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The Summa Halensis

Towards a New Concept of ‘Person’

Abstract: The *Summa Halensis* is, although written by many authors, the birthplace of a new concept of person. To be sure, the traditional definitions of person by Boethius and Richard of St Victor are not rejected, but they are interpreted within a new ontological frame. This new frame is indicated by the notion of *esse morale*, to be distinguished from natural being (*esse naturale*) and rational being (*esse rationis*). The person has a ‘moral being’ which means they are first of all a being of freedom. As such, they are assigned, and this in contradistinction to both natural things and rational things, the specific property (*proprietas*) of ‘dignity’. This dignity is not an incidental but an essential characteristic of the person. Within the aforementioned sources, the moral dimension of the person is highlighted for the first time as its proper nature, which thus pertains from then on to the domain of practical philosophy. The fields of contemporary Christology and philosophy in general also (Bonaventure, Thomas of Aquinas, natural law, Kant) adopted this new concept of person and furthermore created a new idea of individuality according with the *Summa Halensis*: the ‘moral individual’, to be distinguished from the natural and the artificial individual.

The Manifold Meaning of the Concept of Person

Plato and Aristotle did not know what a person is. It was the product of late antiquity, which was the first to develop a concept of the person in the modern sense. Certainly, the Greeks knew what a *prosôpon* is, namely the countenance of the human frontally facing us, or the artificial face of a mask, and the Romans understood the *persona* as the identical role of the actor behind the mask seeping through, yet they did not know what a person is.¹

Even when the concept *persona* is used to denote, so to say, the role in life of the human, i. e. the role he plays in both life and society, still there is a lack of awareness for persons as being distinct from all other things in this world. Cicero’s famous theory of the four roles, which are assigned to the human partly by nature, by universal reason, by coincidence or are chosen by man himself as *cursus vitae*, mirrors what Stoic philosophy has regarded as the determining factors of human life. However,

¹ For an overview cf. Manfred Fuhrmann, ‘Person,’ in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 7, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1989), 269–83.

it does not become clear in this theory, what the unitary ground of personhood is.² When Epictetus later proclaimed the *prohairesis* to be the ground of the person, he took a big step towards the doctrine of will, which contraposes everything volitional with all that is natural.³

To theology it is of elementary significance, that the concept of person has also been incorporated into the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, the Latin translation of the Greek *hypostasis* with *persona* is anything but transparent. For *hypostasis* is in fact a being in itself, a subsistence, which is to be distinguished from that which is an object of human thought (*epinoia*). Through the doctrine of the Trinity we may be able to better understand—than for instance Aristotle has—what a relation is, what constitutes relational being, even perhaps what being mind involves, yet what a person is, we cannot gather from it. This too is the judgement of famous modern theologians and philosophers.⁴

It shall not remain unmentioned at this point, that the concept of person also plays a significant role in ancient grammar.

A reflection of this manifold meaning of the concept of person as found in Antiquity is provided to us by the Middle Ages. For in the school of Chartres e.g., or also in Abelard, philosophy explicitly contrasts its respective view from that of the trivium, i.e. above all from grammar and rhetoric, particularly in the case of the question so important to philosophical theology concerning the meaning of the concept of person. Abelard is profoundly aware of the ambiguity of the concept of person.⁵ In all three great versions of his 'Theology'—which is not a revealed theology, but a philosophical theology—i.e. in the *Theologia 'Summi Boni'*, in the *Theologia Christiana* and in the *Theologia 'Scholarium'*, he has distinguished between the grammatical, rhetorical and theological meaning of the concept of person. It is very early on that we all learn the grammatical meaning of the concept of 'person' by learning to distinguish between personal pronouns. The human being is in this sense three per-

2 Cf. the illuminating explanations of Maximilian Forschner, 'Der Begriff der Person in der Stoa,' in *Person: Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie*, ed. Dieter Sturma (Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), 40–6.

3 Epictetus plays a special role in the history of the concept of person, cf. Charles H. Kahn, 'Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,' in *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 234–59 and Maximilian Forschner, 'Epiktets Freiheit im Verhältnis zur klassischen stoischen Lehre (Diss. IV 1),' in Epiktet, *Was ist wahre Freiheit?: Diatribe IV 1*, ed. Samuel Vollenweider et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 97–118.

4 Cf. Forschner, 'Der Begriff der Person,' 39.

5 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.181.2228, in *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica*, vol. 2, ed. E.M. Buytaert, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 12 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), 263: 'Tribus itaque seu quatuor modis ac pluribus fortassis hoc nomen 'persona' sumitur, aliter videlicet a theologis, aliter a grammaticis, aliter a rhetoricis vel in comoediis (...)' [So the word 'person' is taken in three or four ways (and perhaps more besides): in one way by theologians, in another way by grammarians, in another way by rhetoricians or in comedies]. All translations from the Latin in the footnotes are from Mark Thakkar.

sons, namely the one who speaks, as well as the one at whom the words are directed and lastly the one of whom one speaks to another. These three persons in one human being are indeed only to be distinguished by their corresponding propria, namely the speaking of the one who speaks, the listening of the listener and the being-an-object for the two who are conversing. This meaning of the concept of person can in a certain sense be transferred to the theological domain.

It is of extraordinary significance that Abelard portends to the rhetorical meaning of the concept of person. This rhetorical tradition is of central importance for the concept of person, because here it pertains to the person, who has to take responsibility for a certain deed while standing trial at court.⁶ This is the object of the kind of rhetoric which was founded by Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd century B.C.) and which Hermogenes of Tarsos (2nd century A.D.) and his famous commentators (Sopatros and Syrianos among numerous anonymi) have continued within the Greek domain. In the Latin domain it was initially presented to us by Cicero in his early work *De inventione*, partly also in his later works, and so too by the Auctor ad Herennium. The Cicero commentaries of Marius Victorinus and Thierry of Chartres complete this rhetorical tradition.⁷

Rhetoric regards the person as a specific subject, together with what it has done as a subject. More precisely, the rhetoricians, in contrast to the grammarians, understand the person as a substance, whose activity is the activity of reason, so that—in the terminology of the rhetorical tradition—*persona* and *negotium* and correspondingly so too the attributes of the person and the attributes of the deed must always be distinguished.⁸ For this rhetorical meaning of the concept of person, Abelard refers to Boethius' commentary on the *Topics*, which reads: 'a person is that which is called to court, whose words and deeds are the object of prosecution', but also to Boethius' famous definition of person according to which it is 'an individual sub-

⁶ For the following cf. the detailed explanation in Theo Kobusch, *Selbstwerdung und Personalität: Spätantike Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf die Moderne* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 348–71.

