended to see them much more similarly.

⁵⁷ *SH* I (n. 81), p. 132: ‘Item, hoc patet per connexionem perfectionis universi. Est esse naturas plurium personarum, sicut patet, demonstrato homine uno et angelo uno; et est esse plures naturas unius personae, sicut patet in uno homine. Si ergo duo sunt extrema in rerum natura, et etiam unum medium est accipere quod similiter necessario intelligitur inter extrema; scilicet unam naturam plurium personarum; sed non invenitur in esse creato; relinquitur ergo quod est in esse divino.’

⁵⁸ Indeed, the Quaracchi editors of the *SH* saw fit to devote an extensive discussion of the good in their general introduction to the whole *SH*. See ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologiae,’ in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924), xxxv-xxxviii.

ing, self-diffusive, self-communicative, ecstatic plenitude, and of the *summum bonum* as maximally and perfectly such.⁵⁹

The explication of divine goodness occurs on two fronts, *ad intra* and *ad extra*, i. e. within the divine life itself and externally in relation to creation. While the focus here is the former, it is important to note that the very possibility of the latter is itself a function of foundational role of divine goodness *ad intra*. Only because God is good in this way, as ecstatic self-diffusive plenitude *in se*, is there anything other than God *ex se*: ‘the manifestation of divine goodness in the highest way is twofold: with respect to the magnitude of power or with respect to multiplicity.’⁶⁰ The first is *ad intra*; the second, *ad extra*.⁶¹

Ad intra, goodness explains divine plurality in a general way thus:

For the praise of the good and of its perfection is shown in communication, but communication is always of one to another, and so where there is communion, there is always one and another, and so multiplication and number. So, the highest good is as the principal cause of that multiplication in God.⁶²

More precisely, since goodness is common to both nature and will,

just as there is a twofold principle, one which is nature, the other which is will, so there will be goodness in two modes, since there is the good of nature and the good of will (...) Thus good-

59 W.E. Gössmann, ‘Die Methode der Trinitätslehre in der Summa Halensis,’ 258: ‘As with Richard, in the *Summa Halensis* the concept of *summum bonum* is the basis for the derivation of the three persons in God.’

60 *SH I* (n. 64), p. 96: ‘(...) manifestatio bonitatis divinae in summo potest esse dupliciter: quoad magnitudinem potentiae aut quoad multiplicationem. Quoad magnitudinem manifestavit se summa bonitas in generatione Filii a Patre et processione Spiritus Sancti ab utroque ab aeterno. Nulla autem maior potest cogitari potentia quam ut ex Patre generetur Filius per omnia aequalis et consubstantialis. Quantum vero ad multiplicationem potentiae ostendendae in creaturis multis, non potuit esse manifestatio ab aeterno’ [(...) With regard to magnitude, the highest goodness manifests itself in the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both from eternity. It is impossible to conceive of a greater power than that a Son equal and consubstantial in every way is generated from the Father. With respect to multiplication of demonstrated power in many creatures, there cannot be an eternal manifestation].

61 *SH I* (n. 64), p. 96: ‘(...) est influentia bonitatis intrinseca in emanatio aeterna Filii a Patre et Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio; (...) est influentia extrinseca, ut in emanatione creaturarum a Creatore, quae sunt in diversitate substantiae, et ad hanc influentiam, si ponatur non fuisse et postea esse, non sequitur mutatio ex parte bonitatis’ [there is an intrinsic inflow of goodness in the eternal emanation of the Son from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (...); there is an extrinsic inflow, as in the emanation of creatures from the Creator, which are in diversity of substances, and with respect to this inflow, if it started or stopped, it would not imply a change on the part of the good].

62 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 465: ‘(...) quia laus boni et eius perfectio ostenditur in communicatione, sed communicatio semper est unius ad alium, et ideo ubi est communio, semper est alius et alius, et ita multiplicatio et numerus, et bonitas summa est quasi principalis causa istius multiplicationis in divinis.’

ness communicates itself either through the mode of nature or through the mode of will⁶³ and affection.⁶⁴

The communication of goodness ‘through the mode of nature is full and perfect through generation,’ so ‘this communion of goodness is the *ratio* of distinction or of number in that determinate distinction which is of the Father to the Son.’⁶⁵ The communication of goodness ‘through the mode of will (...) is through the *affectus* of love or charity,’ so ‘this communion of the highest good is the *ratio* of number in the determinate distinction which is of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit.’⁶⁶ In short, ‘the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of number [in God] is taken from the part of the perfection of the highest good’⁶⁷—‘to the praise of goodness!’⁶⁸ Apart from

63 Kevin Patrick Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness in the Trinitarian Theory of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*’ (PhD thesis, Fordham University, 1978), 97 notes the Aristotelian vintage of this distinction.

64 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 465: ‘(...) sicut est duplex principium, unum quod est natura, alterum quod est voluntas, sic bonitas duobus modis erit, quia est bonitas naturae et bonitas voluntatis (...). Communicat ergo se bonitas vel per modum naturae vel per modum voluntatis sive affectionis.’

65 *SH I* (n. 317), pp. 465–6: ‘Communicatio bonitatis, quae est per modum naturae, illa plena est et perfecta per generationem; quod tamen sit de parte substantiae vel essentiae et non de tota essentia, istud imperfectionis est in natura. Quia ergo omnis imperfectio a bonitate summa removenda est et omnis ei perfectio tribuenda, ideo necessarium est quod communicet se per modum naturae, quae communio est per generationem, et quod illa generatio non sit de parte essentiae, sed de tota essentia: et haec communio bonitatis est ratio distinctionis sive numeri in distinctione determinata, quae est Patris ad Filium’ [The communication of goodness through the mode of nature is full and perfect through generation; since nevertheless it is of part of the substance or essence and not of the whole essence that is imperfect in nature. Since therefore every imperfection should be removed from the highest good and every perfection should be attributed to it, it is necessary therefore that it communicate itself through the mode of nature, which communion is through generation, and that that generation not be partial, but of the whole essence: and this communion of goodness is the reason for distinction or for number in the determinate distinction which is of the Father to the Son].

66 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 466: ‘Sed sicut communicat se bonitas per modum naturae, ita per modum voluntatis, quia summi boni summa est communio; non esset autem summa nisi communicaret se per modum naturae et voluntatis; et ideo communicat se per modum voluntatis, quae communio est per amoris affectum sive caritatem; et haec communio summi boni est ratio numeri in distinctione determinata, quae est Patris et Filii ad Spiritum Sanctum’ [But just as goodness communicates itself through the mode of nature, so [it does] through the mode of will, since the highest communion belongs to the highest good; but there would not be the highest unless it communicated itself through the mode of nature and of will; therefore it communicates itself through the mode of will, which communion is through the affect of love or charity; and this communion of the highest good is the reason for the plurality in the determinate distinction which is of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit].

67 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 466: ‘Ratio ergo numeri sumitur ex parte perfectionis summae bonitatis; sed communio totius essentiae per generationem, cum essentia non habeat partem, est ratio numeri Patris ad Filium, communio per naturam voluntatis ratio numeri et distinctionis Spiritus Sancti ab utroque’ [The reason for plurality, therefore, is drawn from the perfection of the highest goodness; but the communion of the whole essence through generation, since the essence does not have parts, is

such perfect and complete self-diffusion of the good *ad intra*, God would not be the *summum bonum*.⁶⁹

In the tradition of Anselm and especially Richard, all this has the force of a kind of self-evident necessity for the *SH*.^{70/71} In fact, discussing elsewhere the procession

the reason for the plurality of the Father to the Son; communion through the nature of the will is the reason for the plurality and distinction of the Holy Spirit from both].

