Duration and Becoming in Bergson ’ s Metaphysics

In this paper, we will insist on four points. First, Bergson ’ s philosophy is a metaphysics of duration, based on a lived experience that is called “ intuition ” . Intuition is a direct experience of the reality as such, because, as duration, the real is not separated from us. Second, intuition is the very “ method ” of philosophy and Bergson draws a clear distinction between philosophy and science. However, science has also an experience of reality. Bergson ’ s metaphysics follows a dual approach of reality based on two perspectives: philosophy and science. Thirdly, metaphysics is the experience of time, but through this experience we are not locked into the world of our subjective consciousness. Four, duration is certainly not simply lived by our consciousness, as a correlate of our subjective intention-ality. Such a statement would be a complete misunderstanding of Bergson ’ s philosophy, since duration is also present as becoming, into the material universe. To be more explicit, duration is not simply a psychological human property, it is also a cosmic one.* Now no philosophical doctrine denies that the same images can enter at the same time into two distinct systems, one belonging to science, wherein each image, related only to itself, possesses an absolute value; and the other, the world of consciousness, wherein all the images depend on a central image, our body, the variations of which they follow.The question raised between realism and idealism then becomes quite clear: what are the relations which these two systems of images maintain with each other? And it is easy to see that subjective idealism consists in deriving the first system from the second, materialistic realism in deriving the second from the first (Bergson 1947, 13 – 14).


Introduction
In this paper,wewillinsist on four points. First,Bergson'sphilosophyisametaphysics of duration, based on alived experience that is called "intuition" (Bergson 1946,3 2-33). Metaphysics cannot be pure speculation.I tm eanst hat,c ontrary to Kant'sp hilosophy, we can have ad irect experience of the reality as such (Ding an sich), because we are considered as an active part of it,a nd not simplyh ierarchically included in it.T he worldi sa lso our world, the real is also our livedp articipation to the reality.A sd uration, the real is not separated from us, as some kind of first unmovede ngine, or some kind of absent divinity.
Second, intuition is the very "method" of philosophy (Bergson 1946,32;Deleuze 1968), and Bergson drawsaclear distinction between philosophya nd science. However,s cience has alsoa ne xperienceo fr eality.When science is not speculating,i tm oves in the "absolute" of matter (Bergson 1946,3 3, 41;B ergson 1922,201). Bergson'smetaphysics (Bergson 1922, 193) follows adual approach of reality based on twoperspectives, comingfrom philosophy and from science.Unlike all classical metaphysics from Platot oH eidegger, therei sn oh ierarchical privilegea ttributed to metaphysics on science.¹ Thirdly, metaphysics is the experience of time,b ut through this experience we are not locked into the world of our subjective consciousness. We are also element of the material universe in which our bodyisincluded. This experience of inclusion is also an ontological one, meaning thato ur mind is open to another world thanthe world of consciousness. But this experience of the material world is comingf rom science,b ecause science is "life looking outward, putting itself outside itself" (Bergson 1922, 170). It cannot be directlydescribed by philosophy.
Four,d urationi sc ertainlyn ot simply livedb yo ur consciousness,a ss ome kind of correlate of our subjective intentionality.S uch as tatement would be a completemisunderstanding of Bergson'sphilosophy,² since duration is alsopresent as becoming, into the material universe. To be more explicit,duration is not simplyapsychological human property,itisalso acosmic one. "Nevertheless, it is along this thread that is transmitteddown to the smallest particle of the world in which we live the duration immanent to the whole of the universe" (Bergson 1922,11).
Therefore, in order to sympathize with it,i ntuition must "use ideas as conveyance" (Bergson 1946,48). Intuition is not able to provide alone am etaphysical experience of cosmic duration as becoming. It needs intelligence to do it.Reciprocally, intelligence is not able to read alone by its explanations and theories the intimate natureo ft he material universe, which will not only consist into a Being,b ecause the Being of the universe is nothing but also the result of aB ecoming.

