The Rhetoric of Nordic Cooperation: From the Other Europe to the Better Europe?

Despite the recent surge in rhetoric of (New) Nordicness, the term “Nordic cooperation” continues to evoke a mixture of feelings among most people in the region. On the one hand, the term refers almost unconditionally positively to the special kinship associated with the idea of Norden as a cultural, linguistic, and historical community, and as such it involves a strong sense of normative obligation. On the other hand, “Nordic cooperation” implies a sense of impotence and irrelevance, relating to the primacy of the transatlantic security regime and the European economic and political frameworks. A similar tension is also present in scholarship,which tends to build on pre-determined narratives of Nordic cooperation either as a remarkable success in creating a transnational community, or as a series of failures to formalise cooperation in economic or security policy.1 This chapter explores the political struggles to define Nordic cooperation from the 1950s until today. It will show that the tension between obligation and impotence has been an enduring part in the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation, but also that the criteria for success and failure, and indeed the meaning of Norden has changed through time. The chapter analyses the debates of the annual sessions of the Nordic Council (NC), focusing primarily on periods of formative importance in negotiating the tasks and limitations of official Nordic cooperation: the first years of the NC after its establishment in 1952, the (collapsed) plans for a Nordic customs union around 1960 and again a decade later, the EU debates during the first half of the 1990s, and the rise of “the Nordic brand” in the new millennium. A key feature at all these junctures was the omnipresence of “Europe” in the background of the discussions. “Europe,” “European cooperation,” “the European Economic Community (EEC),” or, since the late 1980s and 1990s, “European integration” and “the European Union (EU),” were for a long time all seen as competitors to Nordic cooperation, legitimising it and pushing it forward. At the same time

European integration also constituted amassive gravitational forcewhose movements had huge repercussions for Nordic cooperation even before Denmark joined the EEC in 1973 and Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995.² Following the terminologyo fR einhart Koselleck, "Nordic cooperation" and "European integration" can be analysed as "asymmetric counter-concepts."³ The rhetoric of Nordic cooperation and European integration was never an antithetical juxtaposition of twoe quallydistinguishable units. Instead, Nordic cooperation was defined through an indeterminateo ther,a ssociatedw ith an umber of vagueand usuallyquite negative attributes. "Europe" served as the supranational, utopian, bureaucratic, capitalist, conservative,orelitist other,which was used to portrayNordic cooperation as democratic, pragmatic, progressive,and socially responsible. Yet, it would be misleading to claim that the discussions at the NC werem arked by ag eneral anti-European sentiment; on the contrary,the NC attracted internationallyoriented MPs, many of whom weredecidedlyinfavour of European cooperation alreadyinthe 1950s.The point of the asymmetrical juxtaposition was to negotiate the relationship between the Nordic and the European frameworks,tobolster the idea of Norden as acultural and political community, as well as to legitimise the NC as an institution.
The rhetoric of Nordic cooperation and European integration was also asymmetric in the sense that the one (Norden)i nm ostc onventional definitions was understood as part of the other (Europe). The relation between Norden and Europe was under constant negotiation, but the 1990s represented amajor turning point.The Maastricht Treaty and the European Union were debated across the region, initiallyr eigniting the historical opposition between Nordic cooperation and European integration. Eventually, however, Norden was absorbed by Europe, not least as Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995.Inthe new millennium, therefore, manyoft he old narrativeso fN ordic cooperationh ad lost their foundation. Gradually, however,anew rhetoric of Nordicness was invented, which relied less on the European other,but alsoless on notions of transnational cooperation.
This chapter focuses on the development of two related tropes in the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation. The first half of the chapter explores how the idea of Nordic cooperation as am ore democratic and "popular" form of international collaboration thanE uropean integration emergedd uring the first decades of the NC,and how this trope was turned into ac elebration of the "flexibility" of Nordic cooperation, and of the close, trusting,p ersonal connections between leading Nordic politicians in the integrating Europe of the post-Cold Warperiod. The second half of the chapter analyses the emergence of the idea of Nordic cooperation as evolving primarilya round ac ulturally, linguistically, and historically foundedc ommunity and describes how the turn towards branding in the new millennia transformed Nordic culture and welfareinto examples of European excellencet hat wereu sed on the global markets.T ogether, the two parts of the chapter make the argument that therei nt he new millennium seems to be more use for "the Nordic" as ap re-existing natural qualityo ft he peoples and products of the region, than of Norden as ap olitical community of five nations, which is whythe recent wave of Nordic rhetoric has so far failed to bolsterNordic cooperation.

Nordic cooperation and the Nordic Council
The history of Nordic cooperation is usually dated back to the bourgeoning trans-Nordic networks among professionals and voluntary associations in the wake of the Scandinavist movement at the end of the 19 th century.Ofspecial importance weret he Nordic Lawyers' meetings, arranged regularlysince 1872 with the aim of harmonising legislation and creating acommon Nordic legal culture.⁴ The NC,f oundedi n1 952, grew out of the gradual intensification of the political relations between the Nordic countries during the inter-war period, intense debates on Nordic unification duringt he Second World War, as well as ag eneral push for regional cooperation and alignment in Western Europe in the emerging Cold Warsetting.⁵ The immediate post-war period sawmanyNordic initiatives: a Nordic CultureC ommission was founded in 1946 and discussions on aN ordic customs union began in 1947. Followingt he Prague coup in February 1948, there werea lso prestigious negotiations on aS candinavian defence union, which ultimatelybrokedown in January 1949 when Norway(and then Denmark) decided to join NATO.
Accordingt oacommon interpretation, the NC was foundedasacompensation for the failureofthe Scandinavian defence union, and preciselylikethe defence union -and the Scandinavist movement acentury before -it was primar-ilyaDanish-Swedish initiative.H ans Hedtoft,t he Danish Social Democratic leader and Prime Minister for the periods 1947-50 and 1953 -55,served as apolitical driving force, and the Swedish ConservativeM Pa nd lawyer Nils Herlitz drafted the founding documents. It has been speculatedt hat Hedtoft'si nterest in Nordic cooperation was motivated by an urge to associate his party with the success of the Swedish Social Democrats, and certainly, the Nordic labour movements had alreadye stablished strongr elations before the war.⁶ But Nordism was undoubtedlyacatch-all ideologya tt he time, with the Nordic Associations attracting highm embership figures across the political spectrum in Denmark and Sweden. Among Norwegianc onservatives and farmerst herew as, however,alingering suspicion that Nordic cooperation was at ool for Danish or Swedish imperialistic ambitions, and am ajority of non-socialist MPsv oted against the establishment of the NC in the Norwegian parliament.A lso, in Iceland the NC was met with some opposition connected bothtoeconomic considerations and to their recent independence from Denmark. Restricted by its relation to the Soviet Union, Finland was unable to join until 1955,but the founding documents left aspace open for the easternmost Nordic country.⁷ Thus, the geographical extension of the NC'sd efinition of Norden was undisputed from the start and has largely remained so until today, despite some discussions of Baltic membership in the early1 990s.
