Emotions across Cultures
Roma Sinica

Mutual interactions between Ancient Roman and Eastern Thought

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Volume 3
Emotions across Cultures

Ancient China and Greece

Edited by
David Konstan

DE GRUYTER
Preface

The present volume is the result of a workshop held in Shanghai on 17–18 October 2019, bearing the title, “Emotions between China and Greece,” sponsored by New York University, Fudan University, and New York University—Shanghai, and co-organized by the editor of this volume and Yang Huang, of Fudan University. The workshop was the successor to another, titled “Emotions across Cultures: Classical Greek and Arabic,” held in Abu Dhabi on 25–26 February 2015, sponsored by New York University and New York University—Abu Dhabi, and co-organized by David Konstan and Maurice Pomerantz. I wish to express here, on behalf of all the participants, our profound gratitude to NYU, Fudan University, and NYU-SH for their support and generous hospitality, and also to NYU’s Center for the Humanities, which generously contributed to making it possible the open access publication of this volume. I am pleased too to thank all those who attended the sessions in Shanghai for their helpful comments and contributions to the discussion. As editor, I wish particularly to acknowledge the collaboration of Yang Huang, without whom this volume would not have been possible; it is in many ways his as much as mine. Not all of the papers presented at the workshop appear here, and those that are included have been much revised for publication, but all participants are grateful for the opportunity to engage in a lively and fruitful exchange of ideas at what, to the best of our knowledge, was the first workshop ever addressed to this topic.

David Konstan, New York University
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Introduction
Comparing Emotions Historically

It is now widely accepted that the description of emotions may differ from one culture to another. The idea that there is a limited set of so-called basic emotions that are universal and readily identified across cultures, whether by facial expression or some other indicator, has been subjected to devastating criticism.\(^1\) What is more, the very idea of emotion as a distinct psychological category varies, and indeed is not identified at all in some folk taxonomies of mental faculties. Nevertheless, the emotions seem to be grounded in, or at least have some relation to, certain constants of human nature, and several theories have offered to explain just how.

One such approach is to distinguish between the immediate object of an emotion, which may vary even among individuals who live in the same society, and some property that these objects share. For example, Florian Cova and Julien Deonna observe that, despite differences in their specific objects, all the objects of a given emotion share some common feature:

Different instances of an emotion-type will have different particular objects (e.g. I may be angry at a colleague, and angry at the government), but the formal object will remain the same (e.g. if I am angry, I experience both the colleague and the government as offensive). My various episodes of fear, sadness, guilt, and so on, will be directed at and take as objects a rich variety of things, but I will always see as dangerous what I fear, see as a loss what I am sad about, and see as a wrongful act what I feel guilty about. It is an essential feature of each emotion-type that we construe the particular object of the emotion in a way that is specific to that emotion-type. In addition to the fact that it sheds light on the nature of an emotion-type, the formal object of an emotion also constitutes a feature in virtue of which it is possible to evaluate the intelligibility and the appropriateness of an emotion. For instance, we would say of an instance of fear that is directed at something that seems quite harmless and innocuous that it is unintelligible or inappropriate.\(^2\)

The difficulty with this approach is that it assumes that “emotion types” are constant across cultures. Take anger: is this the only response to something that is offensive? We may be angry at an insult, indignant at a miscarriage of justice, or

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\(^1\) For the basic emotions, cf. Ekman (1973), (1980), (1984), (1992). In response to criticism, Ekman has recently modified his view so as to accept a degree of cultural variation in the emotions.
\(^2\) Cova/Deonna (2014) 450.
disgusted by an offensive odor. Again, is guilt the only response to a wrongful act? What of languages that speak of shame but appear to have no term that quite corresponds to our notion of guilt? We may believe, as I do, that all cultures have ways of expressing personal responsibility for one’s actions, but it is not clear to me that the resulting emotions share a single “formal object.”

Gerrod Parrott and Niko Frijda have offered a different way of reducing the variety of emotions across cultures to a set of shared experiences. As Parrott has put it, we may “use the term ur-emotion to refer to the commonalities shared by otherwise different emotions of various species.” Parrott explains:

there are many differences between the emotions marah (in Indonesian), ikari (in Japanese), song (in Ifaluk), and anger (in English), but in all of them the ur-emotion of antagonism is evident – all four are aimed at an object that is appraised as interfering in some way with one’s concerns, and all four give rise to a motivation to stop that interference in different, culturally specific ways . . . The recognition of these components across cultures leads to the intuition that there is something universal about emotions, but it is a mistake to suppose that there exist universal “basic emotions” – marah, ikari, song, and anger are not the same emotion! Rather, it is the presence of the ur-emotion of antagonism that provides the intuition of universality.3

Elsewhere, Frijda and Parrott observe that ur-emotions are “intentional states” that are accompanied by a “mode of action readiness,” of which there are eighteen in all, including such postures as acceptance, attending, avoid, reject, desire, exuberance, domination, submission, tenseness, and inhibition).4 But is “antagonism” an emotion, whether ur- or otherwise? Frijda and Parrott affirm that “Ur-emotions are elicited by events as appraised,”5 which makes them look very much like regular emotions. What is it that distinguishes antagonism from, say, “anger” as the term is employed in English?

A better course may be to discriminate between emotions proper and a more elementary kind of response, analogous to emotions, to which we may, following Silvan Tomkins, apply the label “affect.”6 Tomkins himself was not consistent in the application of this distinction, and it has not had a major impact on recent psychophysiological studies of the emotions. A more systematic differentiation between emotions and proto-emotions was developed by the Stoics, and more especially by Seneca, writing in the first century A.D. On the Stoic view, certain kinds of judgment are specific to emotions in the full sense of the word and are not shared by pre- or proto-emotions. In his treatise, On

4 Frijda/Parrott (2011).
5 Frijda/Parrott (2011) 410.
Anger, Seneca gives an account of these elementary responses which calls “the initial preliminaries to emotions” (*principia proludentia adfectibus*, 2.2.6), as opposed to emotions or *adfectus* proper. He defines these preliminary reactions, which some Greek Stoics called *propatheiai* as opposed to *pathê*, as “motions that do not arise through our will,” and are therefore irresistible and do not yield to reason. Seneca provides a variegated list of these proto-emotions, which includes shivering or goose-pimples when doused with cold water, aversion to certain kinds of touch, hair rising upon hearing bad news, blushing at obscene language, vertigo produced by heights, sentiments we feel while reading or in the theater, or witnessing punishments even when they are deserved. Seneca also adds contagious laughter and sadness to the inventory.

Genuine emotions, according to Seneca, differ from these preliminary affects in that they depend on willing assent, unlike the latter, which are not subject to our will (*voluntas*) and so are “invincible and inevitable” (2.2.1). In the case of anger, for example, Seneca writes: “There is no doubt but that what arouses anger is the impression [*species*] that is presented of an offense [*iniiuria*]” (2.1.3). As Seneca says, this is similar to Aristotle’s definition of anger as “a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight [*oligoria*] on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one’s own” (*Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378a31–33). Anger is aroused by an impression of an offense – in this respect, Seneca seems to agree with Cova and Deonna – but it requires further that we assent to the proposition that the offense has wronged us. As Seneca states:

> We maintain that anger does not venture anything on its own but only when the mind approves. For to accept the impression of an injury that has been sustained and desire vengeance for it – and to unite the two judgments, that one ought not to have been harmed and that one ought to be avenged – this is not characteristic of an impulse [*impeitus*] that is aroused without our will [*voluntas*]. For the latter kind is simple, but the former is composite and contains several elements: one has discerned something, grown indignant, condemned it, and takes revenge: these things cannot occur unless the mind consents to those things by which it was affected”.

Genuine emotions involve an ability to formulate propositions to which one may give or withhold assent, based on one’s values and sense of propriety. This is what distinguishes emotion both from purely physical reactions such as goosebumps or vertigo and from the fear- or pity-like responses we may experience upon viewing a tragedy. Animals other than human beings do not possess this capacity, and so do not have emotions in the full sense of the word. As Seneca states: “We must affirm that wild animals, and all creatures apart from human beings, are without anger; for since anger is contrary to reason, it does not arise except where reason has a place. Animals have violence, rabidity,
ferocity, aggression, but do not have anger any more than they have licentiousness . . . Dumb animals lack human emotions, but they do have certain impulses that are similar to emotions.” In the terms employed by Frijda and Parrott, animals may experience the ur-emotion of antagonism, but not anger proper. As Seneca goes on to observe, animals “do not have fears and worries, sadness and anger, but rather things that are similar to these” (On Anger 1.3.4–8; in the Consolation to Marcia 5.1, Seneca remarks that animals do not experience sadness and fear, any more than stones do). If Seneca does not describe animal reactions as “preliminaries to emotions,” it is presumably because with animals there is no further stage.

I once tried to construct a set of correlations between specific emotions and pre-emotions, drawing upon various writings of Seneca. Thus, I connected shame with blushing, although Seneca notes that not everyone blushes and not all blushes are evidence of shame. I further associated grief with a primitive sense of the loss of a loved one, which even animals experience, and fear with the kind of nameless dread we may feel in a dark tunnel, even if we know that there is no real danger.7

Now let me try to apply the distinction between affect and emotion, if those are the right terms, to the development of emotional concepts over a period of some two thousand years in Greek history, that is, from Homer to the high Byzantine epoch (a comparison with modern Greek terms is the subject of Stavroula Kiritsi’s chapter). We may begin with anger. We have already seen that anger is said to involve a primitive feeling of antagonism, according to Frijda and Parrott, and by the impression of an offense, according to Cova and Deonna, as well as Seneca. But Seneca adds that we must “accept the impression of an injury that has been sustained and desire vengeance for it,” and he remarks too that anger is contrary to reason, which is one reason why animals are not susceptible to it, since they do not possess reason and so cannot experience its absence. The medical writer Galen described anger as “a sickness of the soul,” and recalled that his mother “was so very prone to anger that sometimes she bit her handmaids; she constantly shrieked at my father and fought with him.” This wariness of anger was widespread, but Christians writing under the Roman Empire had to come to terms with the fact that God was clearly subject to this passion, according to the Bible, and so it could not be entirely an evil. Thus Tertullian, writing in the second century A.D., opined that God “will grow angry rationally [indignabitur deus rationaliter] at those whom he ought to” (On the Soul 16.5), for he will be angry at those who are wicked but

7 Konstan (2016).
desire salvation for the good. Two centuries later, Lactantius noted that anger is a reaction to harm, to which God is not vulnerable, and is a perturbation of the mind, which is foreign to God’s nature (On the Anger of God 5). And yet, Lactantius says, if God is not angry at the impious and unjust, neither can he love (diligit) the pious and just, for as he loves the good, he hates (odit) those who are evil: the two emotions are inseparable. There is thus a just and an unjust anger (ira iusta et iniusta, ch. 17), and when Seneca spoke of anger as a desire for revenge (De ira 2.2), he was referring, Lactantius says, to the unjust kind; proper anger seeks rather to correct wickedness (so too Basil of Caesarea, Homily against Those who are Angry 365.26–30 Migne). But is a desire to correct evil the same emotion as a desire for revenge? Does God’s desire arise from seeing evil as offensive, as Cova and Deonna argue, or from a sense of antagonism, as Frijda and Parrott suggest? If God is indignant, as Tertullian suggests, is this the same emotion as anger – though Aristotle himself was careful to distinguish the two?

Or take pity, an emotion universally recognized in ancient accounts, for example by Aristotle (Rhetoric 2.1, 1378a20–23), Cicero (De oratore 2.206; Brutus 188), and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Demosthenes 22), though it is strikingly absent from modern discussions of the emotions, perhaps in part because it is regarded nowadays as expressing a certain contempt, and hence a politically incorrect sentiment. (David Hume already noted this negative side of pity.) It is missing too from Thomas Hobbes’ list of “seven simple passions” (Leviathan Part 1, chapter 6) and from Descartes’ “principal passions” (Les passions de l’âme, articles 68–69).

Aristotle provides a characteristic definition (Rhetoric 2.8.2): “Let pity, then, be a kind of pain in the case of an apparent destructive or painful harm to a person who does not deserve to encounter it, which one might expect oneself, or one of one’s own, to suffer, and this when it seems near.” We may note first the specification that the misfortune that elicits pity must be undeserved; as Cicero puts it, “no one is moved by pity at the punishment of a parricide or a traitor” (Tusculan Disputations 4.18; cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 1386b26–29). Second, to feel pity one must be vulnerable, according to Aristotle, to the same kind of adversity as the person who is pitied, though not actually suffering it at the moment (for then one no longer expects it). This is a crucial restriction: Aristotle himself observes that those who have been prosperous all their lives, and so do not anticipate calamities, are less given to pity. On this basis, an omnipotent deity would be wholly incapable of such an emotion. The case is further complicated by the Stoic view of the emotions, developed in the generation after Aristotle’s death, according to which the sage was entirely free of passions, including pity (see Seneca De clementia 2.5). Among other drawbacks, pity, like anger,
threatens to distort the judgment, rendering one unduly lenient in assigning punishment and hence corrupting the judge. Such an emotion seems inappropriate to a strictly just deity, who would be expected to be as little moved by favor as by ire.

What, then, of the Jewish and Christian idea of a merciful God? Gregory of Nyssa, writing in the fourth century A.D., affirms in his sermon on the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are those who pity, for they shall be pitied” (Matthew 5:7): “The obvious meaning of the text summons human beings to be loving and sympathetic to each other because of the unfairness and inequality of human affairs.” He then offers a definition of pity as “a voluntary pain that arises at the misfortunes of others” (On the Beatitudes 44.1252.28–30). Aware that this brisk statement may need further explanation, Gregory adds: “Pity is a loving shared disposition [ἀγαπητικὴ συνδιάθεσις] with those who are suffering under painful circumstances.” We may note first that Gregory’s definition takes no account of whether the misfortunes are merited: it simply preaches a universal sympathy for the plight of others. What is more, the notion of a shared disposition suggests a merging of identities that is characteristic of modern definitions of sympathy. Thus Adam Smith observes that when we pity another, “By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations.” Today, this sentiment looks less like pity than like compassion or empathy, a modern coinage dating to the nineteenth century (indeed, the Latin noun compassionio is found for the first time in Tertullian). If pity has been displaced by sympathy or empathy as a basic emotion, is there any core affect subtending the two sentiments that may be said to unites them? Seneca includes the feeling we experience upon seeing people being punished even when we know that they deserve it under the rubric of preliminaries to emotion, and this might be a good candidate for the ur-sentiment that lies behind both classical pity and Christian mercy or compassion.

Fear would seem to be a universal sentiment, and yet it too is subject to different interpretations. We might associate fear with an instinctive drive to flee, but often it motivates us to fight back. Aristotle defines it as follows: “let fear be a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from an impression of a future evil that is destructive or painful . . ., these if they are not distant but rather seem near so as to impend. For things that are remote are not greatly feared” (Rhetoric 2.5, 1382a21–25). This sounds something like Cova and Deonna’s “formal object” of fear, of which they write: “I will always see as dangerous what I fear.” It may also remind us of one of Frijda and Parrott’s “modes of action readiness,” namely “avoid.” Aristotle, however, goes on to say that fear makes us more deliberative (2.5, 1382a5), and so helps us to make wise decisions, for
example about whether or not to go to war against a powerful enemy. In itself, it is not paralyzing; rather, it encourages a careful calculation of the balance of forces.

We might detect an analogous attitude toward fear in Paul’s advice to the Philippians: “work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure” (2:12; cf. 2Corinthians 7:15, 1Corinthians 2:3, Ephesians 6:5). Fear would seem here to be a motive to rational reflection. In his homilies on Paul’s letter to the Philippians, John Chrysostom expatiates on the phrase:

What do you want, Paul? Tell me. “Not for you to listen to me but with fear and trembling to work for your own salvation. I mean, it’s not possible for the person who lives without fear to display something authentic and wonderful.” And he didn’t say simply “fear,” but “and trembling,” which is an intense manifestation of fear. That’s the fear that Paul had. That’s why he said too: “I’m afraid that after preaching to others, I myself should be disqualified” (1 Corinthians 9:27). For if it’s not possible to conduct our temporal business successfully without fear, how much more so our spiritual business? Tell me, who learns to read and write without fear? Who becomes master of a craft without fear . . . ? Tell me, if you were continually standing next to the ruler, wouldn’t you be standing in fear? And if you’re standing beside God now, can you laugh and be laid back and not be afraid or even shudder? Don’t despise his forbearance: his patience is leading you towards repentance . . . If you continually have this attitude, you’ll continually be in fear and trembling, the reason being that you’re standing next to the king.8

We might say that the good Christian is terrified of damnation, surely an impending and painful evil, and so conforms to Aristotle’s conception of fear. But the anxiety that John Chrysostom describes is more existential, and pertains to a personal sense of sinfulness: it is this that is the immediate cause of trembling, and inspires not avoidance but repentance, a rather different kind of reaction.

If we extend our purview to the Byzantine era, we find that once again there is a notable shift of emphasis. There is a new attention to sentiments such as joy [terpsis] and wonder [thauma], for example the amazement or awe inspired by gazing at the nighttime sky (Theodore Metochites, Sententious Remarks 43). Wonder, moreover, is said to be inspired by what is incomprehensible [tói de alēptōi thaumazētai] (Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 38.7). Another prevailing passion is something like astonishment. As Symeon the New Theologian writes: “Whoever has inside the light of the most holy Spirit, cannot endure to see it and falls head-on on the ground. He shouts and yells in amazement [ekplêxei] and fear by seeing and experiencing a thing that is beyond nature, word, or thought”

(Theological and Practical Chapters 3.21). John Sikeliotes (eleventh century), in his commentary on the ancient rhetorical writer Hermogenes, includes in his list of the primary emotions “the painful” (to lupron), “the marvelous” (to thau-mastikon), “the shocking” (to skhetliastikon), and “the grievous” (to thrênetikon), which sound like states of intense feeling rather than the kinds of object-directed emotions that ancient thinkers like Aristotle had in mind. Ur-emotions may well be discovered to lie behind each of these sentiments, but they may not resemble those that Frijda and Parrott identified for the emotions they explored. Or perhaps they are more like Seneca’s proto-emotions, which are involuntary and not subject to assent.

In her book, The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy, Curie Virág quotes a passage from the Analects, in which Confucius explains to his disciple, Zigong, how to describe his teacher: “Why did you not just say, ‘He is the type of man who becomes so impassioned (fa fen 發憤) that he forgets to eat, who becomes so full of joy (le 樂) that he forgets his worries (wang you 忘憂), and who does not notice the coming of old age?” (7.19).9 I do not know whether the formal objects of these sentiments resemble those that Cova and Deonna identify for their list of emotions, or whether there are ur-emotions or Stoic pre-emotions that cross the boundaries between ancient Greek and Chinese accounts of the passions. Perhaps there are some universals that we can elicit, such as the idea of phrikê or “shuddering” that Douglas Cairns has explored to such excellent effect,10 that will subtend Aristotelian fear, Pauline trembling, Theodore Metochites’ wonder, and even Chinese ju 懼, not to mention the Arabic al-shidda, “literally, pressure, intensity, strength” but also signifying “disaster, hardship, misfortune, harm, calamity, pain,” according to Lale Behzadi.11

Recent accounts of the emotions have recognized that they have an indispensable cognitive dimension. In fact, some theorists, both ancient and modern, have gone so far as to affirm that the emotions are nothing but judgments. Richard Lazarus, one of the founders of the approach that nowadays goes under the name of appraisal theory, has stated: “cognition is both a necessary and sufficient condition of emotion.” Robert Solomon, another of the leading figures in the discipline, put it succinctly: “emotions are judgments.”12 Interestingly, Lazarus traces the genealogy of this method straight back to Aristotle: “those

9 Virág (2017) 45.
11 Behzadi (n.d.).
12 Solomon (1993) viii (italics in the original). Contrast, for example, the still lively conviction that emotions are the very opposite of reason, or at least of what we might call propositional knowledge.
who favor a cognitive-mediational approach must also recognize that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* more than two thousand years ago applied this kind of approach to a number of emotions in terms that seem remarkably modern.”

We may contrast this emphatically cognitive view with the traditional attitude toward emotions, according to which they are irrational and quite without intellectual input. To take just one recent example among many, Hartmut Böhme, in a chapter bearing “Gefühl” or “Feeling,” which appeared in a German handbook on historical anthropology, asserts that any connection between feelings and knowledge must be ironic, “since where the latter is, the former is not.” Böhme concludes by citing the famous verses from Heinrich Heine’s lovely poem, “Lorelei”: “Ich weiß nicht, was soll es bedeuten, dass ich so traurig bin” (“I don’t know what it may mean, that I am so sad”). Böhme explains: “Feelings mean nothing. They intend nothing. And they are not intended.” It is certainly true that we sometimes find ourselves feeling blue without being able to say precisely why. We all have moods, after all. But is a mood an emotion? And might the difference between a mood and an emotion be just that emotions require some kind of reflection on the reasons why we fell them? But consider the following example: You are standing on a street corner, just off the curb, and someone suddenly gives you a rough shove from behind, thrusting you forward. You will certainly have a reaction, and most likely you will identify it as anger. Now suppose you learn that you had been standing in the path of an oncoming car, and the person who pushed you in fact saved your life. Will you still be angry? Doubtless, the surge of adrenalin, or whatever it was that felt like an intense emotion when you were shoved, will still be there; one does not calm down at once. But as soon as you realize what the person’s motive was, your anger dissolves and gives way, very likely, to something like gratitude. So the feeling itself isn’t anger. But what about the anger you felt at first, before you became aware of the reason why you were pushed? Then too, you were evaluating the other person’s intention, imagining, reasonably enough, that she or he was either deliberately jostling you or else was so careless as to be indifferent to the consequences – another form of insult or abuse.

And yet, in spite of the crisp statement by Solomon, it is hard to believe that emotions are in fact nothing but judgments. Would a wholly disembodied mind experience emotions? Or, as the early Christians wondered, does God, who is immaterial, have emotions? Let’s imagine that I’ve been shoved from

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behind, as in the anecdote related above, but I have no perceptible physical reaction at all, apart from that of falling forward (of course, if I really didn’t have a body, it would be hard for someone to jostle me). I am conscious of having been pushed, and I raise my arms to protect myself as I lurch forward, but there is no tension. I may wonder why someone might have pushed me, and consider that it may have been an accident or, conceivably, intentional. I have reason to suppose, then, that an offense of some sort has been committed against me, but I feel no passion, it is simply a fact that I register. Would we call this anger? Probably not. Emotions, or at least emotions like anger, are not incorporeal experiences. As many researchers have argued, emotions are necessarily embodied. Indeed, there is even talk of “the bodily turn” in emotional psychology, as in other areas of philosophy and psychology. Barbara H. Rosenwein and Riccardo Cristiani, in their article, “Old and New in the History of Emotions,” note how, in the wake of the largely cognitive interpretations developed by Peter Stearns, William Reddy, and Rosenwein herself, among others, the medievalist Gerd Althoff advanced the argument by stressing the role of the body in “the emotional displays of medieval rulers.”\(^{15}\) As the authors remark, Althoff’s “point was not that the body was the seat of emotions, but rather that in the Middle Ages people in power used their bodies to communicate their policies, their religious piety, their favor and disfavor.” Rosenwein and Cristiani go on to observe: “More recent directions may be styled as a turn to the body, a turn that rejects cognitivism’s sway.” But this is not to say that emotions are just reflections of bodily states, and William James had argued. Rather, this new approach “considers the body itself to be socially constructed. Of course, the human body has consisted – and no doubt always will – of nerves and muscles, hearts and stomachs, skin and bones.” But these organic features “are subject to the same social, environmental, and epigenetic factors as every other element of human life and behavior.”

How the body is socially constructed, and how this bears on the nature of the emotions, may seem opaque. If a modern physiologist were to describe the physical aspect of anger or any other emotion, she or he would naturally have recourse to such things as hormones, muscle tension, heartbeat, body temperature, galvanic skin response, and so forth. Now consider this extract from an ancient Chinese medical text some two thousand or so years old, called the Su Wen: “When essence qi 氣 collects in the heart, joy results. When it collects in the lung, sadness results. When it collects in the liver, anxiety results. When it collects in the spleen, fright results. When it collects in the kidneys, fear results.

\(^{15}\) Rosenwein/Cristiani (2018) 41.
These are the so-called ‘the five accumulations’” (23). This sounds as though it is a theory of emotion, positing a one-to-one correspondence between different emotions and bodily organs. But these same organs have other functions as well. “The heart is the official functioning as ruler. Spirit brilliance originates in it. The lung is the official functioning as chancellor and mentor. Order and moderation originate in it. The liver is the official functioning as general. Planning and deliberation originate in it. The gallbladder is the official functioning as rectifier. Decisions and judgments originate in it” (Su Wen 3). Cognition would appear to be distributed among the several inner organs, and not confined to the single region of the brain. That the organs corresponding to the several emotions enumerated have multiple functions suggests that there is no central location that is identified with emotion as such, and perhaps no reason to think that the emotions were thought of as constituting a specific class, even though five apparent emotions are listed in a row. The mysterious entity qi itself has a much wider application, and cannot be reduced to some kind of emotional energy.

If we switch to Greek sources, we might find some support for the mentalist conception of the emotions in a comment in one of the treatises in the Hippocratic corpus, a collection that ranges over a century or so. Thus, in the work entitled On the Sacred Disease, we read: “It ought to be generally known that the source of our pleasure, merriment, laughter and amusement, as of our grief, pain, anxiety and tears, is none other than the brain” (14 = 6.386–87 Littré). Here, everything is located in one place, the ruling function according to some ancient schools (especially the Stoics); but emotions are mixed up with other phenomena like pain, laughter, and tears, and it is not clear that they form a distinct class. What’s more, this is an exceptional view in the corpus. Other contemporary texts place the seat of at least some emotions in other parts of the psyche, or as we might call it, the self. Thus anger is, as we will see, often associated with a function called the thumos, which, however, is not necessary conceived of as the seat of love or shame. Depending, then, on how the psyche or self is subdivided, in one or another popular or quasi-scientific taxonomy, the emotions too will be differently distributed, and in the process be paired with other sentiments or faculties that to our way of thinking have little to do with emotions as such. All of which suggests that there is nothing natural or inevitable about our modern category of emotion, which, as we have seen, is highly elastic and very variously construed.

Still in connection with the body, emotions are often associated with gestures, such as lowering the eyes in the case of shame, clenching teeth, making a fist, and many more. These movements are not uniform across cultures, though they may have some basis in nature or evolution, as Darwin argued with a wealth of examples from human beings around the world and various species of animals. Facial expressions in particular as a cue to emotion have been extensively studied, though the results have been subjected to criticism from various angles, and any necessary connection between a given look, such as wide eyes or a smile or a frown, and a specific emotion turns out to be highly problematic. Yet emotions have been thought to involve some sort of expression, however imprecise. If a person were to receive a strong dose of Botox, immobilizing facial expression altogether, we might suppose that it would not only inhibit one of the natural means by which our feelings are communicated to others but might even affect our very capacity to experience emotion. Some studies have suggested that an injection of botulinum toxin, which paralyzes the area between the eyebrows and hence renders frowning impossible, impairs the capacity to recognize emotions in others, presumably because responding to an emotion requires at least in part that we ourselves mimic it physically.¹⁷

A further physical aspect of emotion has to do with what is sometimes called action readiness. When we are afraid, we may run away from the danger but also brace to face it, or else, in certain circumstances, feel paralyzed: the alternatives are indicated alliteratively as flight, fight, or freeze. Shame may make us want to hide; envy can arouse a desire to handicap our rivals or else to work harder and outstrip them. When we pity others, we may be moved to help alleviate their suffering. From the physiology of emotions, to their expression and the desire they may induce to act, we see that emotions are not detachable from the body, purely mental entities that can be wholly captured in judgments that assume a propositional form. But again, judgments that are not necessarily accompanied by emotions may also lead us to act. As Seneca remarked, we do not need to be angry to stop a killer, or to defend ourselves against an enemy. In fact, strong emotion may get in the way of effective action. The Athenian Xenophon, who was among the disciples of Socrates and was also a distinguished general who guided the Ten Thousand out of Persia, composed a sequel to Thucydides’ History, called Hellenica. In the course of this work, Xenophon describes a scene in which a general leads his troops against a city in a fit of rage (orgistheis), with the result that he himself is slain and his men massacred (5.3.5–6). Xenophon draws the conclusion (5.3.7) that masters ought not

even to punish slaves in anger, and that by doing so they frequently suffer more harm than they inflict. He explains: “to attack opponents in anger and without intelligence [gnômê] is a complete mistake, for anger is without forethought, but intelligence looks as much to avoiding harm to oneself as to doing harm to one’s enemies.” Anger indeed leads to action, but is ill advised, and the clear implication is that reason alone is a better guide. And yet, some modern studies of emotion have suggested that emotions may serve to focus our attention on a given object, and in this respect they allow us to act more rationally, at least in certain circumstances, rather than less. Aristotle, indeed, affirmed that fear makes people more deliberative, which may strike us as paradoxical. But, as we shall see, this is yet another way in which the comparative study of emotion may cause us to rethink our own conceptions.

We commonly experience emotions when we read a novel or watch a play or a movie, or when listening to music. But we do not normally leap up in fear and run out of the cinema, or seek to rescue a character whose sufferings are reported on the printed page. Aristotle famously defined the emotions proper to tragedy as pity and fear. Are these, then, truncated emotions that we feel, in which the action tendency has been somehow repressed? Or do such ostensibly aesthetic emotions, aroused by works of art rather than real life, have a distinct nature of their own? Saint Augustine reproached himself for feeling pity for Dido as he read Virgil’s Aeneid, a fictional character whose misfortunes were unreal, while his heart remained unmoved by the distress of actual human beings.

One potential window on the way in which the emotions are conceived is the metaphors by which they are described. Anger today is often associated with heat, as in expressions such as “my anger was boiling” (here the idea of a container is also in evidence). One can be sunk or mired in grief, and wallow in self-pity. Often we speak of growing cold with terror, and physical symptoms such as shuddering, shivering or turning different colors (as in red with shame) may stand in for various feelings. Some regard the recourse to metaphors as universal, having its origin in the need to express what is abstract or hidden by reference to things that are perceptible to all. The assumption behind this approach, which picks out what are called conceptual metaphors, is that at some early stage of language acquisition such subtle ideas as time or sadness were beyond the linguistic capacity of our ancestors, and so they borrowed imagery from the visible world to denote them. Thus, time is treated as a path, with spatial distance transferred to temporal; sadness is associated with a downward direction, perhaps because of the shape of frown, whereas happiness is up. Even today we speak of feeling down, but for us that is a kind of dead metaphor, since we have developed a vocabulary to express mental or interior events.
Originally, the theory goes, such metaphors were the only way in which these states could be articulated. Attempts have been made to identify universal metaphors and the emotions to which they correspond, thereby presupposing that what we call emotions constitutes a natural category, and that its members are shared by all cultures. The common physiology of the human body accounts, for example, for the image of the body as a container.

Zoltán Kövecses, one of the leading exponents of conceptual metaphor theory, offers a more nuanced version, according to which the body does not entirely determine the metaphors; rather, it sets limits to the their nature, so that in no culture will such metaphors contradict human physiology. As he writes: “My view is that, given the universal real physiology, members of different cultures cannot conceptualize their emotions in a way that contradicts universal physiology (or maybe even their conceptualization of universal physiology); but nevertheless they can choose to conceptualize their emotions in many different ways within the constraints imposed on them by universal physiology.”

The method has been fruitfully applied to ancient emotion terminology, as we shall see. I have some reservations about its theoretical underpinnings, which retain, I fear, some hidden assumptions about “primitive minds,” but the approach does indeed illuminate multiple folk conceptions of the self as a psychophysical unity. Such metaphors, however, do not necessarily reveal what the several emotions have in common, and so do not provide evidence that they were, at any given time and place, gathered into a single class.

So far, I have been calling into question the overall category of emotion, since it is so easy to take for granted that our conception of emotion is somehow natural and universal. As Anna Wierzbicka, an expert on language, has remarked, scientists have a tendency to “absolutize the English folk-taxonomy of the emotions.” In fact, something like the modern English assortment of emotions did emerge in classical antiquity, specifically with Aristotle. Richard Lazarus’ remark about Aristotle’s apparently prescient cognitive interpretation of the emotions may have an even wider relevance to modern conceptions that he suggested. Even so, we have to be cautious about assuming an easy equation between Aristotle’s understanding of emotion and our own (to the extent that there is a single modern view, even among speakers of English).

As I indicated earlier, although there may be no universal consensus on just what sentiments or responses to group together under the heading “emotion,” it is nevertheless possible to discuss given emotions in a historical perspective. But

18 Kövecses (2000) 165; emphasis in the original.
here too, we must be always on guard for unsuspected differences, sometimes so
great as to leave us wondering whether we are really dealing with the same emo-
tion then and now. One of the stimuli to my own research on ancient Greek emo-
tions was a pair of affirmations by Aristotle concerning the nature of anger. First,
he claimed that we do not get angry with people of whom we are afraid. This
seemed quite contrary to my own intuitions concerning anger. And then he said
we do not tend to be angry with people who are afraid of us. Both statements
seemed so odd to me that I was moved to wonder whether Aristotle and I shared
the same notion of anger. After all, his word for anger was *orgê*, not “anger.” By
what right did I assume that *orgê* and anger meant exactly the same thing? Anna
Wierzbicka noted the problem pointedly in her rejoinder to a statement by Paul
Ekman, the leading representative of the view that the emotions are hard-wired
in us, and so are universal, independent of cultural differences. Ekman had writ-
ten: “Regardless of the language, of whether the culture is Western or Eastern,
industrialized or preliterate, these facial expressions [reproduced in photographs
in the text] are labelled with the same emotion terms: happiness, sadness, anger,
fear, disgust and surprise.” Of course, it was a casual slip on Ekman’s part to
say that, “regardless of language,” the expressions were identified as “happi-
ness, sadness, etc.” Those are plainly English words. But it is revealing of our
natural tendency to imagine that the emotions conform in their very nature to
our own lexicon, and to set aside the possibility that others might describe them,
and indeed even feel them, in ways that differ from our own.

As it happens, the term for anger, or that is most commonly translated as
“anger,” in the Homeric epics is not *orgê* – that word doesn’t appear at all – but
rather *kholos*, which is related to the word for bile. Ought we, then, to be on the
lookout for subtle differences in connotation between the two terms? One ten-
dency in modern scholarship, no longer dominant but still influential, has sup-
posed that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* reflect an early stage in the evolution of Greek,
or indeed human, thought, and a correspondingly distinct, even primitive con-
ception of the self. Bruno Snell, the most important figure in this tradition,
went so far as to deny that Homer had a coherent idea of the self at all. In his
published in German in 1946, and translated into English in 1953), wrote: “It
has long been observed that in comparatively primitive speech abstractions are

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21 Wierzbicka 1999: 168. Cf. Harris (2001) 36: “The study of classical emotions has been seri-
ously impeded by our failure to realize, with a few noteworthy exceptions, that the relevant
Greek and Latin terminology is very unlikely to correspond neatly to modern English usage.”
as yet undeveloped.”22 Thus, there is no word in the epics that corresponds to “sight” in English, “and if they had no word for it, it follows that as far as they were concerned it did not exist” (p. 5). The same is true of the idea of the body, according to Snell. And, finally, “Homer has no one word to characterize the mind or soul” (p. 8). Given such a worldview, or view of the self, it would seem reasonable to wonder whether a putatively Homeric conception of anger or any other emotion would correspond not just to ours but even to Aristotle’s, since Aristotle very clearly did have a term for “sight” and the rest. And yet, I am inclined to see more continuity than difference in the understanding of anger from Homer to Aristotle, a view that Aristotle himself evidently shared. The question cannot be settled once and for all, and what is more, even if Homer and Aristotle are in agreement with respect to anger, it does not follow that this coincidence obtains for all the emotions. There may well be emotions, or what we would regard as emotions, that appear in the Homeric epics but not in Aristotle, and vice versa. This is what makes the history of emotions such a fascinating field of investigation.

A study of the history of emotions must look beyond formal philosophical works, with their precise definitions and classifications. It is true that Aristotle, along with the Stoics, gives us the most explicit accounts, and these are enormously helpful, even indispensable tools. But there are many other kinds of evidence, in Greek and in Chinese, whether epic, drama, novels, historical works, dialogues, and more, in which we can see emotions in action. First and foremost, we want to know how the ancients conceived of the emotions, but it is also important to see how they played out in life. To take one example, it is only recently that we have seen serious studies of the role of emotions in politics, or in economic behavior. As G.E. Marcus observed back in the year 2000, “It has been common, at least since Madison [the reference is to The Federalist Papers], to treat emotion as an unavoidable factor in politics that should be constrained and minimized so that reason dictates judgment with minimal distraction.”23 But, as we have already seen adumbrated in the citation from Xenophon’s Hellenica above, ancient historians were intensely alive to how emotions affected judgments in politics and war. The fact that Aristotle’s major discussion of the emotions is to be found in his treatise on rhetoric is a sign of their crucial role in the courts as well as in the assembly. To take an especially dramatic and disturbing instance, I have found that appeals to emotion function differently in

22 Snell (1953) 1.
23 Marcus (2000) 221.
ancient examples of mass extermination than they do in the way modern motivations for genocide are represented.24

The chapters that follow treat a variety of emotions in classical and mediaeval Greek and Chinese writings. A study of anxiety or worry in Chinese divinatory and medical texts is followed by a study of hope as an emotion in Plato and Aristotle. The notion of daring in Chinese documents is followed, in turn, by an examination of anger in Greek and Roman texts. This chapter leads, in turn, to an overview of hatred and revenge in ancient China. The next two chapters treat emotions in performance: first, a discussion of tragic emotions as conceived by the Greeks, both in antiquity and in the modern reception of ancient tragedy, and then a cross-cultural investigation of emotions in classical Greece, China, and India. The last two chapters examine gendered patterns of emotion in Chinese biographies of emotions, and, finally, an analysis of the concept of practical wisdom in relation to the emotions in Xúnzǐ’s ethical theory. Taken together, the chapters not only treat a variety of sentiments, or experiences, that exhibit the wide range of the category “emotion,” but they do so from a variety of perspectives and theoretical commitments. This is all to the good: the comparative study of the history of emotions is still in its infancy, and for that very reason we have not seen fit to impose a single formula or format for this volume. Some chapters cover a multitude of sources, others focus on a single author; some are lengthier, others shorter, according to the nature of the topic and the approach. For the most part, the essays treat either Chinese or Greek emotions (the outstanding exception is John Kirby’s chapter), and comparisons across the two cultures are left to the reader to infer. At this stage of research, juxtaposition is itself methodologically justifiable, prior to the framing of an overarching theory. We trust, then, that the chapters collected here may serve as a springboard to further research and analysis.

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You are What Eats at You: Anxiety in Medieval Chinese Divinatory and Medical Manuals

Historians of emotions have long recognized the difficulties in studying emotions in history. One immediate question is whether people in the past (or in different cultures, for that matter) experienced the same emotions as we now understand them, in other words, the question of universalism vs. constructivism. The second problem is the limited array of sources for studying emotions. Written documents remain the main point of access to the emotions of historical actors. Therefore, historians deal more with language and texts than with other kinds of evidence for emotions, including introspection. On top of the first two difficulties is the third one: different emotions are hardly clear-cut in practice. They are not only interrelated, but also mutually transformable. Therefore, identifying what historical actors really felt is an even more slippery task.¹

One response to these difficulties is to explore the normative theorization of emotions in history. This approach aims to understand how certain individuals or communities of people thought about the meaning of emotions and how they should function in reality. The normative nature of this approach circumvents the problem of what historical actors really felt. It also justifies the use of written documents, since these are the principal source of thought about emotions. Although focusing on the normative side of emotions, this approach may nevertheless shed light on how such theorizations reflect emotions in social practice.²

But can we go further to explore how people “practiced” emotions in history? We might never be able to reconstruct the somatic and psychological details of a historical figure, but as Peter Stearns and others have proposed, we can still understand better in what social contexts certain emotions were expected and permissible; how people used emotive languages to communicate with each other; and how social hierarchies defined and affected emotions.³

In this chapter, I examine how emotions are practiced in two contexts: divination and medicine. I focus particularly on “worry,” or you 憂, a feeling that is common to these two contexts. The divination context not only helps us understand when and about what topics worry was regarded as permissible, but also reveals how “worry” was connected to other emotions and mental acts, especially deliberation. The medical context informs us also about when worry came to be seen as excessive in medieval China and what interventions, such as medicine, were available. While noting excessive worry, medical practices in medieval China also localized worry in the human body in order to understand what causes worry and what worry in turn causes. Furthermore, I compare “worry” in divinatory and medical practices with worry in intellectual discourses as in Confucius’ Analects and Xunzi, so as to display worry along a spectrum from normative discourse to social practices.

1 From Worry to You, and You to Worry

By “worry,” I refer to the uneasiness that people experience, whether ephemeral or lasting, in relation to specific or general concerns. In imperial China (221 BCE–1911 CE), this experience was often called you 憂 in Classical and Literary Chinese. The linguist Christoph Harbsmeier associates the English “worry” with the word you in the definition: “DISTRESS CAUSED BY THINKING about something PRESENT OR FUTURE, which is DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT.” Harbsmeier’s capitalization in the definition highlights several distinctive features of the concept: (1) it is a feeling of distress, (2) it is induced by thinking, (3) the content of the thought is something dangerous or difficult, and (4) it is in the present or the future. In the rest of the chapter, we shall see all these features, even though they do not necessarily cluster in a single case in medieval China.

4 The other commonly used word for “worry” is chou 憂. See Middendorf (2001) 177–222, Chen Mudan (2016) 42. For a longer list of words related to worry, see the words under the synonym group label “worry” in Christoph Harbsmeier’s Thesaurus Linguiae Sericae, http://tls.uni-hd.de/procSearch/procSearchSynGroup.lasso, last visited 2019.08.29.
5 See the synonym group label “worry” in Christoph Harbsmeier’s Thesaurus Linguiae Sericae, http://tls.uni-hd.de/procSearch/procSearchSynGroup.lasso, last visited 2019.08.29.
6 Apart from Harbsmeier’s definition, I have chosen the English word “worry” to render the Classical and Literary Chinese word you 憂 because both words can refer to anxiety in the most common and general way in their respective languages. Functioning both as a verb and a noun, they can indicate either the state of anxiety or the process of becoming anxious. The other fitting English rendering is “concern,” which, like you, can also refer to something
However, you is more than what we think of as “worry” in English. The character you can refer in Classical Chinese to what we think of as several distinctive feelings. Besides the most common meaning “worry,” it can also signify “sadness” and “sorrow,” in relation to mournful events that happened in the past. This is particularly the case for the practice “filial mourning,” or you 悼, where a man is expected to resign from his official position for a period of time to mourn for the loss of his parent. Less commonly, the character can also mean “fear.” These three meanings can be distinct in idiomatic usages, but are not always distinguishable in a given context, for they all point to feelings in respect to threats.7

To help specify the meaning in a given context, it is worth noting that you often appears in binomes or compounds in Literary Chinese with similar semantic meanings. For “worry,” Literary Chinese has youlü 憂慮 and younian 憂念, where the second character refers to the action of deliberation.8 For “sadness,” there is youshang 憂傷, you’ai 憂哀, and youbei 憂悲, where the second character denotes the feeling of pain and sorrow.9 “Worry” and “sadness” are not always distinguishable, however, as in the case of you-chou 憂愁, where both characters can mean worry or sadness. For “fear,” Literary Chinese has youbu 憂怖 and youkong 憂恐, where the second character specifies precisely fear.10 In addition, Literary Chinese also has binomes that combine worry with anger, such as youhui 憂恚. These words form a set of feelings of distress, showing the close relationship between worry, fear, anger, and sadness.

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7 As Joanna Bourke points out, power and social hierarchy can influence and decide whether an individual is perceiving anxiety or fear. See Bourke (2003) 126–7.
2 Recommended Worry: The Intellectual Discourses

In modern times, we tend to avoid worry. This is not only because it is an intuitively unpleasant feeling, but also because it has been pathologized as a disorder that needs to be cured. But this was not always the case. In this section, we will see how worry was transformed from a negative feeling to a positive virtue in the literati discourse of traditional China. In this transformation, morality and the identity of the literati played a significant role.

To Confucius (551–479 BCE), worry was a negative feeling that was related to morality. Famously in the Analects (Lunyu 論語), Confucius said:

知者不惑，仁者不憂，勇者不懼。12

The wise person does not become confused, the benevolent person does not become worried, and the courageous person does not become scared.

Here Confucius affirms that virtues, in this case wisdom, benevolence, and courage, can ward off certain negative feelings, such as confusion, worry, and fear, respectively. Benevolence is the “cure” for worry.

On another occasion, Confucius’s disciple Sima Niu 司馬牛 asked what a gentleman (junzi 君子) was, and the master answered:

君子不憂不懼。

曰:不憂不懼，斯謂之君子已乎?

子曰:內省不疚，夫何憂何懼?13

Gentlemen do not worry or fear.

[Sima Niu] said: “Is it being a gentleman at all, to not worry nor fear?”

The Master said: “What is there to worry about or fear if one reflects and there is no regret?”

In this conversation, being free of worry is a sign of a gentleman, who is morally superior to ordinary people. Answering his disciple’s question, Confucius further points out why this is so: if a person does no wrong according to the moral rules, he should not and will not worry. For Confucius, being a gentleman is to fulfill one’s moral duty. Benevolence, as part of that duty, calls for

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11 Horwitz/Wakefield (2012).
doing what you would expect others do to you in the same social situation. A benevolent person carries out the proper actions without wrongdoing, and thus eliminates the feelings that derive from regret, or jiu 疚, which is the source for fear and worry.

Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 310–235 BCE) also saw worry as a feature that distinguishes petty people (xiaoren 小人) from gentlemen. He cites a conversation putatively between Confucius and his disciple Zilu 子路:

Zilu asked Confucius: “Do gentlemen also worry (you 憂)?”

Confucius said: “When gentlemen have not achieved something, they enjoy (le 樂) the idea of it. When they have already achieved it, again they enjoy the management of it. Therefore, they have lifelong joy without a single day of worry. When petty people have not achieved something, they worry about not achieving it. When they have already achieved it, again they worry about losing it. Therefore, they have lifelong worry without a single day of joy.”

In this conversation, worry is the opposite of joy (le 樂), the main Classical Chinese word for the feeling of pleasure. This conversation also implies a sense of contentment: gentlemen are satisfied with what they have, while petty people focus on what they do not have. In this way, worry is an emotion that derives from dissatisfaction with one’s situation. According to Xunzi, the movement of the universe, or the way of Heaven, is consistent, and was translated into rites and moral codes by the ancient sage kings. Accordingly, one will have a fulfilled life by following the way of Heaven, especially by observing the rites and moral codes. Gentlemen know their allotment from Heaven, so they are constantly satisfied. In contrast, petty people are ignorant of their allotment from Heaven, so they constantly worry about their life. For Confucius and Xunzi, worry indicated either a lack of knowledge or moral inferiority.

Soon, however, worry came to be celebrated. In the 1st century BCE compilation Garden of Persuasions (Shuiyuan 說苑) by Liu Xiang 劉向 (77–6 BCE), it was considered to be a painful, but productive feeling:

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14 For a more complete picture of Confucius’s thought especially on the virtue of benevolence, see the relevant chapters in Goldin (2011), Van Norden (2007).
16 For a seminal study on le in Early China, see Nylan (2001) 73–124.
先憂事者後樂，先傲事者後憂。18

The one who first worries about matters at hand will be happy later; the one who first looks down on matters at hand will be worried later.

This passage cleverly highlights the two sides of worry: the act of thinking and the feeling of uneasiness. The first “worry” in the passage looks to an uneasy concern about matters at hand, which results, however, in the positive feeling of happiness. That is to say, worry leads to deliberation and preparation of one’s affairs, which in turn brings about a happy ending. By contrast, a lack of worry in dealing with immediate affairs leads to an absence of deliberation and consequent failure, which in turn results in a feeling of uneasiness. In this case, worry is not just a feeling of apprehension as it was for Xunzi; it is also tied to deliberation that can shape the future.

Many literati in imperial China considered worry an appropriate action when facing troubles. For example, a passage from the Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露) from the 2nd century CE relates:

魯桓忘其憂而禍逮其身。齊桓憂其憂而立功名。推而散之。凡人有憂而不知憂者凶，有憂而深憂之者吉。19

Duke Huan of the State of Lu forgot his worries, and troubles found him; Duke Huan of the State of Qi worried about his worries and established his achievements. Deducing from [their stories], it is inauspicious if someone has something worrisome, but they do not know to worry; it is auspicious if someone has something worrisome, and they deeply worry about it.20

Summarizing several historical anecdotes, the passage distinguishes worry from the worrisome. The historical figures Duke Huan of Lu and Duke Huan of Qi each had his own troubles, or “something worrisome” (you 憂) to cope with. The neglect of these troubles, or “forgetting the worries,” does not make them go away but leads to even bigger disturbances. Like the passage in Garden of Persuasions, to worry voluntarily does not just mean to feel uneasy, but also to deliberate on solutions to what is worrisome. The passage then distills a general rule: in facing troubles, worry makes a difference between life and death.

20 Also see the translation of this part and the whole section in Queen and Major (2015) 109.
By the 11th century CE, worry became morally attached to the virtue of a gentleman. The most famous example is from Fan Zhongyan’s 范仲淹 (989–1052) “The Record of the Yueyang Tower” ("Yueyang Lou ji" 岳陽樓記):

嗟夫!予嘗求古仁人之心,或異二者之為,何哉?不以物喜,不以己悲。居廟堂之高,則憂其民;處江湖之遠,則憂其君。是進亦憂,退亦憂;然則何時而樂耶?其必曰:“先天下之憂而憂,後天下之樂而樂歟!”

Alas, I have tried to seek to understand the mind of benevolent people of ancient times, which is different from the aforementioned two feelings [pleasure and sorrow]. Why? Because [benevolent people of ancient times] do not become happy from [external] things, do not become sad for themselves. When they take high positions in temples and offices, they worry about the people. When they live afar by the rivers and lakes, they worry about their emperor. They worry both in advancing and retiring. Then when will they be happy? It must be: they worry before all-under-Heaven and become happy after all-under-Heaven.

Written in 1046 CE, Fan’s contemporaries considered his essay a paradigmatic guide to being a proper gentleman (junzi 君子). In the essay, Fan first discusses two feelings that are commonly provoked by visiting the Yueyang Tower, pleasure (le 樂) and sorrow (bei 悲). However, neither feeling is the most proper, he remarks. Referring to the benevolent people of ancient times as exemplars, Fan believes that a proper gentleman should instead always worry. According to him, there are plenty things to worry about, including the populace and the ruler. If we also understand worry as deliberation, as discussed above, Fan’s point becomes clearer: it is gentlemen’s responsibility to assist the emperor to rule and to provide for the ordinary people, thus they need constantly to deliberate on them, or “worry” about them. This worry is tied not so much to the literati’s official positions as to their self-identity. To worry is to take responsibility.22

So far, we have seen the permissible areas for worry. As unpleasant as it feels, it is normal for one to worry about health, family, and undertakings. On a more general level, worry can even be a virtue for the literati, since it can serve as a motivation to solve potential problems. However, this moral character appears mostly in literati discourses; how much it permeated to other social spectra remains a question. In the next section, I examine how ordinary people perceived worry in medieval China by focusing on a divination manual.

21 Fan Zhongyan (1919) 7:4.  
3 Manageable Worry: Divination

Worry prevails in divination. In the practice of divination, clients often come to the diviners with worries, either about specific problems or more amorphous, general concerns. The diviners use certain divinatory techniques to discern how the problems or concerns will unfold. Knowing what will happen, the clients will at least have a concrete vision of the future, false or not. If the vision is positive, the clients are relieved from dwelling on the negative possibilities. Even if the vision of the future is catastrophic, clients can plan accordingly, and the distress caused by uncertainty thus alleviated. In other words, divinatory practices crystalize the worry of clients and potential solutions to their problems.

Divination has a long tradition in China that can be traced back to Shang dynasty (ca. 16th century BCE–1046 BCE) oracle bones. In early imperial China (221 BCE–220 CE), divination was practiced not only among ordinary people but also at the imperial court on a regular basis. Divinatory knowledge was routinely recorded and categorized in dynastic histories. In recent years, divination manuals, from the famous Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) to previously unknown techniques, have constituted a large part of early Chinese excavated texts, where divinatory knowledge was juxtaposed with the classics and bureaucratic documents.23

A similar situation persisted in medieval China. In the beginning of the 20th century, more than 30,000 texts were discovered from one of the grottos in Dunhuang 敦煌, Gansu Province, China. Dated between the 4th and 11th centuries, they belonged to the library of one of the monasteries from the late Tang (618–907 CE), the Three Realms Monastery (Sanjie si 三界寺), a center for local education.24 These texts include not only Buddhist sutras, but also classics, primers for children, official documents, and divination texts. Among them, 1,500 divination texts were found, many of them copied by the students of divination from the provincial school.25

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23 For a thoughtful survey on Early Chinese divination in comparison with ancient Greek divination, see Raphals (2013). For studies on more recent excavated divination manuals from Early China, see, for example, Harper and Kalinowski (2017), Cook and Zhao Lu (2017).


One of the divination manuals from Dunhuang, *Maheśvara’s Divination* (*Moxishouluo bu* 摩醯首羅卜, S.5614), exemplifies the manifestation of worry. Dated to the 10th century, it is constructed in the typical format of a divinatory manual. At the beginning of the text, the title is announced. It then instructs on how to conduct the divination: when various deities are watching, the diviner needs to face south, announce his name, focus his mind, and then report the inquiry to the deities. After this ritual communication, the diviner needs to roll a four-sided die three times. Each side of the die contains a number: 1, 2, 3, or 4. The resulting numbers form a sequence, which corresponds to a specific statement. With a four-sided die rolled three times, there are sixty-four possible resulting sequences. The text contains sixty-four corresponding statements that announce specific degrees of auspiciousness or varying outcomes.

Once the diviner completes the divination, the inquirer receives one of the sixty-four statements, such as the following one:

142 此名月光王局: 汝所求事, 成就已訖, 甚稱, 汝更不用愁, 好欲自至, 甚忻慶。勿重看之。大吉。26

142: This is named the set of [Bodhisattva] King Moonlight. Whatever you seek is achieved and completed, and it will be deeply satisfying. You don’t need to worry anymore. What you desire will happen on its own with great joy and celebration. Do not look again. Greatly auspicious.

At the very beginning of the statement, the three numbers from rolling the die are announced; they form one of the sixty-four sets of numbers.27 The number is followed by the name of the set, “King Moonlight” in this case. In *Maheśvara’s Divination*, each of the sets has a distinctive divine name, linking the result to the protection of specific deities. Following the name of the set, the statement announces the fortune. First, it specifies what has or will happen regarding the matter in question (in this case, the matter has already been accomplished). Second, the statement advises on what one needs to do; in this case, the inquirer is instructed to not worry and not consult a diviner again. Finally, the statement concludes with a statement of auspiciousness, either inauspicious (*xiong* 凶), neutral (*ping* 平), or, as in this case, auspicious (*ji* 吉).

Worry, or *you*, appears in many of these statements, and *Maheśvara’s Divination* discusses worry in two ways. The first involves the prediction of future events, as in “what you do will not be accomplished, and there will be much worry and fear” (*suozuo bu cheng, duoyou duoju* 所作不成, 多憂多懼). In this

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26 S.5614.
27 In the original manuscript the three numbers are arrayed vertically instead of horizontally.
context, you refers to worrisome future scenarios. These worrisome events are unfavorable to the inquirer. In contrast to this external aspect, the second way the text discusses worry is focused on the inquirers’ acts and mental state, as in “don’t worry” (wu you 勿憂) and “you need not worry” (buxu youlǔ 不須憂慮). Assuming a favorable future scenario, these expressions aim to manage the inquirers’ behavior.

Maheśvara’s Divination separates worry from the worrisome in several ways. Syntactically, it formulates worry through the imperative mood, as in “don’t worry” (wu you 勿憂) or expressions of modality, as in “you need not worry” (buxu youlǔ 不須憂慮). In contrast, it renders the worrisome using copulas, as in “there will be a lot of worry” (duoyou 多憂). Related to this syntactical distinction, the text places worry and the worrisome in different parts of a statement. For example, it puts suggestions for worry together with other advice, such as turning to the Buddha for help. In contrast, it puts the worrisome together with the reporting of future events, such as “what you do will not be accomplished.”

This distinction indicates a specific understanding of worry in medieval China. Distinguishing worry from the worrisome may appear to be splitting hairs, but each is subject to two distinct theories of emotions. A classic theory of emotions holds that human beings react to outside stimuli which generate corresponding emotions. Thus, the worrisome in Maheśvara’s Divination and other divination manuals emphasizes future events as causing worry, that is, they are worrisome. This is the reason why many divination manuals use the word for worry to refer to troublesome events as well as to the sentiment they produce.

Another theory understands emotion as appraisals, where one evaluates the situation and reacts emotionally to the evaluation instead of to the external stimuli per se. Maheśvara’s Divination considers worry in this sense as well. In the text, the statements speak about the matters at hand (shi 事), which refers to whatever event or activity is under inquiry. At the moment of inquiry, the matters are presumably still unfolding and can potentially end well or badly. That is to say, the inquiries look to clarifying uncertainty and not just to specific threats. In this respect, the texts assume that the inquirers’ worry comes from

28 S.5614.
29 S.5614.
30 For more information on the stimulus-response model, see, for example, Plamper (2015) 31–9.
31 For a survey of this approach, see Plamper (2015) 204–6. For more information, see Scherer et al. (2001).
the uncertainty inherent in their appraisal of the future. The expression of “don’t worry” calls a halt to the appraisal.

Moreover, worry as an act is intrinsic to deliberation in Maheśvara’s Divination. When it comes to the suggestion, “don’t worry,” the expression bu xu you 不須憂 is interchangeable with “you do not need to worry and be concerned” (bu xu youli 不須憂慮) and the advice to “deliberate less” (shao silü 少思慮). Both youli and silü use the verb lü, to be concerned (about something) or to think. That is to say, in Maheśvara’s Divination, worry is a type of thinking.

What type of thinking? Maheśvara’s Divination mentions a series of emotive expressions: “deliberating” (silü 思慮), “concern” (youli 憂慮), “worry” (you 憂), and “distress” (chou 憂). In Middle Chinese, they form a spectrum of thinking: silü neutrally refers to the action of thinking; youli is the act of thinking, but usually about negative outcomes; you refers to being concerned about negative outcomes; and chou emphasizes the state of distress. Therefore, as Harbsmeier points out, deliberation on unfavorable scenarios is key to you.

In various traditions, worry is linked to fear. For example, the Epicureans from the 2nd century CE distinguished between two types of fear, one responding to specific objects, and the other to amorphous impressions. The latter kind of fear resembles a modern definition of anxiety.32 The English word “anxiety” has something in common with the German word Angst, which suggests “dread,” “fright,” “terror” and “apprehension.”33 Angst most often refers to an anticipation of future events that are either uncertain or negative. It can be as specific as potential death or failure in conducting a task, or as general as not knowing what career to choose. These uncertain and negative future scenarios all cause a kind of fear in anticipants.

Because of close connection between anxiety and fear, definitions of the two concepts often attempt to specify the differences between them. For example, according to Sigmund Freud (1856–1939 CE), while anxiety (Angst) refers to general apprehension regarding the future, fear (Furcht) is directed toward specific objects.34 The contrast here is between a vague object, barely discerned, and a concrete source of fear. Again, the latest, fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) defines fear as follows: “Fear is the emotional response to real or perceived imminent threat, whereas anxiety is

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anticipation of a future threat.” The contrast is between responses to the immediate future and to a more remote future danger.

In Maheśvara’s Divination, worry and fear are also linked and contrasted. Most obviously in the text, fear is expressed in predictions, such as “you will be surprised and afraid night and day” (zhouye jing bu 畏夜驚怖), or “There will be horrific matters and something fearful” (ru bieyou eshi, you kongbu 汝別有惡事，有恐怖). However, the text rarely contains statements like “do not fear” or “you need not fear.” One explanation is that bu is more an immediate reaction to perceivable threats, while you is a continuous act that can focus on both perceivable threats and reflect a more amorphous uncertainty. Thus, the contrast between the general and the specific is also observable in Middle Chinese you and bu, at least in this divination text. But you may also embrace the entire range of fears and anxieties, and is thus something of an umbrella term, comparable, perhaps, to the way the sociologist Allan Horwitz defines anxiety as “feelings that are amorphous and those that are directed at some definite threat.”

What is there to worry about or fear? Many views emphasize death or existential annihilation as the source of anxiety. Indeed, health is a constant topic in divination manuals of medieval China. In addition, divination manuals mention other social activities that were commonly subject to inquiry. For example, the Divination of Confucius and the Duke of Zhou from Dunhuang lists the following topics: the wellbeing of family members, arrival of travelers, litigation, quarrels, evil deeds, robbery, loss of property, what one seeks, rain, trade, and sickness. Topics can be as crucial as the prediction, “family members will have worries and troubles, but they will not die.” But they may also be as mundane as whether travelers will arrive or are still on the road.

In fact, success or the expectation of success in social activities is a main source of worry. For example, when it comes to trade, the Divination of Confucius and the Duke of Zhou discusses not just whether the matter in question will bring ominous results, but whether it will be successfully carried out, or he合. This sense of expectation appears most strongly in divinations regarding unspecified matters, such as “what you seek” (suoqiu 所求). In Maheśvara’s Divination, the expectation of success is even more focused on unspecified matters that depend on the clients’ desires. The text uses expressions such as “matters” (shi 事), “what you make” (suozuo 所作), “what you seek” (suoqiu 所求), or “what you wish” (suoyuan 所願).

37 Rollo (1950) 190.
38 P. 2574.
The longing for success is of two kinds: (1) expressions such as to make, to accomplish, and to achieve (de 得) convey a sense of successful outcomes and achievements; (2) other expressions, such as following your wish, what you desire (suoyu 所欲), and being in accordance with your intentions (cheng yi 稱意) convey expectations relating to the matters at hand. Both kinds of expression refer to matters about which an inquiry is made and are interchangeable in the text, showing that the expectation of success is the default state for inquirers. Naturally, any delay or failure to achieve such success would be worrisome. Therefore, as Harbsmeier observes, both danger and difficulty can lead to worry.39

Does this sense of success represent just pragmatic concerns or also a sense of self-worth? As a divination manual, Maheśvara’s Divination does not give a clear answer to this question. However, we can infer an answer by looking at what is considered an auspicious result in the text. In addition to wishes and desires, the text often mentions improvement. The improvement can be specific and worldly, such as “promotion in official positions and higher salary” (jiaguan jinlu 加官進祿) and “official ranked will be promoted” (guanzhi jiaqian 官職加遷). But it can also refer to the general state of an individual, such as “it will lead to your advancement” (bian ru jinda 便汝進達) and “every day you will advance” (riri shengjin 日日昇進). The latter kind of improvement is less attached to a specific socio-economic situation and more related to the general state of an individual. This wish to be better as an individual does seem to indicate attention to a person’s self-worth.

Indeed, divination in medieval China served to manage the level of worry of clients on a daily basis. It addressed both the clients’ mental state and uncertain situations, however mundane and trivial they might have been. But what if one’s worry was out of control? That is the focus of our next section.

4 Harmful Worry: Pathologizing Worry

In traditional Chinese medicine, worry is linked to a core concept of health, qi. Cosmologically speaking, qi not only forms the human body, but also the universe. More than just the building blocks of all things, qi also flows: it circulates through the human body rhythmically, forming breath, blood, and other bodily substances. The cycle of the human body, or the microcosm, also interacts with

39 Maheśvara’s Divination mentions nan de 難得 (difficult to obtain) and nan cheng 難成 (difficult to achieve), which gives a sense of difficulty.
the seasonal cycle, or the macrocosm. In order to maintain good health, one needs not only to maintain the regular circulation of the qi inside the body, but also to ward off outside qi that can interfere with bodily functions. In this framework, the disturbance of the qi and its movement inside the body become the primary cause of a variety of illnesses.  