1D uration and Space
In Time and Free Will,Bergson proposes "to isolate consciousness,f rom the external world" by a "vigorous effort of abstraction" (Bergson 1910,90). In order to do this,wemustrecognize the difference between durationand space. Homogeneous spacei sa lreadya ne xperience by which consciousness fits with the ma- "In doingthis we makeaclear distinctionbetween metaphysics and science. But at the same time, we attributea ne qual value to both" (Bergson, 1946,4 2).  See Deleuze (1968);Worms (2006); Miquel (2007); Ansell-Pearson( 2018). terial world. The more consciousness goes outside itself, and the more it will be able to captureexternal material entities in homogeneousspace.However,duration is not space. Adding the present moment to the previous one, as if they were simultaneous entities, is not dealing with these moments, "but with the lasting traces which they seem to have left in space" (Bergson 1910,79). Thus, anyspatial representation of time, can deal with numbers and prediction, but not with the very concept of succession. Events are not collections of units, and they cannot be represented in space.
As asecond deeper argument,aseries of sensations has nothing to do with a series of physical qualities, like position or velocity in mechanics (Bergson 1910, 32-74). Qualities can be distinguisheda nd put in order,s ot hat if the series is reversed, we will getsome reverse order of qualities. However,sensations cannot be distinguished and measured, as we distinguish and measure qualities, since they can preciselynot be simultaneouslycompared, as qualities do. Such acomparisonr equires space.³ One would counter-argue⁴ that it would be possiblet o put sensations in order by ordinal measurement,e veni fw ed on ot compare them. But this order will not be characterized as af unctional relation external to its relata understood as variables; like for instance the relation: "Ai sb igger than B" (Russell 1914) or "Ci sl ater than D" (McTaggart 1908). Aa nd Bs ensations would be interpenetrated and organic entities. As asensation, the previous sound of amelodyisalwayshere in my consciousness. It doesn'tdisappear in the present,e veni fi tw as alsoi nt he past.T hus, if we come backt oo ur "deeper self" (Bergson 1910,125), if we find duration in succession with interpenetration of conscious states,i tw ould be by overcoming in our mind the superficial one, that "retain something of the mutual externality which belongstotheir objective causes" (Bergson 1910,125).

2M atter and Memory
In Bergson'ss econd book, the analysis of the livedd uration must be deepened, by completingthe scheme of succession with the imageofthe cone of memory,a first decisive philosophical invention. The livedmemory that in fact inhabits our consciousness also shelters ap ast that is co-extensive (Bergson 1947, 195) with our present,i nt he sense that preciselyitdoes not coexist with it,like two com- See Deppe (2016).  See Berthelot (1911). Bergson'sM etaphysics mensurable segmentso ft he same line.⁵ Essentially virtual,m emory is then that movement by which the past "expands into apresent image, thus emerging from obscurity into the light of day" (Bergson 1947, 173). As coextensive,t he past is livedi na ni nternal experience, thatc annot be reduced to am aterial one.

Duration and Becoming in
However,the differencebetween actual and virtual, between the present and the past,isnot adifferenceofsubstance. First of all, there is adifferenceofdegrees between the present and the past,ashabit.Second, thereisadifference of nature between the present and the past as souvenir,meaning thatthe past is not simplya na ncient present.The past grows up in the present,a ss ome coextensive internal dimension of it.Finally, the virtual, as apast,can onlybecharacterized recursively from the relationship between the virtual and the actual. The process of consciousness is some kind of creative and virtuous circle.⁶ The virtual is a pure difference;⁷ it is more than the present,but it doesn'texist withoutthe present,a si ti sc learly mentioned by the imageo ft he cone SAB, which has simultaneously an actual topSin the plane of images P, and av irtual base AB.
As there is no darkness without light,t here is no virtual without actuality. The world of our livedc onsciousness is closed on itself, by placing its double unconscious otherness in it: the past, and the present. The consciousness is closed on the livedco-extensiveness of several layers of the past that are present in the memory as akind of psychic potential, because it is at the sametime open on the present.The oppositeofthe virtual, the actual is thus alsoinsome wayits  To be moreexplicit,the coexistence of twocommensurable segmentsisaproperty of spatialized time, and the coextension of the past in the present is ap roperty of internal duration. It means of course,t hat these two words aren ot synonymous.  contradictory,b ut it is also its complementary through which the virtual differs unceasinglyf rom itself.⁸ Andt his is how it finds its consistency.There is therefore no plane of coextension, without the coexistence of contemporary events/ images with my body in the plane P. " At Sthe imageofthe bodyisconcentrated; and since it belongst ot he plane P, this imaged oes but restore and receive actions emanating from all the images of which this planeiscomposed" (Bergson 1947, 196).