⁷ Further details can be found in Peter von Moos, 'Dialektik, Rhetorik und "civilis scientia" im Hochmittelalter,' in *Dialektik und Rhetorik im frühen und hohen Mittelalter: Rezeption, Überlieferung und gesellschaftliche Wirkung antiker Gelehrsamkeit vornehmlich im 9. und 12. Jahrhundert*, ed. Johannes Fried (Munich: De Gruyter, 1997), 139–44; see also Mary Dickey, 'Some Commentaries on the "De Interventione" and "Ad Herennium" of the 11th and 12th centuries,' *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 6 (1968): 1–41, where the important role of Manegold of Lautenbach is emphasized.

⁸ Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.178.2207–10 (Buytaert, 262): 'Rhetores quoque alio modo quam theologi siue grammatici personam accipiunt, pro substantia scilicet rationali, ubi uidelicet de persona et negotio agunt et locos rhetoricos per attributa personae et attributa negotio distinguunt' [Rhetoricians also take 'person' in a different way than theologians or grammarians, namely for a rational substance, viz. where they deal with the person and the action and distinguish rhetorical loci by what is attributed to the person and what is attributed to the action]. Concerning the different kinds of attributes see Lucia Calboli Montefusco, 'Die *adtributa personis* und die *adtributa negotiis* als loci der Argumentation,' in *Topik und Rhetorik: Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium*, ed. Thomas Schirren and Gert Ueding (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2000), 37–50.

stance of a rational nature'.⁹ This definition, however, cannot be applied to theology at all, as in order to do so, tritheism would have to be posited.¹⁰ But since in the same place Boethius—as Abelard argues—refers to the ancient explanation of the concept *persona*, which takes it to mean the masks, which represent the people in comedies and tragedies, who are at their centre, the famous definition of person (*naturae rationalis individua substantia*) means precisely this rhetorical sense. And therefore, we call—as Abelard says—the persons in the comedies those people who portray through their *gestus* that which we say and do.¹¹

It was moreover within the rhetorical tradition that one became aware for the first time of what a person is. Indeed, this occurred precisely through the insight that the person is not a What. Rather, the person is the Who of a human being, while the *negotium* is the What, namely what one has done.¹² The distinction between the questions pertaining to the Who and the What, which had long been regarded as a discovery of the Christian doctrine of Trinity of the Middle Ages, is in reality the point of departure of this much older rhetorical tradition. The distinction between What and Who corresponds to that between the thing (*Sache*, pragma) and the person (*prosopon*). It has become infinitely important, not only for jurisprudence, as it was quickly adopted by Roman law, but also for philosophy, as for instance, for the philosophy of Kant, in which the distinction between thing and person appertains to the supporting foundation of his entire practical philosophy.

9 Boethius, *De differentiis Topicis* 4 (PL 64:1212 A): 'Persona est, quae in iudicium vocatur, cuius dictum aliquod factumve reprehenditur'; Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.179.2214–8 (Buytaert, 262): 'Qui etiam hanc acceptionem personae, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium disputans de unitate personae Dei et hominis in Christo, tali prosecutus est definitione: "Persona est", inquit, "naturae rationalis individua substantia"' [He [sc. Boethius] followed this way of taking 'person' as well, arguing *Against Eutyches and Nestorius* about the unity of the person of God and Man in Christ with the following definition: "A person", he said, "is an individual substance of a rational nature"].

10 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.179.2218–21 (Buytaert, 262): 'Quae quidem nequaquam definitio dicenda est trium personarum in diuinitate superius a nobis distinctarum, hoc est Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Alioquin cum sint tres personae, essent tres individuae rationales substantiae' [Of course, this definition must never be given for the three persons in the Godhead that we distinguished above, namely the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Otherwise they would be three individual rational substances in virtue of being three persons].

11 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.180.2222–7 (Buytaert, 262–3): 'Personas etiam comoediarum dicimus, ipsos uidelicet homines qui per gestus suos aliqua nobis facta uel dicta repraesentant. Quas et ipse Boethius ibidem distinxit dicens: "Nomen personae uidetur aliunde tractum, ex his scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque eos quorum interest homines repraesentabant"' [We also speak of the 'persons' of a comedy, namely the people who represent by their behaviour some of our words or deeds. Boethius himself distinguished these persons in the same passage as well, saying: "The name 'person' seems to be derived from elsewhere, namely from the persons who in tragedies and comedies used to represent the people concerned"].

12 Marius Victorinus, *Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam* 1.26.7–9, ed. Antonella Ippolito, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, 132 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 116. Cf. Hermogenes, *Peri Staseōn* [= Les états de cause] 3.6.3, in *Corpus Rhetoricum*, vol. 2, ed. Michel Patillon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009), 22.

In this overview, one must indeed not forget the doctrine of person of Abelard's great contemporary, namely that of Richard of St Victor. The topic of his *De Trinitate* is the self-differentiation of the godly unity in the plurality of the persons. To clarify what is understood by a person therein, Richard in turn invokes a 'general concept of the mind', i.e. a fully accepted axiom, which is the starting point of certain cognition for every intellect. Fully accepted therein is—as the structure of language already suggests—the content of the concepts of substance and person. While the substance of a thing represents its general determinedness, the concept of person signifies an individual, singular and utterly uncommunicable determinedness. The name 'substance' signifies a What, a something, the name 'person' a Who, a somebody. The something is always a generality (*Allgemeines*), the somebody, however, is as such singular, and indeed unique. Accordingly, the question 'what?' always aims at a general determinedness, the question 'who?' asks after the determinedness of the singular. It appears that Richard has adopted the distinction of the questions 'What' or 'Who' from the rhetorical tradition.¹³

The New Ontology of the Person in Alexander of Hales

With Alexander of Hales a new age for the concept of person emerges, and this in two respects at once. The person is for the first time placed in an ontological context within the scope of Christology, and this ontology of the person concurrently generates the awareness of a hitherto unknown mode of being: 'moral being' (*esse morale*). According to the *Summa Halensis* a three-fold view of being must be distinguished in Christ: natural being, i.e. the two natures in Christ, rational being, i.e. being human, and 'moral being'. It is through moral being that Christ is a 'person'. The peculiarity of the person, however, is his dignity, which is grounded in moral being.¹⁴

¹³ For the background of the rhetorical tradition cf. Kobusch, *Selbstwerdung und Personalität*, 348–71.

¹⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*) (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48) Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, Di3, M4, C1 (n. 46), p. 70: 'Alii alio modo distinguunt secundum triplicem speculationem respectu esse in Christo: est enim esse morale et esse naturale et esse rationale. Prima ergo opinio respexit ad esse naturale et, quia duae naturae sunt in Christo, dicit Christum esse duo (...) Sequens vero opinio respexit ad esse morale; persona enim est nomen dignitatis, dignitas autem ad esse moris retorquetur: unde ad personam pertinent morales proprietates. (...) Tertia vero opinio considerat esse rationale: unde dicit Christum esse quid secundum quod Deus et aliquo modo se habentem secundum quod homo' [Others draw the distinction [between the three opinions on the metaphysics of the incarnation] in another way, based on three ways of looking at 'being' in Christ: for there is moral being and natural being and rational being. So the first opinion looks at natural being, and because there are two natures in Christ, it says that Christ is two. (...) But the second opinion looks at

Moral being is the being of the will and everything connected to it. It is as such distinguished from natural being. Something which is distinguished in accordance with its nature, as are the human and the devil, can thereby be one and the same according to moral being, namely, with regard to moral depravity.¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas too knows of this distinction and connects the concept of the moral to the one of the realm of the volitional in contrast with the realm of the natural.¹⁶ This significant innovation in ontology and terminology is originally implemented in Christology.