68 *SH* I, (n. 304), p. 438: ‘Duo sunt principia diffusionis in rebus: natura et voluntas. Perfectissima autem diffusio naturae est illa quae est per generationem, perfectissima diffusio voluntatis est illa quae est per amorem sive per dilectionem: et haec est laus bonitatis in rebus; magis autem laudabile est bonum quod diffundit se secundum utrumque modum quam quod diffundit se secundum alterum tantum. Si ergo quod est laudabile et perfectum non potest deesse in summo bono: est igitur in summo bono, quod est Deus, diffusio generationis, quam consequitur differentia gignentis et geniti, Patris et Filii, et erit ibi diffusio per modum dilectionis, quam dicimus processionem Spiritus Sancti’ [There are two principles of diffusion in things: nature and will. The most perfect diffusion of nature is that which is through generation, the most perfect diffusion of will is that which is through love or affection: and this is the praise of goodness in things; but more praiseworthy is that good which diffuses itself in both modes than that which diffuses itself in only one. If therefore that which is praiseworthy and perfect cannot be absent from the highest good, there exists then in the highest good, which is God, a diffusion of generation, which follows the difference of the one begetting and the one begotten, of the Father and the Son, and there will be a diffusion through the mode of affection, which we call the procession of the Holy Spirit].

69 See *SH* I (n. 295), p. 415 and *SH* I (n. 270), p. 365: ‘in Deo sunt actus aeterni, ut generare et huiusmodi, sine quibus non est summa bonitas’ [in God are eternal acts, such as to generate and the like, without which there is not the highest goodness].

70 *SH* I (n. 76), p. 121: ‘Supposita hac propositione per se nota, quod esse divinum est summum et perfectum bonum; item supposito quod perfectio boni consistit in communione, tertia suppositio est quod communio non est eiusdem ad se, sed unius ad alterum. Ex iis necessario relinquitur quod ponenda est pluralitas in esse divino: quia ubicumque est ponere communionem boni unius ad alterum, necesse est ponere pluralitatem, quia ibi est ponere alterum et alterum vel alium et alium; sed in Deo est ponere summum bonum, sicut patet per primam propositionem, et communionem boni, sicut patet per secundam, quia aliter non esset bonum perfectum, et unius ad alterum, sicut patet per tertiam; ergo in esse divino est ponere pluralitatem’ [This supposes a self-evident proposition, that the divine *esse* is the highest and perfect good; likewise the supposition that the perfection of the good consists in communion, and a third supposition: that communion is not of one person with itself, but of one person with another person. From this it follows necessarily that plurality is to be posited in the divine *esse*: because wherever a communion of the good of one with another is posited, plurality is necessarily posited, since that is to posit one and another or one and another; but the highest good is posited in God, as is clear from the first proposition, and the communion of the good, from the second proposition, since otherwise it would not be the perfect good, and of one with another, as is clear from the third proposition; therefore plurality is posited in the divine *esse*]. Cf. *SH* I (n. 295), p. 414.

71 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi: “communio boni non potest nisi duobus modis esse, scilicet vel per modum naturae—et haec est generatio vel productio generati a generante—vel per modum voluntatis—et haec est processio amoris ab amante”—necessario sequitur quod in divinis habentur tum generatio Filii, tum spiratio Spiritus Sancti’ [But since “the communion of the good can only be in two modes, namely, through the mode of nature—and this is the generation or production of the one generated from the one generating—or through the mode of will—and this is the procession of love from the beloved”—it follows necessarily that in divine things there is had as

of the Spirit from the Father *and* the Son, the *SH* invokes each of Richard's interpersonal (less precisely, 'social') arguments for why there *must* be no more and no less than three divine Persons: perfect love,⁷² generosity,⁷³ hospitality,⁷⁴ pleasure,⁷⁵ be-

much as generation of the Son, as a spiration of the Holy Spirit]. See *SH* I (nn. 304–12), pp. 438–53; *SH* I (nn. 317–20), pp. 465–70. See also *SH* I (n. 319), p. 469: 'communio boni non possit nisi duobus modis esse, scilicet vel per modum naturae—et haec est generatio vel productio generati a generante—vel per modum voluntatis—et haec est processio amoris ab amante (...)' [The communion of good can only be in two modes, namely, through the mode of nature—and this is generation or production of one generated from one who is generating—or through the mode of will—and this is the procession of love from one who is loving (...)].

72 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: 'Sed communis est conceptio animi quod illud quod laudabilius est summo bonotribuendum est; ergo necesse est ponere, quod summum bonum diligit alium sicut se et velit illum diligi ab alio sicut se; sed hoc non potest esse in paucioribus quam in tribus personis; ergo sunt tres personae; ergo Spiritus Sanctus est; sed non habet esse nisi procedendo; ergo processio eius est' [But there is a common conception of the soul that what is most praiseworthy in the highest good must be shared; therefore, it is necessary to posit that the highest good loves another as itself and wishes him to be loved by another as himself; but this cannot be in fewer than in three persons; thus there are three persons; therefore there is a Holy Spirit; but he is not considered to be except by proceeding; therefore there is his procession]. *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: "'(...) Summe ergo dilectorum summeque diligendorum", scilicet Patris et Filii, "uterque oportet quod pari voto condilectum requiratur, pari concordia pro voto possideatur" ["(...) Therefore it is required that the one who most highly loves and the one who is most highly loved", namely, the Father and the Son, "seek out one who is co-beloved, who is loved mutually by both (*condilectum*) with an equal will and possess such a one with an equal concord"]].

73 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, Richardus de S. Victore, in libro *De Trinitate*: "Sicut in summa caritate non potest deesse quod maximum est, sic nec deesse poterit quod constat esse praecipuum. Praecipuum autem videtur esse in vera caritate alterum velle diligi ut se: in mutuo siquidem amore multumque fervente nihil praeclarius quam ut ab eo, quem summe diligis et a quo summe diligeris, alium aeque diligi velis; probatio itaque consummatae dilectionis est votiva communio exhibitae sibi dilectionis". Ex hoc igitur relinquitur quod cum summa sive maxima caritas probet dualitatem personarum, quod praecipua caritas probet Trinitatem personarum' [Again, Richard of St Victor, in his book *On the Trinity*, says: "Just as in the highest love whatever is greatest cannot be absent, so it is clear that whatever is preeminent will not be able to be absent. However, the preeminent seems to be the willing, in true love, that another be loved as itself: in mutual and fervent love, however, [there is] nothing more excellent than that one should will that another be loved equally by the one whom you most highly love and by whom you are most highly loved; and thus the proof of consummate love is the willing communion in the love that has been shown to oneself." From this, therefore, it is admitted that since the highest or greatest love evinces a duality of persons, that most preeminent love evinces a Trinity of persons].

74 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, Richardus de S. Victore, in eodem: "Signum magnae infirmitatis est non posse pati consortium amoris, posse vero pati magnae perfectionis; maius est gratanter suscipere; maximum autem ex desiderio requirere". Si enim magnum est pati posse, maius est gratanter suscipere, maximum autem ex desiderio requirere, "hinc manifesta ratione colligitur quod praecipuus gradus caritatis et eo ipso plenitudo bonitatis esse non possit, ubi voluntatis vel facultatis defectus dilectionis consortium praecipuique gaudii communionem excludit. Summe ergo dilectorum summeque diligendorum", scilicet Patris et Filii, "uterque oportet quod pari voto condilectum requiratur, pari concordia pro voto possideatur" [Richard of St Victor says: "A sign of great infirmity is the inability to endure a sharing of love, but [a sign] of great perfection is the ability to endure [this]; it is

nevolence,⁷⁶ joy.⁷⁷ For Richard, and for the Halensist following him, all these arguments are simply logical entailments from the *Grund-axiom* that God is the fullness of goodness. From Stohr's perspective, precisely here the *SH* performs the influential synthesis of Richard and Dionysius as the foundation for Bonaventure.⁷⁸

even greater to accept [it] with joy, [it is] greatest, however, to seek [such sharing] with desire." If, indeed, it is great to be able to endure [it], greater to accept it with joy, but greatest to seek for it with desire, "from this it is inferred by clear reason that the preeminent level of love cannot also be by itself the fullness of goodness, where a defect of the faculty or will excludes a fellowship of love and a sharing of preeminent joy. Therefore it is required that the one who most highly loves and the one who is most highly loved", namely, the Father and the Son, "seek out one who is co-beloved, who is loved mutually by both with an equal will and possess such a one with an equal concord"].