Emotions are made of qi, and they can jeopardize the regular cycle of qi for an individual. The “Basic Questions” (“Suwen” 素問) part of the Inner Classic of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi neijing 黃帝內經) from the 1st century BCE states:

人有五藏,化五氣,以生喜怒悲憂恐。故喜怒傷氣,寒暑傷形。  

Human beings have the five viscera, and the five viscera cultivate the five qi in order to produce delight, anger, sorrow, worry, and fear. Therefore, delight and anger harm qi, and cold and hot [weather] harm the body.

The passage goes on to pair each of the Five Phases (wuxing 五行) of the macrocosm with the five viscera of the microcosm and with the emotions: Wood – liver – anger; Fire – heart – delight; Earth – spleen – deliberation (si 思); Metal – lung – worry; Water – kidney – fear. All of these emotions are derived from the will, or zhi 志, of a person, and they can in turn disturb the regular movement of qi in the human body and do harm especially to their respective viscera.

More specifically, worry or deliberation can block the circulation of qi. The “Basic Questions” treats worry (youchou 憂愁) and deliberation (silü 思慮) together, believing that they can harm a person’s heart (shang xin 傷心). It specifies how deliberation can cause harm:

思則心有所存,神有所歸,正氣留而不行,故氣結矣。  

When one deliberates, one’s heart has something to contain and one’s spirit has somewhere to return to. The rectified qi stays still instead of moving. That is why the qi stagnates.

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The action of deliberation does not come from nowhere, but has a physiological location, the heart, which is the organ of thinking.\textsuperscript{45} Normally, \textit{qi} is constantly moving in the body, but the heart can cause it to halt and eventually stagnate, causing various diseases.\textsuperscript{46}

Later medical texts build on this premise and specify when worry will lead to sickness. For example, Chao Yuanfang 趙元方 (550–630 CE) discusses sickness caused by worry in his \textit{Discussions on Causes and Manifestations of Various Illnesses (Zhubei yuanhou lun 諸病源候論}, 618 CE):\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{quote}
七氣者,寒氣、熱氣、怒氣、憤氣、喜氣、愁氣。凡七氣積聚,牢大如杯若柈,在心下、腹中,疾痛欲死。飲食不能,時來時去。每發欲死,如受災狀,此皆七氣所生。
\end{quote}

The seven \textit{qi} are that of cold, heat, anger, resentment, worry, joy, and of sorrow. When the seven \textit{qi} accumulate, they harden up as big as a cup or a plate. If [the accumulation] appears under the heart or in the abdomen, the acute pain will [make one] want to die. One cannot eat or drink. It comes and goes from time to time. When they appear, one wants to die, as if suffering from disasters. It is all produced by the seven \textit{qi}.

In this book, Chao aims to delineate the causes of illnesses and symptoms.\textsuperscript{48} For him, the emotional \textit{qi} can materialize through their accumulation. The materialized form of these \textit{qi} not only has a size and shape, it also has a location, such as under the heart or in the abdomen. For Chao, the existence of the seven \textit{qi} is already harmful in itself. For example, the \textit{qi} of worry can make one feel uneasy when lying down at night; the \textit{qi} of sorrow can make one forgetful and not recognize people’s faces. Even the \textit{qi} of joy can make one unable to walk.

\textsuperscript{45} In traditional China, the mind was thought to be located in the heart or to arise from the functioning of heart. As Edward Slingerland points out, the heart as a physical organ is related to but distinct from the mind. This is especially true in the case of medicine as we will see below. See Slingerland (2019) 100–10. For a comparative study of the mind in Early China and Ancient Greece, see Raphals (2015) 132–82.

\textsuperscript{46} According to Chao, the “rectified \textit{qi}” refers to the \textit{qi} and blood indigenous to one’s body. See Chao Yuanfang (2013) 2:44.

\textsuperscript{47} Chao Yuanfang 趙元方 (2013) 13:266.

\textsuperscript{48} For the formation of the book and its knowledge structure, see Chen Hao (2019) 200–15. For a discussion of the concepts \textit{bing}, \textit{zheng} 發, \textit{hou} 候, see Sivin (1987) 99–109. Sivin translates the first concept as “disorder,” for it is more inclusive than the modern concept of “disease.” He translates the latter two as “symptom.” During the Tang dynasty, the circulation of medical texts like \textit{Zhubei yuanhou lun} did reach ordinary people, but in general it was mostly limited to the literati. See the assessment of medical texts’ circulation in Yu Gengzhe (2011a) 55–74, esp. 57, Fan Jiawei (2010) 223–32.
fast or stand up long. In other words, when you have a cup of worry, you have too much worry.

Indeed, worry and deliberation can cause the stagnation of qi, leading to multiple conditions. First, if the qi stagnates in the chest, it causes a stifling feeling (fanmen 煩悶). Because this clog can block the production of saliva, the patient will not be able to eat and in turn will become fatigued. This condition is called the Blockage of Worry (youge 憂膈). Second, related to the blockage of saliva, this clog can cause the choking as well as the blocking of channels for saliva and blood, or the Triple Burner (sanjiao 三焦). This condition is called Chocking on Worry (youye 憂噎). Third, when worry is joined with anger, it harms the viscera and moves the qi in opposite directions. As a result, the patient spits blood. Chao refers to this condition as Spitting Blood (tuxie 吐血). Fourthly, worry and deliberation can also produce venom that turns into a grub (qicao 蠐螬). The grub first appears on the neck and moves under the skin, causing the patient to feel cold and hot as well as stifling sensations. Chao refers to this condition as the Grub Bump (qicao lou 蠐螬瘻).

To Chao, all these conditions can be caused simply by the act of worrying:

The illness of stagnant qi is produced by worried deliberation. When one deliberates, one’s heart has something to contain and the spirit has something to return to. The qi stays still instead of moving. That is why the qi stagnates. There are correct recipes with medicine and needles.

Repeating the sentences about deliberation from the Inner Classic, Chao explains what worry can cause: it can lead to the stagnation of qi, which in turn not only causes pain but also blocks the movement of other bodily fluids, such as saliva. In addition, because the qi of worry itself is poisonous, its accumulation can transform it into harmful creatures, such as grubs.

In many cases, worry does not result from deliberate action; the natural environment can inflict worry on people, causing various conditions. Wind as a kind of qi is one of the main causes:

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The Palpitations of Deviant Wind are caused by the fact that wind enters the heart. The heart stores the spirit and is the head of all viscera. If one’s blood and qi are in balance, then one’s heart and spirit are at ease. However, if they are depleted, they become weak to the extent that the deviant wind can take advantage of this depletion and invade them. Therefore, one feels surprise and uneasy palpitations. Surprise and uneasy palpitations in turn cause absent-mindedness, worry, and fear.

Rainy weather can also inflict worry and fear on the female body. According to Chao, when females are traveling during a rainy day, they may be frightened by thunder and their clothes may become wet. When that happens, their hearts become uneasy and their body tired, and so their spirits start to wander. The deviant qi (xieqi 邪氣) will enter their vagina, creating the condition, the Fox Abdominal Lump (hujia 狐瘕). The Lump can lead not only to feelings of sorrow, worry, and fear, but also cause multiple menses per month. As the name jia suggests, it creates an obstruction in the abdomen that causes pain in the chest, waist, and back. It can even cause infertility.

The Palpitations of Deviant Wind and the Fox Abdominal Lump have several similarities. First, a cause of the windy or rainy weather is the deviant qi that contrasts with the normal qi in the human body. Second, for both conditions, the deviant qi first interacts with the mind (literally “heart”) and the spirit of individuals. Third, the interaction shakes the spirit, causing uneasiness. And it is the uneasiness that causes further conditions, including worry. Fourth, the deviant qi may not be able to attack someone successfully unless the person is weak: the Palpitations of Deviant Wind happen to people whose heart and spirit are depleted, and the Fox Abdominal Lump happens to females.

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55 Chao Yuanfang (2013) 37:713.
56 For Chao’s understanding of feng xie and the significance of wind, see Chao Yuanfang (2013) 1:2, 26; 2:44. The illnesses caused by wind became increasing important in the Tang court in the 7th century. See Chen Hao (2019) 280–86.
57 Chao Yuanfang (2013) 38:745.
because, according to the medical theories of the time, they are physically weak and thus more subject to emotions.\footnote{For the understanding of the female body in Chinese medicine, see Furth (1999) esp. 25–58.}

Corresponding to this pathology is the “treatment” of worry. Since the emotion of worry is linked to a weak heart condition, one solution is drugs that can ease and support the heart. For example, according to the \textit{Newly Compiled Materia Medica} (\textit{Xinxiu bencao 新修本草}, completed in 659 CE), the flower of Albizia (\textit{Hehuan 合歡}) can ease the five viscera and one’s will (\textit{xinzhi 心志}) so that the patient can be happy without worry.\footnote{For the textual formation of the \textit{Xinxiu bencao}, see Chen Hao (2019) 219–43. Su Jing (1985) 13:110.} For the Blockages of Worry in particular, one can take sheep’s heart. The rationale behind this is that animal hearts can strengthen the human heart. Similarly, according to the \textit{Materia Dietetica} (\textit{Shiliao bencao 食療本草}, completed in 741 CE), donkey meat can settle down (\textit{an 安}) the qi of the heart so that one can stop worrying.\footnote{Su Jing (1985) 15:180. Meng Shen (2007) b:111. Both \textit{Xinxiu bencao} and \textit{Shiliao bencao} were found in Dunhuang, with the manuscript numbers S.4534, P.3714, P.3822, S.9434, and S.76, respectively. \textit{Xinxiu bencao} is especially illuminating regarding the influence of official medical knowledge in Dunhuang. See Yu Gengzhe (2011b) 36–50, esp. 47–9.}

Many compounded recipes are also mentioned, having the function of easing the mind. For example, the comprehensive medical compilation \textit{Secret Essentials of the Outer Terrace} (\textit{Waitai biyao 外臺秘要}, completed in 752 CE) records the Small Pills of Settling the Will (\textit{Dingzhi xiaowan 定志小丸}) as well as three kinds of Pills of Heart Calming (\textit{Zhenxin wan 鎮心丸}).\footnote{Some of these recipes were circulating beyond the heartland of China. For example, the recipe of \textit{Zhenxin wan} was found in Turfan. For more information on the formation and circulation of medical recipes in medieval China, see Chen Hao (2019) 269–300, esp. 294.} Most of the recipes contain at least one of the two ingredients: Chinese Tuckahoe (\textit{Fuling 茯苓}, \textit{wolfiporia extensa}) and Fangfeng 防風 (\textit{saposhnikoviae radix}). The former ingredient was often thought to be able to ease the mind. And, as the Chinese name suggests, the latter ingredient can ward off wind that causes illness. Again, the names of both ingredients allude to the pathology of worry in medieval China: uneasiness of the heart and the interference of deviant wind.
5 Conclusion

In early and medieval China, worry was not only considered an emotional reaction, but also a voluntary act that was linked to deliberation. The medieval Chinese you covers both the modern concepts of fear and anxiety; it refers to apprehension regarding both specific and amorphous concerns. Whereas modern anxiety has become pathologized, you is further distinguished in that it can have moral value. For early Chinese thinkers like Confucius and Xunzi, worry is a sign of a moral defect. From the 1st century BCE onward, worry became permissible and even celebrated as a virtue for literati because they were supposed to take responsibility for the people, the emperor, and the world.

Outside intellectual discourse, there did occur a pathologization of worry. In medieval Chinese medical literature, worry was considered to be both a cause and symptom of certain illnesses. In this context, worry, deliberation, and the theory of qi come together to form a specific pathology: (1) the heart is the organ of deliberation, (2) the action of deliberation can lead to worry, (3) worry as an emotion takes the form of qi, and (4) the qi of worry accumulates to clog certain parts of the human body and causes corresponding illnesses. Meanwhile, wind and rain can invade the human body and cause uneasiness in the heart, which in turn leads to worry. As these pathologies and the medicines suggest, the heart is where the drama of worry plays out.

These intellectual and medical discourses are elite and theoretical, but divination manuals show how common worry was throughout medieval China. Worry could emerge from events ranging from lost property to litigation, from travel to illness. It was not only linked to concrete activities, but also to a sense of achievement and completion. Consistent with the intellectual and medical discourses, worry in divination was not just an involuntary reaction to external stimuli, but also a type of thinking that one could manage. Through predicting the future, divination manuals also served as a remedy for excessive worry, by providing auspicious results or at least a definite answer to a troubling question.

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Douglas Cairns

Can We Find Hope in Ancient Greek Philosophy? Elpis in Plato and Aristotle

1 Introduction: What is Hope?

The aim of this chapter is not simply to investigate the various approaches to the Greek concept of elpis in Plato and Aristotle,¹ but to orient that investigation with regard to the emotion that we in English call hope (§3). This is a project that calls for two preliminary steps: first, a brief attempt to pin down what is distinctive of the English-language concept of hope (this §), followed by an outline sketch of the semantic range of elpis in Greek (§2.1), and especially of the ways in which elpis and hope show significant degrees of overlap (§2.2).

According to the psychologist, Richard Lazarus, “To hope is to believe that something positive, which does not presently apply to one’s life, could still materialize, and so we yearn for it.” The “yearning,” Lazarus goes on, is important: it implies that “desire (or motivation) is an essential feature” of hope.² More technical formulations in clinical and social psychology differ in language, though perhaps not so much in substance: the doyen of “hope theorists” in that field, C. R. (Rick) Snyder, defines hope as “a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (1) agency (goal-directed energy) and (2) pathways (planning to meet goals).”³ As Rand and Cheavens explain, this means that “hopeful thinking requires both the perceived ability to generate routes to a goal and the perceived ability/determination to use those routes.”⁴ According to definitions of this type, hope involves a desire for an outcome that one believes is possible, but not certain. These are criteria that we shall need to bear in mind when turning, presently, to the

¹ Given the fragmentary state of our sources, and the fact that some of the best evidence is in fact in Latin, I exclude Hellenistic sources from this analysis. For a brief survey of what can be gleaned about Stoic approaches to elpis see Kazantzidis/Spatharas (2018) 10–14.
² Lazarus (1999) 653.
³ Snyder et al. (1991) 287. Cf. e.g. Snyder (2002); Rand/Cheavens (2009); Gallagher et al. (2019).

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analysis of Greek *elpis*, for not every instance of *elpis*, by any means, will meet even these minimal criteria for hope. We might note, however, that even on these criteria, English “hope” *prima facie* qualifies as an emotion: it encompasses at once an intentional and a phenomenal aspect – both an appraisal, with reference to goals that are valuable to the agent, of present and future states of affairs and a pronounced affective tone or colouring, something that no doubt implies (at least in prototypical, occurrent cases) some kind of perceptible bodily change. This is another yardstick against which instances of Greek *elpis* will need to be measured, if they are to be candidates for consideration as instances of what we call hope.

There are, however, shortcomings in these orthodox or “lowest common denominator” accounts of hope. For Philip Pettit, the lowest common denominator view of hope – that it is just “the belief that some prospect may obtain or may not obtain, where one desires that it does [sic] obtain” – denies hope “any interest as a phenomenon in its own right” (as distinct from belief and desire), whereas there are core, central, and interesting cases of hope in which it acts as an antidote to despair, so that hope “will consist in acting as if a desired prospect is going to obtain or has a good chance of obtaining.” “The cognitive resolve that hope brings with it can be our salvation.” For Adrienne Martin, on the other hand, the orthodox view fails even to establish minimal conditions for hope: she points out that two people might desire an outcome equally strongly, and share identical evaluations of its probability, and yet only one of the two be said to hope for it – the other might desire it very much, see it as at least theoretically possible, but fail to find any grounds for hope in its coming to pass. For Martin, hope is not just the desire for a possible but uncertain outcome, and not even (as in Pettit) a way of behaving *as if* the outcome were going to obtain, but rather a way of accepting the uncertainty of the outcome that incorporates into one’s life a positive and rationally defensible way of dealing with it. Thus hope is not just about desiring the end or about planning to achieve that end: “hope does involve rational desires, but not necessarily the

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8 Martin (2013) 14–17, 34.
rational desire for the hoped-for outcome.” Indeed, there may be no clearly envisaged hoped-for outcome, as in the “radical hope” explored by Jonathan Lear, in which one’s hope for a future that one cannot as yet clearly imagine allows one to go on living in circumstances in which all old certainties, all traditional ways of making sense of the world, have gone.

These formulations perhaps capture features that are latent or underarticulated in less nuanced or developed accounts (e.g. in the “yearning” that features in Lazarus’s definition, quoted above); and their core insights are, of course, not without precedent. Yet these insights are important. Though neither Pettit nor Martin wishes to revise the concept of hope so that only their preferred cases qualify, and both recognize that what they regard as central and important in the concept may be related focally or by family resemblance to a wider range of other, more trivial senses, the power of their formulations lies in the range of phenomena of which they help us make sense. Trivial formulations (such as “I hope you have a nice day” or “I hope your headache gets better”) may have only limited contact with these core examples; but when we hope against hope that something will turn up we organize ourselves to deal with uncertainty in a way that, at least to some extent, fortifies us in the face of the shadow that the future casts on the present. The person who hopes that it won’t rain during the picnic still goes on the picnic, taking all the steps that one might need to take to enjoy a picnic even in uncertain climatic conditions, even though there is nothing she can do to ensure that it will not rain, and even when exactly the same assessment of the weather forecast might cause other participants who were looking forward to it just as much to call off.

13 See, for example, the remarks of Gadamer in a work first published in German in 1931: “In hope, one does not simply leap toward something to come; rather, in being “out for” the hoped-for thing, one holds precisely to something present which gives one hope — be it only the straw at which the drowning person clutches.” Hope “is a basis — a reason — only for the person who hopes” (Gadamer (1991) 170). Gadamer’s remarks here occur in the context of a discussion (at (1991), 169–72) of Plato’s failure to distinguish hope from desire and expectation in the Philebus: cf. below, pp. 57–63.
The notion that hope sustains – that it involves not merely thinking that the desired outcome is possible, but also using that idea, affectively and motivationally, as a compensation for the outcome’s uncertainty – explains why it is generally regarded as a “good thing.” Though it is claimed that the depressed have a more accurate sense of their place in the world, no one wants to be depressed. In English, hope’s antonym, despair, carries a strongly negative charge. But it also explains why the supposed realist, who does not share the hopeful person’s perspective, may regard that person’s hope as deluded or self-deceiving. Whether, in fact, hope sustains or deludes is a major issue in many of the sources in which ancient Greek *elpis* comes closest to English “hope” (§2.2 below).

The general sense that hope sustains and motivates contributes greatly to its specificity in the English emotional lexicon. Optimism, for example, does not have these qualities: it is more closely linked with (what agents regard as) realistic assessments of outcomes. One can be hopeful against all the odds; to be optimistic is to assess the odds as pretty good. For similar reasons, hope differs (in ways that will be crucial for our assessment of Greek *elpis*) from both confidence and expectation. Yet its relationship with these notions is complex: it is a normal feature of hope that it can remain in the absence of confidence, and to be confident in an outcome normally represents it as probable enough to make hope unnecessary. But the hopeful person still faces life with more confidence than the desperate. Equally, if one expects a certain outcome (whether eagerly or dispassionately) that outcome is normally represented as more likely than is the typical object of hope. One also can expect (but not hope for) outcomes that would be negative for oneself. Yet it makes sense in English to say that one both hopes and expects (e.g.) that someone else will do their duty – the hope may represent the outcome as less certain than the expectation, but it also invests an expectation with an affective charge that both encourages the other and motivates that person not to disappoint. We also speak quite readily in English of the high hopes that drive people to pursue outcomes that they believe to be well within their grasp: such people expect to succeed and are confident that they will do so. It is the chance that they may not that ties their high hopes to what Pettit and Martin identify as the core or prototypical case. Yet the Anglican Book of Common Prayer can commend the deceased to God

18 Cf. and contrast Martin (2013) 29–33.
“In sure and certain hope of the resurrection to eternal life through our Lord Jesus Christ”; this may be an outlier, but it is a very familiar formula.

These are issues that will recur when we come to compare *elpis* in Greek with English hope. But in comparing the concepts and categories of different historical cultures we need to follow a descriptive rather than a prescriptive approach: in the rest of this chapter we shall be looking not only for the core concept of hope in Plato and Aristotle, but for any plausible candidates for consideration as instances of what we call hope, across the entire semantic range of the English concept.

# 2 Hope and *Elpis*

## 2.1 The Homeric Poems

The difference in extension between “hope” in English and *elpis* (in Homer also *elpôrê*, verbs *elpesthai*, *elpizein*) in Greek can be demonstrated by a brief examination of the Homeric evidence. First, *elpis* does not always focus on a positive outcome and so a reference to what we call “hope” is excluded. We see this in Penelope’s words to Antinous at *Odyssey* 21.314–316:

Do you *elpesthai* that, if this stranger should string Odysseus’ great bow, trusting in the strength of his hands, he would take me home and make me his wife?

Since the beggar’s stringing the bow and winning Penelope as wife is precisely what Antinous and the other Suitors do not want, *elpesthai* here is not “hope.”

In such negative or quasi-negative uses of the verb, fulfilment of the hypothesis in question is presented as comparatively unlikely and the context excludes any notion of desire that the hypothesis should be fulfilled. As in English, in such contexts “expect” often means the same as “suppose” (“I expect you’ll be hungry”); and we see from the case of Achilles in *Iliad* 17 (he did not *elpizein* that Patroclus was already dead, 17.404–405) that in this sense *elpesthai* (like “hope,” “expect,” and “suppose” in English) can involve hypotheses about the past; the focus on

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19 Lachnit (1965) 4; Schrijen (1965) 3. Cf. instances of “he/they did not expect (*elpesthai*)” some negative outcome, as at *Il.* 13.8–9 or 16.280–282; Schrijen (1965) 2.

20 Cf. *Il.* 13.309–310 (Meriones: “for nowhere else on the battlefield, I imagine [elpesthai], are the Achaians so weak”); cf. Hesiod’s confidence [elpesthai] that Zeus will not bring it about that the unjust prevail over the just (*Op.* 273).
the future survives in the sense that the truth of the hypothesis remains to be confirmed.21

Where, however, the hypothesis is less likely, the outcome is a desired one, and the element of desire, striving, or yearning is prominent in the context, elpis clearly does refer to the same affective state as does the English “hope.”22

Having dismissed the possibility that Antinous might expect (elpesthai) the beggar to string the bow and make her his wife (Od. 21.314–316, above), Penelope then refers to the beggar’s own expectations – “not even he hopes for/expects [elpesthai] that” (Odyssey 21.317). This is a remote hypothesis, with a negative verb, and so the sense might be “expect”; but it is also, from the beggar’s point of view, a highly desirable outcome, and so we might want to translate the verb as “hopes.” In other cases, the sense “expect” seems to be excluded by the context. In the same episode, for example, the emphasis on the effort that it takes for Telemachus to bend his father’s bow, three times failing to draw it (21.124–127), suggests that the participle epielpomenos in the phrase “epielpomenos to stretch the string tight and shoot an arrow through the iron” focuses on a remote goal that Telemachus strives with difficulty to reach rather than a likely scenario that he expects to see realized. Connotations of this sort are especially clear in passages in which elpis is attributed not to the named agent, but to that person’s personified thymos (“spirit”), where the point seems to be strength of motivation and a heightened level of arousal.23 The attribution of hope to the personified thymos presents the experience of hoping as something that possesses a certain affective and motivational character, and as an impulse that presents itself to the individual rather than being something that the individual sets out to generate.24

21 Cf. e.g. Il.15.110, Odyssey 6.297, 23.345–346. Lachnit (1965) 3–5 distinguishes elpesthai as meinen and as erwarten in such cases precisely on the grounds that erwarten cannot refer to the past. But whatever may be true of the relevant German terms, it makes perfect sense in English to say “I expect he wasn’t happy about that,” just as it does to say “I hope I haven’t offended you.” On hope with regard to past events, see Martin (2013) 67–69.

22 Cf. Schrijen (1965) 5–15. Clear-cut cases would include examples such as Il. 24.490–492, where (according to Priam) Peleus’ hopes that Achilles will return alive from Troy are all that sustain him amid the troubles of old age and isolation. On hope and expectation as different ways of feeling about (positive) outcomes that have differing degrees of probability, see Martin (2013) 30–32.

23 Especially where the verb is modified by adverb “greatly,” as at Il. 15.288, 17.234, 395, 495. For the elpis of the thymos as hope see e.g. Il. 19.328–333, where Achilles laments the departure of such elpis, now that Patroclus is dead – Achilles’ despair makes it absolutely clear that what he feels he has lost is a hope that hitherto sustained him.

The attribution of *elpis* to the personified *thymos* is one of the features of Homeric diction that permits the identification of “hope” as a distinct – and distinctively affective – sense of the term.

### 2.2 *Elpis* as Hope

The Homeric evidence illustrates very well that Greek *elpis* is not co-extensive with the English-language concept of hope. It differs in two main respects: it can focus on bad outcomes as well as good; and thus it does not always exhibit the motivational aspect that for us is constitutive of hope. Yet “hope” is one of the senses of Homeric *elpis*, and Homeric Greek has all the resources it needs to express that concept. This suggests that Myres (1949) is wrong in arguing that, because *elpis* does not always refer to what we call “hope,” it never means “hope” as such. Similarly for Lachnit (1965), it is only contingently (at best) that *elpis* means “hope,” “Hope,” he accepts, sometimes works as a translation, but because it does not always do so it cannot represent the Greek term’s *Grundbedeutung*; it is the context that often suggests hope, not the concept itself.26 Hence Lachnit prefers to translate *elpis* as *Erwartung, Annahme, Vorausdenken*, and the like; *Hoffnung*, it is claimed, emerges as a new possibility only in the later fifth century BCE.27 The unwarranted assumption here is that meaning is abstract rather than contextual and that terms must have a unitary denotation based on the fulfilment of a single set of criteria.28 In later Greek literature, however, locutions such as Polyxena’s reference to confidence that depends either on *elpis* or on *doxa* (belief – Euripides, *Hecuba* 370–371) and the Chorus’ to an *elpis* that is beyond expectation (*Heracles* 771) help to confirm that native speakers are perfectly capable of distinguishing affective/desiderative and purely

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26 Lachnit (1965) 7.


28 Much of the remainder of Lachnit’s dissertation is devoted to explaining away evidence that suggests that “hope” is a distinct sense of Greek *elpis*; I do not record every case of disagreement in the discussion of individual passages. Schrijen’s dissertation, on the other hand (also 1965), accepts that “hope” is a regular sense of *elpis*, and catalogues (presumed) occurrences of that sense, mainly in terms of positive versus negative representations, from Homer to Plato. For a full account of *elpis*’ affective/desiderative aspects, see also the extensive survey of the concept in archaic epic, lyric, iambic, and elegiac poetry (especially Pindar) in Theunissen (2002) 307–395. See also the essays in Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018). Useful remarks on *elpis* as hope also in Fulkerson (2015) and (2016).
propositional senses, between “hope” and “expectation.” Even native speakers know that the words they use are not univocal.

The strongest evidence for *elpis* as hope, however, comes from the metaphors by which it is conceptualized in Archaic and Classical poetry, where “hope” is the term’s prototypical sense.²⁹ Archaic Greek poetry (hexameter, elegiac, iambic, and lyric), like the tragic poetry that draws, to a large extent, on the traditional beliefs and representations that are characteristic of Archaic Greek thought, is rich in reflections on the nature of *elpis* as both a positive and a negative aspect of human motivation. These reflections are expressed very largely in forms of imagery that underline, for good and for ill, *elpis’* affective and desiderative aspects, as well as the (often illusory) comfort that it can provide (i.e. the ways in which it approximates most closely to hope).

Hesiod’s myth of Pandora’s jar at *Works and Days* 90–105 contains antiquity’s most celebrated account of *elpis*, but there is no end in sight to the controversy over its meaning.³⁰ The standard view is still that the jar contained evils, whose escape allows them to afflict humankind, as well as one good, *elpis*, whose failure to escape paradoxically affords human beings some minimal and perhaps illusory comfort.³¹ One of the many alternative explanations is that the jar contained no evils, but only goods, whose escape deprived humans of all defences against evil apart from hope. This similarly retains the association of the myth with hope’s (perhaps minimal or even illusory) power to counteract misfortune,³² and both of these interpretations would be in keeping with the ambivalence of *elpis* elsewhere in the *Works and Days.*³³

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²⁹ See in more detail Cairns (2016).

³⁰ For the various possibilities, with bibliography, see Musäus (2004) 13–30 (with 30–41 for his own suggested solution, that the jar contained provisions and *elpis* is retained as hope of further provisions); cf. more recently Ercolani (2010) 156–158, Fraser (2011) 21–24 (both with further lit.).

³¹ A passage in Euripides (where Andromache laments that she does not “even have what is left to all mortals, namely *elpis,*” *Tro.* 681–682) probably reflects the Hesiodic myth and suggests that the idea of *elpis* as the (only remaining and perhaps ineffectual) antidote to evils was an ancient commonplace. Cf. e.g. West (1978) on *Op.* 96. Verdenius (1985), 66, disputes the claim “that hope is the natural companion of misery” in Greek thought; but his observation that “hope accompanies man in favourable as well as in unfavourable circumstances” is not a relevant objection with regard to a context in which (on any interpretation) the outcome for human beings consists in “dire cares” (95), i.e. evils, toil, illness, and death (90–92). See rather Fränkel (1960) 334.

³² *Pace* Beall (1989) 227 n. 6, Fraser (2011) 22.

³³ Cf. *Op.* 498–501 (below, n. 42). Verdenius (1985) 69–71, however, argues that the retention of *elpis* means that expectation of evil is the only one of the evils that the jar contained which did not make it into the world of mortals. This would then be a blessing of sorts: if we do not
The suggestion that Pandora’s jar contained not evils, but goods would bring Hesiod’s narrative closer in spirit to an elegiac poem in the corpus attributed to the (probably sixth-century) Megarian poet, Theognis, which might be regarded either as an early interpretation of the Hesiodic passage or as a reflex of a tradition that underlies them both (1135–1150).34

Elpis is the only good deity among human beings: the others have abandoned us and gone to Olympus. Trust has gone, a mighty deity, and Moderation (Sophrosyne) has gone from men, and the Graces (Charites), my friend, have left the world. Oaths of justice are no longer trustworthy among people, and no one reveres the immortal gods. The race of pious men has perished, and they no longer recognize rules or acts of piety. But as long as a man lives and sees the light of the sun, let him be pious with regard to the gods and await Elpis; let him pray to the gods, and sacrifice to Elpis first and last, burning splendid thigh-bones. Let him always beware of the crooked speech of unjust men, who with no fear of the immortal gods always have their minds on others’ goods, making shameful compacts for wicked deeds.

In the absence of other divinities representing positive commitments to moral, social, legal, and religious values,35 the deified Elpis of this poem is, we might say, human beings’ only hope. Thus, as an emotion, elpis is a potential source of solace in difficult times, yet its apotheosis as the only remaining protection against injustice emphasizes the poet’s point about the precariousness of trust in circumstances of moral decline. Passages which present hope as at least potentially positive, as an antidote to despair, typically carry this implication of its limitations.

Other positive images of hope reinforce this impression. Elpis is, for example, something one can cling to, as does the Guard in Sophocles’ Antigone (235–236).36 Elpis similarly sustains the abducted Persephone in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (33–37):

As long as the goddess saw the earth, the starry heaven, the strong-flowing, fishy sea, and the rays of the sun, and still hoped (elpizein) that she would see her dear mother and the tribes of eternal divinities, so long did elpis enchant her great mind, distressed though she was.

expect the evils that befall us, we can at least get on with our lives. The obvious objection (Bremmer (2008) 28–29) is that expectation of evil is self-evidently just as common and just as debilitating in the ancient Greek world as it is now.

34 So e.g. Beall (1989). For the view that the Theognidean elegy is the key to the interpretation of Hesiod’s myth of Pandora, see Theunissen (2002) 339–340.
Again, *elpis* is a positive antidote to fear and despair, but the maiden’s hope is ultimately dashed; and the notion that *elpis* “enchanted” her (*thelgein*) may imply the thought that its consolations are more apparent than real. Trust in *elpis* is better than despair (Euripides, *Heracles* 105–106,\(^\text{37}\) but the personified Elpis in whom we trust can lead us astray (Euripides, *Hecuba* 1032–1033)\(^\text{38}\) or betray us (Euripides, *Heraclidae* 433–434),\(^\text{39}\) for *elpis* is an unreliable thing (Euripides, *Supplices* 479–480).

The most common positive image of *elpis*, however, is of its power to provide nourishment, nurture, or comfort: “Live in *elpis* and be nourished by it,” is the advice of a speaker in a fragment of Euripides’ *Phrixus* (826 Kannicht); *elpis* is what “nourishes the majority of mortals,” says one in a play by Sophocles (fr. 948 Radt).\(^\text{40}\) Exile is an evil, but the exile feeds on *elpis*, according to Aeschylus’ Aegisthus and Euripides’ Jocasta (Agamemnon 1668; *Phoenician Women* 396). Eurydice’s sudden departure is a concern, agrees the Messenger in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, but he feeds on the hope (1246) that she has simply gone to grieve in private (1246–1250). That hope is soon disappointed; and the same locution (ἐλπίον δ’ ἐβόσκετο) in Euripides’ *Bacchae* (617) in itself conveys the notion that Pentheus’ hope of binding the god was illusory. This idea, that the sustenance that *elpis* provides is temporary or illusory,\(^\text{41}\) is frequently present in such contexts: just so, Jocasta in *Phoenissae* follows her reference to hope’s nurture of the exile (396) with another (very common) metaphor, that hopes are frequently proved to be empty (398).\(^\text{42}\) Just so, for Semonides of Amorgos, the sustenance that *elpis* seems to offer plays all human beings false (1.1–10 West):

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38 “Your *elpis* for this journey will cheat you, for it has led you to your death in Hades . . .”; cf. Fisher (2018) 59.

An idle man, waiting on empty *elpis*, lacking in livelihood, has much to reproach himself with in his heart. *Elpis* is not good at looking after a needy man who sits in the lounge and doesn’t have enough to live on.

My boy, Zeus the loud-thunderer holds the outcome of all that there is and arranges it as he wishes. There is no sense in human beings; rather they live from day to day like grazing beasts, knowing nothing of how the god will bring each thing to pass. *Elpis* and credulity nourish all as they strive for the impossible. Some wait for day to come, others for the turning of the years; there is no mortal who doesn’t think that next year he will arrive as a friend to wealth and good things.43

Here, the dubiety and unreliability of *elpis* is subsumed in a pessimistic and typically “Archaic” account of the inadequacy of human knowledge and the ephemerality of the human species.44 It is human beings’ inability to foresee and determine the outcome of their actions that gives *elpis* this negative aspect, yet *elpis’* shortcomings lie not only on the intellectual side, but also in the false comfort that it offers and its misguided motivational force. In all or virtually all of the passages which present *elpis* as a source of sustenance the notion has a strongly goal-directed, affective-desiderative, and motivational aspect. These are metaphors for what we call “hope.”

### 3 Philosophical Perspectives

It is thus clear that, if “hope” were a concept or a phenomenon that Greek philosophers especially wanted to explore, they would not lack the linguistic or cultural resources to do so. Yet in investigating *elpis* in Plato and Aristotle, the semantic range of *elpis* is a significant fact that will repeatedly cause us difficulties in our search for approaches to what we call hope. Philosophical applications of *elpis* in Plato and Aristotle often rest on other senses of the term.

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43 For the same general picture, with a related image of *elpis* as an interlocutor who offers encouragement, cf. Hermolochus 846 PMG: “Unfathomable, all life wanders at the mercy of events, with nothing one can rely on; *elpis* consoles the *phrenes*, but as for the future, no mortal knows where he is being taken. God steers all mortals in the midst of dangers, and often a terrible breeze blows in the face of success.” Cf. also Euripides fr. 391 Kannicht (*Thyestes*): “human beings have nothing without the gods: prompted by *elpides*, we zealously pursue many goals, but our labours are in vain, because we have no clear knowledge.” Cf. finally Sim. (or Sem.?) fr. eleg. dub. 8.4–7 West: all men have *elpis*; implanted (ἐμφύεται) in the breast of the young, it causes them, given the “lightness” of their *thymos*, to form many intentions that remain unfulfilled.

3.1 Plato

In Plato’s first Alcibiades (105a–e) elpis is associated with the prodigious extent of the young Alcibiades’ ambitions. The elpis that characterizes Alcibiades’ life, Socrates says, involves not only the assumption that the Athenians will soon recognize his exceptional claims, but also a deep inability to be content with what he already has, such that not even divine command would limit his ambition to rule in Asia as well as in Europe, filling the whole world with his name and his power.45 The elpides of Alcibiades, referred to repeatedly, involve boundless self-confidence of a sort that appears to regard as certain goals that for ordinary people would be far out of reach, but also go far beyond what even Alcibiades regards as immediately achievable. These elpides thus extend from confident expectation into what we might call “high hopes” of remoter and less certain outcomes. Though Socrates is fond of Alcibiades and speaks in jest,46 Plato’s readers know where his elpides got him, and the traditional dangers of elpis as over-confidence and excessive ambition are in play.

The positive side of elpis, and its clear affinities with what we call hope, emerge in its recurrent association with the afterlife in Plato. In saying that there is every reason for elpis (Apology 40c) that death is a good, Socrates acknowledges the absence of certainty, but holds that none of the various conceptions of what happens after death gives any grounds for fear (40c–41c); thus the trial judges, too, should be of good hope (euelpides) in the face of death (41c) – at least if they are virtuous, as no harm can come to a good man, in life or in death (41c–d). Elpis again focuses on outcomes that are positive for the agent yet not entirely certain; there is a contrast with fear; and elpis allows one to face uncertainty with a degree of confidence.47 Though the aged Cephalus, Socrates’ interlocutor in the first book of the Republic, takes a view of virtue that is worlds away from that of Socrates in the Apology and the Phaedo, he too believes that living a just life enables one to face death and the afterlife in the

45 Plato draws on what must have been a common representations of the Persian King Xerxes’ invasion of Greece, as found in Herodotus 7.8γ1–2, 8.109.3. For Xerxes’ “wise adviser,” Artabanus, this is not just hope, but hybris (7.16a2), a phenomenon that is regularly seen in terms of over-confidence (see Cairns (1996)).
46 We might compare Bacchylides’ characterization of the hopes for world-domination in his encomium of another ambitious young man in fr. 20B.11–12 Maehler.
47 Similarly, in Phaedo (63b–c, 63e–64a, 67b–68a, 114c), Socrates repeatedly and strongly affirms his elpis that the afterlife will be good and emphasizes the confidence (NB tharrein as well as “being euelpis” at 63d–64a) that this engenders. Confidence (tharros) in the face of death is a recurrent theme (78b, 87e, 88b, 95c, 114d, 115e).
“pleasant elpis” that derives from a clear conscience rather than in fear or “bad elpis” (330d–331a). In using the adjective “pleasant” (hêdys, which one can also translate as “sweet”), Cephalus draws on traditional conceptions of elpis as a form of sustenance (above) and widespread ideas that there is occasion for elpis in the belief that righteousness or piety is rewarded by divine favour both before and after death, ideas that he illustrates by quoting a fragment of an otherwise unknown poem by Pindar (fragment 214 Maehler).  

With him lives sweet Elpis, his nurse in old age who nurtures his heart, the one who most of all is helmsman of mortals’ much-veering judgement.

Most likely these lines had in their original context the import given them in Cephalus’ quotation, but the reference to elpis as the helmsman of our (fallible) judgements underlines that elpis of a different sort can preclude the elpis that sustains the just and pious.

In these cases, then, traditional, poetic associations of elpis are apparent and “hope” is, in one or other of its senses in English, a legitimate translation. Traditional conceptions of elpis also shape its appearances in the Laws. In the celebrated image (eikôn, 644c) of the human being as a puppet with three strings in Book 1 of that dialogue elpis is the generic term for two varieties of opinion (doxa) about the future, tharros and phobos (644c–645a). The association with doxa reflects the most general sense of elpis as simply a matter of entertaining certain hypotheses. But these doxai are also pathê, affections; tharros and phobos are correlated respectively with pleasure and pain, the two “opposite and senseless counsellors” that we each have within us (644c); and each of the three strings exercises motivational force, pulling us in opposite

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48 For the thought, cf. Bacchyl. 1.163–5 (“he who treats the gods well gladdens his heart with a more glorious elpis”); more generally on the pious use of wealth as a means to divine favour, Bacchyl. 3.21–22, 83–84. For elpis as “sweet”, cf. the anonymous tragic fragment, 456 Snell-Kannicht: “He [sc. Hades vel sim.] alone admits no share of sweet elpis”; also Pindar Pythian 4.201, [Aesch.]. Pr. 536–538: “it is pleasant to stretch out long life in confident elpides, nurturing one’s thymos in bright festivities.” In Plato, cf. Resp. 5, 496d–e, Laws 4, 718a, Epin. 973c.


50 Cf. phobos and elpis at Phil. 32b (Schôpsdau (1994–2011) i.230).

51 As indeed is the element represented by the third, golden string, namely calculation (logismos), 644e, even though its job is to adjudicate on the goals pursued by the other two.

52 This draws on the language of the Timaeus at 69d, where the foolish counsellors are tharros and phobos themselves. Here elpis, itself euparagôgos (it readily leads us astray), appears alongside pleasure, pain, and anger (thymos) as one of the terrible and compulsive pathêmata associated with the lower, mortal type (eidos) of psychê (to be subdivided into the two lower types, the spirited and the appetitive, familiar from the Republic).
directions (644e).\textsuperscript{53} Though elpis is a matter of doxa, its subspecies are affects. But though the negative motive of avoiding pain is called fear, the positive one, that which pursues pleasure, is called not hope but confidence. It is possible that the choice of this term was at least partly influenced by a wish to avoid using elpis in both unmarked and marked senses, for it is clear that tharros performs a function, as the antonym of phobos (defined, as in Philebus, as expectation of harm, 646e) and as a motive for pursuing desired goals, that might be performed by elpis in its marked sense as a form of motivation focused on future good.\textsuperscript{54}

But the main reason for the choice of tharros rather than elpis as antonym of phobos is that it suits the Stranger’s purpose in the next stage of the argument (646e–650b), where he presents the controlled drinking party as a means of inculcating shame (aidôs/aischynê), a positive form of fear that inhibits self-assertion and permits control of other emotions and desires.\textsuperscript{55} This good fear is contrasted with the bad variety that leads to cowardice in martial contexts: alcohol promotes excessive confidence (called tharros at 647a, 649a–b) and overcomes aidôs/aischynê (647a–b, 649c), yet repeated exposure to such situations of overconfidence and shamelessness can inculcate an ingrained sense of shame and fear of ill-repute in the same way as repeated exposure to danger can develop courage (647b–649e). The affinity of the relevant sense of tharros here to traditional conceptions of elpis emerges at 649a–b, where excessive or misplaced confidence and “being full of a greater number of good elpides” are similar effects of drinking wine; just so (in Laws 2), it is the job of sympotic nomoi to step in when the drinker becomes “euelpis, confident (tharraleos), and more impudent than is fitting.”\textsuperscript{56} “Good elpides” and “being euelpis” designate that sub-class of the neutral and generic elpis that is called tharros at 644d, and so elpis (in the sense at least of confident optimism, and perhaps even of hope)

\textsuperscript{53} With the added complication that the person him- or herself can also intervene to increase the pull on the golden string of logismos (644e, 645a–b); see England (1921) 256 on 644e4; Stalley (1983) 61; Bobonich (2002) 264, 266–267. This is a form of intrusion between vehicle and tenor of the eikôn that is common also in the Republic's metaphors of the tripartite soul; see 443d–e, 550a–b, 553b–d, 571d–572a, 591e, 606a, with Cairns (2014b) §§69–72.

\textsuperscript{54} Cf. England (1921) i.254 on 644d1. The Laws’ deployment of elpis-words in unthematized, incidental contexts shows no real preference for “expectation” (853d, 893d, 898d, 923d, 954a) over “hope” (817c, 898d, 907d, 950d).

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Laws 2, 666a–c, 671c–e, 672b–d, with Cairns (1993) 374–375.

\textsuperscript{56} For the elpires of the drinker, cf. e.g. Bacchyl. fr. 20B.3–12 Maehler; Arist. Probl. 20.1, 955a3.
is drawn in to the *Laws*’ extended discussion of law and education as means of fostering self-control and inhibiting self-assertion.\(^{57}\)

Confidence, *tharros*, is thus a species of *elpis* in its neutral sense, while “good *elpis*” is an element of the *tharros* that needs to be restrained by one’s sense of honour and the fear of ill repute. The affective, desiderative side of *elpis* therefore does play a role in the argument, despite *elpis* being introduced as a kind of *doxa* of which fear is also a sub-species, and while the use of *elpis* as the generic term reflects the fact that it may be neutral, a kind of belief or opinion, its division into subcategories both of which are affective states also reminds us that it encompasses forms of motivation that may not align with rational calculation (and thus may involve an element of moral danger). The designation of the subspecies of *elpis* that motivates us to pursue future pleasure as *tharros* invites us to consider in what ways *tharros* and *elpis* overlap, both as affects and as potentially harmful forms of motivation.

*Elpis* appears in conjunction with *doxa* again in Book 9’s discussion of the forms of error that lead to injustice, but whereas Book 1 makes *elpis* a form of *doxa* that has two morally dubious varieties, fear and confidence, in Book 9 both *doxa* and *elpides* are associated with well-intentioned actions that nonetheless fail to achieve their aim (864b). Here, *elpis* may encompass a desire to achieve a good end and not merely an expectation that such an end will be achieved. Neither is sufficient, yet the possibility of failure entails the possibility of success, and so *elpis*, when its assessment of the ends to be pursued is correct, can also play a positive role in just action.

And in fact the *Laws* also makes room for positive conceptions of *elpis qua* hope. An association between *elpis* and the *aidôs* (698b, 699c) that overcomes negative *tharros* and promotes its positive counterpart emerges in Book 3, where Athenian resistance to the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 BCE is given as an example of a state’s regulation of its mechanisms for allocating honour and disgrace with primary reference to the best conditions of the *psychê* (697b). The Athenians had only a slim prospect of salvation, yet were buoyed by a degree of *elpis* (ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχούμενοι) on the basis of their previous successes, and this allowed them to find refuge in themselves and their gods. This fostered a spirit of co-operation among the citizens, in so far as their fear of annihilation was balanced by *aidôs*, the good fear that involves subjugating oneself to the city and its laws (699b–d). Again, as the work progresses, the morally dubious

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\(^{57}\) See e.g. the characteristic passages at *Laws* 4, 715e–718a, 5, 782d–783a, with Cairns (1996) 28–31.
elpis of the puppet image is set against more positive representations of hope, confidence, and other emotions.

As the Athenians’ chances of salvation were slim, it is clear that elpis in this passage refers to what we call hope, but that sense is further enhanced by the use of the metaphor of “riding at anchor” (ocheisthai). As far as the project of the Laws is concerned, this positive sense of elpis also resides in the suppression of individualistic and self-assertive motives in favour of co-operation, community, and deference to greater powers, namely the laws and the gods. The notion that positive forms of hope lie in understanding the limitations of one’s powers as an individual human agent recurs later in the work. In Book 4, honouring the gods and one’s parents, both before and after their deaths, permits one to live the rest of one’s life “in good hopes (elpides)” that the gods will reward our efforts (718a). But the strongest statement comes in the preamble to the legal code in Book 5, where all transgression is traced to its source in excessive self-love (731d–e), so that “every human being must shun excessive self-love, and always follow the person that is better than oneself, with no shame at so doing” (732b). In the same way, one should control one’s emotions, both in good fortune and in bad,

in the hope (elpizein) that, for good people, at any rate, the god will confer his gifts in such a way as to make the hardships that may befall us smaller rather than greater and change for the better those that are currently present, while, by contrast, the good things that fall to them should always come with good fortune. It is with these hopes (elpides) and with reminders of all such things that one should live, sparing nothing but always clearly reminding others and oneself, both at play and in serious pursuits. (732c–d)

This passage is followed by an allusion to the puppet image (every mortal animal is suspended from strings of pleasures, pains, and desires, 732e), but here elpis avoids the tharros, the over-confidence, that is castigated in the puppet image and its sequel in Books 1 and 2, encompassing instead due recognition of human fallibility and fragility, of the mutability of fortune, and of the role of the divine in all human prosperity. Divine favour is possible, but not certain; and so this elpis is clearly hope, which is here given a positive and sustaining role in a life of self-restraint and religiously inspired humility – a keynote of the Laws’ ethical programme.

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58 For these as cornerstones of traditional Greek ethics, especially as reflected in epic and tragedy, see Cairns (2014a), and cf. Cairns (2006), Cairns (2011), Cairns (2013).

59 The elpis of 10, 950d (“there is every elpis that, in all probability, if things turn out as we expect, the sun and the other gods will look upon [our city] as one of the few well-governed cities and countries”) may be more optimistic (i.e. expectation, not hope).
Elpis plays a more central role in the *Philebus*’ argument that all forms of pleasure involve some form of mental representation, but though interpretations of this part of the dialogue’s argument typically assume that this entails a role for what we call hope, very few offer any argument for that position and it is in fact not as self-evident as many scholars seem to think. The frame of the discussion includes references to *elpis* that sound both traditional and incidental, and which may well draw on traditional attitudes to what we call “hope”: at 12c–d the general premise that pleasure is not the good is supported with reference to a common opinion that “even the idiot who is full of idiotic opinions (*doxai*) and *elpides* feels pleasure”; while at 61b Socrates opines that “there is more *elpis* that what we’re looking for [the good] will be more apparent in the well-mixed life than in the one that is not well mixed.” Similar traditional-sounding phrases (“we are always full of *elpides* throughout our whole lives”; 39e; “every human being is full of many *elpides*,” 40a) recur within the main relevant argument. There, however, *elpis* is given a more specific set of tasks to perform, even if the traditional-sounding phrases do influence a reader’s assumptions regarding the nature of the *elpis* in the main argument.

The point of the relevant section of the argument is to prove that, as all pleasures involve an element of mental representation, pleasures, like beliefs, can be false. *Elpis* enters the picture in association with the pleasure of anticipating future pleasure (32b–c):

Now posit within the *psychê* itself with regard to the expectation (*prosdokêma*) of these experiences (*pathêmata*) one element, involving *elpis* in advance of pleasure, that is pleasant and confident and another in advance of pain that is fearful and painful.

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60 Frede (1985), for example, uses “hope” throughout, but in arguing that this hope focuses on what will be somewhat undermines the translation. Similarly, Forte (2016) devotes his article to “hope” in the dialogue, without setting out any criteria by which the dialogue’s uses of *elpis* would qualify. Vogt (2017) also tends to use “hope” with only minimal explicit justification, though she does point (p. 40) to a link between pleasure and motivation that suggests a role for hope as we understand it. Moss (2012) translates *elpis* as “hope” throughout her discussion of *Philebus*, justifying this with the claim that the argument for false pleasures is also intended to prove that affective states such as fear and anger can be false (p. 263, on *Philebus* 40e), while also arguing for a (nuanced) form of cognitivism in the dialogue that “identifies passions with beliefs” (p. 265). Gadamer (1991) 158–172 has a superb exploration of hope, but though he recognizes that the *Philebus* does not distinguish between hope and anticipatory pleasure (p. 169), he still attributes rather more of his insights on hope to Plato than the text, in my view, warrants.

61 On the difficulties posed by the relevant phrase in Greek, see Gosling and Taylor (1982) 430.
These forms of expectation (*prosdokia*) are in themselves pleasures, and if we come to understand these then we shall be able to tell whether pleasure in general is to be welcomed or not (32c–d). Here, it looks as though *elpis* and *phobos* are the two species of *prosdokia/prosdokêma*, and the antithesis between *elpis* and *phobos*, as well as the association between *elpis* and confidence (*tharros*), suggests that we are dealing at least with affective phenomena, if not specifically with hope.

At an earlier stage of the argument, however, in 21b–d, the topic of anticipatory pleasure is signalled in advance in a wider discussion of the place of thought in general in pleasure: all pleasure, whether it is past, present, or future, requires some form of intellect (*phronêsis*), whether it be the belief (*doxa*) that this present experience is pleasant, memory (*mnêmê*) of past pleasures, or calculation (*logismos*) that future experiences will be pleasant. This might suggest that *elpis* in 32c is fulfilling the same role as *logismos* in 21c.

Memory plays a crucial role in this account of anticipatory pleasure (34d–35e): when we experience desires (*epithymiai*) such as hunger and thirst, the pain of being empty implies an apprehension of being full that is the object of desire (*epithymein*, but also *eran*, to desire passionately, 35a–b), and this apprehension derives from memory. Memory thus generates projections of future states, and projecting such future states, according to Socrates at 35a–b, in itself generates the desire that is presented to the *psychê* by the body – there are thus no purely bodily desires (35c). *Elpis* then returns to the argument to illustrate an intermediate state between pain and pleasure (35e–36c): Socrates asks whether such a person, one who remembers the kind of pleasure that would put a stop to present pain (35e), is wholly in pain or wholly in pleasure, and Protarchus affirms that such a person suffers from twofold pain: the physical pain of being empty and the pain in the *psychê* that is caused by ‘a longing that derives from expectation’ (*προσδοκίας τιν ιπόθω*, 36a). For Protarchus, then, projection of a future state of pleasure involves a yearning that is painful. Socrates, however, introduces the opposite cases of one person who is empty, but in a state of “manifest (or vivid) *elpis*” with regard to replenishment, and another who is in a state without *elpis* (36a–b): the former “rejoices in remembering” in so far as he hopes for/expects (*elpizein*, 36b) replenishment, but is in pain in so far as he is empty; the latter, on the other hand, does indeed experience twofold pain, in so far as he is empty and without *elpis*. This argument is designed to show that pleasures, like fears, expectations, and beliefs, can be true or false (36c).

This present pleasure, formed by memory, of anticipating future pleasures is then described in two ways – in terms of *logoi* (propositions) and mental images (38e–40b). Pleasures and pains regarding the future (like those which refer to the past and present) are underpinned by letters (*grammata*) and paintings
(zôgraphêmata), and these are said to be elpides. Human beings are full of such elpides throughout their lives (39e–40a). An example of the kind of mental picture that relates to anticipatory pleasure is then given, in the case of someone who sees himself acquiring an abundance of gold in the future and feeling great pleasure on that account (40a). The conclusion is then drawn that such images are true when they are presented to the good and false when presented to the bad (40b). And just as there are false opinions (doxai), so there are not only false pleasures, but also false fears (phoboi) and false forms of anger (thymoi, 40e).

A final element is added in the discussion of mixed states of pleasures and pains: returning to the topic of desire (epithymia) Socrates recapitulates the argument that the psychê desires the opposite of the condition of pleasure or pain presented to it by the body (41c); this entails the co-existence of pleasures and pains and the co-existence in the psychê of sensations (aisthêsiseis) of pleasure and pain (41d). The case in which a person experiences pleasure in so far as s/he experiences elpis and pain in so far as s/he is empty is an example of many states in which there is one single mixture of pain and pleasure (47c–d). Though in such cases the origin of the pain that the psychê perceives is the body, there are also cases in which the mixture involves the psychê alone, including “anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like” (47d–e, illustrated in the sequel by the pleasures of mourning, weeping at tragedies, and the co-existence of pain and pleasure in envious people who take pleasure in others’ misfortune).

This is clearly an important discussion, especially for its exploration of what most would probably now call the ‘cognitive’ aspects of pleasure and pain, but also for the links it draws between aisthêsis, mnêmê, and the kind of projection of future states of affairs that Aristotle would go on to categorize as form of phantasia. But it is also one that is full of difficulties, obscurities, and apparent contradictions. The deployment of popular conceptions of elpis (probably qua hope) as fallible and misguided, both prior to and within the main discussion (12c–d, 39e,

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62 This involves the psyche’s desiring emptiness when the body is full as well as replenishment when the body is empty. Similarly, at 35c–e the psychê’s desire is for the opposite of the condition (pathos, pathêma) of the body: “In being filled and being emptied and all things that concern the preservation and destruction of living beings, if one is in either of these states, he is pained, and then he rejoices in respect of the change [to the opposite]” (35e). Thus, while the relevant case for the examples that involve elpis is that of pleasure at anticipated replenishment and pain at current emptiness, pain at current fullness and pleasure at the process of emptying, conceived of as the restoration of one’s “nature” (physis, 31d, 32b, 42d), are also envisaged. See Dixsaut (1999) 260; Wolfsdorf (2013) 77.

40a), suggests that Socrates wants to draw on these common beliefs as a way of underpinning the overall argument that the pursuit of pleasure is an unreliable guide to life. But when the discussion of the mental aspects of pleasure gets underway, anticipation of future pleasure is first called logismos, calculation, at 21c. At 32b–c elpis is presented as one of two forms of prosdokêma/prosdokia (expectation): elpis is a pleasant and confident expectation of future pleasure, as opposed to the painful expectation that gives rise to fear. The association with confidence (tharros) and antithesis with fear might be thought to suggest hope; if that were the case, the stipulation that to elpizomenon is pleasant might reinforce the idea of hope’s capacity to encourage and sustain. But confidence can derive from the mere expectation that success is likely as well as from the more affective and desiderative attitude that we call hope, qua that sense of the possibility and desirability of a beneficial outcome that has the power to sustain us in the present. There is an affective aspect here, but hope is not unambiguously its focus.

Throughout the discussion, rather, elpis appears as a purely mental aspect of pleasure (32b–c) that involves pleasant anticipation of future pleasant experiences (32b–c, 36a–b, 47c–d). This does entail an account of the phenomenon of desire (epithymia) in which the psychê apprehends, by means of memory (mnêmê), the future condition of restoration, while the bodily condition supplies (to the psychê) the pain that underpins that apprehension (34d–35d, 41b–d),

64 For elpis as a species of prosdokia, cf. the Platonic Definition at 416a21, ἐλπὶς προσδοκία ἄγαθοῦ. See also the definition of fear as προσδοκία κακοῦ at Prot. 358d (picked up – but not necessarily endorsed – by Aristotle at EN 3.6, 1115a9).
65 At 39d–40a, on the other hand, elpis encompasses both pleasant anticipation of pleasure and painful anticipation of pain: all forms of “pre-pleasure” and “pre-pain” (39d–e) are said to be elpides that involve words and images (39e–40a). As Seeck (2014) 86 notes, Plato here uses elpis in the sense in which he had earlier used prosdokêma/prosdokia; most (e.g. Frede (1992) 446) overlook this. Even if this is merely a slip, the breadth of elpis’ semantic range (i.e. its ability to cover expectation of bad as well as good outcomes) asserts itself.
66 Contrast Vogt (2017) 40:

The way in which pleasure is false/true should have something to do with the fact that pleasure/pain are motivational and thereby directed towards the agent’s future. This constraint puts hope and fear at the centre of the discussion. If all pleasure and pain is future-directed, all pleasure and pain has hope/fear components.

This seems to be correct in assuming that elpis and phobos are the only kinds of prosdokia that there are in the dialogue; but though elpis clearly has a role in desire analogous to that of phobos in aversion, it can play that role without corresponding to English “hope.”
there being no purely bodily condition of desire (35c). Thus, as a projection of future states, ἐλπίς has a role to play in desire. But that role seems not to be in itself affective or desiderative – ἐλπίς simply conjures up, in a pleasant way, a narrative or picture of a future pleasurable state (38e–40b). It seems, moreover, that ἐλπίς is not a name for that “one single mixture of pain and pleasure” (47d) in which pleasant anticipation of pleasant replenishment is combined with the pain of emptiness and so generates desire. Rather, ἐλπίς names only one aspect of that experience, the pleasant anticipation of future pleasure (especially 36b, 40a, 47c). Here, it is instructive to compare the ensuing account of those mixtures of pleasure and pain that belong to the ψυχή alone (i.e. what we call emotions): “anger (ὀργή), fear (phasis), longing (πόθος), lamentation (θρῆνος), erotic desire (ἐρός), emulation (ζῆλος), envy (φθώνος), and all such things” are forms of pain that also involve pleasure, in both cases in respect of the ψυχή alone (47d–48a; cf. 40c–41a). Ἐλπίς, on the other hand, is consistently used not of a mixture of pleasure and pain, but only of one aspect of such a mixture, the pleasant anticipation of the future pleasure that will assuage present pain. There being no other obvious candidate, ἐλπίς may play that role also in the case of the emotions enumerated at 47e; but that would make ἐλπίς itself a rather different entity from these emotions. Though the pleasant anticipation of the realization of one’s hedonic goals may (according to this argument) generate desire, the actual descriptions of that anticipation in themselves are compatible not only with the kind of hope or longing for such future states that would motivate one to seek to realize them, but also with idle fantasy (as in the case of the man who sees images of himself enjoying the acquisition of abundant wealth at 40a).

Some of the difficulties in relating the role of ἐλπίς in the discussion to our concept of hope emerge clearly at 35e–36c. If, Socrates argues, someone remembers pleasures whose return might in future bring an end to the present pain, then that person is “in the middle of these affections” (παθήματα, 35e–36a). For Protarchus, as we have seen, such a person experiences a double pain – “in the body because he is in the grip of the παθήμα and in the ψυχή because of a certain longing that derives from expectation” (προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ, 36a). To this, Socrates offers a counter-example: some people who are empty are none the less in a state of “manifest (or vivid) ἐλπίς” of being replenished, while others are

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68 Cf. and contrast Moss (2012) 268–269. For a wider consideration of some of the issues here (without reference to Plato), see Martin (2013) 17–19, 25–29, 85–94. As Martin observes ((2013), 28) hope too requires an element of fantasy of “what it would be like” for one’s hopes to be fulfilled.
without *elpis* (36a–b). The latter, i.e. someone who was empty and without *elpis* of replenishment, would fit Protarchus’ case of “the double experience (*pathos*) of pain” (36b–c).

Socrates does allow that such cases exist. But if they do, it is very difficult to fit them in to the psychology of the rest of the dialogue. The “double experience of pain” of the person who is “in an *elpis*-free condition” (ἀνελπιστῶς ἔχειν, twice in 36b) involves the pain that derives from emptiness and an additional element of mental pain at the absence of any prospect of replenishment. That thought, however, must surely entail a representation, deriving from memory, of what replenishment would feel like, even if it is unattainable.69 The absence of any prospect of replenishment, moreover, does not exclude the possibility of desire for replenishment. So perhaps the person who is in an *elpis*-free condition has such a representation, but it is not *elpis*, and has a desire for replenishment, but that desire does not depend on the *elpis* that derives from memory of previous replenishment. Perhaps that person has what Protarchus called ‘a certain longing’, albeit one that derives not from ‘expectation’ but merely from the mental representation of replenishment. This might suggest that *elpis* (the *elpis* that this person lacks) is not, in this dialogue, merely the pleasant imagination of future pleasure that supplies the goal of desire, but precisely what is lacking in the person who ἀνελπιστῶς ἔχει – i.e. hope or realistic expectation of relief.70 Against that hypothesis, however, are (a) the implication (at 32b–c) that anticipation of future states of pleasure takes only two forms, *elpis* and fear; (b) the clear statement of 41b–d that desire entails a mixture of pleasure and pain; (c) the implication of the present passage (at 35e–36a) that all memory-based representations of future replenishment create this intermediate state of mixed pleasure and pain; and (d) a strong sense that Socrates’ example of the pleasure which lies in the *elpis* of replenishment is meant to contradict Protarchus’ view that the longing that derives from expectation might be painful – all desire, the argument suggests, involves the pleasure of anticipating its satisfaction. The argument at 36a–b does appear to suggest that there are two possible affective states with regard to the memory-based representation of future pleasant states – a pleasant feeling of *elpis* when fulfilment of one’s desire appears as a distinct possibility (when one is “in manifest/vivid

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70 Teisserenc (1999) 270–271 is right, as far as it goes, to note that “being in an *elpis*-free condition” here strongly suggests that the *elpis* that is lacking is hope. But he himself glosses that “hope” as that which “anticipe le plaisir proprement dit; il s’élance vers l’aspect agréable de l’avenir prévu” – i.e. anticipatory pleasure, not *espoir*. 
elpis,” ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερῶ, 36a)

71 And a painful absence of elpis when there is no apparent prospect of fulfilment. If that were the case, we might describe the second of these stances as despair. What the person in “an elpis-free condition” has lost would be what we call hope; but what the person “in manifest/vivid elpis” has would remain ambiguous between hope and expectation. But this seems not – or not straightforwardly – to be the case: taken out of context, the passage appears to pit hope (or expectation) against despair; but the dialogue as a whole has no room for desires that do not depend on elpis (qua pleasant anticipation of future pleasure) or for representations of future pleasant states that are not themselves pleasant states. The problem lies in a tension between the immediate implications of this passage, the connotations of elpis as hope on which it seems to draw, and the wider role that elpis plays in the dialogue’s account of the nature of pleasure and desire. And this is a sign that the presentation of elpis in this dialogue has little to tell us about hope as an ethical and psychological phenomenon. The semantic range of elpis makes the specific phenomenon of hope more difficult to pin down than it might be for us; and pinning that phenomenon down is not in any case Plato’s purpose in the Philebus.

