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The Ontology of Grace of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle

Abstract: A major advance in the theology of grace occurred in the 13th century, as theologians began to conceive of grace as created, positing *gratia creata* alongside *gratia increata*. While Philip the Chancellor has long been regarded as the primary catalyst of this development, it was Alexander of Hales who introduced these terms, and his Franciscan confrère, John of La Rochelle, who first explained their relation. The contribution of these Franciscans to the development of the theology of grace has been underappreciated, in part because Hales's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (the first critical edition of which has only recently appeared) and Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and *Tractatus de gratia* have received little attention. Through an exposition and analysis of these texts, as well as the relevant portions of the *Summa Halensis*, this article demonstrates how the early Franciscans spearheaded the 13th-century development in the ontology of grace.

A turning point in the theology of grace—what Bernard Lonergan called a ‘Copernican revolution’—occurred in the 13th century at the University of Paris.¹ Specifically, this revolution concerned the ontology of grace. Theologians began to conceive of grace as created, positing *gratia creata* alongside *gratia increata*. The move can be seen in comparing Peter Lombard's conception of grace as something uncreated, namely, charity, which is equated with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul, with the view of Thomas Aquinas, who argues that grace is not only uncreated, but also, as sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), is a created form in the soul.² While this development from the Lombard to Aquinas may have been a Copernican revolution, it was not a quantum leap. Rather, it occurred incrementally through a series of figures. Key among them were the Franciscans Alexander of Hales and his student and confrère, John of La Rochelle (de Rupella). Alexander was the first theologian to use the terms *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*. Rupella was the first to explain their relation. Nevertheless, their theology of grace is relatively unknown. The *De gratia* treatise of the *Summa Halensis*, the magnum opus of the early Francis-

1 Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000 [original, 1971]), 17.

2 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 17, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81): 1:141–52; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* II, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, 4 vols, ed. Marie Fabien Moos and Pierre Félix Mandonnet (Paris: Sumptibus P. Lethielleux, 1929–47): 2:667–70; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 7, 4 vols, ed. Pietro Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1948): 2:553.

cans, has received a modicum of study.³ Yet their personal treatises on grace, Hales' *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and Rupella's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and *Tractatus de gratia*, have been largely ignored by scholars.⁴ Hence the role these theologians played as catalysts of the 'Copernican revolution' has been underappreciated.

This article seeks to address this lacuna by offering an exposition and analysis of the ontology of grace of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle. In the process, it will challenge three claims. First, scholars have asserted that John merely repeated, or only minimally developed, Alexander's theology of grace.⁵ This claim was made without recourse to Alexander's principal treatise on grace and consequently without a detailed comparison between Alexander's and John's personal treatises on grace. When this comparison is made, as our study will do, it is clear that Rupella significantly developed Hales in articulating the interplay between uncreated and created grace. Second, this article will question the opinion that Philip the Chancellor was the key protagonist in bringing about the new ontology of grace.⁶ As will be

3 Studies of the *Summa Halensis*' theology of grace include Karl Heim, *Die Lehre von der gratia gratis data nach Alexander Halesius* (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1907); Karl Heim, *Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhältnis zu den natürlichen Funktionen des Menschen bei Alexander Halesius* (Leipzig: Heinsius, 1907); Bogumil Remec, *De sanctitate et gratia doctrina summae theologiae Alexandri Halensis* (Ljubljana: Domus Societatis Jesu, 1940); Alejandro Salas Cacho, 'El concepto de la gracia en la Suma Teológica de Alejandro de Hales' (PhD thesis, Pamplona Universidad Navarra, 1985); H. Daniel Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa: A Lonergan Reading' (PhD thesis, University of St Michael's College, 2000); Hubert Philipp Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter*, Innsbrucker Theologische Studien, 63 (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2003); Gérard Philips, 'La théologie de la grâce dans la *Summa fratris Alexandri*,' *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 49 (1973): 100–23; Guillermo A. Juarez, 'La inhabitación y su relación con la presencia ubicua, considerada desde la doctrina de la Suma Halesiana sobre la gracia y la procesión temporal de la persona divina,' *Estudios Trinitarios* 41 (2007): 41–88.

4 A critical edition of Alexander of Hales' *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* is found in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica; Un contributo alla teologia della grazia nella prima metà del sec. XIII*, ed. Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, *Studia Antoniana*, 50 (Rome: Antonianum, 2008). Critical editions of John of La Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and *Tractatus de gratia* are found in Ludwig Hödl, *Die neuen Quästionen der Gnadentheologie des Johannes von Rupella OM (+ 1245) in Cod. lat. Paris. 14726*, *Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Instituts der Universität München*, 8 (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1964). All citations are to page number of these editions.

5 Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78–9; Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa,' 89, n. 8.

6 The attribution has become commonplace. Lonergan calls the Chancellor's formulation of grace a 'pivotal moment'. Stephen Duffy says a 'major breakthrough emerges in his [the Chancellor's] writings.' Paul O'Callaghan regards the Chancellor as 'the first medieval author to have reflected on the relationship between the natural and the supernatural order.' See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 20; Stephen J. Duffy, *The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 152; Paul O'Callaghan, *Children of God in the World: An Introduction to Theological Anthropology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 339.

shown, the early Franciscan account, which was developed prior and concurrent to the Chancellor's, exceeds his in sophistication. Third, our study will disprove Karl Rahner's categorical assertion that all scholastic theories base God's indwelling and union with the soul exclusively upon created grace.⁷ This is not the case in John of La Rochelle.

The article will unfold in three parts. The first will introduce Hales and Rupella and their treatises on grace. It will also consider the status of the questions that formed the immediate backdrop to their work. Next, an exposition of Alexander's and John's respective ontologies of grace will be given. The third part of the article will compare and analyze their accounts. It will be shown how John both built on the thought of Alexander, especially in adopting the schema of *esse primum-esse secundum* as a way to articulate the orders of nature and grace, and advanced beyond his master by explaining how created grace is a disposition or habit by which the human person is made deiform and joined to God through the reception of uncreated grace. This latter development in John of La Rochelle marked not only a theological shift within the early Franciscan school, but was a watershed moment for the theology of grace as a whole.

Background

The development in the theology of grace that occurred in the second quarter of the 13th century contained two interconnected elements. First, theologians began to speak of grace as created, distinguishing between uncreated grace and created grace. Second, they began to conceive of grace as an accidental property of the one having grace. This was articulated in various ways, such as by calling grace a quality, habit, disposition, or form. The terminology of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* surfaced in the works of three theologians operating concurrently in Paris: Philip the Chancellor (c. 1160–1236), Alexander of Hales (before 1186–1245), and John of La Rochelle (c. 1190/1200–1245). In his comprehensive historical study of the notion of created grace, Gérard Philips concludes that the term *gratia creata* appeared for the first time in written form in Alexander of Hales, specifically in Alexander's *Glossa* on Lombard's *Sentences*, which Philips dates to 1225.⁸ The first traces of grace con-

7 Karl Rahner, 'Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace,' in *Theological Investigations I: God, Christ, Mary and Grace*, trans. Cornelius Ernst (New York: Seabury Press, 1974 [original German, 1939]), 325.