In the background of the doctrine of person in the *Summa Halensis* lies an ontological Christology and within it a theory of moral being, which Alexander has described in greater detail in the *Glossae*. According to this theory, the ‘individual’, the *subiectum* and the ‘person’ are to be distinguished from each other in Christ. They are distinguished regarding their mode of being. The individual, as ‘this human being’ is Christ according to the mode of being of rational being, *subiectum* he is, however, insofar as natural being is constituted by human nature, and finally he is person, insofar as he possesses moral ‘or divine being’.¹⁷ Alexander expresses

moral being; for ‘person’ is a term that indicates worthiness, and worthiness is derived from moral being, which is why moral properties belong to a person. (...) And the third opinion looks at rational being, which is why it says that Christ is something insofar as he is God and a being-in-a-certain-way insofar as he is a man].

15 *SH* III, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar2 (n. 81), arg. 2 and Solutio, p.100: ‘Forte diceretur quod distinctae sunt personae in esse naturali, sed non sunt distinctae in esse morali. – Contra quod sic obicitur: Aliud est peccatum mali hominis et aliud est peccatum ipsius diaboli; ergo distincta sunt peccata; et distinctae sunt voluntates, secundum quod in voluntate est prima ratio peccati; ergo malus homo distinguitur in esse morali ab ipso diabolo; ergo nec est una persona quantum ad esse naturale nec est una persona quantum ad esse morale. (...) [Solutio]: Ad quod dicendum quod diabolus et ipsi mali dicuntur una persona, non in esse naturali, sed in esse morali secundum quemdam modum’ [Perhaps it might be said that [the devil and bad people] are distinct persons in natural being but not in moral being. Against this is the following objection: the sin of a bad man is one thing and the sin of the devil himself is another, therefore [their] sins are distinct; and [their] wills are distinct, because the fundamental ratio of a sin is in the will; therefore a bad man is distinguished in moral being from the devil himself; therefore there is not [only] one person as regards natural being, nor is there [only] one person as regards moral being. (...) In response to this, it must be said that the devil and bad people are said to be one person, not in natural being, but in moral being (in a certain way)].

16 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.10, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, vol. 14 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1926), 27: ‘Nihil autem ad malitiam moralem pertineret si actus exterior deficiens esset defectu ad voluntatem non pertinente: claudicatio enim non est vitium moris, sed naturae’ [But nothing would come under the heading of moral wickedness if external actions were deficient by a defect that did not belong to the will: for limping is not a moral failing but a failing of nature].

17 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) III, d. 6, n. 25, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 3:82: ‘Respondeo: intelligendum est quod differt dicere in Christo individuum, suppositum vel subiectum, et personam. Secundum enim esse rationis, est iste homo individuum; secundum esse naturae, est humana natura subiectum; secundum esse morale vel divinum, accipitur persona’ [I reply: it must be understood that in Christ there is a difference between speaking of an individual, a supposit or subject, and a person. For according to ration-

the same notion elsewhere by stating that corresponding to the three-fold being, there are three 'principles' in Christ: from a moral perspective, the person, under the aspect of the natural; the subject, i.e. body and soul, (while divine nature does not have the determinedness of the subject); and *secundum rationem*, the 'first substance' or 'this human being'.¹⁸

It is a threefold way of seeing, or as Alexander could also say, of speaking of Christ: when we speak of him from a moral point of view, he appears to us as a person who is a 'moral thing', because the person expresses the 'peculiarity of dignity'. If we speak of him in a logical manner, then the nature (*essentia*) of this human being lies in the foreground, which is signified by the general form of the power of thought. With reference to nature (*naturaliter*) we speak of him when what is meant is the unity of the two natures in him.¹⁹

This threefold perspective is expressed differently again, when Christ is regarded as 'one' in the moral sense (*unus*), as 'one' in the logical sense (*unum*) and is understood from a natural perspective as the union of two natures.²⁰ Behind this lies the

al being, he is this man, an individual; according to natural being, he is by human nature a subject; according to moral or divine being, he is taken as a person]; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 18, 3:80: 'Et nota quod quando Christus dicitur secundum personam, tunc dicitur secundum esse morale; quando autem secundum naturam humanam, tunc dicitur secundum esse naturale; quando autem secundum essentiam, tunc dicitur secundum esse rationale' [And note that when Christ is spoken of with respect to [his] person, he is spoken of with respect to moral being; but when he is spoken of with respect to [his] human nature, he is spoken of with respect to natural being; and when he is spoken of with respect to [his] essence, he is spoken of with respect to rational being].

18 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 7, n. 25, 3:98: 'Ut dictum est, triplex est esse; ita quasi tria principia inveniuntur in Christo: suppositum vel subiectum, substantia prima et persona. Moraliter, persona primum est in sustinendo; naturaliter, subiectum, id est anima et corpus: deitas namque non est in ratione subiecti; secundum vero rationem, substantia prima sive iste homo' [As has been said, there are three kinds of being; likewise, three quasi-principles are found in Christ: supposit or subject, primary substance, and person. Morally, he is primarily a person in suffering; naturally, he is a subject (that is, a soul and a body, for deity is not in the *ratio* of a subject); and with respect to reason, he is a primary substance or this man].

19 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 38, 3:87: 'Ortae autem sunt istae tres opiniones secundum triplex esse: naturale, morale, rationale; et secundum haec tria tripliciter contingit loqui de Christo. Persona res moris est, quia dicit proprietatem dignitatis; personaliter loqui de ipso, est loqui moraliter. Quando autem loquimur secundum essentiam quae est homo, cum sit communis forma rationis, rationaliter loquimur. [Quando] loqui autem est de unione naturarum, quomodo duae sunt naturae, naturaliter loquimur' [But these three opinions arose in accordance with three kinds of being: natural, moral, rational; and in accordance with these three, one can talk about Christ in three ways. A person is a moral thing, because [the word 'person'] indicates the property of worthiness; to speak of Christ personally is to speak from a moral perspective. But when we speak with regard to [his] essence, which is man, since it is the common form of reason, we speak from a logical perspective. And when we speak of the union of natures, in the way in which there are two natures, we speak from a natural perspective].

