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Place, Person, and Prayer in the *Summa Halensis*

Reflections on Franciscan Identity in the mid 13th Century

Abstract: This essay argues that *oratio* in the *Summa Halensis* is best understood via the Franciscan appropriation of *locus*, which served in the construction and confirmation of their communal identity in the mid-thirteenth century. The question of their place in the church and the world was subject to intense discussion both inside and outside the Minorite Order. The shift to urban convents was influenced by the monastic paradigm, but this transition did not erase the peripatetic impulse common to the Franciscan worldview. The friars preserved the concept of human beings as *viatores* due to several factors, including the hagiographical accounts of their founder, the rapid expansion of convents, and their diplomatic and missionary travels. In the *Summa Halensis*, Parisian friars engaged two philosophical-theological themes to secure the peripatetic underpinnings of their foundational story regardless of their urban emplacement. The first focused on ontological poverty, which foregrounds the movement from non-being into being as the journey into God. The second was the utilization of *locus* to determine the place of human beings during this passage from non-being into being. This effort reflected the friars' project of identification and emplacement during period of institutional transition preceding the generalate of Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.

In the Fourth Book of the *Summa Halensis* or *Summa minorum*¹, we find a straightforward response to the question, 'can one pray in all places?' The following exemplum suggests we can:

We read of blessed Gregory that while he was purging his bowels and saying a psalm, the devil appeared to him and asked him what he was doing. He responded, 'I am purging my bowels and praising my God since works of nature are not seen as turpid to the perfect.'²

¹ Jean-Yves Lacoste's insights into the relationship between religious communities and theological expression provides a foundation for considering the *Summa Halensis* as a manifesto of Franciscan 'thinking' in the mid 13th century, see Jean-Yves Lacoste, *From Theology to Theological Thinking*, trans. W. Christ Hackett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014). I would like to thank Ms. Maria Dintino and Ms. Jessie Rutland of the Flagler College Library for their assistance in securing the sources needed to complete this essay.

² Alexander of Hales, *Alexandri Alensis Angli Summae Theologiae: Pars Quarta* (hereafter, *SH* Bk IV), Q26, M3, Ar7 (Cologne: Sumptibus Ioannis Gymnici, sub Monocerote, 1622), 721: 'Legitur enim de B. Greg. quod cum purgaret ve[n]trem, et Psalmum diceret, apparuit ei diabolus, quaerens quid faceret;

While theology admittedly is far more intent on exploring soteriology as opposed to scatology, this essay claims that this story, which is recounted in Question 26 *De Oratione*, reflects the innovative interest of the Franciscan theological community in the theoretical and practical consequences of the 13th-century engagement with Aristotle's *Physics*.³ The Stagyrte's discussion and definition of 'place' in Chapter 4 is, 'Place is the boundary of that containing another thing' allows him, as Edward S. Casey has pointed out, to ascribe a certain agency to place.⁴ It is the definition of place as 'containing' that allows things to be 'somewhere' and 'to be' something specific.⁵ This thematic of *locus* or place emerges at various junctures in all four books of the *Summa Halensis* and is linked with question of identity and personhood.

The theologians of *Summa Halensis* can hardly ignore Aristotle's teaching, mediated in many cases by Avicenna, given the Franciscan concept of the human person as both a material-spiritual creature at home in this world and the world to come as well.⁶ An initial understanding of prayer as an embedded anthropological-theological expression of the human person is enhanced when *De Oratione* is examined against the background of the *Summa Halensis*' arguments regarding place and the concomitant subjects of grace, body, and the soul. This essay offers a systematic examination of selected texts in the *Summa* in order to confirm and comment on the Franciscan attraction to the philosophical conception of place or *locus*, articulated by Aristotle but also employed differently by others, the likes of Augustine, pseudo-Augustine and Anselm.⁷ While pursuing this task, this effort assumes that

et respondit: "ventrem meum purgo, et Deum meum laudo; opera enim natura perfectis turpia non videntur".

3 See Cecilia Trifogli, *Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 1250–1270): Motion, Infinity, Place and Time* (Leiden: Brill: 2000), esp. 133–202; Cecilia Trifogli, 'Roger Bacon and Aristotle's Doctrine of Place,' *Vivarium* 35 (1997): 155–76; and Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1–3, ed. Rega Wood, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 152–82. On the question of Richard Rufus as author, see Rega Wood, 'The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall: The State of the Question in 2009,' *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 76 (2009): 1–73. While the reception of Aristotle and Avicenna varied from Oxford and Paris, Avicenna's commentary on Book 4 of Aristotle's *Physics* was already available as early as the twelfth century, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Andreas Büttner, 'Notes on Anonymous Twelfth-Century Translations of Philosophical Texts from Arabic into Latin on the Iberian Peninsula,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Physics and Cosmology*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2018), 313.

4 Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 71.

5 For a study of Book 4 of the *Physics*, with reference to the Greek text, see Diana Quarantotto, *L'universo senza spazio: Aristotele e la teoria del luogo* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2017).

