At the end of the eighteenth century, the Papal States constituted a medium-sized country – 39,629 km² with approximately 2.5 million inhabitants (without considering the territory of Avignon lost in 1791). It was characterised by remarkable variations in local government structures among the thirteen provinces that composed it.¹ Pope Pius VI (1775–1799) reigned as an elected yet absolute sovereign over a composite monarchy and exerted both supreme jurisdictional as well as legislative power.² The lack of representative assemblies – the provincial parliaments had been abolished in the sixteenth century – meant that this governmental system had no inbuilt checks and balances.

For the papacy, the French Revolution represented a turning point. Pius’ spiritual role as head of the Roman Catholic Church came under scrutiny first, as institutionalised religion struggled to survive in a context of irreligion and anticlericalism.³ Soon the legitimacy of the pope’s political sovereignty was called into question, too. In 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the Italian peninsula and launched the creation of ‘sister republics’; following the Treaty of Tolentino (1797), the city of Bologna and the so-called Legations of Romagna, formerly part of the Papal States, were integrated into the Cispadane and later into the Cisalpine Republics. To better control the coastal regions of the peninsula, the French army occupied the remaining part of the Papal States in 1798, allowing local patriots to establish the short-lived Roman Republic (1798–1799). Pius VI was forced into exile in France where he died soon after. Whereas some considered him a martyr, others saw in him the symbol of an intolerable theocratic regime. His successor, Pius VII, likewise became the subject of widely differing opinions.

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¹ Gabriele Calindri, Saggio statistico storico del Pontificio Stato (Perugia: Garbinesi e Santucci, 1829). The geography and demographics of the Papal States had not considerably changed between Pius VI’s death and the publication of Calindri’s essay.

Acknowledgement: This research has been made possible thanks to the support of Ambrogio Caiani, who first introduced me to the activities of the Congregazione dei Disordini. I am also grateful to Gianfranco Armando for his archival help at the Archivio Apostolico Vaticano and to Christine Randall and Edward Watson for proofreading the text.

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During his papacy, which lasted from 1800 until 1823, Rome was again occupied and annexed to the French Empire (1808–1814).

This chapter considers these temporary regime changes and the ensuing restorations of the papal government, supported by the Neapolitan army, as key moments in understanding the interaction between political disloyalty and forms of religious misbehaviour in a peculiar historical context like the Papal States. A place where the pontiff was both the spiritual head of the Catholic Church (plus the bishop of Rome) as well as the temporal sovereign of the Papal States.⁴ The following pages will highlight that acts of religious misbehaviour (blasphemy, sacrilege, secular cults et cetera), especially those prevalent at the time of the Roman Republic, were used to express patriotic attitudes and show opposition towards the papacy’s political and theocratic power. After the collapse of French power, allegations of blasphemy and sacrilege were, by contrast, crucial to stigmatising supporters of the Republican and Napoleonic regimes. They also played a part in restoring the sacred nature of papal authority by purging oppositional voices with the aid of references to religious misbehaviour. In fact, the doctrinal definitions of the crimes of blasphemy and lèse-majesté ensured that any form of political opposition to the papacy consisted of a sin, and vice versa. Because blasphemy and sacrilege dealt with the sacred and hence with taboos, they were intimately connected to questions of power. As a result, the Republican and Napoleonic regimes tried to redefine them through legislative reforms, with patriots sometimes adopting downright irreligious attitudes to confront the past. Under the restorations of 1799–1800 and 1814–1816, the punishments meted out for blasphemy and sacrilege helped instead restore – and even increase – the pope’s sacred authority.

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I not only examine the early-modern definition of blasphemy in both canon and civil law, but also demonstrate the doctrinal connection between this religious sin and the political crime of lèse-majesté. Both were revived in the 1790s, when the papal government came under threat from those demanding political and religious reform. Secondly, focusing on the years of the Roman Republic, I clarify the relationship between religious misconduct on the one hand, and symbolic or physical violence on the other hand. I also analyse the alleged commitment of blasphemous and sacrilegious acts. Who were the offenders? How were these blasphemies and

sacrileges performed? To what penalties were the offenders later sentenced?\(^5\) Finally, I delve into the sacralising rituals (*Te Deum*, prayers, civic festivals et cetera) connected to the cult of Napoleon, which Catholic apologists interpreted as sacrilegious and, more rarely, as blasphemous ceremonies that hurt the papacy’s religious and political majesty. The comparison between the 1799–1800 and the 1814–1816 restorations will highlight that in both cases, accusations of blasphemy and sacrilege – including their judicial pursuit – were used to reinstate the papal monopoly on the sacred and re-establish obedience towards his indisputable temporal sovereignty. As this chapter shows, the crimes of blasphemy and lèse-majesté were, in the Papal States, interconnected to an extent practically unseen elsewhere.

**Blasphemy in the Papal States: Doctrine and Legislation**

At the end of the eighteenth century, the papal laws on blasphemy were the same as they had been for around 250 years; neither the characteristics of the offence – which was both a religious sin and a civil crime – nor the fundamental doctrinal stakes had changed. In his *Prompta bibliotheca canonica, juridico-moralis theologica* (1746) Lucio Ferraris, a Franciscan consultant of the Holy Office Tribunal, still defined blasphemy as an outrageous statement made against God, sometimes consisting in denying His substantial attributes or erroneously assigning different ones to Him (also “heretical blasphemy”).\(^6\) Ferraris also stated that whereas both ecclesiastical and civil tribunals held jurisdiction over cases of simple blasphemy – which amounted to a violation *mixti fori*, i.e. of both canon and civil law – cases of heretical blasphemy were the sole responsibility of ecclesiastical courts. He furthermore described suitable penalties and their corresponding jurisprudence. During the sixteenth century, a series of papal *constitutiones* had defined these penalties with greater precision and progressively increased the sentences connected with them. With *Supernae dispositionis arbi-

\(^5\) Although several Jews were accused of blasphemy or sacrilege – mostly due to selling former holy objects – as well as stigmatised for their alleged support of the republican regime, I will only focus on Catholic-secular narratives. For Catholic anti-Judaism see Marina Caffiero, “Le insidie de’ perfidi giudei: antiebraismo e riconquista cattolica alla fine del Settecento,” *Rivista Storica Italiana* 105 (1993).