75 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, idem, in eodem: "Dilectionis dulcedine nihil iucundius invenitur, nihil in quo animus amplius delectetur. Huiusmodi autem delicias solus possidet qui in exhibita sibi dilectione socium et condilectum habet. Communio itaque amoris non potest esse in minus quam in tribus personis; nihil autem gloriosius, nihil magnificentius quam quod habes utile et dulce in commune deducere'" ["Nothing can be found more pleasant than the sweetness of love, nothing in which the soul might take more delight. The only one who possesses pleasure of this kind, however, is the one who has a sharer or co-beloved in the love that has been shown to himself. And so a communion of love cannot exist in less than three persons; nothing, however, is more glorious, nothing more magnificent than to share in common what you possess usefully and sweetly"].

76 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, idem, in eodem: "Notandum in divinis illis personis quod perfectio unius exigit adiunctionem alterius et consequenter in geminis perfectio utriusque requirit cohaerentiam tertiae". Nam cum "in alterutra persona aequa benevolentia existat, necesse est ut pari voto, ratione consimili, praecipui gaudii sui consortem utraque requirat", videlicet Spiritum Sanctum' ["It must be noted that in those divine persons the perfection of union finds perfection in the addition of another and, so, the perfection in the two requires the coherence of a third." For when "equal benevolence exists in another person, it is necessary that with an equal wish, by similar reason, it requires a fellowship of its preeminent joy," [which is] clearly the Holy Spirit].

77 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 440: 'Item, idem, in eodem: "Quamdiu iste ab alio solus diligitur, praecipuae suae dulcedinis delicias solus possidere videtur; similiter et alius, quamdiu condilectum non habet, praecipui gaudii sui communione caret. Ut autem uterque possit istiusmodi delicias communicare; oportet eos condilectum habere", videlicet Spiritum Sanctum' ["As long as that one alone is loved by another, he alone seems to possess the pleasure of his preeminent sweetness; and similarly another, as long as he does not have a mutual delight, lacks a fellowship of his preeminent joy. However, so that both might be able to communicate the pleasure of this kind, it is necessary that they have a mutual delight", which is clearly the Holy Spirit].

78 Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, 171: 'Alexander pursues the question in the sense of and with reference to Richard and to the Lombard. He became important for Bonaventure in that he moved the question under the perspective of *bonum diffusivum sui*. Cf. *SH* I (n. 330), pp. 485–6. Stohr's reference to the *bonum diffusivum sui*, of course, raises the question of Alexander's relationship to Dionysius, on which Zachary Hayes, 'Bonaventure's Trinitarian Theology,' *A Companion to Bonaventure*, ed. Jay M. Hammond, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and Jared Goff, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 48 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 196 rightly comments: 'This shift in Victorine studies unavoidably raises many new questions about Bonaventure, for it has long been assumed that he was deeply influenced by Richard, and that he imbibed a Dionysian inspiration from the great Victorine. If such an inspiration is lacking in Richard, it is—nonetheless—present in Bonaventure. But from what sources is it derived? And what is the precise nature of the tie between Richard and Bonaventure, if

This observation prompts a further clarification. Some secondary literature suggests that in its Trinitarian theology, the Halensist prefers Richard over Augustine. But this can be very misleading. A more precise observation is this: the *SH* does indeed deploy Ricardian arguments (derived from an interpersonal analogy of human love) in order to understand *that* God is plurified, and *why* plurified triadically; i.e. why there must be three but only three in God. But, as will be elaborated below, when the *SH* seeks to understand *how* God is three, it quite explicitly deploys Augustine's psychological analogy.

The Monarchy of the Father

This account of divine plurality as a function of divine goodness, accordingly, puts particular emphasis upon the person of the Father.⁷⁹ It is the person of the Father who, *ad intra*, is the productive goodness that sources the plurality: 'the fullness of goodness is the reason (...) why the Father generates; and this in as much as that goodness is understood [to be] in the Father, that is, in the person which is not from another, and not in as much as [goodness] is considered in se.'⁸⁰ The Halensist thus distinguishes between the *personal* goodness of the Father and the *essential* goodness of the divine nature: 'the highest good or the divine essence can be considered in two ways: as in itself or as in the person who does not have being from another.'⁸¹

Considered *in se*,

it is considered absolutely and apart from the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of diffusion, since if the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of diffusion were understood in it essentially, it would follow that there would be a diffusion of the substance itself in infinite persons and that there

the latter is fundamentally Dionysian while the former is not? These questions raise the further question of Alexander of Hales in relation both to Richard and Dionysius on the one hand, and to Bonaventure on the other.'

⁷⁹ This may be due to the influence of John of Damascus, who channeled the preceding Byzantine tradition to the western Latin thinkers in the high Middle Ages through the Latin 12th-century translation of his most significant and well-known work, *De fide orthodoxa*. This text stressed the monarchy of the Father within the divine life. See Andrew Louth, 'Late Patristic Developments on the Trinity in the East', in *Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 148.

⁸⁰ *SH* I (n. 297), p. 428: 'Dicendum quod plenitudo bonitatis est causa, id est ratio, generationis, quare Pater generet; et hoc secundum quod ipsa bonitas intelligitur in Patre, id est in persona quae quidem est et non ab alia, non secundum quod consideratur in se.'

⁸¹ *SH* I (n. 297), p. 428: 'Dicendum ergo quod summum bonum sive divina essentia potest considerari dupliciter: ut in se vel ut in persona quae non habet esse ab alio.'

would be no order in anyway. Accordingly, the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of self-diffusion is not considered in relation to the divine essence in se.⁸²

Considered in the Father, on the other hand,

the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of diffusion is from the highest goodness in the Father, both from the essence in the Father through generation, and in the Son with the Father through the procession [of the Spirit], as will be clear. Therefore it does not follow from this that to generate is to be attributed to the essence, but rather to the very person having the essence; granted therefore it is not self-diffusive as considered in itself, yet it is diffusive in as much as it is in the person not having being from another.⁸³

As the Quaracchi editors summarized, in the *SH*: ‘the diffusion of goodness in the Trinity is personal,’ i.e. stemming from the Father,⁸⁴ ‘since, by contrast, in the production of [created] things, it can rather be called essential.’⁸⁵ In sum, ‘in the system of Alexander the highest goodness is the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of all communication in God.’⁸⁶ All this, which may have a precedent in earlier eastern Trinitarian traditions,⁸⁷ flows from the *SH* into the thought of Bonaventure.⁸⁸

82 *SH* I (n. 297), p. 428: ‘Secundum quod consideratur in se: sic consideratur absolute et absque ratione diffusionis, quia si hoc modo intelligeretur ratio diffusionis in ea, consequeretur quod esset diffusio ipsius substantiae in infinitis personis, et quod non esset status in aliqua; propterea manifestum est quod essentia secundum se sive summum bonum consideratur absque ratione diffusionis sui.’

