The Test of Time: Human and Cosmic Time

The ultimate project of Bergsonism is to find a ‘living unity’ that welcomes life, consciousness, and the material universe. But it proves difficult for this philosophy, which starts from the experience of conscious life and takes the immediate data of consciousness as its guiding principle, to connect our subjective and private psycho-vital experience to the ‘objective’ and common reality of the universe. In fact, the very concept of the material universe is heavily saturated with intellectual representations that leave no room for a ‘living unit’. It is precisely at this level that the debate between Einstein and Bergson gains importance. From Bergson’s point of view, there is no way to grasp the real nature of time but by living it; we can only start from the intuition we have of our own conscious, lived experience. In this paper we want to show how Bergson constructs a ‘plane’ of nature – that is a plane of light – that connects the duration of the universe to the duration of the self. A plane in which nature is understood as the univocal feuilletage of durations that we experience: nothing more nor less than the unity of spirit, life, and matter 1 Science and Philosophy: Two Different Methods For Bergson, the relationship between science and philosophy is essential. Science is not second or secondary. It has its own method, different from that of metaphysics, and its own kind of precision. In The Creative Mind, Bergson says that science touches the absolute and then, the real. But this was not a new thesis. Bergson had already expressed it in Creative Evolution: Positive science, indeed, may pride itself on the uniform value attributed to its affirmations in the whole field of experience. But, if they are all placed on the same footing, they are all tainted with the same relativity. It is not so, if we begin by making the distinction which, in our view, is forced upon us. The understanding is at home in the domain of unorganised matter. On this matter human action is naturally exercised; and action, as we said above, cannot be set in motion in the unreal. Thus, of physics, – so long as we are considering only its general form and not the particular cutting out of matter in which it is manifested – we may say that it touches the absolute. On the contrary, it is by accident – chance OpenAccess. © 2022 Pierre Montebello, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110753707-011 or convention, as you please – that science obtains a hold on the living analogous to the hold it has on matter. Here the use of conceptual frames is no longer natural. I do not wish to say that it is not legitimate, in the scientific meaning of the term. If science is to extend our action on things, and if we can act only with inert matter for instrument, science can and must continue to treat the living as it has treated the inert... But, in doing so, it must be understood that the further it penetrates the depths of life, the more symbolic, the more relative to the contingencies of action, the knowledge. On this new ground philosophy ought then to follow science, in order to superpose one scientific truth a knowledge of another kind which may be called metaphysical [Thus combined, all our knowledge both scientific and metaphysical, is heightened]. In the absolute we live and move and have our being. The knowledge we possess of it is incomplete, no doubt, but not external or relative. It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science and of philosophy (Bergson 1922, 209–210). Let us take up Bergson’s arguments again: what is interesting about science is not its uniform approach to both physical matter and other kinds of objects (life, living beings, consciousness, and spirit).What is usually seen as an advantage (science’s generality) becomes, for Bergson, a defect. Science does not really grasp life or spirit starting from matter and therefore its knowledge is merely relative. Science treats objects as unreal phenomena. Yet it succeeds in one area: that of action on matter. At this level, science even touches reality, grappling with it even if through mathematical and geometrical formulas. In fact, intelligence – science’s organum/instrument – cannot be unreal since, for Bergson, it is, properly speaking, action on the real. So, in its general form, science ‘touches the absolute’, although in its detailed form it forgets time – real time, which is duration – considering only space. Intelligence, then, is not only symbolic or artificial: it has access to the real. Intelligence only become symbolic when it leaves the sphere of action on matter and tries to understand life, living beings, consciousness and spirit, all of which it considers to be inert. Symbolic, for Bergson, means conventional and relative. But if intelligence is symbolic it is because it is weighed down by the need to act. Intelligence has to organise our action in the world and, therefore, it cannot take change and duration into account. One can act only by leaning on what is fixed, motionless, and not on what is continuously becoming. Nevertheless, Bergson does not consider science and philosophy to be in opposition; instead, he assigns philosophy the task of grasping that absolute which science can only touch symbolically. Philosophy, in fact, can touch the absoluteness of non-material objects (life, consciousness, God), building true metaphysical knowledge. And this is why Bergson makes Saint Paul’s famous assertion from the Act of the Apostles, ‘In God we live and move and have our being’ the key concept of his philosophy – on condition, of course, that ‘we replace “God” with the “Absolute”’ (Bergson 1911, 210). Indeed, from the point of view of the Absolute wherever we are, we are 166 Pierre Montebello

or convention, as youp lease -that scienceo btains ah old on the livinga nalogous to the hold it has on matter.Herethe use of conceptual frames is no longer natural. Idonot wish to saythat it is not legitimate, in the scientific meaningofthe term. If scienceist oextend our action on things, and if we can act onlyw ith inert matter for instrument,s ciencec an and must continue to treat the livingasithas treatedthe inert… But,indoing so, it must be understood that the further it penetrates the depths of life, the mores ymbolic, the more relative to the contingencies of action, the knowledge.O nt his new ground philosophy oughtthen to follow science, in order to superpose one scientific truth aknowledge of another kind which maybecalled metaphysical [Thus combined, all our knowledge both scientific and metaphysical, is heightened]. In the absolutew el ivea nd movea nd have our being. The knowledge we possess of it is incomplete, no doubt,but not external or relative. It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaningoft he word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of sciencea nd of philosophy ( Bergson 1922, 209-210). Let us take up Bergson'sa rguments again: what is interesting about science is not its uniform approach to both physical matter and otherk inds of objects (life, living beings, consciousness, and spirit). What is usually seen as an advantage(science'sgenerality) becomes,for Bergson, adefect.Science does not really grasp life or spirit starting from matter and thereforeits knowledge is merelyrelative.S cience treats objects as unreal phenomena. Yeti ts ucceeds in one area: that of action on matter. At this level, science even touches reality,g rappling with it even if through mathematical and geometrical formulas. In fact,i ntelligence -science'so rganum/instrument -cannot be unreal since, for Bergson, it is, properlyspeaking,action on the real. So, in its general form,science 'touches the absolute',although in its detailed form it forgets time -real time, which is duration -consideringonlyspace. Intelligence, then,isnot onlysymbolic or artificial: it has access to the real. Intelligenceo nlyb ecome symbolic when it leavest he sphere of action on matter and tries to understand life, living beings, consciousness and spirit,a ll of which it considers to be inert.