\(^6\) Lucio Ferraris, *Prompta bibliotheca canonica, juridico-moralis theologica* (Bononiae: apud Franciscum Storti, 1746), vol. 1, 610–617. This book was a fundamental reference work until the codification of canon law in 1917.
trio (1514), Pope Leo X had drawn up a three-step punishment for clergymen consisting of a fine, loss of income and removal from their position. Noblemen were threatened with two different fines as well as the loss of their aristocratic rank. Lastly, commoners faced temporary imprisonment, display in the pillory in front of a church or perpetual detention. Later, Pope Julius III (*In multis depravatis*, 1554) ordered not only the extension of these penalties to those who failed to report such a crime to the authorities, but also the perforation of a blasphemers’ tongue. Finally, with *Cum primum* (1566), Pope Pius V extended these measures to the entire Catholic universe; previously, they had only applied to Romans.\(^7\) Beyond canonical law, civil penalties varied. Although legitimate anger, drunkenness et cetera were often considered mitigating circumstances, Ferraris wanted punishments to be carried out irrespective of such considerations. According to his analysis, they should range from economic penalties to flogging or death.\(^8\)

Ferraris’ work suggests that in the eighteenth century the theoretical doctrines of blasphemy and heresy were straightforward. In reality, however, judicial practices were rather eclectic, even in the heartland of Roman Catholicism. The organisation of the judicial system was not uniform, not even in regard to offences *mixti fori*. Indeed, there was a notable lack of coordination and unity, which was also due to the involvement of various tribunals and multiple sources of law.\(^9\) In 1555–1556, in the wake of several Counter-Reformation initiatives, Pope Paul IV tried to streamline procedures by decreeing that the Tribunal of the Congregation of the Holy Office would become the only institution exerting jurisdiction over the prosecution of blasphemy in the Papal States. Nevertheless, overwhelmed by the number of reports and trials, the Tribunal decided thirty years later to only deal with cases of heretical blasphemy.\(^10\) As a result, the following two centuries saw several ecclesiastical, civil and mixed institutions (i.e. the Inquisition, the Governor’s Tribunal, and the *Tribunale del Vicariato*) compete for jurisdiction in blasphemy trials.\(^11\) These contradictions reflected a

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\(^7\) For the *constitutiones* see * Magnum bullarium romanum*, ed. Laerzio Cherubini (Lyon: Borde-Arnaud, 1692), vol. 1–2.

\(^8\) Ferraris, *Prompta bibliotheca*, 613–617.


\(^11\) Giovanni Battista De Luca, *Il dottor volgare overo il compendio di tutta la legge civile, canonica ...* (Colonia: Modesto Fenzo, 1740), vol. 6, 83–84. This work, originally published in 1673, was reprinted several times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the institutions see Gabriella Bonacchi, *Legge e peccato: anime, corpi e giustizia alla corte dei papi* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995). The *Vicariato* was the ecclesiastical and pastoral institution which was responsible for the
“Roman judicial culture undoubtedly dominated by traditionalism and excluded from eighteenth-century theoretical discussions,” as Paolo Alvazzi del Frate argues.¹²

The last reform, which simply reaffirmed the Inquisition’s right not only to prosecute people already sentenced for blasphemy by other courts but also to return cumulative verdicts, was introduced by Pius VI in 1779.¹³ With this the pope responded to the threats against both Catholic doctrine and papal authority emanating from regalism, Jansenism, secularisation et cetera.¹⁴ It was obvious, then, that the Enlightenment debate on the depenalisation of religious offences did not have much resonance within the Roman Curia.¹⁵ This was the context in which French revolutionary initiatives such as the introduction of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the suppression of religious orders and the abolition of all religious crimes were introduced.¹⁶ Because of these reforms, the theologians and intellectuals around Pius VI soon looked at revolutionary politics as inherently dangerous, sacrilegious and impious.¹⁷ Indeed, in the 1790s, religious non-compliance or misbehaviour, immorality and political danger were almost seen as synonymous.

These parallels were not entirely new as already shown by Mario Sbriccoli. In European early-modern penal law, the concepts and judicial classifications of both regal and divine lèse-majesté had moved in tandem for a long time. Blasphemia against God and his ministers had echoed maledictio, i.e. offences against the king’s image or royal ceremonies; apostasia had corresponded to treason; haeresis had coincided with sedition; finally, simonia had been related

diocese of Rome. Although the pope himself was its bishop, he entrusted the daily business to a vicarial cardinal.

¹³ Giuseppe de Novaes, Elementi della storia de’ sommi pontefici (Siena: Francesco Rossi e Figlio, 1807), vol. 15, 48.
¹⁶ The French Penal Code (1791) did not contain any penalty for blasphemers. It only punished offences against religious ministers (notwithstanding their cult), attacks on sacred objects (in public or in a religious building) and interruptions of religious ceremonies. Therefore, blasphemy was not a crime against religion anymore but rather a problem of public order. Alfred Molien, “Blasphème et blasphémateurs,” in Dictionnaire de droit canonique, ed. Raoul Naz (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1937), vol. 2.
¹⁷ Giuseppe Pignatelli, Aspetti della propaganda cattolica a Roma da Pio VI a Leone XII (Rome: Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 1974).
to peculatus, i.e. a form of embezzlement undercutting the State’s stability.\(^\text{18}\) Regal lèse-majesté had usually been defined as a “hideous and extreme crime” (crimen atrox et enorme), the same words with which Ferraris had described blasphemy. Indeed, according to Giovanni Battista De Luca, it was a single crime divided into two types: “against divine or human majesty”.\(^\text{19}\) From the end of the seventeenth century onwards, this idea of dual blasphemy had nonetheless gradually disappeared from European penal law, thus becoming a peculiar characteristic of the Papal States. European monarchies, in fact, began limiting their interventions against blasphemy and other forms of divine lèse-majesté.\(^\text{20}\) By contrast, the papacy could neither renounce its double sacredness nor deny the perfect identity between divine and regal lèse-majesté, since these were consubstantial with the sources of papal temporal and spiritual authority. This connection between divine and regal sovereignty needed to be reaffirmed and protected in Rome after the outbreak of the French Revolution, and in light of its influence over groups of political opponents. From the 1790s onwards, the Roman Curia treated felony and impiety as features of the same dangerous republican intrigues; every symbolic and verbal criticism of the pope’s kingship became an attack on religion, too. Blasphemy and other demonstrations of religious non-compliance or misbehaviour were loaded with political meaning. Therefore, they are crucial subjects for interpreting social upheavals, counter-reactions and violence in revolutionary times in a state where religious and political authority were intertwined in an unusual way.