83 *SH* I (n. 297), p. 428: ‘(...) est ratio diffusionis ex summa bonitate in Patre, sive ex essentia in Patre per generationem et in Filio cum Patre per processionem, sicut patebit. Non ergo sequitur ex hoc quod essentiae attribuaturs generare, sed magis ipsi personae habenti essentiam; licet igitur non est diffusivum sui ut in se consideratur, nihilominus est diffusivum prout est in persona non-ente ab alio.’

84 Cf. *SH* I (n. 311), pp. 452–3; *SH* I (n. 330), p. 486: ‘Eadem bonitas est qua Pater summe diffundit se generando Filium et Pater et Filius spirando Spiritum Sanctum et illa quae diffusa est in Spiritu Sancto’ [It is the same goodness by which the Father highly diffuses himself by generating the Son and the Father and the Son in spirating the Holy Spirit and that which is diffused in the Holy Spirit]. Cf. *SH* I (n. 304), p. 440.

85 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi, n. 15.

86 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi, n. 15. See *SH* I (n. 317), p. 466. Cf. *SH* I (n. 248), p. 340.

87 See Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,’ 68–9, who sees a similar approach in the Capadocians and in Pseudo-Dionysius.

88 Hayes, ‘Bonaventure’s Trinitarian Theology,’ 214: ‘Thus, the Father receives an emphasis that would be foreign to the thought of either Augustine or Aquinas, and is similar to the theology of the classical Greek fathers.’

Distinction by Emanation

This emphasis on the primacy of the Father *ad intra* also pushes the Halensist toward what has come to be called an emanational account of the constitution and identity of the divine persons. Here, each of the persons is defined and properly distinguished from the others by a distinct mode of originating,⁸⁹ and thus a singular mode of possessing (*modum se habendi*) the one, simple divine nature.⁹⁰ Preferring Richard's definition of person over others,⁹¹ the *SH* defines a person as both 'an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature' and, more importantly, 'a being existing in itself alone by way of a singular mode of rational existence'.⁹² Or, in a similar vein but from another source, certain anonymous *magistri* (William of Auxerre? Phillip the Chancellor?): 'person is hypostasis, distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.'^{93/94} Aptly, Coyle suggests a 'hybrid definition', namely, 'a divine person is an

⁸⁹ *SH I* (n. 341), p. 505: 'In divino esse necessario ponitur natura et ordo naturae secundum rationem originis' [In God, it is necessary to posit nature and the order of nature according to the ratio of origin]. See also *SH I* (n. 22), p. 52; *SH I* (n. 307), p. 445; *SH I* (n. 312), p. 456; *SH I* (n. 316), p. 464; *SH I* (n. 321), p. 472; *SH I* (n. 327), p. 481; *SH I* (n. 467), p. 668.

⁹⁰ *SH I* (n. 467), p. 668: 'Proprietas enim personalis est quae uni soli personae convenit et eam ab omni alia distinguit' [For a personal property is that which belongs to only one person and distinguishes that person from all others].

⁹¹ De Régnon, *Études*, 2:344–5: 'Our doctor [Alexander] openly professed the doctrine of Richard (...) This alerts us that already in Alexander's time, scholastic teaching was trained in a current which he resisted (...) Alexander adopts the whole theory of Richard on personhood (...) He explains the famous definition of person that Richard gives and shows its superiority over that of Boethius.' Keane, 'The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,' 68–9, seeing similarities here with the Cappadocians' understanding of 'person,' notes that for the Halensist, 'the nature or essence can only be properly understood within the one possessing it,' citing *SH I* (n. 316.), p. 463: 'Intelligendo enim divinam naturam, necesse est quod intelligatur in habente illam' [In understanding the divine nature, one must understand in one possessing it]. For Keane, 'the Augustinian tradition, with its concern for the one divine nature, might reasonably state the inverse of this view: the persons must only be considered within the divine nature.'

⁹² *SH I* (n. 387), p. 570: 'Nam Richardus ponit duas; prima est haec: "persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia", secunda est haec: "persona est existens per se solum iuxta quemdam rationalis existentiae modum".' The quotations derive from Richard of St Victor, *De trinitate* 4.22, in Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Jean Ribailier, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge, 6 (Paris: Vrin, 1958), 180 and *De trinitate* 4.24 (Ribailier, 182), respectively.

⁹³ *SH I* (n. 387), p. 570: 'Magistri vero ponunt tertiam talem: Persona est hypostasis, distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente.' The Quarrachi editors credit it to Alan of Lille, *Regulae theologicae*, c. 32 (PL 210:637), but the formulation is not quite there. Weber is likely right to suggest that it comes from Alexander himself at *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) I, d. 23, 9b, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 12–15 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 1:226. Cf. Hubert Philipp Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 2003), 119–41.

incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature, distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.⁹⁵

For the *SH*, the incommunicable modes of having the divine essence are these three:⁹⁶ 1. having it ‘not from another’ (*non ab alio*), 2. having it ‘from another through generation’ (*ab alio per generationem*), corresponding to the above-noted *per modum naturae*, and 3. having it ‘from another through spiration’ (*ab alio per spirationem*) or ‘through procession’, corresponding to the above-noted *per modum voluntatis*.⁹⁷ Assigning abstract terms to these modes produces three personal properties: ‘not being from another’ is the property of innascibility (*innascibilitas*); ‘being from another through generation’ is filiation (*filiatio*); and ‘being from another through spiration’ is procession (*processio*).⁹⁸

94 Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 104: ‘Like all his peers, [Thomas] discusses three main definitions of the ‘person’ in trinitarian theology: those of Boethius and of Richard of St Victor, and the ‘definition of the masters’, to which the early Franciscan school was much attached.’

95 Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 123.

96 *SH* I (n. 467), p. 668: ‘Ex quo patet quod proprietates personales sunt tres (...)’ [From this it is clear that the personal properties are three].

97 *SH* I (n. 81), p. 133: ‘(...) sed solum originis: quia est ibi habens naturam non ab alio, et habens naturam ab alio per generationem, et habens ab alio per processionem.’ See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 28, 5d, 1:274: ‘(...) sicut prima divisio est ex parte essentiarum “ens aliud est ab alio, aliud non ab alio”: ab alio ut creatura, non ab alio ut Deus; ita ex parte hypostaseon erit distinctio “alius ab alio, alius non ab alio”. Et ratio est, quia, cum prima divisio sumpta sit ad dividendum res secundum habitudinem causae efficientis, scilicet “ab alio, non ab alio”, maior autem sit convenientia hypostaseon divinarum inter se quam essentiarum, prior erit ratio distinguendi personas ad invicem quam creaturam a Creatore. Sed nulla prior est ratio ratione causae nisi ratio principii (...) erit ergo distinctio personarum divinarum secundum originem a principio’ [(...) just as there is a first division on the part of essences, “being that is from another, [being] that is not from another”: from another, such as creatures, not from another, such as God; so with respect to persons there will be distinction “one from another, one not from another”. The reason is that, since the first division is taken for the purpose of dividing things according to their relation to an efficient cause, namely, “from another, not from another”, but there is a greater agreement of divine persons among themselves than of the [created and uncreated] essences, the reason for distinguishing the divine person from one another will be prior to the distinction of creatures from the Creator. But no reason in the ratio of a cause is prior except the ratio of a principle (...), therefore there will be a distinction of the divine persons according to origin from a principle’]. Cf. Walter Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 26.