20 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 38, 3:87: 'Moraliter Christus est unus, non unum; rationaliter unum, prout participat unitatem personae; naturaliter est duae naturae' [From a moral perspec-

distinction of the questions pertaining to the ‘who’ and the ‘what’. It stems from the very first theory of person, which we owe to the rhetorical tradition of Antiquity. It is there that—even prior to Roman law—an initial distinction is drawn between the ‘person’ and the ‘thing’, and in this sense also between the ‘who’ and the ‘what’.²¹ Alexander of Hales has taken up this distinction, which is found already in Richard of St Victor’s *De Trinitate*. ‘Who’ accordingly asks after the person, i.e. after the moral being, ‘what’ in contrast asks after the nature or the natural being.²²

As one can easily discern, the natural being of Christ is understood at times in the sense of a doctrine of two natures, while at others simply as human nature.

More difficult to understand is the expression of the *esse rationis*. On the one hand, the individuality is grounded, as mentioned earlier, in this being.²³ However, it must be taken into account, that Alexander distinguishes a twofold sense of the concept, *individuum*. Something can be called individual, when it is a substance detached through a ‘final separation’, an *atomon* in the Greek sense. The divine persons are not individuals in this sense. Yet we also call something individual—following the idea and terminology of Porphyry—which is distinguished by a ‘collection’ or aggregation of properties, which we cannot find in any other. It is therefore this aggregation of properties, which grounds the individuality of something unique, and the divine persons can be conceived of as individuals in this sense.²⁴ On the other hand,

tive, Christ is one, not one thing; from a logical perspective, he is one thing, in that he shares the unity of a person; from a natural perspective, he is two natures].

21 Theo Kobusch, ‘Person und Handlung: Von der Rhetorik zur Metaphysik der Freiheit,’ in *Person und Rechtsperson: Zur Ideengeschichte der Personalität*, ed. Rolf Gröschner, Stephan Kirste, and Oliver W. Lembcke (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 1–28.

22 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 25, n. 8, 1:247: “Quis” est quaesitivum personae; ‘quid’ autem dupliciter: aliquando essentiae, aliquando suppositi essentiae’ [‘Who?’ asks for a person, but ‘what?’ asks in two ways: sometimes for an essence, sometimes for a supposit of an essence]; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 27, n. 8, 1:268: ‘ut per ‘quid’ quaeratur de essentia, per ‘quis’ de persona (...)’ [so that ‘what?’ is used to ask about the essence; ‘who?’ about the person (...)]; *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 297), Solutio, p. 424: ‘Per ‘quid’ ergo quaeritur ipsa divina essentia, per ‘quis’ ipsa persona (...)’ [Therefore ‘what?’ is used to ask for the divine essence; ‘who?’ for the person (...)]; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), pp. 661–2: ‘Triplex enim quaestio circa hoc nascitur: quid, quis, quomodo, ut quaerentes de aliqua persona ‘quid est’, respondebitur nomen significans essentiam, ut Deus; quaerentes ‘quis est’, respondebitur nomen significans hypostasim, ut Patrem vel personam; quaerentes ‘quomodo se habet haec persona’, respondebitur proprietas vel relatio, ut generans vel genitus (...)’ [For three questions arise about this: ‘what?’, ‘who?’, and ‘how?’, so when they ask about a person ‘What is this?’, the response will be a word signifying an essence, like ‘God’; when they ask ‘Who is this?’, the response will be a word signifying a hypostasis, like ‘the Father’ or ‘a person’; when they ask ‘How is this person?’, the response will be a property or a relation, like ‘begetting’ or ‘begotten’].

23 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 25, 3:82: ‘Secundum enim esse rationis, est iste homo individuum (...)’ [For according to rational being, he is this man, an individual (...)].

24 *SH* I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), Ad obiecta 6, p. 501: ‘Nota tamen quod intentio eius quod dicitur ‘individuum’ dicitur duobus modis. Uno modo individuum dicitur discretum secundum substantiam separatione ultima, sicut atomus: et hoc modo intentio individui nullo modo est in divinis personis;

the *Summa Halensis* brings the concept of the *esse rationis* in connection with the Aristotelian notion of the being of truth, the so-called veritative being, which in Aristotle is explicitly excluded from the domain of metaphysics.²⁵ Yet in Alexander the being of truth is not a thing of thought (*ens rationis*) in the sense of the Averroistic translation of the Aristotelian *on hos alethes*, and therefore not a result of human thought. More so it is truth, understood as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, the truth of the matter (*res*), which is also within the matter and can thereby be grasped by the intellect.²⁶ This is also the meaning of the transcendental determination of that which is true, that which is convertible with being.²⁷ The *esse rationis* therefore does not mean the objective side of the cognized truth, i.e. not the truth as cognized, but the subjective side of the alignment of the intellect with the thing. Through cognition the human is qualified as ‘this human being’, i.e. as an individual.

After all, here we are above all concerned with the concept of a person and the property of dignity which as such belongs to it and is grounded in its moral being. What indeed makes this doctrine of the person into a significant philosophical con-

alio modo individuum dicitur discretum aggregatione proprietatum, quas non est in alio reperire: et hoc modo sumeretur individuum in divinis, si in aliqua auctoritate inveniretur quod persona divina est individuum, quia est substantia habens proprietatem quam non est in alio reperire’ [Note, however, that the notion of what is called an ‘individual’ is said in two ways. In one way, an individual is said to be distinguished with respect to substance by a final separation, like an atom; and in this way the notion of an individual has no place in the divine persons. In another way, an individual is said to be distinguished by an aggregation of properties that are not to be found in anything else; and this is how ‘individual’ would be taken in the divine if it were discovered in some authoritative passage that a divine person was an individual, because it is a substance that has a property that is not to be found in anything else].

25 SH III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Respondeo, p. 3: ‘Est enim esse rationis, secundum quem modum quaecumque veritatem habent, id est adaequationem rei et intellectus, dicuntur entia: secundum hunc modum malitia est, cum deformat illud in quo est’ [For [one kind of being] is rational being, and in this way all things that have truth – that is, conformity between the thing and the thought – are called beings: in this way, wickedness is a being, as it deforms what it exists in].

26 SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M2, C4 (n. 94), Solutio, p. 152: ‘Sed est alia veritas, quae est adaequatio rei et intellectus: et haec veritas est in re, non solum ratione eius quod habet similitudinem cum primo, immo etiam ratione dissimilitudinis. Unde res corruptibilis, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet similitudinem cum primo, tamen habet veritatem quantum ad hoc unde intellectus apprehendit et intelligit quod haec res est corruptibilis (...)’ [But there is another kind of truth, which is conformity between the thing and the thought: and this truth is in a thing not only in virtue of its having a similarity to God, but also by virtue of dissimilarity. Thus a corruptible thing does not have a similarity to God insofar as it is corruptible, but in this respect it does have a truth whereby the intellect understands and thinks that this thing is corruptible (...)].