Symbolic, for Bergson, means conventional and relative.But if intelligence is symbolic it is because it is weighed down by the need to act.Intelligence has to organise our action in the world and, therefore, it cannot take changeand duration into account.One can act onlybyleaning on what is fixed, motionless, and not on what is continuouslybecoming. Nevertheless, Bergson does not consider science and philosophyt ob ei no pposition; instead, he assigns philosophyt he task of grasping thatabsolute which science can onlytouch symbolically. Philosophy, in fact,can touch the absoluteness of non-material objects (life, consciousness, God), buildingt rue metaphysical knowledge.A nd this is whyB ergson makes Saint Paul'sf amous assertion from the Acto ft he Apostles, 'In God we live and movea nd have our being' the keyconcept of his philosophy -on condition,o fc ourse, that 'we replace "God" with the "Absolute"' (Bergson 1911, 210). Indeed, from the point of view of the Absolutew herever we are, we are in Being and not,asKant argued, at adistance from it,that is, we are within the unknowable 'thing in itself'.F or Bergson, matter,life, consciousness and supraconsciousness are all forms of being,a bsolutelys peaking.
In order to respond to those who accusedhim of having devalued the role of science in CreativeEvolution -for example, Julien Brenda and Bertrand Russell, who werep erhaps his most virulent critics -Bergson restated his thesesi nt he second part of the introduction to TheC reativeM ind,r epeatingo nce again that science can also touch an absolute. In aw ay,t hen, his 1922 book onlyc larifies the position he first took in CreativeE volution in 1907. In 1922, Bergson says that the sciences are no less precise than philosophya nd this is whyi ti sn ot even necessary to reject physics in its 'general form' as CreativeEvolution did. Instead, it is necessary to outline the precise contours of intelligence because this also touches on the very structure of matter,afact thatmodern trends in science continue to confirm: when we bringthe intellect back to its precise contours and when we delve deeplyenough into our sense impressions so that matter begins to surrender to us its inner structure, we find that the articulations of the intellect applyexactlytothose of matter.Ithereforedonot see whyt he scienceo fm atter should not reacha na bsolute (Bergson 1946,44).
That science and metaphysics bothtouch the real absolutely, although by applying twod ifferent kinds of precision, is one of the essentialp ointso fB ergson's philosophy. But what does it mean to sayt hats cience touches the absolute? To maintain that science touches the absolutem eans thats cience is no longer the set of laws governing the phenomenal worldasKant thought,but instead coincides with al evel of reality,n amelyt he reality that extends itself in and as space. Intelligencei sd irectlyc oncernedw ith this extended reality (in Creative Evolution, Bergson had alreadys tated: 'Matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as ap erpetual becoming '-Bergson 1922, 287).
Yet, by affirming this, Bergson is not according scientific knowledge superior value, nor is he putting science and philosophyonthe same plane.While being critical of the sciences, Bergson constantlyi ncludes scientific approaches in his analyses.N onetheless,h ea lways distinguishes between the methods of science and philosophya st wo different ways of approaching the same reality.N ot because one is real and true, while the other is fictious and artificial. In order to removeany ambiguity from his discourse, and to avoid being accused of irrationalism,B ergson often insists that intelligencei sn ot ap ure abstraction: it apprehends apart of reality itself, because both science and metaphysicsdeal with the real absolute. Science, in sum, does not distort its object,itisnot pure constructivism. Yet, if science touches am aterial absolute, namely an absolute thati se xtended in space, metaphysicst ouches an absolutew hich lasts and takes time. Thus, it is clear that Bergson challenges Kant in two ways.F irst,h er einstates the possibility of metaphysics;s econd, he denies science'sd ependence on the relativity of knowledge: 'Ir eject the arguments advanced by philosophers, and accepted by scholars, on the relativity of knowledge and the impossibilityofa ttaining the absolute' (Bergson 1946,41). This leadstoadouble benefit:metaphysics becomes possibleand science is not phenomenal. Both of them return to reality itself and can be absolute.
Let us now examine the scientific methodo fp recision, starting from Bergson'sd istinction between two types of reality:e volutionary and material.
Radical indeed is the differencebetween an evolution whose continuous phases penetrate one another by akind of internal growth, and an unfurlingwhose distinct parts areplaced in juxtaposition to one another […]I ti st rue that alongside the states of consciousness which live this unshrinkable and inextensible duration, therea re material systems which time merely glideso ver. Of the phenomena which follow fromt hem one can reallys ay that they aret he unfurlingo fafan, or betters till, the unrolling of ac inematographic film. Calculable ahead of time, they existed prior to their realization in the form of possible (Bergson 1946,19) In some cases, nothing can be acceleratedw ithout changingt he very nature of reality;inothers, acceleration changes nothing -afilm, for example, wherethe speed of its unwinding has no consequences for the content.O ne might think that Bergson here considers all material systems to be timeless: 'Does the material universe in its entirety form as ystem of this kind?' (Bergson 1946,1 9). But this is not the case; the question is onlyamethodological artifice: 'When our science assumesthis,itsimplymeans by so doing to discard everythinginthe universe which is not calculable' (Bergson 1946,19). Science measures space, it does not take time into account; it eliminates time to better take space into account. Science always movestowardsthe spatial and material dimension of things. But the philosopher whod oes not want to discarda nythingi sr eallyobliged to ascertain that the states of our material world arec ontemporaneous with the history of our consciousness.A st he latter endures the former must be bound in some wayt or eal duration (Bergson 1946,19).