The annual sessions of the NC take place in the parliament building of aNordic capital on arotatingbasis. Eighty-seven delegateschosen among the national members of parliament gather for three to six days of meetingsand debates on Nordic issues.⁸ The NC has never had legislative power.I ts main role is to give recommendations to the five governments, the normative power of which have varied through time. Even though the NC nominallyi sa no rganisation for inter-parliamentary cooperation representativesf rom the governments, including the Prime Ministers, also take part in the NC sessions. This lends the debates ap arliamentary character,w hered elegates hold governments accountable for their activities.⁹ This aspect of the NC was strengthened in 1971,when the governments established their own organisation for Nordic cooperation, the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), which also has an independent budget(todayanannual of €128m illion).
Traditionally, the sessions begin with ageneral debate, which,formally, concerns an annual report on Nordic cooperation put forward by the presidium of the NC,b ut which in practice turns into ad iscussion on the state of Nordic cooperation in general and the most pressingi ssues of the time.¹⁰ To be sure, focusing on the debates at the NC sessions in order to targetthe rhetoric of Nordic cooperation involves some methodological challenges. There is an obvious risk, not onlyt hatt he significanceo ft he rhetoric of Nordicness and Nordic cooperation is exaggerated, but alsothat the phrase "Nordic cooperation" is used differentlyi nt he NC sessions to how it is usedi nt he national parliaments or public debates.T he material is particularlyl ikelyt oc ontain an overrepresentation of sentimental Nordism,a nd the delegates tend to equate "Nordic cooperation" with the NC and NCM, overlookingo therv enues for interactionb etween the  Iceland has 7seats and the four largerNordic countries have 20 each. Two of the Finnish and two of the Danish seats have,s ince1 970, been reserved for representativesf romÅ land and the FaroeIslands.Since1984 an additional twoDanish seats have been allocated to delegates from Greenland. Due to the small size of the Icelandic parliament,the sessions in Reykjavik usually take placei na nother location. In additiont ot he annual sessions,the NC has,s incet he end of the 1980s, arranged shorter thematic sessions on asemi-regular basis,usuallyatavenue outside of the capitals.  Of the four keyf eatures of ap arliament listed by Ihalainen,I lie, and Palonen,the NC fulfils two:deliberation and representation.The other two features, responsibility and sovereignty,are not fulfilled. See Pasi Ihalainen, CorneliaI lie, and Kari Palonen, "Parliamenta saconceptual nexus," in Parliament and parliamentarism: Ac omparativeh istoryo faEuropean concept,e d. Pasi Ihalainen, Cornelia Ilie, and Kari Palonen (New York: Berghahn, 2016).  Thereh ave, of course, been numerous changest ot he agenda and choreographyo ft he NC sessions throughout the years,but the first day(s) of the sessions have usuallyremained reserved for moreg eneral discussions. five countries.With these caveats in mind, there is arguably no better material for exploring the broad variety and complexity of speech acts associated with the term "Nordic cooperation," as the NC sessions confront both political and national variations of this rhetoric with each other.
From democracy to flexibility:N ordic cooperation and itss upranationalo ther Democracy as national sovereignty One of the most enduringt ropes at the Nordic Council has undoubtedlyb een that of democratic Nordic cooperation and its supranational and federal European other.Clearly, the NC was not established with anysupranational ambitions, but in the 1950s,when the aims and purposes of the NC weres tillu nder negotiation, therew erem anya nimated discussions on Nordic cooperation and national sovereignty.Atthe very first sessions in Copenhagen in 1953, the issue surfaced in the form of ad ebate on the legacyo f1 9 th century Scandinavism. Celebratingt he establishment of the NC,H ans Hedtoft argued that the Scandinavist movement had an unfortunatelyp oor reputation as it wasr emembered particularlyf or its failuret op roduce au nited Scandinavian kingdom or a more formal union. Itsm ain achievement,H edtoft argued, was in bringing the Scandinavian peoples togethera nd making war between Nordic countries impossible.¹¹ This idolisation of the Scandinavist movement provoked ar esponse from the leader of the NorwegianC onservative Party,C .J .H ambro, who explained that his opposition towardst he establishment of the NC had not been based on anyanti-Nordic sentiments, but on ahistoricallyconditioned suspicion against Swedish and Danishgreat power ambitions. "The wordunion," Hambro explained, "whether it refers to the Kalmar Union or something else, does not ring well in Norwegian ears."¹² This Norwegiancriticism forced Hedtoft to clarify  Hans Hedtoft (Denmark, Social Democrat), Nordiskr åd 1. session, K øbenhavn 1953(København: J. H. Schultz, 1953, 94-100.Irefert ot he debates at the Nordic Council with the name of the speaker (country,p arty), Nordiskr åd (Nordic Council), and the city and year of the meeting. The protocols area vailable in the so called Blue book series,published at various locations and publishers throughout the years 1953 -2011, after which they have been made available online at https://www.norden.org/en/information/past-sessions (accessedS eptember 16 2021). All translations fromt he Nordic languages arem ine.  C. J. Hambro(Norway, Conservative), Nordiskr åd,K øbenhavn 1953, 143 -144. On the Norwegian relation to the Scandinavist movement,s ee Hemstad'sc hapteri nt his volume. that in referringt oS candinavism he was not proposingt hat the NC would lead the wayt owards aN ordic union. Rather,i nc arrying the spirit of Scandinavism, the NC had learned the lesson that cooperation requires respect for the distinctive character of each nation: "the aim of the NC is agreement,n ot unity," Hedtoft concluded.¹³ Caution was undoubtedlyc alled for,n ot onlyw ith regardt ot he Norwegian sceptics,b ut also against the background of the recent failure of the defence union and the different foreign policies pursuedb yt he Nordic countries in the Cold Wars etting.I ndeed, foreign policy was excluded from the agenda of the NC from the start,which in itself contributed to the wide agreement that "Nordic cooperation" had to refrain from supranational and federal aspirations. Following Hedtoft'sexample, astandard argument was that "cooperation" (dk. samarbejde,f.yhteistyö,isl. samstarf,n.samarbeid,sv. samarbete)required equaland sovereign partners, and that the breakup of the formerDanishand Swedish empires and the independence of the five Nordic nations had enabled peaceful coexistenceand collaboration in the region.¹⁴ Initially, this was also interpreted as as trength. Comparisonsw ith European initiativesl iket he Council of Europe (1949), the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), and Benelux cooperation initiativesw erec ommon in order to articulate the advantageso ft he pragmatic and democratic Nordic model of cooperation. The DanishC onservative Ole Bjørn Kraft,f or example, argued in 1954, "Whereas the Council of Europe is foundedo nt he idealistic aim of creating aU nited Stateso fE urope, Nordic cooperation has grown organicallyo ut the independence of the five peoples: it is practicallyoriented and rejects calls for unification based on dogmatic principles or theoretical speculation."¹⁵ Similarly,inthe following year,Hedtoft proudly stated that the NC had not wasted time and energy on fruitless discussions between federalists and functionalists. Insteadi th ad proceeded soberlya nd pragmaticallyw ith the issues at hand, and by paying due respect to the sovereignty of the participating nations. Thisa pproach, accordingt oH edtoft,n ow served as an example for Europe.¹⁶  The first yearso ft he NC is often celebrated as a "golden epoch" of Nordic cooperation,¹⁷ but they werec ertainlyn ot seen as such by contemporaries. To be sure,the period producedapassport union , acommon labour market (1954), and as ocial security convention (1955), but these agreements were never central to the debates at the NC -they had been initiated alreadyb efore the establishment of the NC and werelargely uncontroversial.