The lives of others: selecting the Congolese elite (1948 – 1956)

His superior’s assessment, the many articles in the press and his post as president in multiple associations were testimony to it. The contents of his kitchen and the arrangement of his living room left no room for doubt either: the selection committee was quite clear that they were dealing with a “genuine” évolué. In the summer of 1954, Patrice Lumumba was granted immatriculation and could now be entered into the “Register of the Civilized.”1 Like all those enjoying this legal status, from now on Lumumba no longer had to fear floggings, had equality with Europeans under penal law and was permitted to socialize and drink wine in European districts at night. In brief, he was a member of what colonial policy envisaged as the Congolese elite. But how were holders of this status selected and by whom? What were the key criteria? Who was granted this special legal status? And what advantages did the status reforms confer? We may describe the practical implementation of these reforms as an attempt to translate the attributes of the “perfected black,” as negotiated and propagated in the media, into bureaucratic test criteria. Ultimately, the selection procedure for the carte du mérite civique and immatriculation turned out to be a perfidious practice of colonial rule, with dual objectives. Despite the authorities’ declared commitment to reforms, the goal was to uphold the social order while lending new legitimacy to the hegemony-stabilizing colonial distinction between European and African society. It is important to reaffirm that, despite resistance from the European colonial milieu, the elite’s demand for legal equality with Congo’s European population managed to effect an initial shift of political direction. But the introduction of the carte du mérite civique in July 1948 was only a partial victory. As we will see later in more detail, the relevant decree merely promised several benefits for its holders, to be granted little by little, and the abolition, in part, of the indigénat. This did not, therefore, constitute full legal assimilation of the kind initially demanded by Congolese authors. The carte du mérite civique was no more than a transitional solution through which the architects of colonial policy wished to gain time in order to lay the ground for a more far-reaching reform of immatriculation. At the same time, therefore, Colonial Minister Wigny had instituted an ex-

pert commission, headed by renowned colonial jurist Antoine Sohier.The commission was to come up with proposals to resolve the pressingissue of the "status of the civilized Congolese population."² Thisa lso ushered in the next round of controversy over the legal and culturala ssimilation of the vernacular elite.
Ag ood deal of time was to pass before the Sohier Commission put forward its suggested reform of immatriculation. Guided by the aspiration of creatinga graduated legal system, one that had to reflect the differing developmental levels of the heterogenous group of évolués and servea sagaugef or the successive grantingo fr ights, for two years the participating jurists discussed changes in specific areas of law.³ Forwhom, on what premises,s hould legal discrimination be eliminated in the fieldsoffamily, education and citizenship, property and residence? In addition to this hierarchyoflegal subjects,basedondiffering levels of civilizationald evelopment, the Sohier Commission alsop roposed as tatus for those Congolese "who have fullya cquired European civilization."⁴ Fort his group of the "assimilated," Sohier envisagedn othing less than legal equality with the European population across the board. The foundation here wast o be ar eform of immatriculation, which previouslyg ranted Africans equality with Europeans onlyi nm atters of civil law. The limited targeto ft his expanded form of immatriculation was asmall group of priests and futureuniversity graduates.
This proposed reform toocaused controversy,not least as it had to be passed by the Conseil de Gouvernement in Léopoldville, which had rejected the carte du mérite civique in 1947. This time around, the publiclyp roclaimed goal of legal equalityf or an assimilated elite triggered ay et more vehement reaction in the European settlermilieu. It led to the amalgamation of the settlers' associations, which had been operatingonaregional basis, to createacolony-wide umbrella bodyk nown as the Fédération des unions provinciales de colons au Congo et au Ruanda-Urundi (FEDACOL).⁵ In continuity with its predecessor organizations, which had emergedi nt he inter-war period, the FEDACOL championedastatebacked European settlement policy and demanded that Europeans' supremacy over the Congolese population be maintained through legal and economic priv-ileges.⁶ In the inter-war period, Belgian colonial policyh ad impeded the immigration of settlers, partlyb ecause the financiallys trong firms in the Congo, alreadys trugglingt or ecruite nough manpower,w eree ager to avoid the arrival of new competitors. After 1945, Brussels began to promotethe settlement of Belgian farmers by providingt hem with financial aid.⁷ But this was no more than symbolic politics whens et against the demands issuing from the settlement organizations in Katangaf or settlers' political integration, to be achieved through the establishment of parliaments and af orm of suffragel imited to Europeans, akin to the situation in the British dominions. Settlers in Katangas ometimes went so far as to claim autonomous status, not least because tax revenues from the industrial firms in their provincem ade up almosth alf of the colony's budget. While the FEDACOL purported to act as the voice of all settlers, its leaders were from Katanga.
On the Conseil de Gouvernement,the FEDACOL had ah igh-profile representative in the shape of its president OscarD efawe, who had been resident in Katangas ince the 1920s, initiallya sa na dministrativeo fficial and then as ab usinessman. Defawe was alsoc onsidered aw ar hero, having joined the Belgian resistancei nt he Second World Wara nd been interned for at ime by the Gestapo.⁸ During the session of summer1950,Defawe presented himself as the "voice of alarge numberofcolonizers and theirchildren," who had "everything to lose" from the assimilation of an "immature people."⁹ Defawe defendedthe status quo by pointing to the colonial wars ragingi nI ndochina and Java,which he traced back to the emancipatory post-war reforms implemented by the other European colonial powers: "Do youb elieve, for instance,t hat France, Holland and Great Britain would pursue the samepolicy again if they could start over?," as Defawe asked the members of the Conseil de Gouvernement. He also lamented the limited political rights of the BelgianCongo'ssettlers. His reference to the Boers, of European descent,whose secessionist effortsinthe resource-rich region of Transvaal around 1900 had initiallybeen put down by the British empire but who had now proclaimed the independent Apartheid state of South Africa, wasaclear threat from ap rominent figurei nt he prosperous provinceo fK atanga. "Thea ssimila- tion of an anomalousassemblageofso-called évolués," as Defawe concluded his combative speech, "would entail prematuree mancipation and the tyrannyo fa small minority." That Sohier'soutline project had been submitted to the Conseil de Gouvernement justafew days before it met,was used by other anti-reform members as a pretext for postponing the decision until the next year.B ut in light of the warningsgiven by some representativesofCongolese interests against anynew disappointment for the vernacular elite, finally the Conseil de Gouvernement acceded to the governor general'sr equest to pass the draft reform on to the conseils de provincefor debate in the meantime.Within just three months, their assessment was communicated to the Députation Permanente,i nstituted within the General Government in 1947, in order to provide the Colonial Ministry with arecommended course of action as soon as possible.¹⁰ Through this unprecedented procedure, Governor General Eugène Jungers was trying to retain the colonial government'sc ontrol over assimilation policy and to expedite ad ecision before the next sitting of the Conseil de Gouvernement. Instead, he lost all control over such matters.
While the provincial councils discussed the SohierC ommission'sp roposal, opponents of the policy of assimilation from the European settlers' milieu readied themselvesfor action. Those constituting the "thin whiteline"¹¹ feared above all the loss of their distinctiveness, the delegitimization of their supremacywithin colonial ideology. Fort hem, legal assimilation was merelyt he first step towards political self-determination for Congolese, which threatened to turn the European minority into ap olitical minority as well. The lack of ap olitical say was am ajor cause of concern for the 40,000 Belgiansi nt he Congo, who lost their right to vote as temporary residents of the colony.¹² In addition to technical impediments, the colonial state identifiedthe highproportion of non-Belgian Europeans in the Congoasareason for this denial of acorecomponent of Belgian citizenship. After 1945, the potential to exercise apolitical influencewas limited to the representativeso fi nterest groups on the councils serving the various ad-ministrative levels.¹³ Hence, Brusselsw as worried not just about the loyalty of the vernacular elite, but also about the settlers' consent.O ne of the key goals of colonial policy was to stymie secessionist ambitions, especiallyi nt he economicallyi mportant southern provinces, which werea lso the ones with the greatest number of European settlers. The Colonial Ministry looked on with concern as the whitesettlers in neighbouringRhodesia, taking South Africa as their role model, mobilized for political independence under whitel eadership.¹⁴ In Angolat oo, borderingC ongoi nt he southwest,the self-confidence of the Portuguese colonatos was growing; while they had no right to vote, after the Second World War, in contrasttoBelgian policy,the state supported their settlement,so that by 1950 they had almost doubledinnumber,tojust under 80,000.¹⁵ Belgian politicians with afocus on colonial policy feared for good reason thatthe region of Katangawas not onlygeographicallynearer to the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury and Portuguese Luanda than to Léopoldville, but that it was also closer in ideological and political terms.
Against this background, it is hardlysurprising that the granting of equality with Europeans to selected Africans, as envisagedinSohier'simmatriculation reform, sparked off an intense debate. European and Congolese spokesmen, segregated but keepingaclose eyeo no ne another,e ngaged in trench warfare in the media. In September 1950,t he Uniona gricole du Kivu (UNAKI) warned of the "fatal consequences"¹⁶ of assimilation. In ap ress release publisheda tt he same time, the Unionp our la Colonisation (UCOL), the regional settlers' association in Katanga, insisted on the differences between Europeans and Africans, which werenot interpreted as biological, but as comparablyinsurmountable. According to this organization, the two groups were stilld ivided by moral values that had evolvedo vert he course of history and werec ulturallyt ransmitted: "The Congolese […]r eadilye mulatest he good example, but his ancestors have left him no spiritual or material legacyw hatsoever that would allow him to playa na ctive part in the modern world."¹⁷ These groups directed their ire against Belgianpoliticians pursuing colonial policies while lacking awareness of local realities and allowing themselvestobe drivenb y" UN alarmism."¹⁸ In additiont ot he settlers, otheri nfluential voices from Katangaa lso spoke out against the Sohier reform. In ad etailed statement on Sohier'sproposal, the CEPSI research institute in Elisabethville,which specialized in indigenous policy issues, raised the question of whyt he colonial state was enteringi nto such ac onflictual debate on legal equality in the first place, giventhat the targetgroup of assimilated Congolese, made up of priestsand secondary school graduates, was so small.¹⁹ One daybefore the decision of the Députation Permanente on status reform, the cardinal of Katanga, Mgr.H emptinne, stated his views in the conservative Essor du Congo. He referred to assimilation as "premature" and advocated aform of immatriculation extendingonlytoequality under civil law, as the 74-year-old clergyman had himself called for in the interwar period as al eading membero ft he CPPI.²⁰ While influential sections of the European milieu expressed their opposition in newspaper articles and press releases, it was not long before Congolese authors responded. The Voix du Congolais was stillthe key media forum wherea uthors could aid the supporters of status reform by arguing that their developmental level made legal equalityi ndispensable.O ne of the leadinge xponents of legal assimilationw as Antoine Omari, originallyf rom the eastern provinceo f Kivu, who was now ab ookkeeper at the colony'sm ost important construction firm, Synkin, in Léopoldville and al eading member of elite groupings such as the aforementioned Cercle d'Études et d'Agréments and the Union des Intérêts Sociaux Congolais (UNISCO), aC ongolesea dvocacy group close to the ADAPES. Omari legitimized his demands basedo nt he civilizing mission of Belgian colonialism and invokedKingLeopold II: "The time has surelycome, […]toopen the door to assimilation, terminus ad quem of the humanitarian goals our ruler Léopold II has assigned to us."²¹ Compared with the flood of articles published in 1945a tthe start of the debate on évolué status, initiallythe authors writing for the Voix du Congolais commented on the work of the Sohier Commission rarelyand with great circumspec-tion.²² Subsequent to the resistanceo nt he Conseil de Gouvernement,h owever, their reportage regained ac ombative tone. In the October 1950 issue,e ditor-inchief Antoine-RogerB olamba argued that while one could never make "a black into aw hite," it wasb eyond doubt that "henceforth, some Belgian Africans are alreadyc omparable with their custodians."²³ From this point forward, Congolese authorsr eminded the opponents of assimilation of the noble goals of the Belgian colonial project.I nt he samei ssue, the editors publishedaselection of articles composed by correspondents in reaction to the publiclyaired resistance within the settlers' milieu. In addition to contributions from the abovementioned Omari, these included an article by Jean-Pierre Dericoyard, another membero ft he Cercle d'Études et d'Agréments. Following ac areer as ah ighlevel clerk in the privates ector,D ericoyard had built up al ucrativef urniture business in Léopoldville and was one of the few évolués to succeed as am erchant.²⁴ He assailed the critics of immatriculation as "NEGROPHOBES."²⁵ Dericoyarda rgued deftlya gainst the idea of an insurmountable gulf between the cultural and moral beliefs of Europeans and Africans as anchored by UCOL in the two groups' developmental history.Ifthe spread of civilization in Europe as initiated by the Romans had taken 2,000 years, then this was solelyd ue to the "slow development of this era." The colonized countries,b yc ontrast, who werenow in contact with the "previouslycivilized,"²⁶ would acquire the benefits of civilization far more rapidly. While the opponents of assimilations oughtt o delayr eforms, then, representativeso ft he Congolese elite tried to accelerate the pace of change.
