Diffractive Care and the Careful Accounting of It

Alberto Condotta

* 1987 Castelfranco Veneto, Italy | Treviso, Italy

Alberto Condotta is a visual artist, Special Educational Needs (SEN) teacher, and independent researcher. He studied painting in Venice, then studied philosophy and reconceptualised painting at the Centre for Fine Art Research (CFAR) Birmingham, where he completed his PhD within the *Radical Matter* research group. He is now researching inclusive approaches to art and knowledge.

Introduction: Situating care

This essay proposes an understanding of ‘care’ that stretches from its daily use as in ‘committing’ or ‘getting involved’ to the ontological level: as the keyword for a philosophy interested in the emerging present as opposed to the timeless transcendental.¹ Such a care-based as opposed to identity-based philosophy is a methodological ideal to strive for: an ideal that belongs to whomever prioritises the sharing of passions / practices over the defence of identities. It stems from the crossing of continental philosophy, philosophy of science, feminist critical framework and queer theory.² It does not have one name. Arguably, it cannot have just one name, being that it is a way of thinking which avoids single origins. It can be called Agential Realism, Radical Matter, Diffractive care, Ecology of Practices, ecetera.³ Another reason why it does not have a name is because it does not have one author. Although, if it had one, that would probably be Donna Haraway, who first argued the need for a “successor science project [of] situated knowledges.”⁴ This is the theoretical ground from which we depart, but if the reader is not very familiar with it, she / he / they should not be discouraged, as on a practical level, care is something everyone knows and can relate to. We should start from that.

² Judith Butler (1988), “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” in *Theatre Journal*, 40, no 4, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 519–31; Barad, *Meeting the*

Universe Halfway; Donna Haraway (1988), “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in *Feminist Studies*, vol 14, no 3, (College Park: Feminist Studies), 575–99;

Jean-François Lyotard (1996), *Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event*, (New York/Oxford: Columbia University Press); Ilya Prigogine (1996), *The End of Certainty*, (New York: The Free Press).

¹ This is part of a tradition of philosophy criticising what could be called classical ontology, that is, thinking according to the principle that reality is ultimately made of individual entities. Cf Karen Barad (2007), *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and The Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*, (Durham: Duke University Press); Gernot Böhme (2001), *Asthetik. Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre*, (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2001); Donna Haraway (2016), *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press).

³ On Agential Realism see Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 132–85. On Radical Matter see Johnny Golding (2018), “Friendship,” in L. Turner, U. Selbach and R. Broglio (Eds.), *The Edinburgh Companion to Animal Studies*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 262–73. On Ecology of Practices see Isabelle Stengers (2013), “Introductory notes on an ecology of practices,” in *Cultural Studies Review*, no 11, 183–96.

⁴ Haraway, “Situated Knowledges,” 579.

happiness [ˈhæpɪnis]

‘cry and you cry alone’. what a load of unequivocal tosh that has come to be. the world loves its sadness, its cruelty, it’s shame! any revolution that is missing happiness is not my revolution. ditto for dancing, long walks on beaches, sex games. mental note no 1: one does not have to be sad to be a militant, even though the thing one is fighting is abominable—so sayeth st foucault, early 80s. mental note no 2: happiness is a fundamental right for which people the world over are being tortured, imprisoned, drugged should they dare to break rank and ‘be happy’. cut to: sheikha princess latifa, hiding near the fire extinguisher.

⁵ See Stengers' principle of 'minor key responsibility' as the "need to decide in this particular case and not to obey the power of some more general reason." Cf Stengers, "Introductory notes on an ecology of practices," 188.

⁶ Cf David A. Kolb (2015), *Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Financial Times Press).

⁷ Golding, "Friendship," 263; "Whenever there is reciprocal capture, value is created." Isabelle Stengers (2010), "The Science Wars," *Cosmopolitics* vol 1, translated by R. Bononno, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 36.

⁸ Donna Haraway (1997), *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan@Meets_Once-Mouse*.™, (New York: Routledge), 71-94; Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*.

⁹ Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1984), "Order Through Fluctuations" in *Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature*, (New York City: Bantam Books), 177-212.

Care is the practice of savouring how subtle differences can make all the difference. It is the curiosity to see what will happen at each next step; the enjoyment of feeling at the same time both researching and finding; it is the availability to make space for the emerging real at the cost of reconsidering one's beliefs and priorities.⁵ Care is to be attuned to a practice that is so intense that knows no separated planning, making and learning.⁶ As a pursuit of intensity, care makes any practice a research. Or, to put it in a way that sounds less hierarchical, care is an umbrella term to think both the officially labelled practice-led research within academia and any other practice, inasmuch the latter is not instrumental.

A practice, based on care, starts from the small and the contingent and acquires relevance and validity by means of befriending its surroundings, without the need of a transcendental plane to justify its logic.⁷ However, we should not image such a process of befriending as if it were effortless or irresistible. As new sense to some extent must tear the fabric of common sense to establish its locality, caring comes with issues of communicability. When trying to speak of what one care for, one faces problems of translation, as if one were a returning expat. Such a translating effort can be painful, yet one cannot avoid it. As 'no man is an island,' no practice exists outside of an ecology of practices; one who cares cannot just care about one's focus of care. One also has to spread actively the mutation / anomaly that one's practice of care embodies. The question is: how to account for a practice we care for in order not just to represent it (care), but also to spread the specific care that informs its logic.

Understanding care through diffraction

In order to understand better what do we mean here with care, we should look at diffraction.⁸ In physics, diffraction describes the autonomous formation of new complexity / qualities out of the superimposition of waves that did not present such complexity / qualities individually. As described by Prigogine and Stengers, such self-emergence of complexity within out-of-equilibrium systems can become order and information independently of a masterplan, through mere self-repetition.⁹ According to diffraction, order / information is not transcendental but metastable: it emerges locally and temporarily without ever fully detaching from chaos.¹⁰

¹⁰ According to a wave-based as opposed to particle-based understanding of reality, metastable equilibrium

consists of a statistical recurrence of behaviours informing an ever-changing organisation.