6 On this thematic, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010).

7 The crucial question of 'locus' in the writings of Alexander of Hales will be taken up in a later study. The point of departure for that investigation will be Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 45 ['De modo essendi Deus in rebus'], in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam*

place and prayer are of specific interest to the Franciscan theological community of the mid 13th century given their commitment, both in theory and praxis, to a mythical-practical re-ordering of the cloister-world paradigm that dominated religious life in the 13th century.⁸

Place, Creatures, and Grace

The reception of Aristotle's *Physics* is immediately evident in Book 2, where the authors note, 'Place is the boundary of that containing another thing' in the treatment of the question: *Utrum omnis creatura sit localis* ('Whether every creature is local').⁹ At first, the *Summa's* authors appeal to the Pseudo-Augustinian *De anima et spiritu* to clarify that a corporeal body is local or perhaps better said, located or embedded, since it is dimensional and circumscribed with an assigned beginning, middle and end. This, however, cannot be said of all creatures; yet, given that all creatures can be totally present somewhere but not somewhere else, they are said to have a locality. The authors then parse Aristotle's definition to argue that not all creatures are local in the sense that each and everything can be contained by another creature. They then further nuance their response to clarify that the explanation from the *Physics* can be applied properly to bodily reality, as noted earlier, and to spiritual realities by way of similitude. While physics serve as the point of departure for the Summists, they go far beyond Aristotle's understanding of place as they explore both the

esset frater", 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 2:760–82.

⁸ For example, see Timothy J. Johnson, 'Place, Analogy and Transcendence: Bonaventure and Bacon on the Franciscan Relationship to the World,' in *Innovationen durch Deuten und Gestalten: Klöster im Mittelalter zwischen Jenseits und Welt*, ed. Gert Melville, Bernd Schneidmüller, and Stefan Weinfurter (Regensburg: Verlag Schnell & Steiner, 2014), 83–96; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Choir Prayer as the Place of Formation and Identity Definition: The Example of the Minorite Order,' *Miscellanea Francescana* 111 (2011): 123–35; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Prologue as Pilgrimage: Bonaventure as Spiritual Cartographer,' *Miscellanea Francescana* 106–7 (2006–7): 445–64; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Dream Bodies and Peripatetic Prayer: Reading Bonaventure's *Itinerarium* with Certeau,' *Modern Theology* 21 (2005): 413–27. This reordering was particularly important for the Franciscans, who, unlike their Dominican counterparts, were faced with the challenge of moving from the hermitage-city paradigm to conventual life centered in the city.

⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol II, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti5, C1 (n. 72), pp. 96–7. The definition of locus attributed to Aristotle on p. 96 reads, 'Locus est terminus rei continetis aliam rem.' This precise text is not, however, found in early Latin translations of Aristotle such as *Translatio Vetus*, see *Physica Translatio Vetus*, ed. Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 160. Indeed, the formulation '(...) locus est "terminus continentis"' is found in the work of Richard Rufus when he is commenting on Book 4.1.7 of Aristotle's *Physics*, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1.7 (Wood, 160–1) thus furthering the suggestion that Richard influenced John of La Rochelle's composition of Book 2 of the *Summa Halensis* in the 1240s.

physical and spiritual dimensions of the term in light of their own theological tradition and cultural-historical shift of perspective due to the Order's rapid urbanization in the 1240s and 1250s.

The meaning of 'containing' is explored further in the following two questions: *Utrum ominis creatura habeat eamden differentitam localitatis* ('Whether every creature has the same difference of locality')¹⁰ and *Utrum creatura possit esse sine localitate* ('Whether a creature is able to be without locality').¹¹ Every creature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, has a location but the physical body is bounded in a place such that—with the exception of the Body of the Lord—a part of the body is in part of the place, but the same is not the case with spiritual creatures.¹² They are in place in a different manner insofar as they can be delimited but not be measured by parts. Some might claim that angels, as spiritual, incorporeal beings are without locality, as their substance and twofold activity of contemplation and knowledge of self and others is not dependent on a physical body.¹³ Nevertheless, they have a certain affinity to corporeal bodies given their ministry to humanity. Like all creatures, however, angels are limited in power; thus they possess locality understood, however, in terms of a position or station in the empyrean heaven.¹⁴ Additionally, only God is present everywhere, while every creature is 'somewhere', that is, either 'here' or 'there' according to Scripture. This mode of distinction pertains to substance, not to place or position; thus angels are in place because they are always somewhere specific. As creatures dwelling in heaven, they are remote from the earth, yet they remain present to the world due to their natural acuity.

The locality of God is also questioned in the *Summa*. When treating the nature of the divine unity, Book 1 also probes the *localitas* of God.¹⁵ The first question is: *An*

¹⁰ SH II, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti5, C2 (n. 73), p. 97.

¹¹ SH II, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti5, C3 (n. 74), p. 98.

¹² Concerning place and the sacrament of the altar, see SH Bk IV, Q10, M7, Ar3, pp. 353–8. Alexander himself briefly takes up this question in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* IV, d. 10, nn. 4 and 14; d. 11, n. 6; d. 12, n. 9, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 4:154–6, 168, 173–4, 192–5. Henceforth this work will be referred to as *Glossa*.

¹³ SH II, In2, Tr1, Q1, C3, Ar1 (n. 101), pp. 126–7. See also Travis Dumsday, 'Alexander of Hales on Angelic Corporality,' *The Heythrop Journal* 54 (2013): 360–70 and Franklin T. Harkins, 'The Embodiment of Angels: A Debate in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Theology,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 78 (2011): 25–58. Alexander himself notes that the spiritual locus of angels is determined by their proximity to God *secundum affectionem* while the empyrean heaven is their corporeal place. Human beings acquire their spiritual locus *per victoriam*. See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 9, n. 25, 2:95–6. On angels, movement, and corporeal bodies, see Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 8, nn. 1–3, 2:73–5. In addition, see Alice Lamy, 'La théorie du lieu selon Alexandre de Halès,' in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: Physique, Métaphysique et Cosmologie (XIIe-XVIIe siècles): Actes du colloque international Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 12–14 mars 2015*, ed. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antonio Petagine (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 39–55.