¹⁸ Instead, the discussions werem arked by the shadow of the failed defenceu nion on the one hand, and by difficult and divisive negotiations on aN ordic trade deal on the other.Whereas the Danishr epresentativesa imedf or af ull customs union that also included agricultural products, the Swedes and Norwegians feared that their farmers would be outrivalled. Swedish scepticism was mitigated by the prospect of an expanded market for their thriving industry,which in turn only exacerbatedt he Norwegian concerns.¹⁹ At the NC,t he Norwegians ceptics often associatedt heirr esistance with ac oncern for national sovereignty.J on Leirfall from the Agrarian (Centre) Party,f or example, believed that the advocates of the customs union were aiming at turning the NC into as upranational parliament.Leirfall argued that "Danishand Swedish dreams have often proved to be Norwegiann ightmares," pointing also to the historicallyconditioned Norwegian scepticism against the word "union."²⁰ The Norwegianl iberal Arthur Sundt,inturn, stressed that there werelimits to how far Norway could go in political integration onlyf ifty years after gaining sovereignty.H ea lso feared that the NC was aiming tooh igh, and that the success of Nordic cooperation in the field of lawa nd social policy should not be scoffed at just because Europe provided temptinge xamples of economic integration.²¹ Significantlyenough, the proponents of the Nordic trade deal did not object to this framing of supranationality as essentiallyun-Nordic. Instead, they played along with the rhetoric of democratic Nordic cooperation and federalist European integration, trying to convince the Norwegiansceptics that therew eren osupranational ambitions in the Nordic plans. The Swedish Prime Minister Tage Er- See e. g. Sundelius and Wiklund, Norden is ick-sack,18. lander, for example, ensured thatnational sovereignty and democracy remained priorities, and contrastedt his with how the Benelux customs union had been pushed through by the countries' respective governments. The Nordic countries had chosen amore democratic path, Erlanderargued, involving the parliaments in the discussion, thus buildingt heir cooperation on solid ground.²²

Nordic cooperation and itsa ccelerating other
Intimatelyconnected to these discussions of democracy,sovereignty,federalism, and supranationality werenotions of temporality and the speed of development. If the members of the NC in the early1950s boastedthat Nordic cooperation was "ahead" of Europe, thingschanged with the complex European freetrade negotiations in the latter half of the decade. Alreadyin1955, when the so-called Inner Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourga nd the Netherlands) agreed upon the Messina plan for economic integration, aworry emergedwithin the NC that Nordic cooperation was being outpaced. "It seems as if the decisiveness is greater in Europe," the chairman of the Swedish liberals Bertil Ohlin complained.²³ At this point,h owever,t herew as still wide agreement thatt he slowness of Nordic cooperation was ac onsequence of the lack of supranationality, and as such ap rice worth paying:i tw as "characteristic of the Nordic peoples to build slowlyb ut solidly," which would "servet or educef rictions in the long run."²⁴ Just ac ouple of years later,h owever,when the Treaty of Rome (1957) established the European Economic Community (EEC), there wasa lreadyawidespread fear that Nordic cooperation was beingl eft behind. While EEC membership was still out of the question, aB ritish proposal for al argerE uropean free trade area wasw elcomed by the Nordic countries.²⁵ As the 1958 sessions were postponedf rom the spring to the autumn in anticipation of the EEC'sr eaction to the Britishp roposal, impatience and self-criticism grew within the NC. Ohlin, for example, feared that the pace and practices of Nordic cooperation had become ah andicapr ather than an advantage: "Perhaps,m aking comprehensive studies and investigations before every decision serves onlyt oa mplify the problems."²⁶ Am onth after the 1958 sessions, France pulled out of the  FTAn egotiations, which left the UK and the Scandinavian countries stranded without adeal with the EEC.Asaresponse, "the outer seven" (the three Scandinavian countries,UK, Switzerland,Austria and Portugal) established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the summer of 1959.²⁷ EFTAeffectively put an end to the plans for at ightlyi ntegrated Nordic customs union and the NC sessions in November1959wereagain held in agloomy atmosphere, with manyspeakers bemoaning the fact that the NC had failed with its keyinitiative.²⁸ The Prime Ministers,i nturn, argued thatEFTAwas asuccess as it created aNordic common market,but admitted that Nordic cooperation had been overrun by European developments. The Danish Prime Minister H.CH ansen, for example, bemoaned the fact that the Nordic tradition of advancing step by step -so successful in forging the social security convention -had provena to dds with the rules of the game on this particularo ccasion. But he also emphasised that the prolongedp rocess had served its purpose of forging broad Nordic unanimity:e vent he Norwegian opposition to the Nordic customs union was in favour of EFTA.²⁹ Al asting legacyf rom the prolongedc ustoms union negotiations was undoubtedlythe cementation of "Nordic cooperation" as inherentlyanti-federalist. Indeed, it wasevencodified as such in the Helsinki Treaty,signed in March 1962. The aim of the treaty was to signal Nordic unity at apoint when external forces seemed to pull the region apart: the Soviet Union was, following the Berlin Crisis, increasingits pressure on Finland, while Denmark and Norwaywere -along with the UK -considering EEC membership.³⁰ The resultwas atreaty with vague and non-committingf ormulations, which was met with disappointment at the  Thorsten BorringOlesen, "EFTA1959 -1972:anexerciseinNordic cooperation and conflict," in Regional cooperation and international organizations:The Nordic model in transnational alignment,e d. Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén (London: Routledge,2 009). Finland was unable to join EFTAi n1 960 because of Soviet and UK opposition,but after effective lobbyingbyF inland in the east and Sweden in the west, Finland became an associatem ember in 1961( Finn-EFTAagreement). 1962sessions.³¹ The Prime Ministers, however,defendeditas"an importantdeclaration of intent," and the Finnish Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainene vena rgued that the treaty was "ap erfect reflection of Nordic cooperation, bringing the countries together despite the differences in foreign policy orientations."³² The un-Nordicness of supranational federalism wasa lso ak ey element in the negotiations for aN ordic economic union around 1970.T he ambitious socalled Nordek plan included, among other things, ac ustoms union and ac ommon investmentbank.³³ Considerations had, again, to be paid to the different security policies of the Nordic nations, and to the potential Danish -and Norwegian -membership in the EEC.A ccordingly, the governments werec areful not to propose anyl imitations of national sovereignty.The rhetoric of Nordic cooperation and European integration served this purpose well. At the 1969sessions, the DanishS ocial Democratic leader Jens Otto Krag recognised thatN ordek required new institutions, but emphasised thati tw as important to stickt o" the voluntary and consensual form of Nordic cooperation" and "to avoid majority decision-making procedures like in the EEC."³⁴ The Norwegian Centre Party Prime Minister,P er Borten, similarlye mphasised that Nordic cooperation had to stayt rue to its "democratic ideals."³⁵ Nordek would undoubtedlyh aveb een ar ather strangec onstruction: ac omprehensive economic union without supranational institutions. It was, however,the onlyp ath available, on the one hand because of the different security policies pursued by the Nordic countries,a nd on the other hand because Nordic cooperation was defined as inherentlya ntifederal.