27 SH III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 10f, p. 4: ‘Ad sequens vero quo dicuntur verum et ens converti: dicendum quod accipiendo esse rationis, dicuntur privationes esse et ex iis relinqui veritatem secundum quod est adaequatio rei et intellectus, et sic dicitur esse secundum rationem (...)’ [In response to the next argument, where truth and being are said to be convertible, it must be said that, taking ‘being’ in the logical sense, privations are said to have being, and truth is said to be left by them, inasmuch as truth is conformity between the thing and the thought; and in this sense [evil] is said to have being according to logic].

ception and concurrently into a pertinent development in the history of philosophy, is clearly discernible for at least two reasons. For one from the fact that Alexander does not simply place the three perspectives alongside each other and enumerate them, but conceives of the third mode of being, moral being, the person, as that which contains and presupposes the other two. A person whose dignity lies grounded in moral being can only be thought of if their natural being, the human nature, and their rational being, human reason, are already presupposed. Within the being of the person the natural and rational being are not destroyed, but ‘suspended’.²⁸ Furthermore Alexander has assigned to the concept of person a univocal sense, i.e. the person is a determinedness, a concept, which must have the same meaning for the created and uncreated.²⁹

At the same time Alexander elucidates in the sense of the history of philosophy, that his doctrine of the person, though presupposing that of Boethius and Richard of St Victor, places a new emphasis on the idea of moral being. In the *Summa Halensis* the two famous definitions of the person, which Boethius and Richard of St Victor presented, are extensively discussed. Furthermore, Alexander clarifies how the theses of Richard must be conceived of as justified ‘corrections’ of the Boethian definition. For his own understanding of the person as a hypostasis distinguished by the property of dignity—which is itself grounded in moral being—Alexander invokes the thought or definition of certain *Magistri*, which was indeed available also to Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.³⁰ This concurrent linking-up to the historically pre-

²⁸ Cf. Alfons Hufnagel, ‘Die Wesensbestimmung der Person bei Alexander von Hales,’ *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 4 (1957): 148–74, esp. 166.

²⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 25, n. 1, 1:238: ‘Respondeo: non communiter dicitur de utroque, sed secundum prius et posterius; tamen aliquo modo est una ratio, quae est: “Persona est existentia incommunicabilis intellectualis naturae” vel “exsistens per se solum secundum quemdam existendi modum”’ [I reply: [the word ‘person’] is not said jointly of both [God and creatures], but with a relationship of prior and posterior; and yet in a way there is a single definition, which is: “A person is an unshareable existence of an intellectual nature” or “something existing by itself alone according to a certain way of existing”]. On the same topic, see *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 388), p. 572; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 388), p. 573: ““(…) Quarta univocatio est secundum convenientiam effectuum, sicut dictum est superius de hoc nomine ‘iustus’, et hoc modo hoc nomen ‘persona’ univocum est ad personas creatas et increatas, quia rationalitas creata et rationalitas increata conveniunt in effectum”’ [(…)The fourth kind of univocity is according to agreement of effects, as was said above about the word ‘just’; and in this way the word ‘person’ is applied univocally to created and uncreated persons, because a created rationality and an uncreated rationality agree in their effect”]; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M3, C3 (n. 400), Contra a, p. 589, says: ‘Ergo persona univoce dicitur’ [Therefore ‘person’ is said univocally].

³⁰ *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 387), Contra 9, p. 570: ‘Magistri vero ponunt tertiam talem: Persona est hypostasis, distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente’ [But the masters posit a third such [definition]: a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity]; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 387), Ad obiecta 9, p. 571: ‘quarta vero, quae est magistralis, dicit de persona quid est secundum usum nominis: sic enim utimur hoc nomine ‘persona’ ut dicamus personas differentes secundum differentias dignitatum’ [but the fourth [or rather, the third] definition, which belongs to the masters, says what a person is according to the word’s usage: for we

scribed person-conception and the transcending of it is expressed e.g. in the following sentences:

Note, that a person is a hypostasis [subsistence], which is signified by the property of dignity; a hypostasis is the incommunicable existence, which is based on certain individualising elements, presupposing the nature. Therefore, every person is a hypostasis, but not the other way around.³¹

The historical significance of the person-conception of Alexander of Hales cannot be estimated highly enough. With the conceptualisation of 'dignity' for the first time as the property of the person, i.e. a feature, which belongs to it as such, a new domain of being, which Alexander calls 'moral being', comes to the centre of philosophical interest. Moral being is from now on understood in the entire Middle Ages and beyond as the being of freedom or of will.³² Good and evil are the main categories, which apply to this domain.³³ Correspondingly, this domain of being of moral being does not have its respective concept of nothing. Sin is in the sense of the Au-

use the word 'person' in such a way that we call persons different according to differences in their dignity]. Cf. Albert the Great, *Alberti Magni Commentarii in I-IV Sententiarum* (hereafter, *In Sent.*), d. 25, a. 1, in *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, 38 vols, ed. Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1890–9), 25:624: 'Alia datur a Magistris, haec scilicet, Persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente' [Another [definition] is given by the masters, namely: a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity]. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (hereafter, *In Sent.*) I, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3, 4 vols, ed. R.P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47), 1:626; Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sed contra (Mandonnet, 2:90); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 3 (hereafter, *ST*), in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, vols 4–12 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888–1906), 4:331–2. The term 'magistri' seems to imply the authorship of Alanus ab Insulinus, cf. Alan of Lille, *Reguale caelestis iuris* 32, in Nicholas M. Häring, 'Magister Alanus de Insulis Regulae Caelestis Iuris,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 48 (1981): 146–7.

31 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 13, 3:78: 'Nota quod persona est hypostasis distincta per proprietatem dignitatis; hypostasis est exsistentia incommunicabilis ex quibuscumque individuanti-bus, supposita essentia. Unde omnis persona est hypostasis, et non convertitur (= n. 32).'

32 Cf. e.g. Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *In Sent.*), II, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 5, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 2:602: 'liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, respicit actum moris' [free will, as such, has to do with moral action]; Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 2, ed. Victorin Doucet, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 11 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1935), 33: 'sed esse moris habet principium seminarium in voluntate (...)' [but moral being has its seminal principle in the will (...)]; Albert the Great, *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, A, a. 23 (Borgnet, 29:592): '(...) laudem, vel vituperium: et hoc est esse moris' [praise or blame: and this is moral being]. On the history of 'moral being' see Theo Kobusch, *Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997).

33 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q5, C1 (n. 13), Ad obiecta 1, p. 22: 'Nam, cum dicitur quod bonum est contrarium malo per se, hoc intelligitur ratione boni in esse moris' [For when it is said that good is contrary to evil per se, this is understood in virtue of the good in moral being].

gustinian *privatio boni* a nothingness within the domain of moral being.³⁴ Bonaventure expanded this idea into a doctrine of double nothingness. Nothing as opposed to natural being, i.e. absence or non-existence, and nothing as the opposite of moral being, i.e. moral misconduct.³⁵ Yet as being can also encompass the *privatio* of being, so too does the immoral belong to the domain of being of ‘moral being’. Everything which has any relation to the will, the acts of the will, the circumstances of an action, motives and feelings, an external deed, even a misdeed etc., can be called ‘moral’ and ascribed to moral being. At the centre of this domain, however, lies the person. The person is qualified as a being of freedom, insofar as its mode of being is moral being. Yet the opposite concept to the moral is nature. Freedom and nature are contraposed. While the person also has a natural foundation, a person is a person through freedom.