¹⁴ SH II, In2, Tr1, Q1, C3, Ar2 (n. 102), pp. 128–9.

¹⁵ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2 (nn. 40–4), pp. 64–70.

Deus sit alicubi vel nusquam vel in se ipso ('Whether God is somewhere, nowhere, or in himself').¹⁶ Relying on Boethius' *De Trinitate* and Augustine's *De praesentiae Dei*, the authors note that 'to be in a place' can refer to being contained by a place, present to a place, and to fill up place. While the divine nature is uncontainable, God can fill a place just as wisdom fills a wise person, and water a place. The divine is nowhere circumscribed or enclosed, but present everywhere in the fullness of divine goodness.¹⁷ Furthermore, since God exists 'in his self' any notion of dependency on place is removed; indeed, every place and the entire world depends on the divine nature.¹⁸

When taking up the question: *Utrum divina natura tota sit in omni tempore et semper* ('Whether the entire divine nature is always in all times') Book 1 references Anselm, Aristotle, Augustine, and Richard of St Victor.¹⁹ Aristotle's *Physics* is utilized regarding the meaning of *tota*, which can be spoken of in three ways: 1. as the whole constituted from its parts; 2. as the whole without anything else; and 3. the whole that is perfect and complete.²⁰ The last definition applies to the divine nature.²¹ The authors of Book 1 rely almost exclusively on Anselm's *Monologion* here to define this question and argue for an affirmative response.²² Anselm framed this issue by assuming the supreme being exists in every place and in all times, but confessed further investigation was needed. He concludes, as does Book 1, that this being does not exist in every place since the nature of *locus* is to contain and this being does not exist in time as the nature of *tempus* is to measure. Clearly the divine nature can neither be contained nor measured; nevertheless, this supreme being exists in every place and time.

The question *Quid sit deum esse ubique* ('In what way is God everywhere') allows the Summists to consider place from five perspectives that entail either corporeal or spiritual definitions.²³ Following John Damascene, *locus corporalis* is the boundary of what is contained in accord with Aristotle's definition from the *Physics*. *Locus corpo-*

¹⁶ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C1 (n. 40), pp. 64–5.

¹⁷ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C4 (n. 43), pp. 68–9.

¹⁸ The link between place and dependency is further developed by Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *In Sent.*) I, d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 volumes (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 1:638–9.

¹⁹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, M4 (n. 71), pp. 110–1.

²⁰ When defining the third meaning of *totum*, the *Summa* states, '(...) tertio modo, quod est perfectum et completum' [the third manner which is perfect and complete] and the Quaracchi Fathers understand this to be based on Aristotle's *Physics* 3.6, see *Aristotelis Opera Omnia: Graece et Latine cum Indice Nominum et Rerum Absolutissimo*, 2 vol, (Paris: Editoribus Firmin-Didot et Sociis, Institutum Francisci Typographis, 1883), 414. The use of *perfectum* and *completum* does not appear in the *Translatio Vetus*, but Richard Rufus does utilize both terms together when commenting on locus in Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.6 (Wood, 156).

²¹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, M4 (n. 71), p. 111.

²² SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, M4 (n. 71), p. 111.

²³ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), pp. 66–8.

ralis communis refers to the heavens, where all creatures, visible and invisible, are contained. *Locus spiritualis* denotes an intelligible place that is incorporeal and intellectual. According to Gregory, the *locus spiritualis communis* is where divine power is exercised such as in the sending of angels. Finally, Ambrose provides the Summists with the definition of *locus spiritualis specialis*, which suggests that every creature is circumscribed according to the limits of its nature. Here it is important to note that all creatures, be they corporeal or incorporeal, as substances are determined by place and thus limited or contained in terms of essence and power. This concept of containment and power fosters a nuanced appreciation of how God is everywhere. Power is twofold regarding place, *extra* or outside and *intra* or within. While the soul contains the body with a power within, the power of the divine is within and beyond all things. Turning to Augustine, the authors of the *Summa* rework his claim that God is present everywhere and never absent from anywhere to argue that God is present in every place and fills every place.²⁴ This suggests that God is both within all things without being enclosed by them and outside of all things without being excluded from them. Hence God is in all things and all things, whether corporeal or spiritual, are in God.

How God is present in sacraments and human beings through the indwelling of grace is also a concern of the Franciscan authors of Book 1. In response to the question *Utrum deus sit in sacramentis per inhabitantem gratiam* ('Whether God is in the sacrament through indwelling grace'), they clarify the nature of indwelling and point out that while God is present in the sacraments through grace, the divine nature cannot dwell within them.²⁵ Indwelling denotes the end of movement, but a sacrament is an *adminiculum* or aid for those still on the way, that is, a means by which humanity, *in statu viatoris* may receive grace. With a nod toward common piety, the text admits that it is common to speak in an intimate way of the divine presence, like Gregory the Great, when claiming that God is in a sacrament. What is meant, however, is that God is within the sacrament as the cause which disposes the soul to reception of grace but does not inhabit the corporal elements.

Corporality is the concern of following four questions, *An in carne ante infusionem animae possit esse deus per inhabitationem* ('Whether God is able to dwell in the flesh before the infusion of the soul'),²⁶ *Utrum deus sit in homine per inhabitantem gratiam et hoc ante nativitatem* ('Whether God dwells in a human being before birth'),²⁷ *Utrum Deus sit in parvulis per inhabitantem gratiam* ('Whether God is in infants through indwelling grace'),²⁸ and *Utrum deus dicitur inhabitare in habentibus gratiam gratis datam* ('Whether God may be said to dwell in those who have freely

²⁴ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), p. 67. The reference to Augustine is based on *Letter 187*, c. 6, n. 18 (PL 33:838–839).