8 See Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) II, d. 26, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 2:242–7. The term *gratia creata* also appears in Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae* 'antequam esset frater' and in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*; see Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae* 'Antequam esset frater' (hereafter, *Antequam esset frater*), q. 12, m. 2 and q. 53, m. 3, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Francis-

ceived of as an accident are found in William of Auxerre (d. 1231), who calls grace a *habitus superadditus naturalibus*, and in William of Auvergne (c. 1180–1249), who speaks of grace as a medium.⁹ Both conceive of grace as elevating human beings above their natural powers, thus sketching the outlines of a formal theory of *gratia elevans*.¹⁰ For his part, Philip the Chancellor, in his treatise on grace in the *Summa de bono*—the first treatise ever dedicated explicitly to grace—distinguishes between uncreated and created grace, asks whether grace is a substance or an accident, and considers grace vis-à-vis the virtues.¹¹

Yet the Chancellor's treatment of these matters, like that of the other secular masters William of Auxerre and William of Auvergne, is cursory compared to the fuller development found in the early Franciscan school. The chef d'œuvre of this school is the *Summa Halensis*.¹² The *Summa* was long thought to be the sole work of Hales. Since the early 20th century, however, scholars have viewed the *Summa Halensis* as a collaborative work. Alexander likely initiated the project and contributed to parts of it, but his work was supplemented and redacted by other Franciscans at Paris. While it is known that John of La Rochelle was Hales' chief collaborator, definitive proof of the identity of all of the authors for each part of the *Summa Halensis* is lacking. One

cana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:155–6 and 2:1020–2; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, q. 3, ed. Nicolai Wicki, 2 vols, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta, 2 (Bern: Francke, 1985), 1:364. Modern editors date Alexander's *Glossa* to between 1222 and 1229 and the *Antequam esset frater* to between 1220 and 1236. The Chancellor's *Summa de bono* was completed in 1232. See Gérard Philips, *L'union personnelle avec le Dieu vivant: Essai sur l'origine et le sens de la grâce créée*, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium, 36 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989), 81–2; Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian *Summa*,' 86–90.

⁹ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 10, c. 5, q. 1, ed. Jean Ribailier, 7 vols, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 2:289; William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de gratia* 6, in *Il "Tractatus de gratia" di Guglielmo d'Auvergne*, ed. Guglielmo Corti (Rome: Libreria Editrice della Pontificia Università Lateranense, 1966), 60–1.

¹⁰ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 10, c. 5, q. 2 (Ribailier, 2:293–7); William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de gratia* 3 (Corti, 52–5).

¹¹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, qq. 1–4 (Wicki, 1:355–68). For more on this history, see Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'Dottrina della grazia: Da Agostino d'Ippona ad Alessandro di Hales,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 176–92; Johann Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik*, 2 vols (Freiburg: Herder, 1942–51).

¹² The work is also known as the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, *Summa theologica* of Alexander of Hales, or the *Summa [universae] theologiae* of Alexander of Hales. While various editions of the text have been published since the 15th century, the first critical edition was undertaken by the Quaracchi editors in the 20th century: Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48). All citations are to this edition. For other editions, see Irenaeus Herscher, 'A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945): 434–54.

scholar has suggested that the uncertain status of the *Summa*'s authorship has led to its neglect by scholars, opining that the questions of its authorship will only be settled when there are critical editions of the personal works of all of the *Summa*'s putative authors.¹³

Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki's recent completion of the first critical edition of Alexander of Hales' *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* is a step in this direction. The text opens a hitherto closed window into Hales' doctrine of grace. Alexander's other works for which there exist critical editions, for example, his *Glossa* on Lombard's *Sentences* and his *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, do not contain treatises dedicated to grace, even if they treat the matter obliquely.¹⁴ Moreover, the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* belong to Hales' *postquam fuit frater* phase, having been composed sometime between 1236 and 1245, and thus they represent Alexander's mature theology of grace.¹⁵ This dating also places them in the same period when work was beginning on the *Summa Halensis* and in which John of La Rochelle composed his two personal works on grace, his *Tractatus de gratia* and *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*.

John of La Rochelle has long been seen as the redactor of and principal contributor to the third book of the *Summa Halensis*, where the *Summa*'s treatise on grace is found. Yet the *Summa*'s *De gratia* treatise is a hybrid work. In the main, it relies—sometimes verbatim—on Rupella's writings on grace. Other passages, however, reproduce Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*. For example, the second question of Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (*Quator consequencia gratiam*) is inserted into the *Summa Halensis* with only slight reworkings as the eighth and final question (*De gratia comparative spectata*) of the *Summa*'s first tractate on

13 The suggestion, and this historiography, comes from Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Other putative contributors to the *Summa Halensis* include Odo Rigaldus, who may have taken over the project after the deaths of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, and William of Melitona, who possibly made the final edits to the *Summa* with Bonaventure. Composition of the *Summa* likely began around 1238. The work seems to have been substantially completed by the deaths of Alexander and John in 1245, although the *Summa* was probably not entirely finished until 1256. For more on the composition of the *Summa Halensis*, see Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae fratris Alexandri"', in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948); Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312; Jacques Guy Bougerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure*, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, NJ: St Anthony Guild Press, 1964), 13–21; Johann Auer, 'Textkritische Studien zur Gnadenlehre des Alexander von Hale,' *Scholastik* 15 (1940): 63–75.

14 For the editions see above, n. 8.

15 Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Problematiche storico-letterarie,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 100.

grace, which concerns sanctifying grace (*De gratia gratum faciente*).¹⁶ The *Summa*'s articles that pertain to the ontology of grace, however, use Rupella's rather than Hales' material. These include questions such as whether grace is created or uncreated, whether grace is a substance or an accident, whether grace differs from virtue, and what the definition of grace is. This selection is noteworthy, since both friars treat these questions in their respective personal works on grace.

The critical edition of Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* allows one to compare the thought of master and student on these decisive questions. Hitherto, scholars have tended to emphasize the continuity in the early Franciscan school's doctrine of grace, especially between Hales and Rupella. For example, Alister McGrath rightly notes that the latter developed the former's thought by articulating the soul's need for a disposition in order to receive uncreated grace.¹⁷ However, McGrath's account of this development is cursory, being limited by the fact that he only compares John's personal works on grace with Alexander's *Glossa* on the *Sentences* and *Quaestiones disputatae* 'antequam esset frater', both of which lack the robust treatment of grace that is present in the *postquam fuit frater* questions. Perhaps for this reason, he concludes that 'it is possible to argue that the main features of the early Franciscan school's teaching on justification are essentially identical with the early teaching of Alexander of Hales.'¹⁸ Similarly, H. Daniel Monsour argues that the first robust discussion of the distinction between the terms *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* is found in the *Summa Halensis*. While noting that the treatise on grace in the *Summa* may represent elaborations on Alexander's thought by his collaborators, including John of La Rochelle, Monsour nevertheless endorses 'the possibility that John may have been largely or, at least, significantly dependent on Alexander for the content of the first part of *De Gratia*.'¹⁹ Both McGrath and Monsour made these assertions without recourse to Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*. A comparison of these questions with John's personal works on grace presents a different picture, in which the student is seen to have considerably developed the work of his master concerning the ontology of grace. As these texts are little known, an exposition of them is in order.