If references to Europe, duringthe late 1950s and early1960s, served the purpose of rallying Nordic cooperation in order to keep pace with European developments, the Nordek negotiations were even more stronglymarked by the asymmetry between Nordic cooperation and European integration: it was clear that the formerh ad to adapt to the pace of the latter.T he Danishg overnment  The reasons for the failureofNordek have been subject to much discussion, but ak ey factor was the Danish-Finnish disagreement on the relation between Nordic cooperation and Europe. As pointed out by Danishh istorian Thorsten Borring Olesen, the normative appeal of Nordic cooperation was that it could be -and oftenwas -used as wayfor the Nordic countries to influenceand direct each other.³⁷ During the Nordek debates, Krag tried to pull his neighbourscloser to the EEC,claiming that "the Nordic union is adesirable and perhaps even necessary steptowards something larger: Europe," while the Finnish Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto, out of considerations of Finland'sspecial relations to the Soviet Union, tried to keep the whole of Norden outside of the EEC by insisting on the "intrinsic value" of Nordek.³⁸ These different views came to ahead when it graduallybecame clear thatDenmark intended to follow the UK into the EEC,which ultimatelyprovoked Finland to withdraw from the project,causing its collapse.³⁹

Flexible cooperation within Europe
The Single European Actin1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which transformedthe European community into the European Union (EU), provoked an intense debate on the future of Nordic cooperation. By this time the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation, as something that wasunique, pragmatic, and democratic, had become part of the liturgy at the annual NC sessions. In 1989,intypical fashion, the Swedish Prime MinisterI ngvarC arlssona pplauded how Nordic cooperation brought together not onlythe governments, but also the peoples in Norden,that it was voluntary in character and respected the sovereignty of the nations.⁴⁰ An increasingn umber of delegates,h owever,s tarted to challenget his rhetoric of Nordic exceptionality,a rguing that Nordic cooperation had to adapt to the pace of an acceleratingEuropean integration. At the 1988 NC sessions, the Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlüter warned his Nordic colleagues that "the European train" was on the move, and that the rediscovered dynamismi nt he EC was something that could not be ignored by the NC.⁴¹ Most vocal was the Swedish conservative leader Carl Bildt,who, from 1987t o1 994,r elished presentingt emporalized arguments that urgedthe Nordic countries to getinvolvedinEuropean integration. He argued that "when history is acceleratingi nE urope, the clock must not stand still in Norden," warning also that "in stagnating, the NC was risking what it had accomplished."⁴² Doing so, Bildt alluded to established notions of the slowness and impotenceo fN ordic cooperation, as well as to its asymmetrical and reactive relation to European integration. Indeed, one of Bildt'sl eadingt hemesw as to call for as hift towards thinking in terms of "Norden within Europe" rather than "Norden or Europe."⁴³ In the escalating EC/EUdebates it was particularlythe opponents of Nordic EU membershipw ho weremost eager to sustain the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation as ad emocratic alternativet ot he federal European other.⁴⁴ Criticising the transfer of sovereignty from the national legislaturest oB russels and the "democratic deficit" of the EU apparatus, they celebrated Nordic cooperation as a more democratic model of international cooperation. Olof Johansson, the leader of the Swedish CentreP arty,f or example, argued that Nordic cooperation was uniquei nb eing mellanfolkligt ("inter-popular," meaning transnationalo ri nternational at an on-elite level) in the true sense of the word, and claimed, in 1991, that Nordic cooperation could serveasamodel for countries in Eastern Europe who, in recentlyh aving regained theiri ndependence, wereh ardlyk een on new supranational constraints.⁴⁵ On the pro-European side, which included the governments, it became akey task to frame not onlyE uropean integration, but alsos upranationality and federalism in am orep ositive light.The standard argument wasthatinb indingt he European nations together,supranational European integration had been crucial in creating peace in Europe. Some, like the Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, also claimedthat "bindingcooperation" actuallywas in the interest of small states like the Nordic ones. With the creation of the EU,France and Germanywerenolonger able to pursue theirforeign policies without taking smaller European nations into account.⁴⁶ Supranationalism and bindingi nternational cooperation werea lso presented as inevitable parts of post-Cold Warg lobalisation. Most explicit was, again, the Swedish Prime Minister CarlBildt,who, notablytired of the sovereignty debate, claimed that "[t]here is no place for Robinson Crusoep olitics in the modernworld." He argued that if Crusoe had been sovereign on his deserted island, he was certainlyvery happy to share some of it when Fridayc ame along.⁴⁷ Significantlyenough, the governments reserved their propensity for binding and supranational cooperationf or the European framework. When it came to Nordic cooperation, they continued to emphasise the right of every nation to pursue its own interests. TheNorwegian Prime MinisterGro Harlem Brundtland, for example, argued that while Finland, Norway,and Sweden would pursue the EU negotiations separately, the governments would constantlyk eep each other informedusing the unique informal networks that exist between the Nordic countries. AccordingtoBrundtland, Nordic cooperationhad not been created through formal decisions or treaties; rather,its defining feature and special strength was the multitude of informal networks that existed between politicians,b ureaucrats, unions, and businessesinthe different countries,and the cultural and historical affinity based on shared values.⁴⁸ In this way, the governments gradually redeployed the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation and its supranational European other: the non-binding and democratic character of Nordic cooperation evolved into an argument about apre-existing affinity between the Nordic governments, and the flexibility and efficiencyoftheir informal relations. If the previous argu- ment had been that the Nordic countries could not unite because of their different security or economic interests, the argument now was that the Nordic countries did not need to unite because they shared so manyn etworks and values.