To sum up, in consciousness duration and memory cannot be liveda so ur own spiritual world, without to be open to the present,a sapure discrepant dimension of duration. This discrepancy ( Miquel2 007) is what characterizes the othernesso ft he virtual, as af undamental dimension of the temporality of the human mind. Finally, human consciousness appears as as piritual entity that "draws from itself more than it has" (Bergson 1946,3 8), because of this internal "differenceo fn ature" (Bergson 1947, 71)b etween the coextensivity of souvenirs and the coexistence of contemporary images in the present.

3T he Experienceo ft he Universe
The second important consequence is that,i nMatter and Memory,a ctuality becomes the characteristic of apresent,asadimension of time.⁹ In order to understand this paradoxicalp oint,Bergson introducest hree new philosophical statements.
1. Starting from duration, could we ontologicallyu nderstand what duration is not?T he answer is: the negation of consciousness is nothing but matter,a s another dimension of duration,the dimension of the present.Asmy present connected with my body,i tm eans firstlyt hatthe present is also ad imension of the human mind. That is whym ym ind is alsom aterial, and not simplys piritual.¹⁰ 2. However,itmeans also,that my present is not onlyinm ymind. As amaterial dimension of reality,mypresent is also included into the material universe.
 See Miquel (2007).  To be moreexplicit and for people that ignore it,inhis first book the French philosopher was dualist.H estated that "within our ego, there is succession without externality;outside the ego, in pures pace, mutual externality without succession" (Bergson 1910,109). On the contrary,i n Matter and Memory,externality,asconcrete extension is adimension of duration, the dimension of the present.A nd reciprocallyi nCreativeE volution,d uration is also present outside of us,a s élan vital.  To be moreexplicit,and for people that ignore Bergson'sbooks,itmeans that in Matter and Memory,t he French philosopherr ejects explicitlyc lassical dualism.
And the expanded experience of the presenceo fm ym ind, and of my brain into the material universe, is nothing but pure perception. By pure perception, consciousnessi so pen to the pure coexistence of images, which cannot fit with the coextensivity of memory.O bjects perceiveda re not onlyi mages. Form e, they are not onlyr epresentations, because Ib elievei mmediately, thatt hey exist independentlyo ft he wayIam thinking of them. Is ee the table here, and Ik now by some kind of common sense intuition, that this table exists. Whyisitso? Because in my perception,the table, the tree, and finallythe garden, are images related to themselves.
As fara st he egoi sc oncerned, it does not exist,a ss uch, in my perception. When Iperceive,Ialso perceive my body. And thus, my bodyisanimageinthis world of images. But to mean that perception comesfrom my bodyand my sense awareness is nothing other than acceptingthatIperceive material images in the world of images. Through this experience, Id on ot see the images as correlated with my subjective consciousness.Isee, on the contrary, my perception as an image included in another world,t ow hich my consciousness is also open. This is an experience of contemporaneity,t hrough which through which Ia mg oing out the immanent world of the duration livedbymyconsciousness.Moreprecisely,t his new experience means thatIsee the table, the tree and the garden as being linked to the same objectivew orld of images, and that Is ee these images as also linked to my body, as asubjective center of action and decision.The ideal perception is nothing more than the pure limit between these two perspectives: the world of images in relation to themselves, and the world of images in biological relation to my bodya nd my consciousness.
Finally, to understand the contemporaneity of the material world, Imust let both perspectivesemerge in my mind. Icannotremainaprisoner of asubjective point of view,since by my perception Isee things "in themselves" (Bergson 1947, 59). Such an assertionc omes from the fact that contemporaneity,a st he coexistenceofmaterial images, is another dimension of duration, already present in my mind: the dimension of the present.There is no duration without actuality,a nd thereforeIhave no experience of duration livedbym yconsciousness without at the samet ime experiencing what is outside my consciousness and uncorrelated with it,¹¹ namelyt he experience of my body, and then that of the relationship between my bodyand the other bodies of the universe. This enlarged experience shows the locality of our temporalc onsciousness in the whole universe.