¹⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 2 (Wierzbicki, 135–60); *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q8 (nn. 642–45), pp. 1016–22.

¹⁷ McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 78–9.

¹⁸ McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 161.

¹⁹ Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa,' 86–90, quotation at 89, n. 8.

Alexander of Hales

Alexander of Hales' *De gratia* questions come from the first series of his *Quaestiones disputatae* 'postquam fuit frater'.²⁰ There are two *De gratia* questions. The first treats grace in general, while the second considers grace vis-à-vis virtues, gifts, fruits, and beatitudes. The first *quaestio* is divided into two *disputationes*. The first disputation considers grace in itself, and the second treats grace in relation to *liberum arbitrium*. Finally, this first *disputatio* consists of two *membra*. The first inquires after the existence and necessity of grace. The second asks what grace is, exploring the quiddity of grace. It is divided into three articles: 1. whether grace is a substance or an accident; 2. whether grace is the same as virtue; and 3. what the definition of grace is. The marrow of Hales' ontology of grace is found in these three articles.

Alexander begins his exploration of the quiddity of grace by asking whether grace is a substance or an accident.²¹ Five preliminary arguments are presented, three that hold that grace is a substance and two that consider it an accident. Alexander commences his *responsio* by drawing a fundamental distinction between uncreated grace and created grace. Uncreated grace is identified with the Holy Spirit; there is no doubt that this is a substance. Created grace, on the other hand, is infused in the soul by God. In order to explain the ontological status of created grace, Alexander makes a distinction between what he calls the 'first being' (*esse primum*) of a thing and its 'second being' (*esse secundum*). These are distinguished by their differing perfections. A thing with respect to *esse primum* is perfected by its own act. This act, with respect to this *esse*, is a substance, not only according to how it is ordered to that which it perfects, but in itself. In contradistinction, a thing with respect to *esse secundum* is perfected by a different act. Yet the act which perfects a thing in second being, like the act which perfects a thing in first being, is a substance, both with respect to this *esse* and with respect to the thing which it perfects in *esse secundum*. In itself, however, *esse secundum* is accidental. Returning to the issue at hand, namely, the ontological status of created grace in the soul, Alexander judges that grace is the perfection of the soul not with respect to *esse primum*, but with respect to *esse secundum*. Therefore, he concludes that grace in itself and simply is accidental. Yet in its ordering to the soul as that which perfects and vivifies it, grace, with respect to *esse secundum*, is a substantial thing.²²

Alexander immediately addresses an objection that states that grace should be a substance, given that grace is a likeness to God. Since substance is in God, the ob-

²⁰ For questions concerning authorship, dating, and redaction history of the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, see Wierzbicki, 'Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Problematiche storico-letterarie,' 69–109.

²¹ Prior to the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, Alexander had already taken up the question of whether grace is an accident in the soul in his *Glossa* on the *Sentences*. However, in this early treatment, he gives neither a clear nor detailed response. See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 26, 2:245–6.

²² Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 1 (Wierzbicki, 120–2).

jection argues, grace as God's likeness in the soul should also be a substance. Alexander responds that this is not so, because a thing that is in God as a substance is in us as an accident, for example, goodness. Yet grace is something substantial inasmuch as it perfects the soul in what Alexander here calls 'gratuitous being' (*esse gratuito*), which equates with *esse secundum*.²³

Hales' responses to the objections shed further light on the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction. To a first objection that holds that grace must be a substance insofar as it joins the soul to God, Hales argues that while this is true of grace, this joining happens not through nature nor with respect to *esse primum*, but rather through assimilation and with respect to *esse secundum*, which is accidental rather than substantial. A second objection argues that grace is a substance insofar as it vivifies and perfects the soul, just as the soul perfects the body. Alexander responds that grace does vivify and perfect the soul, but not insofar as the soul is a substance, but rather insofar as the soul is ordered to an end. Were grace to perfect the soul in terms of it being a substance in the manner in which the soul perfects the body, then grace would be a substance, but this is not so.²⁴

Having concluded his consideration of whether grace is a substance or an accident, Alexander proceeds in the second article to inquire whether grace is the same as virtue. An opinion holding that they are the same is put forward. It commences with a quotation attributed to Augustine: 'Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly and no one does wrong, which God works in us without us.'²⁵ Since this is also true of grace, it would seem that grace and virtue are the same. Alexander responds that grace is not the same as virtue. He concedes that both the first part and last part of this definition of virtue are also fitting for grace; that is, both virtue and grace are good qualities of the mind and are worked by God in us without us. However, whereas virtues cannot be used badly, grace can be misused—not grace as *gratia gratum faciens*, but grace as *gratia gratis data*. Furthermore, there is a distinction between grace and virtue in the second part of the Augustinian definition, 'by which one lives rightly'. Here, 'to live' refers properly to grace, since the soul lives in this sense by having the life of grace, while 'rightly' is said in reference to virtues, more specifically, in having righteous virtue in actions and affections. Put differently, one *lives* by grace, but lives *rightly*, by gratuitous virtue. As Alexander puts it, 'When I say "gratuitous virtue" I mean two things: first,

²³ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 1 (Wierzbicki, 122).

²⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 1 (Wierzbicki, 122–3).

²⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 2 (Wierzbicki, 124): 'Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte uiuitur, qua nemo male operatur, quam Deus operatur in nobis sine nobis.' For the background of this definition, see the critical edition's apparatus for lines 294–6.

what is gratuitous, and this refers to living; and second, what virtue is, and this refers to having rectitude.²⁶

The Irrefutable Doctor's inquiry into the quiddity of grace culminates in the third and final article, which treats the definition of grace. There are no objections in this article, with Hales moving immediately to his response. He begins by invoking the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction. In *esse primum*, there is a first act, life, by which the living live, and there are other consequent acts which proceed from natural powers. Likewise in *esse secundum*, there is a first act, the life which comes by grace, and then consequent acts which proceed from the powers of the soul, namely, virtues. In light of this parallel, Alexander goes on to say that this first act in *esse secundum*—the life stemming from grace—is common to both baptized infants and good adults, even though only adults, and not baptized infants, can perform meritorious acts. Why? Hales explains that in baptized infants, the first act of the soul in *esse secundum*, the life of grace, exists, as it does in good adults. But this first act of the soul can be distinguished from the soul's other powers from which its operations come forth. In baptized infants, the virtues by which one gains merit do not exist in use, but only in habit, inasmuch as these little ones are pleasing to God in sanctifying grace (*in quantum gratuite sunt*). Then Alexander makes the important observation: 'Just as the act of living, which is the first act in first being, always is in act, so likewise the act which is living by grace always is in act in those having sanctifying grace.'²⁷ For sanctifying grace, rather than gratuitous grace, vivifies the soul. Just as the powers of the soul in *esse primum* are not always in act, so likewise the powers of the soul in *esse secundum* of one in a state of sanctifying grace—namely, the virtues—are not always in act, but exist according to habit. In contrast, 'sanctifying grace always is in act.'²⁸ Thus, this grace can properly be called an act, while the virtues are habits.²⁹

²⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 2 (Wierzbicki, 125): 'Set cum dico "uirtutem gratuitam", duo dico: quod est gratuitem et hoc ad uiuere refertur, et quod est uirtus, et hoc ad rectitudinem habet referri.'

²⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 126): 'Et sicut actus qui est uiuere, qui est primus actus in primo esse, semper est in suo actu, ita actus, qui est uiuere per gratiam, semper est in suo actu, ita actus, qui est uiuere per gratiam, semper est in suo actu in habente gratiam gratum facientem.'

²⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 126): 'Set gracia gratum faciens semper est in suo actu.'

²⁹ A coda to Alexander of Hales' account of the relationship of grace to virtue is found in the article of the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* considering whether grace is necessary. There, Alexander explains how the soul performs meritorious acts. He says that grace is not just the form, but also the mover (*motor*), of free will. In Alexander's account, 'God moves the free will through grace toward the good. God is as a separated mover, and grace is as a conjoined mover' ('Deus mouet liberum arbitrium per gratiam ad bonum, et Deus est quasi motor separatus, gracia quasi motor coniunctus'). God, therefore, is the one that moves the soul to perform meritorious works, but he does so through grace moving free will. See Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 1 (Wierzbicki, 117).

This elucidation of the status of *gratia gratum faciens* as act and the virtues as habits permits Alexander to reach the summit of the whole inquiry concerning the quiddity of grace, namely, his definition of grace:

Grace is the first and perfect act of the soul in second being. It is called “act” in distinction from virtues, which, rather, are habits. It is called “first” in distinction from acts that are elicited by virtues, which are instead consequent acts. It is called “perfect” in distinction from gratuitous graces, which do not fully perfect the soul. “Second being” is added to distinguish it from the perfecting act of the soul in first being.³⁰

John of La Rochelle would develop this conception of grace. To his work we now turn.

John of La Rochelle

In his *Tractatus de gratia*, John of La Rochelle considers the same questions pertaining to the ontology of grace as did his master. The structure of Rupella’s account closely follows that of Hales’. Under the rubric of ‘On grace in general’, John first asks whether grace is necessary, before moving on to the question of what grace is. This question is subdivided into three *membra*: 1. what grace is in reality; 2. what grace is according to definition; and 3. what grace is according to name. In the first of these *membra*, John proposes the core of his ontology of grace in four articles, considering whether grace is something in reality in the soul, whether grace is created or uncreated, whether created grace is a substance or an accident, and whether grace is in essence the same as virtue. These four articles from Rupella’s *Tractatus de gratia* are reproduced—in large measure verbatim—in the *Summa Halensis*, comprising the first chapter of the *Summa*’s *Quid sit gratia* question.³¹ They also echo material found in John’s *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, developing what is sketched there into a more polished literary form.³² Thus, three fonts present themselves for an exposition of John of La Rochelle’s doctrine of grace: the more primitive *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, the *Tractatus de gratia*, and finally the corresponding *Summa Halensis* questions that incorporated his material and were edited under his hand.

³⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 127): ‘Gracia est primus actus et perfectus anime in esse secundo; et dicitur ‘actus’ ad differentiam uirtutum, que potius sunt habitus; ‘primus’ ad differentiam actuum, qui habent elici / a uirtutibus, qui magis consequentes sunt; ‘perfectus’ ad differentiam gratarum gratis datarum, que animam non perficiunt; ‘esse secundum’ additur ad differentiam actus perficientis animam in primo esse.’

³¹ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (nn. 608–11), pp. 956–66. For a textual comparison of John of La Rochelle’s *Tractatus de gratia* and *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* with the *Summa Halensis*, see Hödl, *Die neuen Quästionen der Gnadentheologie*, 23–8.

³² Hödl, *Die neuen Quästionen der Gnadentheologie*, 18–23.

A preliminary inquiry John makes under the umbrella question, ‘What is grace?’, is whether grace places something in the soul. He answers that grace, by which one is said to be pleasing to God (*esse gratus Deo*), necessarily places something in the soul that renders one pleasing to God. One is pleasing to God, John explains, through deiformity and being assimilated to God; in other words, one is pleasing to God when one is similar to him. In contrast, one is displeasing (*odiosus*) to God when one is dissimilar to him, as is the case for the sinner, whose sin has placed in his soul a defect and privation that renders him unlike God. Grace places in the soul a positive assimilation to God, by which one becomes worthy of eternal life, which is the full assimilation of the rational creature to God.³³

Rupella then asks the pivotal question of whether grace is a created or uncreated thing in the one who has grace. In the *Tractatus*, he presents seven arguments for grace being uncreated and five for it being created before he gives his account; these are each reproduced in the *Summa Halensis*. John states that there is both created grace and uncreated grace in a person having grace. Uncreated grace is equated with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is called grace both inasmuch as he is gift (*donum*) and inasmuch as he is given (*datum*). These differ, John explains, in that the Holy Spirit is *gift* from all eternity, but he is *given* in time. For even though the Holy Spirit himself is bestowable from all eternity, there has not existed from all eternity a creature to which the Holy Spirit could be given. The bestowal of the gift of the Holy Spirit to the creature, Rupella states, is that ‘glorious gift’ which Jesus promises he will send to his disciples (John 14:16), ‘because the Holy Spirit by it makes us pleasing to him by making us deiform.’³⁴ Because the Holy Spirit is love, and ‘the power of love is to transform the loved into the lover’, when the Holy Spirit is given to us, he transforms us into a divine likeness.³⁵ John calls this transformation ‘deiformity’. It comes about through the soul receiving in its affect the form of the Holy Spirit. Thus, while the Holy Spirit is uncreated grace, he produces created grace as the disposition of the rational soul, preparing it for the reception of uncreated grace.³⁶

The salient point in John’s replies to the objections—many of which argue, in one way or another, that God acts in the soul immediately and thus has no need of created grace—is that while created grace is not needed from the side of God, it is needed from the side of the creature. The assimilation of the soul to God requires an assimilating form and a disposing form, the latter being placed in the soul by the former. The need for this form is not on the part of the Holy Spirit, but rather on the part of the soul, which is not able to receive uncreated grace unless it is disposed

³³ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar1 (n. 608), p. 957.