The Subversion of Papal Majesty: Blasphemy, Sacrilege and Political Opposition in the Roman Republic (1798 – 1799)

Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, critical statements against the Catholic hierarchy, acts of disdain towards devotional practices and disrespectful expressions against God had been relatively frequent in the Papal States, despite severe penalties against them. There had always been incidents. From 1792 onwards, however, mockery took the form of a virulent and widespread criticism against religion and the pope’s theocratic government issued by groups of law-

\(^{19}\) De Luca, *Il dottor volgare*, 130.
yers, intellectuals, noblemen, artisans and foreigners – mostly French artists.\textsuperscript{21} Hence, a Congregazione di Stato was invested with the tasks of among other things eradicating political subversion and policing religious offences. A wide array of acts and behaviours such as conspiracy, spreading rumours, wearing revolutionary symbols and uttering blasphemous insults were included in an all-encompassing concept of the crime of lèse-majesté. Court rulings were often lenient, though, as defendants benefitted from social patronage and the lack of uniformity of the judicial system. Exile was a common penalty because this sort of civil death was considered a logical and proportional punishment for those who had broken the sacred bond of political and religious allegiance towards the supreme authority. Moreover, this solution would help purge society of unruly elements without however provoking an international crisis with France, especially after Bonaparte’s first victorious campaign in the Italian peninsula (1796–1797).

The decision of Pope Pius VI to refrain from prosecuting those crimes with more vigour reflected precise political goals. As Marina Formica writes, he tried to preserve his theocratic power “by emphasizing his spiritual image […] [in order] to revamp the role of the Roman Church in the world”.\textsuperscript{22} Hence, it is not surprising that as the Papal States became politically more unstable, religious ceremonies became more magnificent and grew in number. Public forms of fervent devotion such as processions, litanies or the display of holy images that took place immediately before the French invasion (January 16 – February 6, 1798), were intended to prepare Rome against the révolution en marche. In this way, the connection between the sacred and the counterrevolutionary effort was spatially, behaviourally and emotionally cemented.\textsuperscript{23}

By rejecting the pope’s temporal authority, those who asserted the sovereignty of the nation and proclaimed the Roman Republic (February 15, 1798) paved the way for a systematic attack on Catholic symbols. This does not mean that the majority of Roman revolutionaries were atheists; although the constitution did not assign any specific status to Catholicism, the fundamental Atto del popolo sovranopromised that the new Republic would not interfere in traditional re-


\textsuperscript{22} Marina Formica, Sudditi ribelli. Fedeltà e infedeltà politiche nella Roma di fine Settecento (Rome: Carocci, 2004), 63.

igious worship. In that sense, counterrevolutionary and ecclesiastical polemists were wrong when they depicted republicanism as a cohesive movement aimed at the destruction of religion. Nonetheless, some radical factions were undoubtedly ready to get rid of all references to the primacy of Catholicism and papal authority in order to regenerate citizens and form a new esprit public befitting a free and sovereign people. Three features were crucial in this fight: symbols, public ceremonies and civic education. Blasphemy played a remarkable role in each case. It was either presented as evidence of a break with the past or stigmatised as an implicit consequence of a perverted revolution. Both the demolition of Catholic or papal symbols and the shaping of a new deist or Christian civic religion depended on a reconfiguration of the sacred, thus bearing on accusations of blasphemy, sacrilege and idolatry.

### Clashes Concerning Sacred Symbols: Blasphemy and Sacrilege as Sources of Violence

On the very same day that the Roman Republic was officially proclaimed, a tree of liberty was brought from Campo Vaccino – the ancient Roman forum – to the Capitol Hill, where it was erected with the help of French troops and the local population. The number of such liberty trees quickly increased not only in Rome, but also in provincial towns and villages across the Papal States; they often replaced crosses that had stood in the main area of public gathering. Together with emblems of papal power, of the Inquisition and of mourning on gravestones and church walls, the removal of these crosses was often perceived as a sacrilegious act; it caused widespread discontent among the faithful, and even ignited debates about the legitimacy of iconoclasm in the case of objects with a clear artistic or historical value.

Putting liberty trees in the main squares of the Eternal City was neither politically nor religiously innocent. Rather, it was an attempt to build a new society based on secular and republican values, which was in turn condemned as an

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24 Collezione di carte pubbliche, proclami... tendenti a consolidare la rigenerata Repubblica Romana (Rome: Luigi Perego Salvioni, 1798), vol. 1, 11–14. Although republican authorities limited the number of public rituals because of the risk of disorder, they did not systematically forbid masses, processions, retreats, sermons et cetera.
26 Marina Caffiero, La Repubblica nella città del papa: Roma 1798 (Rome: Donzelli, 2005), 61–89.
outrageous attack on religion. During the revolts that accompanied the short-lived Roman Republic, counterrevolutionaries therefore not only set such symbols on fire but even burnt the bodies of the patriots they killed, thereby aiming to eliminate both the agents and the emblems of an allegedly desacralizing and blasphemous policy.² This happened on July 26, 1798 in Alatri and Veroli, where the outbreak of the uprising followed from a conflict over religious symbols. In Alatri, dozens of people took up arms to prevent the requisition of the silver statue of Saint Sixtus, the town’s patron and hence a key figure in local devotional culture. The violent revolt was led, among others, by the parish priest Francesco Colamartini. He officiated at a solemn procession to raise a cross on the remains of a liberty tree, loudly asking devotees whether they would rather worship the cross or the devil (“Chi volete? La croce o il diavolo?”). He thus created a violent religious paroxysm – worshippers were chanting “Long live the cross! Let us kill all the Jacobins!” – whose victims included some members of the republican Vinciguerra family. On the same day, consular prefect Giovanni Franchi authorised a procession in Veroli that would see the statue of the Virgin of the Two Graces carried across town. The procession had to take place without the participation of religious orders and local confraternities, which had been officially suppressed on May 10, 1798 by General Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Even so, it conveyed the solidarity and religious zeal of which these institutions typically were the principal local pillars. Such a decision was enough to cause violent outbreaks of disorder, during which the Prefect, his son, and five further people were slaughtered and their bodies savagely defiled.