This gradual redescription of Nordic cooperation coincided with as eries of reforms which increased the role of the prime ministers and decreased the funding of the NCM.⁴⁹ Critics weres wift to notice that the celebration of the unique informal networks were used to cushion or even conceal adismantling of Nordic institutional cooperation. As president of the Nordic Councili n1 994,the Swedish Social Democrat Sten Andersson expressed his concerns that Prime Ministers wereb locking the NC and the parliamentarians' ability to influenced ecisionmaking and that Nordic cooperation was developing ad emocratic deficit like the EU.⁵⁰ The Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt responded thatwhile the governments werei mprovingf ormal institutions, uniquei nformal networks weree fficient and something that the Nordic countries should be proud of.⁵¹ Informalitya nd flexibilityr eplacedd emocracya nd sovereignty as the main characteristic of Nordic cooperation. In 1995,the new Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson proudlys tatedt hatN ordic cooperation was part of his everyday routine: "Among the Nordic Prime Ministers, we phone each other when we need to, in order to checko ur positions -it is fast and easy."⁵² At this point, the rhetoric of informal Nordic cooperation was usedp articularlya gainst the idea of formalisingN ordic cooperation on EU matters. One of the most determined voices was the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, who repeatedly testified to the intimate informal relations between the threeNordic EU members while vehementlyr ejecting the idea of creating a "Nordic block."⁵³ In his federal vision of the EU,therew eren op lace for permanent alliances.A iminga tt aking Finland to "the coreo ft he EU," Lipponen was also reluctant to associate with Denmark and Sweden, whose governments still struggled with significant domestic scepticism against particularlyt he Economic and Monetary Union.⁵⁴  As the majorityofthe Nordic countries weremembers of the EU,the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation and its supranational and federal European other became aw ay of expressingt he special informal bondsb etween the Nordic countries within alargerEuropean framework. Clearly, it was an attempt to make avirtue of necessity.I namore cynical interpretation, however,i tw as alsoawayo fr e-ducingN ordic cooperation to am atter of informal contacts and relations in the shadow of European integration, and of legitimising or even disguising budgetary cuts in the NCM. The rhetoric of the unique democratic,pragmatic, and informal Nordic cooperation served as ah andyn arrative against strengthening Nordic institutional cooperation. It provided the governments with an opportunity to frame themselvesaspro-Nordic while at the same time refusingtocommit themselvest om ore formalised cooperation.
In the new millennia,t here was as omewhat surprising return of the Scandinavist dream of af ormalised Nordic union, associated primarilyw ith the Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterbergand his 2010 yearbook of the Nordic Council calling for a United Nordic Federation.⁵⁵ Despite receiving quite alot of public attention across the region, the politicians at the NC politelyi gnored Wetterberg'sp roposal as avaluable sourceofi nspiration.⁵⁶ The former Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg'sr eport with 13 proposals for strengthening Nordic security and defence cooperation made am ore significant impact on the debates.⁵⁷ Some observers have claimedt hat the circle became complete, as the discussion had returnedtothe same theme that had started Nordic political cooperation in the wake of the Second World War. It was an opportunityt o make good for the failureo ft he defence union in 1948.⁵⁸ It is, however,i mportant to emphasise that the Stoltenbergreportdid not propose anysupranational elements, that it did not address the divisive NATO question, and that it was celebrated for its pragmatism and flexibility.⁵⁹ Indeed, as the Nordic countries in the wake of the Stoltenbergreport have strengthened their foreign and security policy cooperation, the rhetoric of the successful informal Nordic cooperation prevails,while proposals for am oref ormalised framework for foreign and security policy cooperation has fallen on deaf ears.⁶⁰ From distinctiveness to distinction: Nordic cooperation andi ts conservative andc apitalist other The Nordic culturalc ommunity Closelyr elated to the notion of Nordic cooperation as ap articularlyd emocratic and "popular" form of transnationalc ooperation, is the idea of Norden as a uniquec ommunity of shared languages, cultures,a nd values.⁶¹ This has also been ac entral trope in the rhetoric at the Nordic Council, serving as al egitimation of the NC itself, and as part of the motivations for various cooperation initiatives. The first sessions of the NC in 1953w ere, understandably, marked by much sentimental rhetoric of Nordic kinship and unity.A ccording to Hans Hedtoft,for example, the NC was "the latest shootonthe tree whose roots run deep in the Nordic peoples."⁶² ComparisonstoEurope werec ommon, and as tandard argument was that if "Europe" had succeeded in forging cooperation schemes and trade deals, the Nordic countries should also be able to do so givent he exceptional culturalties between the countries.Launching the Nordek initiative in 1968, for example, the Danish Liberal Prime MinisterHilmar Baunsgaardargued that the affinity between the Nordic peoples had "the potential for developing into something more concrete," while his foreign ministerPoul Hartling claimed  Therehavebeen repeated proposals to include foreign and security policy in the institutional framework of the NCM, and in 2014 Thorvald Stoltenberghimself suggestedthe establishment of aN ordic defencec ommission. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordiskr åd,S tockholm 2014,s peech number 292, https://www.norden.org/en/node/18902.  See e. g. Iver B. Neumann, "TreInnfallsvinkler til Norden: Kulturfelleskap, oppdemming for stormaktspolitikk, regionbygging," in Hvaskjedde med Norden,ed. Iver B. Neumann (Oslo: Cappelen, 1992 that the region, by virtue of the special kinship between its peoples, had "outstanding pre-conditions for economic integration."⁶³ More common, however,thanusing cultureand identity as alever for deeper integration was to refer to the culturala nd linguistic community as aw ay to strengthen the rhetoric when Nordic cooperation had experienced ab acklash.⁶⁴ In the wake of the collapsed customs union negotiations, the Norwegian Christian Democrat Erling Wikborga rgued that in languagea nd culturet here was more that tied the Nordic countries together than there was pulling them apart,while the Danish Conservative Ole Bjørn Kraft bemoaned the Nordic failures in defence policy and trade, but urgedthe NC to take its third chance in the field of culture.⁶⁵ When the Nordek deal broked own in 1970 and Denmark was moving towards the EEC,the Danish Social Democratic Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag called upon the NC to strengthen its focus on areas that remained outside the Rome Treaty,m ost notablyt he field of culture.⁶⁶ HisF innish colleaguef rom the CentreP arty,A hti Karjalainen, even claimed that "Finland has always seen culturea so ne of the most importantf ieldso fN ordic cooperation."⁶⁷ Indeed, it was oftent hose who, for various reasons,h ad toppled Nordic integration schemesw ho felt obliged to praise Nordic culturalu nity and the rhetoric was also often backedu pf inanciallyb yi nitiativesa nd investments to further cooperation in the field of culturea nd education. After the collapse of the customs union the NC established the Literature Prize in 1962a nd aN ordic Culture Fund in 1966.S imilarly,t he breakdown of the Nordek negotiations led to a new culturetreaty in 1971 and asignificant rise in funding for the Nordic Culture Fund.⁶⁸ Of course, from today'sh orizon it would perhaps be easy to arguet hat the aim of the rhetoric of culturalunity and Nordic culturalc ooperationwas to create ac ulturally( and even racially) homogenous Norden. In some structural sense, this might be the case, but it is important to remember thati nt he 1960s and 70s, cultural policy was not primarilyassociated with national conservatism; rather,i tf ormedakey part of the toolboxo fp rogressive Social Democrats who wanted to counter marketisation and make cultureavailable for larger sections of society.⁶⁹ It was seen as ap ivotal vehicle for democratising society and building the welfare state,a nd in this sense,N ordic cooperation in culture was not merelyacompensation for failures in other areas,but part of aprogressive programme for modernising society.
