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The Contribution of the *Summa Halensis* to the Reason for the Incarnation

Abstract: This article gives a clear presentation of the key contributions of the *Summa Halensis* at the outset of the 13th century debates over the reason for the incarnation (*ratio incarnationis*) among Franciscans at the University of Paris. Moving from Alexander of Hales to the *Summa Halensis*, the article shows the brothers' two signal contributions: 1. the categories of necessity and fittingness, set out at the outset of their commentary on the Lombard's third book of *Sentences*, set a frame for their discussion of the reason for the incarnation, and 2. an advanced appreciation for the problems counterfactual reflection presents for divine freedom. Finally, the brothers' contributions are shown to receive further development in Odo Rigaldus' subsequent reflections on the reason for the incarnation.

If there were no fall, would there be an incarnation? Our earliest record of this counterfactual, which sparked the historic 13th-century debates over the reason for the incarnation (*ratio incarnationis*), occurs early in the 12th century in Rupert of Deutz's commentary on Matthew's Gospel, *De gloria et honore Filii hominis*.¹ He gives only a cursory answer to this question.

The first extended discussion of the question was produced sometime between 1230 and 1235 by Robert Grosseteste in Book 3 of *De cessatione legalium*.² Grosseteste's treatment is roughly contemporaneous with Alexander of Hales' far briefer treatment of the question in his *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* (*Qu. disp.*).³ Both texts predate the treatment of the counterfactual question in Book 3 of the *Summa Halensis*.

The *Summa Halensis* marks an important moment in the history of the reason for the incarnation. When the authors of the *Summa* placed the counterfactual in the opening questions of *Summa Halensis* III, they established it as a common point of disputation for theologians commenting the Lombard's *Sentences*. After the *Summa Halensis*, it was standard to consider the question in the opening distinctions of Book 3, until it was moved by John Duns Scotus to the discussion of Christ's pre-

1 Rupert of Deutz, *De gloria et honore Filii hominis super Mattheum* 13.696 (PL 168:1628B).

2 Robert Grosseteste, *On the Cessation of the Laws*, trans. Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation, 13 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012); Robert Grosseteste, *De Cessatione Legalium*, ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

3 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam esset frater"* (hereafter, *Qu. disp.*), q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:207–9.

destination in Distinction 7.⁴ However, placement was not the only contribution made by the *Summa Halensis* to the reason for the incarnation.

Though the treatment of the counterfactual question in the *Summa Halensis* is brief, spanning just over two columns of text, it marks a significant moment of development in Franciscan reflection on the reason for the incarnation. Broader contributions of the *Summa Halensis* can be observed by comparison with the treatment of the reason for the incarnation by the two scholars who occupied the Franciscan chair at Paris before (Alexander of Hales) and after (Odo Rigaldus) the period in which Book 3 of the *Summa Halensis* was authored. When viewed together, we see the *Summa Halensis* III marks important developments from Alexander's *Glossa* and *Qu. disp.*, and prepares the even more advanced treatment of the reason for the incarnation by Odo Rigaldus. Thus, in order to assess the particular contribution of the *Summa Halensis* to the reason for the incarnation, we will consider the key texts on the topic in the work of Alexander of Hales, the *Summa Halensis*, and Odo Rigaldus. Together, these texts develop the key conceptual framework for the later, influential reflections on the reason for the incarnation by Bonaventure and Duns Scotus.

Alexander of Hales

Alexander's *Glossa* does not directly address the counterfactual question. It does, however, include comments on multiple causes of the incarnation.⁵ Later, Alexander discusses the counterfactual briefly in his Disputed Question 15, *de incarnatione*. Thus, the best we can discern of Alexander's thought on the reason for the incarnation arises from an analysis of both the *Glossa* and the discussion of the counterfactual in the disputed question.

Redaction A(E) of the *Glossa*, Book 3, was composed circa 1225 to 1227.⁶ In Book 3, Distinction 1, Alexander considers 'multiple causes for the incarnation of the Son'.