3.2 Aristotle

In Aristotle’s De Memoria, elpis plays the role with regard to future events that memory (mnêmê) plays with regard to the past and sensation (aisthêsis) with regard to the present (De Memoria 1, 449b10–15, 449b25–28). Each of these three is, in a general sense, a pathos of the psychê,72 but though each can be implicated in various ways in affective phenomena (see below), in this basic sense, the affective aspect of elpis’ orientation towards the future is not phenomenologically salient – the “elpistic science” (i.e. divination) briefly canvassed as 449b12 is simply about predicting future states of affairs, and not primarily about how they make us feel. Thus, in a number of passages elsewhere in the

71 Thus there is no need to translate the adjective phaneros here as “certain,” as does Forte (2016) 283, even though the idea of “certain hope” militates against his contention that the Philebus deals consistently with what we call hope. Cf. Frede (1985) 170.

72 Memory: De Mem. 1, 449b25; aisthêsis: see DA 1.1, 403a7. Elpis is not explicitly described as a pathos, but the DA passage in particular implies that everything that the soul does or undergoes is a pathos.
corpus, *elpis* can be oriented towards negative events in the future; when its orientation is positive, Aristotle occasionally makes this clear by means of terms such as *euelpis* (see below) or “good *elpis.*” At the same time, *elpis* can be credited with a pronounced affective aspect in passages such as *De Spiritu* 4, 482b36–483a5 (where, along with fear and anguish, it is one of the conditions that makes the pulse irregular) or *De Partibus Animalium* 3.6, 669a17–23 (where the “leaping” of the heart in *elpis* and expectation is described as a phenomenon that is more or less confined to human beings). The addition of “and in expectation of the future” suggests that “in *elpis*” refers to more than mere expectation here.

The complementarity of *mnêmê* and *elpis* takes on particular affective connotations in discussions which associate these phenomena with pleasure and pain. In the *De Motu* (8, 701b33–702a7), *elpides* (anticipations) and *mnêmai* (memories) are causes of the changes in bodily temperature that are associated with the *pathêmata* in general (of which confidence, fear, and sexual excitement serve as prototypical examples). If *elpides* here refer to the kind of anticipations operative in fear as well as in confidence, it would seem that they are capable of being either positive or negative in terms of valence. More often, however, *elpis* appears, as in Plato’s *Philebus*, as the pleasant anticipation of future pleasure. It may thus, as a passage in the *Physics* has it, be a marker of one’s ethical character (7.3, 247a7–13):

> All excellence of character is concerned with bodily pleasures and pains, and these depend on action, memory, or anticipation (*elpizein*). Now, those that depend on action relate to sensation, in the sense that they are aroused by something sensible, and those that depend on memory and anticipation derive from it too: for either they are pleased when they remember what has happened to them or when they anticipate (*elpizein*) the sort of thing that is going to happen to them. Thus, of necessity, all such pleasure is caused by sensible objects.

An extended discussion of pleasure in the *Rhetoric* (1.11, especially 1370a26–1370b32) explores the psychology of this further. All pleasure depends on sensation, including that which depends on memory and *elpis*, because these

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73 See e.g. *EE* 2.8, 1224b16–21, where the self-controlled are said to feel pleasure and the weak-willed pain “from *elpis,*” where ἀντ’ ἑλπίδος means something like “prospective.” Cf. *EN* 9.4, 1166b15–16, where bad people’s memories of past and *elpis* of future difficulties contrast with the good memories and *elpides* of the good (1166a25–26).


require *phantasia* (imagination), which is itself a weak form of sensation (1370a26–35). The pleasures of *elpis* and memory derive from the same things as do present pleasure, though *elpis* in particular is focused on major (*megala*) sources of pleasure or (pain-free) benefit (1370b6–9). An element of pleasure of this sort informs “most” desires (1370b14–16), as when those whose fever makes them thirsty take pleasure in remembering or looking forward to (*elpizein*) drinking (1370b16–18).

Since it is pleasant to anticipate those things whose presence gives pleasure, anger, which involves the *elpis* of redress (*timôria*), also involves an element of pleasure as well as pain (1370b9–14, 1370b29–32). While the *De Motu* passage cited above suggests a role for *elpis* in all pathê that focus on the future (and the present passage of the *Rhetoric* concurs in giving it a role in desire more widely), Aristotle returns several times to its role in anger in particular, not only in the account of that emotion in *Rhetoric* 2.2 (1378b1–2), but also in discussions of courage and confidence in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Eudemian Ethics*, where the pleasant anticipation (*elpis*) of redress that anger entails can motivate people to face dangers in a way that is not truly courageous (EE 3.1, 1229b30–31) – the angry fear nothing and the element of *elpis* in anger makes them confident (*Rhet. 2.12, 1389a26–28*). Both in the discussion of pleasure at *Rhetoric* 1.11 and in the account of anger in 2.2, Aristotle emphasizes that anger’s *elpis* focuses on the possibility of the desired redress or revenge (1370b12, 1378b3–4). This makes it natural to see this form of *elpis* as hope. Yet the second of these passages suggests that the element of pleasure lies in “thinking that one will obtain what one aims at” (1378b2–3), specified less in terms of yearning for a possible but uncertain outcome than as an obsessive fixation with the object of one’s desires – the pleasure of anger rests both on the future pleasure of *timôria* and on dwelling on that outcome in the present, imagining oneself exacting revenge and in so doing taking the kind of pleasure that one takes in dreams (1378b7–9). Distinctions that we might like to draw between hope, pleasant anticipation, and earnest desire are effaced by the semantic range of *elpis* in such passages; but it is clear that the general thrust of Aristotle’s approach leans more towards anticipation of the future and anticipatory pleasure than towards hope as such. As a notion that is broader than our ‘hope’, *elpis* has a role in a wide range of affective and desiderative phenomena, but that role only occasionally and in certain contexts encompasses hope.

*Elpis* has a role in anger not only because it is future-oriented but also because that orientation entails an element of desire that both motivates and can lead us to focus on the objects of our desires to the exclusion of all else. This also gives *elpis* a role in conditioning attitudes to risk – as we saw, the *elpis*
that anger entails can accompany kinds of passion that can look like courage, but are not (EE 3.1, 1229b30–31; cf. Rhet. 2.12, 1389a26–28). These points are expanded in Aristotle’s discussions of the ethical virtue of courage (andreia) and his approach to the affective states of fear and confidence.76

Aristotle’s account of the virtue of andreia in his ethical treatises famously sees it as a mean state with regard to both fear (phobos) and confidence (tharrê, EN 1115a5–6, EE 1228a26–b3).77 Fear and confidence are treated in their own right in Rhetoric 2.5, where elpis turns out to have a role in both. Tharsos (i.q. tharros) is analysed in terms of elpis at 1383a16–19: “For confidence, tharsos, is opposed to <fear, and that which inspires confidence to> the frightening, so that the elpis [implied by tharsos] comes with a phantasia that salutary things are close, and that [or ‘while’] fearful things do not exist or are far away.” Translators and commentators regularly translate elpis here as “hope,”78 and no doubt hope can be a basis for confidence and may be elicited by the prospect of imminent salvation. But the forms of confidence in question in this passage rest fundamentally on various ways of thinking that one is safe and has nothing to fear – the confident believe that nothing is likely to go wrong or that they can deal with it if it does (1383a20–b9); they are not simply people who have reasonable hopes of success. Even if they were, their elpis would be of a partial and limited sort – it would not encompass the hope that persists even when success is unlikely.

Yet it is precisely that brand of elpis that is at issue only lines before, at 1383a3–8, where elpis is said to be necessary for fear. The difference between those who fear nothing further, because they think that nothing worse can happen,79 and those who are capable of fear is that the latter retain a degree of elpis:

Nor do those [sc. experience fear] who think that they have suffered all the terrors that there are and who have become cold with regard to the future, like people who are already dying on the plank; there must be some elpis of salvation [from] the source of their

agony [sc. if fear is to persist]. This is suggested by the fact that fear makes people inclined to deliberate, yet nobody deliberates about what is beyond hope.

The operative antithesis in these lines is between hope and hopelessness, not between confident expectation and hopelessness.80 Though *elpis* in Aristotle spans a range from anticipation of future states of affairs in general through the anticipatory pleasure that informs desire and confident expectation of success, it can also encompass hope. And this hope (like most if not all of the other forms of *elpis*, no doubt) can be a minimum condition for deliberation.81

The conditions for fear and confidence outlined in the *Rhetoric* pertain to ordinary human beings rather than to the virtuous. In the ethical treatises, *elpis* features in the discussion of courage, but though in both the courageous person will manifest both fear and confidence as the situation requires, only the Nicomachean explicitly credits that person with *elpis*. In the Eudemian, *elpis* is a feature only of one of the inferior forms of *andreia* that does not rest either on a rational estimation of the danger or on a commitment to the noble, *to kalon* (*EE* 3.1, 1229a18–20):

Another [form of courage] is that based on *elpis*, in accordance with which those who have often been successful or those who are drunk face dangers; for wine makes people *euelpides*.

The condition of being *euelpis* (regularly translated “sanguine” in these contexts), based on previous good fortune or the kind of foolhardiness that is induced by alcohol, here signifies irrational forms of optimism and over-confidence of the kind that we might attribute to those with “high hopes”; but high hopes are more like great expectations than the attitude that sustains us when we sets our hearts on a possible but uncertain outcome.

Being *euelpis* is a feature of states that resemble courage also in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. At 3.8 the *euelpides* are denied the status of *andreioi*, on the grounds that their confidence rests on their experience of success in battle; unlike the courageous, they are confident because they think that their strength is sufficient and thus that nothing will go wrong. In so far as they are *euelpides*, they are like the inebriated.82 Just as Dutch courage wears off, so does the confidence of the *euelpides* when they realize that circumstances are not as they had thought, while the truly courageous stand their ground, resisting real and apparent dangers because it is *kalon* to do so (1117a9–17). In this way, the *euelpides* are

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82 As at *EE* 3.1, 1229a20 (above), and in the case of the young at *Rhet.* 2.12, 1389a18 (below).
not far removed from those who underestimate the risks out of ignorance, even if the confidence of the latter is even more easily dispelled (1117a22–26). Again, one might say that the *eulpides* have “high hopes,” but inasmuch as they believe that they are safe from harm and perfectly able to deal with the risks that face them, it would strain English usage to say that they are hopeful.\(^8^3\)

At *EN* 3.6, however, Aristotle draws a similar contrast between the way that a genuinely courageous person and an experienced seafarer would face peril at sea: both would be without fear, but for the courageous this would rest on a belief that salvation was impossible and death in such circumstances deplorable, while seafarers are *eulpides* in proportion to their experience; courage in its true sense is displayed where there is occasion for valour or where death is *kalon*, which is not true of death at sea (or from illness, 1115a35–b6). Here, *eulpis* refers to the confidence that derives from experience (and not to the hope that focuses on an uncertain but possible outcome), but this passage raises the question of hope (in our sense) also in the case of the courageous. In “giving up on salvation” (ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν) the courageous seem to have abandoned hope, and this is one of the reasons why they feel no fear; without hope (in our sense) they face an ignoble death at sea, one that gives them no occasion to demonstrate true courage, as courageously as they can. “Giving up on salvation” is a condition for the absence of fear, and so comparison with *Rhetoric* 1383a3–8 (above), where it is said “there must be some *elpis* of salvation” if there is to be fear, confirms that “giving up on salvation” entails abandoning *elpis*. But if *elpis* is necessary for fear, it is not sufficient: experienced sailors are both *eulpides* and fearless. *Elpis* can be a feature both of the kind of uncertainty in which fear might arise and of the conviction that risks are minimal that underpins (over-)confidence. Since the courageous person is not entirely free from fear in those circumstances in which the virtue of courage is paradigmatically possible,\(^8^4\) it seems likely that such a person will retain an element of *elpis* (*qua* hope) in such circumstances, whether that be hope of salvation or just hope of achieving the nobility of action that is the aim of all virtue.\(^8^5\)

But if *elpis qua* hope is a feature of courage in its prototypical sense, so too is *elpis qua* confidence, as we see from *EN* 3.7, 1116a2–7:

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\(^{84}\) See *EN* 3.7, 1115b7–20; *EE* 3.1, 1228b4–1229a11.

The coward is a hopeless/desperate (dyselpis) sort of person, for he is afraid of everything. As for the courageous person, the opposite is true: for confidence (to tharrein) is a mark of someone who is euelpis. The coward, the rash person (ho thrasys), and the courageous person are concerned with the same things, but are differently disposed towards them: the cowardly and the rash exhibit excess and deficiency, while the courageous person is in the intermediate and correct state.

This passage seems to contradict those (EN 1115a35–b6, Rhet. 1383a3–8) which suggest that elpis is necessary for fear – here, the coward fears everything, but lacks elpis. Equally, the courageous person is contrasted, at EN 1115b3–4 and elsewhere, with the person who is euelpis; here, the courageous person is himself euelpis. But since elpis in Greek spans a much wider semantic range than hope in English the apparent contradictions can be reconciled: we might say that the coward, excessively prone to fear, is dyselpis in so far as he is severely lacking in confidence; without confidence he has no belief that (as the Rhetoric puts it) safety is near; but one can be dyselpis – in the sense of expecting the worst – without abandoning hope altogether. Equally, the courageous person is neither over-confident nor excessively fearful, but feels both fear and confidence as is right in the circumstances: he can retain the elpis (of safety or of attaining the noble) that underpins fear of what is genuinely terrible and the elpis that underpins justified confidence, avoiding the extreme fearfulness that promotes deep pessimism without being euelpis to the extent of underestimating the danger or basing his confidence on reasons other than the pursuit of to kalon. The semantic range of elpis allows it to be mapped in a variety of subtle ways onto the continuum that encompasses fear and confidence and the various right and wrong ways of dealing with them. The multivalence of the terminology reflects both the extension of elpis as a concept in ordinary Greek and the functions that the notion is made to perform in Aristotle’s system.

Many of the features of elpis in Aristotle come together in the Rhetoric’s account of the characters of the young and the old (2.12–13). The young are oriented towards elpis and the old towards mnêmê, because for the young the future is long and the past short, and vice versa for the old (1389a20–23, 1390a6–9). The old are dyselpides because of their experience of life’s setbacks and because of their cowardice (1390a4–6); the young lack that experience, and so are euelpides (1389a18–20). This belongs with their gullibility (1389a17–18, 24–25), but also with the intensity of their passions: they are hot by nature, like those who are inebriated (1389a18). They tend towards courage, in so far as they have characteristics associated with two of the imperfect varieties of courage identified in the ethical treatises, i.e. they are spirited (thymôdeis) and they are euelpides: spiritedness implies anger, which drives out fear, while elpis is a source of confidence (1389a25–28). Equally, they tend to megalopsychia, not in
the fully virtuous form expounded in the ethical treatises, but in its ordinary language sense,86 in so far as “they have not yet been humbled by life, but are inexperienced in its stresses”; here again their being euelpis plays a role, in that being euelpis makes people think that they are worthy of great things, which is what megalopsychia entails (1389a29–32). The elpis of youth encompasses forms of optimism, boldness, and self-confidence that belong with the extravagance of young people’s desires and ambitions (1389a1–14), but also with the apparently unlimited array of opportunities open to them (1389a23–24), even if this is only an illusion born of inexperience. This is an elpis with a strongly affective character, and so it is much more than mere anticipation or expectation of positive outcomes. It belongs with the “high hopes” that are attributed to the young in other authors, such as Plato and Bacchylides. But in the way that it risks tipping over into over-confidence, failure to appreciate risk, and unwarranted optimism it excludes features that many of us might regard as typical of modern English “hope.” As a future-oriented pathos, rooted in the phantasia that derives from sensory perception, focused on future pleasures, and enmeshed in affective phenomena such as anger and confidence, elpis spans a wide range of states and circumstances in Aristotle. What we call hope is certainly in there somewhere,87 but one could hardly say that hope, in our sense, is thematized.

From Plato and Aristotle, one might get the impression that Greeks of the Classical period had little interest in hope, its nature as an emotion, or its potential benefits and pitfalls as a distinctive way of orienting oneself towards the uncertainties of the future. The poetic sources that we considered earlier in this paper, however, show that this is far from being the case. While the aspects of hope, in our sense of the word, that are highlighted in those sources do crop up from time to time in Plato and Aristotle, they are not central to their moral psychology. The wide semantic range of elpis in Greek certainly contributes to that phenomenon; but so, it would seem, does the culture of ancient philosophical debate itself, especially the particular turn taken in Plato’s thematization of elpis as something rather different from hope in the Philebus.

86 Gravlee (2000), 475, relates it to the “natural virtue” of megalopsychia at EN 6.13, 1144b4–7. 87 One might mention another passage that associates elpis with youth, but from a different (third-person) perspective: at EN 1.9, 1100a3–4 children regarded as happy (eudaimôn) are counted blessed on account of elpis, and given the context (that eudaimonia can be predicated only of a complete life, and life is beset by unpredictable changes of fortune, 1100a4–9) this elpis must be what we call hope. We might compare (and contrast) the association between the uncertainties of life and first-person hope in Plato’s Laws (5, 732c–d).
References


The person who speaks with understanding (xun noōi) must insist upon what is shared (xunōi) by all, as a city insists upon its laws and customs. – Heraclitus fr. 114 Diels-Kranz

The institutions and policies of the former kings are the tools the ruler uses to share with (gong 共) the crowd. His orders are the tools he, a single person (du 獨), uses to rule others. 先王之政所以與眾共也, 己之命所以獨制人也. – Wang Fu, Qianfu lun ("Shuai zhi" 奧制 chap.).

In early China, the idea of superior knowledge, so essential to the conception of sage rule, ran counter to the value placed on shared experience and understanding. For insofar as any claim to know was a claim to special insight and personal authority, it defied conventions of sharing and ran the risk of appearing imperious and inciting resentment. Therefore, common courtesy virtually required people to say of themselves that they “did not dare [claim to] know” (bu gan zhi 不敢知); this self-deprecating formula in essence signaled, “I dare not claim to command any special knowledge that you yourself may not know.” Indeed, the ubiquitous phrase “not daring,” while appearing in many disparate contexts, most often was intended to convey the polite speaker’s reluctance to claim any monopoly on knowledge, understanding, or insight. The more powerful the well-educated person, the more incumbent it was for him or her to experience and duly perform a sense of trepidation when venturing to speak. To mitigate the threat, cultural norms provided highly ritualized ways to avoid seeming to act so as “to monopolize” discussions and decision-making (zhuan 專); taking action “alone,” i.e., “on one’s own authority” (du 獨), or acting “selfishly” (si 私), on privileged information or insights was taboo. Part and parcel of high cultural learning was an extraordinary sophistication in confronting psychological and sociopolitical dilemmas whose parameters we trace in this essay.¹

¹ For those who continue to embrace the myth that the early Chinese could not think in abstract terms, we urge consideration of He Xiū’s theories of the Three Ages for the Gongyang which approach in complexity, abstraction, and counter-abstraction the sci-fi The Three Body Problem. In Chinese, Huang Pumin (1998) provides a basic introduction to this theory; in English, one may consult Arbuckle (1991), Hsiao (1979), and Liu (2014). See also the large body of Karine Chemla’s work on mathematical computations. Sophistication is also evident in the Shangshu dazhuan assertion that the allotted time of a particular dynasty may expire without the need for any outrageous misbehavior on the part of any “bad last sovereign”; dynasties might simply shift like the seasons. For further information, see Arbuckle (1991) 116. Han Ying, another Ru master from Yan, agreed.
Always, as the Wang Fu epigram suggests, impulses to share authority had to be squared with the requirements of hierarchy, undergirded by ritual propriety. After all, there was but one ruler and a small circle of advisors at court, but the administration of a vast empire depended on many activities besides sharing ideas, sometimes in messy and protracted deliberations. As Sheldon Wolin has observed, the central problematic of governing has always been “how to render politics compatible with the requirements of order, so as to reconcile the conflicts created by competition under conditions of scarcity with the demands of public tranquility” [aka “harmony,” “concord,” or security].\(^2\) The administration also needed institutions designed to ensure efficient order, so that, in the best of all possible worlds, “not a single person in the crowds of officials and functionaries would ever dare to follow the ruler’s commands less than wholeheartedly”群臣百吏莫敢不悉心从己令矣.\(^3\) This profound tension between shared (gong) deliberations and singular (du) powers and privileges reserved for the highest-ranking members of court\(^4\) created a dynamic arena for negotiation within early Chinese politics. The motif of “undaring” was crucial to that structure, which, in theory, allowed the experienced person to strike a careful balance between claiming knowledge and authority, on the one hand, and alleviating suspicions that the claims were self-aggrandizing in any way.

This essay consists of four parts. The first examines the rhetoric of “undaring” in the Documents classic (Shangshu 隴書), undoubtedly the most influential repository of political theory in early and middle-period China. The second part turns to the prescriptive teachings urging the person of immense privilege to “not dare to monopolize” (bu gan zhuan), where passage after passage urges the reader not to claim special insight, even when the person is highly, even uniquely placed as a sage, king, or sage-ruler. Since all good political theory is to some degree diagnostic\(^5\) (and Chinese political theory unabashedly so), part three provides good examples of direct remonstrance in which a Han emperor was reportedly taken aback by an officer’s “daring” to interject unpalatable counsel into polite court assemblies. The fourth and final part looks briefly at some of the institutions in the early empires in China designed to foster the ideal “sharing” of knowledge. These institutions, we argue, relieved some portion of the emotional burdens of “daring to know” by providing occasions when personal views were solicited on behalf of the common good. As we see


\(^3\) Qianfu lun, juan 5, 317.

\(^4\) Du does not necessarily refer to the ruler alone, according to Du duan. See Giele (2006).

\(^5\) Sluga (2014) mentions five aspects of the “diagnostic turn,” which require philosophers to study history.
it, in setting up such institutions of shared authority, the emperor and his chief advisors sought to spare themselves the obvious dangers attending claims to autocratic authority in decision-making. Precedent and custom – Wang Fu’s “institutions of the former kings” – weighed as heavily on the highest-ranking members of the court, it seems, as upon the lowly, perhaps much more so, given that their reputations would be scrutinized by later generations.6 As the Odes puts it,

They say heaven is high, but 謂天蓋高
I dare not not crouch. 不敢不跼
They say earth is firm ground, but 謂地蓋厚
I dare not not tread lightly. 不敢不蹐
Pitiful are we of recent times, 衰今之人
Forced to confront these snakes! 胡為虺蜴
At a minimum, one never dares take a stand in the world, 本不敢立於人間
How much worse, for anyone daring to take a stand at court! 況敢立於朝乎
Guarding oneself never means escape from harm! 自守猶不免患
How much worse, for anyone daring to protect himself from his peers! 況敢守於時乎
The faultless are still slandered, and 無過猶見誣枉
How much worse, for anyone who dares to offend! 而況敢有罪乎
Shutting one’s mouth never brings relief from calumny 閉口而獲誹謗
How much worse, for anyone who dares to talk straight! 況敢直言乎

Before proceeding to Part I, we would like to outline our thinking, in particular what we see as the intellectual stakes of this ongoing project of ours. Initially we chose this particular topic for three cogent reasons:
1. “Daring” and “undaring” are neutral terms that convey admirable and despicable feelings and actions, and hence come with fewer entrainments;7
2. Always the language of daring is deployed within the context of real-life dilemmas, and so it immediately alerts us to the knottier problems of socio-political co-existence in antiquity, unlike the fashionable platitudes, virtue words, and abstractions of their period or ours;8

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6 Ban Gu’s Hanshu, which spends a great deal of time outlining the difficulties of balancing the need to be courteous with the need to be forthright and upright, shows us that emperors in many cases also faced impossible dilemmas squaring the two incommensurate needs (e.g., Hanshu 82.3371–74). That officials were acutely aware of this is clear from the story of Wang Feng and Du Qin. See Loewe (2000) 81–82, 520–21; also Hanshu 67.2922: 凤專勢擅朝; cf. Hou Hanshu 60A.2006.
7 On methodological issues, we are guided by Schäfer (1986); Fischer (1970); Geuss (2008); and Chappel (2014).
8 Here, we admire the bracing observations by Anderson (2018).
3. At the same time, the early texts define morality, good governance, and sometimes even civilizational order in terms of what those with access to power and privilege can or cannot bear to do and dare or do not dare to do. Accordingly, tracing such ideas supplies a far better picture of the “social glue” (their metaphor) they believed bound their early “emotional communities” in China.

For these reasons, this brief history of daring promises deeper probes into the emotional lives of members of the governing elite in the early empires than any conventional list of set “emotions.” Earlier secondary studies have noted the conventions of status and hierarchy displays, yes, but many Sinologists have dismissed the powerful rhetoric of “daring” and “undaring” outright, seeing it as “mere meaningless politesse,” not worth a second look. Closer examination of the history gets us closer to the continual adjustments made to unfolding situations in real time, with some skirting of tricky moral issues. Discerning how social divisions within society were construed, constituted, and maintained through authoritative performances in pre-industrial societies far more reliant than we on bonds of personal trust also gives us moderns a more fine-grained sense of how far one could go to challenge others’ authority.

As David Graeber notes, all formulae indicate, establish, and so reaffirm the hierarchies. The interlocking structures provided by the rival hierarchies in China’s early empires required continual reaffirmations, insofar as they tended to be unstable, with that instability doubtless exacerbated by the era’s limited facilities for transportation and communication. Factions, families, and individuals alike experienced rapid upward and downward mobility to a degree almost unimaginable today. Meanwhile, the values of the old warrior aristocracy needed to be adapted to the new realities of the centralized empires, necessitating frequent re-adjustments to the longstanding roles assumed by power-holders, functionaries, experts, and visionary masters. No wonder that

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9 See, e.g., Shiji 126.3213.
10 Examples that come readily to mind are ke 可 (“I consent”) and zhi 制 (“The rules say . . . ”). For the phrase “emotional community,” see Rosenwein (2017).
11 We all can cite our favorite stories about the “emotions” in early China, and most of us can supply “lists” of the four, five, or more “emotions” (which actually refer to what “moves the heart” and often refers more to inclinations than to emotions).
12 See Johnstone (2011).
13 Graeber’s most relevant texts here are Graeber (2015) and Graeber/Sahlins (2017).
14 Nylan’s forthcoming essay for The Cambridge History of China describes no fewer than eleven separate hierarchies in play in early China.
nearly all early texts, regardless of genre, reveal the intense scrutiny directed to
acts of daring and undaring, in light of the post-facto praise or blame attached
to them.15 We figure we must be on to something since nearly every text we
have read for the early empires circles ‘round the issues we summarize here. To
give the reader some idea of the enormous source base we have explored, we
have prepared a sample set in Tables 1a-b.

Al Pacino once remarked, a good actor is “always looking for that thing
that’s going on besides the words.” We students of history, much like the his-
torical agents whose regimes we study, must remain alert to the subtexts in-
forming the standard writings and scripted gestures, the court institutions and
conventional practices. For that reason, our paper mulls over the single concept
cluster centered on daring and undaring, sketching the perennial yet highly sit-
uation-specific problems relating to trust and mistrust, in the belief that this
concept cluster certainly had wide-ranging ramifications then, and perhaps
tells us something worth knowing even today.

1 The Documents Classic and Daring

Most modern scholars writing about imperial China predicate their hypotheses
on an autocratic emperor who issued top-down directives to “those below”
(subjects who had no say in the matter).16 Abundant counter-evidence exists to
challenge this presumption, in both the prescriptive and descriptive texts com-
piled during pre-Han and Han.17 Therefore, this part focuses on the Documents
classic, as the “crown” of the Five Classics,18 whose early readings define
sages, rulers, and regents in unambiguously non-autocratic terms.

15 The Shitong is full of passages attesting the lengths to which post-facto praise and blame
could go, e.g., Shitong, 12:2/47, the story of Wei Shou.
16 Such claims tally with many of the religious scholars’ arguments, beginning with Weber,
that “teachers” in Asia command unusual authority that brooks no dissent from students. See
17 Prescriptive and descriptive passages exist in nearly all of our sources. NB: most of our
work emphasizes the differences between Western and Eastern dynasties, but here those may
be less germane, especially as so few of our sources can be precisely dated. Nylan (2008) has
defined “early empires” as late Zhanguo (and more specifically, after 323 BC) through AD 316,
i.e., the pre-Buddhist world.
18 See Shitong 7:26/5, for the Documents classic as crown. Nylan (2021) shows that it was the
Documents classic – and not the Analects or the Mencius – that was considered the main classi-
cal source of Han political thinking. Second only to the Documents classic in importance was
the Xunzi 荀子. 
In the Han-era *Documents*, all effective rulers by definition (a) readily acknowledge their dependence on a huge range of factors and forces, including cosmic conjunctions, the gods and ancestors in heaven, and a host of subjects whose thoughts and feelings are not just hard to ascertain but ultimately unknowable;\(^\text{19}\) (b) accordingly, endeavor to ascertain the views of as many interest groups as possible through wide consultation via a range of methods, including direct inquiry, repeated divinations, court audiences held in the capital and provinces, and even invitations to speak issued to such low-status subjects as fodder- and fuel-gatherers, widows and orphans;\(^\text{20}\) and by this means (c) good rulers were to carefully avoid the appearance that they are, in fact, the deciders, in the full knowledge that such prudential acts occasioned by fear may sometimes constrain them, although they also offer undeniable benefits to the body politic on which all rely.\(^\text{21}\) Close reading of the earliest traditions relating to the *Documents* classic confirms this picture, point by point, as do a host of masterworks portraying good governance, under the influence of the *Documents* (see below).\(^\text{22}\)

The early empires celebrated the *Documents* for its ample supply of instructive scenes modeling the ruler’s trust in wide consultation prior to undertaking new policy initiatives. By the early readings, it was incumbent upon the ruler not to monopolize power (*bu gan zhuan* 不敢專), just as the leading members of his court should never arrogate to themselves the powers and privileges reserved for their superiors (*bu gan shan* 不敢擅). Riffing on the antique rhetoric of intimate friendship, one Han authority remarked, “I have heard that each and every one of the wise rulers of antiquity searched high and low for worthy men to support and protect him.”\(^\text{23}\) By a second source, even the ruler’s use of a specific pronoun for the “royal we” raises a problem: all rulers and their administrators, based on

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\(^{19}\) Hence Yang Xiong’s resort to the Mystery 玄 as synonym for “the way things are.” Cf. Hannah Arendt’s “we are in no position ever to know all causes that come into play” (*Arendt [1961] 144*), or even what motivates our own actions, as noted in Fingarette (1969). *Hanji, juan* 16 (Xun Yue’s comment on Zhaodi’s reign), puts it vividly: “This explains why in antiquity the enlightened kings all were terrified, as if they were stepping on a tiger’s tail” 是以昔者明王戰戰兢兢如履虎尾.

\(^{20}\) "Da gao": 賜我大寶龜. That this was the standard reading in Han times is suggested by the “Qilue” (Seven Summaries), quoted in *Quan Hanwen, juan* 41: 尚書, 直言也.

\(^{21}\) In general, modern accounts of antiquity reflect an overly individualistic idea of power; power in the antique world is rooted in families and communities, rather than in autonomous rational beings. The continuance of the dynasty and thus of sacrifices rests upon the support of many constituencies, which is widely acknowledged across the early sources.

\(^{22}\) As the dating of so many of the relevant passages cannot be ascertained, given the activist editing practices in early manuscript culture, we leave this as unverified conjecture.

\(^{23}\) *Hanshu* 49.2292: 臣竊聞古之賢主莫不求賢以為輔翼.
the antique models, should be working side-by-side in a common endeavor to achieve a stable and just order of lasting benefit to all.24

Let us look first, then, at a sampling of passages that utilize the language of daring and undaring to portray the good ruler’s frank acknowledgment of his own limitations. One of the most striking comes from the “Lord Shi” 君奭 chapter, where the sage Zhougong 周公, speaking either as king or on behalf of the king, says:

Lord Shi, merciless Heaven has sent ruin down upon Yin [the previous dynasty], and Yin has already forfeited its charge. Our house of Zhou then received the mandate. We dare not presume to know and claim that at the beginning a ruler can always trust in Heaven’s favor continuing for a long period of time, for Heaven, it seems, is not to be relied upon in that regard. Likewise, we dare not presume to know or claim that any dynastic change always derives from misconduct . . . We, for our part, dare not slack off with regard to the charge from the Lord on High. We should always keep in mind Heaven’s awesome might and our leading men, so that nothing untoward is done. This depends on having the right people in place.25

The “Shao gao” 章 echoes these sentiments in nearly identical language. Once again the sage Zhougong disavows any clear understanding of recent events:

We dare not presume to know and claim that the Yin rulers were given Heaven’s mandate for a limited term of years. Nor dare we presume to know and claim that it [their mandate] could not be extended. It seems they did not attend to cultivating their characters, and so they lost their mandate early.26

Why does Zhougong refuse to claim credit for knowing Heaven’s will after his recent string of victories over Yin, which secured Western Zhou legitimacy? He refuses for cogent reasons. First, as mere mortal he does not fully understand Heaven’s intention, the operations of the dynastic cycle in history (or if this cycle really exists), or the terms of the mandate the Zhou have been granted. Secondly, Zhougong cannot imagine proceeding to govern without being duly

24 Du duan: 古者尊卑共之. Cai Yong’s point is that only later did zhen become a monopoly of the ruler. In the ideal ancient times, high and low shared it. Far too little attention has gone meanwhile into considering the import of the rhetorical formula by which a ruler names himself as “but a young child” (xiaoz子) or a helpless “orphan” (guaren 众人), too inexperienced to be confident in his decision-making powers, no matter what his age. Xiaoz子 appears in the following Han-era Documents chapters: “Tai shi” (3x); “Jin teng” (2x); “Da gao” (3x); “Kang gao” (6x); “Jiu gao” (4x); “Luo gao” (2x); “Duo shi” (1x); “Jun shi” (3x); “Gu ming” (1x); and “Wen hou zhi ming” (1x). Guaren never appears in the Han-era Documents, although it does appear in related traditions.
25 This is the opening speech in the chapter by Zhougong. Full annotations for the translation will appear in a forthcoming translation by Michael Nylan and He Ruyue (Shaanxi Normal University), scheduled for publication two years hence.
26 This is the second speech in the “Shao gao.”
mindful both of Heaven’s awesome might and the consequent necessity to surround himself with the right sort of competent and well-intentioned men in office. As Zhougong warns,

Should our descendants one day find that they cannot pay due reverence to those above and below, they will cut off their forebears’ glorious examples. Should they fail to recognize how hard it is to retain the mandate of Heaven . . . Our rule will not be able to last for many generations.27

It is therefore at once prudent and right for those above and below to be shown due deference by the members of the ruling family. At a minimum, to respect others is a first step toward dignity and justice, righting the obvious wrongs and ameliorating the hardships of others.28 Hence the warning delivered in the “Proclamation to Kang” 康誥 that no ruler shall “dare to mistreat widowers and orphans,” as synecdoche for the realm’s most disadvantaged subjects. Meanwhile, good rulers are to “diligently put to use any useful people [who can be found],” in order to stabilize their realms.29 By the “Gao Yao mo” 皋陶謨, good governing rests simply in “knowing others,” and then employing the best men in office “to settle the people.” Of course, the wise ruler is not merely deferential to others.30 He works exceedingly hard on their behalf, never “daring” to engage in such leisure activities as hunting and touring the countryside because his position is nominally higher.31

The three-part “Pan Geng” 盤庚 chapter supplies one of the best illustrations of the lengths to which a ruler or his representatives should go to register that respect. As the court has already determined through divination that the ruling house must move its capital to a new location or face extinction, the chapter’s protagonist spends a great deal of time persuading disgruntled groups to cleave to the auspicious model set by their illustrious forebears, who to a man “shared the rule” with all right-minded others, including the dead ancestors in heaven. Pan Geng acknowledges that two alternatives exist, if he cannot manage to persuade the people to trust to the collective wisdom of the spirits expressed through turtle divination: either Pan can force others to do what he believes is

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27 This is the second half of the first speech by Zhougong in the “Jun shi” chapter.
29 See the opening speech in the “Kang gao” chapter for both these passages.
30 The Bohu tong, for example, demonstrates that the ruler may not “regard as subjects” several classes of people, including the senior members of the consort clans and the emperor’s own teachers. He is to show deference to any worthy, as well (for the latter point, see Tjan [1949–52] 139h).
31 This is the main message of the “Wu yi” chapter, contra Michael Hunter, in Kern/Meyer (2017). For “work and worry” as the key duty of the sage-king in the Documents, see Nylan (2011) chapter 3.
best for them or he can take the course of least resistance, allowing people to
stay in place, knowing that the latter course in the end only “poisons” the pres-
ent and blights their future prospects, in that it breaks community and blithely
ignores the best available information regarding their situation.32

“I had only planned to make things easy and comfortable for you,” Pan
Geng insists. Ergo, his outright refusal to resort to violence to impose the
throne’s will on its subjects (“How would We ever dare to impose irregular and
unjust punishments on you?”). Instead Pan – by turns reasoning and cajoling,
dangling the carrot and the stick – insists that “the good of the country” relies
on the crowd working in tandem with the ruler to effect a solution. Pan exhibits
the utmost patience as he seeks to encourage the recalcitrant populations “to
move with one heart and mind” to the new site, lest calamities rain down on
those who disregard spirit communications and past precedents.33 “We would
fain have there be no disrespect . . ., so that we always pull together as one, with
one heart and one mind” 永肩一 心, for a better life is only possible through this
combination of mutual aid and fond regard.

Many Documents chapters emphasize this necessity for the true king of su-
preme wisdom to consult widely. For example, the “Li zheng” 立政 (Establishing
Rule) chapter has this to say about the two archetypal sage-kings of Western Zhou:

King Wen, an able judge of people’s characters . . . never once took on 固攸兼 another’s
responsibilities in addition to his own, whether it be a policy advisor’s, a trial judge’s, or
those of the person issuing rulings on taboos. He paid attention only to whether those in
charge of their respective bureaus acted well or not. As for the trial judges and those issu-
ing taboos, King Wen never once dared to presume that he understood what they did 固敢
知于兹, even as King Wu, for his part . . . never once dared to outdo his father’s dutiful
character 不敢替厥義德. King Wu only thought to heed their good counsels, with gracious
mien, and thus it came to pass that through joint efforts they received these vast, vast ter-
ritories, as a solid basis for good rule and order.34

Thus King Wen worked in concert with his many officers, avoiding the appear-
ance or even the thought that he knew best, and King Wu sought only to cleave
to his glorious legacy. Naturally, worthy officials must feel safe enough to de-
liver forthright remonstrance early and often.35 Hence the “Li zheng” chapter

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32 This argument appears in “Pan Geng, A” but continues in “Pan Geng, B.”
33 “Pan Geng, B”: 暨余/予一人猷同心. “Pan Geng, C” emphasizes the will of heaven, as ex-
pressed through divinations.
34 The phrase “outdo” in reference to the family model relies on Hanshu 81.3338.
35 These include the “straight men” (aka the “upright figures”) (zhi ren 直人) (Ruan Yuan
places great weight on providing a number of posts expressly charged to deliver unpalatable truths, while cautioning the ruler, in company with multiple other Documents chapters, against sycophants and glib analysts.\(^{36}\)

In such passages, the Documents classic exhibits a highly sophisticated awareness of the push-pull that characterizes effective administrations, an admiration for efficient administration (or rationalization without initiative) offset by a keen awareness of the perennial need for introducing minor tweaks and even major adjustments to policy-making to meet the exigencies of the time. After all, good governance rested on the correct analysis of multiple factors, as well as coordination between disparate groups, with no one person capable of commanding all.\(^{37}\) Clearly, the goal of wide consultation was to devise better policies with fewer unintended consequences, since all interested parties have been encouraged to express their views during the decision-making process.\(^{38}\) By design, wide consultation also provided a measure of plausible deniability for the ruler and his court, should a policy initiative go badly awry. Han thinkers took it for granted that, even with sages, it took considerable probing to elicit good ideas through dialogue.\(^{39}\) And underlying this approach was something far more profound: a widespread consensus that “growth and development depends upon a blending (judicious) of things that are dissimilar, whereas too much similarity and conformity (tong 同) leads to exhaustion and decline.”\(^{40}\) Seeking a diversity of views would therefore likely not only conduce to present order, but also serve to sustain it over the long run.

Crucially, the Han-era Documents never aimed for perfection, acknowledging this to be unattainable by human beings.\(^{41}\) Rather the Documents readings

\(^{36}\) Cf. “Yao dian,” “Punishments,” and “Qin shi” 普習 chapters, for examples (Ruan Yuan (1815 preface/1980) 43–1, 303–1, 315–1).

\(^{37}\) For example, Hanji, juan 2 (comment on Gaozu).

\(^{38}\) Thus clearer heads and balanced emotions are foundations for more effective acts in service to the community. Compare the Nine Virtues of two Documents chapters with the Nichomachean Ethics, both of which cast the highest virtue as a balance of two virtues. Xunzi is, of course, the master on “unintended consequences,” and had we more time, we would explore this fully.

\(^{39}\) See, e.g., Lunheng, “Wen Kong” 閣孔 chap. which speaks of a lengthy exchange between Gao Yao, Shun, and Yu, saying that while Gao Yao explained his statements to Shun, it was only when Yu questioned Gao Yao further that his advice became deeper and more incisive 深言復深, adducing the appropriate historical precedents.

\(^{40}\) Gentz (2020), 45, summarizing sources both received and unprovenanced (“found”).

\(^{41}\) We suspect, but do not know enough to prove, that the image of perfection retrojected onto the sages and their institutions owes more to Buddhist notions and to conventions of court rhetoric than to the Documents or to any pre-Buddhist writings we now have. The figure of 70% is given for the best doctors and the best diviners in the early administrative documents. Meanwhile, the “ethical demand” is simply to hold oneself to a higher standard, while
sought to nudge those in power to accept a system of institutional and personal checks and balances (see below), in the hopes that the best and most balanced outcome could be achieved when all committed themselves to work toward a common goal. No one doubted that this process represented a curb on autocratic decision-making; that was obvious to all. Not coincidentally, then, two Documents chapters highlighted the sage-king Yao’s acceptance of his officers’ consensus opinion, even when he entertained grave doubts about its inherent wisdom.42 Nor did it go unnoticed that in the oft-cited “Gao Yao mo” chapter, the protagonist, a minister, teaches his sage-ruler how to govern.43

The “Great Plan” chapter outlines two successive procedures by which the ruler may consult varied interest groups.44 In the first, the ruler consults the spirit world (presumably Heaven and the ancestors) regarding a proposed policy initiative.

If one would deduce the appropriate changes, one sets up the leading experts . . . and has them divine by turtle and milfoil. If three men divine about an issue, then one follows what two say.45

However, this procedure does not suffice when serious doubts arise as to the best course of action:

If you then have grave doubts, you consult your own heart, you consult your ministers and officers, you consult your commoners, you consult your diviners by turtle and milfoil. If you think it a good plan to follow, as do the turtle and milfoil, your ministers and officers agree, as do your commoners, this is called the Perfect Concord . . . But if you think it a good plan to follow, as do the turtle and milfoil, but your ministers and officers disagree, as do your commoners, this is still auspicious. If your ministers and officers agree, as do the turtle and milfoil, but you yourself along with the commoners disagree, this is still auspicious. If your commoners agree, as do the turtle and milfoil, but you and your ministers and officers disagree, this remains auspicious. And if you agree, as does the turtle, but the milfoil, your ministers and officers, and the commoners disagree, to make domestic decisions may be auspicious but to deal with outside matters [i.e., diplomacy and war]

being tolerant and forgiving toward others. “It’s shameful to be a junzi alone,” we are told, which echoes the Analects 4.25 line, “Virtue always brings neighbors” (德不孤, 必有鄰). Does virtue ever stand on its own two feet in the Documents? No, and why should it?

42 “Yao dian,” 1A.3, concerning the employment of Gun to control the floodwaters.
43 Many Han texts also construed Pan Geng as first minister and then ruler, with his excellence as much in evidence in the former post as in the latter.
44 See Section 7 of the “Hong fan,” where the ruler’s view can be outweighed by other important stakeholders in the decision-making process, the spirits and ancestors, officials of every rank, and commoners.
45 Section 7, “Hong fan.”
is inauspicious. If the divination by turtle and milfoil both disagree with the men in the three groups, then it is auspicious to do nothing and inauspicious to act.46

Note first, the surprising fact that, in resolving doubtful cases, high-ranking ministers are equal to commoners and kings. Note, too, that the same Documents chapter prescribes watching signs in the heavens and on earth to seek confirmation that the right course of action has been adopted and implemented, even when there are sages on the throne and in the ministerial posts.47 (Han sources, following the Great Plan, lay particular stress on this.)48

In sum, the sage-kings, ranging from Tang the Victorious down to Kings Wen and Wu, supposedly insisted that good rule required them to forego “acting on their own authority” and “privileging their own kin.”49 The empire is held in trust for the ancestors (who rely on dynastic houses for their sacrifices) and for the group the Documents calls “the little people.” In order to serve them, the most prudential course is to abide by the models, principles, and institutions that have worked well in the past (ergo, the continual calls to examine the antique heroes), except when new situations demand innovations and adaptations, negotiated via wide consultation.

That people in Western Han “got” the message that the wise ruler would never dare to rule autocratically is clear from a verbal map sketched in the Yi Zhoushu, the para-classic for the Documents. There a total of nine people “face south” and eight (all but the emperor) “wear the pearl crown” associated with superior insight.50

46 Section 7, “Hong fan.”
47 Section 8, “Hong fan.”
48 The “Meaning of Sacrifice” chapter in the Rites Record (Liji 礼记), for example, explains the significance of divination rituals in this way: “The Son of Heaven, cap in hand, faced north as a subject. Even if the ruler is enlightened and wise, he must still approach the turtle to [help him] decide on the proper decision to be made. For he must show that he does not dare to monopolize power, and by doing so he expresses his reverence for heaven. When the outcome is good, such a ruler claims it is due to others, whereas when the outcome is unsuccessful, he claims it was due to him. In this way he teaches [two lessons]: not to act aggressively and to revere worthy advisors.”
49 This is argued implicitly against a competing Annals’ dictum, “treating kin as close kin” qin qin 親親, invoked in many Han writings, often in association with Zhougong.
50 This image, based on Song-era ritual manual manuscripts, has been altered to conform with the description given for early Western Zhou court rituals (doubtless imagined) in the “King’s Meeting” (Wang hui 王會) chapter of the Yi Zhoushu 逸周書 (Surviving Zhou Documents). In that chapter’s portrayal, the Zhou king appears as but primus inter pares. For he rules, from the upper dais, with his four legendary advisors, the most famous being Taigong wang and the Duke of Zhou. All but the king himself wear the pearl crown signifying supreme sovereignty, and all five face south (i.e., in the ritual direction of rulers). Below, on a lower
Figure 1: Map generated on the basis of the *Yi Zhoushu*, “Wang hui” chapter.

dais, four additional figures wear the pearl crown and face south. To the sides of the daises are ranged the highest-ranking knights, and facing north, as subjects, are lesser officials, including the scribes who supposedly transcribed the scene and liturgy. The *Yi Zhoushu* literary portrait aptly conveys the early aspirations for ideal governance, wherein hereditary ruler and worthy advisers “share the rule” with “dispersed responsibilities.”
This general picture is confirmed by multiple masterworks, including the Zuozhuan and Guoyu, as Joachim Gentz has demonstrated. True harmony results not from the uniformity of views, let alone mindless conformity or coercion; it requires exquisite skill in balancing disparate views, creating a community stronger than the sum of its parts. For much the same reason, the early histories applaud the wisdom of those who refuse to take credit for their own achievements, regardless of how exalted their positions. No evidence supports the widespread notion that the Documents enjoins anything approaching the “divine right of kings” theory championed for centuries in Europe, let alone the autocratic systems championed by the “Asian Values” crowd today.

The focus here on the Documents stems from the limitations of the present essay format. But other Classics convey similar messages, with both the Odes and Changes famously emphasizing that bold action is liable to end in disaster for all parties. Hexagram 1 and Hexagram 64, the bookends for the Changes classic, are typical in this regard. Hexagram 1 illustrates the lesson that pride goeth before the fall, with “the soaring dragon” crashing down, while Hexagram 64 says that the successful completion of any enterprise depends upon proceeding with salutary fear, like an old fox warily “crossing the ice,” on the lookout for fissures and cracks. Hexagrams 5, 6, 13, 18, 26, 27, 42, 59, 61, and 64 liken the conduct of court business to “crossing a great river” in a gale force. Ode 253 insists that only villains entertain “no fears” of retribution, while Ode 192, as we have seen, protests against the “snakes” in power who oppress their subordinates (“Who says Heaven is high?”). The Zuozhuan features exchanges such as that between Ran Ming 然明 and minister Zichan, where Ran Ming’s impulse is

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51 Gentz (2020). One of the clearest examples comes from Guoyu, “Lu yu, xia,” 5.20 (p. 206), which says that the sage kings always attributed their achievements to antiquity (先聖王之傳 恭，猶不敢專, 稱曰自古，古曰在昔，昔曰先民). Hanshu and Hanji concur: for an official, no matter how high-ranking, to zhuan (“monopolize”) control in a locality is a capital crime (Hanshu 81.3346; Hanji, Chengdi’s reign, year 3).
52 E.g., Hanshu 81.3338.
53 For one very clear statement in Western Han that the emperor serves High Heaven by protecting the least of his subjects, see Hanshu 72.3089, 3091. The closest theory comes in the early empires in China to the “divine right of kings” is Ban Biao’s “Wang ming lun,” but even there, the anointed king must demonstrate his worth by multiple actions before ascending to the throne.
54 Hexagram 64.
55 She da chuan 涉大川, a motif taken up in many Han-era texts, including the Yantie lun. Bohu tong, section 6 ("Li yue" 禮樂) ties this to the great humility of the noble man or ruler (junzi 譽謙君子). The variant “crossing the great abyss” (she yuan 涉淵水) appears in the “Da gao” chapter of the Documents and in Hanshu 6.161, 84.3428.
56 See Hanji, juan 25, speaking of the misuse of power.
to dismantle the ritual centers, knowing that the locals “gather there to debate the merits of their administrators.” Zichan’s wise response to this suggestion is swift: the debaters are his own respected “teachers,” allowing him to quickly see what will or not work in his policies. Besides, says Zichan, a demonstration of force can never staunch sharp criticisms for long.\footnote{Zuozhuan, Lord Xiang, Year 31.11 (Zuo Tradition, p. 1285).}

Finally, the \textit{Rites} classics are meant to school one in the arts of social cultivation required to communicate effectively and well with a wide range of people ready to take offense. Perhaps the best example comes from one lengthy passage in the \textit{Yili}, where guest and host identified as peers compete to abase themselves, lest either party feel aggrieved. The passage (included in the Appendix for reference) begins \textit{in media res}: “Etiquette for audiences between gentlemen: As for the gift, in winter use a pheasant. In summer use dried pheasant meat. The guest presents it with its head to the left, saying, “I have long wished to present myself before you, but I have had no reason to come. So-and-so has ordered me to present myself before you.”\footnote{Zheng Xuan: 言久無因緣以自達也。某子，今所因緣之姓名。We have consulted the available translations, but the translation is our own.} Well over ten lengthy exchanges between guest and host are needed to create a ritualized space that permits an amicable visit between the two peers. The protracted process seems ludicrous to us, but it was deadly serious to them. By the protocols, the exchange can be completed only when the guest has persisted so long with his courtesies that the host is virtually forced to obey by taking the gift and welcoming the visitor, lest he humiliate the guest and risk his lasting enmity. Since impeccable classical precedents made nearly everyone equal in some circumstances, the scope of the issue is much wider than it seems.\footnote{Analects 20/1 shows that it is not only Shun, as emperor, who orders Yu, his official, but also Yu who orders Shun: 禹亦命舜.}

\section*{“Even if one has the knowledge and understanding of a sage . . .”}

The set phrase in Chinese “not daring [to monopolize knowledge or authority]” “gave one pause.” The uneasiness it signified “made one stop in one’s tracks, or caused one to reverse one’s course.” Like \textit{religio} in Latin, it was associated with “feelings of being bound, restricted, inhibited, stopped short.”\footnote{For this analysis and quotations, see Barton/Boyarin (2016), esp. 19–21.} “Not daring to monopolize” was associated with a concept cluster that included such
emotions and attitudes as “fear” (kong 恐) or worse, being “wide-eyed with fear” (ju 懼), “reverence” and “reverent attention to duty” (both gong 恭), and a sense of being tied (xi 隻) to something older and finer than oneself, all sentiments that tended to foster an awareness of one’s tenuous hold on authority. “Not daring to monopolize” means that the person in power rightly senses that his or her privileges and powers are hardly self-made; they trace back invariably to an antecedent that has priority in both senses of the word: “the institutions of the former kings,” the spirits of deceased ancestors, the old laws, or, most abstractly, the “origin” and the “Way.”

For example, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (fl. 141–ca.114), glossing the first graph in the Annals classic, speaks of “tying the myriad things back to the origin” (xi zhi yuan 繫之元).61 Out of reverence, then, the ancient sage kings “did not dare to entertain the thought that they were rulers over the people” (bugan you junmin zhi xin 不敢有君民之心); rather they were to work hard on the behalf of others.62 The ruler’s very legitimacy stemmed, in fact, largely from his willingness to subject himself to the preeminent and prior authorities (and not only from the perspective of self-described Confucian devotees). To claim to be “the decider” was indisputable evidence of malfeasance or worse.

By his refusal to act on his own authority, the sage, marked by his feeling of “undaring,” shows his mindfulness of the sources of his legitimacy, as one anecdote from Advice from the States (Guoyu 國語) makes plain. As the various components of our argument are in view and at play in this anecdote dramatizing the difference between the imperious but mediocre ruler and his sage-officer, we translate it in full:

King Ling of Chu was cruel. Baigong Zizhang repeatedly remonstrated with him. The king was troubled by this and told the Diviner Lao: “I want to put an end to Zizhang’s remonstrations. How can I do it?” The diviner replied, “It would be difficult to employ his advice, but it would be easy to put an end to it. When he remonstrates, you should say to him, ‘I possess, in my person, the ghosts on my left and the untimely dead on my right. I have heard all of the hundred remonstrations. What else do I need to hear?’”

Baigong remonstrated again and the king responded to him in the way the Diviner Lao had suggested, to which Baigong replied,

In the past, the [exemplary] Shang king Wuding was able to elevate his virtues, until he became god-like. He moved to the Yellow River area, and from the River he went on to

61 Cf. his “reverently upholding the origin” (feng yuan 奉元).
62 Gongyang yishu, 11. Later He Xiu 何休 (129–182) comments on the same line, “The enlightened king should be an heir to heaven and reverently uphold the origin” (ji tian feng yuan 继天奉元).
Hao. For three years, he remained silent, meditating on the Way. His high-ranking ministers and counsellors were upset by this and they said, ‘The king must speak to issue his commands; otherwise, there is no way for us to receive the commands.’

Wuding then wrote down the following note: ‘I fear my virtue is not yet of the sort that would allow me to put the realm in order. This is the reason I have not yet spoken. So I have drawn an image of the figure who appeared to me in a dream. I would have you seek everywhere for this worthy man.” They found Fu Yue, brought him back, and he was appointed prime minister. Wuding had him admonish him day and night.

Were I a piece of metal, you would be the whetstone;
Were I to cross the water, you would be the boat;
Were I to experience a drought, you would be the rain.

Open your heart to me to cleanse mine. As they say, ‘If the medicine does not cause dizziness, the illness will not be cured.’ And ‘If a person walks without looking at the path, he will injure his foot.’

Wuding was godlike in his perspicacity; his sagely insight was vast, and his knowledge unimpeachable. And yet he still said of himself that he was not yet ready to rule. He spent three long years in silence meditating on the Way. And once he had attained the Way, he still did not dare to monopolize the rule (bu gan zhuan zhi). Instead, he had them search everywhere for a sage [to instruct him]. And once he got the sage to assist him, he was still afraid that he would falter or forget. And so he tasked the sage with teaching and remonstrating with him day and night: “You must correct me! Do not forsake me!”

Now, you, perhaps, do not measure up to Wuding, and yet you opposed any teaching and remonstration. Does that not defy logic?63

Diviner Lao, anxious to please, proposed that the king claim perfect knowledge and command of the spirit realm. Baigong deployed an example from history to show how self-defeating this would be. For in legend, Wuding’s special access to the gods in dreams did not lead him to boast of his authority. Rather it sent him to seek assistance and instruction. Wuding, “even though his knowledge was unimpeachable,” then begged his new advisor to constantly remonstrate with him. The moral of the story is obvious: even if King Ling had had perfect knowledge and god-like powers, he should not have tried to have his own way. Real authority conducing to real success readily acknowledges the duty to heed and defer to other authorities. That King Ling did not do so simply advertises how mediocre a ruler he really was.

Many rationales for divination in the early empires were structured in identical ways with the Guoyu: “even though X person had attained the Way [or was “unusually perspicacious”], he still should not dare monopolize” the decision-making

power. *Hanshu* 75, for example, includes Ban’s withering Appraisal of a group of erudite classicists who used their expertise to advance their own agendas.⁶⁴

One passage by Wang Chong 王充 (27–97) highlights the purported function of wide consultation. For Wang, the best way to secure others’ trust is to show others (shi 示) that one has no intention of monopolizing the decision-making processes:

> When the sages undertake any affair, they first establish what is their duty. Once the right course of action has been ascertained, they then proceed to test their belief through turtle and milfoil divination, in this way showing that they would never make a decision on their own authority. This clearly demonstrates that they agree with the spirit realm and share its end goals. By this, they hope to cause their subjects to trust them and to obviate mistrust.⁶⁵

While a cynical reading of this passage was not only possible in theory but also in real life – with the institution of divination manipulated in such a way that it rubber stamped the ruler’s every whim⁶⁶ – the key to this passage lies in the role the spirits play in persuading the masses to entrust their fates to the wise ruler. Even for the sage, it was not enough simply to be right. In addition, the best leader, be he king, minister, or village head, must know how to act in social situations, lest he appear tyrannical or suspicious.⁶⁷ Showing one’s own reluctance to monopolize the decision-making powers was thus a smart acknowledgement that any form of power must be consensual, and therefore explained to the public in intelligible ways.

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⁶⁴ “It seemed they had a single starting point [in the Dao]; they made use of the Classics to set up what they deemed right, relying on images and categories [in their analyses]. Did they not sometimes fail to avoid the situation where they “hit the target by dumb luck after a million tries”? (*Hanshu* 75.3195). Many other examples could be adduced, for instance, Sima Qian’s injunction to “show the Way of having the power but refusing to monopolize” it 明有而不專之道也; also Liu Xiang’s *Shuoyuan*: the diviners of the past “had recourse to their arts in order to assist their Way and investigate doubtful matters, showing that there are others who take precedence and one does not dare assume sole power” 凡古之卜日者，將以輔道稽疑，示有所先而不敢自專也; and Wang Fu’s *Qianfu lun* “even though sages and worthies have penetrating insight, they do not act on their own authority; thus they divine in order to inquire of the spirits” 聖賢雖察而不專，故立卜筮以質神靈.

⁶⁵ *Lunheng*, juan 24, pian 72, 1009 (“Bian sui” 辨祟 chap.).

⁶⁶ In their discussions about divination, Ruan Kan 阮侃 and Ji Kang 姜康 disagreed on whether there is any element of deception or trickery in the sages’ use of divination and prayer. For Ruan Kan’s view, see Ji Kang (2014) 494; for Ji Kang’s response, see Ji Kang (2014) 491–532.

⁶⁷ A parallel distinction comes up in legal discussions; it is not enough for the judge to be fair and right, when dispensing justice. Far better is it for the fair judge to be seen as fair (as was the case with Yu Dingguo).
Being supremely cognizant of the effect one’s judgments and actions will have on the wider viewing public is a major theme in the Confucius legend. When Confucius as Minister of Justice in Lu was adjudicating cases, he was mindful of what he knew and what he could or could not do and say.68 The Shuoyuan account of Confucius the sage-judge fits the tried-and-true motif of knowing-but-not-daring:

When Kongzi was Minister of Justice in Lu, he always rendered judgments in front of large groups of people [to make his legal opinions “teaching moments”]. All would gather around and he would come forward, saying: “X, believing the situation to be like this, has made such-and-such a statement, and Y, believing the situation to be like this, has made such-and-such a statement.” He would then give his analysis of the statements. Did Kongzi really need to go through the statements in this way? If he knew something, why did he feel the need to go through this lengthy process before he [decide he] knew how and why to decide the case? Because a noble man like Kongzi is both reverent and yielding. And his phrasing has what it can share (gong 共) with others. He would never keep his knowledge to himself alone (du 獨).69

This notion of justice for the people required that the people be apprised of their superior’s reasoning, in order to attain consent and trust without coercion. While the wisdom and knowledge of the sage might not be fully shared by all, the sage was human after all, and so he could use his pronouncements to bring others in line with his way of thinking.