Republican Festivals: Between Civil Religion and Idolatry

The erection of liberty trees either relied on the patriotism of relatively small groups of (local) republicans or followed from rituals that formed an integral part of public festivals, whose importance as a means of staging political ideas cannot be underestimated. It is important to understand why such ceremonies could be perceived as blasphemies or impieties towards God, religion or the supreme majesty of the pope.

It is well known that some of the areas of Rome that had been important during Antiquity regained a new significance at the time of the Republic, hosting

either governmental institutions or public festivals.\textsuperscript{28} Having said that, revolutionaries also tried from the very beginning to make use of areas in the city that represented the magnificence of Roman Catholicism and had in the past been used to stage religious or papal rituals. In this way, they intended not only to affirm the harmony allegedly existing between republicanism and Catholicism but also to give their ceremonies the necessary splendour to win over popular support. On February 17, 1798, General Commander Cervoni strongly urged Monsignor Francesco Saverio Passeri – the viceregente responsible for the Viceriato – to sing a \textit{Te Deum} in St. Peter’s Basilica in order to thank God for the arrival of French troops. Passeri unwillingly accomplished the task the following day.\textsuperscript{29} Less than one week later, a mourning ceremony in honour of General Duphot, whose murder had provided the pretext for both the invasion and the overthrow of papal rule, took place on St. Peter’s square, where architect Paolo Bargagli had designed a pyramidal mausoleum. The commemoration of the first republican martyr appropriated and superseded the glorification of Catholic saints, which had historically been celebrated in the very same area.\textsuperscript{30} Such ceremonies might be considered as provocations, a sort of demonstration of how churches and core symbols of papal majesty were at the republicans’ disposal. Yet, they are better understood as attempts to “nationalise” Catholic rituals. Indeed, the intentions of public festivals were not explicitly blasphemous or sacrilegious, even if intransigent polemicists and members of the Curia thought otherwise. According to Francesco Valentinelli, for example, the commemoration of General Duphot was simply hypocritical and idolatrous: the men who were praising his moral virtues were in reality corrupt anticlerical sinners, trying to mislead the audience through “infernal inscriptions” and open contempt for holy objects.\textsuperscript{31} In this view, civic ceremonies were a perverted version of Christian rituals, gestures and other sacred things; they were an expression of a dangerous neo-

\textsuperscript{28} Pier Paolo Racioppi, \textit{Arte e rivoluzione a Roma} (Rome: Artemide, 2014).
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Collezione di carte pubbliche}, vol. 1, 36 – 37. Whereas nineteen cardinals took part in the ceremony, French officers did not attend. According to Francesco Valentinelli, this showed their hypocrisy and impiety. Francesco Valentinelli, \textit{Memorie storiche sulle principali cagioni e circostanze della rivoluzione di Roma e di Napoli} (s.l.: s.n., 1800), 224.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Collezione di carte pubbliche}, vol. 1, 45 – 50. Projects and engravings of these decorations have been published in Marco Pupillo, ed., \textit{Quando Roma parlava francese} (Rome: Gangemi, 2016).
pagan faith, that automatically offended God due to the way in which He had been replaced by secular deities.³²

A festival held on July 17, 1798 raised different issues. Three patriots planned the ceremony and prepared the necessary decorations: Pietro Guerini (a member of the Alta Pretura tribunal), architect Bargigli and sculptor Giovan Battista Comolli, who had been arrested in 1797 on charges of political conspiracy. In the view of some republicans, publicly burning the documents of the Tribunal of the Holy Office together with the golden book of aristocracy was a means to purify Roman society, remove the influence of fanaticism, superstition and inequality as well as free society from the burden of the past.³³ The destruction of those documents certainly mirrored the Inquisition’s methods, whilst also constituting a performance that highlighted the relationship between violence and the preservation of the sacred (or, as in this case, the imposition of new sacred principles).³⁴ The ceremony thus shocked Catholic polemicists because they saw the Inquisition not only as a key aspect of papal spiritual authority, but also as a safeguard against heresy, atheism and religious error. Fighting the Holy Office meant to harm both the pope’s and – potentially – God’s majesty. Thus, even when civic ceremonies were not directly blasphemous, they seemed to support the spread of dangerous political and religious behaviour, which the presence of republican authorities implicitly legitimised. It is therefore logical that following the collapse of republican power, Rome was perceived as a desacralised city whose Christian nature needed to be rebuilt. This was the aim, then, of Pius VII’s solemn entry into the city on July 3, 1800 that was performed as a long parade in which triumphal arches, decorations and inscriptions praised the victory of religion over impiety, freemasonry, philosophical mistakes and fraudulent doctrines.³⁵ Rituals of public derision addressing famously irreverent republicans served a similar purpose.³⁶


³³ For the destruction of the court and criminal records held in the archives of the Tribunal of the Holy Office between 1798 and 1815, see Archivio della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, Archivum Sancti Officii Romani, Privilegia Sancti Officii 1796 – 1799, 37; Andrea Del Col, L’Inquisizione in Italia: dal XII al XXI secolo (Milan: Mondadori, 2006), 736.


³⁶ See the anonymous engraving Ingresso di due ultimi Consoli dell’abolita Repubblica, in Museo del Risorgimento di Roma, Ved1b (26).
Republican Blasphemers and Their Judges: The Classification of Alleged Religious and Political Crimes

From the beginning of the revolutionary era, intransigent anti-republican pamphleteers like Galimberti and Sala stigmatised various forms of impious behaviour, which seemed to occur with dangerous frequency, especially at the Roman Circolo Costituzionale.⁷ Although their accusations were certainly politically biased, it is true that the debates and civic education classes held in Palazzo Altemps between April 20 and June 22, 1798 allowed both opinion leaders and ordinary citizens to express anticlerical and blasphemous ideas. The members of the Circolo Costituzionale intended to “form a group of cultural mediators to offset the clergy”; as democratic patriots, their aim was not only to encourage political activism but also to confront Catholic cultural hegemony.⁸ They felt free enough to question sacraments and dogmas, to offend Pius VI, to reject his theocratic power and to curse God openly.⁹ This experiment did not last for long, though. Whereas French generals feared the formation of political clubs, Roman authorities became worried that anti-religious polemics and activities might jeopardise the stability of the Republic. Indeed, public gestures and statements revealed the way in which patriots rejected traditional forms of Catholic devotion and papal theocratic authority. Despite the unquestionable influence of French models, such actions should be interpreted as primarily local demonstrations of political and religious non-compliance, which the republican regime unintentionally fostered. Had they been of French origin, the republican authorities would not have tried to curb them.