⁴ One exception to this rule is the commentary of Albertus Magnus, which locates the question in Distinction 20 of Book 3, on the passion. See Albert the Great, *Commentarii in III Sententiarum*, d. 20, a. 4, in *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, vol. 28, ed. Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1894), 360–2.

⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) III, d. 1, 4, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 3:12.

⁶ Victorinus Doucet, Caelestinus Piana, and Gedeon Gàl, 'Prolegomena,' in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 3:32*. For the relevant passages, Redaction E follows A, and L is variant. I will be following Redaction A(E) insofar as 1. the authorship of Redaction L is uncertain and 2. L simply relocates the text of A(E) later in Distinction 1 of Book 3. For a discussion of the text-critical issues in Alexander's *Glossa*, see Walter Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967), 16–20; Hubert Philipp Weber, 'The

He gives much attention to the phrase, 'of the Son'. Alexander's chief concerns are the topics addressed in Peter Lombard's first distinction of Book 3 of the *Sentences*: why the Son is incarnate and not the Father or Spirit, whether the Father or Spirit could become incarnate then or now, and so on. It is notable, however, that all the arguments he considers have in view the redemption from sin. For instance, Alexander argues that, since all were created in the Word of God, they ought to be *recreated* through the same.⁷ This is consistent with Alexander's fundamental conception of the incarnate Son as 'the repairer of human nature'.⁸

As Walter Principe observes, the *Glossa* produces an argument that will recur in the discussion of the motive for the incarnation in the *Summa Halensis*.⁹ It arises, however, in Alexander's discussion of the Trinity at *Glossa* I, Distinction 31. There, Alexander recites several arguments, against Arians and others, that God is one essence in three persons. The second argument anticipates an argument on the reason for the incarnation in the *Summa Halensis*. Alexander observes the existence of two extremes in nature: multiple essences in multiple persons, and one essence in one person. He then posits that 'extremes are not in reality unless there is a mediate in which there is no opposite'.¹⁰ The mediate, in this case, would be multiple persons in one nature, and one person in multiple natures. The argument, therefore, applies both to the doctrine of the Trinity and the incarnation. As we will see, the brothers apply it to the latter in the *Summa Halensis*.

The *Qu. disp.* give a clearer view of Alexander's thought on the reason for the incarnation. The *Qu. disp.* are dated sometime between 1220 and 1236.¹¹ At Question 15, Distinction 2, Membrum 4, Alexander considers 'whether the incarnation would have had a certain usefulness assuming there were no passion'.¹² He first gives one argument for the negative by appeal to the *praechonium paschale*, a regularly cited authority in medieval debates on the reason for the incarnation. Alexander cites the prayer as follows: '(our) birth would have been no gain, had we not been redeemed.'¹³ The same authority appears, also alone, in favor of the negative in the *Summa Halensis*.¹⁴

Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,' in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, ed. Philip W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 79–109.

⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 1, 4, 3:12–3, at 12: 'Multiplex est causa quare Filius incarnatus est.' All translations are my own.

⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 1, 3, 3:12: 'Filius Dei incarnatus est reparator generis humani.'

⁹ Principe, *Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 82.

¹⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 31, 32b, 1:315: 'Cum ergo extrema non sint in actu rerum, nisi et media sint in quibus non est oppositio.'

¹¹ 'Prolegomena,' in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam esset frater"*, 3:36*.

¹² Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 45, 1:207: 'Consequenter quaeritur, posito quod non esset passio, utrum incarnatio aliquam utilitatem haberet.'

¹³ Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 45, 1:207–8, at 208: 'Nihil nasci profuit nisi redimi profuisset.'