Diffraction is particularly useful for researchers whose practices are not structured as if learning / finding was the successive and final moment of a process that sees making / researching as a mere stage of production, which is what the epistemological paradigm of reflexivity implicitly assumes.¹¹ While reflexivity presupposes that constructions abstracted from the embodied sensuousness should receive more credit than the embodied sensuousness itself (that is, that which makes sense in the moment, the sense that is the moment), the paradigm of diffraction provides an analytic way of describing reality by exalting sensuousness. While the epistemological paradigm of reflexivity understands knowledge as the extrication of an algorithm from a logarithm, or the transcendence of the discursive from the material, the onto-epistemological paradigm of diffraction surpasses the traditional matter / form ontological divide (as such, a divide does not apply to waves). It thus supports an understanding of research in which the inevitably blurring boundary between discursive and material is not an ambiguity to be hidden. Rather than considering the sensuous dimension within a research practice as an indication that knowledge had not being quite achieved, as form had not yet been extracted by the noise / contingencies of matter, the paradigm of diffraction celebrates the fact that the material and the discursive cannot be taken apart.¹²

Diffraction has an extraordinary emancipatory power when it comes to knowledge production. However, it also presents an epistemological and political problem. If one cannot exclude the possibility that what one perceives as some indistinct noise could be in fact information for someone else, who decides what is information and what is noise? In the absence of a universally generalizable reference, the only way not to settle for subjectivity and relativism but to claim objectivity of some kind is to respond that no one decides. It is the contingent relation between perceiver and perceived that causes information to happen. This claim is not pronounced lightly. It means conceiving agency as pertaining to situations and not just individuals, thus problematising at once the traditions of ontology, ethics and epistemology. In the next section objectivity will be presented as the capability to account for the contingencies that appear to be required for a specific information to happen.

¹¹ The spelling 'reflexion' follows Barad, which she conceptualises in opposition to 'diffraction'. Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 29–30 and 71–2.

¹² On performative approaches as distinct from representationalism, see Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 47–8.

¹³ On 'event' see Martin Heidegger (2002), "*The Origin of the Work of Art*," in *Off the Beaten Track*, translated by J. Young & K. Haynes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). See also Lyotard, *Peregrinations* where he writes, "We will not ask [...] what is the sense of the event: the event is sense itself." 55. See also Haraway where she writes: "Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, [...] never [...] as slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and his authorship of 'objective' knowledge," in "*Situated Knowledges*," 592.

¹⁴ Cf Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 225 and 246; Haraway, "*Situated Knowledges*," 579 and 589; Stengers, "*Introductory notes on an ecology of practices*," 194; and Stengers, "*The Science Wars*," 32–33 and 37.

¹⁵ Cf the concept of 'emergence of self-organisation' described by the theory of complexity as an emergence with no origin. Cf Prigogine and Stengers, *Order out of Chaos*, 160.

This section argues that the information in question is not an object (emphasis on transcendental meaning), but an action: the information of both perceived and perceiver. Information is the intense relation that contingently establishes itself as an event, as well as establishing perceiver and perceived as part of an encounter or an instance of situated knowledge.¹³ As within diffraction identity is substituted by metastability and essence by performativity; information is not a message going from A to B, but emerges as a resonance from a statistical non-enclosable system entangled to it. Such emergence is not just epistemological, but also aesthetic, political, ontological.¹⁴ The emergence in question is not just information. It is also sense and existence.¹⁵

What is an 'emergence?' In statistical terms emergence is information, though many philosophers discuss it emphasizing its many different flavours. Deleuze called it a "difference in itself," or—with Guattari—an "anomaly."¹⁶ Lyotard wrote that it is something "pass[ing] for a-grammatical without [...] being nonsensical."¹⁷ Golding uses the image of a "singular multiplicity."¹⁸

¹⁶ For the concept of 'difference in itself,' see: Gilles Deleuze (1997), "*Difference in Itself*" in *Difference and Repetition*, translated by P. Patton, (London and New York: Continuum), 27–69. On 'the anomalous' see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2005), *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by B. Massumi, (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press), 244–5.

¹⁷ Jean-François Lyotard (2011), *Discourse, Figure*, translated by A. Hudek & M. Lydon, (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press), 138.

¹⁸ For 'singular multiplicity' see Sue Golding (2000), "*Singular Multiplicity: The A-radicality Lecture—Second Meditation on Identity, Ethics, and Aesthetics [or What Does It Mean to 'inhabit' Technology?]*," *Contemporary Culture and Aesthetics*, 10/11, (Maastricht: Jan Van Eyck Akademie), 286–292. Cf Jean-Luc Nancy (2000), *Being Singular Plural*, translated by R. D. Richardson & A. E. O'Byrne, (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

information [ˌɪnfəˈmeɪʃən]

when associated with data (where data represents values attributed to parameters) information enables categorising, archiving, and is fundamental to library sciences, search engines, apps and gaming. because it can provide (usually traceable) meaning, it can be extremely lucrative, that is monetarised.

Stengers proposes “cause;” Barad uses the neologism “intra-action.”¹⁹ Researching quantum mechanics, Bohr might have been the first one equating it to a phenomenon beyond the distinction between epistemology and ontology.²⁰ Borrowing from Lyotard, it can be referred to as “emergence with intensity,” since such a term can be easily related both to the perceived emergence and the emergence of attunement within the perceiver.²¹ That is, when and where the variously named being / becoming, appearance / substance, matter / form divide ceases to apply.²² Attunement cannot be limited to observation, not even in those cases where it appears to take place as pure observation, for example in an art gallery. This is because the intensity that is essential for attunement always radiates consequences. Attuned perception is always also attuned participation, for the attuned perceiver is always to some extent changed by the perception. Within the context of practice-led research and any practice of care in general, the intensity of attuned perception / participation can simply be called care. Care is intensity as seen from one end of an emergence of information / sense / existence. It is then a particularistic view of the tension that informs the carer as much as the carer actively commits. In its diffractive reconceptualisation, care is not to be intended as a series of actions performed by an attentive/careful subject. Care is not mastery. As argued by Stengers with reference to Whitehead, care could be pictured as “[...] a decision without a decision-maker which is making the maker[...] where] the gesture of taking in hand is not justified by, but both producing and produced by, the relationship of relevance between the situation and the tool.”²³ When opening oneself to incompatible co-presences and inter-fereces that know no synthesis, everything is suspended including one’s identity, grounding definitions and the need of an ideal horizon.²⁴

¹⁹ Karen Barad (2012), *Interview with Adam Kleinmann*, “Intra-actions,” *Mousse* 34, 76–81; Stengers, “Introductory notes on an ecology of practices,” 189.