Thus, the method of philosophyisnot at all the sameasthat of science:ittakes into account the whole of experience,l eaving nothing aside (metaphysics is an integrale xperience). Mores pecifically, philosophyc onnects external thingst o livedd urations, the material universe to consciousness.I ts eeks duration in those realities that are different from consciousness and findsthat they also en-dure, taking part in duration. Consciousness, in fact,i sn ot isolated. Yet, if it lasts, the other realities,l ife and the universe, which act upon consciousness, must also last.Inthis regardthe example of the glass of sweet water used in Creative Evolution and takenu pi nTheC reativeM ind,i sv ery important.
Let'st akeu pt he argument from CreativeE volution. Bergson starts by commenting on the dream that inspires modern science: to geta sc lose as possible to the state of an intelligencet hatc ould embrace in as ingle mathematical formula the totality of the forces that make up nature and the variety of the situations of the beingsthat populate it.Bergson sums up this project for us: 'The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact,ist or egard the future and the past as calculable functionso ft he present,a nd thus to claim that all is given' (Bergson 1922,39-40). This idea, 'all is given',does not involvetime. Bergson has already shown manyt imes that between two times, ta nd t',s cience does not deal with the interval but onlyw ith its extremities.This interval, in fact,could slow down infinitelyo rc onverselyt ake on an infinite speed,b ut nothing would changei n the scientist'sf ormulas and results.
Science doesn'treallytake duration into account: it onlytakes the relations, the juxtaposition of the parts into consideration, firmlyb elievingt hat 'time doesn'tbite'.Scientific time is mathematical and excludes duration, considering onlyt he simultaneous definitiono fe ach position of as ystem'sp arts. But then, how can we understand succession in the physical world?And, besides, is there even succession in the physical world?O ri nt he universe? Unquestionably, answers Bergson: 'Succession is an undeniable fact,e veni nt he material world' (Bergson 1922, 10). Yet, succession or history in the universe cannot be explained starting from isolated systems carved out by intelligence: 'this history,inpoint of fact,unfoldsgradually, as if it occupied ad uration likeo ur own' (Bergson 1922, 10). ForBergson anysuccession proves thatsomething is happening, that something new is being produced.
[I]f the future is bound to succeed the present instead of beingg iven alongside of it,i ti s because the futurei sn ot altogether determined at the present moment,a nd that if the time takenu pb yt his succession is somethingo ther than an umber,i fi th as for the consciousness that is installed in it absolute value and reality,itisbecause there is unceasingly beingcreated in it not indeed in anysuch artificially isolated system as aglass of sugared water,but in the concrete whole of which every such system forms part,somethingunforeseeable and new (Bergson 1922, 358 -359) The famous example of the sugar in the water glass now becomes clearer.Itisan experiment that links two types of reality: 'If Iwant to mix ag lasso fs ugar and water,Imust,w illy-nilly, wait until the sugarm elts' (Bergson 1922, 10). This means that at ime thati sd ifferent from mathematical time immediatelye rupts: it is the time of my waiting,ofm yimpatience. It is no longer athought or aconceptual time; no longer as et of relationships.S ugar'st ime is livedb ecause, although sugar dissolving in water seems to be ap hysicale vent independent of me, this event has an absolutemeaning for me. Waitingtranslates into 'acertain portion of my ownd uration,which Icannot protract or contracta sIlike' (Bergson 1922, 10) -once again the problem of acceleration!) and for Bergson this 'other' time immediatelym anifests itself: sugard issolvesi nw ater through a chemical process, but this event,a ss imple as it is banal, highlights ac reation upon which my consciousness inevitablys tumbles. Something is happening: an unpredictable event,aduration that is also uniquei nt he universe. Sugar thereforedoes not onlydissolve chemically: it has aduration that must be linked to the durationo ft he Whole because, for Bergson, as soon as we integrate a physical system into the Whole, its own duration becomes evident.Why precisely at thatmoment?Why does Bergson allow himself to attribute duration to each physical system, that is to sayaform of existenceanalogous to ours, as soon as it becomes part of the Whole?
Bergson says: 'There is no reason, therefore, whyaduration, and so aform of existencelike our own, should not be attributed to the systems that science isolates,provided such systems are reintegrated into the Whole' (Bergson 1922,12). This is the casebecause melting sugar is not an isolated phenomenon. It is true that science tends to understand matter geometricallya nd to artificiallyr epresent isolateds ystems in order to better capturet he characteristics of extended matter.But even the smallest system is nested within, is linked to, external influences,such thatwecan go back through these threads to the entire universe, 'in which we live the duration immanent to the whole of the universe' (Bergson 1922, 11). Every part of the universe links us to the Whole. And it is this Whole that is at work in every single system, right down to the glass of water,a nd that makes itself felt in the very duration of my expectations of what is going to happen. Thus, for Bergson the duration of each physical system is no longer am ystery: it coincides with the creative movement of the Whole through each of its parts, that is with the pulsation of the Whole in each of its systems, which are onlyc onceptualised as isolated units by science. Each duration, in fact,i st he emanation of the duration of the Whole and Bergson, therefore, can conclude that 'the universe endures' (Bergson 1922, 11).
After having discovered duration at the coreo fp sychological life, Bergson makes it the stuff of the entire universe. The latter createsforms and continuously elaborates something absolutelyn ew: 'The duration of the universe must thereforeb eo ne with the latitude of creation -which can find place in it' (Bergson 1922,359). This is why, in Bergson'sopinion, the methodsofscience and philosophyshould not be fullyseparated. In the physical universe studied by scien-ces,i ti st rue that no duration or creation can be detected, because science freezes time to focus on space, that is, in order to act.The work of science consists in isolating parts of the Whole as closed material systems, so as to better decompose them in space. But the work of the philosopher consists,onthe contrary,inreturning these to the Whole, starting from our experience of 'it'.Philosophy, in short, reintegrates af ragmented physical system into the Whole and grasps its relation to duration. But it can do this onlybyconnectingthe universe as aw hole to our duration. Our perception, in fact,i solates closed systems as does our science.B ut,a part from science and its need to plan action,t hese closed systems are not isolated. They are isolated for science only. In reality, they are connected with al iving bodyc apable of 'marking out upon matter the design of its eventual actions even before they are actual' (Bergson 1922, 12).