Alexander gives three counterarguments. Two appear in the *Summa Halensis*. First, he cites the influential passage from Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*; since the soul is created for glory in both its sensitive and intellectual parts, that through which it reaches glory should be both sensitive and intellectual.¹⁵ Second, he argues, the greatest goodness should declare itself to creation in the greatest way, which requires incarnation in order that the greatest goodness would be manifest.¹⁶ Here Alexander recalls the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius.¹⁷ Third, natural philosophy shows there to be a 'concatenation'—a linking of things—in the world, as between the elements and higher bodies. But for the perfection of this concatenation, there ought to be a further link of deity with creatures. In particular, based on prior arguments for the suitability of union with human nature, this link ought especially to be with human nature. Hence, for the sake of a perfect concatenation, there ought to be incarnation even without passion.¹⁸ Similar appeals to the 'perfect concatenation of the universe' are common in Robert Grosseteste's arguments on the reason for the incarnation in *De cessatione legalium* III.

Alexander favors the arguments for the affirmative response; yes, there would be incarnation without the fall and passion. He responds to the appeal to the *praeconium paschale*; while it is true that our birth would be to no gain unless we are redeemed 'regarding the fittingness of redemption, nevertheless it would be great delight for man were he to see the union of his nature with deity, even if there were no passion.'¹⁹

Although Alexander's early *Glossa* thought of the reason for the incarnation chiefly in connection to the redemption from sin, by the time of the disputed questions he preferred the position that even without the fall and passion there would be an incarnation for the magnified delight of humanity. Moreover, he recites several important authorities (i.e. *praeconium paschale*, Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*, and Pseudo-Dionysius) and a speculative argument (i.e. concatenation) in Disputed Question 15 that would recur in subsequent debates over the reason for the incarnation.

14 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Ad oppositum 1, p. 42.

15 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 46, 1:208. See *De spiritu et anima* 9 (PL 40:785).

16 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 47, 1:208.

17 And so the critical edition cites Eriugena's *Versio Dionysii*; see Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 47, 1:208, n. 3.

18 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 48, 1:208–9.

19 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 49, 1:209: 'Nihil nasci profuit quantum ad convenientem redemptionem; tamen magna delectatio esset homini, quod videret naturam suam unitam deitati etiam si non esset passio.' N.b. Alexander also supplies a standard defense of Anselm's argument at *Cur Deus homo* in Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 3, m. 1, 1:211–3, when he inquires whether or not the incarnation was necessary for repairing the fall, to which he responds that it was fitting that satisfaction be made through the union of divine and human nature.

Summa Halensis

Book 3 of the *Summa Halensis* opens with a tract on the incarnation and assumption in four questions: the necessity of the incarnation (Question 1), the fittingness (*convenientia*) of the incarnation (Question 2), the predestination of the incarnation (Question 3), and the act of the incarnation (Question 4). The first question cites Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus homo* dozens of times. Thus, question one concludes, in Chapter 7, with a consideration of 'whether the reparation of humanity ought to be accomplished by the God-man.'²⁰

Whereas question one focuses upon issues of necessity, in line with Anselm's *rationes*, question two turns to issues of fittingness. This concern arises from Peter Lombard's opening distinctions of *Sentences* III and several arguments from John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* III. There, the Lombard considers speculative possibilities beyond the *de facto* order, such as the possibility of incarnation of the Father and Holy Spirit. Thus, the brothers, in considering the fittingness of the incarnation, revised Anselm's *rationes* in light of problems provoked by the Lombard's questions.

Having determined the incarnation of the Father or Spirit is not suitable, the brothers ask whether or not they could possibly become incarnate.²¹ The first argument for the negative is taken from Anselm:

In book I of *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm says: "Impossibility follows from whatever is unfitting for God." But if another person than the Son were to become incarnate, unfittingness for God would follow; therefore it is impossible that another person than the Son become incarnate. The middle is clear: for it is unfitting for God that there be confusion of the character of the persons.²²

This teaching is opposed by Peter Lombard who insists the Father or the Spirit could have become incarnate, although the Son was the most fittingly incarnate.²³ Whereas the Lombard gives no argument, rational or authoritative, for his position, the *Summa Halensis* develops two—one based on Augustine's theology of the *imago Trinitatis*, the other by appeal to the *Glossa Ordinaria*. In this way, the brothers juxtapose Anselm and Lombard, alongside other authorities, a strategy they pursue elsewhere.²⁴

²⁰ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C7 (n. 9), pp. 23–4: 'Utrum reparatio humani generis debeat fieri per hominem Deum.' Andrew Rosato's essay in the companion to this volume gives a thorough account of the *Summa's* reliance upon and departure from Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*.