²⁰ The term ‘phenomenon’ is not intended as oppositional to ‘noumenon.’ Following Barad, phenomenon can be understood as a synonym of event. Cf Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 140 and 206.

²¹ “[W]hen one is ‘there’ (there where I do not think, as Lacan says), then it is indeed intensity, without intention, without a precise goal, which arises.” Jean-François Lyotard (1993), *Libidinal Economy*, translated by I. H. Grant, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 207.

²² Roland Barthes (1981), *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, translation by R. Howard, (New York: Hill and Wang), 72; Maurice Blanchot (1993), *The Infinite Conversation*, translated by S. Hanson, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota), 321–2; Jean-Luc Nancy (2007), *Listening*, translated by C. Mandell, (New York: Fordham University Press), 5–9.

²³ Stengers, “Introductory notes on an ecology of practices”, 185.

²⁴ Lyotard’s concept of ‘paganism’, as judging without grounding such a judgement on a preestablished criteria, from which derives the contextual locality of justice in Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud (1985), *Just Gaming*, translated by W. Godzich, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 16.

They are preceded by the emerging logic of the research / practice. This does not make the activity of the diffractive carer aimless, nor completely rudderless. The practice still attains critical / relevant / remarkable results. Only the concept of criticality relinquishes its traditional meaning of objectivity; that is a subject's ability of attaining objectivity (a supposedly pre-existing truth). It shifts to the ability of a proposition to make sense in itself, to embody enough intensity so as to be the embodiment of its own law (hence not judged outside of it). Within the paradigm of diffraction, being critical is being remarkable / relevant. It is to perform remarkability / relevance. On the one hand, intensity must become system within the context of sense—must make a difference within a system of differences—to leave a mark or to be. In other words, it needs to be accountable / perceivable to exist. On the other hand, intensity is creative, as it marks a difference that was not there, a dimension of sense that is radically new, as it has no singular origin.

Once having stepped outside of the variously named reflexivity / metaphysics of substance / classical ontology into diffraction, the criticality / remarkability / relevance of a practice is to be intended in terms of intensity of new sense as opposed to extension of pre-existing knowledge. Care does not identify its focus with an object of knowledge. Its focus is rather the paradox that moves the practice in the first place, in the sense of the intensity—the core of non-reducible complexity—that is at the heart of the practice / situated knowledge itself.²⁵

²⁵ “[P]aradoxes [...] are not contradictory; they rather allow us to be present at the genesis of the contradiction.” Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 74.

Rather than using the research practice as a tool to discover something that is supposedly outside / independent of it, one probes the core of one's practice by trial and error, researching whichever differences are critical to it and how they happen to be so. This move does not close itself in a circle of tautological self-referentiality, because full identification is never reached. As far as curiosity sustains it, such a research practice can be truly practice-led, as it both chases and produces the differences it investigates in an open-ended way. This happens because each breakthrough in the research diffracts—that is reconfigures ontologically—the practice in question, rather than marking a further step in the process of identifying / objectifying it.

Care is the logic of practice-led research. Performing care or, in other terms, succeeding at keeping a research practice effectively practice-led, is meaningful in two ways. One is that it keeps one's practice intense / open / anomalous / irreducible. It means never to stop looking for the paradoxical core of one's practice. This is critically important for practitioners in order to resist identity-based logics of production that so often characterise neoliberalism. The second one is that it means propagating the locality of sense of the practice.²⁶ Never stop looking for better accounts of one's practice enhances the possibilities of the latter to expand its locality of sense. That is, the locality within which the differences that are critical to its logic are relevant / remarkable.

An excursus on evidence-based science as practice-led research

It might appear as if conceiving of one's practice in terms of care is useful only for practice-led researchers that risk seeing their academic status questioned. One could be tempted to say that a paradigm describing knowledge that celebrates the production of new sense over the extension of pre-existing sense is just a tool for outsiders. Things are not this simple. Even some branches of what has been the core model of modern academia—that is, evidence-based science—have embraced a methodology of care. In the move from Newtonian physics to statistical mechanics, as well as within the development of quantum mechanics, a few scientists have radically questioned the ontological ground of reflexive epistemology upon which the traditional image of academia as a positivist / encyclopaedical enterprise is premised.²⁷

Building on Barad, Haraway and Stengers, this section argues that if the essential job of a scientist is to discover, such discovering is not the uncovering of some reality but to account for their experimental practice. It is only by persuading their colleagues that their experimental practice is indeed 'practice-led' as opposed to 'hope / prejudice-propelled' that they can propose their conclusions as discoveries rather than self-referential creations. Accounting, or the practice of abstracting without losing sight of the contingency from which the abstraction has started, is what science does. Beginning with Bohr, some scientists facing profoundly contradicting results that were produced by means of different measuring devices have performed care

²⁶ Locality of sense is what Paganelli names as 'open finitude,' Stengers as 'constraints' and Barad as 'constitutive exclusions'. Cf Stengers, *Cosmopolitics* vol 1, 43; Cf Karen Barad, "Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheritance: Discontinuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Justice-to-Come," *Derrida Today*, 3.2 (2010), 254; Cf Mattia Paganelli (2016), "Finitude, Possibility, Dimensionality; Aesthetics After Complexity," (unpublished PhD thesis: Birmingham City University), 146–175.

²⁷ Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 66–70; Stengers, "The Science Wars", 38; Mattia Paganelli (2017/18), "Ontology Interrupted: Prigogine, Stengers and the Abdication of Physics," in *Pulse: a History, Sociology & Philosophy of Science Journal*, no 5, 46–69.

²⁸ On Barad's arguments against the traditional understanding of objective truth, first with reference to Bohr's indeterminacy principle or what Bohr names 'quantum wholeness' and then in view of the experimental tests of Bell's inequalities and the experimental finding in the 1990s.; see Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 118, 261, 289–292 and 306.

²⁹ On the ontological difference between Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Bohr's indeterminacy, Cf Barad, *Ivi*, 115–8.