³⁴ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72): ‘Quia Spiritus Sanctus eo facit nos gratos quo facit nos deiformes.’

³⁵ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72): ‘Haec enim est vis amoris, ut transformet amatum in amantem.’

³⁶ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72).

by created grace. Put differently, uncreated grace is united to the soul without a medium, but from the soul's side, the medium of created grace is necessary. By a similar logic, Rupella says that created grace in one way is finite and in another way is infinite: it is finite inasmuch as it is in a finite creature, but it is infinite according to its source, uncreated grace, which is infinite goodness. Given that created grace comes from God, it is truth, and so—against the objection that the highest truth cannot be joined to that which is vanity—created grace is seen as that which disposes the soul for such a union.³⁷

The *Summa Halensis* reproduces this discussion, with the addendum of identifying created grace explicitly with sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*).³⁸ In Rupella's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*'s treatment of whether grace is uncreated or created, one finds many of the same arguments concerning the need for a *dispositio* on the part of the soul, rather than on the part of God, for the union of the soul with God. Here, however, John advances one important argument not found in the *Tractatus* or the *Summa*. He cites an argument from Augustine holding that the soul is naturally capable of God (*per naturalia capax Dei*) and capable of being beatified; therefore, it would seem that the soul is beatified without grace, or that grace is simply God himself. John responds by arguing that while the soul is *capax Dei* and capable of being beatified according to its natural powers, nevertheless, it is not beatified through natural powers alone, but rather it is elevated beyond its nature through grace, which elevates its natural powers and sufficiently disposes them for beatitude.³⁹

Rupella then proceeds to ask whether created grace is a substance or an accident. The *solutio* to the article is here reproduced in full, so that a detailed comparison of it with Hales' account may be given:

Created grace has a twofold relation, namely, according to the first being of the soul, which is of nature, and according to the second being, that is, well being or ordered being, according to which it is ordered to the soul. In regard to the first being of the soul, which is the being of nature, I say that [created grace] is an accident, because it is a disposition arising in the soul after the soul has reached its fulfillment in first being. But in a second way, [created grace] is a substantial disposition—although not a substance—namely, in regard to second being. This is because second being with respect to first being is accidental and in no way substantial. For that reason, the principle of this being will be accidental and not substantial. However, [created grace] is substantial with respect to [second being].⁴⁰

37 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72–4).

38 SH III, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar2 (n. 609), p. 960.

39 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 7 (Hödl, 69).

40 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 910), p. 962: 'Gratia creata duplicem habet comparationem, scilicet ad primum esse animae, quod est naturae, et ad esse secundum ipsius, quod est bene esse vel esse ordinis, secundum quod comparatur ad animam. Quantum ad primum esse animae, quod est esse naturae, sic dico quod est accidens, quia est dispositio adveniēns animae post completionem illius quantum ad illud esse. Secundo autem modo est dispositio substantialis, non tamen substantia, scilicet quantum ad secundum esse, et hoc est quia secundum esse est accidentale respectu primi

The notion of created grace as an accident in terms of being a disposition is further developed in the subsequent discussion of whether grace and virtue are the same thing. John opines that they are the same according to substance, but that they differ according to essence and according to *ratio* or definition. For while grace and virtue subsist by the same thing, their essences differ, because that by which grace is grace is not the same as that by which virtue is virtue. John explains that grace differs from virtue as the soul differs from its powers. Thus grace perfects the soul with respect to its essence, but virtues perfect the soul with respect to its powers. He employs the metaphor of light and rays: while a light and its rays are the same according to substance, given that light is the substance of rays of light, there is a difference in essence, since light perfects the air indistinctly, while rays perfect distinct parts of the air. So, too, grace perfects the soul essentially and indistinctly with regard to the soul's powers, while virtues perfect the soul according to distinct powers.⁴¹

The first objection to this account was also treated by Hales; it argues that grace and virtue are the same based on the definition of virtue being a good quality of the mind. John responds by saying that this definition is said of grace and virtue in diverse ways, because 'mind' is here to be understood in a twofold manner. It can refer to a substance, in which case it is fitting to say that grace is a good quality of the mind. But 'mind' can also refer to the powers of cognizing and loving (*potentia cognoscendi et diligendi*), in which case it refers to virtue. Likewise, 'to live rightly' can also be said in two ways. This can mean 'to exist well' (*bene esse*), which happens through grace, or it can mean 'to act well' (*bene operari*), which comes about by virtue. This distinction clarifies a difference between baptized infants and adults: whereas adults 'live rightly' in both senses, according to *bene esse* and *bene operari*, baptized infants live well only in the first sense of *bene esse*. Thus, it is seen how baptized infants can possess grace without virtue.⁴²

Finally, the discourse arrives at the definition of grace. John, in both the *Tractatus de gratia* and *Summa Halensis*, first indicates what grace is according to name (*secundum nominis rationem*) and, second, according to definition (*secundum definitionem*). According to name, 'Grace is a gift given by God without merits that makes the one having it pleasing to God.'⁴³ On the other hand, according to definition, 'Grace is a habit of the mind, universally ordinative of the whole of life.'⁴⁴ This def-

esse et nullo modo substantiale, et ideo principium illius esse erit accidens et non substantia; est tamen substantiale quantum ad illud.'

41 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar4 (n. 611), pp. 963–6.

42 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar4 (n. 611), pp. 963–6.

43 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar1 (n. 612), p. 967: 'Gratia est donum a Deo sine meritis datum, gratum faciens habentem.'

44 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar2 (n. 613), p. 967: 'Gratia est habitus mentis, universaliter totius vitae ordinativus.' The definition is close to one found in Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, q. 1 (Wicki, 1:357): 'Gratia est habitus universaliter totius vite ordinativus' [Grace is a habit universally ordinative of the whole of life].

inition is then unpacked. The *Summa* says that grace is not a substance, and therefore must be a quality. Qualities, however, are of many kinds, such as forms constituting figures, or natural powers or weaknesses. Grace is none of these, but rather is a quality as a *habit* (*habitus*) or disposition (*dispositio*). It is not a habit of the body, but rather of the soul, particularly of the rational soul, which is why it can be called a habit of the mind (*mentis habitus*). Grace is not a speculative habit like knowledge, but rather a habit *ordinative of life* (*habitus vitae ordinativus*). Moreover, grace is a habit that is *universally* ordinator of life, because it is so in all places, in contradistinction to political virtues, for example, which are habits ordinator of life that vary according to the laws and customs of particular regions. Finally, while charity and other virtues are likewise universally ordinator, these virtues primarily and *per se* order only one specific act, whereas grace orders all acts. Therefore, grace is a habit universally ordinator of the *whole* of life (*habitus universaliter ordinativus vitae 'totius'*).⁴⁵ With this definition, the *Summa Halensis*—under the hand of John of La Rochelle—concludes its consideration of the question, ‘What is grace?’, having presented an ontology of grace that both builds on the thought of the master whose name the *Summa* bears, while surpassing it in innovative ways, as will now be considered.