²¹ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), pp. 31–2.

²² SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), Ad oppositum a, p. 32: 'I libro *Cur Deus homo*, dicit Anselmus: "Quodlibet inconveniens Deo sequitur impossibile." Sed, si alia persona quam Filium incarnaretur, sequeretur inconveniens Deo; ergo impossibile est aliam personam quam Filium incarnari. Media patet: Inconveniens enim est Deo quod sit confusio dignitatis personarum.'

²³ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 3, d. 1, c. 2, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:26.

²⁴ E.g. SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C3 (n. 18), pp. 28–30.

The brothers attempt to accommodate both Anselm and Lombard with a distinction between two kinds of ‘divine possibility’:

Something is said to be “divinely possible” in two ways, namely what is absolutely possible, and this way is spoken of in III *Sententiarum*, that any divine person is able to become incarnate; and what is suitably possible, and in this way to become incarnate befits the Son alone.²⁵

On questions of suitability (*congruentia*) or fittingness (*convenientia*), the brothers are not afraid to diverge, with all propriety, from Anselm.

Indeed, this judgment is clarified in the preceding article, which considers whether or not it is as fitting for the Father or Spirit to be incarnate as the Son.²⁶ The *Summa Halensis* recites the arguments of John Damascene that incarnation of either the Father or Spirit would be fitting. However, the brothers juxtapose the Damascene with arguments, first, from Anselm, but also from Hugh of St Victor and Augustine. This juxtaposition of authorities leads the brothers to clarify several senses in which the incarnation is *fitting*, and one which is most fitting (*convenientius*). Whereas the incarnation of the Father and the Spirit is fitting, it is only according to appropriation (*secundum appropriationem*), whereas the incarnation of the Son is fitting both according to appropriation and according to peculiar property (*secundum proprium*).²⁷ More precisely, the brothers argue that, according to appropriation, the act of the incarnation is more fitting to the Spirit, to whom goodness and love is appropriated, insofar as love is the proximate motive for the act of incarnation.²⁸ Here the *Summa Halensis* recalls the Lombard’s argument for the Spirit’s unique role in the work of the incarnation ‘because the Holy Spirit is the charity and gift of Father and Son, and the Word of God was made flesh by the ineffable charity of God.’²⁹ But the incarnation of the Son is both 1. fitting according to appropriation (per a. 1), and 2. fitting according to peculiar property, in this case filiation, and therefore more fitting.

Whereas the questions which precede are clearly concerned to square the arguments of *Cur Deus homo* with other sources, notably the Lombard, when the *Summa Halensis* raises the counterfactual question of the reason for the incarnation, the brothers gather an assemblage of other authorities. Here they show the same instinct as Robert Grosseteste in *De cessatione legalium* to go beyond Anselm in fidelity to his methods.³⁰

²⁵ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), p. 32: ‘Dicendum quod est ‘posse divinum’ dupliciter, scilicet posse absolute, et hoc modo dicitur, III *Sententiarum*, quod quaelibet persona potuit incarnari; et est posse de congruentia, et hoc modo soli Filio convenit incarnari.’

²⁶ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 14), pp. 30–1.

²⁷ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 14), Ad obiecta 1–2, p. 31.

²⁸ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), Ad obiecta 2, p. 32.

²⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 3, d. 4, c. 1 (Brady, 2:38): ‘Quia Spiritus Sanctus est caritas et donum Patris et Filii, et ineffabili Dei caritate Verbum Dei caro factum est.’