Because the person is understood as a being of freedom, yet freedom had always been a subject of practical philosophy, the person from then on belongs to the domain of practical philosophy. In this sense Alexander has explicitly assigned the ‘being-a-subject’, i.e. human nature as understood by the philosophical discipline of natural philosophy, and accordingly the ‘individual’, i.e. the cognition, to the logical part of philosophy and finally the ‘person’, as the moral being, to moral philosophy.³⁶

Reception History

The history of the reception of this ontology of personhood developed by Alexander of Hales, which is an ontology of moral being, is in the mid-term traceable both in the philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages, and as well as clearly recognizable in the long-term in the history of philosophy. As for the immediate effect—sweepingly

³⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa I*, d. 36, n. 14, 1:362–3: ‘Sed haec privatio huius termini ‘nihil’ intelligitur in genere moris, et quoniam ‘non aliquid’ est medium inter ‘aliquid’ et ‘nihil’, ut dicit Augustinus in libro *Quinque responsionum*: “Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni” [But this privative sense of the term ‘nothing’ is understood in the moral genus; and since ‘not something’ is an intermediate between ‘something’ and ‘nothing’, as Augustine says in the *Five Responses*, “A sin is an act arising from a deficiency of the good”].

³⁵ Bonaventure, *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica*, q. 1, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae 1891), 122: ‘Et ratio huius est: quia, cum duplex sit esse, scilicet naturae et gratiae, duplex est nihilitas: uno modo per oppositionem ad esse naturae, alio modo per oppositionem ad esse moris et gratiae’ [And the reason for this is because, since there are two kinds of being, namely natural and graced, there are two kinds of nothing: in one way by contrast with natural being, in another way by contrast with moral and graced being].

³⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa I*, d. 24, n. 7, 1:237: ‘Et sciendum quod cum sint tria nomina: subiectum, individuum, persona, subiectum videtur referri primo ad naturalem philosophiam, individuum ad rationalem, persona vero ad moralem’ [And it must be known that since there are three words, ‘subject’, ‘individual’, and ‘person’, ‘subject’ seems to relate primarily to natural philosophy, ‘individual’ to logic, and ‘person’ to moral philosophy].

evaluated—this doctrine of person is adopted by the entire 13th century, most prominently within Christology. Thus only a few years after Alexander, and strongly connected in terminology, Philip the Chancellor states: *Esse personae est morale et respicit dignitatem*.³⁷ In the Christological *Quaestiones* of this time, collected and anonymously edited by W.H. Principe, there is not only a significant distinction between the unity of a natural thing, a thing of thought and a moral thing, but also with regard to the concept of the ‘individual’: the individual within the domain of nature is of a certain indeterminateness, the so-called *individuum vagum*, e.g. ‘any human being’. What is expressed in this way is an individualisation within a general or universal category. The individual in the domain of the rational is constituted by the ‘collection of accidents’, which according to the definition of Porphyry, ‘are to be found in no other’. The moral individual is indeed that which is truly ‘complete’, because it is not subsumable under a universal and is characterized by the distinguishing property of dignity.³⁸ What we can gather philosophically from this, is that that

37 Philip the Chancellor, *Quaestiones de incarnatione*, q. 2, n. 30, in Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 4, *Philip the Chancellor's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 177: [The being of a person is moral being, and it relates to dignity]. Regarding the connection with Alexander's concept of *esse morale* see Principe, *Philip the Chancellor's Theology*, 34.

38 *Quaestio 3: De unitate Ecclesiae*, n. 6, in Walter H. Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: IV. Quaestiones from Douai MS. 767: Christ as Head of the Church; The Unity of the Mystical Body*,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 44 (1982): 63: ‘Unde cum sit ens natura, est et unum natura, ens moris et unum moris, ens rationis et unum rationis’ [Hence since there is a natural being, there is also a natural unity, a moral being and a moral unity, a rational being and a logical unity]; *Quaestio 2-A: De Incarnatione*, n. 13, in Walter H. Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III. Quaestiones from Douai MS. 434: The Hypostatic Union*,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 43 (1981): 34: ‘ad hoc responderi solet quod individuum sumitur tripliciter: est enim individuum naturae, individuum rationis, individuum moris: individuum naturae, ut aliquis homo (vagum scilicet individuum); rationis, ut aliquis homo; moris, ut iste homo’ [The usual response to this is that ‘individual’ is taken in three ways: for there is a natural individual, a logical individual, and a moral individual: a natural individual, e.g. any human (that is, an indeterminate individual); a logical individual, e.g. some human; a moral individual, e.g. this man]; *Quaestiones 7: De unione divinae naturae cum humana*, n. 19, in Walter H. Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: I. Quaestiones from the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris*,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 39 (1977): 56: (The fact that the individual can be subsumed under a general) ‘hoc verum est de individuo naturae, non de individuo moris, quod est persona, quod sub nullo est’ [this is true of a natural individual, not of a moral individual, which is a person, which does not fall under anything]; *Quaestio 2-A: De incarnatione*, n. 21, in Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III*,’ 35: ‘Ad hoc dicendum quod individuum tripliciter dicitur: individuum respectu universalitatis, vel individuum respectu incommunicabilitatis, vel individuum respectu excellentis proprietatis’ [In response to this, it must be said that ‘individual’ is said in three ways: individual with respect to universality, or individual with respect to unshareability, or individual with respect to an excellent property]; *Quaestio 2-B: De incarnatione*, n. 49, in Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III*,’ 40: ‘individuum naturae, quod subiectum est in natura; individuum rationis, quod individuum est “per collectionem accidentium quam impossibile est in aliquo (alio) reperire”; individuum moris, quod perfectum est ab

which is individual in natural things (and then logically also things manufactured by the human being) is replaceable and interchangeable, while the moral individual, i.e. the individual endowed with freedom, that is, the person, is simply nonrecurring, irreplaceable, non-interchangeable, un mistakeable and incommensurable with all things.

Also, Bonaventure has adopted the doctrine of person from Alexander of Hales. The complete determinedness of the personality belongs to the individual, if the elements of 'singularity', 'incommensurability' and 'supereminent dignity' are given. Singularity therein refers to the body-soul constitution which is proper to all individuals commonly, incommunicability is that which is not common to all individuals but concerns the properties of one person only and dignity, finally, this most noble property, which stems from the divine nobility.³⁹ Here, in the periphery of Franciscan thought, the notion and concept of the infinite value of the works of Christ is developed, of its 'infinite merit', which also transfers to the personality, even the created one. Therefore, according to Bonaventure, 'infinite dignity' belongs to the per-

excellenti proprietate' [a natural individual, which is a subject in nature; a logical individual, which is individuated "by a collection of accidental properties that cannot be found in anything else"; a moral individual, which is complete in virtue of an excellent property].