That judgments should be perceived as “shared” and not arbitrary was a powerful idea, frequently invoked to defend those “straight-shooters” whose admonitions had infuriated the emperor, as we see from a typical speech delivered by a general Xin Qingji 辛慶疾 (fl. 50–11 BCE), who came to Liu Fu’s 劉輔 defense in a tense exchange that happened ca. 16 BCE:

We have heard that the wise king listens with open-mindedness and values those officials charged with remonstrance and argumentation. As he would expand opportunities for the truly loyal, he refuses to criminalize [even] wild speeches . . . In our humble opinion, Liu Fu came to assist the ruler, and he was fortunate to join the ranks of the remonstrating officials, thanks to his belonging to the imperial clan. He came from a remote backwater and so he does not understand the court conventions. He offended a taboo, yes, but his offense hardly merits harsh condemnation. If his crime is minor, it should be overlooked and tolerated. And even if he did commit a major crime, it would be fairest to ex-

68 See below for the attitude ascribed to Kongzi in compiling his great history, the Annals 春秋 classic.
69 Shuoyuan 14.21 (“Zhi gong” 至公).
pose it, and then have it judged by the proper authorities in such a way that the findings can be shared with the crowd (yu zhong gong zhi 與眾共之).70

General Xin strongly urges the emperor to show his openness to “sharing” in two ways. First, the ideal ruler is to leave himself open to all sorts of comments, even “wild” and reckless talk. Second, in the unlikely event that a serious offense is committed, the ruler should not dominate or even intervene in the judicial process; instead, he should rely on the designated authorities to judge the merits of the case, with their judgment subject to further review, in the court of public opinion. We know of cases where the Han emperors accepted such judgments, even when the findings contradicted their own preferences, lest they appear to “monopolize” the decision-making process.71 The dual failures to tolerate speech and to circumvent the shared procedures for adjudication would tarnish the emperor’s image, in his own era and afterwards. Even if the ruler’s judgment was sound, only shared deliberations could ensure widespread acceptance of the rulings.72 And the same goes for high-ranking officials: even if the remonstrants showed little understanding, so long as they did not intend to do harm, they must be forgiven, as another official pled, successfully.73 The lengths to which forthright remonstrances could go in real life is illustrated by the story of Xue Guangde 薛廣德, who threatens to pollute the imperial carriage, if the emperor fails to heed his advice.74

Wang Su 王肅 (195–256), during the reign of Emperor Ming of Wei (206–239), spelled out the only alternative to such complex processes premised on ritualized acts of yielding authority: a bad emperor might seek out advice but swiftly eliminate those with whom he disagreed. “With the words still in their mouths, the heads [of the remonstrants] would be severed already from their bodies” 言猶在

70 Hanshu 77.3252. It is “our humble opinion,” because Xin Qingji says unnamed others share his point of view.
71 Hanshu 80.3323: 有司請廢，朕不忍。又請削，朕不敢專. Hanshu records two nearly identical statements (Hanshu 53.2432, 2435).
72 A spirited debate considered the issue whether the sangong (three members of the Executive Council) or the tutors to the emperor were equal to the Son of Heaven himself; see Wujing yi yi (2012) 170.
73 E.g., Hanji, juan 2, pian 25 (Xun Yue’s own comment on Chengdi): “Even if Wang Shang’s discussion of water was not the best, and it was not a speech that displayed his wisdom, his speech was not used to harm Wang Feng; he wanted to be loyal to the ruler and settled the people . . . but Wang Feng took it [wrongly] as a pretext for ire” 王商言水不至，非以見智也，非以傷鳳也，欲將忠主安民 . . . 而鳳以為慷慨.
74 Hanshu 71.3047.
Wang Su objected to such arbitrary acts, in a studiously polite but trenchant way:

True, the people whom your Majesty has executed all deserved to die. Still, the masses do not know this to be so; they deem your actions too hasty. I would have your Majesty refer these cases to the proper legal authorities, who may then expose their crimes. True, in each case, the outcome is the same. But acting as I suggest will prevent pollution in the private apartments of the palace, obviate hyper-caution within the ranks of the officers, and forestall mutual mistrust by those near and far [the court and its subjects].

Wang’s persuasion piece, conceding the emperor’s good judgment, deploys the same “even if you are right” logic seen above, arguing that it is not enough for anyone, regardless of rank or status, to assess a situation correctly and to act on his assessment, without wider consultation. Achieving consensus on important decisions depends upon a lengthy process: information and views are to be shared with the proper authorities and interested parties; the evidence at hand is often to be divulged and its significance explained. The alternative is mutual mistrust, upon which once-stable dynasties have foundered.

In each of the texts cited here, “knowledge and understanding” (zhi), and even the perspicacity of the “sage” (sheng), may threaten orderly rule, if such wisdom is acted upon without due consideration for the feelings of the ignorant and aggrieved. Thus the rhetoric of “undaring” was seen as one way to temper the attitudes of those who prided themselves on their immense powers and capacities. Accordingly, the ritual texts and historical anecdotes about the exemplary figures of the remote past sought to cast this attitude as a prime political virtue, a good in itself. Quite cleverly, the rhetoric of “undaring” circumvented the dangerous question of whether the person in power was a sage or not by using the concessive language of “even if,” as seen in Wang Su’s deft plea.

3 Testing the Limits of Speech

Clearly, the good emperor was expected to be open-minded, or at least to tolerate any and all rebukes, even those couched in overwrought and offensive language. Below, we provide two fairly representative episodes, one each from Western and Eastern Han, where an official deemed it his duty to publicly challenge the emperor in a way calculated to provoke him. Evidently, such episodes

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75 Jinshu 30.916 (“Xingfa zhi” 刑法志).
76 Jinshu 30.916 (“Xingfa zhi” 刑法志).
proved immensely edifying to the members of the governing elite, nearly all of whom would have identified with the remonstrant, whether or not they themselves had exhibited comparable bravery in fulfilling their assigned duties.

In the first scene of instruction, during the reign of Chengdi 成帝 (r. 33–7 BC), an official named Zhu Yun 朱雲, who had already tangled with the law several times before, confronted the emperor and his favorite, the Chancellor Zhang Yu:

During Emperor Cheng’s reign, Chancellor Zhang Yu, the former Lord of Anchang, was given special privilege on account of being the emperor’s teacher and was greatly esteemed. Zhu Yun submitted a memorial requesting to be seen. In front of the high-ranking nobles and ministers, Zhu Yun said: “The court’s great officials are unable to correct the emperor and do nothing to benefit the people. They take their salaries and idle away their days. Confucius referred to this kind of court, saying, ‘it’s impossible to serve a ruler alongside these vulgar men . . . They only fear losing their positions. Hence they will do anything to keep them.’ I wish to be given a fine sword crafted by the palace artisans for butchering horses, so that I may cut down one sycophant so as to admonish the rest.” The emperor asked: “Who are you talking about?” Zhu replied: “Zhang Yu, Lord of Anchang.”

The emperor was furious: “A petty underling slanders me and humiliates my own teacher in front of everyone at court. This is a crime punishable by death from which there can be no reprieve.” The officials went to take Zhu Yun away, but he latched onto the balustrade so that he broke it in the process. Zhu cried out: “It’s enough if I can join the entourage of Longfeng and Bi Gan [two legendary loyalists] in the underworld! But then who knows what may become of the imperial court!” At this the officials swiftly removed him. Xin Qingji, General on the Left, then removed his cap and his official seal, and began kowtowing on the palace floor: “For a long time that fellow has been known for his wild but upright speeches. If what he says is correct, he cannot be executed. And if his words are incorrect, in fact you ought to accept him as he is. I, your servant, dare to offer my life as substitute for his by way of defense.” Xin Qingji then kowtowed until the blood flowed. The emperor relented and only afterwards became more self-possessed. Later, when they were about to fix the balustrade, the emperor said: “Do not fix it! Leave it be! This is the way to advertise the virtues of a forthright minister.”

Xin Qingji essentially repeats the argument we have seen others make. “Wild straight talk,” even if it is incorrect, had best be tolerated; certainly, it may not be punished, without causing harm. So here Xin offers himself as substitute, intending to shame the emperor into seeing how counter-productive acting on his own authority would be. Drawing upon good classical precedents, Xin’s rhetorical

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77 Hanshu 67.2915.
Figure 2: “Chu Yun [Zhu Yun] Breaks the Balustrade.” Anonymous. Southern Song painting. 78

78 Anonymous, “The painting about Chu Yun breaking the balustrade” (中文: 折檻圖), 12th or 13th century; Medium ink and light color on silk. Height: 173.9 cm (68.4 in); Width: 101.8 cm (40 in). In the National Palace Museum, Taipei. Wikidata: Q540668; Accession number 故畫000181N000000000. In the public domain, with permission of the Museum.
clarity forces the emperor to relent, regardless of his own feelings. And eventually, like the good emperor he is, Chengdi goes so far as to advertise his own lapse of judgment, when he refuses to have the unsightly broken balustrade replaced or repaired.

This refusal had impeccable classical precedents, not coincidentally. An anecdote found in two masterworks, the *Han Feizi* (compiled before 233 BC) and the *Huainan zi* (compiled ca. 139 BC), records a violent encounter between the blind music-master Kuang and his liege lord, Duke Ping of Jin, in which Kuang attempts to strike the duke with his instrument after the duke made an inappropriate remark. Kuang, being blind, slams his valuable instrument against the wall, damaging both in the process, and the duke refuses to have the wall fixed, so the damage can remind him of the error of his ways. In the *Han Feizi* version, the ruler starts by claiming that the best part of being a ruler of men is “no one disagrees with what you say.” The sage Kongzi, who turns up only in the *Huainan zi* version, heaps praise on the less-than-exemplary Duke Ping for “intending to welcome remonstrators to his court.” Emperor Cheng’s gesture, which surely recalls this famous story, ensured his renown as a ruler unusually “tolerant of direct admonitions”. Determined to foster broader deliberations, deliberations worthy to be shared with a wider public not only in his own day but in later ages, he in essence devised a safe space in which his officials could do their utmost in service to the realm. That explains the Han sources’ praise for the members of his court as well: supposedly, his “nobles and ministers carried out their duties, sending memorials and participating in court debates in model ways”

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80 See Liu (2014), for a full translation of the Gu Yong memorial. Because of the limitations of space in this essay, we have chosen to focus here on a small number of examples. We could cite many others, if space permitted.
81 It would take another essay to show our evidence for this characterization, so ubiquitous is it. But repeatedly our early sources tell us that the “empire” is not the possession of the ruling house. *Shangshu dazhuan* 4.2, for example, tells us plainly that “The position of Son of Heaven can be occupied, correctly, only by those who have the Way. Now, as we all know, the realm is not the possession of one family. Only those who have the Way may have it [the throne]. Only one who has the Way ought to assume that position” 此天子之位, 有道者可以處之矣。夫天下, 非一家之有也。唯有道者之有也。唯有道者宜處之。
82 *Hanshu* 10.330.
While the bulk of the extant anecdotes from the early empires reveal conventions for handling direct speech at court, there also survive anecdotes describing the type of elaborate courtesies the ideal emperor was to use when inviting worthy men of special insight to his court. In the next story a certain Fan Ying樊英 (fl. 121–130) has refused repeated invitations to serve the court; meanwhile, he has dabbled in the occult arts, especially rain-making and divination. Fan’s story skillfully plays on the presumed connections established between the spirit realm, full of enlightened beings, and the preeminent earthly advisors. For by longstanding practice, the Han courts summoned promising candidates for high office in much the same way that a devotee would summon a god through acts of propitiation, lest the emperor appear like an autocrat “ordering children about.”

To perform his perfect humility, the emperor was to “choose an auspicious day, fast and purify himself, set up an altar, and make all the ritual preparations” 擇良日，齋戒，設壇場，具禮，ardently waiting to receive the candidate’s assent to take up a post. Under Emperor Shun, the process broke down; although the emperor was determined to appoint Fan Ying, all his efforts were to no avail. The emperor, finally enraged, shouted, “I can make you live and I can make you die. I can raise you high and I can bring you down. I can make you wealthy and I can make you poor. On what basis do you ignore my commands?” To which Fan calmly retorted,

Your servant receives his commands from heaven. If I live out my allotted days, that is due to heaven, and if I die early, that is also due to heaven. So how can Your Majesty make me live or die? I view a tyrant like a bitter enemy. I would not think of making a career in such a court, so how can you raise me high? Even though I am a commoner and live in a shack, I am relaxed and at ease; I would not exchange my life for that of a lord of a great land. So how, pray tell, would you bring me low? . . . If an offer of employment is not given with the required courtesies, I would never accept the highest salary. If, however, by it I could achieve my aims, I would never be upset with the most meager food. So how can Your Majesty make me rich or poor?

83 The appointment of Han Xin韓信 (f. 206–197 BCE) provides a remarkable example of a ruler “not daring to monopolize.” The Han founder Liu Bang劉邦 (d. 195 BCE) was criticized for “appointing generals the way one summons children.” The founder’s advisor Xiao He蕭何 (fl. 209–193 BCE) advised him how to summon a potential official with the due courtesies.
84 Shiji 92.2611; Hanshu 1.30 and 34.1863.
85 After repeated invitations had failed, Emperor Shun, “sparing no ritual” (bei li備禮), issued him formal robes, “yet Fan declined again, on the pretext of illness. Finally, the emperor, predictably annoyed by the rebuff, had the provincial officials haul him unceremoniously to the capital, but to no avail. Fan continued to plead illness and refused to come to court. When forcibly carried into the palace, Fan still refused to “submit” (qu屈).
86 Hou Hanshu 82A.2723.
Unable to humble Fan and subdue his will (qu), the emperor decided on a different tactic: to humble himself. He began by sending the imperial physician to care for Fan’s “illness,” offering him mutton and wine monthly. A full two years later, the emperor pulled out all the stops: he had a dais built and a mat installed on it, just “as if Fan were a god.”\(^87\) He had an official carriage sent to bring him in state to the palace; he had the Director of the Secretariat usher him in, at which point Fan was offered a table and cane, and treated with all the ritual due to one’s own master and teacher, and invited to speak on the court’s successes and failures. Fan Ying, after all this, acquiesced, and he was appointed, with no prior experience, to a fairly high position.\(^88\)

Little matter that Fan proved to be useless as an administrator. The emperor had shown his mettle, and we, at this remove, see the parallels constructed between a person’s teacher and a person’s god. Setting aside Fan’s own remarkable mediocrity, the imperial gesture was celebrated as an exemplary act by a successful ruler “deploying rituals to gain [the service and allegiance] of a crowd [of worthy men]” (li zhi yi de zhong 禮之以得眾).\(^89\) Indeed, from his perch in the fifth century, the historian Fan Ye feared that civilization itself would be at risk, as soon as such laudable generosity and tolerance were replaced by jealousy, suspicion, and vulgar quid pro quos. Fan’s assessment presumes the same critique of know-it-alls and deciders. Taking his cue from the Analects, Fan decided that the goal of all court institutions and leaders was to “make a path to follow” rather than to strive for perfect awareness or knowledge.\(^90\) To “dare not to monopolize” even when one believed he “knew” the correct course or suspected the motives of certain political actors was a good way to deal with the institutional complexities of a functioning empire. The ritual gesture of “undaring” was a willingness to engage in the world of men in the face of intractable uncertainty. It is not hard to see why Fan Ye saw that as the very thing than separated his beloved culture from the barbarians.

\(^{87}\) Hou Hanshu 61.2032: 朝廷設壇席，猶待神明; cf. Hou Hanshu 82A.2724 朝廷若待神明.

\(^{88}\) Hou Hanshu 61.2032.

\(^{89}\) Hanshu 75.4924.

\(^{90}\) Contrast A.C. Graham’s reading of the Zhuangzi, which highlights the modern elite preoccupation with superior awareness. On this, see Nylan 2016.
4 Institutional Checks and Balances

Knowing, on the one hand, how quickly people tend to take offense and, at the same time, how little knowledge and understanding any single person, no matter how well-intentioned or learned, commands, the prudent person in power (aka the sage or worthy) deduced a third “hard fact” as corollary: that the individual virtues of a few power-holders would hardly suffice to promote civilized conduct (jiaohua 教化) throughout the realm. Institutions were needed to encourage awareness and prevent mistakes, especially the court institutions, since the ruling elites, for good or for ill, provided the most powerful models for emulation. Accordingly, the court mandated elaborate procedures for a host of activities, including the selection of candidates for office and the promotion or demotion of advisors; provisions for experts airing their views in relative comfort; and rules forbidding bureau heads from interfering with others’ work before regular checks on office-holders were conducted. The stated purpose of many such institutions was to form ethical leaders who “felt compelled to communicate what they had learned” (literally, “did not dare to not communicate”), despite the palpable risks of doing so.

Ideally, throughout his tenure, the ruler or regent would “refrain from aligning himself with any one proposed solution to a problem. He must personify the universal spirit, which was perfect but neutral.” To foster the impartiality identified with the celebrated “King’s Way” – impartiality being the most basic precondition for any careful deliberation – four constraints were placed on the imperial person, to bolster the lessons from the Classics and the histories: (1) many channels existed for expressing dissent, collective and individual, via

91 See, e.g., Hanshu 85.3447: 夫治遠自近始...未有左右正而百官枉者也.
92 In the Documents, the “Gao Yao mo” (“Counsels of Gao Yao”) and “Li cheng” chapters emphasize this point, which was picked up by a number of Han-era texts, including Yantie lun, juan 2, pian 10; Gale (1967) 61 (“Ci fu” 刺復 chapter). Bureau chiefs and even rulers are enjoined not to interfere with their subordinates, lest they complicate the execution of their tasks.
93 Liu Xiang’s remark in a doubly-sealed memorial (Hanshu 36.1947).
94 Huang (1981), 100 before the ellipsis, 110 after; cf. Michael Loewe on wuwei (not “non-action,” but rather a conscious refusal to not take the initiative needlessly).
95 Documents, cited in Hanshu 85.3443–50.
96 For a sophisticated view of history as anecdote collections, see Els/Queen (2017).
97 In one typical dissent, Li Xun rebuked the emperor, saying, “The emperor may well find that he cannot help himself [in feeling a depth of gratitude], and so it may be right for him to confer cash or goods upon someone, but it is not permissible for him, for selfish reasons, to confer an official position [upon anyone]” 陛下...良有不得已, 可賜以財貨, 不可私以官位 (Hanshu 75.3186).
such routine communications as memorials, legal and administrative files, and omen reports,\(^98\) not to mention the frequent court conferences convened to discuss policy initiatives; (2) the rituals stipulated several categories of “teachers and models” (\(shī\) 師) to whom the emperor must publicly perform his ritual obeisances;\(^99\) (3) multiple administrative positions were charged to admonish superiors; and finally (4) the historian’s solemn responsibility was to render just praise and blame, making any throne subject to higher standards and authorities.\(^100\)

Good rulers were defined largely by the trust they placed in officials who were ready to speak truth to power.\(^101\) They knew they had to “earn [others’] support in governing,” through repeated acts signaling their humility and desire to serve, and their concomitant willingness to heed harsh rebukes.\(^102\) So it perhaps should not surprise us that we find emperors confessing their inabilities and sense of powerlessness, fearful lest they acquire a reputation for monopolizing power.\(^103\)

Of course, human beings have never yet managed to invent institutional checks and balances that are immune to malfeasance of one sort or another.\(^104\) That said, some regimes with robust institutions clearly seem better equipped to acknowledge failings and repair mistakes through a process of wide consultation. We claim here, contra the common wisdom, only that the early empires in China were blessed with robust institutions, which often (not always) prevented the worst follies, once someone had the gumption to deliver the “bitter pill” to the court.\(^105\)

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\(^98\) For omens as Heaven’s warnings delivered by upright officials, see *Hanshu* 85.3450 (Gu Yong’s remonstrance), for example. The Han emperors, on Heaven’s model, issued “warning rescripts” that inform administrative units that they were being surveilled for possible misconduct. See Hou Xudong (2019).

\(^99\) BHT talks of five discrete *bu chen* 不臣 categories, two of which look very similar, the *sanlao* and *wugeng*. I use the word “publicly” in the limited sense: that many other were meant to learn of the performance (not that the performance was open to the public).

\(^100\) Ergo the fierce debates over whether Sima Qian’s history was “treasonous” or not.

\(^101\) See, e.g., *Hanshu* 75.3158. One can see that this is why debates raged over Wudi’s rule forever afterwards.


\(^103\) *Hanshu* 80.3323.

\(^104\) That always and everywhere even the best institutions can be corrupted is a lesson that should be clear to residents of the United States today. Cf. *Shiji* 112.2950, which calls out Zhufu Yan for being a “yes-man” for his emperor; the same charge is leveled at Gongsun Hong: that he abdicated his responsibilities as high-ranking official to provide independent advice to his emperor. Cf. Qin Tao (2018) esp. 135–36.

\(^105\) *Hou Hanshu* 35.1145, 1145n2. A famous case occurs under Zhangdi, who rather than overturn the consensus views of the White Tiger Hall conference, some of which he opposed, decided to
With that important caveat in mind, we begin with the staffing of the imperial administration, a vast undertaking, given that some 130,000 officials took salaries from the court. The small percentage of the empire’s population who were sufficiently skilled in rudimentary literacy and numeracy virtually ensured that the vast majority of entry-level posts in the bureaucracy (60–70% by some guestimates) were allotted to the sons or nephews of mid- to high-ranking officials, their families being able to hire tutors for professional training and privileged access to valuable colleagues and allies. A smaller proportion of officials came to paid positions in the administrative after slowly climbing through the ranks, having started as low-level functionaries (wen li 文吏) and drafters of documents (wen xue 文學) in unpaid or poorly paid posts.106 While such men could acquire influential backers along the way, often their reputations for efficiency impeded full integration into the highest ranks of the administration, where greater finesse was expected. For a third “fast track,” office-holders at the 2,000 bushel-rank (essentially generals, commandery governors, and ministers) were annually to recommend roughly a hundred or so outstanding candidates with proven skills and good memories.107 Those candidates who tested well in the palace examinations were usually promptly assigned to such coveted posts as Academicians (boshi 博士), keepers of the precedents (zhanggu 掌故), remonstrating counsellors (jian dafu 諫大夫), advisory courtiers (yi lang 議郎), and palace courtiers (lang 郎), with the courtiers enjoying daily access to the emperor. From their first appointments in the middle ranks of the administration, many advanced to the highest offices in the land.108 These “fast-track” positions had

106 For edicts discussing the reasons for setting up these offices, see Ma Shiyuan 2014, 432–33, some of which specifically invite “straight-talkers” to court. Crucially, these first two tracks were not entirely exclusive. Two prime examples of minor functionaries who went on to become high-ranking officials are Bing Ji 丙吉 and Wang Zun 王尊. At the same time, Zhu Bo’s biography (Hanshu 83) illustrates just how difficult it was to move from the second track to the first, especially when gaps in class and in status were to the fore; cf. the biography of Zhou Kan 周堪 (Hanshu 79B.2579).

107 Bielenstein (1980) 140. Most assume that Wudi and Gongsun Hong essentially invented this third track, but there are some signs that the track existed before Wudi.

108 Hsu Fu-kuan (2002), 72, rightly characterizes the boshi as “consultants” invited to advise emperors. Zhang Handong 1984 supplies some numbers: among the 50 boshi whose first promotion is documented, 36 were promoted directly to posts ranking 2000 bushels or equivalent, and 8 to posts ranking at more than 800 bushels. See Zufferey (2003) 207–8. A word of caution: there is no sign of a meritocracy here, with all the problems that that word drag in.
somewhat overlapping duties, in that all were supposed to offer advice and admonitions on formal and informal occasions. Most capital posts had counterparts in the staffs in the kingdoms and commanderies.109

Our essay, given the limitations of space, focuses below on one institution designed to facilitate a free exchange of views at court. The court conferences, whose sole purpose was to determine the optimal policy going forward, had four striking features: the diverse make-up of the conference conveners and participants; the open-ended nature of the questions sometimes posed to the participants; the circulation of draft position papers subject to multiple revisions; and the provision for a “majority vote” that in most cases seems to have been binding.111 In any given year, the court might encounter the sort of problems whose resolution seemed to require a consensus before undertaking any action, often because failures were likely to be costly, in all senses of the word. These issues included water control measures, diplomatic exchanges with hostile powers, decisions to designate a legitimate heir, the adjudication of tricky legal questions, and questions where to locate the main cult sites, in order to please the gods and reduce expenses. Faced with several options, the court convened a conference of experts, usually between 50 and 100 stakeholders, in order to solicit a range of views on the initial plans generated within the imperial administration. Significantly, the ruler or regent, the members of his Executive Council, or one or more ministers had the authority to propose that such a conference be called. This was not the ruler’s sole prerogative, in other words, and the instructions that summoned participants to the palace admitted that in

109 Of course, we tend to think of the Academicians by analogy to modern academics, whose primary job is, supposedly, to teach students. But Academicians from Qin and Han were routinely consulted by the emperor considering different policy proposals, as those equipped with knowledge of the past, and hence what worked and did not. The Han guan yi says of the boshi that they were to participate in court discussions and prepare to answer the chief advisors’ questions: 預朝 Emanuel, 大議. 備左右問. See Shiji 6.236, 242; cf. Qi Juesheng. Zhang Handong (1984), 436, knew that Academicians were policy advisors before Han Wudi, but he seems to think that changed afterwards. That is far from clear. To the group listed above, we should, of course, add diviners. Cf. Loewe (2019).

110 For example, see Shiji 59.2104 for the local boshi. Clearly, xueguan 學官 are mentioned in the localities, for example, in Shu (Sichuan) (Hanshu 89.3626). One wonders if the wenxue are trained there, in these places which seem to be ritual centers (Hanshu 76.3211n). Kingdoms were denied this privilege under Jingdi, in 145 BC (Hanshu 19.741), as part of a larger crackdown on their autonomy.

111 Indeed, Giele (2006), on Du duan, 85, characterizes these conferences as “convening for voting.”
some cases “the imperial instructions had to be overturned,” if justice was to prevail or the appropriate action was to be determined.\textsuperscript{112}

Invitations to the conference (usually issued in the form of edicts by the emperor or the chancellor) were apt to be fairly open-ended. One edict by Wendi, for example, in commenting on a string of recent natural disasters, asked if it were Heaven’s intention to indicate that either the imperial policies themselves or the procedures to implement those policies were at fault. “Should the administration’s official salaries and expenses be reviewed? How are we to feed the people in such parlous times, and where does the blame lie, when the people are starving”?\textsuperscript{113} Typically, the participants represented a broad mix of officials and experts ("different interest groups or constituencies," in today’s parlance), on the understanding that the high-ranking would be inclined to favor the status quo and those still anxious to advance in their careers would be more likely to find the flaws in the current situation. As the surviving histories attest, those who spoke up in intelligent ways could move up the career ladder very quickly, both generalist and specialist knowledge being admired.\textsuperscript{114} And often the invited participants, whether wenxue, xianlang, or Academicians, were the very people whom the court had dispatched to inquire into local conditions, who could then speak with greater authority to the topic at hand.\textsuperscript{115} Position papers were drawn up and the drafts circulated to many interested parties and government agencies; the papers were then subjected to oral arguments, in a lengthy process that sometimes took months. All positions papers were subjected to repeated revisions before the final vote was called.

\textsuperscript{112} One of the most spectacular cases involves Xiahou Sheng, whose upright remonstrance inflamed the emperor (\textit{Hanshu} 75.3156). NB: the excavated texts reveal comparable discussions held at the local level, though the evidence is sparse; sometimes the received texts gesture in that direction (e.g., \textit{Hanshu} 83.3340).

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Hanshu} 4.128. 吾未能得其中。其與丞相列侯吏二千石博士議之.

\textsuperscript{114} Here we think of Zufferey (2003), 189, a proposal to translate Ru as “generalist.” Appeals to the “great Way” or “most fitting solution” are everywhere thought to supersede mere technique. Zufferey adduces the example of Gongsun Hong, who is described as “having all the advantages of Zhougong and Shaogong,” and “who proceeded to establish an example for the empire to follow by never dressing in two colors and never dining on more than two dishes, with no noticeable benefit to the administration” (\textit{Yantie lun}, chap. 10; Gale (1967) 63; Zufferey (2003). The sarcasm drips. While much of the controversial literature of the period is no longer extant, we know that such conference proceedings were compiled in compendia labeled \textit{dan shi} 弹事 (Shots Thrown) or \textit{dan wen} 弹文 (Projectiles in Writing), something not likely to happen if the court discussions were innocuous.

\textsuperscript{115} E.g., \textit{Hanji}, \textit{juan} 2, \textit{pian} 13, on Xu Yan 徐偃 and others. Such envoys were meant to counter or rectify the situation where the members of the court paid no heed to the burdens of the laboring masses (as in \textit{Yantie lun}, \textit{juan} 2, \textit{pian} 10: 但居者不知負載之勞, 從旁議者與當局者異憂).
Notably, throughout this potentially contentious process, the participants were admonished not to “fight to get ahead.” As Xuandi acidly remarked,\(^ {116}\) the men in service who were quick to triumph over and lambaste one another abdicated their responsibility to emulate the exquisite courtesy displayed by the sage Zhougong, which brought to Zhou to nearly perfect rule. “Butting heads” confrontations (\textit{kangli} 六禮) were no-win situations, and the best men, regardless of position, extended the same politeness to everyone, regardless of station and standing in life (\textit{jun li} 鈞禮).\(^ {117}\)

Often the histories record the numbers of those who favored one proposal over another, suggesting that a strong consensus and majority rule were not so easily overturned.\(^ {118}\) Apparently, the decisions reached during the court conferences gained added force and legitimacy when the numbers and the identities of officials who supported a certain decision were put on record.\(^ {119}\) And although all formal decisions reached by the ad hoc consultative body could be re-litigated many decades after the initial conference, the court conferences established binding precedents until over-turned by a similarly protracted process.\(^ {120}\) Significantly, the participants frequently cited classical precedents when reporting their votes to the emperor and the members of his Executive Council: “We have heard that when you broadly solicit plans from the crowd, this accords with Heaven’s heart. Therefore, when the ‘Great Plan’ speaks of following two out of three, saying that ‘the minority should follow the majority,’ it means that the conclusion ought to accord with the past and suit the masses” 論當往古，宜於萬民.\(^ {121}\) Significantly, too, the “best” policy had to meet many

\(^{116}\) Xun Yue, \textit{Hanji, juan 1} for Xuandi.

\(^{117}\) \textit{Hanshu} 71.3042, speaking of the exemplary Yu Dingguo’s stress on the “classical arts” (\textit{jingshu} 經術). Bing Ji is another celebrated figure who acts similarly (\textit{Hanshu} 74.3413).

\(^{118}\) See, e.g., \textit{Shiji} 118.3079, 3094; \textit{Hanshu} 25B.1254–55 (2x), 73.3125, 84.2142–43, 86.3501. Nylan (2013/2020) demonstrates that the Han empire adopted nearly all Qin institutions, including that of the court conferences. The Qin stele erected in Kuaiji describes the court ideals in this way (\textit{Shiji} 6.262): “The Sovereign Lord opens the realm, attending to the myriad affairs . . . He has good and bad explained to him, so nothing is hidden 皇帝開宇，兼聽萬事．．．善否陳前，靡有隱情．” The Qin emperor convened numerous court conferences; see \textit{Shiji} 6.235, 238, 242 (2x), 266, 99.2720.

\(^{119}\) See Loewe (1994), 288–90, 294 and 296, for records of views credited to 70, 44, 28, 8, 18, 53 and 147 persons.

\(^{120}\) Re-litigation (literally, “debating again” 復議) could occur long after the initial decision was reached, and it was especially likely to happen when the vote did not reflect consensus. See, e.g., \textit{Hou Hanshu} 30 (\textit{zhi}).3035.

\(^{121}\) \textit{Hanshu} 25B.1254–55.
incommensurate goals, not necessarily in conformity with the emperor’s own views.\textsuperscript{122}

The foregoing may upon first reading seem irrelevant to those entertaining a very narrow view of the “emotions” in early China (basically the lists that start with “delight” and “disgust”), and equally so to those who feel that “For ancient Chinese historians it was not the mimetic representation of past reality that was at issue, but the elucidation of good and evil.”\textsuperscript{123} Yes, those lists exist, as do the moralizing histories. However, what compels our interest are the texts exploring in sophisticated ways how trust is built, so that a real consensus may emerge, free of fears, to supplant the craven urges and mindless conformities. Often the workings of the governing elite becomes clearest when we see them under stress, responding to situations that leave them sore afraid, and what is striking is the complexity of their responses. In one passage, for example, Chengdi (r. 33–7 BC), who was well-trained in the Classics, professes himself to be “wild-eyed with terror.” Treating the Classics as rich repositories of models for criticism, Chengdi then asks the commanderies and kingdoms near the capital to recommend for his court straight-talking and stridently critical candidates (with “no holds barred”), even as he solicits from the northwestern frontier zone men well trained in and knowledgeable about the military arts.\textsuperscript{124} The best offense is a panoply of defensive plays, it seems, that required him to rethink his court and his place in it from the ground up. When all was said and done, “One cannot be too careful!” 不可不慎也.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{122} That much is apparent from the Bohu (White Tiger) conference of AD 79. Convened by the emperor, the conference participants’ eventual consensus views clearly did not please the emperor, and yet the emperor duly signed off on those views, giving them his formal assent. Six years later, in AD 85, Zhangdi thought he had found a way to maneuver past some of the conference decisions he found most irksome. He therefore asked a trusted ritual expert to devise a new set of court rituals over the objections of several of his officials, who wanted a new conference convened. In the end, however, Zhangdi, a very powerful emperor, decided that it was simply not worth it to foist his views on an unwilling court full of doubters and dissenters. Accordingly, Zhangdi went to the grave without introducing the changes he wanted to see put in place, so cognizant was he of the social dynamics in play. See, e.g., \textit{Hou Hanshu}, 35.1202–3; \textit{Hou Hanshu zhi} 志 2.3026. Worth considering is Tjan (1949–52) Vol. 1, 164.

\textsuperscript{123} This assertion comes from a very smart essay by Kai Vogelsang (2005) 151. We problematize it because it applies to certain authoritative histories in early China, but not to others.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Hanshu} 10.326.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Hanshu} 89.3638 (more literally, “One cannot but be careful!”).
5 Final Complications and First Conclusions

Later commentators to the *Analects* did not always find it easy to square the Supreme Sage’s knowledge with his humble appearance and behavior. The discrepancy crops up in many passages in the *Analects*, but never more prominently than in this passage:

The Master entered the great ancestral temple, where he inquired about everything. Someone commented [snidely], “Who says the man from Zou knows ritual? When he enters the great temple, he inquires about everything.” Upon hearing of this, the Master observed, “That is the ritual.”

There are, of course, different ways to interpret Kongzi’s reply. It might be read as, “Even though I know the protocols, the ritual requires me to perform my lack of knowledge,” as in one standard early reading stressing the prudential quality of Kongzi’s actions. Or perhaps Kongzi was really afraid that he did not know every last detail; that he might annoy others by any show of erudition, arrogant or not; or even that less-erudite men might display unwarranted self-confidence, if they tried to model themselves on his conduct. The last reading was, as it happens, skewered by Wang Chong in an essay demonstrating that sages never have perfect “foreknowledge” 先知:

Kongzi/Confucius says: “When in doubt, inquire.” Doesn’t this mean that one should ask only when in doubt? If, in fact, Confucius already knew everything but needed to inquire again to serve as a model for others, then shouldn’t he have done the same when his students came to ask about the Five Classics? Why, in that case, did he teach his students so authoritatively, brooking no opposition (zhuan 尊)? . . . How is it possible that the sage’s use of his heart and mind could be so inconsistent?

The notion that “even if the sage knew, he still did not dare” received impeccable support from the Classics, masterworks, and early histories; what compels attention is the ever-present potential for adjustments to be made to the standard injunctions warning against acts and attitudes that “dare to monopolize.” Wang Chong’s objections to Kongzi’s reply had important ramifications, of course. It was debated in Han, as to whether it had any divine quality to it. See *Fayan* 9/1; also *Wujing yi yi* (2012) 168.

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127 Citing Kong Anguo 孔安國 (attributed to Han, but later); *Analects* 3/15, commentary by Huang Kan 皇侃 (2017) 65: “Even though he knows these things, he should still continue to ask about it. This is the height of prudence/caution” 雖知之, 當復問, 慎之至也.
128 Of course, the entire question of the sage’s foreknowledge or prescience was hotly debated in Han, as to whether it had any divine quality to it. See *Fayan* 9/1; also *Wujing yi yi* (2012) 168.
129 *Lunheng*, juan 9, pian 28, 397 (“Wen Kong” 问孔 chap.).
course. For to query the claim that Kongzi’s show of unknowing was mere performance was to invite an alternative mode of action: that of “inquiring and challenging” (wen nan 問難), in the belief that “it is hardly necessary to await explicit precepts from the sages before one dares to speak.”

For Wang, it seems, a “shared” 共 notion of inquiry is appreciably better than an unthinking parroting of precepts attributed to one sage or another. Indeed, the admission that even the sage may experience self-contradictions is for Wang the beginning of true understanding. Note, not coincidentally, how well Wang’s rhetoric is suited to appeal to his readers, who have already been primed by innumerable stories to concede the dangers of asserting any monopoly on knowing, whether moral or political.

A second rhetorical move toying with the language of “daring to monopolize” as “acting alone” with equal deftness uses the charge of arrogance to undermine bold actions undertaken to defend sound principles. When, for instance, Wang Chang 王暢 (d. 169 CE), as Governor of Nanyang, sought to rein in the extravagance of the local elites under his jurisdiction, he began his campaign thinking that he would lead by example: wearing commoner’s clothing, he rode in an old cart pulled by a worn-out nag. Wang’s student swiftly came forward to chide him:

One should not usurp the privileges of one’s superiors by extravagance, nor should one use frugality to coerce those below. In following the way and acting with ritual decorum, it is best to reside in the “narrow space between the permissible and the impermissible.” They say Qu Boyu was ashamed to be a noble man alone (du). The governor does not long to embody the enlightened precepts of the sage Kongzi. Instead he emulates the inferior principles of Boyi and Shuqi [who refused to acknowledge the sober realities and changed circumstances of their time]. Are you completely free of the impulse to so dazzle the world that it deems you better than the common run of men?

For the governor to embody frugality was nothing short of a rash and imperious attempt to humiliate any local who dared to dress more extravagantly. But how, then, was suasive example ever to effect gradual improvements? The dilemma was hardly lost on Xunzi 荀子 (d. ca. 221 BCE), easily the most influential thinker in the early empires, who remarked: “The man in service wants to cultivate his person in a discriminating way (literally du 獨), and yet he [also] wants not to offend the vulgar” 夫士欲獨修其身，不以得罪於比俗之人也.

130 Lunheng, juan 9, pian 28, 397 (“Wen Kong” 問孔 chap.): 非必須聖人教告乃敢言也.
131 Lunheng, 26, pian 78, 1083 (“Shi zhi” 實知 chap.).
132 Hou Hanshu 56.1825. The line about residing “between the permissible and the impermissible” (ke fou zhi jian) is a reference to Fayan 11/23.
133 Xunzi, juan 1, pian 2, 30 (“Xiu shen” 修身 chap.).
In this paper, we have merely begun to scratch the surface of the culture of “daring” and “undaring” in the early empires in China. The rhetoric used in this culture tended to generate complex calculations eliciting a mixture of due deference and singular pride, expressed in elevated language and elegant gestures (see the Appendix). We would end simply by reiterating what should be evident by now: always in the early empires in China, men and women with access to power had to weigh the relative importance of their own health and well-being as individuals and as family members, the potentials for honor versus disgrace in this life and in future generations, concerns for the court’s administrative efficiency and standing with its subjects, and hence the very grounding of civilized order. Long-term “knowing what to do” and when and how to act, whether in the court’s pay or not, proved not only to be the ultimate test of supreme cultivation, but also – more surprisingly to us – a mark of great privilege, something to which mere functionaries and those not “in the know” could never aspire. By our reconstruction, then, to “conquer the self and submit to ritual” 克己復禮 during the tense negotiations that inevitably attended court business and domestic affairs was hardly a sign of slavish capitulation, as many have construed it. It represented an enviable triumph of good sense, decorum, and breeding, and was widely regarded as such.

134 In a further study, we intend to pursue the larger cultural grammars through which people negotiated claims of authority to create that narrow social space between the permissible and the impermissible, in a climate where acting without authorization or authority could prove fraught, or even deadly.
135 We recall here Timothy Chappell’s book (2014) by that name; also Hanshu 72, which celebrates the courage and wisdom of high-ranking officials who knew when it was time to quit. Many of the discussions swirl around timing, and the particular obligations a person owes if he or she is currently taking a court salary when the decision to act must be made.
136 This four-character phrase (Analects 12/1; Shiji 47.2187) is found in several histories, including Zuozhuan, Lord Zhao, Year 12, which ascribes it not to Confucius but an “old record”; the Hanji, pian 33 (Xun Yue’s comments on Yuandi’s reign); Hanshu 27B(c).1418, 85.3463; Hou Hanshu 40B.1361, 50.1677, 52.1720, zhi 2.3297.
Tables 1a-1b: We have provided for the reader a small sampling of excavated texts that use the language of “daring” and “not daring.” While the administrative language is hard to parse, absent an understanding of the discourse and stakes of the discourse, Tables 1a-1b show readers versed in classical Chinese how the newest sources relate to the oldest sources in the received tradition.

SHUIHUDI 睡虎地 (Qin kingdom, terminus ad quem 217 BC)¹³⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dare</th>
<th>Violation/Sanction</th>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Strip Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>毋敢</td>
<td>到七月而縱之</td>
<td>田律</td>
<td>4–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>匪敢</td>
<td>其追……殺之</td>
<td>田律</td>
<td>4–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢</td>
<td>有不從令者有昬</td>
<td>田律</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢增積</td>
<td>增積如律令</td>
<td>瘡苑律</td>
<td>26–27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢異</td>
<td>金布律</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢掩行錢、布</td>
<td>擇行錢、布者，……皆有昬</td>
<td>金布律</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其責毋敢逾歲</td>
<td>遞歲而弗入及不如令者，皆以律論之</td>
<td>金布律</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>縣毋敢損壞更公舍官府及廷</td>
<td>其有欲壞更殿，必讞之</td>
<td>衆律</td>
<td>115–124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢之市及留舍闠外</td>
<td>當行市中者，回，勿行</td>
<td>司空</td>
<td>147–148</td>
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<td>所不當除而敢先見事，及相顧以遺之</td>
<td>以律論之</td>
<td>置吏律</td>
<td>159–160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>勿敢留</td>
<td>留者以律論之</td>
<td>行書</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>非史子殿，毋敢學學室</td>
<td>犯令者有昬</td>
<td>內史雜</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢貳史之事</td>
<td>內史雜</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>侯、司寇及群下吏毋敢為官府佐、吏及禁苑憲</td>
<td>內史雜</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>非其官人殿，毋敢舍焉</td>
<td>有不從令而亡、有敗、失火，官吏有重昬，大斬夫、丞任之</td>
<td>內史雜</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢以火入賊府、書府中</td>
<td>內史雜</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
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<td>勿敢行</td>
<td>行者有昬</td>
<td>尉雜</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>縣毋敢包卒為弟子</td>
<td>尉賞二甲，免</td>
<td>效律</td>
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### Tables 1a-1b (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dare</th>
<th>Violation/Sanction</th>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Strip Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>敢深益其眾歲數者</td>
<td>費一甲，棄俘</td>
<td>效律</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>非歲紅(功)及母命書，故為它器</td>
<td>工師及丞費各二甲</td>
<td>效律</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢炊飪</td>
<td>犯令，費一盾</td>
<td>效律</td>
<td>27–29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>敢為詐偽者</td>
<td></td>
<td>效律</td>
<td>32–33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>署勿令為它事……故令為它事</td>
<td>使者費二甲</td>
<td>效律</td>
<td>42</td>
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</table>

#### YUELÜ ACADEMY 岳麓書院 (unprovenanced)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dare</th>
<th>Violation/Sanction</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>廿六年十二月戊寅以來，禁毋敢謂母之後</td>
<td>犯令者耐隸臣妾而毋得相為夫妻，相為夫妻及相與奸者，皆黥為城旦舂。</td>
<td>(5) 1–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>夫及父，不同父者，毋敢相仁為兄、姊、弟</td>
<td>母更嫁，子敢以其財予母之後夫、後夫子者，棄市，其受者，與盗同律</td>
<td>(5) 1–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>毋敢挟合匿者</td>
<td>皆與同冒</td>
<td>(5) 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>新地吏及其舍人敢受新黔首錢財酒肉它物</td>
<td>皆坐其所受</td>
<td>(5) 39–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>令曰: 逍遥節發縣官吏及丞相、御史、執</td>
<td>不從令，皆費二甲，其丞、長史、正、監、守丞有(又)奪各一功(功)，史與為者為新地史二歲。</td>
<td>(5) 128–130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>發卒史以下到縣官佐、史，皆毋敢名發</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>使令其奴婢、私屬、免婢市販馬牛為</td>
<td>不從令者，黥奴婢、私屬、免婢為城旦舂</td>
<td>(5) 163–164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>貿</td>
<td>慘其【顚顚】禁市販。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>吏自佐以上敢罰黔首</td>
<td>不從令者費二甲，免</td>
<td>(5) 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>禁毋敢為旁錢</td>
<td>為旁【錢】者，費二甲而廢</td>
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<td>令曰: 諸有案行縣官，縣官敢屛匿其所案行事及塞塞止辭者</td>
<td>皆耐之。所屏匿畱當道若耐以上，以其所</td>
<td>(5) 218–19</td>
</tr>
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138 Chen Songchang 陳松長, ed., Yuelu shuyuan cang Qin jian, si 岳麓書院藏秦簡.肆, vol. 4, (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2015). Chen Songchong, ed., Yuelu shuyuan cang Qin jian, wu 岳麓書院藏秦簡.伍, vol. 5 (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2017). The column, “Source” marks the volume number (4) or (5) followed by the cardinal number assigned to the strip in that volume.
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<td>敢為人解去此一物, 及吏徒主將者擅弗令傅</td>
<td>皆以綢自爵贍論之, 費二甲</td>
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<td>令曰: 毋以罪女及女子居贍者為吏僕</td>
<td>不從令, 費二甲, 廢。丞、令、令史、官駕夫弗得, 費二甲。</td>
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<td>XX 敢為壹</td>
<td>【限計】過者, 令、丞以以下均行, 許遊者皆為新地吏二歲</td>
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<td>令曰: 諸有乘馬者, 敢步遠行道</td>
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<td>令曰: 縣官官令、丞、尉敢除它縣</td>
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<td>黔首居田舍者毋敢醜(醜)酒</td>
<td>不從令者遜之</td>
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<td>金布律曰: 禁毋敢以牡馬、牝馬高五尺以上</td>
<td>罪令者, 皆費二甲, 沒入無縣官。</td>
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<td>令曰: 車及犁、為人僦(僦)載, 及禁賈人毋得以牡馬、牝馬高五尺以上者載以貫市及</td>
<td>為人僦(僦)載, 而</td>
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<td>原卒律曰: 縣尉治事, 敢令吏獨治, 必尉及士吏與</td>
<td>身臨之, 不從令者, 費一甲</td>
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<tr>
<td>費為里典、老, 敢以公士及毋敢以丁者。</td>
<td>丁者為典、老, 費尉、尉史、士吏主者各一甲, 丞、令、令史各一盾。</td>
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<td>勿敢擅興, 及勿敢擅事(使)放童、私屬、</td>
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<td>伐及不從車牛, 凡免老及放童未傅者, 甘</td>
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<td>伐</td>
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<td>劾已而敢弗遣拾日</td>
<td>費尉、尉史、士吏主者各二甲, 丞、令、令史各一甲</td>
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LONGGANG 龍岡 (near SHUIHUDI site in Hubei)\textsuperscript{139}

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<td>77/48A/48A/238, p. 54</td>
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<td>而毋敢射殺</td>
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<td>敢穿阱及置它機害人馬牛者，雖未有殺傷，賞二甲</td>
<td>103/85A/83A/212, p. 62</td>
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\textsuperscript{139} Chen Wei 陳偉, ed., \textit{Qin jiandu heji} 秦簡牘合集, vol. 2 (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 2014).
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<td>人雖毆變，罰為人變者</td>
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<td>治狱者: 各以其告劾治之。敢放訊、杜雅，求其它罪，及人告劾而擅覆治</td>
<td>皆以鞫狱故不直论。</td>
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<td>毋敢X界而環(还)</td>
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<td>逗留畏弗敢就</td>
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<td>吏六百石以上及宦皇帝，而敢字第(子)貸錢財者</td>
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<tr>
<td>官各有弁。非其官事勿敢為。非所聽勿敢聽。諸使而傳不名取卒、甲兵、禾稼志(識)者: 勿敢擅予</td>
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<td>置吏律</td>
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<td>非當發傳所也，毋敢發傳食焉。為傳過員，及私使人而敢為食傳者</td>
<td>皆坐食為盗。</td>
<td>傳食律</td>
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<td>禁諸民吏徒隸: 春夏毋敢伐</td>
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<td>令勿敢逐夫父母及入贅，及道外取其子財</td>
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<td>縣道官僅擅壞更宮府寺舍者: 賜金四兩，以其費負之</td>
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<td>縣道官毋敢擅用</td>
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<td>毋敢擅史卜</td>
<td>吏擅弗除事者，與同罪</td>
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FENGHUANGSHAN 凤凰山 (at Jiangling, Hubei (burial dated 167 BC)\(^{141}\)

正為市陽人嬰家稱錢衡以錢為彊，劾曰四朱兩疏第十，敢擇輕重衡及弗用劦論
弱繇里家十日

XUANQUAN 懸泉 Site, near Dunhuang (late Western Han/Wang Mang era)

諸吏宦官及比者同秩而敢詈之殿、官、廷中至其上秩，若以縣官事殿晝大夫以上，戍一歲。\(^{142}\)

GURENDi古人堤 (Eastern Han)

敢盜之及私假人者若盗充重以封及用偽印皆各以偽寫論\(^{143}\)

Liye 里耶 (Qin period, 222 BCE-209 BCE) (selection)\(^{144}\)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
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\(^{142}\) IIT0215(1):76. See Zhang Junmin 張俊民, “Xuanquan Han jian suojian lüling wen yu Zhangjiashan Ernian lüling” 懸泉漢簡所見律令文與張家山《二年律令》，*Qin Han yanjiu* 秦漢研究 5 (2011).


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New Strips from Juyan 居延新簡 (Wang Mang to early Eastern Han) (selection)\(^{147}\)

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\(^{147}\) Ma Yi 马怡 and Zhang Rongqiang 張榮強, eds., *Juyan Xinjian shijiao* 居延新簡釋校 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2013).
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## Wuyi Guangchang 五一廣場 (Eastern Han)

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Appendices

Chinese Sources for “A Short History of Daring” (Nylan and Wilson)

*Documents, “Jun shi” (p. 5–6)*

君奭。弗弔天降喪于殷。殷既墜厥命。我有周受。我不敢知曰厥基永孚于休。若天棐忱。我亦不敢知曰其終出于不祥。嗚呼。君已曰時我。我亦不敢寧于上帝命。弗永念天威越我民。罔尤違。惟人。

*Documents, “Shao gao” (p. 6)*

我不敢知曰有殷受天命。惟有厥年。我不敢知曰其不其延。惟不敬厥德。乃早墜厥命。

*Documents, “Jun shi” (p. 6)*

在我後嗣子孫。大弗克恭上下。遏佚前人光在家。不知天命不易。天難諫。乃其墜命。弗克經歷。

*Documents, “Li zheng” (p. 7)*

文王惟克厥宅心……罔攸兼于庶言。庶獄庶慎。惟有司之牧夫是訓用違。庶獄庶慎。文王罔敢知于茲。亦越武王……不敢替厥義德。率惟謀從容德。以並受此丕丕基。

*Documents, “Hong fan” (p. 9)*

稽疑……立時人作卜筮。三人占。則從二人之言。

*Documents, “Hong fan” (p. 9)*

汝則有大疑。謀及乃心。謀及卿士。謀及庶人。謀及卜筮。汝則從。龜從。筮從。卿士從。庶民從。是之謂大同。身其康彊。子孫其逢。汝則從。龜從。筮從。卿士從。庶民從。筮從。汝則逆。庶民逆。吉。庶民從。龜從。筮從。汝則逆。吉。汝則從。龜從。筮逆。卿士逆。庶民逆。作內凶。作外凶。龜筮共違于人。用靜吉。用作凶。

*Guoyu, “Chu yu” (p. 12)*

靈王虐。白公子張駢諫。王患之。謂史老曰。吾欲已子張之諫。若何?對曰。用之實難。已之易矣。若諫。則曰。余左執鬼中。右執殤宮。凡百箴諫。吾盡聞之矣。寧聞他言?白公又諫。王若史老之言。對曰。昔殷武丁能聨其德。至于神明。以入于河。自河徂亳。于是乎三年。默以思道。卿士患之。曰。王言以出令也。若不言。是無所聘令也。武丁于是作書。曰。以余正四方。余悉德之不謙。茲故不言。如是而又使以象篤旁求四方之賢。得傳說以來。升以為公。而使朝夕規諫。曰。若金。用女作贑。若涖水。用女作舟。若天旱。用女作霖雨。敢乃心。沃朕心。若藥不瞑眩。厥疾不瘳。若跣不視地。厥足用傷。若武丁之神明也。其聖之睿哲也。其智之丕茂也。猶自謂末久。故三年默以思道。既得道。猶不敢專制。使以象篤旁求聖臣。既得以為輔。又恐其荒失遺忘。故使朝夕規諫箴諫。曰。必交修余。無余棄也。今君或者未及武丁。而惡規諫者。不亦難乎。
Lunheng “Bian sui” (p. 13)
聖人舉事。先定於義。義已定立。決以卜筮。示不專己。明與鬼神同意共指。欲令眾下信於用不疑。

Shuoyuan “Zhi gong” (p. 14)
孔子為魯司寇。聽獄必師斷。敦敦然皆立。然後君子進曰。某子以為何若。某子以為云云。又曰。某子以為何若。某子曰云云。辯矣。然後君子幾當從某子云云乎。以君子之知。豈必待某子之云云。然後知所以斷獄哉？君子之敬讓也。文辭有可與人共之者。君子不獨有也。

Hanshu 77.3252 (p. 14)
臣聞明王垂寬容之聽。崇諫爭之官。廣開忠直之路。不罪狂狷之言……臣等愚。以為輔得託公族之親。在諫臣之列。新從下土來。未知朝廷體。獨觸忌諱。不足深過。小罪宜隱忍而已。如有大惡。宜暴治官。與眾共之。

Jinshu 30.916 (p. 15)
陛下之所行刑。皆宜死之人也。然眾庶不知。將為倉卒。願陛下下之吏而暴其罪。均其死也。不以君者。不以有茲紳警懼。不為遠近所疑。

Hanshu 67.2915 (p. 16)
至成帝時。丞相故安昌侯張禹以帝師位特進。甚尊重。雲上書求見。公卿在前。雲曰。今朝廷大臣上不能匡主。下亡以益民。皆尸位素餐。孔所謂鄙夫不可與事君。苟患失之。亡所不至者也。臣願賜尚方斬馬劍。斷佞臣一人以厲其餘。上問。誰也？對曰。安昌侯張禹。上大怒。曰。小臣居下諫上。廷辱師傅。罪死不赦。御史將雲下。雲攀殿欄。欄折。雲呼曰。臣得下從龍逢、比干遊於地下。足矣。未知聖朝何如耳？御史遂將雲去。於是左將軍辛慶忌免冠解印緬。叩頭殿下曰。此臣素著狂直於世。使其言是。不可誅。其言非。固當容之。臣敢以死爭。慶忌叩頭流血。上意解。然後得己。及後當治殿。上曰。勿易。因而帳之。以旌直臣。

Hou Hanshu 82A.2723 (p. 18)
朕能生君。能殺君。能貴君。能賤君。能富君。能貧君。君何以慢朕命？

Hou Hanshu 82A.2723 (p. 18)
臣受命於天。生盡其命。天也。死不得其命。亦天也。陛下焉能生臣。焉能殺臣。臣見暴君如見仇讎。立其朝猶不善。可得而貴乎？雖在布衣之列。環堵之中。晏然自得。不易萬乘之尊。又可得而賤乎？陛下焉能貴臣。焉能賤臣。臣非禮之禄。雖萬鍾不受。若申其志。雖箪食不厭也。陛下焉能富臣。焉能貧臣。

Analects 3/15 (p. 24)
子入大廟。每事問。或曰。孰謂鄹人之子知禮乎？入大廟。每事問。子聞之曰。是禮也。

Lunheng “Wen Kong” (p. 24)
孔子曰。疑思問。疑乃當問邪？實已知。當復問。為人法。孔子知五經。門人從之學。當復行問。以為人法。何故專口授弟子乎？不以已知五經復問為人法。獨以已知太廟復問為人法。聖人用心。何其不一也？

Hou Hanshu 56.1825 (p. 25)
夫奢不僣上。僣不逼下。循道行禮。貴處可否之間。蘧伯玉恥獨為君子。府君不希孔聖之明訓。而慕夷齊之末操。無乃皎然自貴於世乎？

Yili passage, as written*

* The underlying logic of this passage, upon first reading totally obscure, is easy enough to parse once one realizes how difficult peer-to-peer exchanges prove to be, as compared with those within well-defined hierarchies of superior-subordinate relations.

Etiquette for audiences between gentlemen: As for the gift, in winter, use a pheasant. In summer use dried [pheasant] meat. [The guest] presents it with its head to the left. [The guest] says: “I have wished to present myself [before you], but I have had no reason to come.149 So-and-so has ordered me to present myself [before you].” 士相見之禮。摯，冬用雉，夏用膳。左頭奉之，曰: 某也願見，無由達。某子以命命某見。

The host replies: “So-and-so has ordered me to see you. Milord has humiliated himself [by coming here]. I beg that milord return home and I will make haste to appear before him.”

主人對曰: 某子命某見，吾子有辱。請吾子之就家也，某將走見。

The guest replies: “I am unworthy, so do not disgrace yourself by giving me orders. I beg that you will finally grant me this audience.”150 The host replies: “I dare not put on such a display of authority. I persist in asking my lord to return home, where I will make haste to appear before him.” 賔對曰: 某不足以辱命，請終賜見。主人對曰: 某不敢為儀，固請吾子之就家也，某將走見。

The guest replies: “I dare not put on a display of authority, I persist in begging you.” The host replies: “I have persisted in declining, but this has not been allowed (lit. “ordered”). I will come out to see you. I hear that milord has brought a gift. I dare to decline the gift.” 賔對曰: 某不敢為儀，固以請。主人對曰: 某也固辭，不得已，將走見。聞吾子稱摯，敢辭摯。

The guest replies: “Without the gift, I dare not show myself.” The host replies: “Do not engage in these rituals – I am not worthy. I dare to persist in declining the gift.” The guest replies: “Without

149 Zheng Xuan: 言久無因緣以自達也。某子，今所因緣之姓名。We have consulted the available translations (Couveur, p. 58; Harlez, p. 47; and Steele, p. 42), here and below.
150 The phrase ruming 辱命 appears in Yili “Shi hun li” 上昏禮 (p. 159). The phrase ruming also appears in Liji 禮記 “Tan gong xia” 檀宮下: 君無所辱命. Also in the Zuozhuan, see Lord Xi, Year 24: 何辱命焉. Translation, 24.1b, p. 375: “Why condescend to issue an order for me to depart?” Lord Xiang, Year 3, 何辱命焉. Translation, 3.7, p. 905: “Why deign to issue a command?”
the support of this gift, I dare not show himself. I persist in begging.” 宰對曰: 某不以摯, 不敢見。主人對曰: 某不足以習禮, 敢固辭。宰對曰, 某也不依於摯, 不敢見, 固以請。

The host replies: “I also persist in declining, but have not been allowed. Dare I not respectfully obey!” The host goes out the gate to meet the guest. He bows twice. The guest responds by bowing twice. The host salutes and enters the right side of the gate. Carrying the gift, the guest enters the left side of the gate. The host bows twice and then accepts [the gift]. The guest bows twice and offers the gift. The host then attempts to exit. The host begs for an audience. The guest returns for the audience. When the guest departs, the host sees him out the gate. The host bows twice. 主人對曰: 某也固辭, 得命, 敢不敬從！出迎於門外, 再拜。宰再拜。主人揖, 入門右。宰奉摯, 入門左。主人再拜受, 宰再拜送摯, 出。主人請見, 宰反見。退, 主人送於門外, 再拜。

The [former] host now pays a return visit, taking the gift with him. He says: “Earlier, when mi-

lord humiliated himself [by visiting me], he demanded that I appear before him. I beg to return

this gift to the usher.” The host responds: “I already had an audience. I dare to decline.” The

guest responds: “It is not that I would ever dare to request an audience; rather, I [simply] beg to

return the gift to the usher.” 主人復見之, 以其摯, 曰: 義者吾子辱, 使某見。請還摯於將命者。主人對曰: 某也既得見矣, 敢辭。宰對曰: 某也非敢求見, 請還摯於將命者。

The host says: “I have already had an audience. I dare to persist in declining.” The guest

responds: “I dare not request to be heard.” I persist in begging through the usher.” The host

responds: “I persist in declining, but have not been permitted to do so. Would I dare to disobe-y?”

The guest presents the gift and enters. The host bows twice and accepts the gift. The host bows

twice and gives the gift. He then exits. The host sees him out the gate. He bows twice. 主人對曰: 某也既得見矣, 敢固辭。宰對曰: 某不敢以聞, 固以請於將命者。主人對曰: 某也固辭, 不得

命, 敢不從? 宰奉摯入, 主人再拜受。宰再拜送摯, 出。主人送於門外, 再拜。

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151 Steele, p. 44, uses “usher.”

152 The Tang subcommentary suggests that the wen 閏 is a further elaboration of the jian 見

from the first line: 上云‘非敢求見’, 已是不敢當, 此云‘不敢以聞’, 《爾雅》則於目見, 故云‘又益不敢

當’也。 (p. 172).


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WESTERN-LANGUAGE SOURCES


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In the Roman philosopher Seneca’s three books dedicated to understanding the causes and remedies of anger, the philosopher identifies this emotion as the most destructive of human passions.\(^1\) While he of course takes for granted anger’s presence in his own society, he seems to have believed it could be especially prominent amongst certain non-Roman peoples. To take one instance, in response to an interlocutor who suggests that surely anger is at least useful in military contexts, Seneca asserts that nothing could be further from the truth:

> For what else could it be that cripples the barbarians who are so much more powerful in body, so much more resilient towards sufferings [than we are], other than anger, a thing most inimical to oneself?\(^2\)

He then asserts that various tribal groups along Rome’s frontier are the most fierce, warlike, and hardy of all peoples. Yet they can be defeated by Romanized Spaniards, Gauls, and men of Syria and Asia, the latter two often represented as being comparatively weak and unwarlike in traditional Greco-Roman ethnography.\(^3\) For Seneca argues that the northern tribes can be defeated for no other reason than the crippling effects of their *ira*, their anger. What wins wars in Seneca’s opinion are *ratio* and *disciplina*, which in the Roman military context means the capacity to obey commands and restrain other impulses. So despite characteristics that might be supposed to confer a military advantage on the barbarians of Seneca’s day, he asserts that Rome’s enemies are decisively hampered by their susceptibility to the emotion anger, a thing “most inimical to oneself.” Nor was Seneca alone in focusing on the tendency towards anger as a characteristic of peoples east and north of the Rhine and Danube frontiers, as will be discussed below.\(^4\) In the writings of Seneca, then, anger plays a prominent role among the list of characteristics separating the peoples of the Hellenistic, Romanized world from their civilizational inverse, the barbarians of the periphery. That this is the

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1. I would like to thank Douglas Cairns and David Konstan for their generosity with their time and comments in reviewing drafts of this essay.
2. *De Ira* 1.11.1.
3. For examples and references, see Isaac (2004) 324–351.
case reflects a not only a marked shift in the locus of the “barbarian” in the Greco-Roman world, first associated with the Achaemenid Persian Empire, but also the fact that perception and construction of the concept itself could be remarkably fluid, if not outright contradictory.\(^5\)

Seneca wrote in the first century AD under the last of the Julio-Claudian emperors, some six hundred years after the point at which scholars have argued that the concept of the barbarian itself took on a new significance. The conventional view is that, initially, “barbarian” was a vague term referring to foreign or corrupt speech but that it gradually became an important factor in processes of pan-Hellenic self-definition.\(^6\) As has been supposed by many scholars, however, it was only following the surprise victories over the Persian forces of the Great Kings Darius and Xerxes that the Greeks came to think of themselves as sharing common cultural characteristics in opposition to a barbarian Other.\(^7\) It is a familiar assertion among modern scholars that the “barbarian” was a useful concept for first Greek and then Roman societies in determining who belonged and who was an outsider.\(^8\) One might reasonably expect the emotion anger, then, to be one of the defining features of the barbarian in the classical Greek world, as it certainly appears to be so in the writings of Seneca the Younger, who lived in the first century of the Roman principate.

And so it is: anger is central to the delineation between Greeks and barbarians, as early as the fifth century BC, but in ways that are perhaps surprising. For in fact, anger – or at least the capacity for, or predisposition and tendency

\(^5\) It has of course been recognized that this ambiguity of the term was present already in the fifth century BC, as illustrated by Herodotus’ observation that “the Egyptians call all those who speak a language different from their own ‘barbarians’”: βαρβάρους δὲ πάντας ο Ἱνυπτιοι καλέσου τοὺς μὴ σφιν ὅμογλόνσους (Herodot. 2.158.5). A similar relativism appears in a fragment of Antiphon, when he states that “we have become barbarians in one another’s eyes; for by birth, at least, we are all naturally adapted in every respect to be either Greeks or barbarians”: πρὸς ἀλλήλους βεβαρβαρώμεθα· ἐπεὶ φύσει γε πάντα πάντες ὅμοιοι περύκ[α]μεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἑλλην[α]ί εἶναι (quoted in Pendrick (2002) 180, Pendrick’s translation). At least from the fifth century BC, one sees the notion that “barbarian” could be a relative concept predicated on one’s point of view.