In light of the increasinglypolemicaltone in colonial newspapers with aEuropean readership, culminating in the headline "The assimilated and the cannibals," Antoine-RogerB olamba called on European authorst oe mbrace reason and common sense.²⁷ With av iew to the disparagingr emarks made in the media, Bolambaw rotet hat "we wonder bitterly whys ome Europeans insist on refusingt od evelop." Fora" sincere, cordiala nd fraternalc ooperation between  N. D. L. R., Voix du Congolais no. 40,J uly1949,267.F or asimilar wait-and-seeapproach, see n.n., "Apropos du statut de la population congolaise civilisé," Voix du Congolais no. 41 (August 1949 the two races," it was not just Congolese that had to work on themselvesbut Europeans too.²⁸ The Voix du Congolais portrayedthe European settlers as the perpetual men of yesterday, who had fallenb ehind the times with theirc ritique of reform. The self-confident tone of these articles penned by the distinguished representativeso ft he vernacular elite in Léopoldville,w ho werec lose to the progressive forces within the colonial administration, was perceiveda so verblown by authors associated with the settlers' lobby.The newspaper wass upposedt o be controlled by the colonial government,a so ne spokesman for the settlers of Katangar emarked indignantlyi nt he Kasai dailyn ewspaper.²⁹ Once again, it is important to bear in mind that the Congolese intervention in the debate on assimilationwas the work of anumerically small educated elite. At this point in time, the numbero fp ermanent and freelance contributors to the Voix du Congolais was just under twoh undred, while its monthlyp rint run was less than5 ,000 copies. But as representativeso ft he évolués,t he authors spoke on behalf of the just under6 0,000 Congolese who had by now attended secondary school and weredoing non-manual work.³⁰ These authors erroneously assumed, however,that the debate was concerned with their ownlegal equality.F or the Sohier plan for immatriculation was geared exclusively towards priestsa nd the future graduates of universities. While the writing elite staked out their claim to immatriculation by highlighting their development,their European opponents furiouslyd eniedt hese "pen-pushers"³¹ this right.
Aq uestion of assimilation: the two-tier évolué status Députation Permanente merelyagreed to the principle of immatriculation, while limiting the associated benefits in terms of legal equalitytocivil law. Further,the individual rights of ayet to be defined group of assimilatedCongolese weretobe extended with the help of decrees. The circle of potential candidates for immatriculationw as also expanded.³³ This watered-down reform proposal from the Députation Permanente was then passed to the Colonial Ministry in Brussels, wherei tw as to be reviewed by the Conseil Colonial.
Meanwhile, the speech givenb yG overnor General Eugène Jungers at the opening of the Conseil de Gouvernement in July 1951caused anew stir.Inhis remarks on elite-makingpolicy,herecapitulated the recommendations of the Députation Permanente on the Sohier reform, but continued to hold out the prospect of legal equalityf or the assimilated.³⁴ Jungers thus left open what the Colonial Ministry'sd ecision on this issue would ultimatelyb e. He sawt he task of future policy as the elimination of discrimination against Congolese and appealed for the European population to keep an open mind. The anti-reform settlers' milieu viewed his dictum that "the hand extended too late risks beingd eclined" as a disturbing declaration of intent.
Jean Sepulchre, editor of the Essor du Congo in Elisabethville, which was close to the settlers, ranted that "the Belgianh and has pulled the indigenous massesu po ut of their barbarism, leading them to material improvementsa nd their elite to moral and intellectual progress."³⁵ He accused the governor general "of breaking,inanoddlyfestive way, with the traditional methodofthe slow but sure development of our charges."³⁶ The lobbying of those opposed to reform in Katanganow expanded to Brussels, wherethe Colonial Ministry had the power of decision. In am emorandum, the members of the KatangaC hamber of Industry and Commercep ersonally informed the colonial ministert hatt he assimilation advocated by the governor general would be impossiblet oi mplement.³⁷ FEDA-COL,which now had al obbying office in Brussels, sent the colonial ministera press review featuringn ewspaper articles from the previous one-and-a-half years, so that the "colonial public'sv iew of assimilation" would be considered when the decisions werem ade.I nt he foreword, FEDACOL president Albert Maus, ap lantation owner from the Belgian mandate of Urundi, warned against giving "abunch of individuals of an inferior civilizational, intellectual and moral state of development" equal status with Europeans,who were "very aware of the superiority of their Western civilization." He accused those politicians concerned with colonial policyofcaving in to "afew thousand impatient évolués," who "are convinced that assimilation is their fate." Maus warned against "the hazardous policy of afar-off and physicallyshielded legislature,inspired by acombination of ideals and ignorance of the realities."³⁸ In March 1952, after several rounds of consultation on the Sohier reform, the Conseil Colonial backed the conservative compromise proposal put forward by the DéputationP ermamente. The advisory bodyr ecommended to the Colonial Ministry,first,areformed version of immatriculation, which guaranteed equality under civil lawt oselectedCongolese. Second, together with holders of the carte du mérite civique,the immatriculated weretobeplaced on an equal footingwith Europeans under penal law.³⁹ But the Conseil Colonial rejected legal assimilation across the board. The goal of colonialism had never been to turnA fricans into Europeans,a st he minutes of its proceedingsb aldlys tated.⁴⁰ The immatriculation subsequentlyintroduced by the colonial minister in May1952was atypically Belgianbalancing of interests, acompromise solution that yielded to pressure from the settlerm ilieu but could still present the vernacular elite with ar esult.
In the Voix du Congolais,once again the Congolese authors toed the line and embraced the political compromise. The departure from legal equality went unmentioned in the commentaries,with Antoine-RogerBolamba loyallywelcoming the "flexible approach of immatriculation."⁴¹ Omari, shortlybefore aleadingadvocate of completea ssimilation, went so far as to call the Conseil Colonial'sd ecision "excellent news" and rejoiced that "assimilation is assured."⁴² As with the carte du mérite civique,inview of this meagrer eform of immatriculation the authors writing for the Voix du Congolais did the onlyt hing they could do in the General Government'sp ress organ: they kept quiet about what they had demandeda nd welcomed the watered-down but still hard-won reform as an irrev- Aq uestion of assimilation: the two-tier évolué status ocable political decision made in Brussels. They remained évolués loyal to the party line.
When Antoine Sohier had taken over as heado ft he status commission, he sawthe évolués problem as rooted in the fact thatthey had answered the call to civilize but now found themselvesf acing a "closed door."⁴³ Sohier perceiveda solution to this in his proposal for af orm of immatriculation that guaranteed equal rights: "The door is open, now it is down to yout ow alk through it,"⁴⁴ he wrotei nd efenceo fh is assimilationp olicy.B yr ejecting Sohier'sr eform proposal, however,t he Colonial Ministry asked the Congolese elite, in the waiting room of colonial development,f or al ittle more patience.
In light of the intense debatesw ithin the colonial public sphere, the question that arisesi sw hat legal and material benefits the carte du mérte civique and immatriculation actuallyb estowed. Through this two-tier status reform, the Colonial Ministry had signed up to the principle that the benefits accruing to holders of the carte du mérite civique and the immatriculated would come into effect incrementally. When the carte du mérite civique was initiallyi ntroduced as at ransitional solution in 1948, strictlys peaking this did not amount to al egal status. Instead, in article xivt he relevant decree recognized cardholders' legal distinction vis-à-vis African society in principle, but failed to define it more precisely.⁴⁵ Instead, for this "category of natives"⁴⁶ benefits weret ob er ealized within the framework of existing legislation and regulatory practice. Rather thang uaranteeingc ardholders' legal equalityw ith Europeans,a tb est the decree wasapromise made by colonial policy to graduallyr emovet hem from the indigénat and grant them certain privileges. This was no longer amatter of rights but of fewer prohibitions and less severe punishments. The assumption in the Colonial Ministry wasthat even moreimportant thanthe benefits was the recognition cardholders would gain from Congolese and European society.⁴⁷ On closer inspection, the benefitsgranted by the carte du méritecivique were modest in the first few years. In the period between September 1948 and the re- form of immatriculation in mid-1952, the colonial government issued several regulations. Henceforth, cardholders weres pared punishment through flogging, werea llowed to exploit mineral resources and in caseo fl egal disputes could applyt oaEuropean judge.I naddition,t hey would no longer be subject to the night-time curfew in the African quarters.⁴⁸ The privilegeo fb eing exempt from flogging,h owever,l asted for less than three years, as this controversial punishment was then universallyp rohibited.⁴⁹ Soon aftert he introduction of the carte du mérite civique unrest began to spread among the évolués. As the official voice of the vernacular elite and tireless advocate for status reform, the Voix du Congolais felt obliged to give expression to the dissatisfaction felt at the card'sthin pickings: "What good is the document to us?,"⁵⁰ asked editor-in-chief Antoine-RogerB olamba in July 1951. Measured against the great hopes fuelledb yt he newspaper over the years, the benefits of the carte du méritec ivique fell short of expectations.
From mid-1952on, criticisms of the long-discussed évolué statuscontinued to mount. Fort he reform of immatriculation was also ad isappointment: it too failed to introduce legal equality with Europeans and was limited to assimilation under civil law. Nonetheless, the associated decree declared grandiloquentlythat the "realm of our European civil rights"⁵¹ had now been extended to the immatriculated.⁵² What distinguished immatriculation from the carte du mérite civique was that the legal status it provided applied to the applicant'sentire family. Furthermore, in case of wrongdoing one could not be stripped of immatriculation, which thus offered greater reliability than the carte du mérite civique.⁵³ At the end of the day, resistancef rom the settlers' milieu and the controversy over the scope of the status had dissuaded the Colonial Ministry from pursuing comprehensive legal assimilation. To avoid losing room for manoeuvre, when it came to immatriculation the Colonial Ministry opted for the piecemeal extension of privileges through decrees,asalreadypractised in the case of the carte du mérite civique.
On the dayi mmatriculation was introduced, for example, the authorities enacted equality with Europeans under penal law. From now on, trials of the immatriculated were no longer to be held before the police court,b ut before the Aq uestion of assimilation: the two-tier évolué status courts of first instance; they could expect the same conditionso fd etention and rehabilitation as Europeans.The immatriculated, however,d id not obtain these privileges exclusively, buts hared them with the holders of the carte du mérite civique,f or whom penal harmonization came into forces imultaneously.⁵⁴ Commentarieso nt hese initial privileges focussed not so much on the satisfaction felt at the prospect of an independent court processasonthe financial disbenefits accruingt ot hose involved, as they would no longer enjoy reduced legal costs.⁵⁵ Furthermore, manyw ondered what palpable benefitsm ight be associated with equality under penal law, givent hat thoseg rantedi th ad to produce a spotlessc ertificateo fg ood conduct anyway.⁵⁶ In Brussels, scornful remarks from the Belgian Congor eached the ears of the colonial minister to the effect that évolué status was attractive onlyt of uture "offenders."⁵⁷ Over the next few years, several new decrees wereissued affecting the holders of the carte du mérite civique and the immatriculated. From March 1954 on, the latter werep ermittedt om ovea bout freelyi nt he European residential zones.⁵⁸ When it came to the right of possession, the colonial government also granted the immatriculated full legal capacity.T hat this was important to those who dealt in property is shown by one applicant for immatriculation who sawt his as the onlym eans of attainingf ull contractual capability.⁵⁹ Most of these decrees,however,applied equallytothe immatriculated and to holders of the carte du mérite civique.⁶⁰ The restrictive laws on alcohol consumption that created separate realms of consumption for Europeans and Congolese werer escinded for botht hese legal categories. They weren ow permitted to drink wine and hard liquor.⁶¹ They could attend public film screenings withoutexception, which was relevant in the sense thatall other Africans were onlypermitted to watch films authorized by ab oard of censors.