³⁰ Robert Grosseteste, *De Cessatione Legalium* 3.1.1 (Dales and King, 119).

The brothers deploy *convenientia* exclusively when they speculate ‘whether, if nature had not fallen through sin, there would nevertheless be a reason or fittingness (*ratio vel convenientia*) to the incarnation.’³¹ The *Summa Halensis* assembles four arguments in support of the conclusion that, even without the fall, the incarnation would be fitting. First, as Pseudo-Dionysius says, the Good is diffusive of itself. Just as the Father diffuses his goodness in the generation of the Son, if creation exists there should be the greatest possible diffusion of the Good. The greatest possible diffusion in creation would be for the creature to be united to the Good itself. Second, per Pseudo-Augustine’s *De spiritu et anima*, the incarnation, even in a world without sin, would be necessary for the full beatitude of the human person, both spiritual and intellectual. ‘If the entire human would be beatified in God, God ought to be corporeal and sensible.’³² Third, since there exist three persons in unity of substance (the Trinity), as well as three persons in three substances, (three human beings), there ought to be three substances in unity of person. How is this possible? The creation of a human nature composed of a body and soul (two natures) united to a divine person with a divine nature (one person and one nature). Fourth, if the divine nature possesses a power for existence in multiple (three) persons, divine persons possess a power for existence in multiple natures. This can only be realized in union with a created nature, which is most fittingly a union between the Son with a human nature. Here, as in earlier arguments, the *Summa Halensis* significantly expands the Lombard’s *Sentences* assertions for the fittingness of the Son, rather than Father or Spirit, to be incarnate, and for incarnation to be with a human nature, rather than an angelic nature.

We can note already the similarity between the *Summa Halensis* and Alexander’s *Glossa* and *Qu. disp.* The first two arguments of the *Summa Halensis* are the first two supplied in the *Qu. disp.* 15. The third argument of the *Summa Halensis* recalls the Trinitarian argument at *Glossa* I, Distinction 31. The brothers’ fourth argument is closely related to, and possibly derived from, that third, Trinitarian argument of the *Glossa* I, Distinction 31. Moreover, the brothers’ lone argument for the opposite is an appeal to the *praechonium paschale*, the same text that appears in the *Glossa* III, Distinction 1. It is apparent, then, that the author of the treatment of the reason for the incarnation in the *Summa Halensis* was closely acquainted with Alexander’s thought on the topic.

While the formulation of the question and the objections are clearly indebted to Alexander, the actual response of the *Summa Halensis* moves well beyond Alexander. The brothers respond in favor of their preferred, affirmative response to the counterfactual by appeal to two authorities. They produce an original argument from Bernard of Clairvaux’s commentary upon Jon. 1:12. Bernard points out that Lucifer’s fore-

31 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), p. 41: ‘si non fuisset natura lapsa per peccatum, utrum scilicet esset ratio vel convenientia ad incarnationem.’

32 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), arg. 1b, p. 41: ‘si ergo totus homo debet beatificari in Deo, oportet Deum esse corporalem et sensibilem.’

knowledge of the incarnation was a condition of his envy and temptation of humans.³³ If Lucifer has prevision of the incarnation independent of the Fall, then the incarnation is independent of the Fall.³⁴

In further support of their position, the *Summa Halensis*, like Alexander, also supplies the authority of *De spiritu et anima*:

For this reason God became man, that the whole human being might be beatified in him, that humanity might advance both inwardly through intellect, and excel outwardly through sense, that they might find pasture in their Creator, interior pasture in the cognition of deity, outward pasture in the flesh of the Savior.³⁵

The *Summa Halensis* adds an assertion: ‘And this reason (*ratio*) remains, and circumscribes the fall of human nature.’³⁶ The cursory assertion belies the advanced understanding of the problem in the *Summa Halensis* vis-a-vis Alexander. According to the *Summa Halensis*, two specific arguments warrant the conclusion that incarnation would have a reason or fittingness apart from the fall: 1. the authoritative reference to Lucifer’s foreknowledge, and 2. a particular reason for the incarnation in a world without sin, supplied by *De spiritu et anima*. The importance of the particular reason supplied by *De spiritu et anima* explains its repeated recitation, both in the second argument for the affirmative, and in the response.