²⁵ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C2 (n. 51), pp. 78–9.

²⁶ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C3 (n. 52), pp. 79–80.

²⁷ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C4 (n. 53), pp. 80–2.

²⁸ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C5 (n. 54), pp. 82–3.

given grace').²⁹ This sequence allows the Summists to sketch out the anthropological foundation of their theology of grace in reference to place which, in this context, is illustrated by referring to the soul as the temple of God.

This first question in the sequence is quick to clarify that it is impossible for God to dwell in the body before the infusion of the soul since flesh alone is neither incorruptible nor perpetual. However, when the body is animated, it then is ordered toward grace and thus toward glory. There can be no indwelling unless there is a place in which to dwell. In terms of place as containment, grace is not poured into nature, but into a person. Could this person, who is now both body and soul, receive sanctifying grace before birth? The second question responds in the affirmative but makes a distinction between common and private law. The former grants that God inhabits the soul by means of sacramental grace, but no one experiences such an encounter before birth. The later pertains to the grace of the Holy Spirit which, in rare cases, sanctifies individuals in the womb.

Once born, does God dwell in the child? According to the third question, a proper response is framed by the issue of free will and the nature of injustice or sin. Men and women commit injustice or injustice is committed against them. In the first case, the individual is culpable due to free will but in the second the individual did not make a choice and remains innocent. A child is clearly innocent but suffers the injustice due to Adam's sin. The grace of baptism, though which God may dwell within the soul, can justify the child without consent but cannot do the same with an adult, who sins, unless the individual freely chooses to cooperate with God. An example of cooperative consent is found in the individual who decides to turn toward God, asks for grace, and remains vigilant while holding to this proposal. In answer to such prayer, God, through *gratia gratum faciens* (sanctifying grace) may dwell within an adult. However, if the divine only dwells within a person by means of sanctifying grace, what value is there in *gratia gratis datam* (grace freely given) to all?³⁰ The answer, according the last question in the sequence, lies in the observation of nature. Matter has the possibility of receiving form, and certain dispositions order material to receive this form, but ultimately one disposition arises that is necessary for the *positio*, that is, the placing or positioning of the form in material. In a like manner, expressions of grace such as prophecy and knowledge are dispositions that order the soul, but the necessary disposition that perfects the soul as the temple of God is sanctifying grace.³¹ Only this gift, by which the divine dwells within the soul, allows

²⁹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C6 (n. 55), p. 83.

³⁰ On the term *gratiam gratis datam*, see SH IV, P3, In1, Tr2 (nn. 646–72), pp. 1023–60. This description is more extensive than what is found in Alexander's own works, see Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica: Un contributo alla teologia della grazia nella prima metà del sec. XIII*, ed. Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, *Studia Antoniana*, 50 (Roma: Antonianum, 2008), 231.

³¹ On the soul as temple, see also SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D3, C3, Ar2 (n. 304), Ad obiecta 2, p. 459.

a person, both body and soul, to be united and joined with God, who is the highest truth and goodness.

Place, Body, and Soul

With the body joined to the soul, human corporality is marked by dignity and ordered by grace to heaven.³² This reality leads the authors of the *Summa Halensis* to raise the question, *Quarto quaeritur de dignitate corporis humani quantum ad locationem, et utrum caelum sit locus eius* ('The fourth [chapter] inquires as to the dignity of the human body regarding location, and whether heaven is its home').³³ At issue is the *locus naturalis* or natural place of a person. Taking their cue from Aristotle's *Physics*, the authors affirm that an individual is constituted by a body and a soul and, therefore, must have the same natural place otherwise the person would be deprived of the perfect rest proper to being in one's place.³⁴ Indeed, if the natural place of the soul was one place and that of the body another, the appetites of the soul would never be circumscribed as they are in union with the body.

Upon establishing the premise that there is only one natural place for human beings, the question arises as to whether that place is heaven or earth.³⁵ One argument in favor of heaven maintains that the human body exceeds the stars as the best and most noble of all creatures, so its natural place must be a higher place which, of course, is heaven. Others contend, for example, that matter and form are proportional, so the more noble matter, the more noble the form, and vice versa. Since the form of the human body is the most noble, that is, the rational soul, the most natural place of the human body is the highest place, heaven. Another similar position asserts that it would be wrong to think that the heaven was not the natural place since that is the only place the human could be fully blessed and the appetites of the soul quieted. The arguments against heaven are, for the most part, not in favor of the earth, but, rather the inappropriateness of the body for heaven or heaven for the body. An exception is an intriguing reference to the hermetic tradition via an argument from the *Asclepium* attributed to the enigmatic Hermes Trismegistus.³⁶ Believing that a person was of two natures, corporal and spiritual, Trismegistus alleged that

32 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C3 (n. 455), pp. 584–6.

33 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), pp. 586–8.

34 The Quaracchi editors suggest references to Book 3, c. 5 and Book 4, c. 1 of Aristotle's *Physics* in this section (*SH* II (n. 456), p. 586, nn. 3, 5, 6, and 10). Richard Rufus treats the question of rest or *quies* at length in his treatment of Book 4.1.6, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1.6 (Wood, 155–6).

35 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), pp. 586–8.

36 For this text, see Hermes Trismegistus, *Astrologica et Divinatoria*, ed. Gerrit Bos et al., *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis*, 144C (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001).

the earthly properties dominated humanity and thus the human body finds a natural place on earth.