But this was all there was to the legislative measures implemented by the colonial government for the immatriculated and holderso ft he carte du mérite

civique.
In the cold light of day, the benefits accruingtothe elite entailed the selective dismantling of forms of legal discrimination that remained valid for the rest of the Congolese population.
The critique emanatingfrom the évolué milieu that elite status did not entail economic assimilation wasn oted within the uppere chelons of the colonial administration.⁶² Disappointedhopes of financial improvement caused elite status to lose some of its appeal. The head of one selection committee for the carte du mérite civique thus reported to the provincial governor the "lack of enthusiasm prevailing among this section of the population." The roots of this disappointment,hee xplained, layi nt he fact that this status entailed no material benefits and thatt he évoluants attachedl ess value to the "moral and civicv irtues" than to "external signs of prosperity."⁶³ Asurvey carried out by the awarding committee in Kivu painted as imilar picture of prevailing attitudes: "It is not worth acquiring the card,"⁶⁴ was one of the views expressed. That the reform of immatriculation had alsobacked away from an article unique,which would have meant equal payfor the immatriculated and Europeans,⁶⁵ inevitably caused dissatisfaction among évolués. Forthe world of work continued to treat Europeans and Congolese differently: the formerw eree mployed within the framework of a contrat d'emploi,w hich stillp rovided for greater income, even for the lowest salary bracket,t hant he best paid contrat de travail,which appliedt ot he latter.⁶⁶ The colonial administration'sannual reportfor 1955 noted that the lack of "material benefits" had prompted manyCongolese to refrain from applying for immatriculation.⁶⁷ Al arge number of them thus made do with the carte du mérite civique.
 Letter fromthe governor general to the governor of Équateur province,25A pril 1953, AA/GG/ 11096.  All quotations from letter fromthe district commissioner of Lac Léopold II to the governor of Léopoldville province,13F ebruary 1950,A A/GG/15726.  Minutes of the district committee in Kivu on the issuingofthe carte du mérite civique,3February 1949,AA/GG/18708. The same document cites another criticism of equality under civil law, namelyt hat divorces were less complicated under traditional law.  See Anstey, "Belgian Rule," 209.  It has been claimed that the head of the Immatriculation Commission, Antoine Sohier,himself backed away from the demand for equality between Europeans and Africans in this regard. He believed he was actinginthe interests of the immatriculated. On the premise of equal pay, he concluded, they would have stoodn oc hancea gainst European candidates when applyingf or jobs; see ibid.  Chambredes représentants, Rapport sur l'administration de la colonie du Congo Belge pendant l'année 1955 présentéa ux chambres législatives (Brussels:M inistere des affaires africaines, 1956), 100.
Despite offering similar privileges, it was easier to acquirea nd the application processw as less expensive.⁶⁸ Manyr epresentativeso ft he African elite were particularlyu nhappy about the financial cost of as uccessfula pplication for évolué status and the time and effort they had to put into it,a ll of which they sawa so ut of all proportion to its true utility. "There are many duties to perform but it provides no great benefits,"⁶⁹ wroteo ne author with av iew to the strict selection procedure.

Civility,s election committees and delayed inter-imperial transfers
In the colonial publics phere, however,t he issue of the utilityo ft he status reforms took up less space than thatofthe admission criteria. How were interested Congolese meant to attain this status?Who was to be granted the so-called "certificate of civilization"⁷⁰ and accordingt ow hich criteria?
Let us turn first to the selection proceduref or the carte du mérite civique, which later served as at emplatef or the granting of immatriculation. According to the decree on the card of 12 July 1948, all African residents of the Belgian Congoa nd Ruanda-Urundi, aU Nt rusteeship under Belgian administration, could submit their oral or written application to the relevant territorial official.⁷¹ The basic conditions included amonogamous lifestyle, aminimum ageoftwenty-one and aclean criminal record over the previous five years. The illiterate had to provide employment references,w hile women had to show proof of attendance at a foyer social. There were also subjective criteria, which playedac rucial role in the selection procedure. The candidates had to "demonstrate good behaviour and habits indicative of as incered esire to attain ah igher level of civilization."⁷²  Letter fromthe governor general to the governor of Équateur province,25A pril 1953, AA/GG/ 11096.  Minutes of the district committee in Kivu on the issuingofthe carte du mérite civique,3February 1949,A A/GG/18708.  This term was used in an internal document producedbythe Colonial Ministry; Normes pour obtenir la carte du mérite civique,A A/AI/4743/II/T/4.  African residents from neighbouringcolonies could applyfor a carte du mérite civique if they had livedi nt he Belgian Congo for at least five years.B ut the largest group, namelyt he Coastmen, who wereb orn in Nigeria and the Gold Coast and worked for British firms,w ere barred from applying. Ibid.  Ibid. Furthermore, the recommendations made by the Congrès NationalC olonial had alreadyfeatured pleas for "strict selection."⁷³ In the Voix du Congolais in particular,wheremonth after month authors exchanged views on which behaviours made a "genuine" évolué,calls weresoon being made for strict screening. As we have seen, the mockery of the évolués in the European newspapers as polygamous, overbearing and overlya ttached to alcohol had gone hand in hand with Congolese authors' critique of allegedlyu nworthyr epresentativeso ft heir group:i tw as always somebodye lse who wasa ssailed for being as nob.⁷⁴ In an editorial,for example, Antoine-RogerBolamba wrotethat the carte du mérite civique "is meantt os eparate the genuine from the false évolués."⁷⁵ The selection proceduretodetermine status, however,was by no means special to the Belgian Congo. In fact,B elgian elite-makingp olicy took inspiration from the naturalization procedures in the French colonies.Asmentioned earlier, the project to introduce an évolué status initiatedi nt he Belgian Congoi n1 944 had drawno nt he statut des notables évolués,e nacted in 1941i nn eighbouring Brazzaville by Governor General Félix Éboué for the French colonyo fA EF.The statut des notablesé volués promised the new social category of the African elite an intermediatep osition between citoyen and sujet français,w hich, among other things, entailed individual release from the indigénat. Applicants had to satisfythe local colonial administration that they wereof"impeccable respectability" and "exceed the averagel evel of the natives."⁷⁶ With this selection process, Governor General Éboué was taking his lead from the conditionsthe inhabitants of other parts of the French empire typically had to fulfil in order to attainF rench citizenship.⁷⁷ Since the 1930s, the French colonial administration in Indochina, for example, had carried out selection interviews on naturalization.⁷⁸ There, applicantsw erem ostlys o-called métis,t he offspringofAsian and French parents who had grown up in Europe or in the European colonial milieu. They had to provet oF rench colonial officials thatt hey had internalized "French civilization," with questions such as the following serving as the basisfor evaluation: "Is he characterized by French courtesy?Does he  Piron, "Le problème," 15.  See for example A. Omari, "L'assimilation des Congolais," Voix du Congolais no. 55 (October 1950).  Bolamba, "Carte du mérite," 361.  Governor General Félix Éboué to governors and territorial administrators of AEF,1 0J une 1943, CAOM/GG/AEF/5D206.  See Saada, "Entre 'assimilation' et 'décivilisation,'" 33.  Ibid., 33 -34.
Civility,s election committees and delayed inter-imperial transfers playFrench music?"⁷⁹ These tests werethe hallmarks of aF rench colonial ideologya ccordingt ow hich the colonized had to acquiret he European wayo fl ife through imitation while setting aside their cultureo fo rigin.⁸⁰ In AEF,applicantsfor the statut des notables évolués had to be of legal age, to be able to read and write, to have served in the army, to be in gainful employment and to have aclean criminalrecord. Furthermore, they had to "be honourable, of excellent moral character and competent to participate actively in matters of administration and civil society."⁸¹ The colonial officials on the spot decided which applications to approveafter examining the candidatesindetail. The governoro fO ubangi-Chari, ar egiono fA EF,p rovided the colonial officials with hints on how to assess whether applicants were suited to ar ole in disseminating French civilization as shining examples: Irequest that youinspect their intimatesphereunnoticed throughspot checks.Agivenapplicant,f or example, has mastereds pellinga nd has fairlyg ood syntax; he is always respectablydressed when he leavesthe house, in shoes and atie; he gets around on abicycle, plays accordion and occasionallye njoys ab ottle of beer.T ake yourself along to his abode without warning; should youd iscover that there,a lthough the head of the family has adequatef inancial means, people aree atingt he same cassava porridge as all the other labourers and eatingwith their fingers fromold claypots […], youcan concludewithout hesitation that despitee verythingt he applicant is not yetd eveloped.⁸² The available sources do not reveal to what extent the French and Belgian colonial administrations exchanged information on their appointment policies. The proximity of the administrative headquarters in Léopoldville and Brazzaville mayhavefacilitated informal meetings between colonial officials. Whatiscertain is that from 1947on, the Belgian General Government initiatedseveral conférences interafricaines en matière d'éducation indigène in Léopoldville that brought together officials from British, French and Belgian colonies.Tellingly,the Belgian side was represented by the patron of the Voix du Congolais,J ean-Paul Quix; in the reform debate after 1945, he championed ablueprint for an évolué status that was astonishinglys imilar to that in the neighbouringc olonyo fA EF.⁸³ The fact that from 1945o n, the Voix du Congolais and correspondence between the polit- Dossiers de naturalisation produced in Indochina in the 1930s,q uoted in ibid.  Ibid, 32-37.  ConditionsR equises, Notable Évolués,n .d., CAOM/GG/AEF/5D206.  Letter from Governor Oubangi-Charis H. Sautot to the chefs de département et subdivisiondu territoire,13J uly1 943, CAOM/GG/AEF/5D206.  Report on the conférence Anglo-Franco-Belge sur l'éducation dans les territoires d'outre-mer, 10 -14 June 1947, CAOM/GG/AEF/5D251. ical masterminds of elite status in the Belgian Congor epeatedlym ade explicit referencet ot he elite-makingp olicy being pursued by Governor General Éboué in AEF shows that key actors in the Belgianc olonyw eret aking ag ood deal of interest in the neighbours.
We should not forget, however,t hat progressive forces in French colonial policy alreadyr egarded Éboué'se lite appointment policy as outdated at the time of its introduction. This is illustrated by the citizenship introducedi n 1946 for all inhabitants of the UnionF rançaise,which renderedt he benefits of the statut des notables évolués,onlyjustenacted, redundant.⁸⁴ The carte du mérite civique,then, involved an inter-imperial transfer that was more apparent than real. Itsintroduction in 1948 wasananachronism when compared with the other side of the Congor iver.While French colonial policy had just broken away from the idea that legal equality between Europeans and Africans must be tied to cultural equality,⁸⁵ this nexus survivedi nt he practice of selecting the vernacular elite in the Belgian Congo.