In fact,t he use of culturea sarhetoricals capegoat was more pertinent in connection with the reforms of the NC/NCM structure afterF inland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995.F or example, although CarlBildt had warned in 1990 that the NC would be "reduced to af orum of culturalm anifestations" if it refused to take European integration seriously,h ec laimed thatthe common culturali dentity wast he very coreo fN ordic unity when he was Prime Minister in 1994.⁷⁰ In his opening speech at the 1995 sessions, the DanishP rime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen emphasised the importance, at this critical juncture, of strengthening the Nordic community and its shared values and cultures.⁷¹ Naturally, concerns were raised that the governments were using cultural cooperation in order to compensatef or,orevenc onceal, the cuts in other sectors of the Nordic budget.⁷² However,a st he futureo ft he NC/NCM structure was cast in doubt, there was no opposition against singling out cultureasakeyfocus areaofNordic cooperation. In aperiod of Europeanisation, culturalcooperation re-emergedas atool for legitimising Nordic cooperation in general and the NC/NCM apparatus in particular. It provided the governments with an alibi against accusations of not taking Nordic cooperation seriously.
The explicit othering of Europe -or other regions -wasrare in this rhetoric of Nordic culturalunity and cooperation. However,the compensatory logic of investing in culturei nt he wake of failures in trade arguablycontributed to as elfpropellingn arrativea ccordingt ow hich Nordic cooperationwas primarily about  culturea nd identity,while European integration was primarily am atter of trade and economy. Indeed, it has often been claimed that the Nordics have approached European integration mainlyasamatter of trade and economy, while remaining rather reserved about European identity building projects.⁷³

Nordic cooperation and the welfares tate
The European other wasmore pertinent in the discussions on the Nordic welfare state. The idea that the Nordic countries share social and welfarepolitical ambitions had been acentral part of the rhetoric of Nordic distinctiveness, since, perhaps,the 1930s. This rhetoric had often been encouraged by foreign interest and modelled on foreign examples.⁷⁴ At the Nordic Council, Nordic welfaree xceptionalism was construed particularlyb yo thering European conservatism and capitalism, which, as shown by Swedish historians Bo Stråthand Lars Trägårdh, formedcentral tropes in Swedish anti-EEC rhetoric from the 1960s onwards.⁷⁵ At the NC,this rhetoric was most pronounced among delegates from the left wing, who alreadyi nt he 1960s and 70sd escribed the EEC as an "unholyR oman Empire" dominated by capitalistic interests threatening the solidaristic Nordic wel-fare states.⁷⁶ It would, however,beincorrect to reduce the idea of Nordic welfare exceptionalism to al eft-wing construction. Liberals like Bertil Ohlin werea lso wary of sharing social policy ambitions with continental Europe, while the Norwegian Conservative leader Kåre Willoch, in the wake of the Nordek breakdown, argued that Norden wasanatural region for cooperation because of "the natural fellowship of the Nordic countries,b ased upon common culture and traditions, and somewhat similar visionsfor developing our welfaresocieties."⁷⁷ The Nordic welfares tate served as al egitimation of Nordic cooperation across the political spectre.
In social policy discourse,t he asymmetrical comparisons to Europe were often temporalised, but contrary to the discussions on economic integration, welfarewas afield wherethe Nordicsconsidered themselvesasmore progressive than their European others, at least until the turningpoint of the 1990s. This pertained botht ot he idea of the Nordic social systems as more advanced thant he European ones, and to the achievementsofNordic cooperation in this area -for example, the social security convention of 1955.E venp ro-Europeans like the DanishL iberal Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaard used temporalised rhetoric to claim thatthe Nordic countries by virtue of their "achievementsinsocial welfare, democracy and freedom" had much to offer Europe.⁷⁸ There were, however,a lso internal Nordic dynamics to this temporalised rhetoric. As shownb yw elfares tate historians Pauli Kettunen, KlausP etersen, and others, Nordic cooperation served as an arena for sharing best practices, and it was not unusual that the countries competed to claim the most advanced social legislation.⁷⁹ Being ahead -usuallythe privilegeofSweden -wastoasignificant degree am atter of having the power of determining the "Nordic" solution to ap articularp roblem. In aN ordic latecomer like Finland, by contrast, the rhetoric of Nordicness signified, in the words of Pauli Kettunen, "af uture code and normative standard of Finnish society."⁸⁰ At atime when social policy  modernisation was thought of as alinearand almostdeterministic development, "the Nordic" became synonymous to "the most advanced" and even "the future".