\(^7\) Two of the most influential studies describing processes of Hellenic identity formation are those of Edith Hall (1989) and Jonathan Hall (1997).

\(^8\) To take just one example, in the Encyclopedia of Ancient History, Andrew Gillett summarizes the function of the term: “The figure of the barbarian served to define and unify ‘us’ while reducing ‘them’ to a single, alien category.” Gillett (2013) 1043. For a recent affirmation of the validity of the Greek-barbarian dichotomy in the classical Greek imagination, see Harrison (2020) 139–63.
towards, this emotion – functions in some of the earliest ethnographic discourse of the classical Greek world in the exact opposite way to that indicated by Seneca. For in this earlier age, it was the Greeks themselves who employed terms associated with the emotion anger in sketching characteristics of their own Hellenic identity. The correlate of this assumption was that the absence of anger could be imagined as a characteristic of certain non-Greeks, or “barbarians,” who posed the greatest threat to the Greek world in the imagination of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, i.e., the inhabitants of the vastly larger and more powerful Achaemenid Persian Empire. In some of the most influential Greek ethnographic texts of the fifth century, a defining characteristic of the barbarian was not a predisposition towards anger but rather the very lack of such an inclination9 – just the opposite of what the above excerpt from the Roman philosopher Seneca in the first century AD might have led one to expect. This essay explores the ethnological significance attributed to the emotion anger at either end of this 600-year period and considers some of the implications of the evolving discourse of anger for Greek, and then Roman, conceptions of the civilized Self and the barbarian Other.

As there were of course multiple words for anger in both Greek and Latin, a brief discussion of terminology will be helpful.10 In Greek, there are two words in particular that were primarily used to cover the semantic range of the modern English “anger”:11 The first of these is ὀργή, which has been variously glossed as “natural impulse,” “temperament,” “disposition,” “passion,” “anger,” “wrath.” The second, and the one that concerns us most here, is θυμός, whose meanings are much more wide-ranging: “spirit,” “heart,” “mind,” “will,” “anger,” or “the basis for the expression of anger.” It has been argued that ὀργή may in some cases have had a stronger sense of madness or blind rage about it, but θυμός too could express these very qualities, and we see this even in the very beginnings of Greek literature.12 The first line of the Iliad, “sing goddess of

9 An important, though qualified, exception is the tendency of Herodotus, discussed below, to represent eastern despots or tyrants as especially susceptible to anger. See Cairns (2021) and note 50 below.
10 For a discussion of terms in both languages as well as the Stoic understanding of the emotions, see Vogt (2006) 60–66.
11 It is interesting to note that the English word “anger” itself has changed over the centuries as to the emotion it represents. In its original form, it was directly derived from Old Norse angr, meaning “sorrow,” “regret,” and even “harm.” Illustrating the overlapping shades of meaning attributed to a given word within a given language group, the word harme itself in modern Norwegian means “anger.” Not surprisingly, the modern Norwegian word anger is closer to the Old Norse original, meaning “regret” or “sadness.”
the wrath of the son of Peleus” uses the noun mēnis-μῆνις, which suggests an even stronger sense of madness; yet in Book 19 when Achilles looks back on the origins of his wrath, he refers to the thymos that Agamemnon had aroused in his breast, saying, “Father Zeus, you give great blind recklessness [atē-ἀτη] to men; not at all would Atrides then ever have aroused thymos in my breast . . .” It is difficult to precisely translate thymos in this passage. Yet the context suggests that there is a connection between the atē-ἀτη, “blind recklessness,” fostered in mortals by Zeus and the emotion experienced by Achilles that is at the root of actions whose commission he regrets. In avoiding cumbersome, multi-word approximations of what thymos seems to signify here, I would suggest “anger” or “rage” as the most suitable translations. Still, as has been demonstrated at length by Douglas Cairns, thymos covers a remarkably wide semantic range in the poems of Homer, and association with the emotion anger is only one of many different possible usages of the word. This semantic richness of thymos persisted in later centuries, and the term continued to express a wide range of meanings; its possible equivalence with the more straightforward term orgē is only one of these.

A brief discussion of ways in which thymos is used by Herodotus provides further illustration of the semantic range expressed by this single word. On its first appearance in Book 1, thymos simply has the sense of “desire,” and this meaning of the word appears frequently throughout the work in the compound verbal forms epithymein-ἐπιθυμεῖν and prothymein-προθυμεῖν, the noun epithymia-ἐπιθυμία (and, less frequently, athymia-أغلثυμία), the adjective prothymos-πρόθυμος, and the adverb prothymōs-προθύμως. Other senses of the word include, but are not limited to, to consider or mull over (ἐςθυμὸν ἐβάλετο, 1.84.4; ἐςθυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐμοίσιν/Ἀτρεΐδης όριν διαμπερές (Iliad 19.270–272).  

14 In Book 1, Achilles uses the expression of being “enraged at heart,” θυμῷ κεχολωμένον (Iliad 1.217). Yet a translation of thymos as “heart” in the passage quoted above of course fails to convey the sense of the word in this particular context. On the relationship between thymos and atē, see Cairns (2019); for more in-depth discussion of atē see Cairns (2012) 1–52.
15 For comprehensive and informative discussion of the various meanings of thymos in Homer and later authors, see Cairns’ (2019) entry in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. For an additional survey and discussion, see Kalimtzis (2012). On usage of Greek terms for anger in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Harris (2001) 50–70.
16 “for which they had desire”: τῶν σφι ήθυμός (Herodot. 1.1.4); σφι θυμός ἐγένετο (8.116.2). Associations of thymos with desire appear in a number of forms: καταθυμίας, “much thought about” or even “loved,” (5.39.1); ἀποδόμων, “something undesired,” (7.168.3); καταθώμαι, “things desired,” (9.45.2).
βάλευ, 7.51.3; 8.68c.1), to take heart in an exhortation (θυμόν ἔχε ὁγαθόν, 1.120.3; 3.85.2; θυμόν ἔχων ὁγαθόν, 7.52.2), to fulfill the desire of someone (ἀποτιμηματάναι αὐτοῦ τὸν θυμόν, 2.129.2), and for something to be a matter worthy of serious consideration (ἐνθύμιον, 2.175.5; 8.54.1). At other times, thymos appears as a sensory or cognitive organ in phrases such as “the things one wishes for in one’s thymos [“heart”],” or simply the thing that “dwells in the ears of men,” which reacts to the good and bad things it hears and produces corresponding sensations in the body. Elsewhere, thymos may simply indicate the mental or emotional, as opposed to physical, aspect of a person or group, e.g., when the Athenians are said to be defeated “at heart.”

Still, the word thymos and its derivatives in the Histories of Herodotus at times also conveys a more direct sense of “anger” or the capacity to be driven by this emotion. For example, it appears in a passage where one is advised against “being angry at one’s parents or those who are stronger than oneself”; accusations may stir up one’s anger; one may be simply “furious,” as is the case with the Egyptian king Apries, who is described as being in a rage (περιθύμως ἔχοντα), or the Greek Periander, who is enraged (περιθύμως ἔχων). So while it is clear that thymos and its derivatives may at times refer to a wide range of cognitive functions or capacities, “anger,” or perhaps even “temper,” are not infrequently the most suitable English equivalents in a given context.

As to why it was the case that some peoples might be more inclined towards the emotion anger than others, the Greeks developed a theoretical explanation, later adopted by the Romans to varying extent, that was rooted in the climatological thought of the day. The Hippocratic text Airs, Waters, Places offers the earliest extant exposition of Greek climatological thinking and ways in which the environment was believed to condition not only human physiognomy but also emotional disposition. In this text, the case is made that attributes

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17 The inverse is also possible, for one can be told not to despair, δυσθύμε (8.100.3).
18 τὰ θυμῷ βουλόμενοι (5.49.4).
19 ἐν τοῖσι ὠς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἰκές ὁ θυμός (7.39.1).
20 ἐσωμένου ἢσαν τὸν θυμῷ (8.130.3).
21 ἐς τοὺς τοκέας καὶ ἐς τοὺς κρέσσονας τεθυμώσθαι (3.52.5).
22 ἐπανάγειν τὸν θυμόν (7.160.1).
23 Apries at 2.162.5; Periander at 3.50.3.
24 Among the most commonly discussed examples of climatological impact on human populations, in addition to those of the Hippocratic corpus and Aristotle, are Pliny, Nat. Hist. 2.78; Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.3–12; Manilius, Astronomica 4.711–43; Ptolemy, Apotelesmatika 2.2–3. For modern discussion of Greco-Roman climatological thought, see Woolf (2011) 44–51; Jouanna (1999) 211–231. For a more in-depth discussion, including later reception of climatological thought, see Isaac (2004) 56–74, 82–109.
of different societies are significantly shaped, though not entirely determined, by the forces of climate. Beginning with a presumed division between peoples of Europe on the one hand and Asia on the other, the author of the Hippocratic text *Airs, Waters, Places* notes that the climate of Asia is both more mild and more consistent than that of Europe, and that this has important physiological and ethical consequences:

> For I say that Asia differs most from Europe in relation to the natures of all of the things produced by the land there and of the human beings. For all things are much more beautiful and large in Asia, and the one land is more mild than the other, just as the customs of the people are more gentle and good-tempered [ἡπιώτερα καὶ εὐόργητότερα] . . . [It is likely that in Asia] the men will be well-fed, most beautiful in form, greatest in size, and least differing in appearance and size among one another . . . boldness, pertinacity, grit, and the predisposition to anger [θυμοειδὲς] could not occur in a natural state such as this, whether among those of the indigenous inhabitants or those coming from elsewhere, but it is necessary that comfort should be predominant.25

The result of the pleasant and less erratic climate in Asia is that plants, animals, and human beings are larger, more beautiful, and more alike amongst themselves when compared to living things in Europe. The author concludes, then, that qualities such as courage, toughness, and propensity to anger are naturally absent or diminished amongst the peoples of Asia. There, the inhabitants’ customs and manner are characterized as being “more gentle,” ἡπιώτερα, and “better tempered,” εὐόργητότερα; this latter term directly suggests the absence of anger, using as it does the comparative form of the adjective eu-orgētos-εὐόργητος, based on the root word ὀργή-ὀργή but with the prefix eu, “good.” As noted above, ὀργή, like thymos, had a variety of possible meanings including “temperament,” “disposition,” etc., but it is also one of the most common words for the emotion anger. The clear assumption in the Hippocratic text is that inhabitants of Asia are less likely to become angry and are otherwise characterized by having a mild temper.

The opposite is claimed for the inhabitants of (parts of) Europe. In this case, I have chosen to translate thymoeides-θυμοειδές as “having a predisposition to anger,” and a brief digression on this choice of translation is relevant. In perhaps its most familiar context, the term thymoeides appears in Plato’s tripartite division of the soul.26 However, in the works of Plato and other authors, the term clearly conveys a sense very similar to “anger” or “irascibility.”27 For

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25 *Airs.* 12.7–44.
26 See Harris (2001) 90–92 with references.
27 For example, see Plato *Respublica* 2.375a, 4.440a-c, 4.441b-c, etc. I am grateful to Douglas Cairns for these references.
example, both *thymos* and *thymoeides* appear in Plutarch’s essay *De Cohibenda Ira* (“On Restraining Anger”) in contexts suggesting an equivalence between these terms and the emotion discussed by Seneca in his three-part treatise *De Ira* (“On Anger”). Indeed, Plutarch at times uses *thymos* and *orgē* as virtual synonyms: ἐν θυμῷ καὶ ὀργῇ.28 Elsewhere in Plutarch’s essay, *thymos* is compared to a flame, a thing that smokes and burns.29 In such instances, it is perhaps the word “temper” that is the best equivalent in English to the words *thymos* and *orgē*, “temper” being a term that can have a neutral sense (i.e., one may have either good or bad temper), yet it clearly has just as strong, if not stronger, associations as the negative emotion anger. And yet also in Plutarch’s *De Ira Cohibenda*, *thymos* is used to indicate the seat of the emotions or the seat of anger itself when one is encouraged to speak directly towards one’s *thymos*.30 Still, it is clearly established usage for Plutarch to assume that the word *thymos* may also signify the emotion anger directly when he refers to *thymos*, i.e., “anger,” as the most destructive of the passions.31 and he describes *thymos* as a tyrant to be dethroned.32 Plutarch also makes use of the term *thymoeides*, here conveying a sense of “irascible” or “prone to anger,” to describe the underlying temperament of a person who is exacting, luxurious, dissatisfied, and abusive, arguing that such an individual lives as a slave (δουλεύων) to his disposition.33 The usage of terms for anger can at times be almost dizzying in Plutarch: he argues

28 *De Cohib. 454a.*

29 τῶ θυμῶ . . . καπνίζοντα καὶ διακαόμενον (*De Chohib. 454e-f*); *orgē* is mentioned in the following sentence with a near identical sense and using the same simile. On anger compared to fire or a flame, cf. Seneca, *De Ira* 1.7.1. Elsewhere, Seneca likens anger to smoke, *caligo mentium* (*De Ira* 2.10.1), or he combines the images of heat and smoke together (*fervor* and *caligo*). Seneca also considers anger to be most typical of those possessing a *fervidus*, “fiery,” temper (*De Ira* 2.15.2; 2.19.1–2). As yet another example of climatological thought, Seneca identifies an excess of heat as responsible for the *ira* so common in northern peoples (*De Ira* 2.15.2); fieriness of mind or temper is his explanation for redness or fairness of hair and complexion, stereotypically associated with northerners (2.19.1–5). (The Hippocratic author provides an alternative explanation for complexion of northerners at *Airs* 20.21–24.) As has often been noted, the Indo-European etymology of *thymos* suggests associations with burning or smoke, and this same root appears in words for incense (θυμίημα) or the burning thereof. See Cairns (2019).

30 εἰπέν πρῶς τόν θυμόν (*De Cohib 458c*).

31 διὸ καὶ [θυμός] μισεῖται καὶ καταφρονεῖται μάλιστα τῶν παθῶν (*De Cohib. 455e*). On *thymos*-θυμός as one of the passions, see also *De Cohib. 459b*.

32 *De Cohib. 455b.* Seneca describes a life in the service of any emotion (*adfectus*, the Latin equivalent of *pathos-πάθος*) as being under a tyranny (*De Ira* 1.10.2). For a discussion of these two works of Seneca and Plutarch, see van Hoof (2007) 59–86.

33 *De Cohib. 461c.*
that it is most shameful of all when we angrily (μετ’ ὀργής) blame those who are angry (ὀργιζομένοις) and punish them with anger (θυμῷ) for the things they have done wrong on account of anger (διὰ θυμὸν). All of this is simply to demonstrate that while thymoeides, and indeed thymos itself, conveys a wide array of meanings, there are many contexts where “anger” or a predisposition to that emotion is clearly the sense intended by the author.

Returning to the climatological view of Hippocrates, who argued that the characteristic of thymoeides could not arise among peoples living in the consistently mild and pleasant climate of Asia, it is important to note that the Hippocratic text suggests that such qualities as irascibility or tendency to anger are also absent at the opposite extreme of the climatic continuum, i.e., the far north. There, one does not see the various “positive” features ascribed to the inhabitants of Asia, such as beauty and high stature that are engendered by climatological forces. In contrast, the physiognomy of the northernmost peoples known to the Greeks, the Scythians, is described as being “gross, fleshy, showing no joints, moist and flabby, and the lower bowels are as moist as bowels can be.”

Like inhabitants of Asia and Egypt, the Scythians are similar amongst themselves in appearance as a result of the climatic consistency of the regions they inhabit. In terms of the character of these northern peoples, they are generally described as being effeminate: they do work which would be reserved for women in Greek societies and otherwise live their lives as women; they are even described as being eunuchs.

Although an Asia-Europe dichotomy is clearly referred to in the text, a subtler formulation appears in the comparison between two different kinds of climates: those where the weather is consistently warm or cold, on the one hand, and

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34 ἀφοσιστόν ἔστιν, ὀργιζομένοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν μετ’ ὀργής καὶ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡμαρτημένα θυμῷ κολάζομεν (De Cohib. 463f).
35 τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν παχέα ἐστὶ καὶ σαρκώδεα καὶ ἀναρθρα καὶ ύγρα καὶ ἄτονα, αἱ τε κοιλίαι ύγρότατοι πασῶν κοιλίων αἱ κάτω (Airs 19.36–38). Trans. W.H.S. Jones. In addition to the opposition between Asia and Europe, the text also opposes Egypt to Scythia, noting the homogeneity of the inhabitants in the one region due to consistent heat, in the other to consistent cold (Airs 18.1–5; 19.1–7).
37 εὐνοχίαι γίνονται οἱ πλεῖστοί ἐν Σκύθῃ καὶ γυναικεία ἐργάζονται καὶ ἕως αἱ γυναῖκες δαντελόνται διαλέγονται τε ὁμοίως (Airs 22.1–4).
38 Airs 22.69. The Hippocratic author explains that the impotence the Scythians experience is caused by their attempted remedies for alleviating the effects too much time spent on horseback. Yet the cold climate itself, along with fatigue, causes them to become emasculated before feeling any stimulation of desire.
and those where climatic conditions are varied and subject to frequent changes on the other. Asia is described as having a consistently warm climate, just as the northernmost regions of Europe have a consistently cold one. The result in either case is unwarlike human beings and greater degree of uniformity in physiognomy. It is therefore the variability in climate, the frequent and erratic shifts in temperature that supposedly obtain in some, but not all, parts of Europe that produce a temperament characterized by *thymoeides*, a predisposition to anger.39

It is also important to note that the Hippocratic understanding of climatic influence is not limited to physiognomy but extends to customs and behavior as well. This connection is equally explicit in the Hippocratic author’s comments on what he perceives as typical traits among some European peoples. After describing the frequent and disruptive changes of the seasons and their impact on the physiognomy of those living in Europe, a phenomenon that leads the Hippocratic author to believe that some of the inhabitants of Europe vary physically much more amongst themselves than do peoples living in regions with less extreme changes in the weather, he correlates this more varied climate explicitly with behavioral dispositions:

> And regarding their customs, the logic is the same: the wild [*agrión-δύρινον*], the doggedly independent [*ameikton-ἀμεικτόν*], and the tendency to anger [*thymoeides-θυμοειδές*] are produced in the same nature. For the presence of constant [climatic] shocks engenders savagery of the disposition while it obstructs what is gentle and mild.40

Due to the forces of climate, the presence of *thymos*, here in its embodied/dispositional form *thymoeides*, is represented in correlation with a tendency to preserve their independence from other groups alongside a potentially angry and violent disposition. Still, it is important to note that the author’s emphasis throughout is not on ethnic groups or peoples for the most part: Scythians,

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39 That the author assumes this quality is apparent in some Europeans as a function of geography and climate, as opposed to heredity, is clear as well from the phrasing employed at various points: contrary to the impression produced by some English translations, the text refers not just to Asians and Europeans – Ἀσιηνοί and Ἑλληναι – but also “those who inhabit Europe,” τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκέοντας, and “those who dwell in Asia,” τοὺς τὴν Ασίην. There is a single instance each where the author refers collectively to the “Asian population,” τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀσιηνόν (*Airs* 16.15–16), and the “population in Europe,” τὸ γένος τὸ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ (*Airs* 23.2). As has often been noted, the term *genos*-γένος could be employed in a wide range of contexts: by virtue of one’s *genos*, one might be identified as a Greek, a Roman, a Scythian, a Lydian, a barbarian, a Cilician, a Byzantine, or even a Christian. The term could thus indicate one’s ethnic or regional origins, one’s political or civic status, or religious identity. Translating it here with “population” is perhaps imperfect, but nevertheless preferable to the term “race.”

40 *Airs* 23.19–23.
Libyans, and Egyptians are indeed named in the text, as are other more obscure groups such as the Makrokephaloi, Phasiensoi, and Sauromatai; but otherwise, one rarely sees references to specific ethnonyms. Indeed, “Greeks,” i.e., Hellenes, appears only once and “Persians” not at all (unless understood in the sole instance where “barbarians,” in opposition to Greeks, are mentioned). In stead, the author is primarily concerned with different regions, climatological conditions, and the impact of those conditions on the respective populations. The assumption to be inferred throughout is that human physiognomy and temperament are by nature more or less the same but are conditioned by different climatological forces and local customs.

Yet the author of *Airs, Waters, Places* also points to a secondary cause for this contrast between the customs of inhabitants of Asia and at least of certain regions of Europe: the difference in political systems. For the author argues that the fact that a monarchical form of government is more widespread in Asia than in Europe further inclines the inhabitants of Asia toward what he sees as an obedient and submissive disposition, a disposition contrasted with the independent and warlike temper of certain European societies. There is, of course, a certain circularity in the argumentation as to the relationship between climate, national characteristics, and dominant form of political regime: the Hippocratic schema seems to argue that a given climate predisposes a population to have a certain ethical disposition, which in turn makes it suitable to be organized politically in a fashion appropriate to that disposition; the form of political organization, in turn, reinforces the ethical disposition fostered by the specific climatological conditions. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this observation too does not imply that these differences are somehow hereditary or immutable characteristics; Greeks and barbarians, or Europeans and Asians for that matter, are not divided by any postulated essential difference. For the Hippocratic author explicitly states that in Asia, whatever Greeks or barbarians are not ruled despotically in Asia, but are autonomous and labor for their own benefit [as opposed to that of a ruler], these are the most warlike – again, irrespective of any ethnic category. Neither thymos nor thymoeides is explicitly noted; yet as discussed above, the tendency toward anger indicated by these terms is elsewhere

41 See below, note 43.
43 ὁκόσοι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ἑλληνες ἢ βάρβαροι μὴ δεσπόζονται, ἀλλ’ αὐτόνομοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἐως τοῖσι ταλαιπωρεῦσι, οὕτως μαχιμώτατοι εἰσὶ πάντων: “whatever Greeks or barbarians are not ruled despastically in Asia, but are autonomous and labor for their own benefit [as opposed to that of a ruler], these are the most warlike of all.” (*Airs* 16.33–36). This is the sole instance in *Airs, Waters, Places* where the term “barbarian” appears.
associated with having a warlike disposition and an insistence on political autonomy.

So it turns out that there are two factors in determining whether a population is warlike, quick to anger, and independent on the one hand, or peaceful, mild, and submissive on the other: climate – either its mildness or lack of variation – and form of political organization. Difference between human populations is thus not understood in terms of an ethnic essence in either case but is rather presented as the result of forces that act predictably and with (supposedly) empirically observable results. While the Hippocratic text clearly assumes the importance of nature, physis-φύσις, it also notes the alternative influence of nomos-νόμος, law or custom, which may exert a countervailing force.\(^4\) Interestingly, however, when one of these two factors trumps the other, it is the latter. As noted above, the author claims that irrespective of whether one is Greek or barbarian, the members of a given community will be warlike if they are politically autonomous and have possession of the fruits of their labor, even if they are in Asia. Moreover, if inhabitants of a particular kind of environment are not naturally endowed with certain qualities, these may be effected in the population by a change of social custom.\(^4\) It is thus clear that even in the consistently pleasant climate of Asia, the temperament of a given population, irrespective of whether or not it is a Greek or non-Greek community, may be determined by the form of political regime. Nevertheless, it remains the case that in the Hippocratic view, thymoeides, a predisposition to anger, is generally absent in the populations of Asia but characteristic of those in parts of Europe. Greeks, Thracians, and others living in the regions experiencing frequent changes in climate are therefore characterized by their thymotic disposition.

The place of anger in the Greek climatological framework has perhaps its most famous expression in Aristotle, who wrote some fifty to eighty years after the conventionally accepted dates for the composition of the Hippocratic Airs, Water, Places. Like the Hippocratic text, Aristotle works within the dichotomous schema that divides the known world between Asia and Europe. Within these two geographical zones, the Hippocratic text had referred to three climatological types: the consistently cold regions of Europe and the north, the consistently warm regions of Asia, and the parts of Europe where the climate

\(^4\) οὕτως οἱ νόμοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τὴν εὐψυχίαν ἐργάζονται (Airs 23.40–41).
\(^4\) τὸ δὲ ἀνδρείον καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὄμως ἑνεῖ, νόμος δὲ προογενόμενος ἀπεργάζοιτ' ἂν (Airs 24.19–22). For another example of this line of thought, see Polybius’ digression on the customs employed by the Arcadians to mitigate the effects of the climate in which they live. Polyb. 4.21.1–4.
and seasons show great variation. Only the inhabitants of this third zone
within Europe exhibit a tendency towards aggression and are presumably
categorized by their thymoeides, a quality the Hippocratic author suggests is
absent in inhabitants of Asia.\textsuperscript{46} Aristotle makes a further and more pointed
use of this tertium quid, a move that explicitly separates the Greeks in particu-
lar from other Europeans in general and elevates them to a position that
embodies Aristotle’s highest ethical ideal of reasoned and balanced moderation:

The peoples living in cold regions and those within Europe are full of a predisposition to
anger [\textit{thymos}: \textit{θυμός} \, μέν \, ἐστι \, πλήρη], but they are comparatively lacking in terms of their
understanding and technical capability; therefore, they remain more free but they are politi-
cally unorganized and unable to dominate those near them. In contrast, the nations of Asia
are intellectual and adroit in their minds, but they are wholly without any propensity to
anger [\textit{athyma}: \textit{ἄθυμα}]; therefore, they remain ruled over and in the state of slaves. But the
nation of the Greeks, since it inhabits the regions in between, has share of both parts: for it is
both endowed with \textit{thymos} and is also intellectual; therefore it remains free and best organ-
nized politically – even able to rule all others, should it ever achieve a single regime.\textsuperscript{47}

Aristotle here presents the Greeks as the people most truly blessed by their geo-
ographical position, for their location allows them to enjoy the benefits of either end of the climatological continuum. Yet his schema differs from that seen in
\textit{Airs, Waters, Places} in important respects. The Greeks are still located between
climatological extremes, as was the case in the Hippocratic schema, but the primary significance of climatic differences (at least in so far as they impact the
emotional disposition of human populations) no longer rests on a contrast be-
tween varying and unvarying climatic patterns but is now a simpler continuum
between warm and cold regions, where the presence of \textit{thymos}, and corre-
sponding lack of mental acuity, increases in proportion to the coldness of the
climate. Like the Hippocratic author, Aristotle believes that certain Europeans
fail to achieve his idealized mean; yet Aristotle claims it is because they are thy-
motic to an excessive degree. While the Hippocratic text had attributed the un-
warlike and effeminate temperament of the Scythians to the unchanging nature
of their cold climate, Aristotle argues that northerners are full of the capacity
for anger, of \textit{thymos}, to an extreme, and it is this condition that makes them

\textsuperscript{46} The Hippocratic author does not explicitly refer to an absence of \textit{thymos} or \textit{thymoeides}
among the Scythians of the north; yet he clearly draws a parallel between the unvaried cold of
the regions they inhabit with the consistently mild climate of Asia, where the inhabitants are
characterized by their lack of \textit{thymos} or \textit{thymoeides}. Moreover, the effeminate or emasculated
qualities attributed to the Scythians would seem to suggest a correlate to the passivity the au-
thor attributes to the athymotic inhabitants of Asia.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Politica} 7.1327b.24–34.
politically independent. But it does so to a fault, for as they cannot obey they
cannot be organized politically and thus command others. Moreover, this ex-
cess of thymos is correlated with a perceived dimness of intelligence. Looking
eastward, he claims that the opposite is true of the inhabitants of Asia, who are
clever and of quick intelligence but are athyma-ἄθυμα, “lacking in thymos,” or
the capacity for anger that is so prevalent in certain inhabitants of Europe.
They are thus accustomed to be ruled by others, since, according to Aristotle,
they are entirely without the necessary predisposition to anger that prompts in-
dependence. In Aristotle’s imagination, it is of course the Greeks who enjoy the
perfect balance of intelligence and thymos.

It is important to stress, however, that Greek characterizations of the inhab-
itants of different regions were not absolute. Herodotus, perhaps not surpris-
ingly, is one of the authors who defies the patterns sketched above. While it is
true that he does not ever refer to “anger” as being characteristic of the Per-
sians, he does make clear that Persians are as capable of experiencing and ex-
pressing the emotion as anyone else. For example, he notes with approval the
conditions under which it is permissible for a Persian, whether the Great King
himself or any other, to indulge in anger. That Herodotus does this in a gener-
alized sense within an ethnographic digression is indicative of his assumption
that Persians, as well as others, had the capacity to express, and a similar need
to restrain, the emotion anger in social contexts. Indeed, it seems that Persian
Great Kings in Herodotus have a particular tendency to be subject to the emo-
tion, at least as it is expressed with terms derived from thymos. Still, it is

48 Seneca subscribes to this same notion: nemo autem regere potest nisi qui et regi (“for no
one is able to rule but he who can also be ruled”), De Ira 2.15.4. Yet it is interesting to note that
Xenophon’s description of Persian education includes an emphasis on this very capacity:
παίδες δόντες μαθάνοντιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι (“as children they learn both to rule and be
ruled”), Anabasis 1.9.4.
49 τῷ θυμῷ χράται (Herodot. 1.137.1).
50 Cyrus is advised by Croesus not to wholly express his anger: μὴ πάντα θυμῷ χρέο (Herodot.
1.155.3). Cyrus’ son Cambyses also receives such an admonition from the former king of Lydia:
μὴ . . . θυμίῳ ἐπιτρέπει (3.36.1); still, Cambyses is described as being angry at several points:
θυμωθέντα (3.1.5; 3.32.4; 3.34.3). Xerxes, while in a state of anger, θυμωθείς, accuses the Per-
sian Artabanos of being ἄθυμῳ (Herodot. 7.11.1). This instance is interesting in that it seems
Artabanos is clearly being accused of what was an “Asiatic” stereotype in the Hippocratic Airs,
Waters, Places. Xerxes himself appears particularly susceptible to anger; he appears on multi-
ple occasions as the subject of the verb thymoó-θυμώ, e.g., 7.39.1; 7.210.1; 7.238.2; 9.111.5. For
further discussion of this point, see Cairns (2021), who statistically demonstrates a marked ten-
dency for Herodotus to characterize Persian rulers as being quick to anger. While Herodotus
associates anger with despotic or tyrannical rule in general, Cairns shows that he does so with
far greater frequency in accounts of Asiatic rulers or commanders. There is not space to go
worth observing that while Herodotus notes there are conditions under which
the Persians are inclined to express anger, in the part of his work most suited to
include ethnographic generalization, i.e., within an ethnographic digression,
he does not indicate any particular propensity among the Persians toward this
emotion.

Aristotle, however, is quite clear about the presence of *thymos* to varying
degrees amongst European peoples and its absence in inhabitants of Asia. As
noted above, there had developed a much stronger sense of opposition be-
tween Europe and Asia in the Greek imagination of the fifth century BC, and
Aristotle’s starker division between the peoples of the two continents is surely
a reflection of this trend. Yet Aristotle takes this dichotomy one step further:
he perpetuates the notion of Greek superiority over the inhabitants of Asia, but
he also further distinguishes the Greeks from their European neighbors, those
who in the Hippocratic text seem to share an equal, not excessive, allotment of
*thymos*. This elevation of the Greeks to a more exalted status is accompanied
by an extension of the term “barbarian” by Aristotle explicitly to include north-
ern peoples such as the Celts, referring to their impetuous bravery as “barbar-
ian courage due to their *thymos*.”51 However, it is interesting to note that
Aristotle primarily associates the term “barbarian” with peoples of Asia, and
with the inhabitants of the Persian Empire above all.52 In addition to references

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51 ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν. Ethica Eudemia 3.1229b.30–31. Also see a reference
to Celts and other barbarians who inure their children to the cold from an early age (Politica
7.1336a.15–19). I would question, however, Harris’ choice to describe the former instance as an
Aristotelian reference to barbarians in the “traditional way”; likewise in regard to his evidence
for characterization of the Carthaginians collectively in Polybius as “irascible characters.” In
the passages Harris cites, the Carthaginians are angry at the Romans’ breaking of the treaty
following the first Punic War by seizing Sardinia and imposing further indemnities (Polyb.
3.10.5; 3.13.1). That the Carthaginians were angry about Roman behavior in this case does not
suggest an irrational susceptibility to their emotions. Harris (2001) 194, 198. Also see Erskine

52 Kim summarizes the referent of the term as “the Persians and their Asian subjects invading
Greece to deprive Hellas of its political freedom.” Kim (2013) 30, 34–35. For a discussion of the
term’s earliest function in a new dichotomous worldview expressed in Aeschylus’ *Persae*, see
Edith Hall (1989) 57ff. According to Meier, the term referred primarily to Egyptians and Mesop-
otamians and then to other peoples the Greeks considered inferior to themselves. Meier
to the Persian Wars where the Persians are referred to as “the barbarians,” τοὺς βαρβάρους, and “the barbarian,” τὸν βάρβαρον. Aristotle claims that just as barbarians are more servile, δουλικώτεροι, than Greeks, it is also true that inhabitants of Asia are more servile than those of Europe; this assumption is the basis for his claim that barbarians “tolerate without distress a despotic form of government.”

He also conflates Persian practice with a general barbarian tendency to adopt, or accept, tyrannical regimes while the general population remains in a state of enslavement, αἰεὶ δουλεύοντες. Despite the occasional inclusion of European peoples north of Greece within the barbarian category, Aristotle maintains a strong association of the term with the supposed “athymotic” character of the nations of Asia.

That he did so conforms to stereotypes that had crystallized over the course of the fifth century, and it is often overlooked that the term seems initially to have been applied far less often to peoples living to the north of Greece. For example, Herodotus does not refer to the northern Scythians as barbarians at all in his Histories, whereas the Persians are consistently referred to as such. Modern scholarship consistently overlooks this point. Paul Cartledge has said that “Herodotus . . . could make the Persians appear surprisingly Hellenic by the side of the, for him, most barbarous of barbarians, the Scythians.” Similarly, Susan Mattern states that “the most famous of Herodotus’ nomadic barbarians are the ferocious, bloodthirsty Scythians.” We might then have expected Herodotus to actually use the term “barbarian” to describe them. In fact, the word occurs only once in the fourth book of the Histories, which is largely dedicated to

53 Atheniensium Respublica 22.7; Ars Rhetorica 2.22.7.
54 ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίοντες (Política 3.1285a.20–23).
55 καὶ τάλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα Περσικά καὶ βάρβαρα τυραννικά ἐστι (πάντα γὰρ ταύτων δύναται) (Política 5.1313b.9–11).
56 The single possible exception I have been able to find appears in book two, when Herodotus refers to “Thracians, Scythians, Persians, Lydians, and nearly all the barbarians”: Θρήμας καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Λυδίων καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους (Herodot. 2.167.1). At issue seems to be an association in the minds of modern scholars between barbarism and nomadism; Marshall writes, “While the nomads [of North Africa] are more civilized than the desert Libyans, they are also constructed as barbarian; they are, for example, the only Libyans whom Herodotus defines as barbarian through their promiscuity. Furthermore, the nomads are characterized as barbarian in similar ways to the desert Libyans.” Marshall (1998) 51. Yet despite the presence of various cultural attributes some scholars have identified as being typically “barbarian,” the word βάρβαρος does not appear in the passages of Herodotus to which Marshall refers the reader, i.e., 4.180 and 4.183.
58 Mattern (1999) 73.
Herodotus’ account of Scythia, and in that case it is a general reference to “a report shared by Greeks and barbarians.”  
While it is true that ethnic groups of various regions might be at times labeled barbarians by Greek authors of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, the barbarian, ὁ βάρβαρος, remains a clear reference to the Great King and his subjects. Likewise, the “barbarian,” when referred to in modern scholarship on fifth and fourth-century contexts, is usually an unambiguous reference to Persia and other inhabitants of Asia. The term’s application to Thracians, Scythians, and others seems to convey a more general sense of pejorative non-Greekness; yet this extension of the term is not straightforward, as it assumes a far more universal application of the label than its original, and far more geographically specific, referent(s).

It has been argued that Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery, equated with a state of barbarism, includes both inhabitants of Asia and Europe on the basis of either deficiency or excess of thymos due to climatic influence. Yet this reading does not account for the political independence attributed to northerners by virtue of their thymotic excess – the very thing that allows them to resist enslavement while it limits their capacity to conquer others. Even though the Greeks were in practice quick enough to enslave Thracians and other European peoples (not to mention fellow Greeks), when Aristotle delineates the qualities to be sought among slaves he notes that they should not be taken from peoples of a thymotic character, i.e., that they should not be thymoeideis-θυμοειδεῖς. The most consistent attributes of the label “barbarian” in the Aristotelian corpus are servility and associations with the Persian-dominated east, both of

59 ξυνὸς Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων λέγομενος λόγος (Herodot. 4.12.3).
60 Herodot. 7.163.2 et passim; Thucyd. 1.18.2; 3.56.4; 3.62.1. This assumption seems quite clear in the sources cited and discussed by Flower (2000) 65–101.
62 See, for example, Thucydides’ comparison of the Thracians to other barbarians (Thucyd. 7.29.4) and Aristophanes’ use of the term barbarian in reference to a Scythian guardsman in Athens (Thesmophoriazusae 1051, 1171).
63 Heath (2008) 253–258. Aristotle writes, “Therefore, the poets say that it is proper for Greeks to rule barbarians, since that which is barbaric and that which is slavish are by nature the same thing”: διὸ φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ “βαρβάρων δ’ Ἑλλήνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,” ὡς ταῦτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον δν (Politia 1.1252b.9–10). A similar idea appears in Isocrates, who claims that Greeks “think it proper to make use of barbarians as servants”: τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις ἄξιον χρήσθαι (Panegyricus 181). For a discussion of Aristotle’s view of slavery, especially in the poetic context he cites, see Cherry (2014) 632–655; on Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery, see Teisserenc (2014) 121–134. Teisserenc rightly points to the difficulty of reconciling the servility Aristotle associates with inhabitants of Asia with the excessive freedom from any subjugation exhibited by some Europeans, Teisserenc (2014) 130–131.
64 Politia 7.1330a.27. On the enslavement of Thracians, see Harrison (2019) 42–43, 47–49.
which are tied to the perceived absence of thymos and any tendency to be compelled by the emotion anger in a manner that might have political consequences. Aristotle’s choice to broaden the barbarian category to include Celts and other European groups north of Greece by virtue of their excess of thymos indicates not only a tension between changing conceptions of the barbarian but also an elasticity and malleability of the concept itself.65

There is a demonstrable trend, therefore, in fifth and fourth-century Greek ethnographic discourse that words associated with the emotion anger, or the predisposition to feel and express anger, were indeed employed in delineating the general boundaries of those who regarded themselves as Greeks in at least some of the major texts of the period. Yet in contrast to later correlations made between a tendency to feel or express anger and peoples identified as “barbarians” in Greek and Latin sources, this tendency was understood as a characteristic of the Greeks themselves—when present in moderation.66 Moreover, this predisposition towards anger (or the closely related “high-spiritedness” or “temper”) could serve as an explanation for the otherwise inexplicable events of the early fifth century: that a greatly outnumbered coalition of Greek cities had somehow managed to fend off the most powerful empire the world had yet seen. While Aristotle would, in contrast to the Hippocratic schema, explicitly attribute an excess of thymos to Europeans north of Greece, this quality may have also served to explain their independence and freedom from subjugation by Persia; like the Scythians, the Greeks (those of the European mainland, at least) had managed to remain outside the sway of the empire. Even though other authors of the fourth century note the harmful repercussions of anger, especially in political contexts, the absence of the capacity to feel anger, the state of being athyma-ἀθυμα, remained a central characteristic of the imagined figure of the “barbarian,” itself a term initially associated with the East in general and Persia in particular. Moving beyond the Hippocratic formulation, Aristotle provided a climatological rationalization for extending the term to include northerners characterized by the opposite extreme of temperament as well.

When we return to Seneca, we see the extent to which anger and its function in ethnographic discourse had changed: in Seneca’s case, the barbarian is

66 And indeed, it was an emotion to be encouraged in certain civic contexts. Konstan (2007) 186–187; Harris (2003) 127–128. For further discussion of ways in which Plato and Aristotle ascribed positive functions to regulated anger in civic contexts, see Kalimtzis (2012) 33–34ff., 103ff. As Konstan has argued, a greater emphasis on the need to restrain anger in public or political contexts is more typical of the Hellenistic Age and later centuries. Konstan (2006) 75–76.
represented as inextricably associated with *ira*, the anger that impels and weakens those subject to it. By Seneca’s day, the capacity to feel anger was no longer the thing that separated the philosopher’s world from that of the barbarian; anger had become a characteristic feature of the barbarian Other in a way that builds on Aristotle’s observation of excessive *thymos* in European societies north of Greece. There are several factors that may have contributed to this development, but the most significant are surely geopolitical. Following Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire in the late fourth century BC, the potential threat from Persia had vanished. Though the Parthian Empire eventually took its place, this successor to Achaemenid Persia and the empire of Alexander was neither as formidable nor as aggressive as its predecessors or its western neighbor, Rome.67 Instead, as the Greek and then Roman gaze shifted northwards beyond the shores of the Mediterranean, new objects of both ethnographic and military interest appeared on the horizon. By Seneca’s day, the new community fashioned by Rome had contributed to extending, if not relocating, *barbaricum* from the east to the north.68

Indeed, Aristotle’s view that northerners suffered from an excess of *thymos* must have appeared to correspond well to the societies of Celtic and Germanic-speaking Europe, which lacked the economic complexity of urban centers, the centralization of political power over broad territories, and the discipline of organized military tactics on the battlefield. In accordance with the Hippocratic description of some inhabitants of Europe, they would have appeared in Greek eyes as characterized by their “wildness, dogged independence, and tendency to anger.”69 Later Greek literature largely maintained the association of excessive *thymos*, a condition predisposing certain groups towards an irascible temperament, with peoples living north of the Mediterranean shores. This association was only reinforced as new knowledge of different societies expanded in step with first Greek commercial – then Roman imperial – penetration of the inland regions of Illyria, Gaul, and Iberia. It is in this context that the *locus* of the barbarian shifted northwards to include new military enemies, and occasional invaders, of the Hellenistic world.

68 Isaac (2004) 83–85. For discussion of the relevant philosophical discourse in this period, see Müller (1993) 46–52. Still, even if the term “barbarian” began to be associated with northern peoples in later centuries, the impact of fifth-century Greek literature assured that Achaemenid Persia and succeeding empires in the region could always be referred to as “barbarian.”
For by the mid second century BC, Polybius associated the presence or abundance of *thymos* with Celtic peoples of Europe, and, as will be discussed below, these societies clearly fell within the barbarian category. Polybius thereby illustrates the shift from primarily associating the barbarian label with inhabitants of Asia, peoples characterized by the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* and, for the most part, Aristotle as deficient in *thymos*, to those driven by anger to an excessive degree. For example, describing the decision of the Gauls, or *Γαλαταί*, to attack Roman-held parts of Italy, Polybius depicts them as being “full of irrational anger,” θυμοῦ μὲν ἀλογίστου πλήρεις.70 Fiercer in battle for their insistence on fighting without clothes, much less protective armor, Polybius describes how some of the Gauls died after recklessly falling upon the Romans under the influence of their “anger and rashness,” ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας.71 This kind of behavior became a recognizable stereotype in later Roman depictions of northern societies, and it is clearly on display in the passage of Seneca with which this essay began. Indeed, Polybius directly correlates this kind of reckless charge with northern *thymos*, when he notes that the Gallic peoples are most to be feared in their rage, τοὺς θυμοῖς, in the first onrush.72 Polybius also has nothing but disdain for the inability of the Gauls to make tactical decisions according to rational planning instead of the impulses of their *thymos*.73

The most significant feature of Polybius’ ethnographic depiction of the Gauls for our purposes, however, is that there is no doubt in his mind that a people driven by their temper or tendency to become enraged are to be classified as barbarians. For Polybius refers to the Gauls as such at multiple points in his account of their conflicts with Rome.74 This usage illustrates the extent to which a deficiency of *thymos* had ceased to be the primary defining characteristic of the barbarian, and Polybius makes clear that he sees no contradiction. For in praising not only the historians who passed on their accounts of the third-century attack on Delphi by Celtic peoples but also those who chronicled Persian campaigns against Greece in the fifth century, Polybius’ juxtaposition of

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70 Polyb. 2.21.2.  
71 Polyb. 2.30.4.  
72 τοὺς τε θυμοῖς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον . . . φοβερώτατόν ἐστι πάν τὸ Γαλατικὸν φύλον (Polyb. 2.33.2).  
73 θυμὸς μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ βραβεύεσθαι (Polyb. 2.35.3). The tendency to be subject to their *thymos* is not the only negative characteristic Polybius attributes to the Gauls; he elsewhere notes their faithlessness or unreliability, ἀθεσία (2.32.8). For further examples, see Erskine (2015) 107, n. 9.  
74 Polyb. 2.7.12; 2.15.8; 2.35.6.
the two invasions associates the Celtic invaders with the armies of Persia; Polybius suggests that such historical works have inspired the Greeks to preserve their own freedom in the face of foreign invasion. The placement of the two invasions side by side, each serving to emphasize Greek freedom in opposition to aggressive barbarian powers, is striking: there would otherwise seem to be little in common between the ecumenical, wealthy, urbanized empire of Persia and the Celtic invaders from the north. Yet by suggesting an equivalency between the Persians and Celts, at least in terms of the extent to which they provided the Greeks with an opportunity to express their independence, Polybius juxtaposes what in Hippocratic and Aristotelian terms would have been two traditionally distinct categories—the excessively “thymotic” European with the “athymotic” inhabitant of Asia—under a single barbarian label.

Even if Aristotle had already moved in this direction, Polybius represents a further expansion of the geographical scope inhabited by the barbarian portion of humanity. In doing so, he undermines the rationalizing and climatological underpinnings upon which a “scientific” Greco(-Roman)/barbarian dichotomy could be based. It is curious that modern scholars are not more struck by this point. Craige Champion suggests that Polybius’ representation of the Celts “conforms to the Greek/barbarian dichotomy which was first articulated in the fifth century as a response to the historical experience of the Persian wars,” claiming that Polybius simply perpetuates the barbarian stereotypes of earlier centuries. According to Champion, Polybius’ choice to pair the Celtic invasion of Delphi with the Persian invasion of Greece was simply because these were “prime examples of Hellenic logismos triumphing over barbarian thymos.” Yet according to Aristotle and the Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places, thymos was the very thing the Persians, the barbarians, did not have. I would argue instead that the Greek understanding of the dichotomy, and the role played by thymos and the emotion anger, had changed markedly by Polybius’ day and that he exhibits a quite different understanding of the term “barbarian” and its potential referents.

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75 Polyb. 2.35.7. See Champion (1996) 315–328.
76 That he did so may have been at least partly prompted by the fact that the Celtic Galatians had been settled in Anatolia since the third century. The statement is also curious due to the fact that Roman hegemony over Greece was completed in Polybius’ own day. On Greek perceptions of the Romans as barbarians, see Marincola (2011) 347–57; Erskine (2015) 118, n. 59. On Romans associated with the emotion anger, see Erskine (2015) 116–120.
77 Champion (1996) 327.
78 Champion (1996) 325.
The notion of the thymotic, enraged barbarian persisted in the Greek literature of the succeeding centuries, and was adopted by Latin authors as well, as more and more northern societies were subjected to the Mediterranean ethnographic gaze. For example, when Diodorus, writing in the mid-first century BC, describes the way in which druids among the Celts manage to dissuade armies on the verge of attacking one another when drawn up on the battlefield, he notes that “even amid the most savage barbarians, their anger (thymos) yields to wisdom and Ares pays his due reverence to the Muses.” Writing decades later, Strabo, in his geographical survey of the Roman-dominated world of the early principate also makes use of these Aristotelian ethnographic tropes. He notes that “the entire nation [of the Celts], which they now call Gallic or Galatian, is obsessed with warfare, quick to anger (thymikon-θυμικόν), and swift to fight – but they are otherwise straightforward and not malicious.” He elsewhere suggests that these two qualities are their most salient characteristics: their frankness or simplicity (tō haplō-τῷ ἁπλῷ) and their propensity to anger (tō thymikō-τῷ θυμικῷ). The two authors thus employ the more broadly conceived barbaricum visible in Polybius; for like Diodorus, Strabo is perfectly clear that the Celts or Gauls may be referred to as “barbarians” throughout.

These characteristics, simplicity on the one hand and propensity to anger on the other, also find expression in the early Latin texts concerned with northern peoples. To take just a pair of examples illustrating the latter, Julius Caesar in the first book of his Gallic War has one of the speakers in the text describe the Germanic chieftain Ariovistus as “a barbarian man, wrathful (iracundum) and impetuous.” Elsewhere, Caesar applies these same characteristics to the Gallic nation of the Aedui, when he notes that “greed drove some of them, anger (iracundia) and impetuousness drove others.” Caesar’s own ethnographic representation of transalpine regions moves in step with the expanding barbarian world created by Hellenistic geographers and historians. In Roman eyes, and in the eyes of Greeks living under Roman rule, the stereotypical northern barbarian of Aristotle had become a new opposing pole to Roman

79 καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις βαρβάροις ὁ θυμός εἰκε τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ ὁ Ἀρης αἰδεῖται τὰς Μοῦσας (Diod. 5.31.5).
80 Τὸ δὲ σύμπαν φύλον, ὃ νῦν Γαλλικόν τε καὶ Γαλατικόν καλοῦσιν, ἄρειμανίαν ἔστι καὶ θυμικόν τε καὶ ταχὺ πρὸς μάχην, ἄλλως δὲ ἄπλουν καὶ οὐ κακόηθες (Geographica 4.4.2).
81 Geographica 4.4.5.
82 The term appears a full six times at 4.1.5 in Strabo’s discussion of Massilia and its interactions with the Celts of the interior.
83 Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium (De Bello Gallico 1.31.13).
84 Impellit alios avaritiam, alios iracundia et temeritas (De Bello Gallico 7.42.2).
qualities of temperantia, ratio, and constantia, qualities that allowed Roman heroes and statesmen to feel and express anger within the bounds of reasoned moderation and in appropriate contexts – and perhaps to conquer it altogether: “[Fabius] defeated his anger before defeating Hannibal.” As the East had receded as a source of political threat to the Greco-Roman world, the peoples of cisalpine and then transalpine Europe became new referents of the barbarian label. At the same time, the capacity to be motivated (to the appropriate extent) by anger ceased to be as distinguishing a characteristic of those inhabiting the perfectly balanced center of the world, as Aristotle had believed was the case for the Greeks. By the time the Romans had established their hegemony over the Mediterranean, the emotion anger, especially when accompanied by a lack of rational self-restraint, had become closely associated with northern peoples whose conquered resources and slave labor further enriched the empire.

As noted above, it may be assumed that this expansion in the locus of the barbarian is best understood in terms of the great shift in the geopolitical position of Greco-Roman authors. Writers working within the Greek, and then Roman, ethnographic tradition had gone from being first the vulnerable objects of Persian imperial expansion to becoming the triumphant leaders of imperial conquest. Accordingly, the concept of the barbarian Other expanded to include not only the, as the Greeks saw it, subservient and passive subjects of the Great King of Persia but also the intractable, and, as the Romans saw it, civilizationally inferior peoples of the north. The result, however, was not just a broadening of the swath of humanity to be designated as “barbarians”; it also entailed the loss of any consistently conceived notion of an Other against which Hellenized, Roman civilization could be defined.

The role of terms for the emotion anger, or concepts closely associated with it, in this evolving discourse of alterity therefore illustrates the fluidity and instability of Greek and then Roman efforts to provide a coherent rationalization

85 iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem (Seneca, De Ira 1.11.5).
86 Adding further complexity to the picture is the fact that the term “barbarian” never lost its original associations with speech or use of language that was seen as somehow corrupt, deficient, or inferior: even in fifth-century AD (and nearly post-Roman) Gaul, Sidonius Apollinaris could make a pun about his Roman friend’s mastery of the Burgundian language of some of the region’s new, and increasingly dominant, inhabitants, saying, “it is impossible for you to imagine how funny it is to me and others whenever I hear that the barbarian is afraid to commit a barbarism in his own language when you are present”: aestimari minime potest, quanto mihi ceterisque sit risui, quotiens audio, quod te praesente formidet linguae suae facere barbarus barbarismum (Epistles 5.5.3).
for the parameters of their own cultural and political communities. Beginning with Herodotus’ more or less clearly articulated definition of what it meant to be Greek, to Hellēnikon-τὸ Ἑλληνικόν,\textsuperscript{87} the succeeding centuries witnessed a series of efforts to rationalize and delimit access and belonging within the ever-changing political landscapes of the ancient Mediterranean. That this is the case should have important implications for our understanding of ancient notions of Self and Other, a dichotomy which remains a fixture in modern assessments of ancient worldviews. Seeing that the conception of the barbarian in the ethnographic discourse was elastic enough to refer first to peoples characterized as deficient in their allotment of *thymos*, but then also include peoples characterized by their excessive endowment of that very quality, efforts to establish ideological boundaries moved in step with the need to respond to changing political, cultural, and economic horizons.\textsuperscript{88} Put simply, barbarians were lacking in *thymos* for many fifth-century Greeks, whereas an excessive complement of *thymos* and its related emotions defined them for the Romans of the first century AD. Such a change points to a marked semantic ambiguity inherent in the term “barbarian” itself: it shows that the urbanized, wealthy, monarchical empire of Persia, which had once served as the barbarian Other in the crystallization of a new awareness of Hellenicity, was replaced by a similarly self-defining Roman “coherent barbarology,” characterized by the haphazardly agricultural, poor, and politically disorganized societies of Germania.\textsuperscript{89} What we see is not only the geographical renegotiation of a “civilized” center whose location moved to accommodate itself in relative position to its oppositional inverse but also an evolving set of perceived qualities and characteristics used to define the civilized community.

By the time of the Roman principate, the point at which this essay began, the works of Roman authors such as Cicero, Virgil, Livy, Seneca, and (soon

\textsuperscript{87} “What it is to be ‘Greek’: the same blood and language, common temples and sacrificial rites to the gods, and the same customs: τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔνον ὀμαμάν τε καὶ ὀμάγλωσσαν καὶ ἠθῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινᾶ καὶ ὀμώδισε τε ὁμόμορφα (Herodot. 8.144.2).

\textsuperscript{88} As the above discussion demonstrates, general assessments of ethnographic characteristics of the “barbarian” in Greco-Roman worldviews can be problematic. For example, Harris has suggested that “in the imagination of Greek and Roman men, women – like barbarians and children – are especially susceptible to anger.” While that certainly may often have been the case in the age of Roman conquest and empire, it does not seem to apply to the thought of Aristotle and the Hippocratic corpus. Harris (2003) 130.

\textsuperscript{89} Shaw (2000) 378. However, I would suggest that “coherence” is perhaps not the best term to describe any such worldviews.
after) Tacitus make clear that the Romans imagined themselves as a community that had incorporated into its citizen body peoples who had once been, if not barbarians, then at least external enemies of the Roman state.⁹⁰ An awareness on the part of the Romans that they themselves had been considered barbarians by the Greeks is just one indication of the Roman understanding that barbarism was a condition out of which, and perhaps into which, individuals and whole communities could move.⁹¹ While the unrestrained rage and anger that Seneca associates with northern barbarians is rationalized in terms of climatological analysis, his admonition to his audience makes clear that even the anger of the barbarians, should they ever mitigate it by learning the Roman virtues of ratio and disciplina and thus enter the Hellenized Mediterranean community, might not prevent them from threatening the Roman political order.⁹² While the conceptual dichotomy of a barbarian world opposed to first Greek, and then Roman, civilization remained a useful rhetorical and theoretical convention in media ranging from oratory, historiography, and panegyric to sculpture and triumphal processions,⁹³ the discourse of anger in representations of barbarian peoples points to the malleability, fluidity, and inconsistency of Greco-Roman strategies of political and cultural self-definition. That what the term “barbarian” did or should signify was a constantly renegotiated phenomenon suggests a vision of community whose boundaries were perhaps not as closely guarded, or at least insurmountable, as moderns have at times assumed.

⁹⁰ See, for example, the work of Farney (2007), who has documented the persistence, and even prestige, of non-Roman ethnonyms down to through the end of the republican period. That Horace would publicly refer to his patron Maecenas as “the Etruscan offspring of kings,” Tyrrena regum progenies, is just one example (Odes 3.29).

⁹¹ “Le barbare, comme d’ailleurs le civilisé, est sujet à mutation et peut toujours évoluer: l’accès à l’humanitas est toujours possible, de même que la chute, ou rechute, dans la barbarie.” Dauge (1981) 19–20. As Shaw has noted, “‘barbarian peoples’ . . . were, it is true, potential Romans.” Shaw (2000) 376. Woolf has described the permeability of categories in slightly different terms: “Romans could not define themselves purely in contradistinction to barbarians, since not all civilized men were Romans.” Woolf (1998) 59.

⁹² De Ira 1.11.4.

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Yang Hua

Hatred and Revenge in Ancient China During the Qin and Han (221 B.C.-220 A.D.): The Expression of Emotions and the Conflict between Ritual and Law

In recent years, the history of emotions has become an important area of inquiry for cultural history.1 The study of emotions must take into consideration both the physiology and psychology of a people, but such aspects are difficult to access directly in historical records. One solution to this problem is to place human emotions in a historical context and examine them through the lens of politics, society, and ideology. This essay discusses emotions in the Qin and Han Dynasties (221 BCE-220 CE) from the perspective of hatred and revenge. The premise is that hostile emotions, such as hatred, resentment, rancor, anger, and the like, emerge from the historical record of special frequency and emphasis where there is a culture of revenge, such as existed in the Qin and Han dynasties. How and why that culture evolved, and was in the end superseded, will form the substance of this chapter.

1 Resentment, Anger and Hatred in the Qin and Han Dynasties

In ancient China, there were many words to express personal resentment, such as yuan 怨 (resentment), hui 恨 (grudge), nu 怒 (anger), and hen 恨 (hatred), and an even greater number of combinations of words. The “First Four Histories of China” (Shiji 史记, Records of the Grand Historian; Hanshu 汉书, History of the Han Dynasty; Houhanshu 后汉书, History of the Later Han Dynasty; Sanguozhi 三国志, History of the Three Kingdoms), provide numerous examples. Thus, the word yuan-hui 怨恨 (grudge and resentment) appears 6 times, huihen 恨恨 (resentment and hatred) 10 times, nuhen 怒恨 (anger and hatred) once, yuannu 怨怒 (grudge and

1 For relevant discussions of Chinese scholars, see the forum papers published in Shixue yuekan 史学月刊, 2018, no. 4. They include Huang Kewu (2018), Sun Yiping (2018), Wang Qingjia (2018) and Zhang Shouan (2018).

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anger) 18 times, yuanhen 怨恨 (grudge and hatred) 40 times, yuanchou 怨仇 (grudge and enmity) 14 times, and duoyuan 多怨 (intense resentment) 21 times. When expanding the search to include terms of mutual resentment and its formation, we find 10 examples of xiangyuan 相怨 (mutual resentment), 5 of xiangchou 相仇 (mutual enmity), 23 of jieyuan 结怨 (incurring hatred), and 4 of jiechou 结仇 (incurring enmity). It appears that, in contrast to other periods, hostile emotions had a particular salience in the Qin and Han Dynasties.

Expressions of resentment and anger abundant in the historical records of this time. For example, the “Biography of Yu Dingguo 于定国 (?-40 BCE)” in the Hanshu records that “the people were burdened with grudges, and the local governments would not deal with the situation.” Again, the “Biography of Han Yanshou 韩延寿(?-57 BCE)” in the Hanshu states that “the people were burdened with grudges” in Yingchuan 颖川. In the “Biography of Dong Zhuo 董卓 (?-192 CE)” in the Sanguozhi we read that “there arose either mutual affection or mutual resentment, and many died of injustice”. Why such concern with resentment and hatred? To some extent, of course, these emotions are common across cultures and times, but there appear to be special emphases associated with the Qin and Han Dynasties. I discuss some reasons for this exceptional situation in the following section.

1.1 Personal vendetta

Such conflicts are unavoidable and common in all of human history, and there are plenty of examples of anger and hatred resulting from greed, jealousy, deception, contempt, insult, disrespect, exploitation, contention (over property and beauty), etc., in the Qin and Han Dynasties. Thus, Han Xin 韩信 (231–196 BCE) was humiliated by being forced to crawl through another person’s crotch, and his anger is easily imagined. He was esteemed for enduring and controlling his anger, and he finally became a general, pacifying his country and winning fame for generations. Again, the prime minister Tian Fen 田蚡 (?-130 BCE) was late for a banquet, and was very arrogant toward the guests there, which angered Dou Ying 窦婴 (?-131BCE) and Guan Fu 灌夫 (?-131BCE). Another instance is Guo Jie 郭解: whenever he went out or returned, everyone avoided him except

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3 “Biography of Han Yanshou 韩延寿传”, Hanshu, 76, p.3210.
4 “Biography of Dong Zhuo 董卓传”, Sanguozhi 三国志, 6, Beijing, 1959, p. 179.
for one person, who rudely “looked at him while sitting with legs apart,” and so the retainers of Guo Jie “wanted to kill him.” The *Hanshu* records that Guo Jie “felt unhappy and killed many people.” These reasons for anger and hatred are not specific to a particular era or culture, but they may also be symptomatic of a highly aristocratic society marked by a strong sense of personal honor.

### 1.2 Group conflicts

Over the 440 years of the Qin and Han Dynasties, although they were relatively stable most of the time, there were several periods of serious unrest. In the short reign of the Qin Dynasty 秦朝 (221 BCE-207 BCE), peace was never achieved throughout its domain. The state of Qin in the west with its superior manpower conquered the six states of the east, but its rule was not accepted universally. The former states of Qi 齐, Chu 楚, Yan 燕, Han 韩 and Zhao 赵 kept their traditional political and social order, and conflicts between them and the Qin were intense. As a result, the collapse of the Qin Dynasty was rapid and complete. The turmoil at the end of the Qin and the beginning of the Han Dynasties intensified conflicts among the different groups. Although the unified Qin empire lasted only 15 years, literary records mention that “The whole country suffered from the Qin for a long time.” In total, there are 15 mentions of “suffering from the Qin” in ten literary works. Resentment of the tyranny of the Qin Dynasty came from various classes and regions. With the outbreak of the peasant revolt at the end of the Qin Dynasty, “families could not restrain their anger, individuals fought with each other, took revenge for their grudges and attacked their enemies. Inhabitants killed the magistrates in the counties and the commanders in the prefectures.” There was also great social turmoil in the period from the end of the Western Han 西汉 (202 BCE-8 CE) to the early years of the Eastern Han Dynasties 东汉 (25–220 CE). The collapse of the Xinmang Regime 新莽 (9–23 CE) almost brought the whole country back to the turmoil of the Warring States period, and conflicts among the regions became more open. Furthermore, during the Yellow Turban Uprising 黄巾起义 (184 CE) in the late Eastern Han Dynasty, regional,
religious, and class conflicts came together to create a dramatic and complicated situation. Under such conditions, personal hatred is often intertwined with national, political, and ethnic antagonism. For example, Xiang Yu 项羽, king of Western Chu (232–202 BCE), treated his subordinates well, but he was cruel to enemies and often massacred the residents of conquered cities. “There was no place where Xiang Yu passed that was not looted and slaughtered. People across the country resented him and did not attach themselves to him voluntarily. It was just coercion through power and tyranny.”

According to Yan Shigu 颜师古 (581–645), because Xiang Yu massacred whole cities, he was deeply resented by the people. At the end of the Western Han Dynasty, when Wang Mang 王莽 (45 BCE-23 CE) usurped the throne, several sources record that “the whole country had been suffering from Wang Mang and missing Han for a long time,” and that “the whole country had been suffering from the tyranny of Wang Mang and missing the previous benevolent rule of Gaozu 汉高祖 (256/247–195 BCE).”