3. The third crucial statement is that prolongation of pure perception is nothing but science,a sa lreadye xplained by Bergson in Matter and Memory:  See also During2 018, 422. Now no philosophical doctrine denies that the same images can enteratthe same time into two distinct systems,one belongingt os cience, wherein each image, related onlyt oi tself, possesses an absolutevalue; and the other,the world of consciousness,wherein all the images depend on acentral image,our body, the variations of which they follow.The question raised between realism and idealism then becomes quitec lear:w hata re the relations which these twosystemsofimagesmaintain with each other?And it is easy to see that subjective idealism consists in derivingt he first system from the second, materialisticr ealism in derivingt he second from the first (Bergson 1947, 13 -14).
Science givesatrue and more developede xperience of contemporaneity,b ecause apoint of view of the universe as as ystem of images emergesinscientific explanation, by experiences,measurement and laws. There is no scientificexplanation without that our mind would refer to something external to it,w ithout that it could be open to another perspective than the perspective of our mind.
In this system of images, every changei sc orrelated with another material change. It is not immediatelyc orrelated with as ubjective changef rom the point of view of my consciousness.Onthe contrary,from the point of view of science, my consciousness appears in its solidarity with my brain, with my nervous system thata re parts of the material universe (Bergson 1947, 9;31;52).Thus, the coexistenceofimages has ametaphysical meaning. It is not nothing. The coexistenceo fm aterial images is not the suppression of reality,i ti sn ot ad eficient cause. The coexistence of images is the substitution of ad imension of reality by another.
In this new experience of reality,what changes depends on invariant principles, as in anyclassical physical theory,and truth comesfrom intelligence, geometric proof, experimental tools.Truth comes from the crystallization of the present in mathematical space. Accordingt oB ergson, an experience of contemporaneity of this kind emergesi nevery scientific theory.S uch an experience is not simplyasubjective representation of the material universe. Rather,it comes from the intuition that we are included in the material universe as aset of images thatexists as such. Consequently, the fact that every scientific theory referst os omething takes the form of an ontological commitment by which consciousnessisable to go beyond itself.This is whyscience is thinking and touching the reality,u nlike in Heidegger'sp henomenological ontology (Heidegger 2001). Scienceh as an absolute view of matter,i th as an experience of what it is as such,a nd not simply of its manifestations (Bergson 1946,4 5;Bergson 1922,191). Scienceisalso able to stay in touch with the materiality of our perceptions, and with the relations between our perceptions and the central nervous system in our brain.
4D uration in the Universe 1. However,w hile scientific explanation does focus on the contemporaneity of the material universe, it cannot be reduced to space, symmetries and invariant structures.The wayBergson understands the difference between space and concrete extension,i nMatter and Memory,c ould be compared with the difference between the concept of "Presentational Immediacy" understood as a "continuum" (Whitehead 1929,6 9-82)i nW hitehead'sm etaphysics,a nd the concept of "common world" (Whitehead 1929,1 48).
Acontinuum is apotential, "whereas actuality is incurablya tomic" (Whitehead 1929,6 1). Therefore, like space is not matter in Bergson'sp hilosophy, Pre-sentationalImmediacy is not contemporaneity,inWhitehead'sphilosophy. Contemporaneity deals with causal independence of actual entities (Whitehead 1929, 61), which means that they cannot coexist simultaneouslyinthe common world, even if every actual entity is also an element in the constitution of other actual entities (Whitehead 1929,4 8), thanks to the principle of relativity (Whitehead 1929,1 48). They cannot coexists imultaneously, because each actual entity prehends the other ones as a datum,f rom its own local perspective,t hat is why there is no global objective prehension of every actual entity,a nd that is why the universe is nothing but ap rocess, in which God itself is included, as an actual entity (Whitehead 1929,88). As Whitehead says, "every actual entity,i nvirtue of its novelty,t ranscends its universe, God included" (Whitehead 1929,94).
Accordingt oBergson, space is onlythe homogeneouscrystallization of this contemporaneity by intelligence. Contemporaneity is actuality.B ut actuality is not pure nothingness,and it is not timeless.Ifvirtualityisotherness, if virtuality is the lived, recursive and creative return of the past into the present,t hrough which the process of consciousness loops upon itself,c ontemporaneity must be understood as what is other than otherness. Thiss tatement has av ery important consequence: it is not possible to reduce contemporaneity to identity and invariance. Identity and invarianceare the vision of contemporaneity that emerges from classicalscientific theories.¹² But true contemporaneity is coexistence and repetition,b ecause in Bergson'sm etaphysics, becoming is not av arietyo fb eing. Being is much more avariety of becoming. Would it be possible to show by aphilosophical analysis of scientific explanation,that true contemporaneity,ascoexistenceand repetition, is avariety of becoming, and not simplyavariety of being?