In contrast to the AEF,itwas not justacolonial official who was responsible for the selection proceduref or the carte du méritec ivique,b ut am ulti-member committee, which met at the district administrative level and was officiallya ppointed by the provincial governor. The decree of 12 July 1948 alsos pecified the makeup of the committees, which consisted of four individuals, including ap ublic prosecutor,acolonial official from the AIMO or the territorial administration and two bearers of the carte du méritec ivique.⁸⁶ While the presenceo ft he European representatives on the committees comes as no surprise, the involvement of holders of the carte du mérite civique, which the committees wereestablished to issue, seems odd. One of their first official acts was in fact to grant the card to their futureC ongolese members. As a rule, the district commissioner put forward asuitable candidate.⁸⁷ This appoint- Interestingly,t he colonial administration in AEF examined the question of how one might retainp rivileges for bearers of the statut des notables évolués. The administration apparently fearedt hat levelling off status-holders' hard-won distinction might lead to discontent among the African elite; letterfromthe governor of Gabontothe General Governor of AEF,6December 1946,CAMO/GG/AEF/5D251. Civility,s election committees and delayed inter-imperialt ransfers ment practice did not go unopposed.G iven that these committee members receivedt he card withoutf irst being assessed for theirs uitability,i nt he Voix du Congolais Antoine-Marie Mobé,the formers eminarian now employed in the administrative service, called the selection procedurei tself into question: "We ask ourselvesw hat the rationale for this process might be, for if this favour can be done for as mall number of individuals, whycan it not be made ag eneral practice?"⁸⁸ This criticism, however,was dismissed by the editors with reference to the good judgment of the European committee members.⁸⁹ The selection of the Congolese members also raised the question of whether they wereneutral enough to make objective decisionsabout the applications; the possiblebias of European members,bycontrast,was not discussed. In Léopoldville, for example, aE uropean committee member, as ocial worker in the local foyer social,p roposed increasingt he number of Congolese members to four,i n order to do justicet ot he internal divisionsa mong évolués in the capital. What she had in mind here was chieflyt he tensions between the members of the two alumni associations ADAPES and ASSANEF.⁹⁰ The need to appoint Congolese representatives delayedthe start of the committees' real work. In the district of Lac Léopold II, for example, the local committee'sf inal composition was onlyd efinitively settled one year after the introduction of the carte du mérite civique. Initially, the district commissioner had been dissatisfiedw ith the territorial officials' suggestions. He categorized the candidates as "commonplace" and emphasized the importance of the criteria of "morality" and "loyalty."⁹¹ When as election had finally been made,o ne of the designated African members died, and the selection procedures tarted again from scratch.⁹² But in additiont oa ppointing African committee members, there was still a need for clarification on substantive issues. The committees weree xercised by the question of how to operationalize the selection criterion stipulatedi nt he third paragraph of the sixth article of the decree. How could the "applicant'ssin- ceredesire" to "attain ahigher level of civilization" be measured?⁹³ Because applicants' civility determined the allocation of the cards,the committees wereresponsiblef or developing bindingc riteria that could be assessed through ab ureaucratic selection procedure.
The committee in the administrative district of Kivu, an area dominatedbya plantation economy, whose settlers' spokesmen had protested against the policy of assimilation, developed adetailedquestionnaire thatguided its assessment of applications.Isthe applicant active in an association, and if so, does he payhis membership fees?D oesh ew rite for the African press?W hat does he do in his free time? Does he go to the library?W hat kind of music does he listen to at home? Does he use most of his salary on his household?D oes his wife attend the foyer social? Were his offspring delivered at ah ospital?W hat do his children'steachers have to sayabout them?Isthe house well-maintained?Dothe furniture and household utensils match the applicant'sfinancial means?Has he attracted attention for immoral conduct,s uch as drunkenness, debts, magic or adultery?⁹⁴ In brief, the committees sought to expose every nook and cranny of applicants' livest os earing scrutiny.
The selection committees werenot onlyrequiredtoclarify the vaguecriteria for the carte du mérite civique,b ut also to demonstrate ar igorous approach to issuing them. In al etter sent to the colonial minister during his work on the reform of immatriculation, jurist Antoine Sohier thus called for astrict screeningof the first holders of the carte du mérite civique. In view of the resentment felt by Europeans in the colony, he contended, it was crucial to ensure that initiallythe card be awarded onlytoa"small number of carefullyselectednatives[…]ofnot onlyf actual but incontestable merit."⁹⁵ Representativeso ft he Colonial Ministry endorsed this view because they believed onlyastrict awardingp ractice could counteract the "shabby but unfortunatelydestructive criticisms made by the European population, which is generallyhostile to the évolués."⁹⁶ As these officials sawit, the successofthe project of promotinggreater recognition for the évolués among the European residents of the colonythrough status reform depended on the quality of the cardholders: "To provide these Europeans with legitimate reasons to complain and playupisolated cases of rashlyawarded benefitswould do tremendous damaget oo ur cause."⁹⁷  Normes pour obtenir la carte de mérite civique,A A/AI/4743/II/T/4.  Minutes of the district committee of Kivu on the issuingofthe carte du mérite civique,3February 1949,A A/GG/18708.  Letter from Antoine Sohier to the colonial minister,2 7J une 1949,A A/AI/4743/III/T/4.  Letter from VanH ove to the colonial minister,2 2J uly1 949, AA/AI/II/T/4.  Ibid.

Civility,s election committees and delayed inter-imperial transfers
In order to prevent ap ermissive approach to allocation, Governor General Eugène Jungers had initiallydispatched alimited number of cartes du mérite civique to the relevant offices and declared this sufficient.⁹⁸ Not long afterwards, however,heclarified that nonetheless all worthycandidates must be rewarded.⁹⁹ The governorg eneral declinedarequest from the provincial governor in Elisabethville, who had requested af urther 150 cards less than two years after their introduction.¹⁰⁰ The idea wastomaintain aparticularlyrigorous approach to selection in thoseplaces in which European settlers weremost critical of assimilation policy.
Yeteventhe authorswriting for the Voix du Congolais advocated strict selection. The criticisms and contempt emanating from the European colonial milieu remained an important topic following the introduction of the carte du mérite civique. The reports in the newspaper,h owever,c onveyt he impression that these authors' vehement calls for recognition of their developmental accomplishments in the European milieu had had the opposite effect.The disparagement of the évolués prompted even Etienne Ngandu, the leading author of the 1944 memorandum, to doubt whether the term was still an apt means of self-description: "In both wordand deed, the whiteman has turned the word 'évolué' into asynonym for good-for-nothinga nd riff-raff.
[…]W ho still wishes to bear this name?"¹⁰¹ In response to apolemicalarticle in the Revue congolaiseillustrée,the press organ of the Association of Belgian Colonial Veterans publishedinBrussels, the Voix du Congolais announced that it would no longer be referringt oévolués,a n " abominable word"¹⁰² that lumped togetheraheterogenous group.
In the light of the first reports of ridicule directed at thosegranted a carte du mérite civique,A ntoine-RogerB olamba urgedt he selection committees to exercise caution. Manya pplicants, he stated, wereu nworthy, "caricatures of évoluants,l ustingafter material benefits."¹⁰³ He called for stricter scrutinyofa pplicants' character and the addition of new criteria: the "genuine black elite" should be distinguished by their commitment to the country'sa dvancement, through active membership of an association, for example.¹⁰⁴ Correspondent Antoine-Marie Mobé assailed what he considered the unclear languageo ft he decree when it came to the precise meaning of the term "good behaviour."¹⁰⁵ He even suggested subscriptiont ot he Voix du Congolais as an additional assessment criterion: readingt he newspaper was evidence of an interest in self-improvement and in helping to advancec olonial development. Another author opined that the committees alone should decide who was am ember of the elite through the award of the carte du mérite civique.¹⁰⁶ The Congolese authors' discourse of virtue and need for distinction, as well as politicians' fears of resistance from the European milieu, ensured thati nt he colonial public sphere the carte du mérite civique was soon no longer interpreted as away of distinguishing ab road group of the so-called detribalized. Contrary to its true purpose, now the card was to be the mark of flawless representatives of the vernacular elite. In the associated debate,the fact that ar eform of immatriculationwas being pursued at the samet ime for the few assimilated went by the board. The carte du mérite civique gained currencyasastrict mechanism for selecting members of the elite. Here the concept of the elite is best understood in light of the original meaningo ft he French verb élire -because ultimatelyt he elite was chosen.¹⁰⁷ Thec ard and the immatriculation enacted four years later weres ubject to ar igid colonial screening practice.

Applicationsa nd selection procedures
How did the application process for the carte du méritec ivique proceed in concreteterms?What documents did applicantshavetosubmit?What did the committees discuss in the detail?W hich applications weres uccessfula nd which weren ot?T he minutes of committee meetings are ap articularlyg ood source of informationonhow local actors negotiated, discussed, staged and bureaucraticallyi nvestigatedt he criteria for defining the official Congolese elite. They not onlyr eveal what qualities the authorities demanded of this elite, but also highlight the invocation of the media ideal of the "perfected black" as abenchmark for evaluatinga pplicants' lifeworld. The decree on the carte du mérite civique itself had remained silenta bout exactlyw hat the application process involved. Initially, then,t herew as al ack of clarity at the various administrative levels about who had to do what and by when. Thisp rompted the General Government to standardize the procedure two years later,inJ une 1950,through an amendment to the decree. This clarified that interested parties had to submit their applications to the territorial official responsible for their place of residence, who would sign them. Based on his own research, the territorial official then had to produce ar eport within three months and present it to the district commissioner.The latter passed the report on to the relevant committee, which finally made adecision or soughtadditional information. The territorial official had to informt he applicant of the committee'sd ecision within one month and state the reasons in case of rejection. The candidate could file an objection to the decision within three months.¹⁰⁸ While this procedurem eant that the final decision layw ith the committee, once again it was the alreadyo verburdened territorial officials who had to do the preparatory work. In particular, they had to obtain an umber of documents and references relatingt oa pplicants.T hey requested statements from applicants' superiorso nt heir work ethic, but also on their privatel ife. Their former teachers weret oa ttest to their intellectual abilities,w hile the relevant chefd e cité and other holders of the carte du mérite civique weretoprovide information on theirs ocial and public conduct. In addition, school reports and ac ertificate of good conduct had to be procured, often by applicants themselves, who were thus responsible for all visits to the authorities along with all the associated costs.¹⁰⁹ Often, the report submittedbythe territorial officials failed to meet the committees' requirements. In August 1950,for example, one committee complained: "In general, the committee regrets the fact that the administrative officials all too easilyv ouch for the candidates' level of development and civic-mindedness. […] In practice, these 'reports' are brimming with vagueinformation couched in stereotypical language."¹¹⁰ Evidently, at times the district commissioners,t hati s, theirs uperiors, who wereo ften simultaneouslyc hairs of the committees, instructed the responsible territorial officials to review the documents: "Iwant adetailedreport on the candidate by 1July1951atthe latest.Inaccordance with the most recent instructions from the governor general, this report must provide evidence that the candidates are not simple évolués but are members of the ELITE."¹¹¹ The committees thus demanded "guarantees of development,m orality and civic-mindedness" from candidates.¹¹² The district commissioner instructed the territorial officials to inspect applicants' homes, sound out theira ttitudes to colonial institutions and the "less developed natives" and verify their loyalty to the administration.¹¹³ In addition, the validity of all information was to be confirmed by at hird party,c ulminating in a "detailed and well-founded report," which was then to be submitted to the committee.¹¹⁴ Let'sc onsider ac oncrete example of what the application process looked like in practice.¹¹⁵ On 8S eptember 1952, the territorial official of Oshwe receivedatypewritten letter.I ts layout resembled that of the administrative correspondence typicalo f the Belgian Congo: sender in the top right-hand corner of the page, recipient at the bottom right,t he usual polite phrases and ah andwrittens ignature. The referencew as to the "Carte du Mérite Civique Application," below which stood: The undersigned, Jacques K., son of Nzie, also known as Nkana ( †)a nd Atemba ( †), from the villageofMbombe, Djoko chefferie,Pendjwa sector,Kiri territory, district of Lac Léopold II, married, currentlyinOshwe in the employ of the colonyasanaid third-class to the territorial assistant,has the honour of respectfullyrequestingissuanceofthe Carte du Mérite Civique for Congolese of outstanding merit.¹¹⁶ Jacques K. pulled out all the stops of bureaucratic discourse, with which he was well familiar as an office worker.Heevenworked under the territorial official to Applications and selection procedures whom he had writtentoinitiate the application process. In line with the regulations, the latter confirmed his application and affirmedthat the "preparation of documents" had begun.¹¹⁷ Six weeks later,the territorial official wrote to the applicant requesting several documents, personal information and adetailed CV.¹¹⁸ Less than seven days later,Jacques K. complied with this request.Heprovided biographical information on his wife, mentioned his traditionalC hristian weddinga nd the birth of his first-born child, which, as fitting for an évolué, had taken place at ahospital. The 27-year-old outlinedhis impeccable educational career:trained as aprimary school teacher by the headofthe Catholicmission in Inongo, he had graduated from the petit séminaire of Bakoro. He alsom entioned the various stages of his professional career:o ne year of teachinga ta Catholic mission school, six months as as tock-keeper,f our months as ac ourt clerk and his current employment as aid to the territorial official. He also disclosed his monthlyincome for the current year and ownership of asmall kitchen garden including20hens, aduck and two pigs. As requested, he enclosed school reports and certificates of employment in the dossiera nd provided the current addresses of his superiorsand teachers to make it easier for the territorial official to write to them requestingr eferences.¹¹⁹ It took six months for the territorial official to completet he dossiero nJ acques K. with an excerpt from his criminalrecord showing that he had committed no offences,¹²⁰ certified copies of his church marriagec ertificate¹²¹ and his primary school certificatef rom the école normale showing a "B" grade.¹²² The responses from third partiesw erea lsoe nclosed in the dossier. The candidate was claimedt ob eagood familym an, to receive the occasional visit from the local priest,but never to gethis handsdirty in his owngarden, though no sources werecited.¹²³ Oneofthe details noted by the official on the candidate's "public life" was that he appreciatedscent,but acritical remark alsocropped up several times in shorthand form: "He does not mingle with the masses -he is withdrawn -he is very proud -he loathes his lower-class relatives."¹²⁴  Letter from territorial official to Jacques K., 1O ctober 1952 It wasnow the task of the territorial official to evaluatethe collated information. In his final report,hehighlighted the candidate'shighdegree of education and good service in the administrative office, but gave to understand thatw hile he behaved respectfullytowards Europeans,hewas arrogant in his dealingswith his Congolese colleagues and treated ordinary workers with nothing short of contempt.¹²⁵ The report culminated in arather diffuse conclusion: "His life, his conduct and his manners distinguish him from the mass of other Congolese, and I repeat thatheisanupright youngman, but he is not part of the group of évolués and certainlyc annot be considered am embero ft he Congolese elite."¹²⁶ Before the dayw as out,t he territorial official sent the completed ossier to the district commissioner of Lac Léopold II, who put the findingsf orward for discussion one month later as committee chair.¹²⁷ Generallys peaking,t he awardingc ommittees debated the candidates' suitability in their absence, with several usually being discussed at the samem eeting.E ach memberh ad one vote, and as imple majority was sufficient to decide on the application.¹²⁸ The committee was onlyquorate if at least five of its members were present,but these always had to include aholder of the carte du mérite civique and ar epresentative of the territorial administration.¹²⁹ The committee could endorse or reject the application. Athird option was to defer the decision, either if it was thoughtn ecessary to obtain more information or if the applicant was rated as not yetmature but potentiallyapt.Int his case he was asked to reapplya tal atert ime.