In their response, the Summists delineate three different places that divine providence has provided for the human body: 1. terrestrial paradise; 2. earth; and 3. heaven.³⁷ In paradise humans exercised their calling to work and thus care for their place. This exertion was by no means onerous and, instead, was marked by solace. Thrown out of paradise into the earth, men and women could only depend on their toils and tears to provide bodily nourishment. Finally, since heaven is the natural place for the human body in the state of glory, those who are pleasing to God through grace will be established in the empyrean or angelic heaven. There, in body and soul, these individuals will glory as they dwell in perpetual beatitude.

To those who argue the inappropriateness of the body for heaven or heaven for the body, the *Summa* draws attention to the relationship between the condition of the place and what is placed there.³⁸ So, to state that the human body is made for heaven is not a teleological claim, but a supposition as to the appropriateness of heaven as dwelling place. The inference here is that paradise, earth, and heaven are all suitable places for the human body at varying times. Furthermore, to say that only the earth is the natural place for humanity is true only inasmuch as it—unlike paradise and heaven—is imperfect and filled with misery and thus the most appropriate place for indigent men and women, living under the curse of Gen. 3:17, to do both penance and merit grace.

Since the human person is a composite of body and soul, the *Summa* authors naturally wonder about the placement of the soul. They ask *Utrum anima habeat locum spiritualem* ('Whether the soul has a spiritual place').³⁹ Regarding the soul, one view, grounded in Chapter 4 of Book 4 of Aristotle's *Physics*, maintains the proportions of the body are defined by 'containing' and being 'contained', so too, there must be a similar state for the soul.⁴⁰ The opinions of John Damascene, Jerome, and Augustine are marshaled to argue, respectively, that angels are intelligible due to their location in spiritual places (John Damascene), whatever has substance is circumscribed (Jerome), and the locus of the soul is God, therefore a spiritual place is ascribed to it (Augustine).⁴¹ Taking the lead again from Aristotle, the contrary po-

37 SH II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), Respondeo, p. 587.

38 SH II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), Ad objecta 4, p. 588.

39 SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar1 (n. 334), p. 407.

40 Book 3, c. 5 and Book 4, c. 4 of Aristotle's *Physics* are identified as sources for this section by the Quaracchi editors (SH II (n. 334), p. 407, nn. 1, 5, and 7). On locus and the issue of *continens* and *contentum*, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1.5 (Wood, 154). This section of the SH relies on Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 27, n. 36, l.c. 1:378 which is, as the Quaracchi editors point out, directly dependent in part (*citatur verb.*) on Richard Rufus (Oxford, Balliol 62, 83v).

41 The texts in this section are identified by the Quaracchi editors as John of Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 2, c. 3 (PG 94:870), Jerome, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 6 (PL 23:108), and Augustine, *De quantitate animae*, c. 1, n. 2 (PL 32:1035). The first two texts are not direct quotes found in the PG and PL texts but

sition argues that one and the same place cannot serve diverse creatures, yet God as *Primum*⁴² contains many creatures directly and thus the divine does not ‘contain’ in the same manner as a place. Augustine confirms that creatures are not in God as in a place, and Aristotle’s view of place as boundary precludes a spiritual place for the soul. The authors attempt to resolve the issue by noting that one can speak of place *simpliciter* or *secundum quid*, that is, in an unqualified or qualified manner. God, as uncreated spirit, offers to spiritual substances a certain *continentia* that allows them to rest in, move toward, and find salvation in the divine. This is distinguished from the simple understanding of place as both ‘containing’ and ‘immobile’; yet, spiritual substances like the soul still have a boundary determined by their power. So, in one way God, can still be said to contain the soul as *locatum* while the soul is contained in *locus*.

The following question is *Utrum anima habeat locum corporalem* (‘Whether the soul has a corporeal place’).⁴³ Here the Summists delineate their perspective in terms of *proprie* (circumference), *minus proprie* (definition), and *communiter* (presence). To be in a corporeal place in terms of presence assumes the existence of the thing and a place. To be in a corporeal place by definition assumes coexistence and the affixing of a boundary. To be a corporeal place by circumference assumes the two previously mentioned points and the addition of symmetry in the place according to the beginning, middle, and end. Accordingly, the rational soul is in place by definition and presence but not by circumference since it is not circumscribed by measurable dimensions, although it is contained, as pointed out earlier, in terms of power. The soul does, however, have a defined corporeal place by reasons of the accidents of the body with which it is united. Even when the soul is separated from the body, it still exists and remains present and commonly considered to have a place.

Place, Person, and Prayer

The preceding analysis of *locus* in the first three books of the *Summa Halensis* lays the foundation for our careful examination of the relationship between prayer and place in the Franciscan theological community of Paris in the mid-1250s. Question 26 *De Oratione* in Book 4 is an exhaustive treatment of the theme that includes Article 7, *De congruentia usus orationis* (‘On the appropriateness of the practice of pray-

are *ad sensum*. The statement attributed to Augustine, *Locus animae Deus est*, is absent from the PL texts. Indeed, the word *locus* is not mentioned at all.

⁴² On the proper name of God and the title of *Primum*, see SH I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, M2 (n. 357), Ad obiecta 2, p. 534.