ForB ergson natural perception and science tend to delimit and close, fragment and geometriseb ecause they are based on preparation for action. But, when they are 'repositioned' in the universe of interactions, these closed systems reveal their ownd urations: What else can this mean than that the glass of water,the sugar,and the process of the sugar'smelting in the water areabstractions,and that the Whole within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding progresses,i tm ay be in the manner of ac onsciousness? ( Bergson 1922, 10) TheCreativeMind closely follows the relationship between the closed systems of science and the whole of the universe. Now,s cience has to build 'material systems in which time onlys lides'-astronomy, chemistry,physics are cited (Bergson 1946,19) -by extendingthe role of natural perception (facilitating action by producing staticimages). But the experiment with the glass of sugar water shows that 'if one can cut out from the universe the systems for which time is onlya n abstraction, ar elation, an umber,the universe itself becomes something different' (Bergson 1946,2 0). Thus, 'if we could grasp it in its entirety,i norganic but interwoven with organic beings, we should see it ceaselesslyt aking on forms as new,a so riginal, as unforeseeable as our states of consciousness' (Bergson 1946,20). We can see the significanceofthis statement: the universe also creates forms, has an unpredictable history,n amelyaform of duration. Yet, it is above all the method that is important:i no rder to reveal the action that duration has on the other durations (life, universe, even the naturans principle of all nature), we must always start from it,a nd from our experience of it.
2T he Whole Is of the Same Natureo ft he Self In sum, Bergson contends that we must not confuse the workofscience with that of philosophy. The latter has to return to the real, moving,t ime which is at the heart of things, life, and consciousness. Starting from his own conscious experience, aphilosopher findsduration in all things, because for Bergson each consciousness, as far as it is duration, takes part in auniverse that lasts (Matterand Memory)a nd in our livedl ives, life being av ital impulse -élan -which is another name for duration (CreativeEvolution). Yet, this method involves adifficulty related to the very nature of direct and psychological experience:t ou nderstand how the material universe is also af orm of duration.F or ap hilosophy which starts from the experience of conscious life and takes what our experience immediatelyattests to as merelyaguideline, it becomes in fact very tricky to connect psycho-vital experiencet ot he material universe. And please note thatt his difficulty does not onlyf aceB ergsonism. It raised questions for all the 19 th -2 0 th century philosophieso fn ature (Nietzsche, Whitehead, Tarde), which tried to deal with the question of cosmological unity and the nature of matter.
In the western philosophicaltradition, the concept of matter has been saturated with intellectual representations thatp revent its insertion into the 'living unity' of the cosmos.Thus, it is not surprising that Bergson considered one of the most important issues in Creative Evolution to be the fact thatt he material universe has the samenature as the self: duration. Speakingatthe French Philosophical Society in 1908, he explained thato ne of the objects of CreativeE volution is to show that 'le Tout est […] de même nature que le moi,etqu'on le saisit par un approfondissementd ep lus en plus complet de soi-même' (Bergson 1972, 774). Thel ast part of the sentencei si mportant because it reveals the meaning of Bergson'sp hilosophicalm ethod:f rom the self to the whole, from inner conscious experience to what is involved in this experience (other durations).
The renovation of the concept of matter began in Matter and Memory,a book focusing on our relationship to the universe. Here, Bergson claimed that the brain, if isolated, does not produce anything,neither interiority nor thought. Onlyt he relationship between the living bodya nd the world can explain the mechanism of perception together with its connection to pure perception, which encompasses the whole flow of the universe. ForB ergson our perception does not create thingsn or images: it merelyp roducest he statici mages needed for bodilya ctions, images selected from the flow of the universe. Perception, then, is linked to the universe, and CreativeEvolution continued this meditation. At anyr ate,this is what Bergson said to the Philosophical Society on August 8, 1908, comparing his reflections to thosei nMatter and Memory Dans le premier de cesdeux livres, on montreque l'objectivité de la chose matérielle est immanente àl ap erception que nous en avons,p ourvu qu'on prenne cette perception àl ' état brut et sous sa forme immédiate. Dans le second, on établitque l'intuition immédiate saisit l'essence de la vie aussi bien que celle de la matière (Bergson 1972, 774) Philosophyc hallenges science exactlyb ecause it studies the essence of matter. In philosophy, 'l'acte de connaissance coïncide avec l'acte générateur de la réalité' (Bergson 1972, 774) -and to grasp the essence of matter means to grasp it exactlyb ym eans of the generating act thatp roduces it.N evertheless,f rom the point of view of method, philosophyc an onlye xploit the intuition we have of our experience of conscious life.
In Matter and Memory,o ur intuitivep articipation in the universe becomes evident.B ut CreativeE volution does not requireu st oc hangem ethod:w ec an movef rom 'immanent to the whole of the universe' (Bergson 1922, 11) onlyb y starting with ourselves, from our existence.

3T he Tendency of Modern Science to Dematerialise Matter
If science understands matter with the help of mathematical laws, should we think thatm atter is reducedtothese laws, and can onlybec omposed of immobile stable elements?B ergson, always on the lookout for new horizons in science, sees another path at the very heart of physical theories. Matter and Memory was inspired by electromagnetism and drawsl essons from Thomson and Faraday: 'psychological analysis has alreadyr evealedt ou st hat this discontinuity is relative to our needs: every philosophyofnature ends by finding it incompatible with the general properties of matter' (Bergson 1947, 266). Science itself thus encourages us to see matter onlya s' modifications, perturbations, changes of tension or of energy,a nd nothing else' (Bergson 1947, 266). In Matter andM emory,B ergson does not forgett oq uote Maxwell, who as earlya s1 864 showed thatl ight is an electromagnetic waveform (see Davies 1988, 32). Even though we had to wait until 1924 before particles of matter such as electrons werec onsidered to have wavelike properties and to listen to scientists talking about wavesinmatter,the fact remains:eversince, atomic matter has been dissolvedi ni mmaterial fieldso ff orce. Electromagnetic science is still present in CreativeEvolution,ascan be seen from the references to Faraday's use of X-rays to penetrate the atom, the discovery that every atom 'fills the world' and, moreg enerally, the idea of forcef ields (seeD avies 1988, 67;N ottale 1997, 34). Again, Bergson tells us thatscience, as well as consciousness,makes us un-  (Bergson 1965, 41). Electromagnetic physics, in fact,c onfirms that solid bodies are not primary, that matter is first wavesand light,indivisibleenergy,and continuous flow.Consequently, there is no gapb etween what consciousness reveals to us and what science tends to show: 'Sciencea nd consciousness are agreed at the bottom' (Bergson 1947, 260).