The patriots’ divisive conduct not only helped radical socio-political groups form an identity of their own, but also became the basis for the prosecutions that the Giunta di Stato launched against individual republicans in 1799–1800. In doing so, it developed a model of “standard Jacobinism” that centred on athe-

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ism, violence and political subversion.\textsuperscript{40} It is remarkable that an extraordinary tribunal created in a turbulent period had to deal with such specific cases, thereby substituting for the Inquisition and the \textit{Vicariato} tribunals.\textsuperscript{41} The reason for this is simple. Pius VI had died in exile, the College of Cardinals had not yet elected his successor and the reorganisation of the institutions of the Papal States was still under way. Therefore, General Diego Naselli, the highest military and political authority during the Neapolitan occupation of Rome, established this six-member temporary court on November 10, 1799. Though officially instituted to fight seditious rumours and post-war disorders, it soon obtained the task of prosecuting republicans and patriots, despite the fact that the latter had been formally granted the right to stay in Rome without having to fear for their lives, properties or freedom (cf. the Convention of Garnier-Troubridge, September 29, 1799).\textsuperscript{42}

When the \textit{Giunta di Stato} ceased to operate on October 31, 1800, it had prosecuted 1,001 people.\textsuperscript{43} At least 106 accusations (10.58 per cent) dealt with religious and moral misbehaviour, whilst a further 66 cases (6.59 per cent) tackled crimes of lèse-majesté and insults. There were three main kinds of violation related to blasphemy and sacrilege: direct violent offences towards God or sacred images, sometimes with the pronunciation of heresies, insults against Pius VI’s sacred persona and the trade in sacred objects.\textsuperscript{44} The \textit{Giunta di Stato} often developed its cases on the basis of offenders’ participation in civic festivals, which was considered proof of their committed republicanism and hence an aggravating factor. Cursing, denying dogmas, damaging sacred objects and images, mocking or beating priests, monks and worshippers et cetera manifested the disgust that republicans felt towards papal authority. Such conduct let them both affirm their radical patriotism and show their irreligiosity. As a result, it is difficult to know whether such behaviour was designed to express intimate beliefs about religion, reject the Catholic theocracy or to signal belonging to a socio-political group. The members of the \textit{Giunta di Stato} were aware of the interdepen-

\textsuperscript{40} Massimo Cattaneo et. al., “‘Era feroce giacobino, uomo ateo e irreligioso’: Giacobini a Roma e nei dipartimenti nei documenti della Giunta di Stato (1799–1800),” \textit{Ricerche per la Storia Religiosa di Roma} 9 (1992).
\textsuperscript{41} However, they might prosecute the same offenders afterwards for heretical blasphemy or as a pretext for adding canonical penalties.
\textsuperscript{44} Cattaneo, “Era feroce giacobino,” 331–382.
dence between blasphemous attitudes and political ideas. They did not only focus on blasphemy and impiety because these crimes had occurred repeatedly (in public) or because in their view republicanism and irreligiosity were synonyms. Instead, their actions followed on their desire to restore the Papal States themselves. The *Giunta di Stato* not only intended to prevent secularisation, but also to protect the religious nature of the pope’s double sovereignty. In order to do so, it was necessary to reaffirm the traditional concept of the sacred in politics, religion and morality, which blasphemers had openly challenged. This included reasserting the divine origin of the pope’s spiritual and political power, restoring respect for God’s majesty and repairing the crucial role that the clergy played as mediator between the temporal and the supernatural.

Penalties varied. Only three offenders were sentenced to death, of which only Ottavio Cappelli was actually executed. In 31.3 per cent of the cases (216 people) – the least serious – convicts were bound over to the precept *de bene vivendo* or *de se repraesentando*; in both cases, the social and moral control exercised by the community, and particularly by parish priests, was key to keeping an offender under surveillance. Exile from Rome (161 verdicts or 23 per cent) or the Papal States (100 people or 14 per cent, mostly foreigners and radicals) was common. Also this punishment continued the pre-revolutionary tendency of courts to limit the use of physical force that we have already observed. After the restoration of the Papal States and his own solemn entry in Rome, Pius VII opted for a politically moderate course that saw secretary of state Ercole Consalvi grant a formal amnesty to all republicans on December 31, 1800. The need for internal pacification, the fear of popular unrest fuelled by anti-Jacobin expeditions and the geopolitical situation – Bonaparte had restored the Cisalpine Republic in northern Italy a few months earlier – persuaded the pope to avoid an overly violent repression and instead focus on reaffirming the sacred nature of his power. Thus, it was political considerations that convinced Pius VII to reject the systematic punishment of blasphemous and sacrilegious acts, even though they had touched the heart of his authority. One year later, the Concordat with the consular Republic opened a new phase in the relationship between France

45 Giacomo Denhan, a 60-year old wheat merchant originally from England, was charged with blasphemous and heretical attitudes, although he had never insulted the Catholic religion or its saints. Instead, he had organised nine civic-religious ceremonies modelled on a Catholic mass, consisting of republican litanies and sermons, altars, candles and the distribution of bread and wine. Topi, “I rei del papa,” 340–341.

46 Marina Caffiero, “Perdono per i giacobini, severità per gli insorgenti. La prima restaurazione pontificia,” *Studi Storici* 39, no. 2 (1998).
and the Papal States; the pope’s power looked finally secure and no reform of the crimes of blasphemy or lèse-majesté was implemented.

**Blasphemy in Imperial Rome (1809 – 1814)**

Blasphemy and sacrilege remained at the core of political clashes in the Papal States following their occupation (1808) and subsequent incorporation into the French Empire (1809). Nonetheless, in comparison to the revolutionary era there were at least two remarkable differences. First, this time the annexation saw only limited episodes of religious misconduct, as the French authorities wished to prevent any possible cause for disorder and discontent. For if imperial officials subverted the principles and institutions on which the papal regime was based, they saw the cooperation of large parts of the Catholic hierarchy – except for the Roman Curia – as essential to social control and to the sacralisation of Napoleonic power. Secondly, after 1814 allegations of blasphemy or sacrilege also targeted priests who had praised the emperor’s virtues and legitimacy; this time, the political allegiance towards the pope was considered more important than the risk of irreligion. This reinforced the link between blasphemy and lèse-majesté.