³⁰ Barad, *Ivi*, 139.

³¹ Haraway, "Situated Knowledges," 583.

towards their practices to the point of rethinking the meaning of their profession entirely.²⁸ As not to betray the experimental method, they have let go of the reassuring promise that a unitarian picture of reality awaits the scientific enterprise.

Rigorous experimental practice has shown them that there are some instances where the source of disagreement among measuring *apparata* cannot be reduced to an epistemological issue.²⁹ They needed to conclude that some phenomena resist being treated as the symptoms of *noumena* endowed with individual existence. Instead, they demand to be recognised as "ontologically primitive relations—relations without pre-existing *relata*."³⁰

Science has taken the leap of reconceiving reality away from the cornerstone of Western philosophy, namely the metaphysical substance / appearance divide. Even without a shared ontological ground, a new understanding of objectivity can be established upon a shared methodological commitment to rigorous scientific accountability. Indeed, if everyone agrees on the deontological level regarding how to make reliable research, knowledge claims can be true or can demand to be recognised as true even without positing the existence of the one transcendental objective reality.

From this shift come gains and losses. On the one hand, science has its positivist dream of approaching a God-like view of everything critically questioned, if not shattered. On the other hand, this disenchantment means that researchers are not expected to pretend being in an impossible detached / disembodied relation towards their object of observation. Instead, within this 'reformed' science, the partiality of their perspective comes to the centre of their accounting. Indeed, as Haraway points out: "only partial perspective promises objective vision."³¹

Given that for evidence-based science the possibility to repeat a given experiment is at the basis of any knowledge claim, the scientific status of some research depends on how well it manages to account for itself: on how rigorously it manages to situate its knowledge claim. These are not accounts of specific experiences, but phenomenological recipes that propose some general conditions of intentionality, proximity and definition that appear to be entangled with the emergence of a determinate kind of phenomenon. Their degree of objectivity depends on the inclusion of all specifications that are

deemed useful for the sake of re-enacting the conceptual and material apparatus through which the encountered/measured phenomenon had emerged, as well as on the exclusion of all impractical details. When objective accounts—that is, accounts that deserve being treated as true—disagree at an ontological level, a common truth must be conjured up by means of diplomacy. Stengers argues that this truth in the diplomatic sense is whatever happens to allow ‘communication between diverging parties’ without having their divergence flattened out.³² It is an agreement over their way of agreeing and disagreeing that allows mutual recognition as scientists, and—more generally—as agents capable of rational knowledge claims. This diplomatic conception of truth is real and viable by being contextual: it works as such only insofar as everyone that is involved keeps in mind that the latter cannot be detached from the material contingencies of the debate within which it has emerged and of which it is constituted.³³

³² Stengers, “Introductory notes on an ecology of practices,” 194. See also the concept of ‘factishistic proposition’: Stengers, *Cosmopolitics* vol 1, 24.

³³ Haraway, “Situated Knowledges,” 593.

Accounting and knowledge claims

It was seen that when scientists producing profoundly contrasting results meet, mutual recognition of rationality / objectivity can be assured solely by the fact that their experiments are accounted for in a way that the latter can be successfully repeated. In the absence of a shared ontological ground, one cannot afford taking for granted one’s foundational assumptions, so the image of what an objective account should look like is turned on its head. Indeed, in these cases being responsible for one’s contingent proximity is the way to enhance the objectivity/repeatability of one’s experiment account, while having one’s account looking objective by pretending neutrality undermines actual objectivity / repeatability.

From this derive two fundamental points. The first is that if not even evidence-based science can afford presenting their findings as self-evident facts, someone operating outside of an experimental setting cannot be satisfied of employing care only in relation to the focus of one’s research. One must employ care also when accounting for the focus of one’s care to others holding conflicting results / different sensibilities. The second one is that, albeit not all practice-led research is evidence-based science, a piece of scientific research can be universally recognised as such only by demonstrating being

a practice-led kind of research. As for the first point, it is clear why a practice-led researcher that is employed by academia must put an extreme effort into accounting: one's sustenance depends on the passing of one's research as a contribution to knowledge. But if the practice-led researcher in question happens to be an independent practitioner of a practice of care, why should accounting for one's research be a priority for her / him / them? Indeed, when encountered by the core of its locality of sense, a practice is already fully knowledge.

"[K]nowing does not require intellection in the humanist sense. [...] In some instances, 'nonhumans' (even beings without brains) emerge as partaking in the world's active engagement in practices of knowing. Knowing entails differential responsiveness and accountability as part of a network of performances. Knowing is not a bounded or closed practice but an ongoing performance of the world."³⁴

³⁴ Barad, *Meeting the Universe Half-way*, 149.

Here Barad proposes a conception of 'knowledge' that can hardly be differentiated by 'capability of living.' By blurring such a distinction, she suggests that abstraction is not ontologically different from other strategies of survival and development. Not only abstraction is just one way for a practice of care to spread its logic, but the essential one would be another: fascination. Care is a cohering of intensity with no ground/*telos*. It does not rely on any justification or endorsement. To exist, it must communicate itself without communicating anything beyond itself.³⁵ So, why commit to rigorous accounting?

³⁵ "[T]o speak poetically is to make possible a non-transitive speech whose task is not to say things (not to disappear in what it signifies), but to say (itself) in letting (itself) say [...]" Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, 356.

Albeit not required for a practice of care to exist or—in other words—to be knowledge within and around its locality of sense, there are two reasons why those who deeply care for a non-scientific practice should not dismiss the importance of contributing with a linguistic account that strives to be objective; that is, responsible of its method and partiality / situatedness. One reason is defensive: in view of the fact that the dominance of a specific practice eventually results in the imposition of its abstracting principle / interpretative key onto other practices, it is in the interest of anyone who cares for a practice to develop autonomous ways for it to be accounted.

What triggers the attempt to produce an account of one's own is the concern that the logic one is invested in is crucially constituted of a materiality whose sensuous charge would be significantly

instant [instant]

an awkward and yet profound naming for both the shortest moment of time and a slice of duration. 'instants' cannot be 'perceived' as such; it just 'is'. a formal instant also functions as an axiom in mechanics.

deteriorated in case of being compressed / homogenised to the given standards of communication.