Theological Comparison and Analysis

The question of whether grace is a substance or an accident, and the associated question of whether grace is uncreated or created, became standard considerations in medieval commentaries on the *Sentences*, appearing in glosses on Distinction 26 of Book 2. Yet a formal consideration of these matters was new in the third and fourth decades of the 13th century. Contemporaneously to the Franciscan confrères Alexander and John, Philip the Chancellor raises these same questions in his *Summa de bono*. Despite the seminal role long attributed to the Chancellor, his conception of the ontology of grace is less developed than the Franciscans’. Philip mentions the distinction between *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, but he does not elaborate upon it.⁴⁶ He also raises the question of whether grace is a substance or an accident, holding grace to be a substance, although in a qualified way. For Philip, grace has the status of an *ens in substantia*: on the one hand, grace is a substance in terms of being a substantial thing that is the ontological foundation of the virtues, which, in contradistinction to the virtues themselves, is not a disposition or *habitus*; on the other hand, grace is dependent upon another substance, the existence of the creature in which it inheres.⁴⁷ One sees in the Chancellor’s thought a slight move-

⁴⁵ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar2 (n. 613), p. 967.

⁴⁶ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, q. 3 (Wicki, 1:364).

⁴⁷ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, qq. 2–3 (Wicki, 1:358–64).

ment away from the Lombardian conception of grace as a substance, without, however, arriving at positing grace as an accident. The Franciscans Alexander and John carry this trajectory forward in two key moves. First, Alexander explains how grace is an accident by employing the *esse primum-esse secundum* schema. Second, John explains how created grace is a *dispositio* for uncreated grace.

While the *esse primum-esse secundum* binomy is the foundational conceptual schema for Alexander's articulation of the ontology of grace, what he means by these terms is not readily apparent. As Walter Principe puts it, 'Alexander employs the term [*esse*] so frequently and in such varied contexts that it is difficult to classify its meanings neatly.'⁴⁸ Principe distinguishes three ways in which Hales uses the term *esse*. First, *esse* can denote 'being in general, being in the broadest, common-sense notion', in which case it is synonymous with *ens*. Second, *esse* can mean 'existence', in other words, the fact of existing, whether in reference to God or creatures. Third, in Principe's judgment, the term *esse* carries its greatest philosophical weight when Alexander 'makes it equivalent to essence or to that very perfection conferred by essence'.⁴⁹ It is in this third sense, that is, in terms of the realization of a perfection, that *esse* is being used when Alexander speaks of *esse primum* and *esse secundum*. Hales himself suggests as much when he introduces the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction by stating that these two orders of *esse* have different perfections by which they are distinguished.

Further inquiry into the meaning of this distinction is found by considering similar distinctions in Alexander's earlier works, his *Glossa* on the *Sentences* and the disputed questions '*antequam esset frater*.' In the *Glossa*, Alexander writes, '*Esse* is said simply in a twofold way: either *esse primum* or *secundum*, which is according to an order to an end.'⁵⁰ Hales calls *esse secundum* '*esse ordinis*'. *Esse ordinis* is equated with *esse virtutis*, which is how one speaks of *esse naturae* inasmuch as it is able to be ordered to an end.⁵¹ Elsewhere in the *Glossa*, *esse naturae* is distinguished from *bene esse* or *esse gratiae*.⁵² Insight into this parsing is given in Distinction 34 of Book 2, where Alexander explains that *esse* is said in various ways: there is *esse naturae* and *esse moris*, the latter of which is further distinguished into *esse gratiae* and that *esse moris* which is not *esse gratiae*. These distinctions are made so as to explain how a bad person suffers a privation, not in terms of *esse secundum naturam*, for in that case there would be nothing in which there would be a privation, but rather in terms of the privation of *esse gratiae*, through the loss of the inhabitation

⁴⁸ Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 30–1.

⁴⁹ Principe, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 31.

⁵⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 46, 1:473: 'Et esse simpliciter dupliciter dicitur: aut esse primum aut secundum, quod est ex ordine ad finem.'

⁵¹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 46, 1:469.

⁵² Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 28, 1:276.

of the *summum bonum*, which is the end of all things.⁵³ Finally, in the *Quaestiones disputatae* ‘*antequam esset frater*’, Alexander uses a further term to explain the action of grace, *esse theologicum*, saying that ‘grace is the first perfection of the soul according to *esse theologicum*’.⁵⁴

By arranging these fragments, an image of Alexander’s conception of *esse primum* and *esse secundum* emerges. They may be said to correspond to the orders of nature and grace. Both refer to perfections of a rational creature. A creature’s first perfection is in *esse primum*, what Alexander sometimes refers to as *esse naturae*. A thing is perfected in *esse primum*, Alexander says, not by grace, but by its own act. *Esse primum*, in other words, is the *esse* of a thing that corresponds to and flows from its nature, the perfection of which is the realization of the connatural end of this substance, and the mere existence of which corresponds to the thing existing rather than not existing. In terms of a rational creature, this obtains through its substantial form, that is, the act of the soul. Anything that exists—one could say ‘merely’ exists—exists in terms of an *esse* corresponding to the thing’s nature. This *esse* exists regardless of a thing’s state; without it the thing would cease to exist. But for Hales, rational creatures have a higher way in which they may exist, which is in terms of *esse secundum*, the *esse* with respect to which grace perfects the soul, ordering it to a higher end and making it pleasing to God. What Alexander means by *esse secundum* is fleshed out by considering the corresponding terms he links with *esse secundum*: *esse ordinis*, *bene esse*, *esse gratiae*, *esse theologicum*, and *esse gratuitum*. Like *esse primum*, *esse secundum* is a perfection, but one which exceeds the connatural perfection of a creature that belongs to *esse primum*. It is a perfection that orders the soul toward an end, which is why *esse secundum* can also be called *esse ordinis*. This is a higher or better mode of existence, which is why it is called *bene esse*. It comes about through God’s action of grace, which is why it is called *esse gratiae* or even *esse theologicum*. Finally, it comes as a gratuitous gift from God and so can be called *esse gratuitum*.

What is striking in Alexander’s discussion is that both *esse primum* and *esse secundum* are understood in terms of being perfected by acts, which are, derivatively and in a qualified way, substances. Hales says that a thing is perfected in terms of first being by its own proper act, and this act, with respect to this being, is a substance, both in itself, and according to how it is ordered to that which it perfects. He has in mind the substantial form of the soul as the perfection of the body. In second being, a thing is likewise perfected by a corresponding act, which is substantial with respect to that which it perfects, yet in itself is accidental. This is a sophisticated ontology of grace by which Hales is able to accomplish two things. First, after the

⁵³ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 34, 2:327.