In Creative Evolution, Bergson stated that 'the more physics advances, the more it effaces the individuality of bodies and even of the particles into which the scientific imagination began by decomposing them:b odies and corpuscles tend to dissolve into au niversal interaction' (Bergson 1922, 168). Yet, he would later sayt his again, in the second introductory essayo fTheC reativeM ind, whereheshows that,although science has served as avector for this movement, it did not follow it to its logical end, because of its own conventions: 'When I began to write, physics had not yetm ade the decisive advances which weret o bring ac hangei ni ts ideas on the structure of matter' (Bergson 1946,8 3). He went on to add: Sooner or later,Ithought,the idea of support would have to be abandoned […]S ooner or later,Ithought,p hysicsw ill be broughta round to the point of seeingi nt he fixity of the element af orm of mobility.When that time came, it is true, sciencew ould probablyg ive up lookingf or an imagedr epresentationo fi t, the image of am ovement beingt hat of a movingp oint (that is to say, always of am inutes olid) (Bergson 1946,8 3-84).
The fusion between the wave and the corpuscle is again evoked: afact that could make us think thatapiece of iron is amelodic continuity more than athing.By necessity, 'the great theoretical discoveries of recent years have led physicists to suppose ak ind of fusion between the wave and the corpuscle, between substance and movement,a sIs hould express it' (Bergson 1946,8 4). Yet, this text from the second introduction of TheC reativeM ind also refers in an ote to the essay TheP erception of Change,w hich makes the point even clearer. Here, in fact,B ergson asked himself: doesn'ts cience dissolve mattera nd each moving thing by making us sense ap hysicalm ovement?T ow hich he answered: Asuggestion of this vision of material things alreadycomes to us from physical science. The morei tp rogresses the morei tr esolves matter intoa ctions movingt hroughs pace, into movements dashingback and forth in aconstantvibration so that mobility becomes reality itself. No doubt scienceb egins by assigning as upport to this mobility.B ut as it advances, the support recedes;m asses arep ulverised into molecules,m olecules into atoms,a toms into electrons or corpuscles:f inally, the support assigned to movement appears merely as ac onvenient schema, as imple concession on the part of the scholar to the habits of our visual imagination (Bergson 1946 ,1 74).
Finally, there are no more thingsinmovement: their supposed movement has become a 'movement of movements' (Bergson 1946,83). By stressing the triumph of the wave over the corpuscle, in these passages, Bergson is basically saying that matter radiates. And what is the meaning of au niverse of light,i fn ot that of being au niverse thatl asts and expands, au niverse of energy to which we are necessarilyconnected?A nd whyi st his so important for at heory of nature? Because this matter is also aform of duration and movement,aswehavejust seen: the example of the glass of sugarw ater showed us that the material universe does not changew ithout us perceiving it changing, and without us perceiving ourselvesb eing transformed. The durations of the universe and ourselvesa re thereforei ntertwined.
To recap, we can saythatBergson followed science'sdevelopments and discoveries because modern science tends to dematerialisematter.Itistrue thatscience still usess patializing images, the necessary work of intelligence being to spatialize,b ut it is clear thate veni ns cience, the tendencyi st od ow ithout such images as much as possible. In anycase, the philosopher who understands what duration is for,byhaving explored it in his psychic life, can onlyb ei nterested in this kind of science. It proves thatmatter cannot be reduced to pure stability although it cannot demonstrate this fact by itself.S cience, in fact,i sn ot philosophyand CreativeEvolution has shownthat the limits on science following this movement so as taket he dematerialisation of matter to its extreme consequences are duet ot he natural infirmity of its proper organum: intelligence. The latter always cuts matter,a lways divides it,b ecause it is not madet og o back in time, but rather to act on matter.
Therefore, the constitution of closed systems is the essence of the work of physics.B yh olding that matter is 'decomposable into isolated systems',writes Bergson, 'in attributingt oi tq uite distinct elements which changei nr elation to each other without changingi nt hemselves( which are displaced shall we say, without being altered), in short,i nc onferringo nm atter the properties of pure space' (Bergson 1922,214 -215), science accentuates the spatialityofmatter and thus sets limits on its own work of dematerialisation. Philosophy, on the contrary,s eeks to go to the end of this dematerialisation by wresting matter back from spatializing intelligence. Forp hilosophy, in fact,m atter is af orm of duration.B ut how can we explain whyi ntellectuality and materiality are nevertheless so well adapted to each other?
In CreativeEvolution,Bergson reflects on the vital genesis of our psychological frameworks for knowledge,concluding that thereisnophilosophicalreason to set intellectuality and materiality in opposition as has been the case in most philosophies. Why, in fact,d oes the world obey our mathematical principles? Whyisthe world knowable? Knowledge would be amiracle if we had had to ad-dress ak ind of matter thatw as totallyf oreign to our intelligence or address it with an intelligence that was totallyf oreign to matter.The intellect and materiality have to communicate because 'this matter,i na ll that it has that is intelligible, is our ownw ork!' (Bergson 1922, 216). ForB ergson, in particular, spatialized matter is the product of the work of intelligence and intelligencei st he product of the work of life. Life produces intelligencet om asterm atter,a nd this reciprocal genesis of materiality and intellectuality makes us understand whym atter is spatializeda nd whyi ti sa lways immobilised in our intellectual and scientific representation. Matter,s aysB ergson, inevitably accentuates 'its materiality,when viewed by the mind' (Bergson 1922, 213).