There remains the alternative authority of the *praechonium paschale*, cited by both Alexander and the *Summa Halensis*. Once again, the *Summa Halensis* makes an important contribution to the reason for the incarnation. The brothers suggest the hymn be understood ‘supposing the guilt of the fall of nature’.³⁷ Given the guilt of the fall, incarnation without redemption would be unprofitable. However, incarnation without redemption would be fitting ‘if the fall of human nature were circumscribed’.³⁸ In that case, while redemption would not be necessary, beatitude would, and beatitude, according to the authority of Pseudo-Augustine, has as a necessary condition the sensitive soul’s perception of God. And that perception is made possible by the incarnation.

We can note, then, several important developments in the brothers’ application of Alexander’s various arguments. The *Summa Halensis* introduces new authorities,

33 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Respondeo, p. 42.

34 Robert Grosseteste produces a similar argument, but from the prevision of Adam on the basis of Eph. 5:32, at *De Cessatione Legalium* 3.1.20 (Dales and King, 127).

35 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Respondeo, p. 42: “Propterea Deus factus est homo, ut totum hominem in se beatificaret, ut sive homo ingrederetur intus per intellectum, sive egrederetur extra per sensum, in Creatore suo pascua inveniret, pascua intus in cognitione deitatis, pascua foris in carne Salvatoris”.

36 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Respondeo, p. 42: ‘Haec autem ratio manet, etiam circumscripto lapsu humanae naturae.’

37 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), p. 42: ‘supposito reatu naturae lapsae’.

38 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Ad obiecta 1, p. 42: ‘si circumscribatur lapsus humanae naturae’.

especially Bernard of Clairvaux. More importantly, the *Summa Halensis* is far more conscious of the relative value of competing authorities. Among them, the *Summa Halensis* isolates the specific reason given in Pseudo-Augustine: that the human creature, in both its sensitive and intellective faculties, might ‘find pasture’ in the Creator. This specific reason remains for worlds without fall and passion. The brothers’ fixation on this argument, attached to this particular authority, likely explains the recurring appeals to the passage in subsequent treatments of the motive for the incarnation by both Franciscans and Dominicans. Finally, the *Summa Halensis* develops a broader grammar for speculation, namely *ratio* and *convenientia*. This grammar permits the brothers to specify a reason in other possible worlds (circumscribing the fall) while remaining grounded in the authority of Pseudo-Augustine and Bernard.

Odo Rigaldus

In 1230, two years following his entry into the Friars Minor, Alexander was succeeded by his student, John of La Rochelle. John, the likely author of *Summa Halensis* III, held the chair until he fell ill in 1244, finally succumbing in 1245, the same year of Alexander’s death. John was then succeeded by Odo Rigaldus, another student of Alexander. Like John, Odo was possibly involved in the preparation of the *Summa Halensis*, although where and to what extent remains debated.³⁹ He held the Franciscan Chair until 1248, at which point he became Archbishop of Rouen.⁴⁰ As we will see, Odo’s treatment reflects engagement with Alexander, the *Summa Halensis*, and other sources.

In direct contrast with Alexander and the brothers, Odo prefers the negative response to the counterfactual question: incarnation without the fall is against the piety of faith.⁴¹ His argument is clear: unless the Son were incarnate principally for the redemption of sin, we would not be so grateful for the incarnation. To this

39 François-Marie Henquinet, ‘Eudes de Rosny, O.F.M., Eudes Rigaud et La Somme d’Alexandre d’Hales,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 33 (1940): 3–54. See also the analysis of Henquinet and others in Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa (Continued),’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312. Finally, note Principe’s comments against Henquinet and Doucet in Principe, *Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 15, n. 6.