98 *SH* I (n. 467), p. 668: ‘In divinis personis est ordo secundum rationem originis; prima autem divisio entis est: omne quod est aut est ab alio aut non ab alio, et haec est prima ratio distinguendi essentiam ab essentia; similiter in divinis est haec ratio distinctionis personarum. Item, “esse ab alio” aut est per generationem aut per spirationem. Iam ergo habemus tres proprietates: quia ex hoc quod est “esse non ab alio” est proprietas innascibilitatis, et ex hoc quod est “esse ab alio per generationem” est filiatio, item, ex hoc quod est “esse ab alio per spirationem” est processio’ [In the divine persons, there is order according to the ratio of origin; for the first division of being is: everything that is either is from another or not from another, and this is the first ratio for distinguishing

More of this will be said below. Noteworthy now is that with this account of the divine persons, the *SH* stands at the headwaters⁹⁹ of a stream of high scholastic Trinitarian theology that, in stressing mode of origin as constituting the persons,¹⁰⁰ flows parallel to an alternative in which relations, more precisely, opposed relations, are constitutive. These two streams are also often associated with the Franciscans and Dominicans,¹⁰¹ respectively.^{102/103}

Emanational Modes: Generation and Procession

The Halensian account of divine plurality posits two emanational modes (*processiones*) from the Father. These ‘eternal pullulations or two lights or two shoots or two rays’ (intriguingly citing terms from the Greek patristic tradition) ‘flow forth’ (*fluit*) from ‘the First Principle,¹⁰⁴ the Father’.¹⁰⁵ As noted, this emphasis on divine fecundity is characteristic of the Halensian account.¹⁰⁶

essence from essence; similarly in God there is a ratio of distinction of persons. Likewise, “being from another” is either through generation or through spiration. So we now have three properties: for since there is “being not from another” there is the property of innascibility, and since there is “being from another through generation” there is filiation, and again, since there is “being from another through spiration”, there is procession].

99 See Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, 105: ‘Now it is interesting that this new direction, which wanted to make the distinction between the divine persons on the basis of origins, and which we see clearly in Alexander’s work in overcoming the old views, is sharply opposed to another whose spokesman we are allowed to designate as Thomas Aquinas.’ The claim, though, originates with Richard of St Victor, *De trinitate* 4.15 (Ribaillier, 177): ‘in God, it is solely in origin that one should seek the distinction of the persons or existents.’

100 Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, 17: ‘On the emanation account of the distinction or constitution of the persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the very same divine essence in three irreducibly distinct ways, the way that each one emanates or originates. Thus, on the emanation account, the Father is the divine essence in a fundamentally different way than the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is the very same divine essence in a third totally different way, these three different ways being how each one originates or has being.’

101 This is Friedman’s heuristic between emanation and relation accounts for distinguishing the persons. Cf. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, 5–49.

102 Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, 31: ‘In Bonaventure and his early followers, men like Walter of Bruges, Eustace of Arras, John Pecham, and Roger Marston, there had developed a marked Franciscan stress on the *divine* emanations as the constitutive feature of the persons in the Trinity (...) This Franciscan view stood in rather stark contrast to the typical Dominican stress in trinitarian theology—something descended from Aquinas—on *opposition* of relations as the rock bottom constitutive features of the persons.’

103 For more on the typically Franciscan version of trinitarian speculation, see Hayes, ‘Introduction,’ 1–103.

104 Bonaventure will adopt this term extensively in his writings. See, e.g., the *Breviloquium* 1.1.1 (Monti, 27): ‘In the beginning, we should understand that sacred doctrine, namely theology, which deals principally with the First Principle—God, three and one—comprises seven topics in all.’

Already noted above is the distinction between production or diffusion *per modum naturae* ('the most perfect diffusion of nature is that which is through generation'¹⁰⁷) and production or diffusion *per modum voluntatis* ('the most perfect diffusion of will is that which is through desire or through love' (*per amorem sive per dilectionem*)¹⁰⁸). The *SH* also refers to these as 'principal' and 'non-principal' modes of production, the distinction hinging on whether the 'product' retains the generativity that produced it:

It is called the principal mode when the product is so produced that it has the power and the property of producing another from itself. Insofar then as there is a production according to the principal mode in God, there is the production of the Son from the Father, because the Son has the power to produce another from Himself, namely, the Holy Spirit, the property of which the Son retains.¹⁰⁹

105 *SH I* (n. 310), p. 450: 'Ad auctoritates vero Dionysii et Gregorii Theologi dicendum quod cum dicuntur coaeternae pullulationes vel duo lumina vel duo semina vel duo radii Filius et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre, non negatur per hoc quod unus, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus, non habeat originem ab alio, videlicet a Filio, sed per hoc insinuatur in Patre ratio primae originis et primi principii et duplex modus emanationis vel exitus a primo principio, Patre: unus conveniens Filio, qui fluit per generationem, alius Spiritui Sancto, qui fluit per processionem' [To those texts of Dionysius and Gregory the Theologian it should be said that when the Son and the Spirit are called eternal pullulations or two lights or two shoots or two rays from the Father, it is not thus denied that one, namely the Holy Spirit, does not have origin from the other, namely, from the Son, but rather by these expressions is insinuated in the Father the *ratio* of first origin and of first principle of a twofold mode of emanation or going forth from the first principle, [namely,] the Father: one [mode] befitting the Son, who flows forth through generation, another the Holy Spirit, who flows forth through procession].

106 *SH I* (n. 295), p. 416: 'Confitendum verissime quod generatio aeterna est. Unde Richardus de S. Victore, in libro *De Trinitate*: "(...) Numquid natura illa, quae huic naturae fructus foecunditatis donavit, in se omnino sterilis permanebit? Et quae aliis generationem tribuit, numquid sterilis erit?" sicut dicitur Isai. ultimo, 9: "Numquid ego, qui alios parere facio, ipse non pariam? Si ego, qui generationem ceteris tribuo, sterilis ero? ait Dominus"; et loquitur ibi de generatione aeterna, ut dicit Glossa. Est igitur generatio aeterna' [It should be most truly confessed that generation is eternal. Whence Richard of St Victor in his book *On the Trinity* wrote: "(...) Can it be that that nature will remain in itself completely sterile, which gave to this (our) nature the fruit of fecundity? And will that which imparted generation to others, can it be that it will be sterile?" Just as it is said in Isaiah 66:9, "How can I, who makes others to bear, not bear myself? Shall I, who grant generation to the others, be sterile? Thus says the Lord"; and as the *Gloss* says this text speaks of eternal generation].

107 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 438: 'Perfectissima autem diffusio naturae est illa quae est per generationem.'

108 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 438: 'perfectissima diffusion voluntatis est illa quae est per amorem sive per dilectionem.'

109 *SH I* (n. 296), p. 420: 'Secundum modum principalem dicitur, quando productum ita producitur quod habet virtutem et proprietatem producendi alium ex se: secundum ergo quod est productio secundum modum principalem in divinis, sic est productio Filii a Patre, quia Filius habet virtutem producendi ex se alium, scilicet Spiritum Sanctum, et huius retinet proprietatem; (...).' Cf. *SH I* (n. 296), p. 420: 'Ex iis igitur patet quid sit secundum rationem intelligentiae generatio in divinis, quia generatio est univoca productio similis in natura de tota substantia secundum modum principalem, et quare haec productio dicitur generatio, hoc est quia inter omnes productiones generatio principalior

On the other hand:

with respect to the non-principal mode there is the production of the Holy Spirit, because [the Spirit] is produced from the [divine] substance, but does not retain the property of producing another from itself.¹¹⁰

Yet, this distinction does not imperil the equality between the Son and the Spirit.¹¹¹

The Psychological Analogy

To clarify the difference between these two emanational modes of having the divine essence, the *SH* appeals to the psychological analogy for the Trinity, the roots of which are of course Augustinian:

To proceed understood by this mode is to proceed through the mode of understanding (*per modum intelligentiae*), is to proceed as in the case of the Son; [to proceed] through the mode of love (*per modum amoris*) is to proceed as in the case of the Holy Spirit. (...) It should be said, then, that to proceed, said in this way, is said first of the Son and second of the Holy Spirit, according to the reasoning of the intellect, since that procession, which is according to the mode of the understanding from the mind, is prior to that which is according to the mode of love, from both.¹¹²

The Halensist also makes use of the same analogy elsewhere, distinguishing between a ‘diffusion through the mode of generation, in the way that understanding emanates

est, et maxime sic debet esse ut ille qui producitur habeat virtutem producendi alium ex se’ [From these things it is clear what generation in God is, understood conceptually, since generation, univocally [speaking], is the production of something the same in nature from the whole substance, through the principal mode. And why is this production called generation? Because among all [the modes of] production, generation is the more principal, and thus it especially ought to be thus: that the one who is produced have the power of being able to produce another from himself].