1.3 Politics and the Bureaucracy

The Qin and Han Dynasties were bureaucratic societies in which power was centralized in the hands of the emperor. To prevent ministers and officials from forming cliques, the imperial court forbade them to develop intimate private relations. For example, Gai Kuanrao 盖宽饶 (105–60 BCE) was just and regarded as a good official. When the Marquis of Ping’en 平恩侯 Xu Bo 许伯 (110–61 BCE) moved to a new residence, Gai went to attend the celebration banquet unwillingly; once there, he saw that the Chamberlain of the Emperor’s Mother was performing the dance “the fight between the monkey and the dog.” He immediately left and reported this disrespectful behavior to the emperor. The emperor punished the Chamberlain, and his contemporaries praised him for “fulfilling his duty of inspection, being straight in his conduct, and having many enemies but few friends.” “Having many enemies but few friends” was precisely the image that autocratic emperors desired. The Legalist theory of monarchical rule advocated that courtiers and officials should not have personal friendships. “If subjects betray the king and tend to forge personal relations with each other, the

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king will become weaker and the ministers stronger.”17 “Couples and friends cannot shield each other’s sins and mistakes, and yet they do not hurt their feelings. People cannot conceal things for one another’s sake. The king and the officials, their business is the same but their interests are different.”18 The relationship between the king and his ministers, as between father and son or husband and wife, is based on interests, and there ought not to be too much affection and friendship. This kind of political ecology was partially implemented under the authoritarian and centralized rule of the Qin and Han Dynasties, which naturally led to tensions within interpersonal relationships.

### 1.4 Collective Punishment and Encouragement of Denunciation

The institution of collective punishment called lianzuo 连坐 has a long history in China. It is said that in the late Shang Dynasty (about 1600–1046 BCE), King Zhou 王 (?-1046 BCE) already “punished people along with their clans and appointed officials along family lines,”19 which may be the prototype of the institution. The law of collective punishment that Shang Yang 商鞅 (395–338 BCE) implemented in the state of Qin

ordains that households are organized into units of ten and the unit receives collective punishment if one member commits a crime. Those who do not denounce a criminal will be executed by severing the waist; those who denounce a criminal shall receive the same reward as one who beheads an enemy, and those who hide a criminal shall be punished as an enemy who surrenders.20

This system helped the Qin State to conquer others and was implemented after the Qin Dynasty unified the whole country. In the legal texts of the Qin bamboo slips excavated in Yunmeng Shuihudi 云梦睡虎地 of Hubei Province, one often finds mention of an official receiving collective punishment for a crime, such as failing to fulfill official duties and the dishonest recommendation of officials. In the Han legal texts found on bamboo slips from Zhangjiashan 张家山, provisions for similar punishments appear.21 To avoid collective punishment and keep oneself safe, one had to denounce the crimes of others. In the Han Dynasty, denunciation

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17 Jiang Lihong (1986) 137.
19 “Mushi,” Shangshu 尚书·牧誓.
of crimes was openly encouraged. For example, in the fourth year of Yuanshou 元狩四年 (119 BCE), the imperial government announced a tax decree called suanminling 算缗令 that levied a 6% property tax and commercial tax. It encouraged gaomin 告缗, that is, reporting concealed property to the authorities, and rewarded half of the property confiscated to the reporter. It is recorded that “Under the supervision of Yangke 杨可 there was reporting of concealed property all over the country, and the most middle-class families had been reported (for concealing property).” 22

This policy of widespread denunciation was designed to strengthen the centralization of power as well as local administrations. There had been many powerful families in the prefecture of Yingchuan 颖川, which made it difficult to govern. The central government sent out a high-ranking official who received an annual pay of two thousand bushels of grain as governor. When Zhao Guanghan 赵广汉 (?-65 BCE) served for this capacity, he encouraged officials and people to denounce each other:

When Zhao Guanghan served as governor of the prefecture, he was concerned about the habit of forming cliques. He therefore sowed dissension between the officials and the people, and made them denounce each other. He thought that this was a wise policy. But because of this it became common practice to denounce people in Yingchuan, and there was much resentment and hatred among the inhabitants. 23

In another passage of Hanshu Zhao Guanghan’s method is more detailed:

The powerful families of Yingchuan formed marriage ties among each other, and the officials were accustomed to forming cliques. Guanghan was concerned about this, so he chose among them those who were suitable to conduct criminal cases and severely punish those who were convicted. Guanghan deliberately disclosed what they confessed and in this way made them resent each other. He also ordered his subordinates to prepare a box for receiving letters of denunciation. When he got a letter, he would cover the name of denouncer and allege that it was from a member of one of the powerful families. After that the rich and powerful families hated each other, the cliques disappeared, and customs changed significantly. Officials and people denounced each other, and Guanghan had plenty of spies. Robbery disappeared. 24

This was typical of the Legalist method of ruling, which severely corrupted folk customs. Later, Confucian officials who succeeded to his position made great efforts to change the new practices and to rebuild more harmonious relationships.

In sum, under the authoritarian and centralized bureaucracy of the Qin and Han

Dynasties, interpersonal relationships were tense, and resentment and hatred among individuals intensified.

2 Revenge in the Qin and Han Dynasties

Grudges lead to hatred, and hatred to revenge. In the “First Four Histories of China,” we find 29 occurrences of baoyuan 报怨 (revenge for grudges), and 59 of baochou 报仇 (revenge for hatred). The following discussion is based on previous research of this phenomenon in the Qin and Han Dynasties.25

Revenge in the Han Dynasty can be divided into two types: revenge for kin and revenge for non-kin, with the former being the more common. Revenge for non-kin included revenge for the sake of the emperor, generals, masters, friends, etc. According to one study, recorded instances of revenge for kin in the Han Dynasty include 14 cases of revenge for a father, 1 for a foster father, 2 for parents, 8 for brothers (including cousins), 3 for a mother, 1 for a husband, 1 for a son, and 2 for an uncle.26

According to another study, the targets of revenge who were killed were not limited to nobles and officials, but also included powerful landlords and commoners. Avengers likewise included powerful landlords, Confucian scholars (students), and commoners, with the latter predominating. The study surveys 59 cases of revenge in the Han Dynasty, out of which 30 cases involved vengeance among men between the ages of fifteen and thirty. There were also many instances of revenge by middle-aged and elderly women. This is to say, neither avengers nor the targets of revenge came from a particular sector of society. Moreover, this phenomenon was widespread throughout the country and was not limited to a certain region.27

In the Han Dynasty, contract killers were employed to obtain vengeance for their clients. The Hanshu records that at the end of the Western Han Dynasty, Wangzun 王尊 governed the capital, Chang’an, harshly, and he captured and killed strong men such as Yu Zhang 莭章, Zhang Hui 张回, Zhao Jundu 赵君都, and Jia Ziguang 贾子光, who were “all famous strong men in Chang’an who took revenge on behalf of people and maintained killers.”28 Not long after that, “there were more and more crafty people in the city of Chang’an. Youths living

27 Peng Wei (1986).
in the alleys gathered to kill officials, and they took revenge on the part of others for money.”

At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, a strong man named Yang Aruo 杨阿若 from Jiuquan 酒泉, “travelled around when he was young and often took revenge for other people, in a professional capacity, so people said that ‘whenever there was a killing in the eastern market or in the western market, the killer must have been Yang Aruo’.”

The Qianfulun 潜夫论, by Wang Fu 王符 (85–163 CE), in the Eastern Han Dynasty, indicated the price of killing enemies in the city of Luoyang 洛阳:

There were even brokers who brokered killing in Luoyang, and they were called the brokers’ house. They would take the amount of one hundred thousand, but pay the killer several thousand... Now killers in Luoyang would kill anyone from the elderly to those as young as four to five years old. They would not quit until they died.

Professional killers who took revenge on behalf of other people charged according to the number and status of the targets. The existence of these professional killers indicates great demand for revenge at this time. For example, when Su Buwei 苏不韦 in the Eastern Han Dynasty avenged his father, he “spent all his property to hire a swordsman.”

Indeed, hatred and revenge were described as one of the “seven major reasons for death” in the Han Dynasty,

The seven reasons of death: first, beaten to death by cruel officials; second, death by severe punishment; third, death by being wronged and framed; fourth, killed by thieves and burglars; fifth, death by grudge and revenge; sixth, death by starvation; seventh, death by plague and illness.

Death because of starvation and illness are common among all peoples. However, of the five other reasons listed here, being beaten to death by a cruel official, death by severe punishment, and death for being wronged are related to the excessive use of force in the justice system. The other two, that is, being killed by thieves and burglars and because of grudges and revenge, indicate problems related to public security in the Han Dynasty.

Let me illustrate the situation by means of a few typical instances of revenge in the Han Dynasty.

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33 “Biography of Bao Xuan 鲍宣传,” Hanshu, 72, p. 3088.
2.1 The revenge of Zhao E 赵娥

The father of the woman Zhao E was killed by Li Shou 李寿, who lived in the same county. Normally revenge was carried out by men. But all three of Zhao E’s brothers had died in a plague. Her enemy was very happy and said, “all the men of prime age of Zhao’s family were dead. There were only weak women left. What should we be worried about?” However, Zhao E undertook the duty of revenge. She bought knives and often hid beside the home of her enemy, but did not find a chance for more than ten years. Finally, she killed her enemy in 179 CE. The instance was recorded in the *Houhanshu* and *Sanguozhi*. After she killed Li Shou, Zhao E surrendered to the local government with the following confession: “I have avenged my father’s death. Now I am surrendering myself for the death penalty.” The local governor Yin Jia 尹嘉, however, was prepared to lose his position in order to free Zhao E. She did not flee, and was prepared to receive punishment under the principle that “personal hatred should not violate public law.” She escaped the death penalty because the imperial court issued an amnesty. It is worth noting that she won overwhelming support from the public: “People all over the country, hearing about this, praised her and exalted her righteousness.” The inspector of Liangzhou province, Zhou Hong 周洪, and the governor of Jiuquan prefecture, Liu Ban 刘班, reported to the emperor, praising her “strength and righteousness.” They also set up a stele with inscriptions honoring her family. The former imperial secretary Liang Kuan 梁宽 wrote a biography of her.

2.2 The revenge of Su Buwei 苏不韦

This instance, which is recorded in the “Biography of Su Buwei” of the *Houhanshu*, occurred in 170 CE. In the Eastern Han Dynasty, Li Hao 李暠, the chief magistrate of Meiyang County 美阳县, was “corrupt and violent and hated by the people.” He was proven to have taken bribes and was punished by his superior, Su Qian 苏谦. But later Li Hao gained the support of the courtier Ju Yuan 具瑗 and was promoted to the position of inspector of the capital. According to the law of the Han Dynasty, after Su Qian retired, he ought to have returned to his hometown and not be present in the capital Luoyang any longer. Nevertheless,

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he visited Luoyang for personal reasons, where he was caught and punished by Li Hao. He died in prison; Li Hao even whipped his corpse.

At that time, Su Buwei, the son of Su Qian, was just 18 years old. He carried the body of his father back, and “buried it without a funeral ceremony.” He moved his mother to the mountains and was determined to avenge his father. He changed his name and “spent all his property to recruit a swordsman” to kill Li Hao, but for a long time he did not succeed. In the end, Su Buwei, together with his cousins, spent several months digging a tunnel, in the night, to Li Hao’s bedroom and attempted to surprise him. Unfortunately, when they emerged, Li Hao was in the bathroom. Su Buwei killed Li Hao’s concubine and his son, left a letter, and escaped. Li Hao was frightened and became more cautious. Whenever he went out, he bore a sword and hired strong men as his guards. Su Buwei knew that it was hard to kill him, so he went to Li Hao’s hometown and dug out the body of Li Hao’s father Li Fu 李阜, and cut off his head to sacrifice it at his own father’s tomb. He hung the head in the street with a note alleging that “Mr. Li removed his father’s head.” Li Hao did not dare to say anything and retired to his hometown; he put the head of his father back in the coffin and reburied it silently. He offered a reward to catch Su Buwei for several years, but did not capture him. In the end he was so depressed that he died of disease, after vomiting blood.

2.3 The story of “Seven daughters’ revenge for their father”

In a Han tomb excavated in Helinger in Inner Mongolia (the tomb is dated to the 60–70s of the 2nd century CE), there is a fresco bearing the title, “Seven daughters’ revenge for their father” (in tomb of Jü County 莒县 in Shandong Province, it is simplified as “Seven Daughters”). In recent years, scholars have found more murals with similar themes; seven murals have been identified so far. The fresco tells the story of a magistrate being blocked when passing a bridge, with several women chasing the carriage and beating him; the owner of the carriage (named “Chief Magistrate of Chang’an 长安令 in the Helinger tomb, and “Chief Magistrate of Xianyang 咸阳令 in the tomb of Cao Cao 曹操) is shown falling off the bridge over the Wei River 渭水桥. There are also women waiting under the bridge to beat the magistrate as he falls into water. Such frescos have been found in several places, including Inner Mongolia, Shandong, and Anhui, indicating that this was a common theme in the late Eastern Han Dynasty.

It is not possible to reconstruct the specific details of the story, but it shows that women’s revenge for their relatives was regarded positively at the time.37

3 Theories of Revenge in Confucian Classics

Violent personal revenge was mostly forbidden ancient China, as in many other societies. So why was revenge not effectively restrained in the Qin and Han periods? And why did public opinion express sympathy and praise for such acts rather than condemning them? The main reason is that Confucianism, which became the official ruling ideology in the Han Dynasty, held that revenge was legitimate and stipulated the method and scope of revenge within its ritual system.38 Confucianism advocated “punishing evil and commending good.”39 The question, then, is how evil was to be punished. Confucius affirmed that one must neither “repay hatred with hatred” nor “repay hatred with kindness,”40 but rather “repay hatred with uprightness and repaying kindness with kindness,” that is, to “requite a grudge with fairness and righteousness, and to treat kindness with kindness.” Xing Bing’s 邢昺 (992–1010 CE) commentary called it “straight justice,” that is, repaying a grudge with justice, righteousness, and fairness. What, then, constitutes “fairness and righteousness”? Mencius was against killing, and thought that “killing others” was equal to “killing oneself.” The argument supposes that killing others inevitably generates revenge: “If one killed the father of another, then the other would kill his or her father; if one killed the brother of another, then the other would also kill his or her brother.”41

There were rules concerning the scope, objects, and means of revenge within the category of Confucian “ritual.” In ritual books such as Liji 礼记 (Book of Rites), Dadailiji 大戴礼记 (Book of Rites of Dai the Elder), and Zhouli 周礼 (The Rites of Zhou), we read:

40 “Xianwen,” Analects 论语·宪问, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 2513.
41 “Jinxin,” Mengzi 孟子·尽心, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 2774.
(1) One should not live under the same heaven with one’s father’s murderer; one should not wait until one fetches weapons to kill one’s brother’s murderer; one should not live in the same country as one’s friend’s killer. (Liji-Qu Li I 礼记·曲礼上)⁴²

(2) Zi Xia 子夏 (507 BCE- 400 BCE) asked Confucius, “How should (a son) conduct himself with reference to the man who killed his father or mother?” The Master replied, “He should sleep on straw, with his shield for a pillow; he should not take office; he must be determined not to live with the slayer under the same heaven. If he meets him in the market-place or the court, he should not go back for his weapon, but (instantly) fight him.” “Allow me to ask,” said (the other), “How should (one) do with reference to the man who has slain his brother?” (The Master) replied, “He should not take office with (the slayer) in the same state; if he was sent on a mission by his ruler’s order, even if they meet, he should not fight with him.” “And how should one do,” continued Zi Xia, “in the case of a man who has slain one of his paternal cousins?” Confucius said, “He should not take the lead (in avenging), but if one who has the duty is able to do that, he should support him from behind, with his weapon in his hand.” (Liji-Tan Gong I 礼记·檀弓上)⁴³

(3) One should not live if the murderer of one’s parents live; one should not live in the same country with the murderer of one’s brothers; one should not live in the same town with one’s friends’ murderer; one should not live in the same neighborhood with one’s kinsmen’s murderer. (Dadailiji-Zengzi 大戴礼记·曾子)⁴⁴

In short, the Confucian rites of revenge include the following principles. First, one should not live under the same sky with one’s parents’ murderer. According to the annotations of Zheng Xuan, it is because one’s father is one’s sky, “If someone killed one’s sky and one lives under the same sky with him, then one is not a filial son.” Therefore, the only choice one has is either kill the murderer or die oneself. Under such circumstances, one should be prepared to kill the enemy at any time, and should have weapons ready even when one sleeps, so that one “is prepared to kill at any moment.” Second, one should carry weapons at all times in order to kill one’s brothers’ murderers, and one should not take office in the same state with the murderer. Nevertheless, if one meets the

⁴²“Qu Li I ,” Liji 礼记·曲礼上, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 1250.
murderer when on a diplomatic mission in another state, one should not fight with him, because if he failed, he would not be able to accomplish the mission of the king. Third, one should not take the lead in avenging one’s paternal cousins’ death. However, if a family member of the deceased takes revenge, one must follow and assist him. Fourth, if someone has killed one’s friend, one should not live in the same country with him (LiJi-Qu Li), or (according to another account) in the same town with him (DaDailij). This is a differentiated ritual for revenge based on how close the relationship is. The closer the tie, the greater the revenge. According to this model, revenge for parents, brothers, teachers, and friends in the Han Dynasty was entirely reasonable.

The idea of “avoiding hatred” in the case of manslaughter was also developed in the Zhouli. It proposes an official position called “mediator” and specifies his duties as follows. When someone accidentally kills another person’s parents, brothers, cousins, teachers, or friends, the mediator should try to let this person escape to some distant place:

The mediator is responsible for mediating enmity among the people. Anyone who has killed or injured people due to negligence should be judged together with the people. The same applies to those who have killed and injured others’ livestock through negligence. Anyone who has killed another’s father, let him hide overseas. Anyone who has killed another’s brother, let him hide a thousand li away. Anyone who has killed another’s cousin, let him not live in the same country. Killing the emperor is regarded as the same as killing the father, killing a teacher or an older kinsman as killing a brother, and killing a master or friend as killing a cousin. If he refuses to escape, then the mediator should show him a government warrant to arrest him. Anyone who kills officers for implementing an execution, all the states should treat him or her as an enemy. Anyone who kills justly will not live in the same country, and the victim should be made not to take revenge. If he takes revenge, he will be sentenced to death. Anyone who quarrels and fights will be reconciled; those who cannot be reconciled should be recorded, and those who started the fight will be punished.  

The mediator arranges for a person who has killed someone else’s father by mistake to escape overseas, one who has killed somebody’s brother to hide a thousand li away, and one who has killed a person’s cousin not live in the same country. A person who has mistakenly killed someone’s king is dealt with in the same way as manslaughter of one’s father, and so on. Zheng Sinong 郑司农 (?-83 CE) noted that “‘reconcile’ means mediation, just as today’s officials who receive an annual pay of 2000 bushels are required to mediate grudges and hatred.

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If those involved still seek revenge afterwards, the officials will remove them from their hometown. This is a similar arrangement.” The passage indicates that officials who received annual pay of 2000 bushels in the Han Dynasty functioned as mediators of private grudges and hatred based on the pre-Qin model.

Most importantly, there is a rule for acquittal in the case of private revenge. In the *Zhouli*, which had a profound impact on later times, we read: “If robbers attack villages and kinsmen, killing them is innocent. If anyone takes revenge on them and reports it to the authorities, then killing them is innocent.” This rule undoubtedly gave people greater legitimacy for taking revenge, with the result that revenge became almost customary from the period to the Qin and Han Dynasties. “In the Han Dynasty, the government did not prohibit revenge. People all built in their houses towers with drums placed there. In an emergency, they would go upstairs to beat the drums to notify the village and ask for help.” The servants there had the duty to guard against the enemy at night.

The ritual classics compare rulers, teachers, masters and friends to kin when discussing revenge, since the theoretical foundation of Confucianism for governing state and society was built on kinship, treating the state as an extension of the family. The rule that “killing a master or friend is regarded as the same as killing a cousin” is especially worth noting. In the pre-Qin period “master” denoted the *dafu* lords whom the warriors took as their masters. This rule provided a reasonable explanation for revenge taken by low-ranking officials. In the Han Dynasty, the government appointed officials by recommendation and interview. Staff and assistant officers were recommended by their head officer, and so low-ranking officials formed strong ties with their head officers; if their master was killed, they would take revenge on his behalf as for a cousin. For example, at the end of the Han Dynasty, Qu Sheng 麇胜 killed Liu Jun 刘俊, the county magistrate of Zuli County 祖厉县. Zhang Xiu 张绣 (?-207 CE), an officer of the county, killed Qu Sheng in revenge. He was highly praised by the locals (“People in the prefecture all praised him for his righteousness”). When the warlord Dong Zhuo 董卓 (?-192 CE) was killed By Lü Bu 吕布 (?-199 CE), Zhang

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48 Wang Bao 王褒, *Tongyue* 僚约: “When the dogs bark, they should get up and alert the neighborhood, lock the gates and doors, go upstairs to hit the clappers, with shields and spears in hands parade three times.” See Li Fang et al., *Taiping yulan* 太平御览, vol. 500, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960, p. 2289.
Ji 张济 (?-196 CE) and Li Jue 李傕 (?-198 CE) attacked Lü Bu on the grounds that they were avenging their master.\footnote{50}

Confucianism was the dominant imperial ideology in the Han Dynasty, with the Neo-Classics at its core. One of the Neo-Classics, the Gongyang Commentary, was the most important of all and had almost become the law code of the Han Dynasty. The Gongyang Commentary records five cases of revenge in the pre-Qin period, all approvingly.\footnote{51} Among these, two cases played a major role in praising revenge in the Han Dynasty.

The first case is Duke Xiang of Qi’s 齐襄公 (?-686 BCE) revenge and annihilation of the state of Ji 纪国. As recorded in the Zuo Commentary, revenge in the Spring and Autumn period might take many years. The revenge for Bo You 伯有 (?-543 BCE) took place eight years after his death; Gongzi Pengsheng 公子彭生 (?-694 BCE) transformed into a pig to take revenge nine years after his death; Duke Li of Jin 晋厉公 (?-573 BCE) took revenge as a ghost eighteen years after his death. Duke Ai of Qi (?-868 BCE), the ancestor nine generations back of Duke Xiang of Qi, was cooked to death by the Zhou King Yi 周懿王 (937–892 BCE) because of the slander of Marquis Ji 纪侯; more than two hundred years later, Duke Xiang of Qi annihilated the state of Ji. The following is recorded in the Gongyang Commentary:

"Duke Xiang of Qi was going to take revenge on the state of Ji. Could he take revenge after nine generations? He could even after one hundred generations. Could a family take revenge like that? No. Why can a country do that? Because the king and the country are a single body. The shame of the previous kings is the shame of the present king, and the shame of the present king is also the shame of the previous kings.\footnote{52}" This event was often cited as a theoretical basis for belated revenge. For example, after Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty 汉武帝 (156–87 BCE) pacified Dawan 大宛 in 101 BCE, he was preparing to attack northern Xiongnu 匈奴, and he issued an edict: "Emperor Gaozu 汉高祖 (256/247–195 BCE) suffered the humiliation of the siege of Pingcheng 平城, and in the reign of Empress Gao the Chan Yu 单于 ended relations and was wholly rebellious. In the past the Duke Xiang of Qi took revenge after a hundred generations, and the Chunqiu 春秋 praised him."\footnote{53} Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty mobilized the whole country in the light of interpretations of revenge in the Chunqiu to avenge the humiliation of his ancestors at the hands of the Xiongnu.

\footnote{50} “Biography of Dong Zhuo” 董卓传, Sanguozhi, 6, p. 182.
\footnote{51} Qiu Libo (2005).
\footnote{52} “The 4th year of Ding Gong” 定公四年, Gongyangzhuan, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 2337.
\footnote{53} “Biography of Xiongnu” 匈奴列传, Shi jì, 110, p. 2917.
The second example is Wu Zixu’s伍子胥 revenge on the State of Chu楚国. Wu Zixu’s伍子胥 (also named Wu Yuan伍员) father Wu She伍奢 (?-522 BCE) and older brother Wu Shang伍尚 were killed, though innocent, by King Ping of Chu楚平王 (?-516 BCE), and he escaped to the state of Wu吴国 to assist its king He Lü阖闾 (547–496 BCE). In 506 BCE, he led the army of Wu to attack Chu楚国, avenging his father by whipping the corpse of King Ping. The Gongyang Commentary comments: “if the father is executed though innocent, it is allowed for the son to take revenge; if the father is guilty, the son’s revenge will lead to further revenge.” The commentary holds that if the father is innocent but is put to death by the king, then the obligation of the subject to the monarch is nullified and it is reasonable for the son to destroy his country for revenge. On the other hand, if the father was convicted and executed and the son tried to take revenge, this is just mutual murder, and this is illegitimate. The Gongyang Commentary especially stresses the value of justice, which was often cited as an ideological basis for revenge in the Han Dynasty.

Furthermore, the Han Dynasty promoted the ideal of filial piety, and since revenge for parents was seen as the greatest expression of filial piety, it is one of the reasons why revenge prevailed in the Han Dynasty. Confucianism held that it is the bounden duty of a filial son to take care and protect the honor of his parents. When kinsmen are insulted and hurt, they must take revenge: “If the king is killed and his ministers do not attack the killer, then they do not deserve to be ministers; a son who does not avenge his father’s murder does not deserve to be a son.”54 But what if revenge and filial piety are in conflict? Above all, one must ensure the continuation of the parental bloodline, not take risks, and cherish the life that one was given by one’s parents, so that there will be opportunities for filial piety and revenge in the future. If one wants to help others to take revenge, one must also consider filial piety. The Liji-Qu Li says:

A filial son does not do things in the dark, nor attempt hazardous undertakings, fearing that he might disgrace his parents. While his parents are alive, he will not promise a friend to die (with or for him).55

If one’s parents are still alive, yet one sacrifices one’s life to avenge a friend, it is “forgetting kinship duty,” which was regarded as not observing filial piety. Nie Zheng聂政 (?-397 BCE), a warrior in the Warring States period, was living in another country with his mother and sister in order to avoid revenge for having killed someone. Yan Zhongzi严仲子 asked him to assassinate his enemy.

54 "The 11th year of Yin Gong"隐公十一年, Gongyangzhuan, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 2210.
55 “Qu Li I”曲礼上, Liji, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 1234.
Xialei 侠累 for a large sum of money. The reason Nie Zheng gave for refusing was, “I am fortunate to be able to take care of my old mother. As long as my old mother is alive, I dare not to commit my life to anyone else.” Later after his mother died, he agreed to “commit his life to someone else” and engaged to assassinate Xia Lie, the prime minister of Han, and died in the attempt. This is what is called “lending one’s life to avenge for a friend,” a notion that appears often in the sources for the Han Dynasty.

4 The Conflict between Ritual and Law – Restrictions of Private Revenge by the Despotic Monarchy

The Confucian theory of revenge seriously conflicted with the political circumstances and legal systems of the Qin and Han Dynasties. This is evident in the political structure, in the private use of violence, and in the conflict between ritual and law.

4.1 First conflict: the political structure presupposed by the theory of revenge conflicted with the system of local administration in the Qin and Han Dynasties

The ritual system of revenge and the system of self-exile for the avoidance of revenge in the Confucian ritual classics are based entirely on the political system of the pre-Qin period. During the Western Zhou Dynasty 西周 (1046–771BCE), the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BCE) and Warring States Period (475–221 BCE), the Zhou Emperor 周王 held the highest authority, yet the whole country was actually not a unified political entity. Although there are nominal kinship relations between the vassal heads, they in fact ruled their domains independently, so there was room for “living in the same state” or “living in different states.” In other words, criminals could freely flee to “other states,” while those who committed unintentional manslaughter could also be helped by the “mediator” in the name of the Zhou royal authority to escape to other states in order to avoid being killed by their enemies.

However, the Qin and Han Dynasties ruled over a unified country that was divided administratively into prefectures and counties. Except for some vassal states in the early Han Dynasty, there were no longer “other states” to which murderers and avengers could escape. First, the Qin and Han Dynasties implemented a strict household registration system, which made movement very difficult. Second, the border controls of the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period were abolished, so that even if a killer fled to another prefecture or county, he or she could not escape from the enemy. Thirdly, “wangjin 王禁” (Imperial Restrictions) were enforced throughout the country, and so murderers and robbers could longer escape the law.

4.2 Second conflict: as the state sought to monopolize punishment, the private violence that was prevalent in the pre-Qin period threatened to undermine the central power and was curtailed by the government

Professional killers in the Han Dynasty were called ke 客 (guest), jianke 剑客 (swordsman), youxia 游侠 (ranger), haoxia 豪侠 (strong man), haojie 豪杰 (hero), shaonian 少年 (youth), and so on. The word cike 刺客 (assassin) appears 30 times in the “First Four Histories.” These people “took revenge for friends” and were the main source of private revenge. Indeed, “there were so many assassins who served for Yuan She 原涉 that these killers didn’t even know the name of their master.”

The Shiji includes “Biographies of Assassins 刺客列传” which record the deeds of Cao Mo 曹沬, Zhuan Zhu 专诸, Yu Rang 豫让, Nie Zheng 聂政, Jin Ke 荆轲, and others, who were all great heroes in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. It also includes “Biographies of Rangers 游侠列传,” which record the deeds of Zhu Jia 朱家, Tian Zhong 田仲, Ju Meng 剧孟, and Guo Jie 郭解 who lived in the Han Dynasty (those who were dubbed “assassins” in the pre-Qin period were called “rangers” in the Han Dynasty). The Hanshu too includes “Biographies of Rangers,” collective biographies of wandering assassins. Sima Qian 司马迁 (145–86 BCE) and Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 CE) these wrote biographies in order to praise their “incorruptibility and humbleness,” “their saving others from misfortune, aiding others,” “their gentleness kindness and far-reaching compassion.” At the same time, they also point out that they “violated the legal prohibitions,” “appropriated the power of life and death as private

persons, and their guilt deserved none other than death penalty,”\textsuperscript{58} which is the reason why they were executed by the imperial government. The reason that the Imperial Counsellor Gongsun Hong (200–121 BCE) gave for recommending the death penalty for Guo Jie was that he interfered with government authority, which was “even more serious than killing others.” That is to say, private violence seriously interfered with the government monopoly of violence. In the end, Guo Jie and his kinsmen were executed for “high treason.”\textsuperscript{59} As was noted by Sima Qian and Ban Gu, since Guo Jie’s execution in the mid-Western Han period, although there were still people who “acted with chivalry,”\textsuperscript{60} they ceased to matter because most of them became more modest and self-disciplined, like gentlemen. Under the control and suppression of state power, the gallant strong men had turned into Confucian gentlemen.

\textbf{4.3 Third conflict: regarding revenge, the Han court established “concurrently the principle of justice and law,” but the conflict of ritual and law became more apparent, and the role of law gradually became dominant}

Who decides whether revenge is legitimate? In a kinship society or a society dominated by a patriarchal system, blood relations naturally acted as advocates of justice. In the Western Zhou Dynasty and the Spring and Autumn Period, when there was no systematic and complete written law code, the society relied on folk and customary law to regulate revenge, which fostered mutual antagonisms. In the Warring States period, written law codes appeared in the various states, but the private violence of the “four princes” and various men of knightly rank in fact administered justice and enforcement of the law, rather than the state. In the Qin and Han periods, the state monopoly of violence inevitably led to conflict between the state law and folk custom.

Legalisists such as Hanfeizi (280–233 BCE) advocated the unification of the law and the strengthening of legal power: “(One) should lead the people by politics, and administer them by penalty.” There is a fundamental difference between the principles of Legalists and those of Confucianism, which advocated “leading the people by virtue and administering them by ritual.” In order to overcome this contradiction, the rulers of the Han Dynasty practiced a “mixture of

\textsuperscript{58} “Biographies of the Rangers,” \textit{Hanshu}, 92, p. 3699.
\textsuperscript{60} “Biographies of the Rangers,” \textit{Hanshu}, 92, p. 3705, p. 3719.
benevolent and coercive rule”, that is, combining Confucian and Legalist forms of ruling. Regarding the phenomenon of revenge, rulers adopted a policy of “pardoning and executing, restraining by righteousness and judging by law,” the so-called “combination of ritual and law,” in the words of Xun Yue’s 荀悦 (148–209 CE). This policy did not completely resolve the contradictions and confusion in the actual implementation process. However, as the rule of law became more and more powerful, the room for private revenge became correspondingly smaller. At the same time, Han Confucian Classics also began to changed their defense of the legitimacy of private revenge.

4.4 First, the principle of judging a crime in the light of motivation was questioned, and pardon for revenge murder gradually decreased

Earlier, an important reason why private vengeance was so common in the Han Dynasty is that revenge murderers were not punished as they should have been. In the Han Dynasty, the law adopted the Chunqiu 春秋 as guide to legal judgement, and paid special attention to the motive of the crime, that is, “punishing the heart,” which is called “sentence according to the original intent of the crime.” Chunqiu fanlu says, “The Chunqiu judges’ cases in accordance with the facts and by tracing back to the original intentions. Those with intention of evil should be punished even if the crime is not committed, since the original evil is the most severe crime.” Confucian scholars in the Han Dynasty placed great emphasis on judging the motivation:

The law was made according to human feelings, not to punish people with penalties. So, the Chunqiu judges in the light of people’s intentions. Violation of the law with kind intentions should be acquitted, while conformity with the law with evil intentions should be met with execution.

The so-called “original heart,” “original goal” and “original emotion” in the Han Dynasty all denoted motivations for crime. This principle of justice, even though in accordance with the law, in reality provided a theoretical excuse for avengers to escape punishment, because the motivation for revenge was invariably filial piety and blood obligation, that is, to protect the life and honor of

62 Sun Qizhi 2012, p. 27.
family members. Thus, in the name of filial piety and blood obligation, killing for revenge could easily be pardoned. The Han emperors frequently issued amnesties. Emperor Wu reigned for fifty-five years and issued an amnesty fifteen times; Emperor Yuan 汉元帝 (75–33 BCE) reigned for fifteen years and issued an amnesty ten times; Emperor Huan (132–168 CE) reigned for twenty-one years and issued an amnesty thirteen times; Emperor Ling (156–189 CE) reigned for twenty-two years and issued an amnesty twenty times. Some emperors declared amnesty every year. As Zhou Tianyou points out, “Amnesty is a gospel for avengers.”\textsuperscript{65} Not a few people who took revenge for their family members were pardoned by the emperor’s and became objects of praise. For some, their action even became a factor in their being recommended for promotion to office.

In the early years of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Emperor Zhang (56–88 CE) pardoned the capital crime of a murderer for revenge and gave him a reduced sentence. This became a legal precedent. However, it was quickly objected to by a minister, Zhang Min 张敏, and it was reversed after the emperor’s death. In the Eastern Han Dynasty, Wang Fu criticized that as a result of frequent amnesty, “the wicked prospered and the good got hurt,” and pointed out that there were very many revenge killings, “all due to the many amnesties.”\textsuperscript{66}

4.5 Second, the theory of revenge had also been changing within Confucianism

For example, regarding the time limit for revenge, “taking revenge for a hundred generations” meant endless revenge. Under the imperial power of the Han Dynasty, this was no longer realistic. So Confucian scholars shortened it to “taking revenge for five generations.”

In another example, the justification of Wu Zixu’s revenge was also questioned. Beginning in the late Western Han Dynasty, Confucian scholars began to argue that it was not right for Wu Zixu to disobey the order of his master and assist another state to take revenge on his motherland. The Eastern Han corpus of Confucian classics, the Baihuotongyi-Zhufa, even put forward the view that “if parents are killed because of their violation of righteousness, the sons should not take revenge,” that is, if parents were killed because of guilt or sin on their part, their children were not justified in taking revenge.

\textsuperscript{65} Zhou Tianyou 1991.
The theorist Huan Tan 桓谭 (23 BCE-56 CE) wrote to the emperor criticizing the harm that private revenge did to the centralization of power:

When people killed each other, though they were punished by law, personal hatreds were generated and their sons and grandsons would take revenge on each other, and the hatred would become deeper and deeper and would even destroy a family, yet people would regard them heroes . . . Now the previous law and statutes should be revised, so that if someone is executed and his or her family members still take revenge by killing or harming, even if the killer escape, the whole family should be exiled to the border areas. Those who do harm should be doubly punished, and they should not be allowed to hire labor to atone for one’s crime. In this way hatred would be eliminated and robbers would disappear.67

In the cultural atmosphere of the “combination of righteousness and law” in the Han Dynasty, although Huan Tan repeatedly made his suggestion, it was not adopted. It was not until the Wei period that the situation fundamentally changed. In 223 CE Emperor Wen of Wei 曹魏文帝 (187–226CE) issued an edict formally prohibiting private revenge, with death as the penalty for the whole clan. In the following centuries, governments of various dynasties reiterated similar laws to prohibit civil violence. But it was not until the Sui and Tang Dynasties of the 7th century that this custom was finally eradicated.

5 Conclusion

Over four centuries in the Qin and Han Empires (2nd century BCE-2nd century CE), there seems to have been widespread mutual resentment and hatred, and interpersonal relations were intense. I have proposed five reasons for such grievances: personal vendetta, group conflict, the political and bureaucratic system, collective punishment, and the encouragement for denunciation. Against this background, there also flourished a culture of revenge, concentrated largely in the revenge for family members and kinsmen, which indeed earned praise both at the time and later. Historical records mention revenge among the seven causes of death in the Han Dynasty. There were also professional killers at this time. Revenge seems to have been practiced with little distinction between subjects, targets, genders, identity, age, etc.

A crucial reason for the approval of revenge at the time was the influence of Confucianism, which recognized revenge as a legitimate way of resolving antagonisms. In advocating “punishing evil and promoting good” and “repaying grudges with fairness, and kindness with kindness,” Confucianism regulated

the scope, objects, and methods of revenge within its conception of “ritual,” endorsing a hierarchical distinction among enemies. What is more, as the orthodox ruling ideology in the Han Dynasty, Confucianism advocated filial piety, and so private revenge gained ideological legitimacy and justification.

The Confucian theory of revenge ran into difficulty, however, because it conflicted with the political circumstances and legal systems of the Qin and Han Dynasties. Firstly, the political landscape inherent in the theory of revenge was fundamentally in conflict with the administrative system in the Qin and Han Dynasties. The Qin introduced a system of prefectures and counties after unification, which made it impossible for avengers to flee other states. Second, the state sought to monopolize punishment. The private violence that was prevalent in the pre-Qin period became a divisive force that undermined the central power and so was repressed by the government. As a result, it became harder for assassins to make a living. In the records of Shiji and Hanshu, killers were re-identified as Confucian gentlemen under the control of imperial power. Moreover, with regard to revenge the Han court adopted the policy of “combining righteousness and law,” which initially allowed for the conflict of ritual and the law, but the rule of law gradually became dominant. At the same time, Han Confucian Classics responded to this change by gradually diminishing the justification of revenge, as the idea of judging crimes based on motivation was questioned. Confucian scholars, moreover, increasingly held that the revenge could not be extended to “a hundred generations.” Amnesty for revenge murder also gradually decreased.

Hatred, anger, and grudge-bearing rancor may be universal, but, as I have argued in this chapter, the history of these emotions, like others, must be historically contextualized. What emotions people harbored in their hearts is difficult to recover, but we can assess the attention they were given in historical sources, and elicit the social and ideological conditions which favored such representation.

References

Wang Fu (1979): Wang Fu 王符, Lü Simian dushi zhaji 吕思勉 历代史籍, Shanghai.
Xing Yitian (2011): Xing Yitian 邢义田, Getao, bangti, weixian yu huaxiang jieshi: yi yige shichuan de “qinli weifu baochou” hanhua gushi weili” 格套、题、文献与画像解释: 以一个失传的“七女为父报仇”汉画故事为例, in: Hua wei xinsheng 画为心声, Beijing, 91–137.
Stavroula Kiritsi

Tragic Emotions – Then and Now

It is by now widely recognized that emotions are not unchanging essences but are at least in part shaped and constituted by the social environment. Over the past two decades or so, important studies have illuminated the nature of Greek and Latin emotion terms, and shown how they differ from what are purportedly their modern English equivalents. With respect to tragedy in particular, scholars have naturally focused on Aristotle’s affirmation (along with similar claims by Gorgias and Isocrates) that the emotions properly aroused by tragedy are pity and fear. There has been less attention, however, to whether Greek tragedies presented in modern translations would arouse the same emotions, which is to say, their modern analogues, or rather a distinct set of affective responses. Still less attention – in fact, none at all – has been accorded to possible differences between the presumed response to tragedy on the part of ancient Greek audiences and that of modern Greek audiences to versions staged in modern Greek. The present chapter addresses just this question. I may note that this chapter is part of a larger project comparing ancient and modern Greek emotion terms in general, a task which to the best of my knowledge has never yet been undertaken in any form.

For the response to ancient Greek drama, we necessarily depend on the testimony of classical witnesses such as Aristotle, both in his Poetics and in his detailed account of the pathē that is, the term commonly renders as “emotions,” in his Rhetoric. To access the emotions aroused by modern Greek versions, I have conducted a survey, by way of questionnaires, of audience responses to two performances of tragedies focused on Oedipus’ story, as well as interviews with the

1 I would like to express my deepest thanks to David Konstan, who encouraged me to undertake this project and supported it at all stages, as well as to the organizers of the conference, ‘Emotions between China and Greece’, 17–18 October 2019 in Shanghai, and especially Huan Yang. I am grateful too to the audience at the conference for their constructive feedback. Finally, I wish to thank the Ephorate of Antiquities of Argolida, especially Nikos Katsarais and Alkestis Papademetriou; the director of the modern Greek play Oedipus the King Konstantinos Markoulakis; the translator Yannis Lignadis; and the composer Minos Mastas, for granting me interviews concerning the modern Greek production of Oedipus the King, produced by the company Athenian Theatres (Αθηναϊκά Θεάτρα) in the summer of 2019.
2 See for example, Kaster (2005); Konstan (2006); Cairns (2018).
3 See Munteanu (2012).
major figures involved in the production. Here, I discuss the results of my research on one of the shows, a modern Greek adaption of *Oedipus the King* by Sophocles staged in the ancient theater of Epidaurus on 12 and 13 July 2019. The questionnaires are deliberately minimal in nature, since they were distributed at the performances, as the audience left the theater. The same questions are presented in modern Greek and English, to accommodate both native and foreign spectators (for the questionnaire see the appendix).

Behind this apparently straightforward approach lie several large issues. For example, Aristotle invokes pity as pertinent to tragedy, an emotion that entails a distance between the dramatic character and the spectator. Modern theater-goers and critics speak rather of a variety of emotions, including pity but also, and far more often, sympathy or empathy, sadness, love, etc. Do the modern terms for emotion imply something more like identification? Are the views of modern spectators more complex than those of ancient spectators, at least as Aristotle presents them? We must allow, of course, for the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that an ancient audience would have experienced a comparable range of affective responses. One indication is the variety of emotions expressed by characters within the tragedies to events and narratives, for example, the messenger speeches that communicated actions that took place offstage. Nevertheless, we may provisionally trust the affirmations of Aristotle and other contemporaries as to the predominant emotions that tragedy elicited. The hope is that a comparative study of the modern and ancient Greek emotional vocabularies in a controlled context such as the theater may contribute to our understanding of the emotions in classical Greece, as well as to the project of the comparative study of emotions across cultures.

The reason for choosing *Oedipus the King* by Sophocles is that this play is one of the most famous and popular dramas in antiquity as well as worldwide in modern times. Paul Woodruff quotes a communication between Sir Richard Jebb, “the greatest Sophocles scholar,” and the British novelist George Eliot concerning Oedipus’ play: “When Jebb asked Eliot how Sophocles’ play had influenced her work, she responded, ‘in the delineation of the great primitive

4 The interviews with the director Konstantinos Markoulakis, the translator Yannis Lignadis and the composer Minos Matsas were conducted in Greek. The translations into English are mine. The other version of the Oedipus story was a free adaptation by Robert Wilson performed at Epidaurus on 21 and 22 June 2019. An appointment for an interview was cancelled by him at the last moment.

5 For approaches to reactions of modern audiences to ancient Greek plays see, Easterling (2005), Budelmann (2010), Budelmann/Easterling (2010), and Budelmann et al. (2013).

6 See Kiritsi/Konstan (2010), with special attention to Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*. 
emotions.””\(^7\) In addition, Sophocles’ play served as the prime example for Aristotle’s aesthetic theory of the best tragedy, an issue to which I return below.

In the *Poetics*, the earliest known work of drama criticism in Western tradition, Aristotle defines tragedy as “a mimesis of an action which is elevated, complete and of magnitude . . . ; employing the mode of enactment, not narrative; and through pity and fear (ἐλέου καὶ φόβου) accomplishing the catharsis of such emotions.” Aristotle specifies that “what is fearful and pitiable can result from spectacle, but also from the actual structure of events, which is the higher priority and the aim of a superior poet. For the plot should be structured so that, even without seeing it performed, the person who hears the events that occur experiences horror and pity at what comes out as one would feel when hearing the plot of the Oedipus.”\(^8\) Aristotle adds that “tragedy’s most potent means of emotional effect are components of plot, namely reversals and recognitions (αἱ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἁναγνωρίσεις) . . . Reversal is a change to the opposite direction of events . . . and one in accord, as we insist, with probability or necessity: as when in the *Oedipus* the person who comes to bring Oedipus happiness, and intends to rid him of his fear about his mother, effects the opposite by revealing Oedipus’ identity.”\(^9\)

The play *Oedipus the King* opens with Oedipus surround by supplicant citizens of his city who beg him to find a solution to the plague that is afflicting the city. Oedipus expresses his pity for the suppliants: “I want to give every form of assistance. For I would be callous if I did not feel pity at such a supplication . . . Pitable children, you have come here with desires known and not unknown to me . . .”\(^10\) Later in the play Oedipus mentions his tears, which are moved by pity because of the suffering of his people.\(^11\) Patrick Finglass, in his commentary on *Oedipus the King*, notes that Oedipus’ “human concern for others – the characteristic that marks him out as an able ruler and profoundly sympathetic man – will turn out to be one of the causes of his destruction. An Oedipus indifferent to the suffering of his people would never even have begun the investigation that ends so disastrously for him.”\(^12\)

From the beginning, the play poses implicitly the question, “who is to blame for the plague?” The chorus in the first choral song of the play too sings about the numerous dead bodies of the citizens who died due to the disease:

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\(^7\) As quoted in Meineck and Woodruff (2000) vii–viii.
\(^8\) *Poetics* 1149b23-28; trans. Halliwell (1995) 73.
\(^10\) Vv.11–13; see Finglass (2018) 45, 170 and 185.
\(^11\) Vv. 66; see Finglass (2018) 107 and 187–188.
\(^12\) Finglass (2018) 46.
“death, beyond death the city’s reckoning: beyond pity, children lie on the
ground unmourned, bearing death to the living, while wives and gray-haired
mothers stream to the bank of altars, exhausted by their sadness.” Pity is a
“crucial casual element” in the play and in Oedipus’ life, starting with the
pity that Laius’ slave felt for the exposed baby Oedipus and continuing with the
Corinthian shepherd who rescued him, who states that his motivation for sav-
ing Oedipus’ life and handing him to the royal couple in Corinth was pity. Pity
reaches its climax when Oedipus has blinded himself and his appearance pro-
vokes the pity even from those who previously might have hated him. The
blind Oedipus begs Creon to show pity to his daughters and care for them in
the future.

What caused Oedipus’ destruction? Was it his own hamartia – that is, error – and if so what kind of error was it? Was it his hubris or arrogance? Oedi-
pus’ “over quick suspicion” of Creon and Tiresias and his belief that they are
plotting against him is not only a characteristic of tyrants, as Ruth Scodel has
pointed out, but also an aspect of Oedipus’ proud and overconfident charac-
ter. The chorus in the second choral song of the play (vv. 863–910) empha-
sizes the hubris of the tyrant, as manifested in Oedipus’ behavior to Creon and
Tiresias. Oedipus’ hubris, in combination with his quickness to anger, was evi-
dent as well in his encounter with Laius and his cohort. Does an awareness of
these aspects of Oedipus’ character temper the pity that might otherwise be
evoked for him? The role of Apollo and his prophecies is also crucial in Oedipus’
life. Douglas Cairns has argued (commenting on lines 374–377) that “Apollo is
actively involved in the events that are unfolding in the play and will be in-
volved – in an adversarial way – in Oedipus’ downfall: it is Oedipus’ moira [des-
tiny or portion] to fall at hands of Apollo, and Apollo is seeing to it that this will
in fact happen.” Does this condition affect the audience’s emotional response
to the catastrophe?

Keeping in mind these fundamental questions, posed by highly competent
scholars, about how the ancient tragedy might have been perceived by its original
audience, let me now turn to the modern Greek production of Oedipus the

14 Cf. vv. 326–7, when Oepidus supplicates Tiresias to help him and his people to discover the
cause of the plague by appealing to the priests’ pity; see Finglass (2018) 48 and 276: “by the
gods, do not turn away when you have understanding, since all of us here prostrate ourselves
as suppliants before you.”
15 Vv. 1178, 1295–6 and 1508; see Finglass (2018) 50, 564 and 611.
The play ‘Oedipus the King’ is arguably the first suspense thriller in Western theatre. The Anglo-Saxons describe it as a *whodunit* play. Unwinding the tangle of events, the hero, masterfully, reaches the center of the labyrinth, where the persecutor and the persecuted are the same person. The scene—like quicksand—is constantly changing, the unanswered riddle is constantly transformed: “how can we save ourselves from the plague?,” “Who killed Laios,” “Am I the slayer?” “Who am I?” This last question is the one that makes this play also the first ever existential drama in Western theatre. The hero attempts to answer the riddle using his mind, his reason, assets that people—especially Western people—have deified: reason, reflection, rationality. They are all we have, and they have launched mankind, but they are not enough. If one decides to raise this question, one has to be prepared for the answer. And the truth, the poet says, “is offered in exchanged for death.”

Oedipus is the First Man in our drama: Adam. His fate makes us humble... Some call it Fortune, others Divine Judgment, others Destiny, and others simply regard it as the mask of the Universe, so completely indifferent about humans... And when everything is over, when all has come to light, I cannot take my eyes off of the first image: an infant, a baby only a few days old, cut off from his mother’s affection, abandoned in Cithaeron, his womb and grave. And a shepherd approaching.18

Markoulakis’ view of the play reflects a modern perception and suggests a possible range of emotional reactions distinct from what an ancient audience might have experienced.

The universality of Oedipus’ story, its thriller-like nature and existential dimension, according to the director, was made visual in the production by the use of a number of little baby figurines made of clay, which were scattered on the stage. The figurines served two purposes in the production, a philosophical and a dramaturgical. They represented a fate or supernatural power that predestines the lives of all of us before our birth. We can make choices and direct our life here or there, but supernatural powers may be stronger than we are. The figurines also were intended to remind the audience of Oedipus’ life at various stages, above all his infancy, which was always under the influence of the prophecy. Apart from the clay figurines, the stage and the props used in the production are very plain.

When I asked Markoulakis what emotional responses he expected from the modern Greek audience and how far or near they might be to Aristotle’s views on pity and fear, he responded as follows:

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18 Markoulakis (2019).
In Aristotelian *eleos* (pity) – *oiktos* in modern Greek – I would also include sympathy, compassion (συμπάθεια και συμπόνοια), and a sense of understanding for our tragic hero, which means that we walk with him, we follow him through his life. In the Aristotelian emotion of fear, I would also include awe (δέος), and we, as spectators, learn from Oedipus’ experience. What do we learn: to be humble and modest in connection with the universe and the world around us because it always exceeds us. At the end of the play we stand by Oedipus’ side and I think that the spectators feel the same.19

The translator, Yannis Lignadis, produced a high quality modern Greek translation of the play which combined learned registers of modern Greek with a certain number of colloquial expressions, but also preserved a great number of ancient Greek lines. He argued that at certain moments in the text Sophocles’ language is better left untouched. However, when he retained ancient Greek lines, he also translated them in modern Greek so that the actors uttered both versions, the ancient and the modern. I asked the translator what the primary were emotions that he felt on reading the original play and whether his translation conveyed the same emotions to the audience. He responded that he always feels awe and admiration for Sophocles’ language and style, as well as pity (οίκτος), awe, and admiration for Oedipus’ character, as for many other Sophoclean characters, such as Antigone and Ajax. Lignadis stressed that at the beginning of the play the emotions of awe and admiration prevail in respect to Oedipus, while at the end he feels pity (οίκτος), sorrow and pain (οδύνη) for Oedipus’ destruction. Lignadis also underlined that during Oedipus’ last scene, where the tragic hero expresses his self-pity (αυτοοικτιρμός, αυτολύπηση), a common emotional term in modern Greek, but not a change of mind or regret (μετάνοια) for his life, he also feels love for Oedipus. In this the translator agrees with the director’s view, that we, as spectators, do not reject Oedipus after his destruction. Lignadis also believes that the content of ancient Greek pity as expressed in *έλεος* and the modern Greek *οίκτος* is much the same, but the two differ in the degree of intensity, and that the way a modern audience expresses it is different from the ancient.

Modern Greek culture, as it has evolved, according to translator, places greater emphasis on the interpretation of feelings than in understanding them and feeling them. This poses a challenge to the translator. For him, Lignadis

19 Konstantinos Markoulakis, interview by Stavroula Kiritsi, July 13, 2019 “Στο Αριστοτελικό έλεος συμπεριλαμβάνεται η συμπάθεια, η συμπόνοια, η αίσθηση της κατανόησης του ήρωα, δηλαδή βαδίζουμε μαζί του· και στον Αριστοτελικό φόβο, συμπεριλαμβάνεται το δέος, η γνώση η δική μας, που μαθαίνουμε από το πάθημα του Οιδίποδα που γίνεται για μας μαθήμα. Και ποιο μάθημα παίρνουμε εμείς από τον Οιδίποδα; Να έχουμε ταπεινότητα και σεμνότητα σε σχέση με το σύμπαν, με τον κόσμο, με τη ζωή που μας περιβάλει και πάντα θα μας υπερβαίνει.”
affirmed, the direct emotional response to a play is the critical thing, and matters more than what he described as the “intellectual” understanding, whereby the audience seeks to explain the action rather than to feel it. That is why he considers as very important the “emotional involvement” of the audience in the appreciation of a play. And this is what Lignadis tried to evoke in his version.

Let me just mention a few examples that indicate the translator’s strategy in the rendering of ancient Greek pity into modern Greek. He uses terms and expressions such as sorrow, a sigh, suffering with another, pity, and lament, In modern Greek ἐλεος (pity) has the meaning of compassion (other modern Greek terms used to express pity are ευσπλαχνία and συμπόνια), and under the influence of Christianity and the idea of God’s compassion (ευσπλαχνία) for mortals the Greek word also carries the sense of compassionate love. Ἐλεος may also mean mercy or charity (ελεημοσύνη), the moral or material support for those in

20 Yannis Lignadis, interview by Stavroula Kiriti, September 15, 2019 “Τα συναισθήματα που νιώθω είναι πάρα πολλά κάθε φορά που διαβάζω ένα κείμενο αρχαίας τραγωδίας και κυρίως του Σοφοκλή. Αν έπρεπε να συνοψίσω τα συναισθήματα μου για τον Οιδίποδα, θα έλεγα νιώθω δέος για τη γλώσσα του κειμένου και για τη δραματουργική τεχνική. Ο Οιδίποδας, αυτός ο αντιφατικός ήρωας, όπως και όλοι οι κεντρικοί ήρωες του Σοφοκλή, χαρακτηρίζεται από ένα αίσθημα θαυμασμού και οίκτου, συναισθήματα τα οποία φαίνονται μεν αντιφατικά άλλα είναι οι δύο όψεις του ίδιου νομίσματος. Ο λόγος που θαυμάζεις τον Οιδίποδα είναι ο ίδιος που σε κάνει να τον οικτίρεις. Για τον Οιδίποδα νιώθω οίκτο, θαυμασμό και στο τέλος του δράματος μια αγάπη . . . Στον κυμονό ο Οιδίποδας αυτοοικτίρεται χωρίς όμως να εκπτίπει του μεγαλείου του. Είναι ένας αξιοπρεπής και δυναμικός θρήνος, ο οποίος διατηρεί τον θαυμασμό αλλά και την οδύνη για τον Οιδίποδα . . . Ο Σοφόκλειοι ήρωες συνειδητοποιούν [τι έχει συμβεί] αλλά δεν μετανοούν . . . Στον σύγχρονο Ελληνικό πολιτισμό, έτσι όπως εξελίχτηκε, χρησιμοποιούμε πολύ τον ορθολογισμό και προσπαθούμε να εκλογικεύουμε τα συναισθήματα και τις πράξεις μας και ο συναισθηματικός αυθορμητισμός έχει χαθεί ίσως . . . Ο σύγχρονος οίκτος και ο αρχαίος έλεος είναι ο ίδιος, αλλά είναι διαφορετικός ο βαθμός της έντασης τώρα [στην σύγχρονη εποχή] . . . Η συναισθηματική κατανόηση ενός έργου είναι πολύ σημαντική από την διανοητική κατανόηση. Πολλές φορές μπορεί να νιώθεις συναισθήματα και μετά να μην μπορείς να τα περιγράψεις ακριβώς ή να δικαιολογήσεις τον λόγο που ένιωσες αυτά τα συναισθήματα . . . Για μένα είναι πολύ σημαντικό το θέμα της συναισθηματικής εμπλοκής του ακροατηρίου”.


23 Lignadis (2019) 35 “συμπάσχωστ ἀπὸ πάθη σας,” an addition to the script by the translator to stress the meaning of the existing line in the original, v. 58.


need. In modern Greek, too, οίκτος has the meaning of “the feeling of sympathy towards somebody who suffers or is in an unpleasant, disturbing condition.”

Still in modern Greek, the word λύπη (sadness) is commonly used to express not only sadness and emotional pain but also compassion and sympathy, a sense close to pity. These nuances are subtle, and bear, I believe, on the way the director translator viewed the modern production.

The composer of the music of the modern Greek production, Minos Matsas, shares the views of the director and the translator about Oedipus’ character and story. In my interview with him, I asked what feelings he wanted to communicate with his music to the spectators, and whether those feelings were different in each stasimon, depending on the action in the act that preceded it. Matsas responded that his music followed the dramaturgical evolution of the play and it extended the action musically. Sophocles himself, in the text, gives the instruction, the suggestion, for the style of lyric parts, which change according to the meaning of the text.

The composer did not use any particular modern music style in composing the music of the play. However, as he said, as part of his family heritage – he hails from Epirus, a region of northwest Greece – sounds of Greek folk music and lamentations that are popular there might have played a role, subconsciously, while he was composing the music, especially in the fourth stasimon and in the exodos. For the fourth stasimon the translator notes: ‘having as an example the fate of Oedipus, the chorus contemplates with sadness the variability of fate and the instability of human beings. His song is an anthem and a lament for the tragic greatness of Oedipus.’ Matsas stressed that the main emotion that he wanted to convey in in this stasimon was compassion (συμπόνια) for Oedipus’ fate and downfall. In this stasimon the chorus sang like a church choir, performing together a song which was reminiscent of a formal lamentation. Their instruments were placed on the ground.
So much for the views of the director, translator, and composer of the modern version, which sought to be faithful to the original, even to the extent of retaining some verses in classical Greek, but at the same time was intended to affect emotionally a public that was accustomed, perhaps, to over-intellectualizing their response to tragedy, especially a famous one often studied in school. Besides, there was the concern that the very terminologies for the emotions in modern and ancient Greek, which at first blush look so similar, carry different meanings, with ancient pity or \textit{eleos} shading into compassion or empathy, very different values in respect to audience response. How, then, did the spectators at the modern production themselves react, and how did they describe the emotions that the performance elicited in them? As I indicated above, I and my team distributed questionnaires at both shows, which took place on successive days on the 12th and 13th of July; 700 were distributed in total of which we collected 365 as the spectators left the theatre (it is worth noting that it was dark by this time). The number of the questionnaires to be distributed was agreed upon in advance with the Ephorate of Antiquities of Argolida, under whose jurisdiction the Epidaurus theatre lies. The total number of the spectators who attended the two shows was approximately 18,000, with slightly larger attendance on the second evening than on the first. The seating capacity of the Epidaurus theatre is today approximately 11,000.

A single A4 printed sheet included on either side the questionnaire in Greek and English. The questionnaire itself briefly informed the spectators about the project, entitled \textit{“Audience emotional response to Ancient Greek Drama”}, and explained its purpose. We posed only three questions. The first asked the gender of the spectator. The second question was: “What is your emotional reaction to the Oedipus’ story, as presented in this production?” Appended below this question was a list of common emotional terms, including pity, anxiety, relief, sympathy, hatred, envy, sadness love, fear, and shame; the last box simply read “other,” which the respondent could fill in at will. The third question was: “What provoked your emotional response?” Here too we offered several possibilities, include Oedipus’ story, the directing, the character, the acting, the plot, the staging, or (again) something else, to be filled in by the respondent. The spectators could tick more than one emotion and more than one cause for their emotions. Finally, there was a space at the end of the questionnaires for additional comments. Of the responses that were collected after the show, 60 were in English and 305 in Greek; in both cases, more women than men responded.

The ranking of the emotions (by number of times ticked) in the English results is as follows: sadness, sympathy, pity, anxiety, love, relief, fear, shame, hatred, envy and, in the category ‘other’, horror, remorse, resignation to fate, justice and
interest. The order of the causes of the emotional reactions was: Oedipus’ story, the acting, the staging/costumes, directing, plot, characters, and finally music. The ranking of the emotions in the Greek results are as follows: οίκτος-pity, λύπη-pity/sadness, συμπάθεια-sympathy, αγωνία-anxiety, αγάπη-love, φόβος-fear, and in the category “other,” δέος-awe, συμπόνια-compassion, θλίψη-sorrow, αδυναμία-weakness, οργή-anger, βαθύς πόνος-deep pain, όνειδος/ντροπή-shame. The order of the causes of the emotional reaction was: Oedipus’ story, the acting, directing, plot, characters, staging/costumes, music, and the modern Greek translation. As we see, the responses varied to some extent between the native Greek speakers and those who responded in English. The modern Greek emotional responses are more diverse, and in many cases pity-οίκτος appears not only on its own but also together λύπη-pity/sadness, συμπάθεια-sympathy and αγάπη-love. To some extent the difference doubtless reflects the fact that the Greek audience was responding directly to the language of the play, while those who responded in English chiefly followed the English subtitles that were provided. Given this difference, as well as the relatively small sample of English responses, no conclusions can be drawn as to this distinction.

But what about the comparison between the collective responses of the modern audience and the emphasis on pity and fear that we have seen in the ancient Greek sources, and also in the interpretations of the play by some modern scholars? Can we say that there has been a shift in the emotional landscape between ancient and modern times? Here, we enter a caveat that is unavoidable at this early stage of the investigation: any statistics drawn from the sample are wholly provisional, given not only the relatively small numbers but also the absence, necessarily, of controls concerning the conditions under which the responses were solicited. This was not a laboratory environment, and we recognize as well that the audience at such a performance is not representative of modern Greek society at large. Also, the scales were in a sense loaded by the preselection of emotions listed. But there are nevertheless certain cues in the tables we have drawn up (two sample tables are reproduced in the appendix) as to patterns of emotional reaction to the tragedy, and these are informative of possible distinctions between the ancient and the modern Greek emotional repertoires and habits of expression. I thus present some tentative observations, which I hope will be a spur to further research in this area and, more broadly, to a more systematic comparison between the emotional vocabularies of ancient and modern Greece.