40 For a full account of Odo’s life, with special attention given to his duties as Archbishop of Rouen, see Adam J. Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

41 Odo’s unedited treatment of the motive for the incarnation is attached to an article by Johannes Bissen as an appendix entitled ‘Fratris Odonis Rigaldi Quaestio Inedita de Motivo Incarnationis.’ It is otherwise unavailable in print. See Johannes Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis: Disquisitio historico-dogmatica,’ *Antonianum* 7 (1932): 334–6.

argument he adds the authority of Bernard, who says that without sin there would not be the mother of God.⁴²

Yet Odo is not so confident as that; he leaves open the possibility of being convinced otherwise: ‘unless I were to see more explicit reasons or authorities, I do not believe that the Son of God would have become man unless humanity had fallen.’⁴³ Odo’s reservations and subtle appreciation for the question, marking a distinction between reasons and authorities (*rationem vel auctoritatem*), mark important developments in the history of the reason for the incarnation, prepared by the *Summa Halensis*.

Odo considers seven arguments for the affirmative response to the counterfactual: four speculative reasons and three arguments from authorities. The first argument is the now familiar argument from the diffusion of the Good, which we saw explicitly in the *Summa Halensis*, and implicitly in Alexander’s *Qu. disp.*⁴⁴ The second argument builds upon two premises: 1. God gives to all creature the happiness of which they are capable, and 2. some creature is capable of union with God. He therefore concludes that God would actualize the capacity for union even without sin.

Odo interweaves his objections to both arguments. It is not necessary that the diffusion of Goodness be manifest in every possible good, but only that there be an eternal diffusion. This need is satisfied by the generation of the Son from eternity. Moreover, the simple creation of the world is a sufficient manifestation of the diffusion of goodness to that which is not God. While God could make multiple worlds, God is not obligated to do so.⁴⁵ Thus, it must not be the case that divine goodness requires the actualization of every possibility or capacity of creation.

Odo considers two further speculative arguments for the affirmative to the counterfactual. Since, according to 1 Cor. 11, ‘man is the head of woman, and Christ the head of man’, unless the Son becomes incarnate, man would lack his head, and the universe would be incomplete, ‘like a picture without a head’.⁴⁶ Here Odo recalls the *Summa Halensis*’ arguments for the perfect concatenation of the universe. The fourth argument we also encountered in the *Summa Halensis*; in the incarnation we find three natures in one person, which completes the universe. The argument is slightly different in Odo’s text. In the *Summa Halensis*, the argument is for the revelation of the extent of divine power. The brothers show a distinctive emphasis upon the revelatory effects of the incarnation. In Odo, the argument is for the completion of the universe, in keeping with the critical theological issue Odo is concerned to confront: whether or not God is obligated to become incarnate in order to perfect some capacity of creation.

⁴² Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 335, contra.

⁴³ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 335, respondeo: ‘Dicendum, quod nisi videam rationem vel auctoritatem magis expressam, non credo quod Filius Dei factus esset homo nisi homo peccasset.’

⁴⁴ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 334, sic 2.

⁴⁵ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 335.

⁴⁶ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 334.

Odo rebuts both arguments for the perfection of the universe with a single argument. Here he makes a critical distinction: Christ is not of the universe (*de universo*), but beyond the entire universe (*supra totum universum*). And so the incarnation cannot be for the completion of the natural order, for the perfection of the universe.

Finally, Odo considers three authoritative arguments. Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* 9, and Bernard's interpretation of Jon. 1:12, the favored authorities in the *Summa Halensis*, are both recited and rebutted by Odo. Odo includes a further argument from predestination, citing Rom. 1:4 in support. The two authorities pertaining to predestination fail because 'God foresaw from eternity himself becoming human and (humanity's) sinning, and his repairing through incarnation.'⁴⁷ The appeal to *De spiritu et anima* Augustine does not obtain for possible worlds without sin because beatitude in these worlds would include corporeal beatitude as a result of the overflow of glory from the soul into the body. Odo's response to *De spiritu et anima* concludes with a highly characteristic assertion: 'it is nevertheless true that it is a great glory, but not essential, (that we are beatified) by the vision of the most brilliant and beautiful humanity of Christ our Lord.'⁴⁸ The incarnation is both entirely free from necessity, and nevertheless the humanity of Christ is the most brilliant and beautiful created thing.