39 On the origins of this three-fold distinction, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 47–90. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, 3:133: 'Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia; dicendum, quod individuum in notificatione personae triplicem importat distinctionem, videlicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis. Individuum enim dicitur quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum. – Distinctionem singularitatis voco, quod aliquid non sit commune ad plura, sed dicatur de uno solo; propter quod Socrates dicit individuum, homo vero non dicit individuum. Distinctionem incommunicabilitatis dico, quod aliquid non sit alicuius pars sive veniens in compositionem tertii; unde pes vel manus hominis, proprie loquendo, non dicitur individuum. – Distinctionem supereminentis dignitatis intelligi illam, quae accipitur a proprietate digniori' [In response to what is objected to the contrary, that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, it must be said that 'individual' in the definition of a person implies three kinds of distinction, namely with respect to singularity, unshareability, and pre-eminent dignity. For something is called 'individual' if it is intrinsically undivided and distinct from others. I call it distinction with respect to singularity when something is not common to several things, but is said of one thing only; that is why 'Socrates' indicates an individual but 'man' does not. I call it distinction with respect to unshareability when something is not part of anything and does not enter into the composition of a third thing; hence a human foot or hand, strictly speaking, is not called an individual. I understand distinction with respect to pre-eminent dignity to be a distinction taken from a comparatively worthy property]. Cf. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, 3:136. See also *SH I*, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C2 (n. 386), Respondeo, p. 568: 'ad nomen autem 'personae' proprietas individualis, singularis et incommunicabilis' [faced with the word 'person', though, [what is tacitly understood is] an individual, singular and unshareable property]; *SH VI*, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, (n. 35), Solutio, p. 55: 'Quod concedendum est, et respondendum ad obiecta dicendo quod ad esse personae requiritur triplex distinctio, scilicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et dignitatis' [This must be conceded, and to the objections one must respond by saying that the being of a person requires three kinds of distinction, namely with respect to singularity, unshareability, and dignity].

son, i.e. an infinite value, which is to be distinguished from a price as the value of the purchase.⁴⁰ Bonaventure designates it as ‘inestimable’, i.e. eluding all quantifiable estimation. Still in the 17th century in Pufendorf, freedom in this sense is called *inaestimabilis*.⁴¹ Here within the frame of the doctrine of person the later fixed terminology of Kant is anticipated: the person alone has ‘dignity’, ‘things’ have only a ‘price, i.e. a finite value’.

Within the reception-history of the concept of person from the *Summa Halensis*, Peter of John Olivi takes up a special position. According to the Franciscan philosophy of the will, he presupposes that ‘what we truly are’, is namely ‘our personality’⁴² or the person a being of the will. Almost concurrently, at the end of the eighties, Matthew of Aquasparta states that ‘the activity of the human being, insofar as it is a human being, is not cognition, but volition.’⁴³

40 Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, 3:280: ‘Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meritum Christi est infinitum; dicendum, quod infinitas meriti consurgit ex unione illius animae ad personam divinam – ob quam unionem non tantum homo, sed etiam Deus mori dicitur – propter quod meritum illud est infinitum, non ratione gratiae creatae in se, sed ratione infinitae dignitatis personae’ [In response to the objection that Christ’s merit is infinite, it must be said that the infinity of his merit arises from the union of his soul to the divine person – because of which union not only a man but also God is said to die – and accordingly his merit is infinite not in virtue of the created grace within him, but in virtue of the infinite dignity of his person].

41 Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 32, a. 1, q. 5, 3:705: ‘Dicendum quod Christus nominat personam in duabus naturis, quarum una est nobilitatis et dignitatis infinitae, et ipsa persona in se; et natura unita ratione personae habet quandam nobilitatem et dignitatem singularem et inestimabilem’ [It must be said that ‘Christ’ denotes a person in two natures, one of which is of infinite nobility and dignity; and this person in itself, and the nature united by reason of the person, has a certain nobility and dignity that is singular and inestimable]. Cf. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, 3:280: ‘meritum illud est infinitum, non ratione gratiae creatae in se, sed ratione infinitae dignitatis personae’ [Christ’s merit is infinite not in virtue of the created grace within him, but in virtue of the infinite dignity of his person]. Cf. also Vitalis de Furno, *Quodlibeta tria* II, q. 5, ed. Ferdinandus M. Delorme, Spicilegium Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 5 (Rome, Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1947), 72: ‘Omnis Christi actio erat infiniti vigoris et valoris, quia elicita a supposito infinito’ [Every action of Christ was of infinite strength and value, because it was brought about by an infinite supposit]. Cf. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, d. 25, a. 1, q. 4, 4:648: ‘Si autem tu quaeras a me, utrum sit peccatum in fide, vel in moribus; dicendum, quod ille qui emit vel vendit huiusmodi spiritualia, aut credit, ea pro pretio posse aestimari et valori rei terrenae aequari et per pecuniam possideri; et haec est haeresis manifesta (...)’ [But if you ask me whether [simony] is a sin in faith or in moral conduct, I must say that he who buys or sells such spiritual things either believes that they can be valued at a price, equated to the value of a worldly thing, and possessed for money, which is a manifest heresy (...)].

42 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum libri Sententiarum quas primum ad fidem codd. mss.* (hereafter, *In II Sent.*), q. 57, 3 vols, ed. Bernard Jansen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 4–6 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–6), 2:338: ‘id quod proprie sumus, personalitatem scilicet nostram (...)’.

43 Cf. Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de anima beata*, q. 4, ed. Aquilinus Emmen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 18 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1959), 318: ‘(...) dicendum quod operatio hominis, secundum quod homo, non est intelligere, sed velle (...)’.

That which constitutes the determinedness of the 'personality' seems for Olivi 'not able to be cognized without the intellect and the will, because indeed the person is self-reflexive existence, or existence capable of self-reflection and beyond this (*superpositum*), that which exists completely in itself.'⁴⁴ Yet no self-reflection or autonomy is possible without the faculties of the intellect and the will. It is them by which the human being can attain complete possession of himself, and this is a necessary condition of the determinedness of personality.⁴⁵ The person is thereby the being which is endowed with self-reflection, which itself is grounded in the structure of will. Therefore, Olivi can also say, that the 'root of a personal subsistence' can only be that which is completely self-reflexive and in itself exists utterly free.⁴⁶ Autonomy and self-reflection constitute the true determination of the person.⁴⁷

Belonging to the immediate sphere of influence of the doctrine of person of Alexander of Hales is also the theology of the Dominicans. Albert the Great cites, as we have seen, the thesis of the *Magistri*. Yet this must not lead to the erroneous opinion that he also accepts the Franciscan teaching on moral being. In his doctrine of the trinity, it is rather the notion of the natural in an intellectual sense which predominates. The 'person as person' appears against this background as that which can only belong to a being of a 'more dignified nature' and is only cognizable through the property of dignity.⁴⁸

It is a similar case with the concept of the person of Thomas Aquinas. It is the person-definition of Boethius which Thomas adopts. Every individual with a nature

44 Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54 (Jansen, 2:249–50): 'Ratio enim personalitatis sine intellectu et voluntate non videtur posse poni nec intelligi, quoniam persona videtur dicere existentiam super se reflexam seu reflexibilem et existentiam seu superpositum in se ipso plene consistens.'