 Moreparticularlyinclassical physical theories,likemechanics;and of course,not in biology of evolution or in paleontology.
In coexistencefirst, actuality and invariancedeal with continuity,and second continuity gets aphysical cosmic dimension thatcannotbefullyreduced to aformal and ageometricalone. This wayofthinking is alreadybasedonthe analysis of motion in classical mechanics. Every motion is divisiblei nto earlier and earlier sections, but the act of moving cannot be the resulto fad ivision. It can be approximated by infinite calculus,b ut ag eometrical line is not able to make anym ove! This is the true lesson of Zeno paradox. In electromagnetism, there is continuity,w ithout anyo bjects, entity or atom. It is ac ontinuity which is not obeying to the principle of impenetrability of matter,because of the principle of superposition used in wave mechanics. That is whyBergson insists on Faraday and Maxwell, and that is whyhesubstitutes the concept of "concrete extension" (Bergson 1947, 244) to the concept of "extension" (étendue).
Let'sinsist to aprovisional conclusion, before to go further.Materialism and physicalism are not precise, whent hese philosophical doctrines try to understand matter,asifi tcould be independent of duration. Focusing on one famous controversy,this is exactlywhy no possibledebate could occur between Einstein and Bergson. Relativity theory is based on strong structural invariants,like every classicalp hysical theory.B ut in Relativity theory the notion of contemporaneity is much more complex thati ts eems to be, at first glance¹³ because the remote action is denied. Every actioni sal ocal one, thanks to the choice of the speed of light as an invariant principle. Furthermore,a sr emarkablye mphasized by Einstein itself,¹⁴ the vision of contemporaneity in Relativity theory is certainly not compatible with the vision of contemporaneity in Quantum Mechanics. In Quantum Mechanics, continuity and coexistence are managedb yt he complex relation between superposition and measurement that introduces the collapse of the wave function.
Finally, the relation between coexistence and continuity stays avery serious problem in science,which is differentlydeclinedineach scientific theory.I tcertainlye xplains whyu nlike Einstein, de Broglie (1941) sympathized with Bergson'sv iews.

Duration and Becoming in Bergson'sM etaphysics
with statistic and probabilities. Repetition is identity as the comingb ack of the same, identity as ar esult of ab ecoming, and not as the characterization of a being: "to be in the present and in ap resent which is always beginning again, -this is the fundamental lawo fm atter: herein consists necessity" (Bergson 1947, 279). Repetition is conceivedb yB ergson as interrupted tension. The more the past is similar to the present,t he more this similarityw ill return, as in some kind of passive and sleeping memory (Bergson 1896,2 47). Thus, repetition introduces at endency into matter.The same future is coming recursively in the present,l ike when we throw ac oin again and again on the table. The more we throw it,a nd the best the samed istribution of probability is checked, up to amaximum. In CreativeEvolution,this hypothesis permittedtodefine entropy as af undamental lawo fm atter. It also explainedw hy Bergson quotedB oltzmann in his third chapter (Bergson 1922, 258). Following Boltzmann'sHtheorem, provided that alaw of partition could be defined, the expansion of amonoatomic gasinaclosed container would be planned, and the maximization of entropy would be nothing but the attractor of the dynamics of this closed system. This vision of the samefuture that keeps comingback introduces abreak in temporals ymmetry:t he future will not be as the present was,a nd we cannot statisticallycome back from the future to the present,a sw ew ent from the present to the future. Following Boltzmann, such ac ome-back is possible, in conformity with the so-called "ergodic assumption",b ut it is statisticallyi mprobable. Since the lawo fe volution of ag as relaxation is based on statistics, and not on determined trajectories, it meanst hatt he entropic transformation is not reversible. There is an arrow of time in physics,e veni nt he context of statistical mechanics.
3. However,repetition is not creation. Would it be possibletofind some creative duration in the material universe? That'sp reciselyt he question asked by Bergson in CreativeEvolution. Science insists on the contemporaneity as acrucial dimension characterizingthe material universe. Science explains contemporaneity with the help of symmetries and invariant structures.But would it be able to explain life on the basiso fa no ntology that insists preferentiallyont he dimension of contemporaneity and repetition?