Odo concludes his reflection on the motive for the incarnation by returning to his central argument: 'But those who want to say that he would have become united to a creature say that we nevertheless owe him thanksgiving, because he assumed a passible and mortal nature, as a result of sin. Therefore we ought to give thanks, yet not as much.'⁴⁹ It is therefore preferable, lacking any compelling argument from authority or reason to the contrary, to say that Christ came to destroy sin and repair nature.

Like the *Summa Halensis* before him, Odo both carries forward and expands the arguments and authorities considered by his predecessors. Notable, however, is his clear distinction between speculative arguments and arguments from authority. Odo's attention to this distinction allows him to rebut these classes of arguments in two distinct, yet coherent ways. When faced with speculative arguments, Odo carefully frees them from entailing any obligation for God to actualize a capacity for the perfection of creation by way of incarnation. Christ remains, for Odo, beyond that which is for the perfection of the universe. When considering authorities, Odo glosses them in line with his aforementioned commitment to divine freedom. It is, finally, this careful preservation of divine freedom which characterizes Odo's contribution

47 Bissen, 'De Motivo Incarnationis,' 336: 'Deus praeviderat ab aeterno se facturum hominem et illum peccatum et se reparaturum per incarnationem.'

48 Bissen, 'De Motivo Incarnationis,' 335: 'Verum est tamen quod magnum est gaudium, sed non essenziale, in visione praeclarissimae et formosissimae humanitatis Christi Domini nostri.'

49 Bissen, 'De Motivo Incarnationis,' 336: 'Illi autem qui volunt dicere quod fuisset unitus creaturae, dicunt quod nihilominus debemus ei gratiarum actiones, quia tunc assumpsisset naturam passibilem et mortalem, sicut fecit post peccatum; et ideo nihilominus tenetur ad gratiarum actiones, sed non tamen ad tot.'

to the reason for the incarnation. His primary concern is that the counterfactual not be settled too strongly one way or the other, for theological reasons. This attitude remains prominent in subsequent approaches to the reason for the incarnation.

The Contribution of the *Summa Halensis*

What exactly does the *Summa Halensis* contribute to the Franciscan tradition of reflection on the reason for the incarnation? Viewed alongside Alexander, we can see several important advances in the *Summa Halensis*. The brothers' placement of the counterfactual question within a treatise on the fittingness of the incarnation, as opposed to its necessity, and the resultant juxtaposition of Anselm with the Lombard and others, produces a climate whereby they advance the understanding of the problem posed by the counterfactual question. This advance is expressed in their pursuit of a reason for the incarnation circumscribing the fall, which they find in the need for a sensitive object for glorification. The arguments of the *Summa Halensis*, then, are all measured with greater sensitivity to the problems posed by the counterfactual than in Alexander's texts. Moreover, they are framed, textually, alongside an important set of distinctions on necessity, possibility, and fittingness.

Odo Rigaldus further advances the *Summa Halensis'* understanding of the problems provoked by the counterfactual as well as the kinds of arguments required for a response. Most notably, he draws the concerns about divine freedom that arise in the *Summa Halensis* directly into the debates over the counterfactual question of the reason for the incarnation. As a result, Odo establishes a firm, explicit commitment to divine freedom that will hold for all the major subsequent Franciscan treatments of the reason for the incarnation in the 13th century. That commitment was prepared by the *Summa Halensis*, in its explorations of fittingness, in its probing after particular kinds of reasons, and in its weighing of them. For that, even the giants Bonaventure of Bagnaregio and John Duns Scotus are in the brothers' debt.