Pity and fear seem to retain their primacy among the responses to the Oedipus tragedy, but nuances suggest some distinctions. As we have noted, pity shades into sympathy, in both the English and the Greek responses. Whereas Aristotle understood pity to require a certain distance from the suffering person,
empathy implies rather identification: the stress is on feeling what the character in the drama feels, rather than feeling something in response to the other’s condition. Fear too emerges prominently in the questionnaires, but it is often paired with anxiety or pain, and suggests a kind of nervousness in the face of another’s misfortune, rather than the sense that the fate of the protagonist represents the kind of existential catastrophe to which we are all vulnerable – which I take to be at the heart of Aristotle’s understanding of this emotion in relation to tragedy.31 Shame, hatred, and envy are low on the scale. When it comes to the eliciting causes of the emotions, Oedipus’ story stands out, followed by aspects of dramaturgy: this is very much in line with Aristotle’s account, but there is one hitch in the way that the questionnaire was formulated that will require further clarification. This is the fact that among the causes of emotional response were listed both “Oedipus’ story” and “plot,” and it may be that an insufficient distinction was perceived between these two categories. Much more work is needed to flesh out these preliminary soundings into a full analysis.

One final point: the chapters in this book triangulate among three languages: classical Greek, classical Chinese, and English, the language in which all the entries are written (one chapter, by John Kirby, also deals with classical Sanskrit). But another language lay implicitly in the background, and that is modern Chinese, the native tongue of many of the contributors. The organizers of the original workshop believed that there should be at least one contribution by a native speaker of modern Greek, as a way of highlighting the inevitable interference that centuries and indeed millennia in the history of a language produce. There has been some recent work on the Byzantine Greek emotional vocabulary, and efforts, still in their infancy, to compare it with the classical language.32 Necessarily, such studies are text based. The method adopted in this chapter makes use of different instruments and test conditions. These will be refined as I continue my research in this area. For now, I am pleased to have had the opportunity to bring modern Greek too into the cross-cultural dialogue on Greek and Chinese emotions.

31 See Konstan (2020).
Appendix

a. The questionnaire in Greek and English

ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΟΛΟΓΙΟ για Επιστημονική Έρευνα:
«Οι συναισθηματικές αντιδράσεις των θεατών σε σύγχρονες παραστάσεις αρχαίου δράματος»

Αγαπητοί θεατές,

Σας παρακαλούμε να μας βοηθήσετε στην έρευνά μας, αφιερώνοντας λίγα λεπτά από το χρόνο σας, για να συμπληρώσετε ανώνυμα το ερωτηματολόγιο που ακολουθεί, αφού έχετε παρακολουθήσει την παράσταση. Τα αποτελέσματα του ερωτηματολογίου θα χρησιμοποιηθούν μόνο για ακαδημαϊκή έρευνα, με θέμα τα συναισθήματα που προκαλούν στους θεατές σύγχρονες παραστάσεις αρχαίου δράματος. Η βοήθεια σας θα εκτιμηθεί. Παρακαλείστε να παραδώσετε το συμπληρωμένο ερωτηματολόγιο κατά την έξοδό σας στη μέλη της ομάδας μας, που θα βρίσκονται έξω από το θέατρο και θα φορούν χαρακτηριστικές κορδέλες με την ένδειξη ΟΙΔΙΠΟΔΑΣ. Αν δεν ενδιαφέρεστε να συμπληρώσετε το ερωτηματολόγιο, παρακαλούμε να το πάρετε μαζί σας και να το αφήσετε στον κοντινότερο κάδο απορριμάτων, έξω από το θέατρο. Αγαπάμε και προστατεύουμε το περιβάλλον και τα μνημεία μας.

Σας ευχαριστούμε

Οι ερευνητές: Δρ. Σταυρούλα Κυρίτση (Πανεπιστήμιο του Λονδίνου), Καθηγητής David Konstan (Πανεπιστήμιο Νέας Υόρκης, Τμήμα Κλασικών Σπουδών)

ΑΡΧΑΙΟ ΘΕΑΤΡΟ ΕΠΙΔΑΥΡΟΥ «ΟΙΔΙΠΟΔΑΣ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΣ» σε σκηνοθεσία Κωνσταντίνου Μαρκουλάκη (12 και 13 Ιουλίου 2019)

- **ΦΥΛΟ** (Παρακαλώ επιλέξτε ανάλογα)
  □ Άνδρας □ Γυναίκα □ Άλλο

- Ποια είναι η συναισθηματική σας αντίδραση στην ιστορία του Οιδίποδα, όπως παρουσιάστηκε στην παράσταση; (Παρακαλώ επιλέξτε ένα ή περισσότερα συναισθήματα)
  □ Οίκτος □ Συμπάθεια □ Δύπη □ Αγωνία
  □ Φόβος □ Μίσος □ Αγάπη □ Όνειδος/Ντροπή
  □ Ανακούφιση □ Φθόνος/Ζήλεια □ 'Αλλο (παρακαλώ αναφέρετε τι συγκεκριμένα;)

- Τι προκάλεσε την παραπάνω συναισθηματική σας αντίδραση; (Παρακαλώ επιλέξτε μία ή περισσότερες απαντήσεις)
  □ Η ιστορία του Οιδίποδα □ Οι χαρακτήρες του έργου
QUESTIONNAIRE for the Research Project:

“Audience emotional response to Ancient Greek Drama”

Dear Spectators,

Please assist us in our academic research project by taking a few moments to fill out, anonymously, this questionnaire after viewing the show. The results of the questionnaire will be used only for academic research, in connection with our project concerning audience emotional responses to modern productions of ancient Greek drama. Your assistance will be greatly appreciated. You are kindly requested to hand in the completed questionnaire to members of our team, who will be standing outside the theatre and wearing sashes with the indication ΟΙΔΙΠΟΔΑΣ (OEDIPUS). If you are not interested in filling out the questionnaire, please take it with you and drop it in the nearest rubbish bin outside the theatre. We love and protect our environment and our monuments.

Thank you

The researchers: Dr Stavroula Kiritsi (University of London), Professor David Konstan (Classics Department, New York University)

ANCIENT THEATRE OF EPIDAURUS “OEDIPUS THE KING” directed by Konstantinos Markoulakis
(12 and 13 July 2019)

– GENDER (Please tick your answer)
  □ Male    □ Female    □ No answer

– What is your emotional reaction to the Oedipus’ story, as presented in this production?
  (Please tick one or more options)
  □ Pity      □ Sympathy   □ Sadness   □ Fear
  □ Anxiety   □ Hatred     □ Love      □ Shame
  □ Relief    □ Envy       □ Other (please indicate)

– What provoked your emotional response?
  (Please tick one or more options)
  □ Oedipus’ story □ The characters □ The plot
  □ The directing □ The acting     □ The staging/ costumes
  □ Something else (please indicate)

Any additional comments:
(b) Tables with the results of two questions in English and Greek. The questions are the same in both languages: What is your emotional reaction to the Oedipus’ story, as presented in this production?
References


What is an emotion? In what ways can emotional experience be perceived and expressed? Are emotions the same, or at least similar, for us as they are for people elsewhere on the planet? Have they always been the same, or at least similar, throughout the history of our species? Is it possible to analyze emotional experience logically? How would such an analysis be conceived and structured?

These are just some of the questions that have inspired the writing of this essay. By their very nature, they require us to expand our horizons beyond the ease of simple paradigms and the familiarity of received ideas. Their anthropological complexity challenges us to look beyond the bounds of the culture we call our own, to move beyond the comforting simplicity of monocultural analysis. Their interrogation of time as well as of space prompts us, moreover, to reach as far back into the past as we possibly can in search of relevant evidence.

Such a project calls for patience and stamina. It also requires the juggling of multiple competences, including the ability to read and evaluate texts in various languages, ancient as well as modern. Where germane, artefacts of material culture should be adduced as well.

My own professional training as a classicist prepared me, to some extent, for such comparative work. Because “classics” in the West was historically disciplinized in such a way as to focalize the cultures of ancient Greece and Rome, it is already essentially comparative in nature. But classics, as an occidental scholarly discipline, runs the risk of privileging the Greek and Latin canons to the exclusion of all others. To do the work proposed here, we must be prepared to cast our nets more widely: to undertake the study of what I have elsewhere called “comparative classics.”¹ My hope is that this kind of cross-cultural study will foster mutual interest, and even collaborative research, among disciplines that increasingly suffer from the pervasive siloization of the modern academy.

¹ Kirby (2016).
I myself was surprised by some of what I discovered in the course of this research. Some of my readers may share my surprise, particularly if they begin from the assumption that experiencing emotions is a purely personal, individual, and above all private event. Now each person surely experiences emotions, first and foremost, on an individual and personal level; but we shall observe that our ancient authors were especially interested in what one might call the shared emotions: that is, how emotions are elicited, felt, and dealt with, in public and societal contexts – and this, above all, as it occurs in ritual or ceremonial events.  

To engage in a cognitive assessment of the emotions is a curious enterprise. It requires that we think analytically about experiences that seem fundamentally non-analytic, non-rational, if not indeed irrational. And yet not to do so is to risk living what Plato’s Socrates called the “unexamined life.”

Once we have embarked on this investigation, many more questions arise. For a classicist like myself, some of these will be: “How did the ancients express their experience of emotions?”; “How did the ancients analyze the emotions?”; “What connections – and disconnects – can we discover among varying ancient cultures’ analyses of the emotions?”; “What can those texts – for we must rely chiefly on texts – tell us about their similarities to (and differences from) one another?”; and, of course, “What can those texts tell us about our own similarities to (and differences from) the peoples of various ancient cultures?”

Modern empirical research has, as it happens, tended to affirm that emotions may be “shared” (or, to use a currently-fashionable metaphor, “contagious”): e.g. Schoenewolf (1990), Hatfield et al. (1994), Kiuru (2012), Sampson et al. (2018). This has also been studied in terms of cognitive “mirroring” (Bastaansen et al. [2009]). There is evidence that shared (or communally-felt) emotions can increase bonding, particularly where the so-called “negative” emotions are involved (Bosson et al. [2006]). All of this has powerful implications for Aristotle’s fundamentally rhetorical examination of how a rhetor may go about eliciting specific emotions in his or her audience – or how a playwright (via the actors onstage) may do the same in the course of a dramatic performance.

We cannot be completely sure of the nature of animal experiences. It seems reasonable to infer, however, that animals feel emotions as much as humans do, and perhaps in similar ways, although there are dissenting voices on the subject. Anyone who has seen a dog expressing joy when her human comes home, or fear when she hears fireworks exploding, knows what I mean. What perhaps no other animal does except for *homo sapiens*, however, is to analyze the emotions. If dogs are engaging in this philosophical pursuit, they are not letting on to their biped colleagues. It is, at base, a cognitive assessment of the affective experience. Such cognitive assessments can be done in a variety of ways: the psychological, the anthropological, the sociological, even the linguistic.

But what interests me here is the philosophical approach to analyzing the emotions. For one thing, it operates supremely in the realm of intellection. For another, the process of philosophical analysis is fully capable of integrating all those other modes of assessment just named.

In order to undertake the sort of comparative analysis I described above, I have selected portions of acknowledged “classics” from three sources: the ancient Greek-speaking world; the Sanskritic culture of the Indian subcontinent; and ancient China. Five major texts are explored here: the *Philebus* of Plato; the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* of Aristotle; the नाट्यशास्त्र *Nāṭyaśāstra* or “Treatise on Drama/Dance” ascribed to Bharatamuni; and the 禮運 “Lìyùn” portion of the early Confucian 禮記 *Lìjì* or “Record of Rites.” There will also be cameo appearances by other texts from each of those cultures, where these can shed light on our inquiry.

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4 Although Martha Nussbaum addresses, in nuanced fashion, a broad array of questions relevant to this, in Nussbaum (2001) 89–138.
5 The degree (and even the kind) of similarity is a matter of debate: see e.g. Fortenbaugh (1975) 67–70, Sorabji (1993), Sihvola (1996), Fortenbaugh (2002) 94 and n. 1. The Stoics and other ancient Greek thinkers flatly denied that animals have emotions in the strict sense of the term.
6 A few decades ago we might have said, a left-brain assessment of a right-brain experience, though that now seems to oversimplify the function of the human brain hemispheres.
7 By which I mean, the Hellenic cultures of the Classical period. Already by the Hellenistic era the material is much proliferated – and the topic is considerably more vexed.
1 The Greeks

1.1 Plato

Obviously we could take this investigation much farther back in time than Plato: back through the Presocratics, back to early poets such as Homer\(^8\) and Hesiod, Sappho and Pindar. But that would be a whole massive study unto itself, requiring a different approach: the primary material for emotions in the pre-Platonic period is substantial, but for the most part it expresses or depicts emotions rather than theorizing them – which makes it very different from the texts examined here. In the present context, my reasons for focusing on Plato are three: because he was Aristotle’s teacher; because he formulates an approach to the emotions that explicitly lays the groundwork for Aristotle’s treatment in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*; and, of course, because he was Plato.\(^9\)

Plato does not offer a comprehensive theory of the emotions. He does, however, recur to the topic repeatedly, and his recurrent treatments sketch out some characteristics of emotions that permit the reader to infer something like a theory. Two of these characteristics that shape Plato’s thinking about the emotions are: [1] the relation of body to psukhê, and [2] the relation of pleasure and pain.

Plato, we are told, wrote dithyrambs and tragedies in his youth.\(^10\) If that is true, he early gained practical experience in the literary expression and stimulation of the emotions. After his conversion to philosophy, under the charismatic tutelage of Socrates, he turned to the writing of philosophic dialogues, sometimes in actual script format, and his characters not only experience emotions: they also discuss them, and indeed subject them to intense and extensive scrutiny. In Plato’s literary world, emotions are expressions or functions of the psukhê – that untranslatable word that some render by “soul,” some by “spirit,” some by “inner consciousness,” some even by “self,” but which remains for all that untranslatable.\(^11\) What we can say is that, for the Greeks, it is the inner core of one’s being, and also that in Socratic as in Pythagorean dualism, the psukhê is

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\(^8\) The very first word in the *Iliad* – arguably the oldest extant document in Greek literature – is μῆνιν: “anger, wrath, rage.” At the other end of the poem, book 24 includes the unforgettable scene of Achilles weeping with Priam.

\(^9\) I think especially of Alfred North Whitehead’s famous saying, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead [1978] 39).

\(^10\) Diogenes Laertius 3.6.

\(^11\) The transliteration “psyche” would itself be a highly attractive solution, but it brings with it the enormous complicating freight of Freudian theory.
distinct (if not wholly separate) from the physical body.\textsuperscript{12} As with all “Socratic” doctrines, it is not entirely clear whether Plato embraces this concept completely; but he does find fodder for discussion in the suggestion.

Whatever Plato’s own conception of the relation of body to psukhê, his Socrates clearly sees them as functioning together and sharing some common concerns. Among the latter are pleasure and pain; and it is in these terms that Plato addresses the experience of the emotions, in a famous passage of the \textit{Philebus}. An overarching concern in this dialogue, as in so many of Plato’s, is the human good: what is entailed in the best sort of life for us? Here, the issue is raised of the relation of pleasure to the good. Socrates addresses the question of “mixed” emotions, which may be mixed in two ways: mixed, as experienced both in the body and in the psukhê;\textsuperscript{13} and mixed, as in both pleasurable and painful.

As is his wont, Plato illustrates this highly abstruse schema with homely down-to-earth examples that bring his ideas into sharp focus for us. His example of the \textit{summeikton pathos}\textsuperscript{14} (“mixed emotion”) is scratching an itch (\textit{Philebus} 46a): the itch may in itself be “painful,” in the sense of “unpleasant”; but the scratching of it is an undeniable pleasure: the overall \textit{pathos}, “experience” or “feeling,”\textsuperscript{15} is thus \textit{summeikton} (mixed). Some of these “mixed” experiences involve the body alone; some involve the psukhê alone; some involve both, and are “mixed” in this regard as well (46b-c). Like a physician in search of a diagnosis, like a speculative thinker sussing out first principles, Plato’s Socrates seeks both to understand and to articulate the operation of pain and pleasure – above all, pleasure – upon the human psukhê.

The specifically antithetical structure of the experience of pleasure and pain, and of their application across bodily as well as psychic contexts, is a profoundly Greek approach, harking back to the Hippocratic corpus (hot and cold, wet and dry) and to Presocratic thinkers such as Empedocles (the opposing forces of Attraction and Repulsion, acting upon the four elements – Earth, Air, Fire, and Water – to produce results in combinatory ways). For all that, it is by no means an \textit{exclusively} Greek approach – indeed there is at least as much

\textsuperscript{12} See e.g. Plato \textit{Gorgias} 493a, and Dillon (1996) 149.

\textsuperscript{13} Hackforth (1945) 61 maintains that Plato’s “real belief” is spelt out at \textit{Republic} 9. 584c, “most of the so-called pleasures that reach the psukhê through the body, as well as the most intense ones are of this form: they are some kind of relief from pain.”

\textsuperscript{14} Accepting the emendation proposed in Hackforth (1945) 90 n. 1. The MSS have \textit{σύμμεικτον . . . κακόν} at 46a 13.

\textsuperscript{15} An older translation for \textit{pathos} is “affection,” i.e. a condition of being \textit{affected} by something. This usage now approaches the quaint, and risks confusion with other more common applications of the word. It is still championed by A. W. Price (2010) 121 and will be understood without hesitation by professional philosophers. The variant “affect” has been reclaimed for the more recent approach known as Affect Theory; see e.g. Gregg/Seigworth (2010).
reason to call it a “profoundly Chinese approach,” seen in everything from the 阴阳 yin/yáng distinction to, as we shall see, their categorization of the human emotions – but we may certainly depend upon the schema to guide us through much of Greek literature, including Plato.

At 47e Socrates makes a casual list⁶ of emotions that register as pains within the psukhê itself: anger (orgê), fear (phobos), longing (pothos), mourning (thrênos), love (erôs), jealousy (zêlos), malice (phthonos), “and the like” (kai hosa toiauta). The last phrase is clear indication that the list is meant to be exemplorum gratia, not exhaustive. But what is particularly interesting about Socrates’ list is that he locates all of these “within the psukhê itself” (autês tês psukhês) – not as being mixed as to body/psukhê; and this despite our awareness that most of them certainly manifest somatic epiphenomena, such as raised temperature, flushing, agitation, and what we would now identify as elevated blood pressure. Even more curious is that he does find all of them mixed as to pain/pleasure, as he remarks in his very next question: “And don’t we find that they are full of remarkable pleasures?” He goes on to cite two famous lines from the Iliad (18.108–109),

καὶ χόλος, ὃς τ᾽ ἐφέηκε πολύφρονα περ χαλεπήναι,
δὲς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοι

khôlos [anger], which can provoke even the thoughtful person,¹⁸ and which is much sweeter than honey dripping down . . .

Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is that he goes on immediately to observe the mixed nature of emotions in theater-goers who have viewed performances of tragedy and comedy (48a–b). Given how widely cited this passage is, it is perhaps not as well understood as it should be. It bears looking at more closely.

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¹⁶ The list as a constitutive element of these philosophical discussions will recur repeatedly in our discussion here. On the rhetorical idea of lists (and their format), in specific comparison with the format of continuous narrative, see O’Banion (2006).

¹⁷ Of all the words in this list, erôs is perhaps the most resistant to adequate English translation. At base it refers to any intense desire, above all sexual desire, but it is by no means limited to that. I have finally settled, however reluctantly, on “love” as tentative translation here, if only because this English term is itself as slippery and polysemous as the Greek.

¹⁸ Literally, “which can incite even the thoughtful person to khalepênai.” The latter is often translated “to become angry,” which here would be redundant. The root-word is khalepos, which means “difficult, painful, grievous” and can carry a connotation of irksomeness, harshness, or anger. Homer’s noun, not used by Plato, is kholos, “anger,” which is etymologically related to a later word for gall or bile, khôle. If Homer was already thinking – Hippocratically, as it were – about the bodily humors and their effects on the emotions, it would explain why he can posit kholos as what causes even the thoughtful to khalepênai. (kholos and khalepênai are probably not etymologically related, but it seems likely that Homer is capitalizing on the similarity of sound in *khol-/*khal-.)
SOCRATES: And similarly as regards viewers of tragedies, when – even while they are enjoying the performance – they weep, do you recall?

PROTARCHUS: How could I not?

SOCRATES: And as to the disposition of our psukhai when viewing comedies, do you realize that here too there is a mixture of pain and pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: I don’t quite understand.

SOCRATES: Well, it certainly isn’t easy, Protarchus, to understand that our emotional response is always like that in such a situation.

PROTARCHUS: Definitely not easy, at least for me.

This exchange points up several details worth noting, not all of which can be fully addressed in this essay.

First, of course, the mixed nature of these emotions, and the paradoxical quality of that mixture: why do we enjoy (khairontes) watching the portrayal of fearful and piteous events in a tragedy, up to and including representations of cannibalism, incest, or parricide? (Similarly, one might ask today, why do we enjoy being frightened by horror movies?) And – we, like Protarchus, may well be excused for confusion over this – what is there that is painful or sad in comedy (specifically, in this case, Attic Old Comedy)?

Plato wastes no time in recurring to a favorite theme of his: the enduring power of art, and dramatic art above all. For his character Socrates, that power is by no means entirely benign. (It is, as will be remembered, a particular bête noire of his in the Republic, particularly books 2–3 and 10,

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19 Some translators render χαίροντες as “laughing,” which, while an understandable inference, is certainly not what the Greek says. χαίρειν means “rejoice,” and here, something like “enjoy, take satisfaction.”

20 To be fair, most Greek tragedies do not actually show these gruesome events onstage – perhaps by reason of the logistical/technological limitations of the time, as much as for aesthetic considerations. Typically the most horrific turns of plot occur offstage, and are reported to the appalled characters and chorus (and audience) by a messenger of some sort. The Ajax of Sophocles is a notable (shocking) exception in that Ajax’s suicide actually occurs onstage.

21 For more on this broad topic, see e.g. Nuttall (1996), Destrée (2014), Liebert (2017).
though it is revisited more optimistically – later in his writing career – in book 2 of the *Laws.* This lays the groundwork for further philosophical discussion of the nature and function of the emotions in aesthetic response.

- Despite the suspect stature of dramatic *mimēsis,* at least in the estimation of Plato’s Socrates, the *Philebus* is itself presented, precisely, in the form of a play-script.
- The discussion of the emotions is oriented specifically to a context of pleasure and pain.
- The ease with which we invoke the phrase “emotional response” should not dull us to the fact that it is indeed seen here as a *response* to some stimulus. The common word for “emotion” in classical Greek, used here, is πάθος *pathos* (which has the related form, πάθημα *pathêma*). This root *path-* is notionally the opposite of *prax-*; as praxai means “to do” something, so pathein means “to have something done to” one – i.e., “to undergo” or “experience” something.22 Here, as throughout, the binary/antithetical nature of the schema is constitutive of the conventional categories invoked. It is Plato who attempts to break the binary by adding a third (“mixed”) category, although this too turns out to be binary, indeed doubly so: painful/pleasurable and body/psukhê.
- As William Fortenbaugh points out,23 Plato gives indication in this text that he is aware of a cognitive dimension to the emotions – but leaves that unclear.

All but the first of those points set the stage for the ways in which Aristotle will, in turn, address the psukhê and the emotions – in his psychological works, in ethics, and in poetics and rhetoric. Without pretending to have plumbed the depths of Plato’s treatment here, which is fraught with implications for perhaps all his other dialogues, it is to Aristotle that we now turn.

### 1.2 Aristotle

Whether or not we are aware of this, our very notion of “philosophical” in the West is largely still shaped by the approach used, and to a great extent codified,

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22 The now-archaic locution “What hast thou done and suffered?” reflects these two meanings. An example of their explicit pairing occurs at *Poetics* 9, 1451b 11, τι Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπραξεν ἢ τι ἐπαθεν.

23 Fortenbaugh (1975) 10–11.
by Aristotle in his “esoteric” works.\textsuperscript{24} He is happy to ponder, scrutinize, and investigate just about anything he finds in the phenomenal universe – be it metaphysics, ethics, politics, respiration, or the movement of animals – and in each case he is typically most interested in what he calls the τί ἦν εἶναι ti ên einai of a thing. We may (very) roughly render this odd phrase as “essential nature,” although it is not even close to that grammatically. And while we may in this post-postmodern era question, or embrace, or jettison entirely, the concept of “essences,” we must nonetheless acknowledge that such a concept is not only squarely Aristotelian, but important even today to a great portion of humanity. All of us, no matter what our philosophical leanings, yearn at one point or another to know what something “truly” is – what it “turns out to be” (ti ên einai) upon careful examination.\textsuperscript{25}

Aristotle’s indefatigable zest for philosophical investigation extended to all aspects of human existence, including the emotions. These come under discussion in a number of his extant writings, notably the \textit{Rhetoric} and \textit{Poetics}. We shall look anon at his treatment of the emotions in those texts. But first, we should consider how he situates the emotions within the \textit{psukhê} – a word that is, as I have noted, essentially untranslatable.\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Psukhê} is absolutely what Raymond Williams might have called a “keyword” for Aristotle.\textsuperscript{27} This is not surprising, as by Aristotle’s time it already had a long lineage, back to Homer’s \textit{Iliad} and doubtless much

\textsuperscript{24} The “esoteric” (or “acroamatic”) works of Aristotle were those that were intended for use by his students in the Lyceum, as opposed to the so-called exoteric works, which were published – in dialogue format – for reading by a larger public. The latter survived for several hundred years, and indeed Aristotle’s impressive reputation as a prose stylist was founded upon them. Eventually the exoteric works were discarded, perhaps on a misunderstanding of the term “esoteric” as referring to a secret doctrine; no copies of them appear to survive today. The writings modern readers think of as the “works of Aristotle” are thus the esoteric.

\textsuperscript{25} The use of ἐν in this sense was already, it seems, an idiom in classical Attic Greek; it occurs with this meaning in the opening words of Book 2 of Plato’s \textit{Republic}: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταύτα εἰπὼν ὁμιλήσας: τὸ δ’ ἦν ἀρά, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον (“So, having said this, I thought I was done with the conversation, which was, however, as it turned out, just an opener,” 357a 1–2); similarly cf. also Book 4, 436c 1; Book 10, 609b 5; and Sophocles \textit{Trachiniae} 1172. See Adam (1962) 1.65 ad 357a 2.

\textsuperscript{26} On the topic see e.g. Wilkes (1992). The problem, in fine, is that no English word maps the semantic field of \textit{psukhê} exactly. (Wilkes’s solution is to leave it untranslated, as in fact I also do for the most part here.)

There are other Greek words for Aristotle’s concept of “mind,” notably \textit{nous}, but for Aristotle \textit{nous} is principally a function or operation of the \textit{psukhê}. Another term related to \textit{nous}, namely \textit{dianoia}, is his word in the \textit{Poetics} for “thought”; sometimes \textit{nous} is actually used more or less as a synonym for \textit{dianoia}, as in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}. There is a sizeable bibliography on \textit{nous}, much of it building on foundations laid by Kurt von Fritz and Bruno Snell in the 1940s: Fritz (1943), Fritz (1945), Fritz (1946), (1964), Snell (1953 [originally 1946]).

\textsuperscript{27} Williams (1976).
further. Like *pneuma*, the Greek word we typically translate as “spirit,” *psukhê* has a connection with breath and breathing: indeed in Homer’s day *psukhê* meant something almost like “life-force,” reflecting its relationship to the verb *psukhein*, which has to do with the moving of air (thus “blow” or “dry out”). So, unsurprisingly, *psukhê* is fundamental to Aristotle’s anthropology. To understand how Aristotle conceived the structure and behavior of the *psukhê*, we turn in particular to two documents: *On the Psukhê*, better known by a Latin title, *De Anima*; and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, one of Aristotle’s best-known works.

The *De Anima* begins by affirming that the *psukhê* is ὁ οἷον ἀρχή τῶν ζῴων – *hoion arkhê tôn zôiôn*, “the arkhê, so to speak, of living beings” (*De Anima* 1.1, 402a 8–9). Now arkhê is the simple Greek word for “beginning” or “start”; but for the Presocratic philosophers, for Plato, and then for Aristotle, arkhê is something of a technical term for a “first principle”: a thing from which other things originate and flow. This in itself signals the scope of the project entailed in a study of *psukhê*. Moreover, by using the term ζῷον, “living beings,” rather than ἄνθρωπον, “human beings,” Aristotle extends the primacy – and arguably the causal or creative capacity – of *psukhê* to the sphere of all life.

Aristotle had inherited from Plato a tripartite map of the *psukhê*. This is encountered in Book 4 of Plato’s *Republic*, where Plato’s Socrates divides the *psukhê* into the appetitive portion (ἐπιθυμητικόν *epithumêtikon*); the “spirited” portion (θυμοειδές *thumoeides*); and the intellect or rational portion (λογιστικόν *logistikon*). In *De Anima* 2.3, by contrast, Aristotle offers a five-fold map of the *psukhê*: its five parts include

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28 Cf. the *hanzi* 氣 *qi*, which is the Chinese word for “vital energy,” and which originates in a pictogram of steam rising from a bowl of rice.

29 I am setting aside the treatment of related material in the *Magna Moralia*, as the Aristotelian authorship of that treatise has been seriously called into question. We shall touch briefly on the *Eudemian Ethics* below.

30 Plato’s character Timaeus also propounds a bipartite division of the World Soul (at *Timaeus* 35b ff.), based on the binary distinction of “self” and “other,” but the language of that passage is profoundly mystical, and the topic is really cosmology rather than human psychology. The tripartite division is almost always the one cited as “Plato’s” conceptualization of the *psukhê*. See (among many others) Burnyeat (2006).

31 See e.g. *Republic* 439–441. In this model, the *psukhê* is first laid out – in traditional binary fashion – as structured in rational/irrational faculties, which is rounded out by a tertium quid: the “spirited” portion. Another tripartite division, roughly analogous to what is found in the *Republic*, is offered by Plato in his famous imagery of the charioteer and his two horses at *Phaedrus* 246a–254e.
the nutritive faculty (*to threptikon*, i.e. *threpsis*), which is the capacity “to take nourishment” (2.2, 413a 30);
- perception (*to aisthétikon*, i.e. *aisthēsis*);
- desire or appetite (*to orektikon*, i.e. *orexis*);
- movement (*to kinētikon*, i.e. *kinēsis*); and
- thought (*to dianoêtikon*, i.e. *dianoia*).

These five faculties or *dunameis* – literally “powers” or “capacities” – function in response to the cumulative intake of the five senses (as is further indicated in the extended discussion of the senses, at *De Anima* 2.7–12). Of particular interest to our discussion here are perception (*aisthēsis*) and movement (*kinēsis*), and the connection they share. In this passage Aristotle takes the time to underscore the passive nature of *aisthēsis* specifically, before discussing each of the five senses in turn, and to define it in terms of *kinēsis*: “As has been said, *aisthēsis* consists in being moved [*toi kineisthai*] and in undergoing experience/being acted upon [*paskhein*, a verbal form of *pathos*]; for it appears to be a sort of alteration/change of state [*alloiôsis*].” (*De Anima* 2.5, 416b 33–35). That last point highlights the role of *kinēsis* as closely related to – in some ways a species of, in

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32 The relevant Greek verb may, as in English, be transitive – *kinein* is to “move” something, *kineisthai* (passive) is to “be moved” – or intransitive (*kineisthai*, in the middle voice, is to “move about,” perhaps as a sort of reflexive: to move oneself).

33 The list in *De Anima* 2.2 omits *to orektikon* (*orexis*). This may be the result of a scribal error in the copying of an earlier manuscript; or it may be that Aristotle’s list in 2.3 was written at a later date, at which point *to orektikon* was added. In this analysis of *psukhê*, Aristotle purports to cover all living beings – for example, plants are said only to have the nutritive faculty – but the human organism is clearly seen as being at the apex of the class of *zôia*, living beings. The five-part list reappears in 3.9–10, with the addition of a sixth item whose importance can hardly be overstated: the addition of *phantasia*, “imagination.” On the interpretive issues raised by latter, see the lucid essay of Schofield (2011), building on the landmark studies by Nussbaum (1978) and Labarrière (2004). Fortenbaugh (2002) 95–103 addresses some important relevant issues as well.

34 The term *dunamis* – assuredly another “keyword” for Aristotle – deserves a book-length treatment unto itself. *Dunamis* is often paired with *energeia*, in the correlate senses of “potential” and “actualization.” *Dunamis* is also the word Aristotle uses in the *Rhetoric*, as part of the definition of rhetoric; there it means “capacity” or “faculty”: the *dunamis* of discovering the available means of persuasion on any given subject (*Rhetoric* 1.2.1, 1355b 26–27). It is interesting that Aristotle lists, in the *De Anima*, neither *rhêtorikê* nor *mimêsis* as *dunameis* of the human *psukhê*, but he does devote an entire separate treatise (the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*) to each – going so far as to assert that *mimêsis* is both natural to humans and peculiar to humans (*Poetics* 4, 1448b 4–9, on which more below).

35 He moreover devotes to *aisthēsis* an entire essay in the *Parwa Naturalia*, “On Perception and Perceptible Objects” (*Περὶ αἰσθῆσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν*), whose title I take to have been the
some cases a metaphor for – change of various kinds. This will prove significant for how Aristotle assesses the experience of the emotions.

Kinēsis itself is a notion of central importance to Aristotle’s system. For him, a great deal about the phenomenal universe can be explained with reference, in one way or another, to kinēsis:36 he goes so far as to describe the godhead as an Unmoved Mover – an entity that causes movement in the universe, but which itself is not moved.37 Now kinēsis and to kinesithai in Greek – like the phrase “to be moved” in English – can have both literal and metaphoric meanings; sometimes, as here in De Anima 2.3, Aristotle will add kata topon, “(movement) as regards place,” when he wants to specify locomotion. But he does not hesitate to use kinēsis in what we might infer is an emotional sense, as at 3.9 (432b 30–433a 1): “it is the heart [kardia] that is moved,” he tells us, not the mind, when stimuli such as fear present themselves; the mind, by contrast, is capable of contemplating something fearful without triggering fear.38

But movement – above all, locomotion – is a faculty in the psukhē that is prompted by the operation of two others: desire (orexis) and thought (nous or to dianoêtikon).39 An example of movement caused by orexis would be going to the cinema because of one’s desire to experience the pleasure of watching a movie. An example of movement caused by to dianoêtikon would be going to the grocery to buy rice, because one knows one does not have enough rice to cook a meal.

We might also add, as Aristotle does not here, that other aspects of the psukhē may be involved in such movements. Aisthēsis, perception, would be involved in both examples just mentioned: when one notices that a certain movie is playing at the local cinema, or that the rice has almost run out. Thus, as modern philosophers since Kant at least have conceptualized the combined input of the five senses, so too we might also speak of the combined activity of these five capacities of the psukhē in Aristotle’s schema. Note too that kinēsis is (here as elsewhere) associated with alloiôsis, “change” or “alteration.” For Aristotle, alloiôsis is not only an important result of kinēsis, but is in fact sometimes its basis of Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility. In this essay as well he examines the senses in some detail.

37 ἔστι τι ὁ οὖ κινομένον κινεῖ (Metaphysics Α [12.7] 1072a 25), one clause in a complex passage of startling and somewhat mysterious beauty.
38 This, we might say, is an example of meta-meta-discourse: a philosopher analyzing the cognitive assessment of the emotions.
39 De Anima 3.10, 433a 10–11.
telos – its “final cause” or goal. We shall have more to say about this with reference to rhetoric and poetics.

The ancient Greeks did not have a unified answer to where (what we might call) the mind is physically situated in the body, though they did have some favorite candidates: the phrên or phrenes, “midriff,” and the kardia or kradiê, “heart.” But Aristotle proposes to map out the functions of the psukhê without resolving this conundrum. He maps them rather differently in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics than in the De Anima, as his purpose in the Ethics is to apply his analysis of the architecture of the psukhê to the living of the best possible life. Here is how he addresses the structure of the psukhê in that context:

αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆ ἐκατέρου, ἢ δ’ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. τρία δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἰσθήσεως νοῦς ὁρέξεις. τούτων δ’ ἢ αἰσθήσεις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως; δὴ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθηθαν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ’ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τούτ’ ἐν ὀρέξει διώξει καὶ φυγῆ: ὃστ’ ἐπειδὴ ἢ ἡθικὴ ἀρετῆ ἐξις προαιρετική, ἢ δὲ προαιρεσις ὁρέξεις βουλευτική, δεὶ διὰ ταύτα μὲν τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁρὲξιν ὀρθῆν, εἶπερ ἢ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν.

This is the excellence of each [part of the psukhê], and the excellence of a thing is relative to its proper function. Now there are three things in the psukhê that control action and truth: sensation, thought, desire. Of these, sensation produces no action; this is plain from the fact that beasts have sensation but no share in action. What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good; and the latter [scil. choice] must pursue just what the former [scil. thinking, reason] asserts. [Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a 17–25]

Aristotle tells us here that there are three things in the psukhê that control action and truth (praxis and alêtheia): “sensation” or “perception” (aisthêsis); “thought” (nous); and “desire” (orexis). No action, he says, originates solely from perception. The possible actions arising from thought are an antithetical pair: affirmation and negation. This dyad is presented as corresponding to the dyad of possible actions arising from desire: pursuit and avoidance. A schematic representation of this text might look something like this (Figure 1):

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40 Epic and lyric Greek have a number of terms for the seat of consciousness (such as kēr and ἔτορ, both terms for “heart”). Some of them are words that, when used in post-Homeric times, shifted somewhat in meaning, such as thumos.
All three of these terms – aisthēsis, nous, and orexis – are familiar from the De Anima. None of them tells us anything about emotions per se. But there is nonetheless a cognitive/affective dimension to this system as laid out in the Ethics: aisthēsis, sense-perception, is itself – like the emotions – a passive experience, but it is related to both thought and desire. Now “desire,” in the sense of orexis, is the basis on which we choose to do or not to do something; the Greek term may entail more intellection than the English term might suggest, but it should be immediately clear that the pursuit or avoidance of a thing – the natural results of orexis – will often be rooted in the data gathered via aisthēsis. And one’s assessment of the advisability of an action – fundamentally an act of nous – will often have an emotional aspect to it. Thus the totality of the emotional experience, which is (to use Aristotle’s phrase at the beginning of On Interpretation) a pathêma of the psukhê, will be rooted in aisthēsis and may issue in orexis, and (in humans at least) may also be subject to the critical analysis of nous.

Returning to the “header,” as it were, of this discussion in Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, we note that Aristotle says that these three things “control action and truth.” One form of “action” might well be kinēsis, “movement,” and another might be threpsis, “nourishment,” the aim of to threptikon. So this schema in the

41 I do not mean to imply here that the relative chronology of the De Anima and Nicomachean Ethics is known. As with the Rhetoric and Poetics, assignment to general periods in Aristotle’s life can be made, but I am almost certain that the esoteric treatises were revised, some perhaps repeatedly, and in some cases with cross-reference to one another. There is still some debate about the relative date of the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, partly due to the three books that they share (EN 5–7 = EE 4–6); on this, and the relative dates of those two treatises, see Kenny (2016). The De Anima does seem to come from Aristotle’s “second Athenian period,” which would make it a work of his late maturity.

42 On Interpretation 1, 16a 8. For a more extended analysis of this key passage in On Interpretation, in the context of Umberto Eco’s Name of the Rose, see Kirby (2000) 32–37.
Ethics actually reflects Aristotle’s five-part map in the De Anima more closely than it might immediately appear to do. It also hints at the way Aristotle appears to understand the connection between cognition and the emotions.

All of the foregoing has been in preparation for looking at Aristotle’s close-range treatment of the emotions in the Poetics and (above all) Rhetoric. Indeed, in preparing to understand the Poetics, which is often terse, sometimes downright crabbed, and in any case incomplete as we currently have it, we are in some ways best equipped by first examining Aristotle’s theory of pathos – emotion – as deployed in rhetoric. This is the case not least because the Poetics itself is conceived and executed in explicitly rhetorical terms: that is, in Aristotle’s view, all the arts – visual, plastic, performing – entail mimēsis, “representation” or “imitation”; and mimēsis is, for Aristotle, fundamentally rhetorical.

The Rhetoric posits that there are three – and only three – pisteis (“arguments” or “modes of persuasion”) that are entekhoi, “within (the province of) the art” of rhetoric. The argument from pathos, i.e. the arousal of emotion in the audience as a mode of persuasion, is one of these; the other two are the

43 The best English translation of the Rhetoric is the second (2007) edition of Kennedy (2007). For the Poetics, I recommend the translations in Janko (1987) and Halliwell et al. (1995) – very different in style and approach, but each superb in its way. The standard Greek editions of the Rhetoric and Poetics are both by Rudolf Kassel ([1965], [1976]). My citations from the Greek of the Poetics and Rhetoric are from Kassel’s editions; English citations from these treatises are taken, or adapted, from the translations of Halliwell and Kennedy respectively.

44 Ancient lists of Aristotle’s works indicate that the Poetics filled not one but two books, or scrolls; and indeed the extant text itself appears to make reference to a second scroll that has not survived. Attempts to reconstruct the lost second book of the Poetics include those by Janko (1984) and Watson (2012). A memorable fictionalization of its rediscovery – in a mediaeval library – is given in Eco (1983).

45 Kirby (1991a).

46 For the purposes of this inquiry I am treating the Rhetoric and Poetics almost as if they were part of the same text. The Poetics presents its topic in quintessentially rhetorical terms; both treatises position the emotions centrally in their respective approaches; and each was clearly revised, after composition, in light of the other treatise. It is interesting and perhaps significant that the mediaeval Alexandrian and Arab philosophers classed both the Rhetoric and Poetics as belonging to the Organon, a post-Aristotelian compilation of Aristotle’s logical works; cf. Walzer (1934), Moraux (1951), and especially Black (1990). The oldest extant example of this approach appears to be Ammonius’ In Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum liber I commentarium 11.22–38 (circa 500 CE); Ammonius classifies the Rhetoric and Poetics as “asyllogistic logic.”

47 An alternative interpretation of the adjective entekhnoi in this context is “imbued with the art [of rhetoric].” Pistis can refer both to the process of persuading and to the resulting state of persuasion.
argument from éthos, the (perceived) good character of the speaker as s/he speaks, and the argument from logos, the explicit application of logic to the matter at hand (Rhetoric 1.2.3–6). In the Rhetoric as in the Poetics, Aristotle indicates that rhetors and playwrights may rely too much – or in the wrong ways – on the power of emotion; so he attempts to redress the balance (especially in the Rhetoric) by underscoring the power of logos. And êthos, “character,” may refer not only to moral traits in a person, but also to the “characters” in a drama. So these three entekhnoi pisteis, “entechnic arguments,” are three of the strong cords that bind the Poetics and the Rhetoric together.

Although Aristotle is at some pains to treat all three of the entekhnoi pisteis equally, there is no disguising his fondness for the argument from logos, or logical inference, which may be inductive (the use of example) or deductive (the use of syllogistic, which in rhetorical contexts he calls “enthymeme”). Indeed the discovery and diagnosis of the syllogism was one of his greatest achievements, and he has a good deal to say about it, in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and of course the Rhetoric. So large does it loom in his entire philosophical system that we may be entitled to partition his taxonomy of the “modes of persuasion” in the Rhetoric a bit further still, adding (as he does not) a division between what we may call the “non-rational” and the “rational” types of entekhnoi pisteis – êthos and pathos being, on the one hand, fundamentally rooted in non-rational responses (though those responses may certainly feed into ratiocination about the situation), and logos, on the other, being, of course, ratiocination par excellence (Figure 2). The point of this distinction, however, is not to suggest that êthos and pathos are actually irrational responses: rather, “non-rational” here is meant to indicate that the ratiocination entailed is not explicit, and perhaps not something of which the audience is conscious, as the rhetor elicits their responses.

Aristotle expresses some dubiety about the ways in which rhetors and playwrights alike depend on the power of pathos. In Rhetoric 1.2.5, he asserts that the contemporary tekhnologountes – the writers of rhetorical handbooks at that time – focus on the arousal of pathos to the exclusion of all else. In Poetics 6 (1450a 33–34), he asserts that it is the muthos, the very plot itself, that is best at “leading the psukhê” – eliciting emotional responses from the audience – and yet, he warns, playwrights are all too prone to rely on the power of opsis, “vision” or “spectacle,” i.e. what we might now call “special effects,” to achieve emotional

48 Lucas (1968) 104 AD loc. makes the startling observation that this use of the word psukhagôgei is “drawn from necromancy,” i.e., it originally referred to the conjuring of spirits. He compares Aeschylus Persians 687.
impact. Opis, he admits, is indeed “emotionally powerful” (psukhagōgikon, 1450b 16), but, at the same time, atekhnos, “completely outside (the province of) the art of poetry.” He could hardly have deprecated it more emphatically.

All the same, it is not the emotions themselves that Aristotle deprecates in poetics. Rather, he seeks to deflate the contemporary value of opis in poetics, as he also does the contemporary value of pathos in rhetoric.

έστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεῖνον ἐκ τῆς ὀδευχὸς γίγνεσθαι, ἕστιν δὲ καὶ εξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡστε τὸν μύθον ὡστε τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἑλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων: ἀπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μύθον. [Poetics 14, 1453b 1–7]

So it is possible for what is fearful and piteous to arise from spectacle, but also from the actual structure of events [sustasis tôn pragmatôn, another term for muthos, “plot”],
which is more important, and the mark of a superior poet. For the plot should be so structured that, even without seeing it performed, one who hears the events [hears them recounted? read?] both shudders [scil. with fear] and feels pity at what happens, as one would feel [an pathoi tis] upon hearing the plot of the Oedipus.  

From Aristotle’s approach to the emotions in the Poetics it is clear is that he sees them as rhetorically very powerful. But he also wants them to be elicited artistically – entechnically, we might say – and not bought cheaply with special effects. As to the specific emotions available to the playwright, he focuses principally on pity and fear, as we see in the celebrated definition of tragedy in Chapter 6:

έστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας [25] καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένω λόγῳ χωρίς ἐκάστοτε τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δὲ ἀπαγγέλλων, δὲ ἔλεου καὶ φόβου περαινούσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. [Poetics 6, 1449b 24–28]

A tragedy, then, is the mimesis of an action52 that is serious,53 complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished [lit. “sweetened” or “seasoned”] by distinct types in its various parts;54 a mimesis of people performing actions [drôntôn] rather than through narrative;55 accomplishing, by means of pity and fear, the katharsis56 of such57 emotions.

51 Presumably the Oedipus the King of Sophocles, one of Aristotle’s favorite plays. But many other Attic playwrights, including Aeschylus and Euripides, composed tragedies on the Oedipus legend.
52 Praxis (“action”) here is synecdochic – or collective – for the whole plot, which is of course a series of actions.
53 Spoudaias, i.e. “noble” or “serious.” Aristotle says that the tragic character should be spoudaios (hence our term “tragic hero”; by extension, the action of a spoudaios is also spoudaia. Cf., by contrast, the term phaulos in the definition of comedy (below).
54 A good example of what I mean by “crabbed” prose. The language is so dense, indeed so opaque, that I infer that this passage (at least) was cobbled together from hurried notes taken by one of Aristotle’s students, not composed by Aristotle himself. Or if he did compose them, these must have been heavily condensed notes from which to lecture, and intended for a later polishing that they never received.

Following Lucas (1968) 97 ad loc., I take Aristotle to mean here that different types of “sweetening” are added to the language, as appropriate, in the various parts of the script: rhythm in the spoken dialogue; rhythm and music in the sung portions.
55 This is a direct riposte to Plato’s Socrates in the Republic, who proposed to ban mimesis entirely from the ideal state, allowing only pure narrative (diégesis) in its place.
56 The topic of katharsis must be one of the bloodiest battlegrounds in all of classical philology. The bibliography is vast. For the moment, I will only say that the major contenders in the battle for translation are “purification,” “purgation,” and “clarification.” (I am setting to one side the explosive assertion in Scott [2018] that the mention of katharsis in the Poetics is not even authentically Aristotelian.)
57 The word for “of such,” toioutôn, is sometimes taken as tantamount to toutôn, “of these,” i.e. pity and fear specifically. The problem is “much-discussed”; Lucas (1968) 98 ad loc., has a lengthy explanation. Just how widely is Aristotle casting his nets here?
An analogous (if less complete) definition of comedy, similarly entailing the arousal of emotions, has already been given in Chapter 5 of the *Poetics*:

*ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστιν ὡσπερ εἶπομεν μῆμις φαιλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πάσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστιν ἀμάρτημα τι καὶ αἰσχρὸς ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἰον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἀνευ ὀδύνης.* [Poetics 5, 1449a 31–37]

Comedy, as we said, is the *mimêsis* of baser but not wholly evil characters; rather, the laughable [to *gelôion*] is only one aspect of the shameful [to *aiskhron*]. For the laughable may be defined as a mistake or occasion of shame [aiskhos] that not painful or destructive: the laughable [i.e. comedic] mask, for example, is something ugly and grotesque, but not painful.

Here as in the definition of tragedy, the focus is on the emotional response of the audience, specifically that of laughter. Like the tragic hero (*Poetics* 13, 1453a 9–10), the typical comic character makes a mistake (*hamartêma*), but its results,

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58 I.e. at Poetics 1448a 17–18, 1448b 26.
59 *Phauloterôn*, “inferior, common, paltry, contemptible”; in characteristic binary antithesis, the comic figure is *phaulos*, as the tragic hero is *spoudaios* (noble).
60 The semantic field of to *aiskhron* includes both “ugly” and “shameful,” and those values are hardly to be pried apart in a context such as this. As such, to *aiskhron* is the binary antithesis of to *kalon*, the “beautiful/good.” These are ordinary classical Greek aesthetic/moral-value terms, but we find them highlighted particularly in texts such as Plato’s *Phaedrus*, where Plato’s Socrates opines – hopes, we might say – that the moral goodness of a person will be evinced by his physical beauty.
61 Aristotle’s term here for “mistake” is *hamartêma*, a close relative of the famous *hamartia* found in *Poetics* 13, 1453a 9–10. In neither case is this a “flaw” of character, as was once sometimes thought; these are actually errors concerning the facts of the matter – and very often errors of personal identity – which issue in either tragic or comic consequences, according to the kind of play in which they occur.
63 *Diestrammenon*, lit. “twisted.”
64 Note my phrase “emotional response,” which is carefully chosen. Janko (1987) 79 ad loc. goes so far as to assert that laughter is itself an emotion: “Laughter is in fact the emotion at which comedy aims, like pity and terror in tragedy.” Cf. Janko (1984) 143–144. (Some might object on the grounds that laughter is a *praxis*, not a *pathos*; but all can presumably agree that laughter is the response to a felt emotion.) We could perhaps be completely certain if we had the now-lost second book of the *Poetics*, which (it seems) treated comedy at greater length (cf. Poetics 1449b 21–22; Rhetoric 1419b 5–6; Janko [1987] 54 boldly attempts a reconstruction of the relevant passage in Poetics book 2). It may be that we should distinguish strongly between *ho gelôs*, scil. laughter *proprement dit*, and to *gelôion*, that which prompts laughter. But the latter is presumably still an external stimulus, not a *pathos* of the *psukhê*.
while they are an *aiskhos* – an occasion of shame – do not result in pain or destruction: hence the audience may take delight in the *mimēsis*, and laugh at the comic character’s foibles.

A 20th-century analogue/example that well illustrates this is the character of Wile E. Coyote in the Looney Tunes “Road Runner” cartoons: he is hurled off cliffs, crushed by giant boulders, caught in TNT explosions – he is humiliated (*aiskhos*)! in every conceivable way – but the results are not (permanently) painful or destructive to him. His escapades are mock-catastrophic, rather than genuinely disastrous, and so the audience feels delight rather than pity or fear.65

Whether the audience’s experience of a comedic performance results in some sort of *katharsis* – and if so, how – we are not explicitly told in the extant torso of the *Poetics*. Would Aristotle say that certain emotions, or types of emotion, are involved in the experience of comic *katharsis*, as are pity and fear in the case of tragic *katharsis*?66 It seems reasonable to think so. In any case, we typically view a comedy in order to be made to laugh. What is the best name for the emotion that prompts laughter as a response?

What we have yet to consider is the fact that emotions are occurring on (at least) two levels in a dramatic performance: not only in the audience, which is the principal concern of the texts we have cited so far from Plato and Aristotle, but also in the *dramatis personae* on the stage. The thoughtful playwright needs to be mindful of these as well, and to portray them skillfully in the script. As they are an integral aspect of one’s own *psukhê*, so too they will be integral dimensions of the creation of the characters in the drama. They must be realistic, and (presuming no derangement of personality) they must also be appropriate to the situations in which the characters find themselves in the play. Aristotle does not discuss this challenge in the *Poetics*, but we may infer it on analogy with his insightful comments on thought in *Poetics* 19.67

Aristotle devotes a substantial portion of the second book of the *Rhetoric* to a catalogue and examination of the emotions a rhetor might seek to arouse. He is not, as we have already seen, a slave to binary taxonomy, but binarism was of

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65 Examples of the hapless coyote’s adventures may be viewed online, e.g. at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aewj-OwcMlo (seen 11.29.2021).
66 On comic *katharsis* see e.g. Janko (1984), Golden (1987) and (1992), Sutton (1994), Kitano (2001). One’s ideas about this will of course depend *in primis* from one’s understanding of what Aristotle meant by the term *katharsis* itself – a mare’s nest we cannot enter here.
67 On this topic see Kirby (1995).
course – then as now – a pervasive way of mentally organizing reality,\textsuperscript{68} so a good deal of his treatment of the emotions is presented in antithetical dyads. The material in \textit{Rhetoric} 2 on the emotions is laid out as follows:

2.1: Importance of the topic; a definition of emotions
2.2-3: [a] Definition of the emotions; [b] ὀργή ὀργê “anger” and πραότης πραοτês “calmness/gentleness”
2.4: φιλία φιλία “love/friendship” and ἔχθρα ἐχθρα “hatred/enmity”
2.5: φόβος φόβος “fear” and θάρσος θάρσος “confidence/courage”
2.6: αἰσχύνη αἰσχύνη “shame” and ἀναισχυντία ἀναισχυντία “shamelessness”
2.7: χάρις κχαρις “gratitude”\textsuperscript{69} and ἀχαριστία ἀχαριστία “unkindness/ingratitude”
2.8-9: ἔλεος ἔλεος “pity” and τὸ νεμέον τὸ νεμέον “indignation”
2.10-11: φθόνος φθόνος “envy” and ζῆλος ζῆλος “emulation”

This is an interesting list in a number of ways, not least because he cannot have imagined it to be exhaustive. George Kennedy surmises that the discussion here may have been inserted into \textit{Rhetoric} 2 from some other (not explicitly rhetorical) context,\textsuperscript{70} perhaps at a later stage of revision, and that does seem possible. Some of the material – for example, that on shamelessness – is, as Kennedy notes, not particularly suited to the needs of an Athenian civic orator. But (as Kennedy does not mention) such material \textit{would} be extremely useful to a tragic or comic playwright, which again points up my connection between the \textit{Rhetoric} and \textit{Poetics}. We should consider the possibility, if only in a highly conjectural spirit, that the original context for this material on the emotions was the now-lost second book of the \textit{Poetics} – and, if so, that the reason for the apparent incompleteness of the list here might be that this represents only a portion of the treatment in \textit{Poetics} 2, and/or that Aristotle himself inserted this selection here from some version of \textit{Poetics} 2. (That he is keeping comic poets in mind is shown explicitly in \textit{Rhetoric} 2.6, 1384b 10.) But John Cooper sees the basis (no more) laid here for a more thoroughgoing investigation, perhaps a comprehensive theory, of the emotions: “Having done the work on the selected emotions dealt with in the \textit{Rhetoric}, Aristotle had achieved certain systematic insights that he could have used as the

\textsuperscript{68} On this fascinating topic, see Lloyd (1966). Aristotle’s own approach to our mental/linguistic organization of reality is set forth in the \textit{Categories}, where again some binary thinking is at play. On the \textit{Categories} of Aristotle, see e.g. Ackrill [1975].

\textsuperscript{69} Here I follow the treatment in Konstan (2006a) 156–168, which corrects the chronic misperception that χάρις here refers to “kindness,” “benevolence,” or the like. As he notes there: “The \textit{pathê} in Aristotle are typically \textit{responses} to the behaviour of others” (163, emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{70} Kennedy (2007) 113–114.
basis for a positive philosophical theory of the nature of emotions. But he never got around to doing that; at least as far as we know, he did not.\textsuperscript{71}

Aristotle’s approach here, if not comprehensive, is nonetheless “philosophical” in something like his usual fashion: for each emotion he “considers the reason for it, the state of mind of the person who feels it, and those toward whom it is directed . . . This division of the subject has some resemblance to his theory of “four causes” as seen in Physics 2.3.”\textsuperscript{72} So, despite its evident practical applicability – in rhetoric as in poetics – this material should not be seen solely as part of a “handbook for rhetors (or playwrights).” Here as always, Aristotle is most interested in the \textit{ti ̀n einai} of each emotion, and of emotion in general. Too, the symbiosis of rhetoric and poetics is pervasive.

In \textit{Rhetoric} 2.1.8 we encounter a definition of the emotions that may at first look rather different from what we have seen so far:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οίς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἠδονή, σὸν ὀργή ἐλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαύτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑναντία.}
\end{quote}

The emotions \textit{[pathê]} are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites.

The reference to pain and pleasure seems a legacy from Plato’s \textit{Philebus},\textsuperscript{73} as we saw, though the reverse may actually be the case if the \textit{Philebus} was composed later than this portion of the \textit{Rhetoric}. In any case the concept of pleasure, particularly as associated with artistic performance, had probably been a matter of discussion in the Academy for some time, so it is probably safe to assume that the topic had come up during Aristotle’s time there.\textsuperscript{74}

The primacy of change (\textit{metabolê}) here reminds us of Aristotle’s reference to “alteration” (alloiôsis) in his discussion of perception (\textit{aisthêsis}) in \textit{De Anima} 2.5, which involves being “moved” (tôi kineisthai) in some way. Indeed, insofar as this is the case, \textit{aisthêsis} is precisely a species of \textit{pathos}. Now just as the goal of rhetoric is persuasion, so the goal of poetics might be said to be \textit{katharsis}; and the emotional experiences (\textit{pathê}) entailed in the viewing of a tragedy, we are told in

\textsuperscript{71} Cooper (1996) 239.
\textsuperscript{72} Kennedy (2007) 114.
\textsuperscript{73} See Frede (1992) and (1994) for a full development of this idea. The compositional date of the \textit{Philebus} is not uncontroversial; see Frede (1992) 458 n. 8 for discussion. But most scholars regard it as a late dialogue. Might the \textit{Philebus} have been composed after Plato had read Aristotle’s \textit{Poetics} or \textit{Rhetoric}?.
\textsuperscript{74} Aristotle’s sojourn in the Academy was not just the equivalent of a BA or even a PhD: he spent twenty years working side by side with Plato, as noted by Guthrie (1990) 6.
Poetics 6, conduct in some fashion to that end. The stirring of the pathê may be called a type of kinêsis, as in Sophocles Trachiniae 974–975, Σίγα, τέκνον, μή κινήσης | ἀγρίαν δόδυνη πατρός ωμόφρονος (“Be quiet, son, lest you stir | the fierce pain/suffering [đødunên] of your savage-minded father [the raving Hercules]”). This example is a negative one – Hyllos is being warned not to arouse his father’s suffering – but clearly one of the regular functions of rhetoric, whether in civic discourse or in dramatic mimêsis, is to arouse the emotions and thereby to “move” the audience to a desired form of change.

Another important aspect of this definition is that it specifies a change of judgment (krisis), a mental activity that we associate much more with cognitive than with affective mental activity. The word krisis is most commonly associated with legal decisions, which (in theory at least) are to be reached without the influence of emotion. But here yet again we observe the operation of ratiocinative cognition in Aristotle’s understanding of the emotions.

That the philosophical conversation was already construed according to the binary antithesis of pain and pleasure makes it all the easier for Aristotle to refer to various emotions “and their opposites”: the dyad itself suggests a dyadic structure for his analysis of the emotions. And we do in fact find in Rhetoric 2. 2–11 that he constructs his representative list along those lines. Moreover, given the close affinity of the Rhetoric and the Poetics, it is not surprising to find that pity and fear are two of the three emotions mentioned in this definition.

* Aesthetic pleasure is regarded by Aristotle, as we see in Chapter 4 of the Poetics, as natural (and indeed peculiar) to humans. And as what is natural is re ipsa good, the pleasure we take in mimêsis must itself be good. The passage is so central to this discussion – to any discussion of Aristotle’s theory of mimêsis – that it is worth citing in extenso:

> ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννήσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν δύο τινὲς καὶ αὐτὰς φυσικαί, τὸ τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφωνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παῖδων ἐστί καὶ τούτω διαφέροντι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικῶς, ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήσαι πάντας, σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαίνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: ὃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρός ὀρῶμεν, τοῦτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μᾶλλον ἥκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, ὅπως περὶ τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμητῶν καὶ νεκρῶν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἢδικτόν ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἄλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσαι αὐτοῦ, διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τι ἐκατον, ὅποι ὁτι οὐκ ἔκεινος; ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προευρακόσ, οὐχ ἣ μήμιμα ποιήσῃ τὴν ἡδονήν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιᾶν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.
It can be seen that poetry was broadly engendered by a pair of causes, both natural. For it is an instinct of human beings, from childhood, to engage in mimesis (indeed, this distinguishes them from other animals: the human being is the most mimetic of all, and it is through mimesis that s/he develops h/er earliest understanding): and equally natural that everyone enjoys mimetic objects. A common occurrence indicates this: we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us, such as the forms of the vilest animals and of corpses. The explanation of this too is that understanding gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to others too, though the latter have a smaller share in it. This is why people enjoy looking at images, because through contemplating them it comes about that they understand and infer what each element means, for instance that “this person is so-and-so.” For, if one happens not to have seen the subject before, the image will not give pleasure qua mimesis but because of its execution or color, or for some other such reason. [Poetics 4, 1448b 4–19]

The particular pleasure he is talking about in the famous οὗτος ἐκεῖνος example, i.e. “this person is so-and-so,” is what comes from successful mental activity in the realm of semiosis: the “aha” moment that comes when we make the connection between (as C. S. Peirce might say) a sign and its object. Meanwhile, the distancing afforded to us by the very phenomenon of mimêsis, Aristotle appears to be saying, is what allows us to take pleasure in things that would otherwise bring pain in such instances. A famous example that instantly springs to mind is the painting by Albrecht Dürer of a stag beetle, now in the Getty Museum (Figure 3). The Getty Center’s notes on the painting include the following: “Singling out a beetle as the focal point of a work of art was unprecedented in 1505, when most of Dürer’s contemporaries believed that insects were the lowest of creatures.”

But, as we saw in Poetics 14, Aristotle also acknowledges the pleasure of the sheer frisson that comes from watching an effective tragedy – or even from hearing its plot recounted.

For the plot should be so structured that, even without seeing it performed, one hearing the events both shudders [scil. with fear] and feels pity at what happens, as one would feel [an pathotis] upon hearing the plot of the Oedipus. [Poetics 14, 1453b 3–7]

The latter is a somewhat different pleasure than one derives from the cognitive, quasi-puzzle-solving activity entailed in the “aha” moment. Both, however, are...
forms of pleasure associated with mimēsis; and in both cases pleasure is derived from cognitive intake.

It may not be coincidental that both instances involve an aspect of recognition. In the passage from Poetics 4, it is the (re)cognition itself – that Peircean connection of sign with object – that is the source of pleasure. Houtos ekeinos!, we exclaim. This is a picture of Wile E. Coyote! In the case of Oedipus, the very mounting layers of horror that accumulate, as the pieces fall into place, are what enrich our emotional experience in the tragedy. We know, perhaps even before we enter the theater, that Oedipus has killed his father and bedded his mother. The combined calamity of parricide and incest may provoke shivers of fear and pity (and revulsion) well before the play reaches the point where Oedipus himself discovers what he has done. But the moment of recognition (ἀναγνώρισις anagnôrisis) is also the very moment of his his peripety or reversal of fortune (περιπέτεια peripeteia) – and that simultaneity is what makes Aristotle esteem the play so highly:
Peripety [περιπέτεια] is a change to the opposite direction of events, as already stated,\(^\text{76}\) and in accordance, as we insist, with probability or necessity: as when in the Oedipus the person who comes to bring Oedipus happiness, and intends to rid him of his fear about his mother, causes the opposite by revealing Oedipus’s true identity\(^\text{77}\) [. . .] Recognition [ἀναγνώρισις], as the very name indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, leading to friendship or enmity, and involving matters that bear on prosperity or adversity. The finest recognition is that which occurs simultaneously with peripety, as with the one in the Oedipus. [Poetics 11, 1452a 22–33]

Note that the moment of recognition-and-peripety is one of extreme emotional upheaval for Oedipus himself: “the person [a messenger from Corinth] who comes to bring Oedipus happiness, and intends to rid him of his fear about his mother, causes the opposite.” And the audience, in whom the tension and anticipation have been building toward this moment, feel both renewed horror and perhaps their own “aha” of aesthetic satisfaction as the puzzle pieces finally fall into place on stage.