Following Bergson, life is characterized by the concept-imageo félanv ital. First of all, life concerns all living organisms in the biosphere.I ti sn ot limited to one. It concerns all the organisms as an immanentand creative durationpresent into them,a nd into their relations. That is whyB ergson says that it looks like aconsciousness (Bergson 1922,24;28¹⁵). Secondly, life is not just amemory,  See also Worms (2006); Miquel (2007). it is aforceofanticipation, un élan. Life influences the future, as aforcecapable of surpassingitself. What exactlydoes this mean? The first property thatcharacterizes life is that its future is always the result of its activity. It cannot be planned from the present.T hus, creative evolution is at ransformation that cannot be characterized by an invariant structure, because of this vis at ergo by which the gateo ft he futurei sn ot closed (Bergson 1922, 108 -110). Life is an élan and not an attractor,b ecause the dynamic of life cruciallyd epends on how the living agents live.I ts meaning can be analyzedr etrospectively,but certainly not prospectively.¹⁶ As afirst consequence, evolution is not predictable, because the causes here, "unique in their kind, are part of the effect,havet ocome into existencewith it, and are determined by it,asmuch as they determine it" (Bergson 1922, 172 -173). As asecond consequence, evolution producesnovelties. Novelties are not simply inventions. They are inventions of possibilities, because the set of possibilities characterizingthe activity of life can never be fullydescribed before living agents act: "Evolution is ac reation unceasinglyr enewed, it creates as it goes on, not onlyf orms of life, but the ideas thatw ill enable the intellect to understand it, the terms which will servet oe xpress it" (Bergson 1922, 108). The third consequence is that living organisms are some kind of local vital forces, they cannot be reducedt om echanicals tructures,m eaning that they future is alreadyd epending on the wayt hey act.They are organized and adaptive agents and not simplym echanical devices.W hat they are doing depend on their individual memory and history.
Would such av ision of life be directed against science? On the contrary, it should be noted that such ap hilosophicali magei sn ot far removed from Darwin'sh ypotheses and proposals in the Origin of species by meanso fn atural selection (Darwin 1859). Unliken eo-Darwinian population geneticists such as Ronald Fisher (Fisher1 930), Darwin did not focus his entire theory on the hypothesis of natural selection, even though he characterized it as "aparamount power".¹⁷ The explanation of the origin of new species reposes instead on three principles: "descent with modifications", "natural selection" and "divergence of characters".Inaccordance with the third one, evolution is represented by adiagram (Darwin1 859, Ch. 4) meaning that the more time is passing,the more different species will appear in ac ascade of successive pathways.B yt he way, this diagram is not at ree,s ince various independent origins are drawno ni t. As a direct consequence, the logic of species classification becomes ac hronological  See Montévil (2019).  See Gayon( 1992). logic, whereby the genus is no longer an abstract category,but simplyacommon ancestor.
However,a nd in accordancew ith the first principle, the space of possible states characterizingthe heredity of abiological system is continuouslyrenewed by the principle of variation at each stageofevolution, so thatnew species may appear again and again. Finally, natural selection is not simply apower of elimination. It is represented as acreative and plastic power of divergence. It should be noted that this point will be at the center of av ery famous scientific controversy between Fisher and Wright duringt he 20th century.
4. As as econd crucial point,the élanv ital is nothing but at hermodynamic differential force, producingeffects "in which it expandsand transcends its own being" (Bergson 1922,52),because it carries within it an entropic power of waste and dissipation, which again meansthat there is no life without matter (Di Frisco 2016). Life is like "acontainer" with "cracks" on the side, through which "steam escapes in ajet",like "areality that 'is making itself',inareality that 'unmakes itself''" (Bergson 1922,2 61). In La nouvelle alliance (1979), Prigogine and Stengers, implicitlyr efert ot his imagea sakind of anticipation of the physical and chemical concept of "dissipative structure".I nd eciphering the philosophical meaning of this image, one understands that life drawsmore from itself than it has, because what is not life is also adimension of life. There is no life without entropy,f or the organicn atureo fl ife comes from entropy.