The second reason comes from hope. It surges as moral responsibility towards institutions, which, despite their imperfection, play a unique and foundational role in our complex mass society / societies. The fact that some evidence-based science has discovered itself to be ontologically practice-led opens to the possibility that increasingly greater localities of academia will embrace a more inclusive understanding of knowledge, thus proceeding with emancipatory agendas. However, this can happen only so long as all parts commit to account for their logics in the most accessible ways. Rather than blaming academia for not having sent some expert like an anthropologist to put one's locality of sense into their maps, or blaming the expert that did come to map the core of one's care for the inevitable inaccuracy of their account, one should take up the responsibility towards hypothetical readers from unknown other localities of sense and strive for having one's practice speaking for itself with reference to already institutionalised knowledge. Contextualising and interpreting one's practice by referencing institutionalised abstract knowledge is act of responsibility / care towards both one's practice and the bigger systems within which one operates. However, such an attempt of self-legitimation is not free of risks. It might fail to be self-emancipatory and turn in its opposite, especially if an individual's effort to represent a certain practice becomes a profession. One should keep in mind the ultimate scope of the accounting enterprise. Which is not self-representation, but propaganda; that is the propagation of the logic one cares for also—but never exclusively—by means of representing it by analytic speech.

The second point brings to the fore the issue of differencing evidence-based scientific practice-led research and other kinds of practice-led research with reference to the issue of counting as knowledge. If evidence-based science can be truly such only by being practice-led research and showing it, the difference between scientific and analytic-but-not-properly-scientific research is a technical one. As has been argued, the difference is not in the kind of care that it is infused in the practice, but in the way of accounting for it. Evidence-based science grounds itself by defining its experiential setting. The whole research practice is built from the start to

be accounted for, so that output—that is, that which is presented as the discovery—and methodological account are one. It is thanks to this tight methodological ground that the claims of peer-reviewed evidence-based science is considered objective and pass automatically as knowledge also outside of the circles within which they can be properly evaluated.

Without a constant reference to the experimental setting, other forms of research cannot present themselves as fully responsible for their methodology; often referred to as ‘just research practices’ or ‘soft sciences,’ not properly as science. However, this does not mean that research practices that cannot be executed within a lab and according to comprehensive protocols cannot be publicly valuable. They can make the case of having their situated knowledge recognised publicly only by virtue of presenting themselves as ‘analytic.’ That is, by the ability to repeat an experiment as the proof of scientific status and therewith new knowledge. While an account is scientific by means of proving its repeatability / generalisability within the most clearly defined context / measuring apparatus, in the absence of a this kind of metric an account is considered analytic when succeeding at describing—with the contextually most appropriate degree of detail—all the differences that are reasonably seen as essential.

For analytic research practice, striving for accountability is an indissolubly creative / critical feat. It is creative, because the benchmark of what is reasonable could potentially be renegotiated at every turn. Indeed, in the impossibility to have a methodological ground that can be universally shared among researchers, a research practice accounting for itself needs to constantly ask itself what is the contextually most appropriate backdrop for its claims and the answer might vary with each and every claim. It is critical, because one needs to be capable of responding about the methodological variation one adopts. The deontology of an analytic account comes from being responsible for the language that it is used. Rhetoric tools are useful and needed. However, they must be used to enhance that which matters, not to hide that which might not fit one’s narrative. The pretension for non-evidence-based research practices of being treated as knowledge of public interest derives from this commitment to use the materiality of the discourse for clarifying and not mystifying. Ultimately, this is a commitment that grounds care within one’s research practice over one’s will to have an impact.

Another way to look at the difference between an account that is recognised as properly scientific and one that is just analytic is in terms of reliability. The first one must present itself as objectively reliable within an objectively defined context, while the second one must appear reasonably reliable within a reasonably generalisable context. Both are reliable by virtue of having their main claims backed up by being verifiable in practice and/or echoed in literature that is considered reliable. The more a community of researchers trust their methodology to be evidence-based, the more the conclusions of one of their accounts have the power to establish themselves even when they go against common sense and the scientific tradition on the topic. Similarly, the more a field of research perceives itself as scientific; the least common it is for accounts within it to try in fascinating the reader, as they would demand to be interesting for their content exclusively. This pretension of being interesting without the effort to fascinate is a direct consequence of grounding one's claims on the experimental setting. In theory, one would assume that accounting for the experimental setting in the most comprehensive way is the only objective way to establish a common ground with the reader, thus the only way to communicate. However, in practice, it is not always the case that a comprehensive account suffices to ensure communication, especially if one cannot pin down a promise of instrumental gain right in the abstract of the account or when a piece of research is particularly anomalous/innovative. Before some content can be properly assessed, the possibility for an account to be relevant depends on its capability to fascinate. Before one can judge whether a piece of research really is interesting, its account should be capable of suspending the reader's disbelief for as long as it takes for its logic to be unfolded and/or enacted.

While science maintains its credibility at a public level by operating as if their knowledge claims were objectively universal (by means of a shared commitment to the experimental method and—once the latter produces non-integrable accounts—diplomacy), accounts of analytic practices are rather grass-root. They become knowledge without the need of referring to a supposedly unified horizon of truth: their way of achieving relevance is by expanding their locality of sense in any possible direction, one encounter after the other. Such accounts are real the moment their descriptions become prescriptions for the

³⁶ One of the most powerful instances of this is the influence that Georgian romantic novels had on British society and, consequently, on the West. Cf BBC (2015), *A Very British Romance with Lucy Worsley*, at bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06h1fys

³⁷ Cf Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 33.

³⁸ See Borges where he imagines languages without nouns, constructed upon an ontology of becoming rather than being. Jorge Luis Borges (1964), "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," in *Labyrinths Selected Stories and Other Writings*, D. A. Yates and J. E. Irby (Eds.), (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation), 20–33. Such a shift in favour of verbs means a move away from the use of the verb 'to be' as the verb entangled with the metaphysics of substance. Cf Eric A. Havelock (1986), *The Muse Learns to Write. Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

fascinated audience. It does not matter if the moment of fascination lasts only a moment, as attunement is an epicentre of change irradiating consequences that can never be tracked in full. What matters is that the intensity of the account had sparked new sense, thus reconfiguring the existent.³⁶

On the limits of written accounts

As for the present account on accounting for what one cares to be analytic/reliable, it is necessary to look at the genetic limits that constitute such a practice, thus showing its functioning not only for its potential, but also through the difficulties that shape it. As far as accounts are intended in terms of verbal communication, the main difficulty is to keep the account consistent with the logic of diffraction that characterises research / practices of care. The difficulties that will be considered here are the ones that I have encountered in the attempt to invent a language that could allow my own research / practice to communicate its material/dense logic.