The committee meetingonJacques K.'sapplication took place in Inongo, the administrative seat of the district of Lac Léopold II.¹³⁰ Nine locallyresident members werei na ttendance, who knew the candidate onlyf rom the documents. First,t he committee chairman reported on the dossiers ubmitted by the territorial official and read out the latter'sassessment of the candidate. He then asked the members for their views. The first to state their opinion were the two Congolese representatives. The assessment of the teacher at the école normale of Inon- go,whose appraisal of the dossier was essentiallyn egative,b ecause the candidate'sa rrogancet owardsh is fellows suggested thath es hould not be issued with a carte du mérite civique,was backed by the warden of the CEC of Inongo. AEuropean representative of the CEC administration took the sameview. ABelgian doctor,o nt he other hand, highlighted the inconsistencies in the dossier and defended Jacques K.'sa lleged aloofness on the basis thath ew as not from the region, which hampered his integration into the local community.A s he sawi t, the candidate's "excellent privatec onduct" spoke in his favour.The local publicprosecutor backed him in this, contending that one could not refuse the carte du mérite civique on the basis thatt he candidate avoided the basengi, that is, uneducated Congolese. Givent hatt he committee had come to no clear view,t he chairman pointed out thatn ot everyone could receive such an important honour as the carte du mérite civique. The territorial administrator of Inongoa lso came out against the candidate: at the end of the dayt he goal was to choose "the elite of the elite." He also pointed out that acareless selection would attract sharp criticism. The territorial official explained further that the candidate ought to be rejected not just because of his attitude towardsordinary workers, but alsodue to an incident,o mitted from the dossier, in which he had been guilty of "public intoxication." As ar esult of the differing opinions among the committee members, no final decision was made about this applicant.
Tenm onths after Jacques K. had submitted his application to the local territorial administrator,hehad to payavisit to the latter in person to hear the committee'sd ecision. In front of him layt he letter explaining thatd ue to his social conduct he could not yetb ec ounted among the elite: The committee takesthe view that Mr K.'sprivateconduct and professional activity areimpeccable. His social behaviour,m eanwhile, chieflyt owards those at or below his level, must be improved. He is highlyc ommendable but not yetamember of the elite. The candidate'sa pplication mayb er eassessed after two years.¹³¹ The letter,s igned by Jacques K., was sent back to the district commissioner. There are no sources available to clarify whether he made as econd attempt two years later,w hether the demands for further perfecting discouraged him or spurred him on, or whether he altered his social behaviour -or whether the objections raised duringt he committee meeting werew ell-founded in the first place.
 Minutes on K.'sa pplicationd eliveredb yp ost, 22 July 1953, AA/GG/15726. As ocial distance from uneducated Congolese was alsoc ited in other committee minutes as grounds for rejection.O ne applicant,w hose readingo ft he Voix du Congolais and Croix du Congo,regular visits to the local library and nicely furnished home werea ttested by the territorial official, failed to pass muster with the committee twice within just three years due to his incorrigibly "snooty behaviour."¹³² But the committees also identified other reasons whya pplicants wereu nworthyo ft he card.
Antoine P. submitted his application as the first candidate from the territory of Mushie.¹³³ The territorial official'sinvestigative report stated that,asadoctor's assistant,the candidatehad dealings with "natives" on adailybasis and treated them "humanely."¹³⁴ He had also been elected president of the local évolué association.¹³⁵ His education, on the other hand, was unremarkable when compared with others practising the sameprofession. Outweighing everything else, however,was the picture the official painted of his visit to the applicant'sh ome. The following description shows that the official must have put every corner of the house undert he microscope: Livingroom and diningroom clean and tidy. Bedrooms quiteuntidyand obstructed by various objects. Kitchen separate from the dwelling;g rime in evidence; leftoverf ood everywhere;t herei sastrong smell here.
[ … ]F urnishings:v ery respectable in the livingr oom and diningroom.F airlyprimitive in the bedrooms.Kitchenware: does not give the impression of beingc leaned regularly.¹³⁶ So while the official wassatisfied with the lounge, so omnipresent in the media imagery of the perfect évolué family,a nd the dining room, he was disturbed by the state of the kitchen and bedrooms,which he evidentlyfelt able to enter without violating the applicant'sp rivacy.
The criticism of Antoine P. ' shousehold was ultimatelyacriticism of his wife. The entry on her "degree of development" stated: "Not applicable. Not attending acourse on household refinement."¹³⁷ As we sawearlier,there was atradition of inspectionvisits of this kind in the Belgian Congo, most of themc arried out by Applications and selection procedures the (female) heads of the foyerssociaux to appraise their students' learning progress.I nacontext in which the state of one'sh ome helpedd etermine whether one was issued with a carte du mérite civique,i ti sn ot hard to understand whym embers of the vernacular elite weres ok een for their wivest oa ttend the household managements chools.¹³⁸ Women playedakeyr ole in staginga ni mpeccable évolué existence.A sthe authorities sought to assess whether individuals had internalized ideas about what constituted acivilized lifestyle, the private sphere became subject to public discussion and scrutiny.
In addition, home visits, which were carried out by the territorial official but in some places alsobystaff of the foyerssociaux or the chef de cité,weremeant to clarify whether the candidate was using enough of his salary on his household. The reports read like inventories of material possessions: In the livingroom thereare 1table, 7chairs,1table with agramophone, 1kitchen cupboard containings everal household appliances. Ac over on the Nonetheless,the inhabitant of this dwelling, described in such detail and highly praised, was deniedthe carte du mérite civique. Foreventhe loveliest of furnishingsc ould not make up for the flawi dentifiedi nt he territorial official'sr eport. Foralengthyp eriod, in addition to his longstandingm arriage, the candidate maintained ar elationship, of which few wereu naware,w ith another woman; he had even had ac hild with her.¹⁴⁰ Although the candidatea pologizedt ot he territorial official for having kept quiet about this child,¹⁴¹ the committee'sjudgment on the otherwise flawless application was unequivocal: "His character is that of the man-about-town, who has al over everywhereh eg oes and drinks a great deal,"¹⁴² to quote one committee member'sf inal conclusion.
Well aware that the practice of polygamyw as an obstacle to obtaining the carte du mérite civique,m anyc andidatesk ept quiet about such relationships in their application. Attempts at concealment oftendid the rounds at committee meetings, promptingthe authorities to urge the territorial officials not to relyon applicants' statements. Instead, through a "thorough investigation of [candidates']p rivatel ives" they weres upposed to check whether they did not in fact have a "lover."¹⁴³ Rumours of applicants with several marriage-likerelationships werethus far from rare. Onef ormerm ission school teacher on another selection committee, for example, who had known ac andidate since childhood, confirmed that while he was one of his "best pupils," recentlyhis wife had confided in the pastor that her husband'si dentity card recorded an "illegitimate child."¹⁴⁴ It is no coincidencethat the comprehensive screening of applicants' livesevenincluded confidential information revealed to clergymen. The missionaries weres till the supreme custodians of the évolués' monogamous nuclear families. This time, however,t he candidate'sw ritten statement,c omposed in the style of ac onfession, persuaded the committee not to permanentlyd enyh im ac ard. Deploying the languageo fp erfectibility,t he letter evoked the desire, requiredo fa ll applicants, to attain ah igher level of civilization against all the odds: Ir egardm yb ehaviour as extremelyf lawed, as Iw as married according to Christian tradition, and Ipromise to takeserious stepstoimprovemyself, for the sake of my own uprightness and to ensurethe peaceofmind of my wife and children. Please believemewhenIsay that Ih aveb etrayed my wife just once in fifteeny ears of marriage.Il eave it to your judgment whether youg rant me ad istinctionIa mn ol onger sureIam even entitled to.¹⁴⁵ On some occasions,infact,the committee learned of the candidate'salleged polygamyo nlya fter it had issued a carte du mérite civique. This applied to one of the first men to be granted this distinction by the committee in the district of Lac Léopold II, and the first in the Belgian Congo whose card was withdrawn.¹⁴⁶ The individual in question was Patrice S., ad octor'sa ssistant.B efore the territorial official had even setadate for the public conferment of the carte du mérite civique,i nS eptember 1950 the district commissioner instructed him to withdrawit  Letter from the district commissioner of Lac Léopold II to the territorial administrators,9 January 1950,A A/GG/15726.  Letter fromthe mission school teacher in Inongo to the territorial administrator of Lac Léopold II, 2J uly1 953, AA/GG/15726.  Letter from Jean T. to the territorial administrator,5July 1953, AA/GG/15726.  This emergesfromofficial statistics on the carte du mérite civique,which list all successful and unsuccessful applications,aswell as withdrawn cards, by territory.Chambredes représentants, Rapport sur l'administration de la colonie du CongoBelge pendant l'année 1950 présenté aux chambres législatives (Brussels:Ministere des affaires africaines, 1951), 111;Rapport annuel AIMO District Lac Léopold II 1951, ARNACO/AIMO/73CC/73/157. from Patrice S. for one year.¹⁴⁷ Shortly before, doubts had been raised about the candidate at acommittee meeting.For after his distinction had been announced, the territorial official receiveda na nonymousl etter allegingt hat PatriceS .h ad two lovers; the head of the local mission, at least,was able to confirm this.I n addition,t wo weeks after the committee'sp ositive decision on 20 December 1949,S.was fined: he was accused of having violatedthe nightlycurfew for Congolese on 31 December and to have been found in astate of mild drunkenness.¹⁴⁸ It is quite possible that Patrice S. was celebrating the award of the carte du mérite civique on New Year'sE ve.H is misfortune,h owever,was that for holders of the card the nightlyc urfew was onlya bolished eighteen months later.¹⁴⁹ The committee chair'sw ish to deprive him of the card permanently, however,w as voted down by am ajorityo ft he members.¹⁵⁰ When the case came before the committee again one year later,the additional investigations, which the territorial official had been expresslyinstructed to carry out,¹⁵¹ favoured Patrice S. and refuted the accusations made against him. In July 1952, he was reissued with his carte du mérite civique.