**The Cult of Napoleon: A Case of Blasphemy or Sacrilege?**

In 1809, after the suppression of the Holy Office and the Vicariato tribunals (June 17) and Pius VII’s deportation to Savona, a series of innovations in the field of blasphemy were introduced. On July 28, 1809, the imperial Consulta decreed that “anyone who had been convicted before the publication of the Penal Code would have the right to ask for a new trial and acquittal, provided the offence had been related to the previous system of government and if such an action was not qualified as a crime according to the new Code”. Even before the official introduction of the Penal Code (1810), it was clear that blasphemy could no longer be considered a crime; on December 23, 1809, the Court of Criminal

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47 To better understand the diplomatic, political and ecclesiastical reasons why Napoleon decided to invade the Papal States in 1808 see Chiara Lucrezio Monticelli, *Roma, seconda città del l’Impero* (Rome: Viella, 2018).


Justice in Rome had acquitted Cesare Manuti, who had previously been sentenced to ten years of forced labour for having professed blasphemies and sung the praises of Napoleonic France. Even so, Manuti was put under surveillance by the Police Générale. This stood in marked contrast to how things had been at the time of the Roman Republic; overtly blasphemous attitudes were now considered by the French a socio-political danger. The Penal Code punished blasphemous misbehaviour against any State-recognised cult, although this only related to attempts to prevent or disturb religious worship. Those preventing believers from taking part in religious ceremonies or causing trouble in churches received a fine (from 16 to 200 francs or 16 to 300 francs respectively) and detention (6 days to 2 months). Verbal or gestural offences towards holy objects (in churches and temples) or religious ministers while they were celebrating service, were likewise punished with a fine (in this case 16 to 500 francs) and detention (15 days to 6 months). Those who had beaten clergy, were punished with the pillory.

During the second French occupation of Rome, there clearly were fewer episodes of blasphemy. Imperial authorities already had to face serious ecclesiastical resistance and were reluctant to let rumours about their alleged irreligiosity further jeopardise the stability of the Rome and Trasimeno departments. The list of ecclesiastical grievances was long: the obligation that clergy had to submit to Napoleon’s sovereignty and swear an oath of allegiance; the suppression of religious orders; the dissolution of the Curia ministries; the reorganisation of dioceses; new laws about civil marriage and divorce et cetera. The grudges that the clergy held against imperial politics did not just concern the disruption of the structure of the Catholic Church. They also addressed new public rituals that were seen as showing a lack of loyalty towards the pope and promoting misleading interpretations of the sacred, which were considered insulting to God and the faithful. Already after the annexation of the Marche provinces, then in the Kingdom of Italy, Napoleon had ordered local bishops to sing a Te Deum and pray for his well-being, something that Pius VII had forbidden them to do on June 11 and again on June 22, 1808. According to the pope, civil authorities had no right to command liturgies, especially not in areas that had been seized from the Papal States. Pius had also let ministers swear an oath of passive submission to the new government, provided it respected the laws established by God and the Church (May 22, 1808).

After the annexation of Rome, an extraordinary congregation guided by cardinal Bartolomeo Pacca confirmed these instructions for all other clergy in the Papal States and sharpened their contents. Any violation of the Patrimony of St. Peter was now officially considered sacrilegious, as already stated in the papal bull *Quum memoranda* (June 10, 1809) that had excommunicated Napoleon, albeit without explicitly naming him. Shortly afterwards, two Jesuit theologians of the *Penitenzieria Apostolica*, the previously anti-revolutionary polemicist Alfonso Muzzarelli and Faustino Arévalo, condemned the imperial oath as “irreligious, impious and sacrilegious”. The Curia had quickly understood the danger of public ceremonies that legitimised the usurpation of Pius VII’s temporal sovereignty, minimised his spiritual authority and suggested a divine protection of Napoleon.

The oath issue immediately caused clerical resistance, followed by the deportation of numerous clerics. By contrast, when dealing with public rituals, the French authorities proceeded with greater caution, as they urged the clergy to participate in ceremonies by means of threats and rewards. Moreover, for almost three years, they avoided civic celebrations in St. Peter’s Basilica. In preparation for the imperial festival on December 3, 1809, Pietro Guerini – the organiser of the ceremony in which documents of the Holy Office had been burnt in 1798 – explained to the *Consulta* that the perfect location would be the Trinità dei Monti church. It was politically important “to accustom the people to seeing these solemnities in a setting that was different from St. Peter’s [...] and to secularise such festivals.”

Yet, secularising these festivals did not mean avoiding all reference to the transcendent, as the ceremonies were intended to stage the divine origin of Napoleon’s power, its sacred and unquestionable nature, to the detriment of Pius VII’s claims. Blasphemy and sacrilege – which here means an attack on the cor-

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53 A *Te Deum* was sung in St. Peter’s Church after the birth of Napoleon’s son (March 20, 1811), but it was a fiasco. Louis Madelin, *La Rome de Napoléon* (Paris: Plon, 1906), 423–424.

54 Together with the churches of St. Luigi de’ Francesi, St. Claudio and St. Andrea, this church was historically connected to the French community in Rome. As to the festival, an imperial decree of February 19, 1806 had established two national festivals: the first on August 15, which celebrated Napoleon’s birthday, the restoration of Catholicism in France, the Assumption of the Virgin and the festival of St. Napoleon, and the second on the first Sunday in December in commemoration of the imperial *Sacre* and the victory at Austerlitz.

55 Archives Nationales de France, F1e 140, dossier 5, November 26, 1809.

56 My doctoral thesis offers a comprehensive study on Napoleonic festivals in Europe, with particular focus on the emperor’s sacralisation: Marco Emanuele Omes, “La festa di Napoleone.
rect definition of the sacred, i.e. of the attributes of divine and human majesty – kept fuelling religious and political clashes. At the heart of this conflict stood the ascription of semi-divine qualities to Napoleon – qualities that should have been reserved for God only – and the disrespect for the pope’s sacred authority as the Vicar of Christ. The case of five priests of St. Luigi de’ Francesi, which fell under the jurisdiction of the French Church, refusing to pray for the emperor because of his excommunication is a telling example. After they had thus confirmed their allegiance to the pope as the supreme spiritual authority, General Radet, the head of the Gendarmerie in Rome, claimed that Pius VII may be the Vicar of Christ, but Napoleon was God’s vicar.\textsuperscript{57} Such a statement effectively ended the monopoly of the Church – at least among those clergymen, who refused to comply with imperial regulations – over the interpretation of and mediation with the sacred. Following the restoration of the Papal States in 1814, it was indeed the clergy’s involvement in sacralising Napoleonic authority that drove the focus of inquiry. Denunciations of blasphemous, sacrilegious or impious behaviour that concerned explicitly anti-religious practices (cursing, demolishing symbols, performing irreverent ceremonies et cetera) were far less frequent than had been the case after the fall of the Roman Republic fifteen years earlier.