⁵⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Antequam esset frater*, q. 53, 2:1022: ‘prima enim perfectio animae secundum esse theologicum est gratia.’ In the *Summa Halensis*, the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction is also employed to explain the presence of grace in Christ. See *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti3, M1, C3, Ar3 (n. 510), p. 726.

initial positing of uncreated grace as a substance, he is able to show that created grace is an accident. Second, however, he is simultaneously able to underscore how grace is an act, since a second level of *esse* allows a second order of perfection, and a thing is moved to a perfection only by an act. Alexander's commitment to sanctifying grace always being an act is unwavering, as is seen in his understanding of the relationship of grace to virtues and in his definition of grace. For Hales, the perfecting act of grace in *esse secundum* is the ontological foundation for the virtues. Whereas he calls the virtues 'habits' given that they are not always in act, he will not give such a designation to grace, since grace, for him, must always be in act.⁵⁵

Alexander's ontology of grace shows significant advances over that of Philip the Chancellor. While the Chancellor, without further elaboration, calls grace 'the second perfection of the rational creature', Alexander's account of *esse primum* and *esse secundum* in the rational creature elucidates how and in what this second perfection exists. Moreover, this same schema allows Hales to explain better what the Chancellor seems to have been moving toward in calling grace an *ens in substantia*. Still, the Irrefutable Doctor's ontology of grace as present in his *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* needs development, in at least two regards. First, Alexander's distinction between *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* remains inchoate, as he does not explain their relation; he goes no further than distinguishing them in terms of the former being the Holy Spirit and the latter being infused in the soul. Second, his articulation of *gratia gratum faciens* as the *esse secundum* of a creature, rather than a habit or disposition, presents an ambiguity that could lead to an undesirable extrinsicism in the nature-grace binomy. The ambiguity lies in the use of the word *esse* and a lack of clarity concerning how *esse secundum* properly belongs to the rational creature. On the one hand, *esse* can be understood as an act of existence, with grace perfecting the creature in this new *esse*, conferring to the creature a new, higher act of existence. At the same time, it can be problematic to speak of a thing having two acts of *esse*, for two reasons. First, there could be an elision of *esse* understood as an act of existence with *esse* understood more akin to *ens*, in which case Alexander's account could move toward the position that would develop centuries after him of speaking of nature and grace in terms of nature and supernature, the two-tiered extrinsicism that 20th-century opponents of neo-Scholasticism found wanting.⁵⁶ Second, a perennial danger for doctrines of uncreated and created grace is that created grace becomes reified (or *ens*-ified) as a thing that inheres in the soul as a *tertium quid* that

⁵⁵ See also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 26 (red. E), 2:246.

⁵⁶ Harm Goris calls this extrinsicism 'Suárez's cream cake', what he vividly describes as 'the well-known picture of nature and grace as two tiers, one on top of the other, without an intrinsic connection between the two. Human nature is complete in itself, and it might very well do without grace, that is, without a personal relation to God. Without the cream of grace, it would be a little dry and less tasty, but the cake of nature is not really affected by the cream topping.' See Harm Goris, 'Steering Clear of Charybdis: Some Directions for Avoiding "Grace Extrinsicism" in Aquinas,' *Nova et Vetera* 5 (2007): 69.

would be neither the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit (for that would be uncreated grace), nor a quality of the soul. By describing *gratia gratum faciens* as *esse* without qualifying this as a habit or disposition, Alexander exposes himself to this danger.⁵⁷

John of La Rochelle remedies these weaknesses by conceiving of created grace as a disposition or habit, which is derived from and ordered to uncreated grace. As we have seen, John weaves his own understanding of created grace as a *dispositio* into Alexander's *esse primum-esse secundum* schema. John retains the schema, but employs it differently.⁵⁸ Whereas Alexander understood created grace to be the perfection of the soul in *esse secundum*—that is, the substantial act that brings the creature into a higher level of existence and becomes the ontological foundation of the virtues—John understands created grace to be a *dispositio* in *esse secundum*. This *dispositio* is what John calls a 'substantial disposition' in regard to *esse secundum*, since it is the substantial perfection of a thing in *esse secundum*. Yet, given that *esse secundum* is accidental in regard to *esse primum*, created grace *in se* or considered absolutely is an accident. For Rupella, what perfects the soul in *esse secundum* is rather uncreated grace, what he calls the *summa Bonitas*.⁵⁹ While Hales does at one point note that the Holy Spirit is that by which God comes to us, and *gratia gratum faciens* is that by which we ascend to God, this point remains undeveloped and secondary in his account.⁶⁰

For John, in contrast, the Holy Spirit not only comes to us, but it transforms us to be like God: 'Because the Holy Spirit is love, it is that which, when given to us, trans-

57 Bernardino de Armellada notes that contemporary theology is uncomfortable with the reified element (*el elemento cosificado*) of created grace and seeks that which constitutes supernatural friendship in a personalist dimension. In this light, he suggests that 'it would be interesting to underscore the absolutely prevalent function that Alexander attributes to uncreated grace (=the Holy Spirit) in the supernatural relation—friendly and personal—between the human person and God' ('Sería interesante subrayar la función absolutamente prevalente que Alejandro atribuye a la gracia increada (=el Espíritu Santo) en la relación sobrenatural – amistosa y personal – entre el hombre y Dios'). While de Armellada's desire is laudable, it is not certain that Alexander's account of uncreated grace, thin as it is, opens up many possibilities. Rupella's more developed account of uncreated grace would be more valuable for such a project. See Bernardino de Armellada, 'Una investigación clave en la historia de la teología, especialmente la franciscana,' *Collectanea Franciscana* 79 (2009): 670.

58 Bonaventure, too, will employ the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction in his articulation of whether grace is a substance or an accident. In John Duns Scotus, what is equivalent to these earlier authors' conception of *esse secundum* is called *esse supernaturale*. See Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* II, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 2:638; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 26, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 8, ed. Charles Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2001), 274.

59 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), p. 962.

60 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 1 (Wierzbicki, 119).

forms us into a divine likeness, which is deiformity.⁶¹ The soul itself receives in its affect a likeness of the Holy Spirit, which renders the soul capable of receiving the Holy Spirit itself. Said differently, created grace is the *dispositio* of the soul that makes it capable to receive uncreated grace, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul. As seen above, John repeatedly argues that while no medium is needed on God's part for God to unite with the soul, human beings are not capable of this union unless they receive a higher disposition that so renders them. For John, this is precisely what created grace does; it 'disposes the soul so that it is ordered to an end'.⁶² For this reason, he fittingly calls *esse secundum 'esse ordinis'*. This is a perfection, but a different perfection than uncreated grace brings about: *gratia creata* 'perfects as disposing', while *gratia increata* perfects 'as bringing to perfection'.⁶³ Whereas for Alexander, human beings are perfected by created grace in *esse secundum*, for John, this perfection is as yet a disposition that orders the creature to a higher perfecting fulfillment (*complens*) in uncreated grace.