In total, the committees demanded the return of the carte du méritec ivique onlyf rom one in fifty of the 1,557 statush olders.¹⁵² This mayb en umerically insignificant,but it is indicative of the logic of the official process of appointment to the elite. It allows us to infer thati ng eneral the carte du mérite civique represented ah ighlyf luid status. It could be revoked and was in as ense awarded on probation. Just as, in colonial discourse, the évolués' development towards acivilized lifestyle wasregarded as unstable, this legal category was also unstable in design. It amounted to provisional assimilation. The expectation that évolués were likelytoregress meant thatholdersofthe carte du mérite civique had to incessantlyp rovet hat they werew orthyo ft his legal category. To sum up, the selection committees mistrusted the applicants,l istened to rumours and malicious gossip and encumbered the candidatesw ith ah ard slog thatwas both protracted and expensive.Aboveall, they requiredapplicants to permitinspection of intimate spheres of life. The committees subjected applicants to a "maturity test," al itmus test of culturalb ourgeoisification. WhatA ntoine-RogerBolamba in the Voix du Congolais demanded of future holders of the carte du méritec ivique,n amelyt hat the "black elite must be capable of everything,"¹⁵³ the committee members made the benchmarkf or their decisions.
Domesticity,am onogamous marriage, ac ivilized gender order,e xemplary conduct,s ensible leisure-time activities, rational consumption: these leitmotifs of the media discourse of self-reassurance among Congolese authors werea lso key themes in the committees.They weret ranslated into ac atalogue of criteria, produced by the committees with bureaucratic meticulousness, which applicants had to satisfy in order to obtain the carte du mérite civique. The selection process was, so to speak, collateral damagec ausedb ya uthors' normative discourse on perfectibility,which had helped them lend weight to their demands. Thep erfidious thing about this was thatthe demands an aspiringelite made of itself contributed to this strict selection. In order to be officiallya ppointed am ember of the Congolese elite, moreover,i tw as not enough to be ac onscientious worker or faithful husband, to aid the indigènes in theirc ulturald evelopment or to maintain ah ousehold beyond reproach. Applicants had to complyw ith all these requirements and more besides. The desire to be attributed to ah igher level of civilization by obtaining the carte du mérite civique might come to nothing due to al ack of clean cutlery.

The colonialm aturityt est
Though so far it has seemed as though applicants bowed to ap rescribed procedure, the application and selection processes weren ot ap erformance in which candidates playedmerelyaminor role. Certainly, the sources prohibit systematic investigation of how applicants sought to positively influencet his process, but they are sufficient to establish that this did occur.
As the examples discussed earlier showed, some applicants kept quiet about their lovers or illegitimate children by opting not to register them in their official  There was an unhappy outcome for one candidate who attempted to convince the committee of his above-average education with af alsified school report,which came to light after he had been awarded the carte du mérite civique. The subsequent forced return of the card seems an even more bitter blow given that provingo ne had completed school wasn ot an explicit criterion, though in practice it improved one'sc hances of success.¹⁵⁵ Less risky than falsifying documents werea ttempts by applicants to fix up their homes for inspection. Particularly when the dateo fahome visit had been set,f urniture was borrowed from friends, while the house was tidied and cleaned.¹⁵⁶ These stagings of exemplary bourgeois domesticity, however,r equired all members of the familyt op laya long,which was markedlym ored ifficult if differing everydayh abits existed within af amily.
The novel Les hauts et les bas by BatukezengaZamenga, published in 1971, tells of the familyc onflicts experienced by the main character in the course of his application for immatriculation.¹⁵⁷ Written from the anti-colonial perspective of Zaïrization in the 1970s, when President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu replaced all names of colonial origin with supposedlyauthentic African ones,¹⁵⁸ the novel interprets the embrace of aEuropean lifestyle as aprocess of increasingalienation from one'sown traditions. Guided by this culturaldichotomy, the author conceptualizes the husband and wife as acontrastive pair: on the one hand we have the male protagonist,who movestoLéopoldville after finishing school and poses as an évolué,and on the other his wife, awoman from the villagewho has brought her habits along with her.
The author describes the protagonist'sa pplication for immatriculation as a series of "difficult initiationrites."¹⁵⁹ At the recommendation of his European su- Havingareligious wedding became as trategyt hrough which futurea pplicants for a carte du mérite civique could improvetheir chances: it eventuallygot about that the committees often requestedastatement from the local missionaries, whose opinion carried weight when it came to makingadecision; A.-A. Ngeke, "La carte du méritecivique scindera-t-elle la classe des évolués?," Voix du Congolais no. 140 ( November 1957). perior,hechanges his lifestyle in order to satisfy the committee members.Henceforth, he stays away from bars and dresses accordingt o" évolué fashion"-" his tie becomes ap ermanent fixture, regardless of circumstanceo rc limate";¹⁶⁰ he also joinst he church choir and speakso nlyF rench.
Yeth is self-staginga sa" genuine" évolué fails duet oh is wife'st raditional wayo fl ife. She not onlyr efuses to adopt the European habit of sitting next to one'sh usband on the pew,b ut also to modify her approach to everydayf amily life. She resists the demand to eat European meals together at the table as afamily. While her husband eats in the house,his wife and children continue to sit on the ground outside, eating from ab owl. Thec ouple finallyr eaches ac ompromise: they eat at the dining table in the living room onlyo nS undays,w hen the committee representativesu sually visit people'sh omes. The author of the novel, however,h as this performance exposed as the homev isit takesp lace on aT hursday,w hen the family is eating in the traditional way: the children cry whent heir father,u nnoticedb yt he territorial administrator,m anoeuvres their fufu into the dustbin. When another unannounced home visit takes place late in the evening,the protagonist is hostinganumber of relativesfrom the village, who are spending the night on mats in the living room.F or the selection committee, this incident is evidence enough that the candidate is captive of traditional notions of family.They thus refuse to grant him immatriculation.
The novel lays bare the familial conflicts that occur duringt he application processf or évolué status, which could be triggered by the authorities' attempts to investigate whether ac andidate fit the ideal of the "perfect black." Furniture could be arranged moree asilyt han family members.
Achangeofstatus, then, waspossible chieflyfor those Congolese menwho, as masterofthe house, could ensure agenderedand domestic order informed by bourgeois precepts. Manyapplicants feared the associated scrutinyofthe private sphere. Today, contemporary witnesses still view this as symbolic of the profound humiliation suffered by the vernacular elite.
Other applicants, meanwhile, went out of their wayt oi nvite committee members to inspect their homes in order to showcase their civility.A ntoine-Marie Mobé, for example, mentioned several times alreadyasanactive association president and press correspondent,i nformed the committee chair thatanyone could see for themselves, at anyt ime, that he wasp erforming his everyday duties as familym an and husband: Please note that as yetIam probablythe onlyfather who -in possession of asmall blackboard,recognizable fromthe street when the windows areopen -attends to the education  Ibid., 55.
The colonial maturity test and edification of his children during the evening. Furthermore, Ia mp robablyt he only husband whoh as taught his wife to read and write.¹⁶¹ Mobé'sc ase, however,i sl ess an example of applicants' subservience than of how they proactively laid claim to elite status. Mobé had alreadys ubmitted his application for a carte du mérite civique during his time in Stanleyville.¹⁶² The application procedure, however,w as temporarilys uspended, probablyi n connection with his conflicts,a sa ssociationp resident,w ith the local colonial administration, which was responsible for the assessment of his dossier.¹⁶³ In anye vent,M obé resubmitted his application in Coquilhatville onlya fter he had moved therei n1 953. Having once again receivedn or esponse of anyk ind from the local committee, Mobé brokew ith the conventions of official protocol, which demanded reserveand patience of applicants, as communication with the committee could occur onlyi ndirectlyt hrough the territorial official. Mobé repeatedlyw rote to the committee chair in person, providing unsolicited arguments for ap ositive decision.¹⁶⁴ He disposed of possible doubts by enclosing in one letter the court decision absolving him of the embezzlement of which he had previouslyb een accused.¹⁶⁵ He forwarded current work evaluations and emphasized that he wasn os imple office assistant: he now sat "at the same table with the Europeans" and took on the tasks of his European superiors, who he even stood in for when they were absent.¹⁶⁶ ForM obé, the carte du mérite civique was not something that he wished to ask the committee for.H elaid claim to it. "What else?,"¹⁶⁷ he asked after listing his own merits. When, after three years of waiting, he had receivednoresponse, in late 1956 he wrotes arcastically: Ihavethe honour of remindingyou onceagain to kindlylet me know whether the relevant committee, otherwise to be found everywhere, exists in Coquilhatville as well. In view of the time that has elapsed sincem yf irst appeal, Ia mf orced to concludet hat therei si n fact no such committee here in Coq.¹⁶⁸ Finally, Mobé'sp ersistencea nd systematic self-portrayal as a "genuine" évolué paid off: on 13 June 1957,h er eceivedh is carte du mérite civique.¹⁶⁹ So far,Ihave focussed on the applications and selection procedureinvolved in the carte du mérite civique. But how did thingss tand in the case of immatriculation?B ecause this status conferred greater legal benefits, namely equality with Europeans under civil law, the General Government demanded that candidates satisfy even more stringent conditions and undergo aparticularlystrict selection process. Ad ecree of 17 May1 952s pecified the following conditions: "Proof of an education and wayo fl ife of ac ivilizational level that allows one to enjoy one'sr ights and fulfil one'so bligations as provided for in the written legislation."¹⁷⁰ In much the same waya sw ith the carte du mérite civique, when granting immatriculation the authorities werekeen for applicants to demonstrate al ifestyle consonant with prevailing notions of civility.
In contrast to the carte du méritec ivique,the application process for immatriculationdid not lie in the handsofaselection committee. Because this was a matter of conferringcivil rights, it was the courts that made the decision. It was thus the king'sp rocurator responsible for ap articular provincew ho dealt with the applications.H er evealedc andidates' identity through a "public notice" that took the form of announcements in the press and notices outside administrative offices.¹⁷¹ This text requested submission of information on, and objections to,a pplicantsw ithin two months.¹⁷² Once again, it was the territorial official'stask to produce adetailed report and compile similar information as in the case of applications for the carte du mérite civique.¹⁷³ At acourt sitting,the judge, The colonial maturity test together with four speciallya ppointed assessors, decided whether to award immatriculation in each case.¹⁷⁴ Further,unlike the carte du mérite civique,i mmatriculation applied not just to the applicant individuallybut alsot ohis wife and children. It was not,therefore, an individual who applied for immatriculation, but af amily. In French Africa too, until the late 1940s the most importantcriterion for switching from the indigénat to citizenship had been the family:asthe nucleus of society,itwas allocated the task of handingdown "those qualities of 'civility' considered specific to French civilization and essentialt oi ncorporation into French society."¹⁷⁵ In the caseo fc andidates for immatriculation, then, the court'sc ritical gaze was directed primarilya tt heir wives. The guiding ideal here was not the "radicallymodern phenomenon of the emancipated woman who enjoys equality with men," but rather at raditionalC atholicconception: "We must be satisfied if she makes ag ood wife, good mother and good housewife in equal measure," stated Antoine Sohier as the main figure responsible for planning reformed immatriculation.¹⁷⁶ The public prosecutorsofthe BelgianCongo wereinformed in the Journal des tribunaux d'outre-mer,edited by Sohier,ofhow immatriculation was to be implemented and how to assess wives' capacity for education. They were also to evaluate whether the children had good enough French and sufficiently "civilized practices" to keep up at aE uropean school.¹⁷⁷ The application process for immatriculation included personal attendancea tc ourt,w hereh usband and wife bothh ad to justify themselvesb efore aj ury: The applicant and his wife undergo ab rief interrogation, which entails complex queries and anumber of loaded questions,including: What do youunderstand by the term immatriculation? What legal benefits does immatriculation entail?Incase of adomestic dispute, do youleave your husband to seek refuge with your aunts?What do youdowith the money your husband earns?¹⁷⁸  The decrees tipulated that thereh ad to be enough assessors for every district,a lwaysi ncludingt wo territorial officials and aC ongolese alreadyg rantedi mmatriculation. See decree on immatriculation of 17 May1952, reprinted in Croix du Congo (13 July 1952);letterfromthe governor of Équateur province to the head of the General Government'sA IMOd epartment,16A ugust 1952, AA/GG/10211.  See Gosewinkel, Schutz und Freiheit?,3 09.  A. Sohier, "Immatriculation des indigènes," Journal des tribunaux d'outre-mer 39,1 3S eptember 1953, 96.  A. Sohier, "Immatriculation des indigènes," Journal des tribunaux d 'outre-mer 41,15November 1954,108.  Lumumba, Congo, terred ' avenir,6 5. This is how PatriceL umumba described attendancea tc ourt,which scrutinized not just applicants' bourgeois lifestyle and their families'" civilized" gender order,b ut also their understanding of European law.¹⁷⁹ Lumumba spoke from experience.H ew as one of the first to be granted immatriculation, submittinghis application in August 1952,less than three months after the introduction of the reform.¹⁸⁰ But it was to be two years before he was awarded this status. Lumumba is not onlyanexample of the flawless imagecandidates had to conveyt oa ttain immatriculation, but also of the references and networks that could help them do so.