Yet, to saythatmateriality derivesfrom intellectuality is to confirm the Kantian thesis of the ideality of space. Our intelligence is certainlyaspatial shaping of the world, but it is so for vital reasons that Kant did not grasp. His mistake, accordingt oB ergson, is to have assumed that 'space is givena saready-made form of our perceptivefaculty,averitable Deus ex machina,ofwhich we see neither how it arises, nor whyi ti sw hat it is rather thana nything else' (Bergson 1922,216). On the other side, to operate the vital genesis of intelligence is to assign it afunction by refusingitasanabsolute: spatialization serves action. This is why, in the end, science works in the direction of materiality and not in the direction of duration. Indeed, [i]t is impossible to consider the mechanism of our intellect and the progress of our science without arrivinga tt he conclusion that between intellect and matter therei s, in fact,s ymmetry,concord and agreement.Ono ne hand, matter resolvesi tself morea nd more, in the eyes of the scholar,i nto mathematical relations,a nd on the other hand, the essential faculties of our intellect function with an absolute precision onlywhen they areapplied to geometry (Bergson 1946,4 3) But this spatialization of matterp revents us from grasping the duration that remains within it.F ullyintellectualised, matterb ecomes spatializeda nd geometrised, without action, movement,ore nergy.I ti sa ne xtended and unfoldedk ind of matter.All of its parts are thereforedivisible and separable ad infinitum. Nothing is transformed within it: this kind of matter has onlyrelative movements(as in Cartesian and Galilean mechanics). We maya dd that such intellectualised matter is continuous, but onlyi nt he sense of mathematical continuity:t he abstract possibilityofinfinite division. But,inr eality,this abstract continuity does not allow for continuity of movement to the extent that it exactlyu nderpins the discontinuity necessary for action. In fact,wea lways find ways to redefine discontinuity,because of these needs, and thereforewealwayspostulate -and thus find -atoms,points, grains, lumps,bodies, and other thingswith spatial extension. Hence Bergson'sw ell-known thesis: intelligence onlyr epresents disconti-nuity on abackground of ideal and mathematical continuity (Bergson 1946,221-222).
ForBergson thereisnopoint in considering atomism and geometrismasopposites,g iven that the twow ork together: the ideal division of space provides fixed points for action.T his means that matter is never as completelys pread out in space as our intelligence and senses represent it: although it spreads out in the direction of space, matteri sn ot space. This double-line explanation recalls the one describing sugari naglasso fw ater: justalittle 'attention' to this matter,which at first seems spatial to us, suffices to make us feel the 'action of the Whole' (Bergson 1922, 219) within it.T hus, science itself puts us on the path to am attert hat cannot be reduced to pure space. Yet, it is the task of philosophytobroaden this trend of science by grasping it within awider experience that includes our own duration.Within it,infact,wecan understand that there is also movement without mobilityi nm attera nd am ovement of the universe, which has its own history.

4E nergy Degradation
Asecond important wayinwhich Bergson refers to physics in CreativeEvolution concerns the second principle of thermodynamics. Bergson wantst os how the slope of the universe towards space. Just as electromagnetism shows us the reality of physical motion, just as aglassofsugar water connects us to the duration of the universe, thermodynamics shows us the reality of that movement which is the extension of the universe. The second principle of thermodynamics affirms that an isolatedsystem progressively and irreversibly converts its potential energy into an equipotential structure. Thus, accordingt oB ergson, it confirms the tendencyo ft he material universe towardss patialization. To spatialize now means to pass from ad ifferencei np otential to ah omogeneouss tructure. And the universe, if it is assumed to be closed,e nergeticallye volves by tendingt owards entropy.This is whyt he second lawo ft hermodynamics appears to Bergson as 'the most metaphysical of the laws of physics' (Bergson 1922, 256). Moreover,i ti ndicates the direction in which the universe is moving,n amelyt he uniformd istributiono fe nergy: 'is seen to be ever exhaustings omething of the mutability it contains' (Bergson 1922,2 57).
Therefore, we find thatonce again physics allows us to escape from the relativity of movement.But how can we account for this trend?For Bergson, the lesson of thermodynamics remains meaningless if we don'trelateitbacktoour own experience.Infact,evenwith respect to entropy,the attestation of our conscious life experience is crucial. The scientistw ho sticks to matter does not aim to ex-The Test of Time: Human and Cosmic Time plain how consciousness, life, and the universe communicateand relatetoeach other.What philosophybrings, on the contrary,isthe intuition that the essential mutability of the world cannot have its sourcewithin matter itself. If matter has a tendencytowards spatialization, how could it be the creator of energy?F or Bergson, we can onlyi nterpret this entropic fall by confronting it with our psychovital experience, that is by connectingi tt oo ur existence, to our experience of duration.I fw ec an understand it,i no ther words, it is because we can see that the universe does not lasti nt he same wayt hatour life and our consciousness do.
Yet, the scientist cannot understand it,h aving cut himself off from part of the experience.S o, accordingt oh im, the direction of the initial mutability towards stability is physicallye xplainable, although the eruption of energy that conditions this mutability will never be so: he maysuppose an infinite universe at the beginning,but he will never bring forth energy from this infinite universe. Accordingtohis definition of matter,infact,such auniverse would be precisely auniverse spread out with material elements that are absolutelyexternal to each other: auniverse without tension, relation, and potential. 'In reality,the problem remains insoluble as long as we keep on the ground of physics' (Bergson 1922, 258) says Bergson. In other words, when he wants to explain the presenceofenergy,the physicist willn ot look for anykind of extra-spatial energy of which he has no concept.But the philosopher sees it at work in every moment of life and, abovea ll, in his living conscious experience.
The physicist does not believet hat anys orto fe xtra-material energy can exist.T hus, he wills tick to the definition of matter he has just given, namely matter as as lopet owards uniformity and stability.The philosopher willi nstead point out that there is adistinctionbetween extra-material creation and material conservation, between open and closed, between philosophya nd science. But how can we establish this distinction if we abstract from our experienceo f being ad uration intersecting with otherd urations? Let us insist on this point of method: the fact thatt he universe radiates and falls towardse ntropy cannot be understood other than by starting from our duration and the wayi ti mplies the duration of the universe (the glasso fs ugar water). Thermodynamics, in fact,l eadsu st ot hink thatt he universe has ad irection or an extra-spatial primordial energy thato nlyl ater will fall back into space.