In light of this account, Karl Rahner's claim that all scholastic theories 'see God's indwelling and his conjunction with the justified man as based exclusively upon created grace' cannot be maintained.⁶⁴ Regardless of what later scholastic theories may have taught, the first robust scholastic elaboration of uncreated and created grace—Rupella's—articulates the soul's union with God as coming about through a dynamic interplay between uncreated and created grace. For John, created grace is, as it were, flanked on either side by uncreated grace. Created grace has its origin in uncreated grace, as it is infused into the soul by the Holy Spirit. Yet created grace is also ordered to the perfection brought about through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as uncreated grace, rendering the soul capable of such an indwelling through the conferral of a disposition. With this dynamism between uncreated and created grace, John can take the further step of speaking of the deiformity of the creature, which Alexander does

61 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72): 'Quia ergo Spiritus Sanctus amor est, inde est quod cum datur, nobis transformat, nos in divinam speciem, et tunc est deiformitas.'

62 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), p. 962: 'illud, quod disponit animam ut ordinetur ad finem, est gratia creata.'

63 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), p. 962: 'perficit ut disponens (...) ut complens.'

64 Rahner called for a reprioritization of uncreated grace vis-à-vis created grace. He held such a prioritization was present in the New Testament and in the Fathers, but then was lost in scholastic speculation as the relationship was inverted. This clarion has resonated with a host of theologians who have sought to reemphasize uncreated grace. While Rahner's historical claim is inaccurate, the broader project of articulating a muscular doctrine of uncreated grace could be aided by a type of early-Franciscan *ressourcement*; i.e. by returning to the seminal account of the relationship of uncreated and created grace wherein the two are in a dynamic interplay, and then crafting a contemporary theology of grace informed by this account. Rahner himself saw the *Summa Halensis* as a precursor of his theory. See Rahner, 'Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace,' 320–5, 337, quotation at 324.

not do, as he does not go further than speaking of an assimilation that the soul has to God in second being.

Furthermore, Rupella's account of created grace as a disposition has the advantage of clarifying a point that is dubious in Hales, namely, in what way *esse primum* and *esse secundum* are related. To put the question differently (and perhaps anachronistically, in the wake of the Baianist and Lubacian-*Summa* controversies concerning supernatural finality), it is unclear in Hales whether the orientation of a creature to be perfected in *esse secundum* belongs to nature *qua* nature, or rather comes about only by grace. While the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* are not explicit on this point, other writings suggest that Hales tends toward the latter position. Like Bonaventure after him, Alexander bifurcates our first parents' prelapsarian period into two states: a first state 'of innocence' before the conferral of sanctifying grace, and a second state 'of grace' after sanctifying grace had been given but before the Fall.⁶⁵ It follows for Hales, even if he is not explicit on this point, that nature in *esse primum* possesses its own proper and proportionate finality, with the finality obtained toward the perfection in grace in *esse secundum* to be conferred only through grace.⁶⁶ Yet if such a conception avoids the Scylla of blurring the orders of nature and grace, it pushes one toward the Charybdis of extrinsicism, because it does not explain how *esse primum* relates to *esse secundum*. John's account navigates this danger through his conception of created grace as a disposition. This disposition orders the soul toward a union with the Infinite Good through the conferral of a form that is nothing less than deiformity. Thus, even if the source of the perfection of the soul in *esse secundum* is properly extrinsic grace, its effects are intrinsic to the soul itself. While Rupella's account is more primitive than later accounts that speak of nature possessing a specific obediential potency for the reception of a supernatural finality, in its fundamental intuition and outline, John's ontology of grace is in accord with this later theory and may be seen as a precursor to it.

Finally, the development from Alexander to John is further witnessed in the friars' respective accounts of how grace differs from virtue and in their definitions of grace. For Alexander, grace is distinguished from virtue precisely in that grace must always be in act, which is not true of virtues. In his account, grace becomes the ontological substratum of the virtues. Just as life is the first act of a rational creature in *esse primum*, so sanctifying grace is the first act of the creature in *esse secundum*. As such, if grace is not in act, given that it is a substantial act in respect to *esse*

⁶⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 19, 2:165–74. See also *SH* II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1 C1 (n. 505), p. 729.

⁶⁶ Wierzbicki misunderstands Alexander of Hales on this point. He avers that Alexander understands human nature to be assisted by grace from the beginning. This is incorrect, as Alexander posits a prelapsarian state before the conferral of sanctifying grace. Wierzbicki compounds his error by claiming his position is shared by Hubert Philipp Weber, which is not true, as Weber himself notes Alexander's positing a prelapsarian state prior to the conferral of sanctifying grace. See Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'La grazia e il libero arbitrio,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 302; Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales*, 145–8.

secundum, the creature no longer exists in this higher way. The virtues that stem from grace are subsequent perfections in *esse secundum* that can be in act or not without affecting the existential status of the being in *esse secundum*. Thus, just as there is *esse secundum* according to grace, there is *esse operari* according to virtue. For this reason, as seen above, Alexander distinguishes between grace and virtue precisely in terms of the former being an act and the latter being a *habitus*. This informs Hales' definition of grace as the 'first and perfect act of the soul in second being', in which he says act is the part of this definition that separates grace from virtue, which is a habit.⁶⁷ John, on the other hand, with his more intrinsicist understanding of grace, has no hesitancy in calling grace a *habitus*, defining grace as 'the habit ordinative of the whole of life'. In so doing, he emphasizes more clearly than Alexander how grace can properly be said to belong to the creature, making a decisive advance over his master.⁶⁸

Conclusion

The early Franciscan theology of grace was a major achievement. Alexander of Hales was the first to employ the terminology of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*. John of La Rochelle was the first to articulate their relation. This article has sought to explicate their ontologies of grace. In so doing, against the claims of other scholars, it has argued: first, that Rupella significantly developed, rather than merely echoed Hales; second, that the Franciscan account exceeds that of Philip the Chancellor; and third, that the first scholastic account of the relationship of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* conceives of the soul's union with God as coming about through a dynamic interplay of these two types of grace. While Hales' and Rupella's theology has long been overlooked, it played a major role in bringing about the 13th-century 'Copernican revolution' in the theology of grace. That revolution would subsequently shape Catholic thinking on a host of crucial matters, such as justification, merit, the relation between divine and human freedom—in short, on that mysterious union between God and the soul that lies at the very heart of Christianity.

⁶⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 1, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 127).

⁶⁸ Per contra, Wierzbicki argues that Alexander's theology of grace surpasses that of John, in that the former has a more dynamic vision of the relationship of the soul to grace, whereas the latter's is static. Wierzbicki finds this dynamism in Alexander's account of grace being the *motor coniunctus* of free will (see above, n. 29). This reading is not convincing. Alexander's account of grace as joined to the free will as a *motor coniunctus*, distinguished from God's action as a *motor separatus*, suffers from a dichotomy and extrinsicism between uncreated and created grace. John's account is, in fact, more 'dynamic', as it articulates how the soul is not just moved by grace, but rather is transformed by it. See Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'Esistenza e necessità della grazia,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 215.