After submitting his application, Lumumba first made ag reat effort to bolster his CV.Atthe post office in Stanleyville, he rose from the lowest to the highest rank of Congoleseoffice assistant within sixteen months.¹⁸¹ He also advanced within the associational world of Stanleyville.B etween December 1953a nd March 1954,h et ook over the presidencies of the AES, the local branch of the ADAPES and the Amicale de PostiersI ndigènes de la Province Orientale; in April 1953, he became secretary of the Association du Personnel Auxiliaire de la Colonie.¹⁸² During the two years of the application process, Lumumba published thirty-one articles in the Croix du Congo and three more in the Voix du Congolais.¹⁸³ He also volunteered at the Bibliothèque Publique pour Congolais.
As if this was not enough, in aeulogy to Henry Morton Stanley on the fiftieth anniversary of his death Lumumba playedu pt oB elgium'sp erception of its colonialism as ap hilanthropic endeavour,w hile keepingq uiet about the bloody chapters in the explorer'sb iography: "Stanley brought us peace, gave us human dignity,i mproved our material lives, nurtured our intellect and developed our soul."¹⁸⁴ The Voix du Congolais printed this speech, givena tt he AES, verbatim, thus painting ap icture of an eloquent and loyal évolué.¹⁸⁵ Lumumba also gained the support of French sociologist Pierre Clemens for his application for immatriculation.¹⁸⁶ Off the back of Lumumba'sr ole as research assistant,a The colonial maturity test friendship took off that even found expression in the naming of his son, born in September 1952, who was christenedPatrice Pierre Clemens Lumumba. His circle of European supporters also included Réné Rom, alocallyresident liberal lawyer and adviser to the AES. In particular,Rom lent Lumumba support when, after his first application for immatriculation wasr ejected, he turned to the Court of Appeal in Léopoldville.¹⁸⁷ When Lumumba was granted immatriculation at the second attempt,¹⁸⁸ he had not onlyi nvested his hard-won cultural and social capital, but alsoh is money:t he courtc osts in Léopoldville came to 1,180 francs, equatingt oa bout half the monthlye arningso fa no ffice worker in the colonial administration.¹⁸⁹ Lumumba'sc asel aysbare the sweeping requirements applicants for immatriculationh ad to satisfy,r egardless of wheret hey livedi nt he Belgian Congo. One of the first individuals to be immatriculated in Léopoldville had served with the Force Publique in Madagascar and Burma duringt he Second World War, after which he became president of the Associationd es Anciens Combattants and amember of the advisory committee of the Voix du Congolais.¹⁹⁰ In Bukavu, the couple T. also satisfiedthe jury in every respect.Jules T. had completed the petit séminaire before continuinghis education at evening schools. He was a "first-class office worker" and highlyregarded by his employers. Active in seven associations as membero rp resident,h ea lsos at on advisory bodies within the colonial administration, such as the Conseil de Province du Kivu and the Conseil de Gouvernement.¹⁹¹ He had ac onsiderable sum in his savingsaccount and had paid off the loan he had taken out to buy his house. In addition, not onlyhad he alreadyr eceivedt he carte du mérite civique,b ut so had his wife, making "Mrs Jules T." one of the few women to be granted the card.¹⁹² Court records on another applicant from Léopoldville mention astayinBelgium and training as apriest at the grand séminaire,while another candidate is documented as having attended the Colonie Scolaire in Boma and helpededit the Voix du Congolais and Mbandaka. The emphasis in another case, meanwhile, was on the candidate'si nvestment of his savingsi nt he building of a "house of durablem aterials,pleasantly furnisheda nd properlym aintained."¹⁹³ In brief, the immatriculated bore impressive testimonyt ot he cultural bourgeoisification of their entire family. They satisfiedt he jury that they werep ropagatingthe ideal of the Congolese elite, and not just in the media: in their everydayl ives too, they werec onvincing embodimentso ft he "perfectedb lack."

Socialp rofiles and success rates
Beyond cases tudies, what can we saya bout the number and profile of applicants and those selected?What was the ratioofsuccessful to failed applications? Did those allocated to the different legal categories have specific characteristics? Were there differences between the carte du mérite civique and immatriculation?
First,wes hould recall that ever since it flared up at the end of the Second World War, the debate on évolué status had revolved around who ought to benefit from it.Both European and Congolese actors long disagreed on whether the targetg roup should be narrowly or broadlyd efined. With the declared goal of preventing the formation of an isolated elite caste, in July 1948 the colonial minister opted for an inclusive solution in the shape of the carte du mérite civique. This he linked with the recognition of an "open class," those "natives" whose education and culturetook their lead from European models but without necessarilyb elongingt ot he elite.¹⁹⁴ The Voix du Congolais reinforcedt his reading, stating that the carte du mérite civique was not intended solelyfor the "category of office assistants," but thateventhe illiterate could apply: "It should be granted to all thosew ho have made serious efforts to develop."¹⁹⁵ Despite all the avowals, ultimatelyi tw as the educated and professionally successfulcandidateswho made up the majority of successful applicants. Astatistical analysis of different social groups shows that by late 1951three out of four cartes du mérite civique went to the so-called "native brain workers":290 out of  "Chronique judiciaire, L'Immatriculation," Journal des tribunaux d'outre-mer 54 (15 November 1954):108 -109.  Speech by the colonial minister on the introduction of the carte du mérite civique,reprinted in "Chronique de la vie indigène et nouvelles diverses," Voix du Congolais no. 28 (July1 948): 303 -306.  Bolamba, "Carte du mérite," 360.
Social profiles and success rates 398 cards in absolute figures.¹⁹⁶ The reports on cardholders published in periodicals such as the Voix du Congolais shed light on the professions covered by this term and indicate that this group consisted chieflyofoffice workers,doctor'sassistants and mission school teachers,i no ther words the typical évolué occupational groups,which required ah ighl evel of education. In the first seven years after the introduction of the carte du mérite civique,atotal of 228i ndividuals werem entioned in the Voix du Congolais,o fw hom half were office workers.¹⁹⁷ This is unsurprising givent hat,a sarule, office workers werer ecruited from the best schools in the country.They were the likeliest to have the kind of cultural and social capital that promised success whenapplying for a carte du mérite civique. Further,itwas mainlyoffice workers employed by the colonial administration who weree ncouraged to submit an application by their European employers.¹⁹⁸ What othergroups were granted the carte du mérite civique? By 1952, "skilled and low-skilled workers," at 51 individuals,m ade up an ot insignificant 13 percent.One in three of this group was from the most heavilyindustrialized region of Katanga, wherethere was agreater need for trainedmanualworkers.¹⁹⁹ These included carpenters,m echanics, but also stock-keepers.²⁰⁰ At 23 individuals, 6 percent of cardholders wereint he category of "native authorities." As so-called chefs,t hey weret askedw ith police work for the colonial administration at the lowest level of territorial unit.Self-employed tradesmenand retailers,at19individuals,receivedjust4percent of cards issued,anindication of the marginal position of Congolese in the colonial economy. Onlyt he category of "women" did worse, at 12 cards.²⁰¹ Tellingly,press reports on women cardholders always referred to the "wife of."²⁰² In line with their limited educational opportunities and  Chambred es représentants, Rapport 1951,1 01. Unfortunately, onlyt he report for 1951i ncludes such detailed statements about cardholders' social profile. Other authors have also made referencet ot his report;M utamba-Makombo, "Lesé volués," 81. associated exclusion from the colonial workingworld, for the most part officially approved elite women could earn merit onlya se xemplary housewives. Overall, one out of every two cartes du mérite civique was granted to male office workers with an above-average education.
These figures reveal that allocation practices contradicted the intention of colonial policy to distinguish an "open class"²⁰³ through the carte du mérite civique. Just under ay ear after the card'si ntroduction, the Voix du Congolais was alreadyp ointing out that manyi lliterate people had neither heard of the card nor been informed about the criteria for obtaining it.²⁰⁴ But even among the literate there was widespread ignorance about exactlywhat was involved. At times, interested individuals asked the district commissioner,w ith the utmostp oliteness, to inform them of the criteria, and werer eferred to the General Govern-  Speech by the colonial minister on the introduction of the carte du mérite civique,reprinted in "Chronique de la vie indigène et nouvelles diverses," Voix du Congolais no. 28 (July1948): 304.  Bolamba, "Prudenceo blige," 220.
Social profiles and success rates ment'sd ecree.²⁰⁵ Other newspapers published the requirements for obtaining a card, requesting that readers cut out the text and check theira pplications for completeness in order to make the territorial officials' work easier.²⁰⁶ Due to the great demand expressedi nr eaders' letters,n ewspapers such as the Croix du Congo published the decree again in full.²⁰⁷ What can we saya bout those whose application for immatriculation was crowned with success?O nce again, it was the highlyq ualified and educated workers who made up the majority of successful applicants.O ffice workers in Léopoldville,w heret he colonial administration and manyf irms were based, formedthe vanguard of this group, making up almost50percent of the immatriculated in the Belgian Congo by the end of 1954.²⁰⁸ The carte du mérite civique and immatriculation thus developed into means of distinction for office workers and public servants,w ith the individuals selected for these status categories most closelya pproximating the official ideal of the "genuine" évolué.
By contrast, the social group with the most comprehensive education and the closest contact with Europeans weren ot among the applicants: Congolese clergy.I ti st rue that the decree on the carte du mérite civique promised that in theory "all nativeso ft he Belgian Congo"²⁰⁹ could apply,b ut in practice Congolese clergy remained the absolute exception. This is particularlysurprising given that the debate after the Second World Warh ad alreadyr eferred to them as the most assimilated group.²¹⁰ Thisunderrepresentation of clergy was politically intended. On 31 January 1949,i naletter to the provincial governors and missionrun institutions, the governor general explainedwhy Congolese priests ought to refrain from applying: "It would seem to me ah umiliation if they weret oapply for the card. Their education and wayo fl ife effectively places them in ah igher category and, in truth, makes them the assimilated avantl al ettre."²¹¹ In the eyes of the colonial government,t he clergy werea lreadyt oo assimilated for the carte du mérite civique and the application process was beneath their dignity. Furthermore, at this point in time plans for ar eform of immatriculation grantingm orec omprehensive legal assimilation weres till being drawn up, with the clergy as ak ey targetg roup. But in 1952, when immatriculation too failed to meet expectations and adhered to the same principle of selection as the carte du mérite civique,the colonial government advised Congolese priests not to seek this status either.