Curiously, however,the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation could also have aconservative function. Apertinent example was the discussions on the Swedish marriagel aw reformsatthe NC in the early1970s which aimed at strengthening the position of wives, makingiteasierfor couples to divorceeach other,and improving the legal position of unmarriedc ouples.This provoked conservativesa tt he NC to mobilise the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation against the proposed reform, claiming that Sweden was abandoningacentury-longt radition of Nordic legal harmonisation. Accordingtothe Norwegian Conservative Berte Rognerud, for example,the Swedish reform represented not onlyaradical break with western traditionsand conceptions of marriage. It wasalso aviolation of the Helsinki Treaty,asSweden intended to transform its legislation withoutpayingdue respect to the situation in other Nordic countries.⁸¹ Carl Lidbom, the legal advisor in Olof Palme'sS ocial Democratic cabinet,r esponded that as ar esulto fD anish EEC membership "harmonisation wasnolonger arealistic ambition for Nordic cooperation," but he also expressed fears that the calls for harmonisation wereslowing down the development of the welfarestate.⁸² Prime Minister Palme made the point even more forcefully, arguing that "Nordic cooperation must never become ac onservative hindrance for ac ountry to movef orward along the path of progress."⁸³ Among legal scholars, the debates on the Swedish marriage laware often referred to as aturning point in the history of Nordic legal cooperation: the point at which Sweden single-handedlya bandoned the aim of Nordic legal harmonisation.⁸⁴ It is moreaccurate,however,toview it as aclash between two different understandingsofNordic cooperation: a progressive one accordingtowhich Nordic cooperation was af orumw heret he laggards could learn from the more advanced, and a deliberative one where Nordic cooperation was af orum for negotiating common solutions.I nt emporalt erms,t he question wasw hether the Nordic countries would synchronise around the most advanced or around an averages peed of development.⁸⁵ The welfare state was in the 1960s and 70sseen as both aproductofNordic cooperation and as somethig that legitimised it,b ut it was not until the 1990s that "the Nordic welfares tate" became ak ey concept at the NC sessions -conspicuouslya tatime when it no longer self-evidentlyr epresented the future.⁸⁶ The end of the Cold Warp ulled the rugf rom under the rhetoric of the Nordic middle wayb etween socialism and capitalism, and the economic recession in Finland and Sweden raised serious questions about the viability of alarge public sector and comprehensive social services.M oreover,the acceleration of European integration and the ensuing EU debatesa cross the region challenged the relationship between Norden and its asymmetrical European other.
At the NC sessions it was, again, particularlythe left-wing members who saw European integration as athreat to both Nordic cooperation and the Nordic welfare state. They claimedthatthe EU wasaneoliberal design that playedinto the hands of big corporations, capital, and business, and argued thatthe Conservativesw ereu sing the EU as at ool for dismantling the Nordic welfares tate.⁸⁷ Some, like the Norwegian socialist KjellbjørgLunde, even tried to mobilise intensified Nordic cooperation as ap ro-welfares tate alternative to the EU.⁸⁸ Fort he Social Democrats European integration was adivisive issue. However,apopular argument,especiallyamong SwedishSocial Democrats, was that Nordic cooperation could become avehicle for exporting the welfarestate to Europe -that Europe could become more Nordic,atleast as much as Norden became more European.⁸⁹ The Finnish Social Democrat Erkki Tuomioja, in turn, was less buoyant and referred ironicallyt o" the admirable self-confidence by which Ingvar Carlsson has professed the aim of realisingM argaret Thatcher'sn ightmareo fawel-fare Europe."⁹⁰ Conservatives across the region wereoverwhelmingly in favour of European integration, which also translated into as omewhat ambivalent attitude towardsthe legacyofthe (Social Democratic) Nordic welfarestate. The Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlüter,f or example, argued thatN ordic EC membership could have something important to offer Europe, "in their societal model, even if it has some deficiencies."⁹¹ Most explicit in their anti-Nordic rhetoric werel ibertarians in the Danish and Norwegian ProgressiveP arties, who saw themselvesa sr epresentativeso faliberal wave sweeping across Europe that eventuallywould emancipate also the Nordic countries from socialist authoritarianism. TheN orwegian Progressive Party chairman Carl I. Hagen professed in 1991 that "The epoch of strongstates,hightaxes and bureaucracy is over," calling alsofor the NC to be shut down, as it was aC old Warconstruction that had overplayedits role.⁹² The fate of the Nordic welfare state and Nordic cooperation werei ntimatelyr elatedt oe ach other in these early1 990s discussions on European integration.

The New Nordic brand
The EC/EUdebates of the early1990s were clearlyaturning point in the rhetoric of Nordic cooperation. It was the first time thatd oubts over,a nd even criticism of, the idea of Norden as adistinct region wereheard at the NC.Asthe asymmetrical opposition to European integration dissolved, there was ag rowingc onfusion as to the meaning and purpose of Nordic cooperation. The professed anti-Nordists,h owever,r emained few,a nd the rhetoric of Nordic kinship continued to figure in celebratory speechesatthe NC,but the discussions wereundoubted-ly marked by as ense of marginalisation of "the Nordic." It did not takel ong, however,b efore culturea nd welfarer eturned as keyf eatureso ft he debates at the NC,but as as ignificantlyt ransformed rhetoric that relied little on the European other,a nd even less on Nordic cooperation. Instead, "the Nordic" was reinvented as ag lobal brand, as at rademark to be used on global markets.