110 *SH* I (n. 296), p. 420: ‘(...) secundum autem modum non-principalem est productio Spiritus Sancti, quia producitur de substantia, sed non retinet proprietatem producendi alium ex se.’

111 *SH* I (n. 296), p. 420: ‘Sic tamen intellige ‘principalem’ in generatione Filii, ‘non-principalem’ in processione Spiritus Sancti, ut nullo modo intelligatur ibi inaequalitas, sed utriusque designetur proprietas; quemadmodum, cum dicitur ‘primum’ vel ‘non-primum’, non ostenditur prioritas vel posterioritas in tempore, sed designatur ordo naturae’ [Yet, one should understand ‘principal’ in the generation of the Son and ‘non-principal’ in the procession of the Holy Spirit, such that in no way is inequality understood there, but [rather] so as to indicate the properties of each. So, when ‘first’ and ‘not-first’ are said priority and posteriority in time are not shown, but rather the order of nature is indicated].

112 *SH* I (n. 305), p. 441: ‘procedere intellectum cum modo, est procedere vel per modum intelligentiae, sicut est procedere Filii, vel per modum amoris, sicut est procedere Spiritus Sancti (...) Dicendum ergo quod procedere, cum modo dictum, per prius dicitur de Filio et per posterius de Spiritu Sancto secundum rationem intelligentiae, quia prior est processio quae est per modum intelligentiae a mente quam illa quae est per modum amoris ab utroque.’

from the mind' 'generating and being generated') and a 'diffusion through the mode of spiration, in which way love proceeds from understanding and from the mind' ('spirating and being spirated').¹¹³ In another place, continuing the psychological comparison, the *SH* likens spiration to

the power of reason moving toward the formation of speech, just as it happens when the understanding (*intellectus*) of reason begets a word which is the messenger of understanding, while at the same time breathing (*spirando*) a breath (*spiritum*) which is the vehicle of the word, just as John Damascene says: "it is necessary that a word has a breath (*spiritum*) and the Word of God no less so than our word."¹¹⁴

Furthermore, in a comparison that Aquinas will also make, 'spiration implies movement *away from* the soul, and so does love; while understanding implies movement *within* the soul or *into* the soul; hence, to be spirated befits love, not understanding.'¹¹⁵ Consequently, 'since the generation of the Son is through the mode of understanding from the mind, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is through the mode of love from both [the mind and its understanding], to be spirated will be proper to the Holy Spirit.'¹¹⁶ Again: 'just as from the mind understanding is begotten, so too from both places [i.e. the mind and understanding] love is spirated.'¹¹⁷ This use of the psychological analogy leads directly, not surprisingly, to the Halensian position on the *filioque*, though the topic itself does not receive explicit treatment in the *SH*.

In sum, the Son emanates from the Father through generation (*ab alio per generationem*), which yields a personal property that distinguishes Him absolutely from the other Persons, namely, filiation. This occurs *per modum naturae*, *per modum intelligentiae*, and *per modum rationis*. The Spirit emanates from the Father and the Son through procession/spiration (*ab alio per processionem*), which yields Its personal property, namely, passive spiration. This occurs *per modum voluntatis*, *per modum amoris*, *per modum per dilectionis*, and *per modum donationis*.

¹¹³ *SH* I (n. 298), p. 431.

¹¹⁴ *SH* I (n. 306), p. 442: '(...) movens vis rationalis ad formationem sermonis, sicut contingit quando intellectus rationis generat verbum qui est nuntius intelligentiae, simul spirando spiritum qui sit vehiculum verbi, sicut dicit Ioannes Damascenus: "Oportet verbum habere spiritum nec est Verbum Dei deficientius nostro verbo".'

¹¹⁵ *SH* I (n. 306), p. 442: 'spiratio dicit motum ab anima, similiter amor; intelligentia dicit motum ad animam vel in anima; inde est quod spirari convenit amori, non intelligentiae.'

¹¹⁶ *SH* I (n. 306), p. 442: 'Quia generatio Filii est per modum intelligentiae a mente, processio Spiritus Sancti per modum amoris ab utroque, proprium erit Spiritus Sancti spirari.'

¹¹⁷ *SH* I (n. 306), p. 442: 'sicut ex mente generatur intelligentia, sic ex utroque spiratur amor.'

The Persons¹¹⁸

Turning finally to the Persons individually, the following additional points should be added.

Father: As is clear from the foregoing, the *SH* prefers to describe the first divine Person as unoriginated or unbegotten, who possesses the divine nature not from another: ‘for there is one in God who has his nature not from another’ (*non ab alio*).¹¹⁹ As noted, the primary term used to express this is *innascibilitas* (sometimes *ingenitus*). At the same time, He is the divine person from whom the other divine persons emanate, from whom the other divine persons receive their ‘being from another’, and this positions Him as the productive source (*principio*), or First Principle, within the Godhead, the single Source or *mon-archia* of divine plurality.¹²⁰ Combining the two ideas, He is one ‘who is not from another and from whom others are’.¹²¹ Most precisely, though, because He generates a Son, He is Father (*pater*)—‘for “father” comes from “principle”’.¹²² Paternity (*paternitas*),¹²³ accordingly, is the *proprium*, the ‘personal property’ of the Father, while *innascibilitas* is a ‘property of the person’ of the Father.¹²⁴ (‘Thus, though the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit, He is not the Father of the Spirit.’¹²⁵)

The Son: For the *SH*, the second Person is the one ‘who is from another and from whom another comes’.¹²⁶ For that reason, He is ‘in the middle/center (*in medio*)’, between the First and the Third. The proper and relational personal names of the second divine person are: Son, Image, and Word.

Because he is generated from the Father, the proper name for the second person is ‘Son’, for ‘He is the true and proper Son by origin, not by adoption, in truth, not in name only, begotten not made.’¹²⁷ The Son persists, in fact, as *semper nascitur*.¹²⁸

118 The personal properties were fixed by the second canon of the Fourth Lateran Council: ‘the Father begets, the Son is begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds.’ English from Norman P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 1 (London: Sheed and Ward; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 231.

119 *SH* I (n. 297), p. 424.

120 *SH* I (n. 297), p. 427.

121 *SH* I (n. 77), p. 125.

122 *SH* I (n. 405), p. 597: ‘unde abundat ‘Pater’ a ‘principio’.

123 *SH* I (n. 483), pp. 685–6. Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 1, n. 14i, 1:14.

124 Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 387: ‘Yet *innascibilitas* must not be regarded as an actual personal property, i.e. as a positive, person-constituting characteristic, for it is only a *distinctio negativa*, thus conceptually dependent on another.’

125 *SH* I (n. 405), p. 597: ‘unde Pater bene dicitur principium Spiritus Sancti, non tamen Pater eius.’

126 *SH* I (n. 305), p. 441.

127 *SH* I (n. 408), p. 601.

128 *SH* I (n. 302), p. 436.