5T he Intricacy of Durations
Bergson does not posit the universe as an objective,a ll-encompassingf ramework that precedesu s. The universe is neither fixed nor unchanging. The uni-verse is deduced from our perception, from what is transformed and sensed in our conscious life experience. We don'tc hangew ithout thingsc hanging, the world doesn'tchangewithoutour knowledge of this change, because life, matter, and consciousness are durations, and therei sc ommunication between all of these durations. Our perception -here synonymous with intuition -is in itself onlyarelation between durations. We perceive the material world, as one reads in Duration and Simultaneity, and this perception appears,rightlyorwrongly,tobeinside and outside us at one and the same time; in one way, it is astateofconsciousness;inanother,asurfacefilm of matter in which perceiverand perceivedcoincide. To each moment of our inner life there thus corresponds am oment of our bodyand of all environingm atter that is "simultaneous" with it; this matter then seems to participatei no ur conscious duration (Bergson 1965, 45) Duration and simultaneity even goes so far as to saythat we live acosmic life as much and more than an individual life (Bergson 1965, 51). Then, it is not by chance that, in TheC reativeM ind Bergson uses the example of colours being wavelengths to gett he point across.H ereB ergson proposes an experiment that consists in imaginingo urselvesa sacolour and wondering whether we might not be immediatelyc onnected to the durations of other colours.
But just as aconsciousness of colour,which would harmonise inwardlywith orangeinstead of perceivingitoutwardly, would feel itself caught between red and yellow,would perhaps even have,b eneath the latter colour,apresentiment of awhole spectrum in which is naturallyp rolonged the continuity which goes fromr ed to yellow,s ot he intuition of our duration, far fromleavingussuspended in the void as pureanalysiswould do, puts us in contact with awhole continuity of durations which we should try to follow either downwardly or upwardly: in both cases we can dilateo urselvesi ndefinitelyb yamorea nd morev igorous effort,inboth cases transcend ourselves. In the first case, we advancetowardaduration moreand morescattered, whose palpitations,morerapidthan ours,dividingour simple sensation,dilute its quality into quantity:atthe limit would be the pure homogeneous, the pure repetition by which we shall define materiality.Inadvancinginthe other direction, we go towardaduration which stretches,tightens, and becomes moreand moreintensified: at the limit would be eternity (Bergson 1946,2 20).
TheC reativeM ind clearlyd efends the thesis of the co-implication of durations each one involving the other. Our experience of conscious life, in fact,i mplies ar elationship to the duration of the universe, that is to another experience of conscious life. Moreover,i ta lsob ears witness to am orec ontracted or more intense duration, which would, at the limit,bet he 'eternity of life' (Bergson 1946, 220): apure and freecreativity whereour ownduration, Bergson says eloquently in the same text on colours and durations, 'would find itself like vibrations in light' (Bergson 1946,220). Light even brighter than the visibleuniverse, because it is the light of at rue source. In relation to science,t he philosopher'sw ork is thereforet othink about how things communicate,a nd for Bergson they can onlycommunicateinasmuchasthey are durations: movements that act mutually.I nt his regard, he writes in Creative Evolution: The philosophermust go further than the scientist.Makingaclean sweep of everythingthat is onlyanimaginative symbol, he will see the material world melt back intoasimple flux, a continuity of flowing, ab ecoming. And he will thus be prepared to discover reald uration therewhere it is still moreuseful to find it,inthe realm of life and of consciousness.

6S ympathy
But how can we move in the direction of the duration of non-human things, that is in the direction of other durations?The notion of sympathyplays aprominent role here. Several times Bergson defines intuition as sympathyand his use of the term sympathyt odescribe the intuition of another reality is very significant.Intuition, considered as sympathy, becomes am ovement of fusion towards otherness: 'Forone does not obtain from reality an intuition, that is to say, aspiritual harmony with its innermost quality if one has not gained its confidenceb ya long comradeship with its superficial manifestations' (Bergson 1946,2 35).
It is thus necessary to become familiar with the object,t oa cquiree nough facts to 'melt' them into au nity that comes close to what the envisaged reality is. Onlythen can there be an intuitive leap from multiplicity to unity,from static to dynamic, from space to time.S ympathyi st he means by which Ib egin to espouse the movement of the other reality Ia pprehend. And, by doing so, Ic an open myself to durationso ther than my own. This point is crucial. We do not onlyhaveanintuition of ourselves: we can also intuit athought that is external to us and sympathise with it.Y et,f or Bergson we can onlyd os os tarting from what has been inserted in languageand concepts. In order to know another philosophy, for example, we are forced to start from the philosophical system that expresses it,f rom its sources, its similarities with others, its culturale nvironment.A nd it is onlyo nce this kind of impregnation, contact or effort has begun that we can grasp the essence of that philosophyb yp enetrating the system'sr eal and simple intention. Thanks to intuition, in short, we no longer seek to 'go around' the system. We grasp its intuition intensively and no longer extensively.