AccordingtoSwedish historian Anna Kharkina,the 2005 report Norden -en global vinderregion (Norden -ag lobal winner region)w as particularlys ignificant in introducing the concept of branding to the NC/NCM apparatus. Commissioned by the NCM and producedbythe Danish think tank Mandag Morgen,the report painted ap icture of globalisation as simultaneouslyathreat and an opportunity for the Nordic countries.⁹³ Threatened by intensified global competition, the success of the Nordic countries in different international rankings, such as the WorldC ompetitiveness Index,was as ourcef or optimism. According to the report, the region shared an umber of culturallye mbedded values that formedc rucial ingredients in the recipe for as uccessful innovation economy, and thus MandagM orgen urgedt he Nordic governments to redefine the aim and purpose of Nordic cooperation towards branding the region on the basis of these distinctive Nordic values and the culturall egacyo ft he region.⁹⁴ The idea of "Norden as aglobal winner region" captured the imagination of the politicians at the NC,who weree ager to capitalise on the improved global reputation of the Nordic countries.In2006,the NC devoted the Prime Ministers' summit to adiscussion of the report. The NorwegianPrime Minister Jens Stoltenbergd id raise aw arning that the Nordics should not attempt to become global winners at the expense of others.⁹⁵ But the general sentiment among the Nordic leaders was that the Nordicsh ad succeeded in balancing af ree market with social security,and as such provided an example for others to learn from. The Finnish Prime MinisterM atti Vanhanen proudlyn oted that "the awareness of the Nordic model has increased lately, not onlyw ithin the region itself. The Nordic brand is spreadinga round the world. Our success in the international rankings has givent he Nordic countries well-deserveda ttention."⁹⁶ The DanishP rime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in turn, praised the Danishmodel of "flexicur-  ity" and called for joint Nordic branding initiativestostrengthen the position of Nordic countries in the global markets.⁹⁷ The Nordic welfarestate had throughout the history of the NC been thought of as amodel for other countries to learn from, but there was something new in this turn to region branding.T he MandagM orgen report can be related to the contestation of the Social Democratic ownership of the welfare state, which had started alreadyinthe 1990s bothinpolitics and in research.⁹⁸ As the origins of the welfarestate weretraced further back in history,the welfarestate was decoupled from social democracy and became an expression of ac ommon Nordic culturall egacyw hich every political party could claim to represent -albeit in different ways.T he culturalt urn playedi nto the hands of the xenophobic right,f or whom the welfare state was threatened by globalisation and immigration, but also the Conservativesclaimed to represent the Nordic model in aseries of political campaigns that framed them as "the true labour parties" and "the new welfarep arties."⁹⁹ Even the Social Democratse mbraced the cultural turn proclaiming the values of the welfare state as the natural values of the Nordic nations: they wereN ordic values -" nordiska värderingar." Intended as am ove to monopolise the welfare state, the redescription of the welfares tate from politics to cultures erved the contrary purpose of stretchingt he concept,m akingi t available for ab roader variety of political actors.I ndeed, as pointed out by the Swedish political historian JennyA ndersson, the appeal to national values and unity wasawayo fs ilencing conflicts around change.¹⁰⁰ Crucially, however,the culturalturn and the rhetoric of "Nordic values" also disconnected the welfarestate from Nordic cooperation,putting the emphasis on Nordicness alone. The Danish historian Mads Mordhorst,f or example, has argued that nation branding transformed the idea of the nation from asocial construct to an ontological object with an essence.B randing was an ationalism for the new competition state,b ringingt ogether the call for economic competitiveness and the quest for culturalb elongingi naperiod of neoliberal globalisation.¹⁰¹ As such, the nation became less an internal concern of creating ac ommon horizon of meaning and values, and morea ne xternal strategyf or promoting the interest of the nation on the global market.The rhetoric of Nordicness served this purpose well as it built ab ridge between the competitive and modernN ordic model and the primordial Nordic culture and values on which it allegedlywas based. Nordic cooperation was no longer part of the narrative.¹⁰² Something similar also happened to the role of culturei nN ordic cooperation. If culturalc ooperation previouslyh ad served identity buildingp urposes, strengthening connections across the region, "the Nordic" was now turned into an attribute or quality of the cultural products of the region. Thet ask of the NC/NCM framework was no longer to promoted ialogue or interaction between culturalinstitutions or independent culturalactors in the different Nordic countries,but to takes uccessful initiativesf rom the creative industries and promote them on the global markets. The turn towards branding redefined the purpose of the NCM, who compensated for its marginalisation as ap olitical forum by accentuating its role as an advertising agency.I nt he years that followed the MandagM orgen report the NCM streamlined its institutions and redirected funds to grant schemesa nd as erieso fr egion branding projects, liket he New Nordic Food programme analysed by Lily Keltingi nthis volume.¹⁰³ The rhetoric of Nordic cooperation and European integration was replacedb yarhetoric of "New Nordicness," wheren ot onlyt he asymmetrical European other,b ut also the ambition of forging at ransnational Nordic community,h ad lost currency.
By wayofparadox, however,this essentialisation of "the Nordic" did not entail areturn of "the European other." As suggested by British IR scholarChristopher Browning, the idea of something distinctively Nordic was, since the end of the Cold War, undermined by amelding of Nordic and European norms and val-ues.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, when Matti Vanhanen in 2006 praised the global success of the Nordic model, he also emphasised that "Europe and Norden share as imilar attitude towards the soft sectors, to social security and sustainable development."¹⁰⁵ Defined less in terms of social democracy and more through global competitiveness and international rankings, the Nordic model was transformed from an alternative to asuperior implementation of acommon European theme. When the Nordic ceased to signify "the other Europe," it was reinvented as "the better Europe."¹⁰⁶

Conclusions
This chapter has revisited the debateso nt he purpose and nature of Nordic cooperation at the Nordic Council, not to revise the traditionalnarrativesofNordic cooperation, but with the aim of exploring how these narrativeswerecreated in the first place. Strategic security concerns and economic interests undoubtedly pulled the Nordic countries apart,m aking more binding formso fc ooperation, let alone af ormalised supranational Nordic federation, impossible. In the wake of failures in security and trade, cooperation was directed towards the fields of cultureand welfare, which graduallybecame defining features of Nordic cooperation itself. More often than not,t his rhetoric of Nordic cooperation was based on an asymmetrical juxtaposition to European integration. Nordic cooperation was framed as democratic and "popular," anchored in shared culturallegacies and acommon social political vision, in contrast to the supranational, conservative,a nd trade-focused European integration.
The rhetoric of Nordic cooperation wasnever static, it was constantlyadjusting to amutating relationship to Europe. Particularlywhen, in the 1990s, the opposition between Norden and Europe was dissolved, the traditionalnarrativesof Nordic cooperation had to be redescribed. The democratic and popular character of Nordic cooperationw as turned into am atter of flexibility, anchored in deep and trusting personal relations between leadingp oliticians in the region, while Nordic culturala nd welfare exceptionalism were reinvented as key aspectso fa " New Nordic brand" to be promoted in international arenas. Both developments point to ar edeployment of "the Nordic" from at ransnational community that the NC/NCM was creating,t oapre-existingq ualitya nd an attribute that the NC/NCM would help Nordic actors to utilise. As such, it is not as urprise that the rhetoric of (New) Nordicness has not served to encourageN ordic cooperation.
Today, thereseems to be more use for the Nordic brand thanthere is for the Nordic community.The purpose of this chapter is not to present an ostalgic call for ar eturn to the past.I na na ge of Europeanisation and globalisation, it was arguably quite reasonable that the NC and NCM turned outwards,f ocusingo n branding the region at aglobal level. The rhetoric of "the (New) Nordic" served as aw ay for the NC and NCM to legitimise themselvesi naperiod when the interest in political cooperation on aN ordic level was diminishing.I tb ecomes problematic onlyw hen branding replacesc ooperation, because the first can hardlys urvive without the other.There ad anger thatt he rhetoric of Nordicness loses its rhetorical forcew ithout the complex practices of comparing and contrasting the countries with each other.A ss uch, the NC and NCM might not need aEuropean other,but they certainlyneed to acknowledge theirfundamental role in construing "the Nordic" through Nordic cooperation.
The Rhetoric of Nordic Cooperation: From the Other Europet ot he Better Europe?