45 Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54 (Jansen, 2:249–50): 'Quod non est aliud quam potestas plenarie possessiva sui et aliorum sine qua non est intelligere rationem personae' [This [dominion] is nothing other than the power of full possession over oneself and others, without which we cannot understand the definition of a person]. Cf. Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 52 (Jansen, 2:200): '(...) personalitatem, quae est idem quod per se existentia dominativa et libera et in se ipsam possessive reflexa vel reflexibilis, id est, se ipsam cum quadam libera reflexione possidens' [(...) personhood, which is the same as per se existence that is dominative and free and possessively self-reflected or reflexive, i.e. that possesses itself with a certain free reflection]; concerning this definition of person see François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté: Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle* (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1995), 156.

46 Cf. Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 51 (Jansen, 2:121): 'quod proprie et per se non est liberum (...) nec potens se reflectere super se directe et per se, quod est contra rationem personalis subsistentiae. Non enim potest esse aliquid radix personalis subsistentiae nisi illud quod est super se ipsum plene re-diens et in se ipso liberrime consistens' [that properly and per se is neither free (...) nor able to reflect upon itself directly and per se, which is against the definition of personal subsistence. For there can be no root of personal subsistence except that which fully reverts to itself and persists in itself most freely].

47 Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 51 (Jansen, 2:121): '(...) cum consistere et reflecti in se sit ratio altissimi suppositi quod personam dicimus' [(...) since persistence and self-reflection is the definition of the highest supposit, which we call a person].

48 Albert the Great, *In I Sent.*, d. 28, B, a. 1 (Borgnet, 26:54).

in possession of reason is a person, and subsisting in a nature capable of reasoning endows him with the greatest dignity. Dignity therefore also belongs to the divine nature, and not only to the person as a person.⁴⁹ Dignity is also not grounded, as it is in the works of Alexander, in moral being, and hence in the being of freedom, but solely in the subsistence of a nature capable of reason.⁵⁰ According to Thomas, a person is the autonomous being of that which is in possession of reason.⁵¹

As for the long-term effect of the doctrine of person in the *Summa Halensis*, and in other works of Alexander, a few remarks must suffice here. If in the investigation of the historical reception one is guided by the particular concept of person characterized by the attribution of supereminent dignity, which is grounded in ‘moral being’ as distinguished from everything natural, then one is led far into modern thought. At first ideas and terminologies were adopted by the so-called ‘Spanish Scholasticism’, most prominently Francisco Suarez. In the course of this reception, the concept of a ‘person’ was extended to the institution (as a *persona moralis composita*). Moreover, in the 17th century in this context a discovery was arrived at, which is of fundamental significance for the subsequent history of philosophy. This is the discovery of the modality of ‘moral necessity’, which is compatible with freedom, and even taken to be its highest form.

The second great multiplier of the idea of person in the *Summa Halensis* is natural law, specifically in its form shaped by the works of Samuel Pufendorf, namely *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* of 1672. For in this work, which soon became known in

49 Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 29, a. 3, 4:332: ‘Quia enim in comoediis et tragoediis repraesentabantur aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc nomen persona ad significandum aliquos dignitatem habentes. Unde consueverunt dici personae in Ecclesiis, quae habent aliquam dignitatem. Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona, ut dictum est. Sed dignitas divinae naturae excedit omnem dignitatem, et secundum hoc maxime competit Deo nomen personae’ [For since some well-known people were represented in comedies and tragedies, the word ‘person’ was assigned to signify people with some dignity. So it was customary for people with some dignity in the churches to be called persons. And some people define ‘person’ accordingly, saying that a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity. And because it is of great dignity to subsist in a rational nature, every individual of a rational nature is therefore called a person, as has been said. But the dignity of the divine nature exceeds all dignity, and accordingly the word ‘person’ is maximally appropriate for God].

50 Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 40, a. 3, 4:417: ‘Ad dignitatem autem pertinet proprietas distinguens, secundum quod intelligitur subsistens in natura rationali’ [But the distinguishing property pertains to dignity because it is understood to be subsistent in a rational nature].

51 Thomas Aquinas, *ST III*, q. 2, a. 2, 11:25: ‘Ad secundum dicendum quod personalitas necessario intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem, inquantum ad dignitatem et perfectionem eius pertinet quod per se existat, quod in nomine personae intelligitur’ [In response to the second argument, it must be said that personhood necessarily pertains to the dignity and perfection of a thing to the same extent that the thing’s per se existence (which is understood in the word ‘person’) pertains to its dignity and perfection].

Europe and even overseas, the teaching of the *entia moralia* compose the ontological foundation for a theory of the person in the double sense of the word: the individual singular person and the person of the institution (state, church and the like).

Finally, the practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be counted among the long-term effects of the Franciscan doctrine of person and will. Kant's practical philosophy is in its essence a doctrine of the will, which though seemingly originating immediately from the school of Chr. Wolff, in the end goes back to the teachings of the will of the Franciscans of the Middle Ages. One important reference for this is to be found therein that, as with Alexander of Hales, the concept of the person lies in the centre of Kant's practical philosophy, i. e. in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). Moreover, in Kant, as before in Alexander, it is solely the person which is marked out by 'dignity' and thereby distinguished from all 'things', which can only have a 'price', i. e. a finite value. By understanding 'dignity' as an 'infinite' or also as an 'absolute value', Kant draws on the terminology of the Christology of the Middle Ages, according to which the work of Christ is of 'infinite value' for humanity.⁵²

What I intended to say with this short contribution by and large, but also with reference to reception history, is this: the *Summa Halensis*, part of whose doctrine of person I have discussed here, is a significant work, and its significance can, not least of all, be deduced from the history of its reception.

52 For a detailed explanation of Kant's practical philosophy see Theo Kobusch, 'Die praktischen Elementarbegriffe als Modi der Willensbestimmung: Zu Kants Lehre von den "Kategorien der Freiheit"', in *Die "Kategorien der Freiheit" in Kants praktischer Philosophie: Historisch-systematische Beiträge*, ed. Stephan Zimmermann, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, 193 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 17–75; see also Theo Kobusch, 'Das Moralische: Der absolute Standpunkt: Kants Metaphysik der Sitten und ihre Herausforderung für das moderne Denken,' in *Freiheit nach Kant: Tradition, Rezeption, Transformation, Aktualität*, ed. Saša Josifović and Jörg Noller (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019), 54–92.