Because the Son is an ‘appearance not different’ (*species indifferens*) from the Father,¹²⁹ ‘an indistinct likeness and coequal’ (*coaequandam imaginata et indiscreta similitudo*) to the Father, ‘an expressive conformity (...) not different in substance with’ the Father,¹³⁰ an ‘express imitation’ (*expressae imitationis*) and ‘express likeness’ (*similitudo expressa*),¹³¹ indeed, ‘the greatest likeness’ (*similitudo summa*) to the Father,¹³² the Son is also Image (*Imago*) of the Father, especially because, with the Father, the Son both ‘possesses and gives the fullness [of divinity to the Spirit]’; that is, ‘just as the plenitude of divinity flows from the Father, so the bestowing of the same plenitude flows from the Son.’¹³³

From the notion of image, the *SH* derives the third proper name for the Son, namely, Word:¹³⁴

129 *SH I* (n. 414), p. 605: ‘Ad aliud dicendum quod species hic dicitur relative: dicit enim essentiam, sed connotat conformitatem plenam quam habet Filius cum Patre in essentialibus et notione. Licet enim Spiritus Sanctus habeat conformitatem in essentialibus, non tamen habet conformitatem cum Patre in aliqua notione; unde non potest dici “species indifferens”, prout sumitur species in hac definitione: dicit enim divinam essentiam, sed connotat notionalem conformitatem’ [It should be said that species here is said relatively: for it refers to the [divine] essence, but connotes the full conformity which the Son has with the Father in essence and in notion. For even though the Holy Spirit has conformity in essence, it nevertheless does not have conformity with the Father in a certain notion; hence, [the Spirit] cannot be called an “indifferent species” as species is understood in this definition: for it refers to the divine essence, but connotes notional conformity].

130 *SH I* (n. 415), p. 606.

131 *SH I* (n. 415), pp. 606–7.

132 *SH I* (n. 89), p. 144: ‘Similitudo ergo principii magna est in creatura, in quantum una est, sed tamen in diversitate essentiae; similitudo maior in Spiritu Sancto, qui est a Patre in identitate substantiae, quamvis non conformis in notione; similitudo vero summa Filius, qui est a Patre in identitate essentiae et conformis in notione (...)’ [A like with the principles is great in a creature, in as much as it is one, but yet in diversity of essence; the likeness is greater in the Holy Spirit, who is from the father in identity of substance, though not in conformity in notion; but the greatest likeness is the Son, who is from the Father in identity of essence and in conformity in notion (...)].

133 *SH I* (n. 418), p. 609: ‘sicut a Patre manat plenitudo divinitatis, sic a Filio’.

134 *SH I* (n. 296), p. 421: ‘Eloquitur autem Filius essentiam et proprietatem Patris, ideo Verbum est; Spiritus vero Sanctus, etsi totam essentiam Patris eloquatur, scilicet potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem, non tamen in se eloquitur proprietatem Patris qua producat ex se alium, ideo non dicitur Verbum sicut Filius, nec dicitur eius productio ‘generatio’ sicut productio Filii, sicut dictum est: verbum enim plene manifestat de intellectu et intentione dicentis proprietates, ideo Spiritus Sanctus non est Verbum nec profertur a Patre ut Verbum, sed dicitur, id est manifestatur’ [The Son expresses the essence and property of the Father, and thus he is Word; but the Holy Spirit, even if the Spirit expresses the whole essence of the Father, namely, power, wisdom, and goodness, the Spirit nevertheless does not express in himself the property of the Father by which the Father produces another from himself, and therefore the Spirit is not called Word as the Son is, nor is the Spirit’s production called “generation”, as is the production of the Son, as was said: for a word fully manifests from the intellect and with the intention the properties of the one speaking, therefore the Holy Spirit is not the Word, nor is the Spirit brought forth from the Father like the Word (...)].

though knowledge is understood in the concept of “word”, it is not nevertheless absolute knowledge, but knowledge which has arisen from another, namely from the knowledge of memory as in the image of it. Whence the intention of “word” designates a concept having arisen as an image of memory (...).¹³⁵

So, ‘the concept of “Word” is proper to the Son.’¹³⁶

The Spirit: The third Person is one ‘who is from another and from whom no one comes’, the Person in whom the divine essence exists ‘as in an end’ (*in termino*).¹³⁷ That is, the Holy Spirit is in the posture of utter receptivity, or in Richard of St Victor’s language, of ‘owed love’ (*amor debitus*), love that is wholly received, in contrast to the Father’s *amor gratuitus*, love wholly and freely given, and the Son’s love, which is both (*amor ex utroque permixtus*) received (*debitus*) and given (*gratuitus*).¹³⁸ The Spirit, accordingly, is non-productive of further emanations *ad intra*: ‘the highest goodness, as it is the *ratio* of production of a person from a person, in the Father and the Son, so it is the *ratio* of non-production in the Holy Spirit.’¹³⁹ The proper and relational personal names of the third Person are: Spirit and Gift.

Because the third Person processes from the Father and the Son by means of passive spiration, the term ‘Spirit’ is ‘proper to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of spiration’.¹⁴⁰ Because, moreover, as noted above, that procession is through the mode of will and through the mode of the love of the Father and the Son, ‘the Holy Spirit is the bond (*vinculum*) and connection (*nexus*) and communion (*communio*) of the Father and the Son.’¹⁴¹ More precisely, as the love of the Father and the

135 SH I (n. 424), p. 617: ‘quamvis in intentione ‘Verbi’ intelligatur notitia, non tamen notitia absolute, sed notitia, quae est ex alio orta, videlicet ex scientia memoriae ut imago illius. Unde intentio verbi dicit notitiam ortam et imaginem memoriae (...).’

136 SH I (n. 424), p. 617: ‘intentio Verbi est propria Filio’.

137 SH I (n. 304), p. 440.

138 SH I (n. 307), p. 445.

139 SH I (n. 319), p. 470: ‘summa bonitas, sicut est ipsa ratio productionis personae a persona in Patre et Filio, ita est ratio non-productionis in Spiritu Sancto.’

140 SH I (n. 427), p. 620: ‘hoc modo proprium est Spiritus Sancti, qui procedit per modum spirationis.’

141 SH I (n. 308), p. 446: ‘Spiritus Sanctus est vinculum et nexus sive communio Patris et Filii, et hoc multiplici ratione. Primo, quia est amor procedens a Patre et Filio communiter et uno modo; amor autem nexus est et vinculum amantium. Secundo, quia exit a Patre et Filio in unitate substantiae cum Patre et Filio; quod non posset esse nisi eadem esset et una substantia Patris et Filii, et ideo ostendit unitatem substantiae Patris et Filii; unde Augustinus, in XV *De Trinitate*: “Caritas, qua Pater diligit Filium et Filius Patrem, ineffabilem communionem demonstrat amborum”. Tertio, quia exit a Patre et Filio per eandem habitudinem et relationem sive notionem, quae est communis spiratio’ [(...) 1. because love is that which proceeds from the Father and the Son communally and by one mode; however love is a connection and the bond of the ones loving. 2. because [the Holy Spirit] goes forth from the Father and the Son in unity of substance with the Father and the Son; which would not be possible unless the Spirit were not the same [substantially] and one substance with the Father and the Son, and therefore it demonstrates one substance of the Father and the Son; whence Augustine [says], in [Book] XV [of] *De Trinitate*: “Charity, by which the Father loves the Son and the Son [loves]

Son,¹⁴² ‘the Holy Spirit is love, and love is the first gift; and whatever is given properly is given by love, and for that reason, because in the Holy Spirit all things are given to us, for which the Spirit is called communion.’^{143/144} So the ‘Holy Spirit is properly (called) Gift,’¹⁴⁵ and has ‘the *ratio* of Gift or gifts (...) from its mode of procession from the Father and Son.’¹⁴⁶ Again, ‘a procession of love’ (*processio amoris*) is ‘a diffusion through the mode of donation (*per modum donationis*), as the gift from a giver.’¹⁴⁷ Most precisely, the Holy Spirit has ‘the *ratio* of gift that specifically is a *habitus*’, that is, ‘a readiness/disposition (*aptitudo*)’ to be given, which is more than a mere potency for being given: ‘So the Holy Spirit is called Gift, not only because He can be given (*dari potest*), but so that He might be given (*detur*): whence gift implies not just ability (*potentia*), but readiness/disposition (*aptitudo*) with respect to the one giving.’¹⁴⁸ Finally, this habitual donative inclination in the Spirit is from eternity: ‘the character of gift from eternity, habitually, as it were, befits the Holy Spirit (...).’¹⁴⁹

Conclusion

An immediate indicator of the historical importance of the *SH*’s Trinitarian theology in the EFIT is its influence on Bonaventure. This is variously visible, but a striking illustration comes from the Seraphic Doctor’s *Breviloquium*, from its discussion of the Trinitarian persons:

the Father, ineffably demonstrates the communion of both.” 3. because [the Holy Spirit] goes forth from the Father and the Son by the same condition and relation or notion, which is common spiration].