However,c ontrary to as imple dissipative structure, life is represented as a creativet endency inventing material systems that expend more and more entropy over time, enabling more and more new vital functions. Contrary to the vegetal, the animal is expending motion, so that anew vital function could emerge:instinct. Unlikethe animal,the human being is able to spend thoughts without acting,so that an ew vital function could emerge:i ntelligence. Finally, life is ap olarized intensive activity,a nd as such, it changes permanently, because what is not life is alsoa ni nternal dimension of life. There is no intensity without entropy, no biological rhythm without habits,n oc reation without repetition. Life is the overcoming of the organic, through the inorganic understood as an immanent force, and not simply as an external obstacle or accident.

Conclusion
1. To sum up, metaphysics alone has no experience of the material universe. The ontological experience of the material universe, is nothing other than an ontological commitment comingf rom perception and from science. Science is intelligence looking outward, it is the expanded experience in our mind of the mate-rial universe, as an entity thata lso exists as such, that has its own perspective, which is not the subjective perspective of consciousness.This is why, to understand the relation between our consciousness and the material world, metaphysics has to "ride" (Bergson 1946,4 8) intelligence. However,when riding intelligence, intuition findsi nt he physical world, thatm atter is more than space. Matter has asleepy memory,and matter has alsoits owntendency; which is extension. Intuition also proposes that the evolution of life cannot be reduced to an entropic thermodynamic transformation, because of this continuous recursive activity of the organic through and by the inorganic. Such ap roposition is not as cientific assumption, but it can be helpful, as some kind of heuristic consideration.
In this wayo ft hinking,m etaphysics is not an activity against science. It is onlyfocused on the fact that it would never be possible to give acomplete theory of the physical world by science. Anyscientific theory,evenapurelyformal one, would always be incomplete, because it refers to another world than the world of consciousness.Scientific explanation would always be basedonthe use of concepts like continuity and discontinuity,oro nt he use on principles and methods that cannot be directlyj ustified by science,b ecause of its external ontological commitment.P hilosophical investigation would be based on analogies between the immanent world of consciousness,and the immanent duration present in the universe thanks to the help of new scientific theories and hypothesis. Reciprocally,itmeans also that thereisalways some kind of negative control of philosophical concepts and philosophical visions by scientific activity.I ft hey cannot be nor directlyn either indirectlyc onnected with science,t hey are simply sterile and speculative.
2. Second, metaphysics is adding to science av ery different ontology,c ompatible but paradoxicallya lso antagonist with science. FollowingB ergson, science givesu saplan for the coexistence of material images, in the form of ascientific theory.T his experience of objectification is thereforen ot,a ss uch, symbolic and artificial. On the contrary,i tg ives avision of the material dimension of reality.Science referstosomething,and at such, it involves some kind of ontological commitment (Bergson 1946,42).Ascientifictheory has to be in touch with the physical world, by some kind of expanded intuition. However, objectification deals with measurement,with predictions,with falsifiable assumptions, and finallyw ith the search of symmetries and invariants.That is whyt he ontologyo fs cientific theories will always introduce ab ias in explanation: it will alwayst ry to explainw hat is changing,b yw hat does not change.
On the contrary,metaphysics has to privilegealogic of substitution to a logic of exclusion. In CreativeE volution,B ergson develops what he calls "the two orders theory" (Bergson 1922, Ch. 3 -4). The negation of spirituality is not nothing.
It is matter.How would it be possibletothink matter as another order,and not as ap ure disorder?I nt he Platonic, and in the Aristotelian logic, the same has a prevalence on the other. Identity has ap rivilegeo nd ifference, and necessity has aprivilegeoncontingency.More particularly, the relation between necessity and contingencyi sahierarchical one, since in Aristotle logic, necessityi sd efined by exclusion of contingency, as what cannot not to be. There is no possible "included middle",¹⁸ in such aw ay of thinking.Conversely, in al ogic of substitution: If A, not Ai sn ot nothing.
The other has ap revalence on the same, because the samec an be thought as what is other than the other. In this wayofthinking,identity must be understood as av ariety of otherness.¹⁹ This heterodoxl ogic of substitution is obviouslya t stake in Bergson'sdefinition of life, since its organic nature is recursively coming back continuouslyfrom the inorganicentropy of matter,drawing aphilosophical picture, that could be directlyc onnected todayw ith the concept of "anti-entropy" proposed by Longo and Montévil (2014).