⁴³ SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar2 (n. 335), pp. 407–8. Alexander briefly mentions definition and dimension when treating spiritual and bodily creatures in light of the potential vacuum in heaven caused by Lucifer’s fall, see Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 2, n. 20, 2:21.

er').⁴⁴ The authors are interested here in the when, where, and how of prayer. Although Paul exhorts the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 5:17) to pray 'without ceasing', the practicality of such advice must be subject to the reality of life and guided by a firm understanding of prayer itself.⁴⁵ Properly speaking, it is the ascent of the mind into God whereby there is a tasting or releasing of something, more commonly, prayer is any contemplative act carried out in relation to God, and most commonly, it includes all good actions.⁴⁶

The earlier treatment of the locality of God in Book 1 and individual human beings in Book 2 assures that no place is excluded when speaking of praising or praying unless the person is not properly ordered to God as a corporeal-spiritual creature. In Book 4, the Summists pose the question: *An omni loco orandum sit; vel tantum in locis sacris, et ad hoc institutio* ('Whether one must pray in every place or only in sacred places instituted for this purpose').⁴⁷ Among the initial affirmative arguments include a reference to both Augustine and Anselm, who maintain that God is present in every place. Since prayers are pious affections directed toward God, and no creature exists outside of divine rule, those who worship in spirit and truth may offer private and public prayer everywhere in accord with the nature of the prayer in question. However, in contrast with the divine, human beings are always somewhere and not somewhere else. As embodied spiritual beings, they are also embedded or located. Consequently, a relationship exists between individuals in specific places and forms of prayer. When it comes to private prayer, where secrets are shared between an individual and God, a secret, private place is natural.⁴⁸ Canonical prayer, such as the psalmody, and other communal prayer forms instituted by the church for the consolation and incitement of devotion, are best suited to church as revealed already in the construction and divine benediction of Solomon's temple.

Churches, properly speaking, are the most appropriate places to pray, since the Lord himself quoted Isa. 56:7 in the Gospel of Matt. (21:13) to remind the money-changers in the temple that his house was meant for prayer.⁴⁹ In a church, believers are also joined by angels who descend from heaven to reverence and honor the Body of the Lord in this sacred place, set aside for the divine. In addition, they serve to gather a community together in the mutually beneficial devotion of canonical prayer, in a manner unlike any other setting since the locus is congruent with the intended

⁴⁴ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, pp. 719–22. Alexander himself treats the question of prayer in Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 17, n. 24, 3:181–9.

⁴⁵ This Pauline exhortation frames the question of whether marital intercourse and prayer are compatible, see Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* IV, d. 31, n. 10, 4:494–6 and d. 32, nn. 6–15, 4:509–13, esp. n. 14 regarding sacred places and times.

⁴⁶ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720.

⁴⁷ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720. A similar definition of prayer is found in Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, d. 15, p. 2, a. 1, q. 4, 4:368.

⁴⁸ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, pp. 720b–21.

⁴⁹ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720.

activities in the place. Yet, if the ‘Philosopher’, in this case, Aristotle, argues for the congruence of a place with what is done there, what can be said for locations far afield from churches?⁵⁰ It is at this point that the authors of *Summa Halensis* appeal to the graphic example of Gregory praying the psalms in the latrine. If there is a relationship between place and activity, it would seem that anywhere that is deemed shameful inevitably gives rise to shameful thoughts contrary to prayer. Place has agency, without a doubt, thus care should be given to avoid those locales prone to promoting what theologians term ‘turbid fantasies’. At the same time, what is an act of nature per se does not preclude prayer for those who Gregory identifies as the ‘perfect’. Those who are the ‘friends of God’ can pray anywhere if their will in that place is ordered properly toward God.⁵¹ Consequently, purgatory is a locus of prayer while hell is not.⁵²

The discussion of purgatory, hell, and prayer is a reminder that it is the human person, understood as an embodied, material-spiritual being embedded in creation, who is the foremost locus of prayer in the *Summa Halensis*. The question *An oratio sit efficax ex puris naturalibus; vel ex gratia gratis data, sive gratum faciente* (‘Whether prayer is efficacious due to natural causes or due to freely given grace, that is, the grace that makes one acceptable’); without sanctifying grace, it is possible to recognize the misery of human contingency and the necessity for divine mercy.⁵³ Everyone is in *statu viatoris*; thus, the precariousness of life is inescapable, and the human mind can recognize this reality. This existential situation births prayer,⁵⁴ and in this light, it is possible to petition for the material blessings of this world. Yet, this same world is passing away just as human beings are passing through it toward heaven or hell. As Aristotle argues in Book 4 of the *Physics*, bodies move in tandem with their appropriate place and find their natural rest there.⁵⁵ Alexander of Hales’ Franciscan confreres link this movement of bodies to the will, and quote the Philosopher to explain how human beings who are damned come to a voluntary, violent form of rest since they moved away from blessings of prayer when they could have opted for the opposite.⁵⁶ These theologians acknowledge that Aristotle was not referring to the will as they are since grace is needed to merit what they described earlier as the natural resting *locatum* of the glorified body; that is, heaven.⁵⁷ From the perspective of all *viatores* or travelers on the journey into God, prayer is ultimately efficacious only when individuals in their poverty are ordered toward the divine

50 SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720.

51 SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 721.

52 SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar4, pp. 699–701.

53 SH Bk IV, Q26, M5, Ar1, pp. 723–4.

54 SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar1, pp. 683b–84.

55 On this Aristotelian text and argument, see Aristotle, *Physics: Books III and IV*, trans. Edward Hussey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 11–2, 80–1.