In Rome itself, only a handful of clergymen were prepared to officiate at masses for Napoleon, pray for him or extol his virtues and sacred authority during civic festivals. Among those who did were archpriest Giovanni Nicola Campanelli, Niccolò Muzio (who was the Dominican abbot of St. Niccolò de’ Prefetti) and Claudio Della Valle (the honorary canon of S. Luigi de’ Francesi). They all based their sermons on the idea of a saviour and delivered a providential, transcendent interpretation of historical contingency according to which God had chosen Napoleon to be the agent of his will and the restorer of Catholicism in France. Despite this similarity, each man interpreted the emperor’s sacred mission differently. According to Campanelli, the expansion of the Empire and lay authority over the Church were the only way in which religion and morality could be upheld across Europe.\textsuperscript{58} Muzio adopted an eschatological perspective, making use of prophetic and biblical aphorisms to underscore Napoleon’s semi-

\textsuperscript{57} Archivio Storico del Vicariato di Roma, \textit{Documenti particolari del Vicariato}, dossier E, fasc. 4, c. 30.

\textsuperscript{58} Nicola Campanelli, \textit{Discorso per l’anniversario dell’incoronazione...} (Rome: Luigi Perego Salvioni, 1809), 8. See also \textit{Orazione per il giorno anniversario della coronazione} (Rome: Mariano de Romanis e Figli, 1810), 9.
messianic status.⁵⁹ In Della Valle’s view, Bonaparte benefitted from a superhuman power because God wanted him to reform the Church. Put differently, the emperor became a sort of divine emissary sent to Earth in order to stop the decadence and eradicate the corruption in the Church.⁶⁰ Beyond Rome, the French authorities could sometimes count on the cooperation of canons, diocesan vicars and even some bishops. Among the most compromised ones are Filippo Angelo Becchetti (Città della Pieve), Camillo Campanelli (Perugia), Antonio David (Narni), Lorenzo de Dominicis (Civita Castellana) and Gioacchino Tosi (Anagni).

The Restoration of Religious and Political Adherence: the Congregazione dei Disordini (1814–1816)

After Napoleon’s fall, all the aforementioned clergymen were investigated by the so-called Congregazione particolare dei Disordini, which was an extraordinary commission formed by five cardinals and four other members of the Roman Curia. The goal of this extra-judicial institution was to restore discipline among the clergy. For this, the Congregazione not just examined cases of cooperation with the French regime but also verified for each comprised clergyman whether his repentance was sincere and publicly communicated in order to restore the population’s faith in him. In more serious cases, the Congregazione could suggest punishment (spiritual retreats, public acts of repentance, dismissal et cetera), which the pope then had to confirm. For almost two years (the first meeting took place on May 30, 1814; the last, and twenty-first in January 1816), this institution cooperated with the Vicariato and the Holy Office tribunals, which had been restored to their traditional status.⁶¹ The amnesty granted on

⁵⁹ Niccolò Muzio, Orazione panegirica alla maestà di Napoleone... (Rome: Paolo Salvucci e Figlio, 1810), 17.
⁶⁰ Claudio Della Valle, Discorso anniversario sul ristabilimento della religione... (Rome: Mordacchini, 1812), 6 – 7. Della Valle had already been involved in conspiracies in 1789 and 1794, spending two years in the Inquisition’s prisons. His aspiration to see the Church return to its evangelical origins had gradually taken the form of deism and anticlericalism. In 1798, he had proposed burning the canon law codes in public. Marina Caffiero, “Della Valle, Claudio,” Dizionario biografico degli Italiani (Rome: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1989), vol. 37.
⁶¹ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Congregazione dei Disordini, b. 1 – 6, 9 – 19. The apostolic delegate Agostino Rivarola had repealed the Napoleonic codes and tribunals on May 13, 1814. In the following months, the Tribunal of the Inquisition dealt with 57 accusations concerning doctrinal issues, i.e. heresy, atheism or blasphemy. David Armando, “Nel cantiere dell’Inquisizione: la ria-
July 27, 1814 to those who were found guilty of treason and disobedience did not make it any less necessary to deal with a “grey area,” consisting of clergymen whose doctrinal and political positions the Holy See considered insufficiently trustworthy.\textsuperscript{62}

It is important to examine the reasons behind this endeavour and the results of these investigations. The Congregazione was supposed to deal mostly with high-level personalities responsible for misleading their subordinates. Preaching in honour of Napoleon was considered less serious than persuading people to swear the oath of obedience towards the emperor. According to the papal instructions of July 5, 1814, bishops could punish offenders (spiritual penalties, interrupting their pastoral activities) without informing the Congregazione itself; even so, many bishops asked for advice, especially so during the first months. The Congregazione handled several cases concerning “speeches that were not only unedifying, but also disgraceful for the holy place [where they had occurred, i.e. churches and cathedrals], shameful for the faithful, overloaded with mean flattery and sometimes offensive towards the Church and its head”.\textsuperscript{63} Paying rhetorical and liturgical tributes to Napoleon was often considered an aggravating factor. Anticipating punishment, Muzio sent his withdrawal to the Penitenzieria Apostolica in May 1814. Although the outcome of his case remains unfortunately unknown, other documents in the archives of the Congregazione dei Disordini demonstrate that two minor panegyrists, Pietro Giovanni Ferrando and Luigi Marchetti, were dismissed from their respective parishes.\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, they were judged unable to perform pastoral and pedagogical duties because of their disobedience and a general lack of trust amongst the populace.