142 *SH* I (n. 308), p. 447: ‘(...) quasi formaliter, quia ipse est amor Patris et Filii.’

143 *SH* I (n. 308), p. 446: ‘ipse enim amor est, amor autem est primum donum; quidquid autem donatur proprie amore donatur, et ideo, quia ipso omnia nobis donantur, per ipsum dicitur communio.’

144 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439: “‘amor est donum intrinsecum in ipso dante, in quo dantur dona extrinseca; prius igitur est donum amoris quam donum aliquod extrinsecum.” In summo igitur largitore prius fuit donum amoris quam aliquod donum extrinsecum conferret creaturis sive esse, antequam scilicet bonitatem creaturis distribueret; fuit igitur donum amoris in Deo ab aeterno” [“Love is a gift that is intrinsic to the giver himself, by which extrinsic gifts are given; more prior is the gift of love, then, than some extrinsic gift” (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*). Thus, in the highest lavish giver, the gift of love was prior to any extrinsic gift or existence that he conferred on creatures, before, that is, he distributed goodness to creatures; therefore, the gift of love was in God from eternity (...)].

145 *SH* I (n. 430), p. 623: ‘Spiritus Sanctus proprie Donum est.’

146 *SH* I (n. 430), p. 623: ‘habet rationem doni vel donabilis (...) ex modo suae processionis a Patre et Filio.’

147 *SH* I (n. 304), p. 439.

148 *SH* I (n. 430), p. 623: ‘Unde Spiritus Sanctus dicitur Donum, non solum quia dari potest, sed quia ad hoc est ut detur: unde aptitudinem importat respectu dantis, non solum potentiam.’

149 *SH* I (n. 430), p. 623: ‘ratio doni ab aeterno convenit Spiritui Sancto quasi habitualiter (...).’

7. For it is proper to the Father to be the one without an originator, the unbegotten One; the Principle who proceeds from no other; the Father as such. “Unbegottenness” designates him by means of a negation, but this term also implies an affirmation, since unbegottenness posits in the Father a fountain-fullness. The “Principle that proceeds from no other” designates him by an affirmation followed by a negation. “Father” designates him in a proper, complete, and determinate way, by affirmation and the positing of a relation.¹⁵⁰

8. Similarly, the Son is properly the Image, the Word, and the Son as such. “Image” designates him as expressed likeness, “Word” as expressive likeness, and “Son” as personal likeness. Again, “Image” designates him as likeness in the order of form, “Word” as likeness in the order of reason, and “Son” as likeness in the order of nature.¹⁵¹

9. In the same way, the Holy Spirit is properly the Gift, the mutual bond or Love, and the Holy Spirit as such. “Gift” designates him as the one given gratuitously, “Bond” or “Love” as one given freely as the gift excelling all others, and “Holy Spirit” as one given freely as an excelling gift, who is also personal.¹⁵²

Bonaventure’s choice of proper titles for the Persons, and accompanying explanations, is nearly identical to the Halensist’s as summarized in the preceding section. It seems impossible to imagine that the *SH* is not Bonaventure’s source. Not just here, though. Rather numerous aspects of Bonaventure’s Trinitarian theology can found already in the *SH*, including the important role of *innascibilitas* in the understanding of the person of the Father, the typically Franciscan emphasis on emanational modes of origin as constituting each of the Persons, as the importance of self-diffusive goodness as the deep *ratio* for Trinitarian plurality.

But it would be a disservice to the history of medieval theology to see the *SH* as merely a transitional text and moment in the evolution of the EFIT, as only a conduit of patristic and earlier medieval sources from which Bonaventure’s genius would forge a unique and compelling synthesis. Already present in its admittedly long and unwieldy form—the *desideratum* for a *Breviloquium* is patent—is a series of original insights and influential syntheses of prior strands of thought, even if these remain not fully developed.

One example of such is the ‘the unusual importance attached to the notion of the Good in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*’, which has long been noted by numerous scholars and especially analyzed by Keane’s dissertation.¹⁵³ As the Quaracchi editors put it: ‘it would be difficult to explain more profoundly how the intimate life of the Holy Trinity consists in the intrinsic diffusion of divine goodness’¹⁵⁴ in the *SH*. Or Keane:

150 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.3.7 (Monti, 35–6).

151 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.3.8 (Monti, 36).

152 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.3.9 (Monti, 36).

153 See Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,’ esp. 30–58. Keane gives a very helpful discussion of how the theme of divine goodness in the *SH* has been treated by modern scholarship.

154 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologiae,’ xxxvi, n. 15.

The internal coherence of the application of the logic of diffusive goodness by the summists to the Trinitarian processions, to explicate the metaphysical framework of their speculation and its history, or to point out the implications and consequences of the theory for other important philosophical and theological issues.¹⁵⁵

It is moreover the Halensian stress on the diffusiveness of goodness that no doubt prompts the *SH* to offer an account of the inner life of the Trinity that later scholars have dubbed ‘emanational’ in light of its stress on the emanational modes in which each of the Persons has the divine nature as the basis for Its proper distinction.

Lastly, the most important feature of Halensian Trinitarian theology is arguably its comprehensiveness, that is, the way in which it thinks trinitarianly about all of reality, from the divine nature itself (its unity, truth, and goodness), to divine activity *ad extra* (its power, knowledge, and will), in creation and salvation, to the transcendental properties of all being, including the human person, to its original theory of trinitarian beauty. Its preferred theological tool in this, wielded deftly and creatively, is that of trinitarian appropriations. Found already in Scripture and the Fathers, but forged and deployed in the 12th-century proliferation of Trinitarian reflection in particular among the Victorine masters such as Hugh and especially Richard,¹⁵⁶ this piece of scholastic technology pursued ‘an analogy of structure and proportion’,¹⁵⁷ between triadic sets of essential divine attributes and the divine Persons themselves. As such, in the *SH* (and beyond) it functioned in the service of scholastic speculation to grant ‘a certain access to that which otherwise surpasses natural knowledge’ and to afford ‘an inkling of the [divine] mystery’¹⁵⁸ as the basis for spiritual meditation and ultimately Franciscan doxology.

¹⁵⁵ Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,’ 7.

¹⁵⁶ Dominique Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons, Monastic Meditations and Victorine Conciliations: The Question of the Unity and Plurality of God in the Twelfth Century,’ in *Oxford Handbook of the Trinity* (see above, n. 80), 169: ‘It is in this proliferation of reflection that appeared the doctrine of ‘Trinitarian appropriations’, a major 12th-century contribution to Trinitarian theology (Hugh, Abelard, and Richard).’

¹⁵⁷ Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons,’ 180.

¹⁵⁸ Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons,’ 179.