The main problem in accounting for practices invested in care is that natural languages have a propensity to systematically objectify phenomena / complex systems / intensity. As for a start, natural languages largely rely on nouns—which are particle-like entities—and on the actions that they perform. Thus, they embody the opposite logic of that of statistical mechanics and diffraction, where there is no basic unit endowed with individual identity, but only relations informing metastable *relata*.³⁷

One linguistic adaptation that could be of help, would be to limit—if not abolish—the use of nouns.³⁸ Verbs in their participle mode would need to take up the roles of subjects and objects: present participle would be used for subjects and past participle for objects respectively. Also, the use of verbs in the infinite mode would be avoided, as that turns them into nouns. All flavours and specifications would be conveyed by means of adverbs, adjectives attached to participles and by clustering participles together. A second linguistic adaptation would be less grammatical and more tactical. To avoid monodirectional agency / linear causality, one should try to balance the directionality of a transitive verb with another one going the opposite way, either in the same sentence or in one of the following ones. A third linguistic adaptation to try evoking the non-objective presence of intensity / a

phenomenon is by means of presenting a string of propositions punctuated by commas, colons, semicolons, dashes that partially negate each other without opposing each other. Here is an example of writing that makes use of this technique:

“An event: what nevertheless does not arrive, the field of non-arrival and, at the same time, that which, arriving, arrives without gathering itself in some definite or determinable point—the sudden arrival of what does not take place as either a single or a general On the limits of written accounts-possibility.”³⁹

³⁹ Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, xii–xix.

Through this string of ‘non-dialectical negations’, Blanchot succeeds in evoking the paradoxical nature of a something that holds attention by resisting objectification. But how far can this strategy go? The problem is that the very linearity of speech produces string-like connections among words. In Blanchot’s text one negation leads to and resonates with the following one or two, not with all of them at the same time. Thus, the length of the text is inversely proportional to its potential of evoking whole phenomena / complex systems / intensity in their width. Moreover, already with entities-based ontology the need of sequencing information makes it difficult for both the reader and the writer to hold together both the detail and the whole picture as the latter grows. When it comes to complex systems and metastable / intense structures, such a difficulty is aggravated exponentially by the fact that the addition of every new specification does not just translate into the adding up of details to some picture that has been already consolidated in the memory. Instead, to some extent every new addition should reconfigure the whole of what has been described up to that point (as it happens when one adds a colour onto a painting).

Furthermore, being that there are limits to the complexity that one can contemplate at one time, at some point one must bracket forcefully the irreducible complexity of an intensity / phenomenon and move on considering more. One could use a cautionary signposting such as ‘x-ish’ for bracketing some complexity and referring to it without the need of contemplating its unique and complex functioning all the time. Yet, despite the cautionary ‘-ish’ addition, sooner or later the habit of handling ‘x-ish’ as a particle-like entity overwrites the memory of the radically heterogeneous intensity it represents. This is what happens when the phenomenology of an intensity’s

irony [ʔaɪrəni]

a flattening of disagreement, without physical violence. sometimes funny, usually not.

⁴⁰ Jacques Derrida (1994), *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge), 29.

⁴¹ Cf Albert Camus (1991 [1942]), "The Myth of Sisyphus," in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, translated by J. O'Brien, (New York: 1st Vintage International), 119–123.

⁴² On the *différend*, see Jean-François Lyotard (1988), *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, translated by G. Van Den Abbeele, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), xi.

⁴³ The discontinuity that is at play in the gap is that of paradoxical difference, not that of opposition. Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 132.

unique functioning remains for too long implicit and the recurrent resorting to the noun 'phenomenon' or 'practice' ends up objectivising the latter. In view of these two points, it can be seen that—irrespective of how one constructs language—the very action of building an argument implies "wounding the dis-jointure, the dispersion, or the difference" and "effacing the heterogeneity of the other."⁴⁰

Accounting for practice of care has been described as a Sisyphean, absurd practice that strives to translate phenomena / intensity verbally, despite such a translation always implies some degree of objectification.⁴¹ The limits that have been identified make all the more pressing to define in positive terms some precepts by means of which clarity of speech—which is ideal for an account—might not lead to forms of objectifying comprehension / identity-based thinking.

Despite such precepts are impossible to abide by (being it impossible to succeed in unfolding an intra-active metastable system linguistically), it might be the case that the identification of such ideals can nevertheless be helpful. It might orientate one's efforts in sharing what one cares for regarding a phenomenon / practice / intensity. First impossible precept: the account must have a good rhythm.

An account is made of sequenced details, but it is paramount not to dwell for too long on any of those, as one might lose sight of the overarching structure. Second impossible precept: no detail should be identified as a thing but as an instance of discontinuity. This

happens as the phenomenon/practice is presented in terms of a singular multiplicity of 'differences in themselves' that intra-actively interfere with each other without the possibility of a synthesis (as in Lyotard's *différend*).⁴² Third and last impossible precept: one should focus on the gaps a system affords without ceasing to be a system.⁴³ Or, in other words, one should never try to identify the phenomenon / intensity in question when accounting for it. Instead, one should try identifying that which is paradoxical in its functioning, as only a paradox can originate/ground a discourse that must not be reducible to a singular origin, i.e. identified with a particle-like entity.