The longest investigation probably concerned Gioacchino Tosi (1761–1838), the bishop of Anagni.\textsuperscript{65} By examining his rhetoric and liturgical dealings, the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Congregazione dei Disordini, b. 10, cc. 193–196.
\item Ibid., c. 226.
\item Luigi Berra, “Gioacchino Tosi vescovo giurato di Anagni e la relazione della sua visita a Pio VI,” in Studi offerti a Roberto Ridolfi, ed. Berta Maracchi Biagiarelli and Dennis Rhodes (Florence: Olschki, 1973).
\end{thebibliography}
members of the *Congregazione dei Disordini* and theologians of the Holy Office closely analysed both the conduct and doctrine of this renowned theologian.⁶⁶ Some of his pastoral pronouncements turned out to be “schismatic, outrageous, misleading and provoking the spiritual ruin of souls”. Tosi was also charged with accusations of felony and rebellion against the pope’s spiritual authority. His strenuous defence and the scandal that an official dismissal would almost certainly have created, convinced Pius VII to suspend Tosi from his pastoral responsibilities forever; the diocese was, temporarily, administered by apostolical officials. In this and many other cases, blasphemy was not the core problem. Rather, the evaluation of the clergy’s attitude depended both on their moral, religious and doctrinal integrity as well as on their loyalty towards the supreme spiritual authority. At the time of the restoration of the papal monarchy, challenges to theocratic power – both spiritual and temporal – were increasingly considered as a precondition for falling into more dangerous crimes such as blasphemy and heresy.⁶⁷ Giovanni Nicola Campanelli offers a case in point.

According to his official retraction, sent to the *pro-viceregente* Attanasio on May 20, 1814, Campanelli had first retracted his oath and prayers in front of the general vicar of Farfa; on April 24 of the same year, he had even publicly begged for pardon during a homily.⁶⁸ Despite his efforts to prove his redemption, the *Congregazione* soon agreed that he was guilty not only of morally, priestly and politically outrageous attitudes, but also of abusing holy texts, opposing the papal government, adhering to the wrong dogmas and possibly even of infanticide.⁶⁹ Blasphemy was mentioned only once; according to some witnesses, Campanelli thought that all verbal outbursts were the product of human nature and could hence not be considered sins. Nonetheless, the *Congregazione* stigmatised several “execrable mistakes, which [had] even tended to compare Napoleon to a deity, because they [had] conferred upon him the same glory as God’s [...] mis-

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⁶⁹ Some inhabitants of Farfa and Toffia complained of women being forced into adultery and abortion. Similar accusations that mixed moral, religious and political misconduct had been seen after the fall of the Republic, even in the same villages: Massimo Cattaneo, “Giacobinismo e trasgressione morale in un paese della Sabina,” *Archivi e Cultura* 23–24 (1990–1991).
takes that [had] bestowed quotations taken from the holy texts and concerning
the divine Redeemer upon Napoleon himself”.\(^7^0\) The Congregazione dei vescovi e
dei regolari and the Tribunal of the Holy Office became involved in the case as
well, but the analysis of Campanelli’s supposedly blasphemous and heretical
declarations did not lead to a formal condemnation. Further investigations
found Campanelli guilty of outrageous behaviour at the time of the Roman Re-
public, too; once he had even trampled on Pius VI’s image, though he had
later repented of this and had decided to be ordained. This “insincere penitent”
was finally sentenced to being removed from his pastoral duties and to banish-
ment to live in confinement in a monastery.

**Conclusions**

The case of Giovanni Nicola Campanelli connects the history of blasphemy and
sacrilege in republican and Napoleonic Rome. Whilst reports about episodes of
religious misbehaviour were far less frequent in 1814 than in 1799, the two resto-
rations shared a number of similarities. In both cases new extraordinary judicial
or extra-judicial institutions like the Giunta di Stato and the Congregazione dei
Disordini cooperated with long-standing bodies such as the Inquisition, the Vi-
cariato tribunal and the Penitenzieria in enforcing political and religious compli-
ance. The Giunta di Stato mostly targeted ordinary people who had professed re-
publican opinions and had demonstrated a lack of allegiance to Pius VI’s
theocratic authority. By contrast, the Congregazione dei Disordini focused on
elites, especially clergymen, who were supposed to behave as role models for
the population. Although the severity with which blasphemous and sacrilegious
offences were prosecuted differed, the priority in both cases lay on the protection
of the sacred, i.e. on the defence of the interdependent majesty of God and the
pope. Any attempt to deny this relationship, or use the sacred as the basis of po-
litical legitimacy without the mediation of the Church, were treated as attacks on
the sacred itself.

The violence that occasionally accompanied blasphemies or acts of sacri-
lege, especially at the time of the Roman Republic, did not have a counterpart
in the prosecution of religious misbehaviour. This absence was not accidental.
Both in 1800 and in 1814, Pius VII and Consalvi opted for pragmatism rather
than revenge. They decided that “restoring the State [the papal theocratic tempo-
ral power] was the same as restoring the Church itself [the universal spiritual au-

\(^7^0\) Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Congregazione dei Disordini, b. 10, cc. 230 – 243.
which could be read as an intransient take on defining and defending the sacred.⁷¹ Beyond showing continuity in the doctrinal definitions of blasphemy and the measures taken against its circulation around 1800, this chapter reveals a remarkable degree of the politicisation of religion during and after the French occupations of the Papal States.⁷² It demonstrates the connections between the civil crime cum religious sin of blasphemy and the charge of lèse-majesté, which endured and even grew stronger after the political upheavals caused by the French Revolution. In the last decades of the papal theocracy, blasphemy became politicised to an unprecedented degree, as it was seen as a sign of a secularising society and as an indication of the collapse of the symbiosis between politics and religion that formed the backbone of papal power.⁷³

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⁷¹ Boutry, “Traditions et trahisons,” 204. See for this argument Adolfo Omodeo, *Studi sull’età della Restaurazione* (Turin: Einaudi, 1970), 417. This renowned historian introduced the concept of “irrigidimento ieratico”.

⁷² Gaetano Moroni, *Dizionario di erudizione storico-ecclesiastica* (Venice: Tipografia Emiliana, 1840), vol. 5, 190–191. In his short review of *Elementi della giurisprudenza criminale. Edizione terza, e prima romana* (Rome: Vincenzo Poggioli, 1817) the famous jurist Gian Domenico Romagnosi ironically noticed that such an essay could only be useful in the Papal States, because the first section dealt with crimes against God and had therefore no juridical basis in secular politics. See *Il Conciliatore* 8 (1818), 30–31. For the measures taken to prevent blasphemy, see also the instructions by the apostolic delegate of Macerata Francesco Tiberi (August 11, 1816) in Domenico Spadoni, *Sette, cospirazioni e cospiratori nello Stato pontificio all’indomani della Restaurazione* (Turin-Rome: Roux & Viarengo, 1904), 57.


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