Belgian missionaries in the Congow erea lso sceptical about the immatriculation of Congolese brethren. The reasons emerge in correspondence between Gustaaf Hulstaert of Coquilhatville, missionary of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and Antoine Sohier,head of the expert commission that had drawnupasystem of immatriculation at the behest of the colonial minister. Sohier sawthe Congolese priests as the true addressees of immatriculation. But shortlyafter the introduction of the status reform, Hulstaertp ointed out that the immatriculation of clergy might have deleterious effectso nt heir role in society.A saFlemish missionary and anthropologicallya ctive chronicler of vernacular groups,H ulstaert had ac ritical view of assimilation policy after 1945. He perceivedt he évolués as the gravediggers of indigenous languageand culture.²¹² Forhim, the embrace of European society wassynonymous with aturn away from the Congolese masses. With an eyeonthe situation in the metropole, Hulstaert reminded Sohier that in Belgium too the clergy werecriticized for being closer to the bourgeoisie than to ordinary folk.²¹³ Hence, according to Hulstaert,t he African clergy ought to foregop rivileges and remain on the same level as the masses. Onlyi nt his way, he contended, would the priestsb em otivated to do their best to improve the liveso ft he population as aw hole: "In my opinion it would beneficial for them to remain subjectt oi ndigenous lawa nd authority,a st his forces them to suffer injustices and harassmenta long with the ordinary people."²¹⁴ Ultimately, this perspective on immatriculation spread among Congolese priests as well, who declared their wish to avoid alienation from their community.²¹⁵ They remaineds ubject to indigenous law.  H. Vinck, "GustaavH ulstaert," in Biographie Belge d'Outre-Mer Belgische Overzeese Biografie, vol. 8, ed. Académie Royale Scienced ' Outre-Mer (Brussels:L ibrairie Falk fils,1 998); Hunt, "Rewriting."  Letter fromH ulstaert to Sohier,2 8J uly1 952, reprinted in "CorrespondenceS ohier -Hulstaert (1933 -1960)," Annales Aequatoria 18 (1997): 9 -238.  Ibid.  Young, Politics,8 4.

Social profiles and success rates
The history of elite status in the Belgian Congo, then, includes several absurd chapters. The broad stratum of the detribalized, for whom the carte du mérite civique was intended, could not copew ith the demanding selection procedure. And those for whom immatriculation was originallyd evised,n amely the priests, opted not to applyf or it.While the latterw erer egarded as too civilized, the former were seen as not civilized enough.
Based on several sets of annual statistics, we can at least make some selective statements,t hough no comprehensive ones, about the quantitative ratio of applications to successfulo utcomes. In the case of the carte du mérite civique we maywork on the assumption that onlyone in three applications was successful. In 1953, for example, the figure was 59 out of 190 applications for the provinces of Léopoldville,É quateur and Orientale.²¹⁶ The figures available for specific districts suggest the same ratio. Between 1948 and 1951, the committee in Lac Léopold II issuedt he carte du mérite civique to just one third of applicants.²¹⁷ Similarly,when it comes to immatriculation, no more than30percent of applications weres uccessful colony-wide in the first year.²¹⁸ If we totalu pt he colonial administration'sofficial annual statistics for 1953to1956 and for 1958, this givesu sasuccessr ate of 46.6 percent ,with 176o ut of 378a pplications being approved.²¹⁹ Considering that it was first and foremost the educated and better-earning elite that contemplated applying for achangeofstatus in the first place, the success rate must be described as meagre. In the first few years, this maystill have been due to the General Government'sp articularlys trict selection guidelines. The indications, however,are that the initial strategyofundercuttingthe resentment felt in the European milieu by limiting applications to "unassailable candidates"²²⁰ became an entrenched,self-perpetuatingprocess. In anycase, the annual growth in holderso ft he carte du méritec ivique and the immatriculated  Chambred es représentants, Rapport 1954,99.  By that point the committee in Lac Léopold II had receivedjust 12 applications: 4weresuccessful, 3w erer ejected, and ad ecisionw as still to be made about the remaining5 ;l etter from the district commissioner to the provincial governor,13F ebruary 1950, AA/GG/15726.  On this percentage, see Mutamba-Makombo, Du Congo belge,7 6.  On the statistics for these years,see Chambredes représentants.Byway of comparison, in the Frenchempireduring the inter-war period the success rate for naturalization was 96 percent in the metropole, but just 61 percent in Indochina duet ot he strict selection process.S ee E. Saada, "Uneq ualitép ar degré. Civilitée tc itoyennetée ns ituation coloniale," in L'esclavage, la colonisation, et après. France, États-Unis, Grande-Bretagne,e ds.P .W eil and S. Dufoix (Paris:P UF,2 005).  Letter from VanH ovet ot he colonial minister,2 2J uly1 949, AA/AI/4743/II/T/4. remained fairlyc onstant.B etween 1948 and 1955,a na nnual averageo f1 26 cartes du mérite civique wereissued.²²¹ The number of thosegranted immatriculation was smaller still: an averageo f3 6ayear.²²² What was the totalnumber of those allocatedtothese legal categories?The official data on this extend onlyuntil January 1959. By then, 1,557 cartes du mérite civique and 217i mmatriculations had been granted.²²³ How many applicants there were, on the other hand, cannot be ascertained. But going by the success rates calculated above, the number of applicantswill have been less than 5,000 for the carte du mérite civique and below 500 in the case of immatriculation.
Though the architects of colonial policy did not wish to create an elite through the carte du mérite civique,d ue to the strict selection procedures it soon stood for what immatriculation wassupposed to imply: "acertificateofcivilization."²²⁴ This prompted the Colonial Ministry to conclude thati mmatriculation must remain an exception: "We maye xpect this acknowledgment of civilization [the carte du mérite civique]tobecome the most highlycoveted status and thus the associated proceduret ob et he most common one,"²²⁵ to quote one report.
We must bear in mind, however,that manyapplicants gotneither apositive nor definitively negative answer,b ut instead had to exercise patience.B etween 1955 and 1958, half of all applications for immatriculation resulted in adeferred decision, which was justified on the basis thatm ore informationw as required about the candidates.²²⁶ The number of thosew ho, after ab rief or lengthy wait,h ad to abandon the prospect of immatriculation for the time being,w as smaller: on average, less than one in five was definitively rejected.²²⁷ Hence, the selection committees always left the door to elite status slightlya jar -in the belief that this prospect would spur on applicants to press ahead with their self-perfecting.
Measured against at otal population of 13 million people,²²⁸ by the time of independence in 1960 the authorities had consistentlya ppointed just as mall number of individuals to the Congolese elite. If we tot up all holderso ft he carte du mérite civique and all the immatriculated, including their wivesa nd children, we come to af igure of 2,325i ndividuals.The colonial state'sa ppointment policys howed that not much more than 0.017p ercent of the population werec onsidered sufficientlyc ivilized for membership of the elite.
As ar esulto ft he strict selection process, then, the door to elite status was open to just as mall number of Congolese. While the applicants hoped to be let into the waitingr oom,f or thosep ermitted entry -through allocation to one of the two status categories -an ew period of waitingb egan due to the onlygradual processoflegal equalization with Europeans.The vernacular elite's routet ol egal distinction and to recognition was not ad irect or smooth one. It was more likea na nxious circling:i nside and outside the waitingr oom.
In several respects, appointment to the Congolese elite with the help of the carte du mérite civique and immatriculation was as ourceo fd isappointment. First,status reform was adelayedreform. The associated debate and political decision-making had draggedo nf or seven years, duringwhich countless commissions and representatives of the colonial publicsphere argued over the need for and scale of reform, with the various schemes repeatedlyh avingt op ass along the time-intensive official channels between metropole and colony. This tough processo fn egotiation endedi nc ompromises that bore little resemblancet o the initial demand for legal equality between Europeans and Congolesee lite. In view of these thin pickings, in 1955,s peaking before the Conseil Colonial, the missionary Joseph VanWing, an ardent advocate of legal assimilation, referred to a "con"²²⁹ and an advertisingcampaign designed to placate the United Nations. But even after the introduction of the carte du mérite civique and immatriculation,i nterested parties had their patience tested. The appointment process was delayedb yatime-consumings election procedure. Time and again, before ad ecision could be reached new people had to be appointed to the selection committees, meetingswerepostponed, new informationwas gathered about the candidates and they wereadvised to applyagain at alater point in time.F urthermore, in case of apositive decision preparations had to be made for the awarding ceremonies and the new documents issued. As ar esult,i tw as not unusual for candidates to enquire about the progress of their applications: "Ih avet he honour of requesting that youinform me of the answer to my letter of 26 January 1949 concerning my application for the Carte du Mérite Civique,"²³⁰ wroteA ntoine Omari, who we have alreadymet as achampion of évolué status, to the territorial administrator after an eleven-month wait.The polite phrasing barelyconceals the Congolese elite'si mpatience to finallye njoyt he privileges -however limited they mayh aveb een -that they claimed for themselvesi nv iewo f their developmental accomplishments.
Second, through the strict selection of applicants,t he statusr eform represented an attempt by the colonial administration to regain the prerogative of interpreting who or what the vernacular elite actuallywas, or ought to be. Certainly,t hrough their ideal-typical self-portrayals as "genuine" évolués,C ongolese authorsh ad helped shape the prevailing interpretation of the elite. But colonial policy left the decision on membership of this elite to the committees, which subjected applicants to strict scrutinyo ft heir lifestyle.
Outside the waitingroom of colonial development,the committees wereina sense the doormen of elite-makingp olicy,ensuring strict control of admissions. With as ceptical gaze,t hey scrutinized the supposed civilizational maturityo f applicants,a ssessingt his, among othert hings, in light of education, social behaviour,w ork ethica nd loyalty to the colonial state. But when we consider that candidatesm ost oftenf ailed due to an "irregular marital status,"²³¹ it is clear thatw hat the committees soughtt oc reate abovea ll else was am oral elite, distinguished by monogamy, an uclear family and the husband'sf idelity. An évolué was am an whose familyl ife complied with the bourgeois model of gender and Catholicm oral values. The Congolese elite must not onlyw ear a "white collar," but alsohavea"whiter than white" record. As arule, the intimate investigations into applicants' privatel ives found what the committees were looking for: evidence of immorality.U ltimately, then, the selection committees certified thatt he majorityo fa pplicants weres till insufficientlym ature as évolués.
 Letter fromAntoine Omari to the head of the Service de la population noire in Léopoldville, 23 December 1949,A A/GG/19669.  As revealed by an internal documentp roduced by the Colonial Ministry of 1956; Immatriculés et Porteurs de la Carte du mérite civique,A A/AI/4743/T/4.

Social profiles and successr ates
Due to ah alf-hearteds tatus reform and the bureaucratic demonstration of applicants' imperfection, the promise inherent in the discourse of perfectibility, namelyt hat the Congolese elite could ascend within colonial society through feats of culturala daptation, lost some of its appeal. Authors writing for the Voix du Congolais increasinglyq uestioned the selection committees' demand for a "perfected black": "Of course an évolué is not necessarilyaperfect man. No country in the world has perfect people; it is not an attribute of this world. There is thus no reason for the government to demand this of us."²³² Antoine Rubbens, the Elisabethville-based lawyer and an influential voice in the colonial publics phere, who had expressedo pposition to special legal treatment for the évolués since 1945, made an ew intervention in Katanga'sl eading daily, the Essor du Congo. Still at pains to put forward as upposedlyf actual critique, he ratedt his form of colonial maturity test as overblown: "The issue is being looked at in the wrong wayi ft he native elite are being subjected to tests to establish theirc ivility that the whites would struggle to pass."²³³ At the end of the day, the strict criteria suggest that Belgianc olonial ideologues envisaged the Congolese elite as the extension of acolonial elite. Thisvernacular elite was supposedtostand out not so much through its educational qualificationsas through an exemplary and morallyimpeccable lifestyle. In the inter-war period, however,m anyE uropeans had failed to meet the requirements of am oral elite, as attested by reports of colonial politicians that expressed outrage, among other things, at their habitual drunkenness and sexual relationships with African women.²³⁴ The colonial authorities soughtt oc ounter the distorted imageo f the civilization-bringer,a sm anyE uropeans in the colonys till articulated it, with an imaginary ideal of European civilization, which the officiallyappointed Congolese elite had not onlyt oe mulate but to embody.A fter the Second World War, the new vernacular elite weres upposedt oc onduct themselvesi nt he way Europeans were expectedt od o. Acquisition of the carte du mérite civique and immatriculation depended on whether candidates satisfied these requirements. Just like their European counterparts, however,t hose Congolese willing to adapt and eager to join the vernacular elite failed as flawless moral paragons. The differencew as that, rather than accepting the deviation of Congolese from the ideal, the selection committees responded with sanctions, rejecting their applications or strippingt hem of elite status. While the colonial authoritiesr egretted the discrepancy between moral discourse and lifestyle along Europeans,