56 SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar4, p. 700.

57 SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar4, p. 700.

by prevenient grace, which is freely given without merit, and their souls are infused with sanctifying grace.⁵⁸ From this point forward, the hallmark of Franciscan prayer is the graced exercise of the powers of the soul through the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.⁵⁹

As the existential and ontological locus of prayer, the embodied soul is called to be physically as well as spiritually ordered to the divine. Such congruency invites specific external corporal postures that may signify the reality of the relationship between the one who prays and the one to whom the petition is directed.⁶⁰ Referencing Hugh of St Victor, a wide range of liturgical gestures are mentioned, but the *Summa Halensis* underscores two specific gestures: turning to the east and genuflection. Each one is grounded in foundational themes favored by Franciscans, the appeal to exterior rays of the sun as the best metaphor for the divine illumination that comes interiorly through grace and the importance of obedient, penitential humility. Facing the east, where the sun arises as the most noble source of light, orients human beings toward the divine, and speaks of the Creator, who excels over all of creation, and Christ, who is the 'sun' of justice. Clearly this action is one of signification, as there is no sense that God dwells more in one locus as opposed to another.⁶¹ The treatment of the *localitas* of God in Book 1 clarified any question in that regard. Indeed, the fact that God is present everywhere highlights the penetrating nature of divine illumination. Genuflection, accompanied by the beating of the chest and outstretched hands suggest humility, together with obedience and penance.

The Summists reveal their predilection for interiority, however, when they remark that these exterior manifestations are in accord with the nature of prayer but are not necessary. Similar to the petitions and praises uttered in public such as psalmody during the liturgical hours, physical gestures may overcome boredom and encourage the pious affections of the community, but interior or mental prayer holds pride of place, so to speak, in the taxonomy of prayer.⁶² Vocalization is necessary for liturgical

58 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M5, Ar1, p. 723.

59 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M1, Ar2, pp. 675–8. On faith, hope, and love as the distinguishing virtues of Franciscan prayer as opposed to the Dominican emphasis on obedience, see Timothy J. Johnson, 'The *Summa Alexandri* Vol. IV and the Development of the Franciscan Theology of Prayer,' *Miscellanea Francescana* 93 (1993): 524–37.

60 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 721.

61 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 722.

62 It may have been the Franciscan David of Augsburg who coined the term 'mental prayer'. See Friedrich Wulf, 'Das innere Gebet (oratio mentalis) und die Betrachtung (meditatio),' *Geist und Leben* 25 (1952): 385. Given the term's prominence in *De Oratione* and other 13th-century Franciscan texts, it may have originated in the Minorite community in Paris, see Timothy J. Johnson, *The Soul in Ascent: Bonaventure on Poverty, Prayer, and Union with God* (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2012), 122, n. 434. This approach to interiority and mental prayer is diametrically opposed to their Dominican counterparts, see Simon Tugwell, 'Introduction,' in *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings*, ed. Simon Tugwell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 3–4.

prayer and required for the common good. Yet at the same time, God is, as the *Summa Halensis* consistently argued, most intimately present within a person—indeed more present than a person is to him or herself⁶³—and mental prayer denotes the conversation of the heart with God, and likewise the ascending journey of the mind or intellect into the divine. Vocal prayer is ordered to mental prayer and, thereby advantageous inasmuch as it affords this *transitus* or passing over into God.⁶⁴ For the Franciscans, even the divine illumination proper to prevenient grace, which initially births prayer to receive the spiritual gifts of grace, is a decidedly, but not necessarily exclusively interior reality.⁶⁵ When introducing *De Oratione* in Book 4, they claim that interior prayer moves individuals most immediately into God,⁶⁶ who while intimately present with a person, appears to be absent.⁶⁷ In comparison with fasting and almsgiving, there is no doubt that this form of prayer is superior in merit and nobility since it is a form of contemplation *in via* (along the way) engaging, raising, and perfecting the totality of the person's understanding and affections in manner similar to love.

Concluding Reflections

The *Summa Halensis*, while both impressive and comprehensive, is but one representative of the massive literary project of the friars in the 1250s. In another mid 13th-century Franciscan text, *The Sacred Exchange between Saint Francis and Lady Poverty*, there is a memorable scene where Francis, after seeking out the naked and forlorn heroine, invites her to a communal dinner with his confreres. When she inquires as to the whereabouts of their cloister, Francis brings her to a certain hill. Gazing out at the world around them, he declares, 'Lady, this is our cloister'.⁶⁸ Given the fierce polemics surrounding the rapid clericalization and urban domestication of the Franciscans in the 1240s to the 1260s, this encounter with Lady Poverty from the 1230s to the 1250s is a stark reminder of how their communal identity had shifted

⁶³ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar2, p. 686.

⁶⁴ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar2, p. 690.

⁶⁵ On the Franciscan focus on interiority and grace, see Johann Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik*, vol. 1, *Das Wesen der Gnade* (Freiburg: Herder, 1942), 347.

⁶⁶ SH Bk IV, Q25, M2, p. 667.

⁶⁷ SH Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar2, p. 686.

⁶⁸ *Sacrum commercium sancti Francisci cum Domina Paupertate*, c. 30, n. 24, in *Fontes Franciscani*, ed. Enrico Menestò and Stefano Brufani, *Medioevo francescano: Testi*, 2 (Assisi: Edizioni Porziuncola, 1995), 1730: 'Hoc est claustrum nostrum, domina.' On the background of the *Sacrum commercium* text, see Stefano Brufani, 'Il Sacrum commercium sancti Francisci cum domina Paupertate,' in *Fontes Franciscani: Introduzioni critiche*, ed. Stefano Brufani, *Medioevo francescano: Saggi*, 3 (Assisi: Edizioni Porziuncola, 1997), 172.

from the peripatetic days of the early movement only to be replaced, albeit contested, by the stability and stasis of a growing monastic practice behind cloister walls.⁶⁹