Perhaps the only way to realise these impossible precepts is to evoke a certain phenomenon / practice / intensity by means of creating an artwork, thus by means of another phenomenon / practice / intensity. Such a form of 'artistic accounting' challenges both the limits of what an account can be and what an artwork can be, as communication

and art cannot be made to coincide.⁴⁴ An instance of phenomenological accounting can become itself a phenomenon inasmuch as the sensuous logic of what it must be accounted for diffracts with the sensuous logic of the medium employed, thus producing unexpected evocative lateral relations. Merleau-Ponty comes to the conclusion that that would be the only form of philosophical speech that could not fail in the ‘absurd effort’ of ‘put[ting] into words a certain silence [the philosopher] hearkens to within himself’ (that is, what I have called intensity).⁴⁵ In his words:

“One has to believe [...] that there is or could be a language of coincidence, a manner of making the things themselves speak [...]. It would be a language of which [the philosopher] would not be the organiser, words he would not assemble, that would combine through him by virtue of a natural intertwining of their meaning, through the occult trading of the metaphor—where what counts is no longer the manifest meaning of each word and of each image, but the lateral relations, the kinship that are implicated in their transfers and their exchanges.”⁴⁶

These ‘lateral relations’ are poetic inventions. That is, moments where the account appears simultaneously at the centre of a plurality of systems of sense, thus enacting superpositionality of sense rather than mere potential polysemy.⁴⁷ Rather than being at a crossroad of potential meaning, there the discourse defies its own linearity and appears to take two or more directions at the same time or to be in non-coincident places at the same time. Such moments of irreducible complexity make sense before subjectivity can perform itself; before there can be a judgement and—with it—a subject. When the operation works, when the account works as an artwork, a propagation of the reality/intensity of the phenomenon is directly lived/re-enacted rather than linguistically represented.

Good teaching, free teaching and epistolary essays

The previous section concluded that only the paradoxical non-opposition of the sensuous and the analytic that happens within the taking place of poetical evocation can succeed in accounting for a phenomenon/practice. However, relying on *poesis* does not amount to a viable precept for accounting practices of care, as the emergence of new sense creates its own conditions of possibility only *a posteriori*.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ On the impossibility to treat a book as a document and as a piece of literature at the same time, see Vladimir Nabokov (1982), *Lectures on Literature*, F. Bowers (Ed.), (New York, London: Harvest), 1–2. Referring to literature, Blanchot writes: “The writer speaks a tongue [that] has no core and reveals nothing.” Maurice Blanchot (1982), *The Sirens’ Song: Selected essays by Maurice Blanchot*, translation by G. Josipovici, (Brighton: Harvester Press), 102.

⁴⁵ On diffraction as laterality, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1992), *The Visible and the Invisible. Followed by working notes*, edited by C. Lefort, translated by Alfonso Lingis, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 125.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ On the use of quantum superposition within the context of the logic of the senses see: Golding, “Friendship,” 272.

⁴⁸ Derrida writes of the *a posteriori* as acknowledgement of the happening of a “non-negative impossible” – which “is a thinking

of the event [...] in its unanticipatable coming, *hic et nunc*) that resists reappropriation by an ontology or phenomenology of

presence as such [...]” In Jacques Derrida (2002), “As If It Were Possible ‘Within Such Limits’ ...”, in *Negotiations: Interventions*

and *Interviews, 1971–2001* edited and translated by E. Rottenberg, (Stanford: Stanford University press), 367.

Indeed, *poesis* is something that happens precisely by breaking expectations, not something that can be punctually planned and executed as part of a procedure.

Hence, should this quest end with an *aporia*? Should I conclude—in a way akin to Derrida—that the only possible way of accounting for what one cares is by means of the more or less casual taking place of an impossibility, of something that is impossible up until it happens?⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid, 344.

Not necessarily. By rethinking knowledge diffractively, the meaning of knowledge production shifts from the capability to abstract from the sensuous to that of responding to it by means of establishing the axes of sense that appear more likely to configure it in a sustainable / inhabitable way. With this notion of knowledge production in mind, it appears that accounting for what one cares does not need producing an entity-looking output at all. Searching for the characteristics of a hypothetical perfect account might have concealed distracted the fact that the practice of abstracting without losing sight of the contingency from which the abstraction has started might be called accounting, but not exclusively so. This definition also applies to good teaching or free teaching.

Free teaching or good teaching can be a community of peers that make up a recurring assembly of researchers/practitioners. It is composed of people that share enough common ground to communicate and differ enough from one another to produce unpredictable—thus lively—conversations. Free / good teaching also happens in structured contexts, but only when a teacher and one or more disciples are attuned to the conversation they are having, so that reflexive issues such as learning objectives and objective evaluation become temporarily irrelevant. When it happens—and I would like to think that it does happen to most people at least once—free / good teaching meets all three of the impossible precepts for a perfect account. As for starts, free / good teaching has a good rhythm, as intensity sustains it. As for the second precept, it makes the disciples and peers inhabiting the topic, in the sense that during the time in which the intensity of teaching suspends subjectivity, the material-discursive logic of the topic becomes an architecture (a singular multiplicity of differences) in which for them to dwell. As for the third precept, the ultimate goal of free/good teaching is not to represent some knowledge, but to diffract the knowledge it proposes with the functioning of each disciple / peer,

jazz [dʒæz]

atonal, wild, soulful. hated by adorno, the font of inhabiting / surviving / inventing freedom from the slave fields of America. famously pioneered around 1895 by buddy bolden in new orleans, it made its way north—via voice, sax, piano. billie holiday, eliza fitzgerald, nina simone all iconic poets of this powerful improv, rhythm, beat. it has bled into the world of painting, architecture, writing, performance. it is central to re-inhabiting information/data 'differently'—with a form of aliveness that matters, that creates matter.

thus making the topic dissolve into competence and further practices. This means picturing the teaching process not just as knowledge transmission (as in a distribution of notions) but as knowledge production; that is a transformation of the parties involved by means of the establishing of new sense / practices / intensity. A major limit of free / good teaching is that it requires time for people to get acquainted. This reduces its capability to address the public sphere directly, thus being inclusive at a public level and on a global scale. To some extent such a limit should be accepted, as no message can be relevant to everyone. However, this limit also entails a problem to be solved. Indeed, if a group devoted to knowledge production becomes uninterested in the public sphere, it means that it has become victim of a totalising narrative.