Bergson presents sympathyasarelationship between my duration and others. Sympathyisaneffort to place myself in otherdurations, by placing myself in their movements. As we said, this is ac rucial point because withoutt his effort we would not be able to captureo ther durations. In other words, it is as if sympathymakes cosmology -the captureofdurations in matter,life, and other spiritual realities -possible. It is, in fact, 'intuition of ourselves' (Bergson 1946,35). Yet, Between our consciousness and other consciousnesses the separation is less clear-cut than between our bodyand other bodies,for it is spacew hich makesthese divisions sharp. Unreflectings ympathya nd antipathy, which so often have that powerofd ivination, give evidenceofapossible interpenetration of human consciousnesses.I twould appear then that phenomenao fp sychological endosmosis exist.I tm ay be that intuition opens the wayf or us intoconsciousness in general. But is it onlywith consciousnessesthat we areinsympathy? If every livingbeingisborn, develops and dies, if life is an evolution and if duration is in this case ar eality,i st heren ot also an intuition of the vital, and consequentlyametaphysicso fl ife, which might in ac ase prolong the scienceo ft he living? […]L et us go still further.A bovea nd beyond the organizing process, unorganised matter appears as though decomposable intos ystems over which time slips without penetrating, systems which belongt ot he realm of science and to which the understanding can be applied. But the material universe in its entirety keeps our consciousness waiting;itw aits itself. Either it endures, or it is bound up in our own duration. Whether it is connected with the mind by its origins or by its function, in either case it has to do with intuition through all the real change and movement that it contains […]Inshort,purechange,real duration, is athingspiritual or impregnated with spirituality.Intuition is what attains the spirit,duration, purechange.Its real domain beingthe spirit,itw ould seek to grasp in things,even material things,their participation in spirituality,Ishould sayi nd ivinity wereInot aware of all the human element still in our consciousness,h owever purified and spiritualised (Bergson 1946,3 5-36).
As we can see, the movement of sympathy leads us to an intuition that takes us out of ourselves, and beyond our humanity.Itisanintuition of the vital, the material, and even the divine nature of the world. Each time we have an intuition, Bergson says,wegrasp areal movement: achangewhich is an indivisible duration. All that lasts is am attero fi ntuition. And therefore, thanks to intuition we also understand the differencebetween mattera nd spirit,s pace and time. Now, science studies systems without time, proceeding to an increasinglyfine analysis of their elements. But it always must be relayedb ya ni ntuition of what makes their movement and theirc apacity to changer eal, thati s, by an intuition of what makes their vital impulse real: the durationo ft he universe. Andp lease note that it is in this sense that Bergson speakso fametaphysics of life: it is 'of' life because it takes the spiritual dimension of life into account.A nd, in The Test of Time: Human and Cosmic Time the samew ay,h es peakso fam etaphysics 'of' the material universe which captures the irreducible movement of the whole'sd uration.¹ Let us note in passing Bergson'sgeneral interest in inter-psychological phenomena: interpenetration of consciences, psychological endosmosis. In 1900, Bergson took part in the foundation of the International Psychical Institute, and in 1909 he became aforeign correspondent for the Society for Psychical Research. Itsa im was to study psychicp henomena such as telepathy, divinatory dreaming( telepathya nd dreaming), spiritualist or mediumistic phenomena, the unconscious, and so on. When he became president of the Society for Psychical Research, he gave his lecture on Ghostso ft he living. But the text of TheC reative Mind on endosmosis is an excerpt from his lecture of 28 May1913.Sympathy, in fact,i ss aid to be similar to an endosmosis in which different durations mutuallyi ntermingle Letu sn ot forget, moreover,t hat it is spacew hich creates the sharp divisions.Our bodies aree xternal to one another in space; and our minds,i ns of ar as they area ttached to those bodies,a re separated by intervals.B ut if the mind is attached to the bodyo nlyb y ap art of itself, we mayc onjecturet hat for the other part of the mind there is ar eciprocal encroachment. Between different minds there mayb ec ontinuallyt akingp lacec hanges analogous to the phenomena of endosmosis ( Bergson 1920,8 6-87).
The essential thesis is that consciousness overflows the organism,sothatwhat is to be explainedare not these phenomena of communication between consciousnesses that go beyond bodies and their spatial situatedness. What remains to be explainedi sr ather whyt hey do not happen more often.

Conclusion
ForB ergson, our intuitions or sympathy, open us to other durations and so we have to payc lose attention to his notion of spiritualism.S piritualism is not the entrenchment of duration in subjectivity,nor does it stand in contrast to science; on the contrary,i tw ins over nature, it invades nature,i tc oncerns all beings. And it does so with the help of science.Tointuit,infact,means to reach the  At the end of the text,Bergson seems to regret that this intuition is not quitec apable of carryingi tself to the point in which the participation of things in divinity happens.M ystical experience, in fact,plays akey roleinTheTwo Sources of Morality and Religion. ForBergsonthe mystics lead us in embracing natura naturans and it is for this reasont hat intuition, the mystic's organum, opens us up to acosmology that is grasped not onlypurelyinaninterior and psychological sense. spiritual dimension of all beings. And so spiritualism is not synonymous with acosmism. Who emphasises the spirit does not move away from thingso rf rom the universe. Thanks to intuition one finds them again, touchingt hem as truly as science does, but by another means, another vision, another method.
Spiritualism, for Bergson, means thatas pirit or psyche is present in all realities of the actual world. Science and metaphysics,infact,donot split the real, as if there weretwo distinct realities.Theyare two different pointsofview taken on the samer eal: space and time, but the real time, i. e., duration. This is why Bergson says that metaphysics is not 'the superior of positive science' (Bergson 1946,48). Both embrace the samereality,and both do so absolutely; 'both touch the bottom of reality' (Bergson 1946,41). In the sameway,the realm of metaphysics is not purer,more complex, more delicate than that of science.Metaphysics grasps the samereality as science, but in adifferent way. Thus, spiritualism does not intend to flee from reality:itrather dwells within things. While science examines the material nature of things, metaphysics makes us understand that things also have another,s piritual dimension: duration.
Life, in short, is not onlym atter,i ti sd uration too;t he universe is not only mechanical, it also lasts. And it is within this framework that we must appreciate the debate between Einstein and Bergson and the meaningo fDuration and Simultaneity. It is easy to understand that Bergson'saim was not to correct Einstein on aphysical level nor to oppose alived time to aphysical time.F or him, it was rather aquestion of finding,inphysical time but beyond its measures,its immanent duration and, moreover,tofind in this duration all the durationsofthe universe. ForBergson there is no single physical absolute time but amultiplicityof durationsthat are constantlyweaving together and opening up to anew cosmology. And it is because the universe is duration thatother durations can be grasped by contrast with it.Philosophyhas to unfurlthis implication in order to reveal an ew cosmos.