The premise of *The Sacred Exchange* is expressed at the outset: poverty has the prerogative among the virtues that prepare a dwelling place for God within those who embrace her.⁷⁰ But where is she located, where is she to be found?⁷¹ This is the question Francis raises, and in the asking, the author appeals to the term *locus* in several passages to narrate how God placed human beings in a most amenable and beautiful place, only to exchange this paradise for a harsh mortality marked by the quest for riches.⁷² Poverty herself wandered, until she prepared an appropriate *locus*, a dwelling place pleasing to the Son of the most high Father.⁷³ Those first following in her footsteps remained faithful to the Lord as they spread the Gospel to the ends of the world, but the false peace of Constantine weakened her.⁷⁴ With the passage of time, the allure of riches returned, and many abandoned poverty, including those dedicated to religious life. Eventually God placed her on a high mountain accessible only to those like Francis.⁷⁵ Now the faithful thorough the ages in tandem with the angels, will both celebrate if Francis and his brothers prepare a place within themselves to receive the grace of poverty, and find refreshment in the fragrance of the prayers offered by those who are passing through the valley of this world.⁷⁶

Without renouncing the importance of poverty, the followers of Francis at the University of Paris found themselves in a much different situation than their confreres on a distant, allegorical or even literal hillside. Nevertheless, the question of their place in the church, and the world at large, was subject to intense discussions and, at times, fierce critique. The shift to large urban convents, and the life that ensued which was influenced by the long-tested monastic paradigm, did not erase the figurative or even literal peripatetic impulse common to the Franciscan worldview. The concept of human beings as *viatores*, while a collective medieval motif, is profoundly preserved in the memory of the brothers due to any number of factors, including the hagiographical accounts of their founder, a rapid expansion of far flung convents throughout Europe, and the widespread diplomatic and missionary

69 See Timothy J. Johnson, "'Ground to Dust for the Purity of the Order': Pastoral Power, Punishment, and Minorite Identity in the Narbonne Enclosure,' *Franciscan Studies* 64 (2006): 293–318; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Dispensations, Permissions, and the "Narbonne Enclosure": The Spatial Parameters of Power in Bonaventure's "Constitutions of Narbonne",' in *Oboedientia: Zu Formen und Grenzen von Macht und Unterordnung im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum*, ed. Sébastien Barret and Gert Melville, Vita Regularis: Abhandlungen, 27 (Münster: LIT, 2005), 363–82.

70 *Sacrum commercium*, prol. (Menestò and Brufani, 1705).

71 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 2, (Menestò and Brufani, 1707).

72 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 8 (Menestò and Brufani, 1713–4).

73 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 6 (Menestò and Brufani, 1711).

74 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 12 (Menestò and Brufani, 1717).

75 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 3 (Menestò and Brufani, 1708).

76 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 31 (Menestò and Brufani, 1731–2).

travels of their contemporary confreres. In the *Summa Halensis*, they access two philosophical-theological themes to secure the peripatetic underpinnings of their foundational story and secure its continual practice regardless of their urban emplacement.

The first is a sustained focus on ontological poverty, which interprets the movement from non-being to being itself as the very journey into God of all humanity. This acute dependency of humanity, according to the *Summa Halensis*, is the matrix for prayer understood as adoration (God bring individuals into existence), praise (God converses with individuals), and thanksgiving (God brings individuals to their goal).⁷⁷ The second is systematic utilization of *locus* to determine the place of human beings in general, and the Franciscans in particular, during their passage from non-being to being. This effort alone is noteworthy, as it suggests far more than a passing fascination with the philosophical materials available in the day; instead, it represents a community project of identification and instantiation amid a turbulent social-ecclesial period. Wherever they might find themselves in the world—even while *in cloaca* (in the restroom) – the authors understood themselves as *viatores* passing into God everywhere at any time in prayer, even if they no longer shared in the contingencies of the road mirrored so poignantly in *The Sacred Exchange*. Despite a shifting cultural context for many of the brothers, this mythic paradigm remained embedded in Franciscan intellectual theory and spiritual practice at least in the *Summa Halensis*, and writers of the same period such as Roger Bacon and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.

In conclusion, the question arises as to the degree of innovation the authors of the *Summa Halensis* displayed regarding person, place, and prayer. One thing is clear, and that is that these Franciscan authors are intensely interested in question of emplacement and salvation history.⁷⁸ In *The Mystic Fable*, the French historian and cultural theorist, Michel de Certeau, links prayer and knowledge. Speaking, he claims in accord with St Anselm, is the condition for knowledge, hence prayer as *oratio* is the field where this epistemological dynamic unfolds.⁷⁹ This essay suggests that theory and practice of prayer presented in Question 26 of the *Summa Halensis* is best understood via the Franciscan appropriation of *locus* as a defining, hermeneutical key to individual self-knowledge and communal identity in the mid 13th century. How does this assertion bear out when examined against the writings of religious communities such as the Dominicans? What about the Franciscans themselves? Does this intentional focus on place disappear as they become more firmly entrenched in society, and their mythic paradigm is rendered, practically speaking,

77 SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D1, M3, C1 (n. 291), pp. 445–7.

78 On the question of salvation history and the *Summa Halensis*, see Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales)* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1964).

79 Michel de Certeau, *The Mystic Fable*, vol 1, trans. Michael B. Smith (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 160.

meaningless? And yes, what about the authentic writings of Alexander of Hales himself? His *Glossa* and other critical editions of his works need to be examined in tandem with the treatment of person, place, and prayer in the *Summa Halensis*. These are all questions to be explored at another time, in another place—perhaps by the same person.