Perhaps one way to bring to a public level part of what happens around the table of an intense research seminar or class would be to rethink publications as public letters (or public video messages) to specific people that are addressed as friends.⁵⁰ As long as these outputs are genuinely intended to be part of an epistolary and interested in knowing a different point of view not as part of a dialectical power-game but according to care, this could be a way to perform diplomatic truth. Thus, such public discussions could balance off the moral duty towards institutions to make contributions to knowledge at a public level and the need to keep the logic of one's research outputs as consistent as possible to the logic of care that originated them. As care is situated openness, it makes sense for contributions to knowledge that are intended for a public audience to be first of all fragments of a caring discourse among friends that stand on partially overlapping and partially diverging localities of sense. Publicly contributing to knowledge can be a diffractive practice among people that befriend each other by giving value to their disagreements as much as they do to their points of contact. However difficult to be sustained, this multi-focal emergence of knowledge taking the shape of a public symposium/seminar where participants commit to be more interested in learning from the other than teaching one's truth to the other is an alternative model to the one where a disembodied author speaks to a public of disembodied readers.

⁵⁰ John Lysaker, "Philosophical writing should read like a letter," Sam Dresser (Ed.) at aeon.co/ideas/philosophical-writing-should-read-like-a-letter-written-to-one-self

Conclusion: 'Care politics'

Attempting to share and account for what one cares for is fundamental both on a small and great scale. At a small scale, I use the word fundamental in the sense that in the absence of an ontological ground, to care and to try sharing / accounting for the focus of one's care can provide that sense of meaningfulness metaphysics had given to many people. At a greater scale, to care and to try sharing / accounting for the focus of one's care is fundamental because it operates as a cohesive force within a system, as gravity. When the focus of one's care is effectively shared, *relations become stronger than boundaries*. This does not mean that boundaries cease to matter. On the contrary, caring is not to confuse oneself with what is cared for, nor it is to equate everything one cares for. Rather, it is to be attuned to the differences that matter to / constitute that which is cared for. In this sense, care is not in opposition to representation and social structures. Care values boundaries, gaps and distances, as these constraints construct reality.⁵¹ Claiming that within care relations are stronger than boundaries is to indicate that care happens when such limitations are not exclusionary barriers, but constraints that shape the flux without impeding the flow of intensity / proximity / intimacy/friendship. Stenger's diplomatic truth is a work of care. There, diverging stances are not made to win each other out or to collapse. Rather, the diverging stances are contextualised to the point of having their contexts to meet somewhere halfway. Their divergence remains, but now there is intensity/care between them in the form of a continuous pattern, which is the mutual commitment to communicate. Crucially, this caring commitment increases the degree of heterogeneity a metastable system affords without becoming critically unstable. This is how the cultivation of practices that are based on care and safe spaces to share the focus of one's care can contribute in making a system more plastic and inclusive. Relations of care and the sharing of practices of care make a system denser and with density comes heat. While the endless quantitative growth of the same, makes a system more homogeneous (constraining possibilities along overarching narratives / identities) and brittle (as such narratives / identities compete dialectically in a mechanistic zero-sum game), localities where a relation-based logic has the strength, safety and courage to establish itself are hotbeds

⁵¹ Stengers, "The Science Wars," 43.

of change.⁵² Whether remaining the size of a firefly or scaling up to a star, for as long as they burn, for as long as their show runs, practices of care are hot, bright bodies.⁵³ They are *nuclei* of heterogeneity: embodying the conditions for the emergence of game-changing new possibilities.⁵⁴ As such practices exist in the performance of surprising / emerging from the average, they thrive through/along the limits of their local context and—within those limits—open a new dimension of sense capable of reconfiguring the contingent image of what is real (without ever opposing it). This makes them inherently revolutionary (albeit in a non-dialectical way) and political (albeit without a deterministic masterplan).

Caring to a practice is not to turn one's back from the public sphere as to attend to one's private garden, it is to cultivate and offer the fruits of one's care knowing that not everyone will take up the offer but someone will. It is in that moment in which shared appreciation is stronger than subjectivity and private property that the soil and seeds for more gardens to come is produced. 'Care politics' might appear naïve from a zero-sum game logic, but its political power consists in being radically alternative to the logic of such games: in the possibility of suspending the ground and premises upon which their logic runs. In particular, care is an alternative to the instrumentalist use of identity politics, that is, to portray the pursuit of privilege in terms of emancipation (see for instance Brexit).⁵⁵ While instrumentalised identity politics risks becoming the political strategy of choice, thus jeopardising institutions, practicing care politics is a form of civic resistance.

In a system that would not last a minute without the walls and membranes of identity-based constraints (laws, rules, contracts, institutions, protocols), care and sharing the focus of one's care play the unsung role of collagen. Such practices bind heterogeneity, thus producing the intensity that affords more heterogeneity. Within a system that risks becoming increasingly brittle, it is urgent to identify and celebrate logics that work for heterogeneity: logics that bet on the anomalous present not because they consider it a good investment, but because they respond to a twofold call. The libidinal one of attunement and the moral one to keep the system inclusive, thus free/open-ended / out-of-equilibrium.

⁵² Michel Foucault (2012 [1983–84]), *The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others, II), Lectures at the Collège De France*, Frédéric Gros (Ed.), translated by Graham Burchell, Lectures 1–3, 1–56.

⁵³ Golding, "Friendship," 263.

⁵⁴ Prigogine and Stengers, *Order out of Chaos*, 187.

⁵⁵ However, it does not oppose itself to identity politics as such. For instance, groups that employ identity politics as a strategy to seek emancipation can commit to care internally to reduce the risk of homologation.

Speaking of care and of the importance of accounting for / sharing the focus of one's care is no quick fix. However, more awareness on a logic that presents an alternative to consumerism / colonialism might help make the systems we live in become more intense and resilient. It is through care, not exclusionary practices, that we can build better and safer places.

jellybaby ['dʒɛli 'beɪbi]

a nasty viral disease, commonly caught by nightclub staff on a weekly basis, causing nausea, vomiting and can in some cases lead to a total mental breakdown. also the congealed mix of sperm and nether fluids which remains if male ejaculate isn't cleaned up within minutes of such a deposit. confectionery historians believe the original innocent-sounding sweets were the work of an austrian confectioner, who designed them for fryers of lancashire in 1864. jelly babies also name brightly coloured bite-sized and overly sugared candies. go figure.