Pity and fear, as we have noted, are highlighted in Aristotle’s Poetics 6 definition of tragedy. This is not without cause, as we see from his definitions of the two emotions in the Rhetoric:

Let fear [φόβος] be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation derived from the imagination of a future destructive or painful evil. For not all evils are to be feared; for example, [a person does not fear] that he will become unjust or slow-witted but [only] what has the potential for great pains or destruction, and these [only] if they do not appear far off but near, so that they are about to happen; for what is far off is not feared; all know that they will die, but because that is not near at hand, they take no thought of it. [Rhetoric 2.5.1]

\(^{76}\) Referring perhaps to Poetics 1452a 4.\n
\(^{77}\) See Sophocles, Oedipus the King, 924–1085, for this disastrous conversation.
Let pity \([eleos]\) be [defined as] a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful event happening to one who does not deserve it, and which a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this when it seems close at hand; for it is clear that a person who is going to feel pity necessarily thinks that some evil is actually present of the sort that he or one of his own might suffer, and that this evil is of the sort mentioned in the definition or like it or about equal to it. Thus, those who are utterly ruined do not feel pity (they think there is nothing left for them to suffer; for they have suffered) nor [do] those thinking themselves enormously happy [feel pity]; they demonstrate insolent pride \([hubris]\) instead. (If they think all good things are actually present, clearly they also think it is not possible to experience any evil; for this [impossibility of suffering] is one of the good things.) \([Rhetoric\ 2.8.2–3]\)

The two emotions, that is, are intimately related in that they are both painful feelings regarding imminent destruction or pain; and though fear is self-oriented and pity is other-oriented, yet both are felt (in some way) with reference to some pain or destruction befalling oneself. The cognitive connections that occur as one watches a tragedy may happen so instantaneously that one is not aware of the mental process, but such connections of course involve [a] a perceptual intake (\(ais-thêsis\)) of the dreadful events befalling the tragic character, [b] an assessment of their destructive and painful nature, and [c] by transitivity, some sort of calculation of how destructive and painful they would be were they to befall oneself.

Interesting, then, that Aristotle does not pair fear with pity in his list, but with courage/confidence (\(tharsos\), present here in its adjectival/substantive and verbal forms, \(to\ \tharraleon\) and \(tharreô\)). That is to say, the binarism that structures this list is again principally antithetical. (The basic structuring antithesis here is not “self/other,” but rather, “positive/negative” or “presence/absence.”) But he also does not hesitate, in the \(Poetics\), to cherry-pick the two from this list that are most germane to the aesthetic experience of tragedy.

An important aspect of Attic drama – and one easily effaced in modern discussions of it – is that such plays were fundamentally \(religious\) events. That is, to the end of the fifth century BCE, tragedy, comedy, and satyr-play were composed specifically for performance at major religious festivals, above all the
The very civic geography of Athens, as well as the ceremonial events entailed in these festivals, would have constantly underscored the religious context for its citizens: the Theater of Dionysus was (and is) nestled against the southeast face of the Acropolis, and directly behind it was a shrine to Dionysus, in which the god’s cult-statue (normally housed at Eleusis, some 14 miles away) would be lodged during the festival (Figure 4).

Aristotle, writing in the mid-fourth century BCE – decades after the death of Euripides, the youngest of the great Attic playwrights of the fifth century – devotes

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78 Much continues to be written on this enormous topic, though it is widely ignored in more purely aesthetic considerations of Attic drama. Two older books that are foundational for any study of the history and nature of this phenomenon are those of Pickard-Cambridge (1962) and Pickard-Cambridge (1968). For more recent work on the subject, one should also have a look at Csapo/Miller (2007) and its bibliography.
very little text to the religious associations of drama. He is, however, acutely aware of them: in Chapter 4 of the Poetics he traces the origins of tragedy and comedy from the διθύραμβος dithurambos and φαλλικά phallika respectively. These were ritual performances in honor of Dionysus: the dithurambos or dithyramb was a hymn accompanied by ecstatic dancing; the song was performed by a chorus of boys or men numbering as many as fifty, and apparently accompanied by the aulos (a reed woodwind instrument, whether with one or two pipes). The phallika were processions in which the representation of a large phallus, probably made of wood or clay, was carried upright; the procession seems to have involved dance and was accompanied (or followed) by risqué or ribald songs – themselves also known as phallika – and a sacrificial offering.

Based on the relevant extant literary and archaeological materials, we can speculate (but hardly more than that) upon the specific procedures of the rituals. What we can do, if Aristotle is correct, is to understand Attic drama as a radically new genre pioneered by the composers of dithuramboi and phallika. Such songs may have originated (in the deeps of time) as solo performances, principally narrative in format, to which a dance element was at some point added; but it is also possible that they began as mimēsis, perhaps specifically as mime; that other participants were at some point added to form a khoros or group of dancers; and that at some point, too, the dance (whether solo or choral) was then accompanied by song as well as instrumental music. In any case, Aristotle’s (very compressed) account of the origin of drama suggests that it was a radically new invention, which at some point (early or late) incorporated all these elements: dance, song, and (above all) mimetic representation.

The idea of religious ritual as closely imbricated with entertainment may seem outlandish to modern Westerners, who are mostly accustomed to thinking of those categories as distinct (or indeed mutually exclusive). But in ancient times their substantial relationship was readily accepted – and not just by the


80 Phallika are specifically designated by Pollux of Naucratis in his Onomasticon (4.100) as danced songs.

81 For more on phallika, see e.g. Pickard-Cambridge (1962), especially Chapters 2.12, 3.1, and Appendix B; and Bierl (2009), especially Chapter 2.


83 For a hypothetical reconstruction (in six stages) of this development of drama in ancient Greece, see Kirby (2012) 416–418. That reconstruction proceeds from the assumption that diēgesis as an artistic urge came prior to mimēsis – an assumption that may be worth rethinking.
Greeks, as we shall see. That relationship has some far-reaching implications for how the ancients understood the emotions as experienced, not only individually or in private, but also in public – or even what we would call civic – contexts. The aesthetic experience of such dramatic performances was clearly acknowledged to elicit emotional responses; and such responses were not incidental or accidental to the ritual contexts in which they occurred. On the contrary: those contexts conditioned both the experience and the analysis of such emotions. There is evidence for this, not just in the ancient Greek philosophical texts, but also in those (from roughly comparable periods) both in Sanskrit and in Chinese. It is to the Sanskrit literature that we now turn.

2 The नाट्य शास्त्र Nātyaśāstra or “Treatise On Drama”

One of the many astonishing anomalies of the so-called “Western” heritage is that the vast, ancient, and rich literary legacies of South Asia are, for the most part, as foreign to most “Westerners” as those of, say, Africa or East Asia. The so-called “Western” languages are for the most part Indo-European in origin, i.e. descended from a putative Proto-Indo-European (PIE) language spoken several thousand years ago, which more than suggests a common ancestry and, however shrouded in the mists of antiquity, a shared set of cultural norms. And yet how many learned humanists in the West today can summarize the plot of the Sanskrit Mahābhārata, arguably the greatest literary achievement in human history?

84 One must be extraordinarily circumspect on the questions of where PIE originated and when its speakers flourished. Experts disagree in the most strenuous (sometimes acrimonious, even hostile) terms. On the topics, see (among many others) Mallory (1989); Fortson (2010); Anthony (2007). A good general reference work is Mallory/Adams (1997).

85 The converse has not always been true: Dio Chrysostom (53.6) reports that “it is said that Homer’s poetry is sung even in India, where they have translated it into their own speech and tongue” (cited in Vasunia [2013] 239). Plotinus appears to have had a longstanding interest in Indian philosophy (Porphyry De uita Plotini 3), and many have discerned substantial Indic influence upon the metaphysics of Plotinus; see e.g. Staal (1961), Vasudevacharya (2017).

86 So great, indeed, is the achievement that legend attributes the writing-down of the Mahābhārata to the divine agency of the god Ganeśa. Its actual length is difficult to calculate, as there is no single “authoritative” version of the text. But some estimates put it at about 1.8 million words, composed in over 100,000 metrical couplets (ślokas) – about eight times the length of the Iliad and Odyssey combined. (The critical edition published by the Bhandarkar
The Nātyaśāstra is doubtless far less well-known than the Mahābhārata or the Rāmāyaṇa, even to the average person born in the Indian subcontinent.87 For one thing, it is a treatise, not (primarily) a narrative work: śāstra can mean “precept,” “advice,” or “theory,” as well as a “treatise” or a manual of instruction. But like certain other śāstras, the Nātyaśāstra is revered as of divine and not ordinary human origin. To think about this as an ancient Indian88 might have done, we must begin with an understanding of śruti and smṛti as religious/philosophical categories. Śruti (literally “[something] heard”) refers to the most sacred and revered documents, such as the four Vedas;89 they were held not to have been composed by human writers, but rather “heard” by the ancient ṛṣis or “prophetic sages” who, hearing their divine eternal reverberation through the cosmos, wrote them down: and wrote them down, moreover, in Sanskrit. This only begins to give us a sense of the sacredness, both of the spanda (vibration) of primordial sound in ancient India, and of Sanskrit in particular as the most perfect and eternal instantiation of that sound. Indeed, for this

Oriental Research Institute in Pune – regarded as standard, if not absolutely definitive – comprises about 89,000 ślokas.)

For a recent complete, unabridged English translation of the Mahābhārata, see Debroy (2015). For an elegant rendition (condensed to about 1/12 the length of the original), in lucent English verse, see Satyamurti 2016. An even more compressed summary, with useful accompanying materials, is that of Narasimhan (1965).

87 That said, it was extensively studied, in the centuries following the stabilization of the text, by various schools (both āstika and nāstika) of Hindu philosophy, as fundamental to the project of theorizing the self. Modern scholars are recuperating these treatments and further advancing their assessments; see e.g. Lynch (1990), Ganeri (2012), Shulman (2012), Bilimoria/Wenta (2015) (especially Torella [2015]), Chakrabarti (2016), Adamson and Ganeri (2020).

For more on the Nātyaśāstra and its cultural context, see e.g. Gupt (1994) and (2016), Ranjacharya (1998), Vatsyayan (2007), Kanjilal (2012).

88 As with the ancient Greeks, it is difficult to find a simple way to refer to the ancient Indians as a people without reference to the modern nation-state. There were anciently many “kingdoms” in the subcontinent, just as not all the nations there today are identical to the corresponding modern Republic of India. Thus the term “an ancient Indian” is in a way nonsensical. But the Sanskrit language is related to Bengali, Hindi, and other modern languages and dialects, as well as to the ancient Pali, Magadhi, and other prakrits; and the term “Greater India” is sometimes taken to refer to the farthest reaches of Indic – and specifically Sanskrit – culture, marked by the use of Sanskrit as a lingua franca as well as in its sacral and philosophical applications. Thus, I will use “ancient India(n)” to refer to people who shared in this widespread South-Asian culture – recognizing the limitations of the term as well as its convenience.

89 Referred to in an earlier period as the “Three Vedas”; the fourth – the Atharvaveda – though perhaps dating from the same period as the Yajurveda and Sāmaveda – was not recognized as śruti until later. (The Rgveda is the oldest of the four and is, in part, the source of portions of the others.)
very reason, the word संस्कृत samskṛta, “polished, ornamented, adorned,” can also mean “perfected” or even “consecrated, hallowed.” To this day, the formal process of education begins with the संस्कार saṃskāra (rite of passage) known as उपनयन upanayana, “initiation” (lit. “bringing near”), in which the boy90 is “brought to” a गुरु guru or spiritual teacher, thereby qualifying him to begin his journey into literacy, numeracy, and the वेदाङ्ग vedāṅga (those ancillary disciplines that included inter alia phonology, prosody, grammar, and etymology). Thus equipped, he would be prepared to study the Vedas and Upaniṣads (the older Upaniṣads, like the Brāhmaṇas and Aranyakas, also qualifying along with the Vedic Samhitas as śruti).

Smṛti, by contrast, means “[something] remembered” or “recalled” (scil. from human tradition rather than from divine revelation), and is thus used to refer to texts that might still in some sense be called sacred – for example the Mahābhārata or the Puraṇas – but that do not have what might be called the “canonical” or authoritative status that a śruti text has.91 This distinction is sometimes then cancelled out by affectionately awarding a highly-favored text – for example the Mahābhārata (or its most famous excerpt, the Bhagavadgītā), the Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa, or certain Puraṇas – the status of “Fifth Veda” (पञ्चम वेद pañcamaveda), thereby effectively classifying it as the transcription of actual divine utterance, and thereby elevating it to the highest level of authority.

We should be impressed, then, to find that the Nāṭyaśāstra proclaims, in its earliest verses, that it too is a Fifth Veda (1.15), claiming to be “of stature equal with the Vedas” (वेदसम्मितः vedasammitaḥ, 1.4), and indeed referring to itself unapologetically as नाट्यवेद nāṭyaveda (1.4 et passim); and if there were any doubt about this, the first chapter goes on to elaborate the inspiration – the actual commissioning – of the text by the god Brahmā from “the pious Bharata,” who is revered as a मुनि muni, i.e. “sage, seer, saint.”92 Brahmā moreover issues

90 The question of education for females, as well as for all members of the शूद्र śudra and “scheduled” varṇas or castes (the latter now being the legal term for those formerly referred to as Dalits, Harijans, or Pañcama), is one that has occasioned seismic changes in the culture of the subcontinent since the twentieth century (Caṇḍāla, literally “savage,” is a different category yet again). But there is some evidence that girls underwent upanayana and learnt Sanskrit even in ancient times; see Kane (1930–1962) 2.1.293–295. In practical terms, upanayana remains primarily a Brahmin custom today. For more on initiation in ancient India, see B. Smith (1986).
91 These distinctions were accepted in the āstika schools of Hindu philosophy, though some members of the Mimāṃsā school interrogated and more or less exploded them.
92 The term muni was applied to such luminaries as Vyāsa, traditionally the author of the Mahābhārata; Pāṇini, the author of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, the earliest extant grammar of classical
this charge upon the request of other gods, above all the god Śiva, who wanted “an object of diversion that must be visual/pleasant to see, as well as auditory/worth hearing” (दृष्यम् श्रव्यम् च dṛṣṭyaṁ śṛṣṭyaṁca 1.11)93 There is quite a lot to unpack in this brief request: it is first and foremost for the gods, which means it is automatically consecrated (or, at least, set apart for consecration); it operates on the supernatural plane; it must inherently entail pleasure or satisfaction; and it must have both a visual and an auditory aspect (not just the auditory dimension of purely narrative poetry).

What is more—and more astonishing—Lord Śiva stipulates that while study and discussion of the four Vedas is prohibited to the śudra, the lowest of the four varṇas or castes, this new nāṭyaveda must be accessible to all the varṇas (वेदं पञ्चमं सार्ववर्णिकम् vedam pañcaṁ sārvavarṇikam, 1.12). In addition, then, it must be egalitarian. As Pushpendra Kumar observes: “Sociologically, this breaking of boundaries and hierarchies would make the author and the text radical, if not revolutionary.”94

Bharatamuni’s impulse, moreover, is to create a fifth Veda that will be सेतिहासं setihāsaṁ, “like itihāsa.” The term itihāsa (literally, “so indeed it was”) is the Sanskrit name for the category of heroic legend or quasi-historical narrative to which belong the great epics, the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa. And this is striking because, while those stories can be (and in fact regularly are) acted out in dramatic form, on stage and screen, such dramatic presentations are adaptations of the original: in the form in which these epics are preserved from antiquity, they are śravya—not to be heard (in recitation)—but not dṛṣṭya, visual. The upshot of this is both to correlate the genre of nāṭya to a venerable and beloved literary form, and also to tout it as an improvement over the latter: another astounding and bold assertion that is made in the opening pages of the treatise.

This fifth Veda is said to be produced from elements drawn from the other four: Bharata takes dialogue (pāṭya) from the Rgveda, song (gīta) from the Śāma-veda, gesture (abhinaya) from the Yajurveda, and rasa from the Atharvaveda. This combination of ingredients from familiar sources to prepare an entirely new recipe may seem no more than a way of legitimizing the Nāṭyaśāstra in quasi-

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Sanskrit; and the Buddha himself (scil. शाक्यमुनि Śākyamuni, “Sage of the Śaka people”). The etymology of muni is obscure: Monier-Williams (1899) sub uoc. traces it tentatively to *man “impulse, eagerness,” while Ghosh (2016) 1.5 n. 2 derives it from a Prakrit root *muṇa “know,” which, he says, “is most probably not of Sanskritic origin.”

93 Translations of the Nāṭyaśāstra are taken, or adapted, from that of Ghosh (2016).

94 Kumar (2010) 1: xvi.
Vedic terms; but at the same time, it also affords Bharata the opportunity to give a brief preview of the contents of the treatise itself.

Just what rasa means in this context, we shall address in some detail. But at the moment it is high time for us to focus on the term नाट्य nāṭya. This comes from the root * नट् nat, which can mean both “to dance” and “to mime/mimic”; an evidently related root is * नृत् nṛt which appears to focus purely on the meaning of “dance.” The etymological ramifications of these two little syllables, nat and nṛt, deserve an essay of their own, but for now let me point out the following:

- The breadth of this semantic field implies that at least some aspects of dance reach beyond the realm of rhythmic bodily movement and into the realm of semiosis: of representation.
- There is a strong implication here that dance and mime share an extremely ancient kinship.95
- We should thus not be surprised at the rich and ancient traditions of representational dance in India, including e.g. Bharatanatyam and Kathakali.
- In all these regards, the term nāṭya calls to mind the Greek μίμησις mimēsis, “imitation, representation,” which is itself derived from μῖμος mimos, a “mimic” or “imitator,” and in particular an “actor” or “mime.”96 (The noun mimos can also refer to the mime as a dramatic form. And mimēsis is an Aristotelian “key-word” if there ever was one – inherited, in fact, by him from Plato.)
- This in turn reminds us that both Plato and Aristotle make much of the distinction between διήγησις diêgêsis, “narrative, narrating,” and μίμησις mimēsis: the epic genre, of which the Iliad and Odyssey are our most famous examples, is said to be a mixture of both diêgêsis and mimēsis, in that there are passages of simple narrative (diêgêsis) interspersed with passages of direct discourse, where the poet – or whoever is singing or reciting the poem – engages in actual representation (mimēsis) of the characters in the tale. It is possible to imagine a poem that would entirely abandon direct discourse in favor of pure diêgêsis or narrative; in such a case, for example, where Homer says,

And then Helen, offspring of Zeus, answered him [scil. Priam]:

“Now this one is Odysseus of the many wiles, son of Laertes,


96 For other comparative treatments of Aristotle with Bharatamuni, see e.g. Gupt (1994), Ley (2000).
who was reared in the country of Ithaca, rugged though it be,
who knows all sorts of stratagems and shrewd plans,”[97]

he could have said, “And then Helen, offspring of Zeus, responded to Priam,
pointing out wily Odysseus son of Laertes, noting that he was born in rugged
Ithaca and knew all sorts of stratagems and shrewd plans.” (Conversely,
there is a form of composition that is pure *mimēsis* or representation: namely,
drama.)[98]

– Bharatamuni offers yet another remarkable point of comparison between
*nāṭya* and the Aristotelian concept of *mimēsis*, insofar as both authors
draw very strong connections between dance and mimetic performance.

– The nature of mimetic performance means, in ancient India as in ancient
Greece, that whatever emotions are aroused in the audience are to be experi-
enced in a group or communal setting. (But whether or to what extent the
*Nāṭyaśāstra* analyzes the emotions of the *audience* is a matter of some de-
bate, as we shall see.)

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* is a work of considerable antiquity, its oldest form originating pos-
sibly as early as the fifth century BCE – which is to say, around the time of Aeschy-
lus in Greece[99] – and undergoing textual changes for several centuries after that.
The authorial persona, as already noted, is a vivid and commanding one, but one
need not subscribe to the traditional account of this Bharatamuni to acknowledge
that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* presents a very thoroughgoing analysis of the nature of
drama: drama as a concept in the mind of its creator, as a work of art performed in
real time, and as an aesthetic experience on the part of the audience. As a very
important aspect of that analysis, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* provides an extraordinary
phenomenology of human consciousness – at least insofar as the author and
actors of a play are concerned. To say the *Nāṭyaśāstra* discusses “emotion,”
and to leave it at that, is seriously to undervalue what is on offer in this text.

[98] For more on *mimēsis* and *diēgēsis*, see Kirby (1991b).
[99] This would be the very earliest end of the range of estimates; see Dace (1963) 249. Ghosh
(2016) xxiii does not venture any more specificity than “two millennia ago.” Gupt (1994)
31–32 envisions the possibility that one Bharata, a man living ca 450 BCE, created the original
version of this text, which subsequently sustained interpolation, mutilation, and losses.
Kumar (2010) 1.xvi asserts that “scholars are more or less agreed that the composition of the
text may have taken place some time between the second century B.C. to second century A.D.”
It might be more accurate (if also more ponderous) to describe it as a psychophysiology of performance.

The author of the Nāṭyaśāstra (whom for the sake of convention if nothing else we shall continue to call Bharatamuni) casts his nets very widely in the course of the treatise: he discusses the size and shape of the theater-hall, the nature of gesture, the rules of prosody, details of costume and makeup, plot types, even the different sorts of musical instruments one might use in a theatrical performance. For the moment we concern ourselves with the material presented in Chapters 6 – “the closest thing we have to a foundational text of the discipline of aesthetics”¹⁰⁰ – and 7, which between them lay out an elaborate taxonomy of cognitive and affective states (and in some cases their somatic analogues).

This cluster of topics is clearly of primary importance for the author; he addresses them very early in the treatise, as soon as he has described the divine origins of nāṭya, the physical construction of the theater-space, the propitiation of the relevant deities, the details of the dance known as tāṇḍava, and the procedures for preparatory rituals. The substance of the treatise is itself spun out as the narration of a sort of performance, a dialogue between Bharata and some other “great-souled munis,” who ask him to recount to them how the Nāṭyaśāstra¹⁰¹ came into existence. It is in this context that we learn of his encounter with the gods, who commission the treatise from him. At the beginning of Chapter 6, the munis ply Bharata with questions:¹⁰²

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पूर्वरङ्गविधिं श्रुत्वापुनराहुर्महत्तमाः ।
भरतं मुनयः सर्वे प्रश्नान्पञ्चाभिधत्स्वन ः॥१॥
ये रसा इतिपठ्यन्ते नाट्ये नाट्यविचक्षणैः।
रसत्वं केनव ै तेषामेतदाख्यातुमर्हसि ॥ २॥
भा श्चैवकः प्रोक्ताः किं वा ते भावयन्त्यपि ।
संग्रहं कारिकां चैव निरूपनं ज्ञेयतः ॥ ३॥
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¹⁰¹ Their actual word is nāṭyaveda, which Abhinavagupta takes as a synonym of Nāṭyaśāstra. As noted earlier, it casually acknowledges the treatise’s status as a (fifth) Veda.
¹⁰² I offer not one but two translations of these Nāṭyaśāstra selections, because we in the West are still in a very early stage of even encountering this text, let alone engaging with it. There is still much to do just to make the materials available to a Western readership.
After hearing about the rules regarding the Preliminaries [[pūrvaraṅga, scil. prologues, preludes]], the great sages continued their inquiries and said to Bharata, “Answer five of our questions. Explain how the Sentiment [[rasa]] enumerated by experts in dramatic art attain their [special] qualities. And why are the bhāvas (Psychological states, lit. feelings) so called, and what do they bhāvayanti (make us feel)? Besides these, what are the real meanings of terms, such as Digest (saṅgraha), Memorial Verse (kārikā), and Etymology (nirukta)?” [[Nātyaśāstra 6.1–3, Ghosh (2016) 1.142]]

After the procedures for the stage preliminaries had been recounted to them, the great sages all addressed Bharata once again: “Answer five questions for us. Authorities on drama list various dramatic rasas. Can you tell us what it is that makes them rasas, “tastes”? Why are the emotions (bhāva) so called, and can you tell us what they bring into being (bhāvayanti)? What exactly is meant by “catalogue,” “epitome,” and “definition”? ” [[6.1–3, Pollock (2016) 50]]

Our first translator here, M. M. Ghosh, has bit the bullet and translated our terms, rasa and bhāva, as “sentiment” and “feeling” respectively; the second, Sheldon Pollock, translates bhāva as “emotion” but leaves “rasa” untranslated. But as we shall see, these terms are so semantically rich and complex that it is difficult to find any English translations that can do them full justice. Part of our task here is to explore their ranges of meaning.

The third, fourth, and fifth questions are evidently included in the text here so that Bharata’s brief answers to them will set him up for addressing the first two, i.e. those regarding the nature and function of rasa and bhāva. He briefly explains what a Digest (saṅgraha) is, indicating along the way that there is a “small number of Sūtras” (6.8) that deal with rasa and bhāva. This is interesting in that he is not claiming to present entirely new data on these phenomena. The “Memorial Verse” (kārikā) is glossed as the brief aphoristic explanation of a rule in a minimum of words (6.11); “Etymology” or “definition” (nirukta, lit. “pronounced, expressed, explained,” and thus “defined” or perhaps “[etymologically] interpreted”) is glossed as follows:104

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103 In the case of items cited from Ghosh (2016) and Pollock (2016), items in parentheses and single brackets are in the original texts. Only the material in double brackets [[like this]] is added by myself.
104 The translation in Pollock (2016) does not include this portion of the text. His term “definition” in 6.3, however, arguably suits this passage better than Ghosh’s “etymology.”
Etymology is the definitive meaning which arises in connexion with various nouns, is helped by diction of various (lit. vocabularies) and the rules of grammatical interpretation, includes the significance of the root involved as well as the reasons modifying it, and is helped by various findings [of Śāstras]. And this meaning [of a noun] is established [mainly] from a consideration of its root [and pratyaya or affix]. [[6.12–13, Ghosh (2016) 1.144]]

This careful explanation also prepares us for the method that Bharatamuni will employ in discussing various terms in the material that follows.

Without further ado he begins to enumerate lists of various rasas and bhāvas.

śṛṅgārahāsya karuṇa raudravīra bhaya

The eight Sentiments [[rasa]] recognized in drama are as follows: Erotic (śṛṅgāra), Comic (ḥāsa), Pathetic (karuṇa), Furious (raudra), Heroic (vīra), Terrible (bhaya-naka), Odious (bibhatsa) and Marvelous (adbhuta). [[6.15, Ghosh (2016) 1.144]]

The erotic, comic, tragic, violent, heroic, fearful, macabre, and fantastic are the eight dramatic rasas. [[6.15, Pollock (2016) 50]]

This certainly looks like a list of emotions. But we cannot proceed further without a more detailed scrutiny of the term rasa here. Its use is in one way or another a metaphor; the literal meaning of rasa is “juice” or “sap,” and the first extension of that – essentially metonymic rather than metaphoric – is to the meaning of “taste” or “flavor.” This very vivid usage is distinct from what we have seen in Aristotle, though it is perhaps not entirely unrelated to the pleasure/pain

105 The ancient Indians distinguished six types of flavor: sweet (madhura), sour (amla), salty (lavāṇa), pungent (kaṭuka), bitter (tikta), and astringent (kaśāya). The Chinese and Japanese traditionally recognize the first five of these, doubtless considering the sixth a mouth-drying property of certain foods and drinks, rather than a “flavor” stricto sensu. (The hanzi for “astringent” is 沣 sè.) Bob Holmes makes the case that “flavor” applies to a range of nasal/oral experiences wider than simply taste and smell; on his account, the data include touch, temperature, and pain; see Holmes (2017). This makes room for the mouth-drying property known as “astringency” under the heading of “flavor” per the Indic system.

In Vaiṣṇava Hinduism the term rasa came to be used to represent any of the five degrees of bhakti or “devotion,” namely sānti (peacefulness), dāsya (servitude), sākhyya (friendship), vāt-salya (affection/fondness), and mādhurya (sweetness). Of these, only mādhurya is a gustatory metaphor. (It is debatable whether a Vaiṣṇava would consider dāsya a metaphor at all.)

For more on rasa, having begun with Pollock (2016), see e.g. Pande (2009).

106 Though it does call to mind the metaphoric use of gustus (“taste, flavor”) in Latin, attested at least as early as Quintilian 6.3.17.
formula, as the notion of *rasa* as the characteristic “flavor” of a work of art may be said to elicit pain or (more typically) pleasure.

While there is some overlap between the terms *rasa* and *bhāva*, the two sets are by no means identical; and the presence of both of them in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is a good indication that the author means to point up certain distinctions. This begins to come into focus when he addresses the term *bhāva* itself, and divides the genus into its various species:

These eight [just cited] are the Sentiments [[*rasas*]] named by Druhiṇa (Brahmā). I shall now speak of the Durable and the Complementary Psychological States [[*bhāvas*]] and the *Sāttvika* ones. [[17]] The Durable Psychological States (*sthāyībhāva*) are known to be the following: love, mirth, sorrow, anger, energy, terror, disgust, and astonishment. [[18]] The thirty-three complementary Psychological States (vyabhicāribhāva) are known to be the following: discouragement, weakness, apprehension, envy, intoxication, weariness, indolence, depression, anxiety, distraction, recollection, contentment, shame, inconstancy, joy, agitation, stupor, arrogance, despair, impatience, sleep, epilepsy, dreaming, awakening, indignation, dissimulation, cruelty, assurance, sickness, insanity, death, fright, and deliriation. These are defined by their names. [[22]] Paralysis, Perspiration, Horripilation, Change of Voice, Trembling, Change of Color, Weeping and Fainting are the eight *Sāttvika* States. [[23]] Four kinds of Histrionic Representation are Gestures (āṅgika), Words (vācika), Dresses and Make-up (āhārya), and the Representation of the Sattva (sāttvika). [[6.16–23, Ghosh (2016)]]

These are the eight [[*rasas*]] that were enunciated by the great Druhin. Now I shall tell you about the emotions [[*bhāvas*]]: the stable, the transitory, and the emotions generated by one’s “sensitivity.” [[17]] The stable emotions are desire, amusement, grief, anger, determination, fear, revulsion, and amazement. [[18]] The transitory emotions are despair, fatiguel, disquiet, resentment, intoxication, exhaustion, torpor, despondency, anxiety, confusion, remembrance, satisfaction, shame, recklessness, joy, agitation, numbness, pride, depression, longing, sleepiness, possession, dreaming, waking, vindictiveness, dissimulation, ferocity, sagacity, sickness, madness, dying, fright, perplexity. [[22]] The eight sensitivities are paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, a broken voice, trembling, pallor, weeping, and fainting. [[23]] The four registers of acting that pertain to drama are the physical, verbal, psychophysical, and costuming. [[6.16–23, Pollock (2016) 50]]

The noun *bhāva* comes from the root *bhū-, “becoming, being, existing, occurring.” Thus *bhāva* may signify a “state” or “condition,” or more specifically, some disposition of mind or body. This is perhaps as close to non-metaphoric language as one can get, unlike the word *rasa*, which as we saw is fundamentally metaphoric or metonymic. That said, in *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.15–17 the eight

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107 Ghosh notes that other translators render *sthāyibhāva* as “dominant emotion,” “Permanent State,” or “permanent mood.” Adamson/Ganeri (2020) 312 glosses *sthāyibhāvas* as “emotional dispositions.”
sthāyibhāvas, the “durable” or “stable” bhāvas, are closely analogous with, or indeed synonymous to, the eight rasas (Figure 5): ¹⁰⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STHĀYIBHĀVA</th>
<th>RASA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>love/desire (rātī)</td>
<td>erotic (śrīgāra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mirth/amusement (hāsa)</td>
<td>comic (hāya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sorrow/grief (joka)</td>
<td>pathetic/tragic (karanu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anger (krodha)</td>
<td>furious/violent (raudra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>energy/determination (utsaha)</td>
<td>heroic (vīra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terror/fear (bhaya)</td>
<td>terrible/fearful (bhayanaka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disgust/revulsion (jugapsa)</td>
<td>odious/macabre (bibhatsa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>astonishment/amazement (vismaya)</td>
<td>marvellous/fantastic (adbhuta)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: The eight sthāyibhāvas and their corresponding rasas.

We should note right away that there are eight emotions and no more¹⁰⁹ in this list. Why might this be? Sheldon Pollock is emphatic that it is necessarily the case: “If we think carefully about the list of eight in the Treatise . . . we will recognize that it comprises only those that can actually be communicated in performance. For “literature meant to be seen” [i.e. dṛṣya] . . . emotion that can be seen was naturally counted as basic.”¹¹⁰ Basic, that is, for the playwright who is creating the characters that feel those emotions; and basic for the actors who portray those characters and their emotions. But not (yet), Pollock asserts, for the spectator/audience:

A half-century ago a leading scholar of Indian aesthetics was correct to note – and has been alone in noting – that in the Treatise “the words rasa and bhāva [emotion] are used in connection with the actor and the artist and not in connection with the spectator,” and that any “historical approach to these concepts must admit that they ‘describe the aesthetic situation, the art object outside, more than the subjective state of the critic [or audience].’”¹¹¹

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¹⁰⁸ Where there are paired English terms in this table for the bhāvas or rasas, these are again taken from Ghosh (2016) and Pollock (2016). Where only one English term is listed, that means both Ghosh and Pollock translate the Sanskrit term the same way.

¹⁰⁹ Later theorists such as Udbhata (early 9th century CE) added a ninth rasa, namely the śānta “peaceful”; Pollock is confident that “the few references in the NS are later additions, though undatable” (Pollock [2016] 346 n. 131; cf. ibid. 21, 48, 340 n. 4). In any case the concept of a “peaceful” rasa is useful, in that it can designate the semiotically-unmarked or zero-degree class of rasa: the blank slate, as it were, upon which any other rasa is inscribed.

¹¹⁰ Pollock (2016) 8.

Once we do open up the consideration of *rasa* to include the spectator/audience, as was later done, we may apply the concept to all genres of artistic achievement, not just performed drama – and we may increase the number of things that merit the name of *rasa*, perhaps substantially.\(^{112}\) Can these *sthāyi-bhāvas* or “enduring emotions” be said to correspond meaningfully to any of the emotional responses likely to be experienced by the spectator/audience? Certainly, though not at all necessarily by direct correlation; a character experiencing sexual desire in the drama may well elicit a response of anger or revulsion in the audience, and so on.

Not all critics, as Pollock notes, take such a strictly formalist approach to the text. For example, compare the following translations of *Nāṭyaśāstra* 7.2 by Ghosh and Pollock:

\[
\text{वागङ्गमुखरागेण सत्त्वेनाभिनयेन च।}
\text{कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन्भाव उच्यते॥ ॥}
\]

\[
\text{vāgaṅgamukharāgēṇa sattvēnābhīnayēṇa ca}
\text{kavērantarataṃ bhāvaṃ bhāvayabhāva ucyatē}
\]

As in these, [[because]] the inner idea of the playwright is made to pervade [the mind of the spectators] by means of Words, Gestures, colour of the face and Representation of the Sattva, they are called *bhāva*. [[Ghosh (2016) 1.164; single brackets his]]

“Emotion” (*bhāva*) is also so called because it serves to “bring into being” (*bhāvayan*) the poet’s inner emotion (*bhāva*), by means of the four registers of acting: verbal, physical, psychophysical, and scenic. [[Pollock (2016) 6]]

It is not incidental that Ghosh adds, in square brackets, the “mind of the spectators,” as though that is implicit in the text; he wants to expand Bharata’s theory to encompass audience reception as well. Noteworthy as well is that he translates *bhāvayan* as “pervade” here, whereas Pollock renders the same term “bring into being.”

As with most ancient texts – and perhaps even more than most – the enduring importance of philology emerges here as soon as we begin to try and determine what was likely the original state of the text, and what changes occurred to it thereafter (and when).\(^{113}\) In the case of a modern author, like Yeats, it is possible to produce a variorum edition that tracks the author’s own changes to

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\(^{112}\) This was in fact part of the later commentarial discussion on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, as noted by Pollock (2016) 13–14.

\(^{113}\) For the importance of philology to world literature, see Pollock *et al.* (2015) (and for Sanskrit in particular, Chapter 5).
his text, in some instances even dating the changes.\textsuperscript{114} But with ancient authors, even those with relatively simple textual histories, it is not always possible even to know exactly what words s/he wrote. In the case of a work like the \textit{Nātyaśāstra}, not only because of its antiquity but because of its complex textual history, the problem is magnified still more. As Sheldon Pollock writes, “While on formal grounds the compilation (and this is what it seems to be) can be vaguely assigned to the early centuries (perhaps third century) C.E., the material was clearly re-edited, and partly rewritten, at a later point in its history, most probably in Kashmir around the eighth or ninth century.”\textsuperscript{115} To the extent that the text was rewritten, it renders dubious anything one might say about the original intentions and views of an author or even of a compiler; and there may be other textual problems intervening as well.\textsuperscript{116}

With such caveats in place, we must depend on those best equipped to pronounce on philological matters, including not only the manuscript tradition but also the changing nature of the Sanskrit language itself over the centuries. In view, then, of Pollock’s admonitions, one must be extremely hesitant about attributing any individual portion of the \textit{Nātyaśāstra} to whoever began the compilation, or to whoever wrote the oldest portion(s) of that compilation. That said, is it entirely plausible that someone (whom we are calling “Bharatamuni” here) would focus so much attention on dramatic performance – on the ideas of the playwright and on the modes of communicating those ideas to an audience, whether human or divine – without even pondering the phenomenon of audience reception? And, given the sometimes highly emotional nature of audience response, the topic of the audience’s emotions must surely have given any such author food for thought.

In addition to this, the very term \textit{rasa}, “flavor” or “taste,” more than points to someone doing the tasting. As Pollock himself notes,

Theoretically, therefore, rasa can be regarded as a property of a text-object, a capacity of a reader-subject, and also a transaction between the two. The whole process, in fact, exists as a totality even while its several moments can be analytically disaggregated. In this, rasa precisely resembles the “taste” it metaphorically references, which may be regarded as existing at once in the food, the taster, and the act of tasting. Something of this totality has been captured by the phenomenologist of aesthetics Mikel Dufrenne, who writes of the “primordial reality of affective quality, wherein that part belonging to the subject and that belonging to the object are still indistinguishable”:\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{114} For Yeats, e.g., see the meticulous edition of Allt/Alspach (1957).
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Pollock (2016) 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Shrinivasan (1980) views “the rasa section in its current state as incoherent beyond repair” (Pollock [2016] 340 n. 3).
\end{itemize}
It is for this reason that we have been led to say that the affective is in the work itself, as well as in the spectator with whom the work resonates. Feeling is as deeply embedded in the object as it is in the subject, and the spectator experiences feeling because affective quality belongs to the object.

The history of aesthetic discourse in India is a history of the gradual elaboration of the components of this comprehensive view.\footnote{Pollock (2016) 26, quoting Dufrenne (1973) 455.}

On this view, there is also something inherent in the thing tasted, that connects it in a peculiar way with the taster:

we have the taste of a thing only because the thing itself has taste, as it does not have sight. The long debate over rasa’s location can be seen as a search for an understanding already gained by the metaphor itself – this is just what Abhinavagupta argued – one not attained in the West until the rise of phenomenological aesthetics.\footnote{Pollock (2016) 43, with a reference to Abhinavagupta 1.283, itself translated in Pollock (2016) 205.}

In view of this potential multiplicity of loci for rasa, Surendra Barlingay offers an interesting interpretation of the Nāṭyaśāstra that takes stock of the audience’s reception and response in terms, precisely, of rasa. It may well be that his reading is conditioned by later interpretations; it was toward the end of the first millennium that commentators’ attention turned particularly to these matters of audience reception and response, and this (not surprisingly) issued in some new or expanded interpretations of the term rasa. Whether our original Bharatamuni would have subscribed to Barlingay’s interpretation cannot be known. But its strength lies, first, in the fact that he thereby accounts not only for all the rhetorical loci in the performance event (playwright, script, actors, audience), but also for the way that bhāva is said to connect to rasa.

Barlingay agrees that the poet is the specific source of bhāva. But he goes on, somewhat remarkably, to propound what is essentially a semiotic theory of rasa as it relates to bhāva:

In the context of drama, sthāyi bhāva thus should strictly mean that persistent meaning or sense or poet’s idea arising from poet’s experience and which continues to associate with the stage. It is necessary to remember that, in drama too, as in ordinary language there are symbolic expressions and there are meanings of these symbolic expressions. If the two do not go together, the whole gamut of drama would be meaningless. It is really strange that most writers have completely ignored the fact that Bharata persistently uses the expressions artha and saṃjñā and adds that sthāyi bhāvas are rasasaṃjñā, i.e. those (meanings) of which the symbols are rasa . . . Similarly, he stated that in the dramatic process no “sense” or meaning could be had without rasa.
The term संज्ञा saṁjñā (or sañjñā as it may be transliterated) can have a variety of meanings: “agreement” or “harmony,” and thus by extension “understanding,” “correspondence,” and even “sign.” Barlingay correctly draws the semiotic correspondence between bhāva and rasa, which obtains even in a strict formalist approach to the text. But he takes this some distance further, applying it not only to the semiotic understanding and production of the playwright, but also to the aesthetic semiosis of the spectator/audience:

If this fact is taken into account then alone the meaning of verse 39 in the Nāṭyaśāstra would be clear that the meanings or bhāvas (for appreciator) would emerge from rasas. It is unfortunate that almost every writer of Indian rhetoric thought that sthāyi bhāvas stand for certain “emotional states” or sentiments. It is certainly a mental state, a citta vṛtti vēṣeṣaḥ [i.e., particular mental activity] as Dhanika has clearly stated. It must not be forgotten that Bharata is only describing the process of stage communication, though this process presupposes the mental states which influence the stage process. And this is certainly the reaction to experience. It must not be forgotten that Bharata is only describing the process of stage communication, though this process presupposes the mental states which influence the stage process.120

Barlingay reads Bharata’s terms sthāyi bhāva and kāvyārtha as “identical” (Barlingay [2007] 44), which enables him to develop his semiotic reading further:

Sthāyi bhāvas, considered as meaning, then, are both prior and posterior to stage symbol or as I understand by it, rasa. Thus, in the process of the creation of dramatic art, sthāyi bhāva (kāvyārtha) leads to rasa, and in the process of appreciation and understanding of staged drama, rasa leads to sthāyi bhāva.121

119 Barlingay (2007) 43. Translations in double brackets here are supplied from Ghosh (2016) 1.148, 166. Single brackets are Barlingay’s own. “Sentiment” is Ghosh’s translation for rasa here; “Psychological State” is his rendering of bhāva.
120 Barlingay (2007) 44.
On Barlingay’s reading, then, the bhāvas of the author produce rāsas in the script, or at least on the stage, which in turn elicit bhāvas in the audience. This is, fundamentally, the process of semiosis in action. Again, whether Barlingay has divined the original conceptual framework of our first author, or whether he is here influenced by later commentators – he does explicitly mention Dhanika – is debatable. But at a minimum, he has provided an account of how the bhāvas of the spectator/audience are connected to those of the playwright, and the role played in that connection by rasa.

Bharatamuni’s approach to the emotions is both like and unlike Aristotle’s. As in Aristotle’s work, we find in the Nāṭyaśāstra a close link between learning and entertainment: there is a strong sense here that the experience of a work of art can afford knowledge as well as enjoyment. Aristotle would doubtless also appreciate Bharatamuni’s passion for taxonomy and categorization, as well as his explicitly semiotic approach to the phenomenon of human cognition. And he would immediately have hailed the ancient lines of connection between theatrical performance with dance.

Where they are very dissimilar is that Bharatamuni frames his entire treatise in terms of a supernatural myth of origin, evidently in order to endow his text with the fragrance of quasi-scriptural authority. The Nāṭyaśāstra is characterized overall by a supernatural focus that is lacking in Aristotle’s approach. While Aristotle conceives the human artistic endeavor in materialist/rationalist terms, grounding his research in empirical observation, Bharatamuni understands the theatrical art in terms of what Gupt (1994) calls “hieropraxis”:

122 Gupt (1994) 3–5, 63–64, 125–127, 233. To be clear, Gupt believes that Aristotle’s dramatic theory too was “formulated for what I have called the art of hieropraxis” (Gupt [1994] 233). While I do not believe that that is so for Aristotle, I do think a case could be made that it does apply to the playwrights (of the 5th century BCE and earlier) of whom Aristotle is thinking in the Poetics. Aristotle himself is separated from these by decades (in some cases centuries) of time, and even more so by a vast gulf in worldview.
But like the ancient Greeks generally, Bharata sees a close link between entertainment and ritual. As we saw in the case of the Attic tragedies of the classical period, these plays are first and foremost an offering to the gods; and insofar as a human audience is present, the latter are not just spectators at a dramatic performance, but also participants in that divine offering. In that capacity they are, furthermore, also participants in a communal event. For this reason, “Bharata is always anxious to emphasize the synthesizing role of drama in the society.” As in the case of the ancient Greeks, it was clearly important for the ancient Indians to experience aesthetic emotional response in a communal, public, ritual setting. And while that may strike us today as odd or foreign, it would apparently also have made very good sense to the ancient Chinese – as we shall shortly see.

3 The 禮記 Lǐjì or “Record of Rites”

Westerners in the grip of an orientalist worldview sometimes speak of Chinese people as “inscrutable,” meaning (as I suppose) that their facial expressions do not instantly telegraph recognizable emotions. This is of course not only embarrassingly absurd but demonstrably false. Nonetheless, it would be presumptuous to conclude without examination that traditional Chinese discourse(s) about the emotions, whether vernacular or academic, inevitably map with full congruency onto typical Western ways of thinking and speaking about such things. What is needed here, to help Westerners understand how the emotions were perceived in ancient China, is a text (or set of texts) that not only mention the emotions but also discuss them in such a way as to provide philosophical analysis of them – or, at the very least, to situate them in their cultural context.

As it happens, we are especially fortunate in the case of traditional Chinese thought, on a philosophical level, in that we have some very early texts that refer to emotional terms: the Zhuāngzī, a Daoist text which (like the Dào Dé Jīng) perhaps represents a compilation of philosophical Daoist thinking, uses

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124 Though probably somewhat later than the Dào Dé Jīng: estimates for the composition or compilation of the Zhuāngzī range from the 5th to the 3rd centuries BCE. The philosopher to whom the work is traditionally ascribed, 莊周 Zhuāng Zhōu or 莊子 Zhuāngzī “Master Zhuang,” himself seems to have lived in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries.
terms like 喜怒 xǐ nù – joy and anger, contrasting emotions – or a longer version of that phrase, 喜怒哀樂 xǐ nù ài lè, “joy anger sadness happiness” – to refer to the gamut or spectrum of human emotion. Indeed the latter four-word phrase is used today in common Chinese parlance to refer precisely to that gamut. The Zhuāngzǐ does not explicitly label these phenomena as 情 qíng, “emotions,” although we do find that term applied to them in the Xùnzhī, a Confucian or Legalist text of perhaps the third century BCE. The latter document gives a list of three such contrasting pairs of 情 qíng that it says are “inborn in our nature” (性 xìng “nature, character”) namely: 好惡 hào wù liking and disliking (lit. “good/bad”); 喜怒 xǐ nù joy and anger; and 哀樂 āi lè sorrow and joy. Such enumeration gives us to wonder whether such lists are found elsewhere in traditional Chinese literature. And, in fact, they are.

The 禮記 Lǐjì or “Record of Lǐ” was, when it was composed, already to some extent a “classicizing” text: the spirit of (and perhaps the very reason for) the document is one of nostalgia, of reverence for the past, arising out of a sense of respect and even reverence for the customs of an earlier time. This is different in degree but not in kind from the Confucian cultural institution of 孝順 xiàoshùn or 孝道 xiàodào, “filial piety,” which as a moral value has withstood the buffeting of millennia of cultural upheaval. Even in the post-Mao People’s Republic of China, the power of xiào remains firmly in place. So too, while Mao decried all relicts of the pre-revolutionary past as baleful monuments of feudalism, the current regime

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125 Chong (2016) 161 n. 14. The Xùnzhī is eponymously ascribed to 荀況 Xún Kuàng, also known as 荀子 Xúnzǐ, i.e. “Master Xun,” who lived 314–239 BCE (thus, apparently, approximately contemporary with Zhuangzi). The 禮論 Lǐlùn or “Discourse on Ritual,” which figures as book 19 of the Xùnzhī, is important background reading for an understanding of the Lǐjì; see Knoblock (1988–1994) 3.49–73.
126 The phrase 好物 hǎowù is today used to mean “tastes” or “preferences.”
128 For the Chinese text of Lǐjì, with facing English translation, consult Legge (1885).
130 The customs detailed in the Lǐjì are of the Zhou dynasty (circa 1056 to 256 BCE), but the document as we have it, though traditionally ascribed to Kǒngzǐ (Confucius, 551–479 BCE, thus a few generations older than Socrates), may date from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).
131 The Cultural-Revolutionary practice of denouncing even family members for criticizing the Party was perhaps the single greatest threat to the survival of xiào. But this has, like much of Maoism, been relegated to the regrettable past; on this see e.g. Branigan (2013). The enduring value of xiào is attested in proverbial expressions such as 百善孝為先 bāishàn xiàowéixiān (”there are a hundred virtues, but xiào is preëminent among them”).
in the PRC celebrates cultural institutions such as Confucian thought, and actively encourages its citizens to honor them.\footnote{132}{On this see e.g. Osnos (2014), Buckley (2014).}

Certainly the compiler(s) of the \textit{Lìjì} were moved to honor the tradition that spawned these rites. The work itself was sometimes referred to as \textit{經 Jin}, “the Jin of \textit{Lì},” which gives a good sense of its canonical status. \textit{經 Jin} is often translated as “Book,” as in 易經 \textit{Yijing}, the famous \textit{I Ching} or “Book of Changes”; but it carries the connotation of “Classic” or “Canonical Text” or even “Scripture,” so strong is the reverential dimension of its semantic field.\footnote{133}{For more on the etymology and meaning of \textit{經 Jin}, see Kirby (2016), Section II. For more on the classics in Imperial China, see e.g. Nylan (2009) and Beecroft (2010).}

The \textit{Lìjì} eventually took its place among the \textit{四書五經 sishù wǔjīng} or “Four Books [and] Five Classics,” an early canon of authoritative Confucian documents. This group of nine texts included, among the “Four Books,” the 大學 \textit{Dà xué} or “Great Learning”; the 中庸 \textit{Zhōngyōng} or “Doctrine of the Mean”; the 讀語 \textit{Lúnyǔ} or \textit{Analects} of Confucius; and the 孟子 \textit{Mèngzǐ}, an eponymous work by Mèngzǐ or Mencius (of whom more below). The “Five Classics” in this list were the 詩經 \textit{Shìjīng} or “Book of Songs”; the 尚書 \textit{Shāngshù} or \textit{書經 Shùjīng}, i.e. “Book of History”; the 易經 \textit{Yījīng}, the “Book of Changes”; the 春秋 \textit{Chūnqiū} or “Spring and Autumn [Annals]”; and the 禮記 \textit{Lìjì} or “Record of Rites.”\footnote{134}{The very monosyllable \textit{禮 lǐ} – whose meanings can include “propriety,” “courtesy,” and “etiquette,” as well as “ceremony” and “ritual” – is a masterclass in traditional Chinese culture, and can teach us much about east Asia generally, both in ancient times and to this day. Even very young Chinese people today, those born long after the death of Mao, live with a profound understanding of \textit{lǐ} in their bones. The notion of \textit{lǐ} is one of four principal benchmarks of the virtue theory of Mèngzǐ (“Mencius,” in its latinized form), who\footnote{135}{Some scholars assert that the \textit{Mèngzǐ} was actually composed, or at least compiled, by Mencius’ students. Lau (1993) dates it to the late fourth century BCE.} describes them as innate qualities (or at least potential capacities) of the 心 \textit{xīn}, that aspect of the self}
whose name is sometimes translated as “heart,” sometimes as “mind,” sometimes as “heart-mind” (Aristotle might have suggested *psukhē* as a Greek counterpart, though *kardia* would be the anatomical organ represented by *xin*):

孟子曰：「人皆有不忍人之心。先王有不忍人之心，斯有不忍人之政矣。以不忍人之心，行不忍人之政，治天下可运之掌上。所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者，今人乍見孺子將入於井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心。非所以內交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。由是觀之，無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。」「惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。」「人之有是四端也，猶其有四體也。有是四端而自謂不能者，自贼者也；謂其君不能者，贼其君者也。凡有四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始然，泉之始達。苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充之，不足以事父母。」

Mêngzǐ said, “All humans have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others. The Former Kings had hearts that were not unfeeling toward others, so they had governments that were not unfeeling toward others. If one puts into practice a government that is not unfeeling toward others by means of a heart that is not unfeeling toward others, bringing order to the whole world is in the palm of your hand.

“The reason why I say that all humans have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others is this. Suppose someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well: anyone in such a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion – not because one sought to get in good with the child’s parents, not because one wanted fame among one’s neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child’s cries.

“From this we can see that if one is without the feeling of compassion, one is not human. If one is without the feeling of disdain, one is not human. If one is without the feeling of deference, one is not human. If one is without the feeling of approval and disapproval, one is not human. ¶ The feeling of compassion [惻隱之心 *cèyǐnzhìxīn*] is the origin [端 *duàn*] of benevolence [仁 *rén*]. The feeling of disdain [羞惡之心 *xiūwùzhìxīn* or *xiūwūzhīxīn*] is the origin of righteousness [義 *yì*]. The feeling of deference [辭讓之心 *cíyàngzhìxīn*] is the origin of propriety [禮 *lǐ*]. The feeling of approval and disapproval [是非之心 *shǐfēīzhīxīn*] is the origin of wisdom [智 *zhī*].

¶ "People having these four origins is like their having four limbs. To have these four origins, yet to claim that one is incapable (of virtue), is to steal from oneself. To say that one’s ruler is incapable is to steal from one’s ruler. In general, having these four origins within oneself, if one knows to fill them all out, it will be like a fire starting up, a spring [泉 *quán*] breaking through! If one can merely fill them out, they will be..."
sufficient to care for all within the Four Seas.139 If one merely fails to fill them out, they will be insufficient to serve one’s parents.140

So ǐ takes its place in this august constellation of moral values, two of which, interestingly, have resonances with Western ideas of emotions: 仁 rén shares some meanings with “compassion”; and 羞 xiū, “shame,” says Mèngzǐ, comes from an awareness of 義 yì, “justice” or “righteousness.” 智 zhì resonates rather with Aristotle’s notion of nous, “thinking” or “thought,” and, as such, is not purely passive in function, but actively “approves and disapproves” – perhaps on a cognitive as much as on an affective platform.

Mèngzǐ (ca 372–289 BCE), a Confucian, was hardly working in a conceptual vacuum here. On the contrary, this list of four 端 duān looks to be his development, or revision, of the 五常 wǔchāng or “five common [virtues]” of Confucian thought:141 仁 rén, benevolence; 義 yì, righteousness; 禮 lǐ, ritual propriety; 智 zhì, wisdom/knowledge; and 信 xìn, trust/confidence/faithfulness. The last item, 信 xìn, is the one not included by Mèngzǐ; it shares some common ground with 忠 zhōng, loyalty/devotion/fidelity, but is in fact pronounced like the word for “heart-mind,” 心 xīn (though with a different tone in modern Mandarin).142

The fact that Mencius makes the other four concepts out to be 端 duān, origins, of virtuous behavior springing from the 心 xīn “heart-mind,” suggests strongly that he is, if not overhauling the older Confucian system, at least restructuring its elements. And, fascinatingly, he finds it natural to move directly from a discussion of xīn responses that, to us, may seem intensely personal and individual, to a discussion of their societal and indeed political applications.

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139 I take “all within the Four Seas” to be a synonym for 中國 Zhōngguó, i.e. China: literally, the “middle nation.” Its “middleness” comes from its putative situation in the midst of the four seas (East, South, West, and North). The ancient Greeks had a roughly comparable notion of a huge river, Ôkeanos, surrounding a central land-mass.


141 The number five has perhaps more than an ordinary valence in Confucian thought: in addition to the five common virtues, there are the 五倫 wǔlún “five [cardinal] relationships” of humankind (君臣 jùnchén, a sovereign and his ministers; 父子 fùzǐ, father and son; 兄弟 xiōng dì, elder brother and younger brother; 夫婦 fūfù, husband and wife; and 朋友 péngyou, friends). Perhaps originating in Daoist thought is the system of 五行 wǔxíng five elements or “phases” of Chinese cosmology: 木 mù, Fire 火 huǒ, Earth 土 tǔ, Metal 金 jīn, and Water 水 shuǐ. A list of five naturally subverts binarism, though individually the 五倫 wǔlún each imply a dyad.

142 Once again, the glyph 忠 zhōng also contains the hanzi for xīn, “heart-mind,” at the bottom.
So it is against this rich backdrop that we are to understand 礼 if we want to situate it (and related concepts of the emotions) in its cultural context in ancient China. The era in which we now live will likely not be remembered as one in which “propriety” was a paramount value; so the Lǐ may strike some modern readers as obscure and even tedious. Our purpose here, however, is not to analyze the entire treatise, but rather to focus on one particular small portion of it: its list of the seven 人情 renqing or “human emotions.”

We may begin with a little examination of the term 情 qíng, the word for “emotion” here, which we had already encountered in the Xùnzi. The radical of this 汉字, namely 心, is once again a (compressed) form of 心 xīn, the “heart-mind,” reminding us (if there were any doubt) that the xīn is the seat of emotion. The addition of 人 rén reminds us that we are focusing here on human emotions, but it also opens the door for a number of idiomatic expressions involving 人情 renqing that specifically address human relations, not just in the interpersonal but also in the explicitly societal sphere. A very partial list of these, most of them current to the present day, would include the following:

有人情 yōurénqíng “humane”
不近人情 bùjìnrénqíng “unreasonable,” lit. “not close to renqing”
人情世故 rénjíngshìgù “worldly wisdom,” i.e. “sophisticated in the ways-of-the-world [as regards] renqing”
風土人情 fēntúrénqíng, “the cultural milieu [of a given area or people]”; lit. “the air and earth of renqing”
人情味 rénjíngwèi, “friendliness, warmth,” lit. “the fragrance of renqing”
人情债 rénjíngzhài, a “debt of renqing, i.e, of gratitude

There are other Chinese words, of course, relevant to the topic of the emotions. One of these is 感 gǎn, which covers a range of meanings including “feel,” “perceive,” and “emotion.” Another is 懷 huái, which means “bosom, breast,” and harks back to 心 xīn as “heart-mind,” but also as an anatomical organ situated in the thorax.

The chapter of Lǐ known as 礼運 Lìyùn, “Ritual Usage,” includes in its eighteenth section the following passage:

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143 For that, the reader is strongly urged to consult Ing (2012), which does an admirable job at such a difficult and daunting task.
Therefore when it is said that (the ruler being) a sage\textsuperscript{145} can look on all under the sky\textsuperscript{146} as one family, and on all in the Middle states\textsuperscript{147} as one person, this does not mean that he will do so on premeditation and purpose. He must know people’s feelings.\textsuperscript{148} lay open to them what they consider right, show clearly to them what is advantageous, and comprehend what are their calamities. Being so furnished, he is then able to effect the thing. ¶ What are the feelings of humans? They are joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. These seven feelings belong to humans without their learning them. ¶ What are “the things which humans consider right?” Kindness on the part of the father, and filial duty on that of the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and obedience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of the husband, and submission on that of the wife; kindness on the part of elders, and deference on that of juniors; with benevolence on the part of the ruler, and loyalty on that of the minister – these ten are the things which humans consider to be right. Truthfulness in speech and the cultivation of harmony constitute what are called “the things advantageous to men.” Quarrels, plundering, and murders are “the

\textsuperscript{144} The Chinese text is taken from the Chinese Text Project’s site at ctext.org/liji/li-yun (seen 11.29.2021). Ancient copies of the L"ijün would have been written vertically, with the columns read from right to left, not horizontally and left-to-right (as here). The addition of punctuation, and of divisions between phrases, is post-classical, though traditional hanzi are used here. The tonal diacritics in my roman transcription correspond to the pronunciation of modern Putonghua, though of course we do not know precisely how classical Chinese was phonated. Doubtless there were many spoken dialects (and distinct languages) then, as there are now. On the history and development of the Chinese language(s) and writing system(s), see e.g. Ramsey (1987), Norman (1988), Qiu (2000).

Once again I have added pilcrows (¶) in both the Chinese and the English text to mark passages central to our discussion.

\textsuperscript{145} 聖人 shèngrén is a Confucian term for “sage”; it is used with reference to Confucius himself. But 聖人 shèngrén can be found in Imperial Chinese as an honorific for whoever is the current emperor, as the word 聖 shèng also carries connotations of sacredness, which would certainly have attached to the person of the monarch long before the birth of Confucius.

\textsuperscript{146} 天下 tiānxià, “[all] under heaven,” is an idiom meaning “all the people,” whether the entire realm of the monarch, the nation-state of China, or in some cases the whole world. As China came under the unified rule of 秦始皇 Qin Shihuang (259–210 BCE), founder of the Qin dynasty and the first emperor, the term would of course take on added valence. (A relevant though not synonymous term is 天地 tiāndì, “heaven and earth,” i.e. the world.)

\textsuperscript{147} Here we explicitly find 中国 Zhōngguó, the “Middle States,” as a reference to China.

\textsuperscript{148} Here is our term 景 qìng, used without the accompanying 人 rén, though that is implied from its use earlier in the sentence. (We must still underscore the fact that 人 rén means “person/people,” not “man/men,” though the world of ancient China was resolutely androcentric and male-dominated.)
things disastrous to men." ¶ Hence, when a sage/ruler [聖人 shèngrén] would regulate [治 zhì, “manage, govern, control, harness”] the seven human emotions; cultivate the ten virtues that are right; promote truthfulness of speech, and the maintenance of harmony; show his value for kindly consideration and agreeable courtesy; and put away quarrelling and plundering, if he neglect the rules of propriety, how shall he succeed?150

Key to our comparative analysis of analyses, then, is the passage marked by the first pilcrow: “What are the feelings of humans? They are joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. These seven feelings belong to men without their learning them,” which we may break down as follows:

何謂人情? What are the human emotions?

喜怒哀懼愛惡欲 七者 joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking, these seven things

弗學而能 belong to humans without their learning them.

The writer stresses that the emotions are 弗學而能 fú xué ér néng, “not learned but an innate capacity,” which accords well with their origin in the 心 xīn “heart-mind” (and which also recalls the 性 xìng “inborn” attribution of the emotions in the Xunzi).

Now, to the list of seven151 emotions: 喜怒哀懼愛惡欲 joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. Some lexical observations on these:

1. 喜 xǐ “joy” can mean “happiness” or even “delight,” but may also refer to “liking” something (cf. 愛 ài below), a natural connection reminiscent of the Greek ἐδονή.
2. 怒 nù “anger” may sometimes have the simpler (?) connotation of “flourishing.” In any case it carries a valence of intensity.
3. 哀 āi “sadness” may also refer to “pity,” or may be used as the verb for “pitying” or “lamentation/grieving.”
4. 懼 jù “fear” once again contains the radical 心 xīn in compressed form.
5. 愛 ài “to love, be fond of, like, affection, be inclined (to do something), tend to (happen)”
6. 恶 è (alternatively phonated wù or wū) is a complex word. Legge’s smooth translation proffers simple “disliking,” but 恶 è can entail a range of meanings, some of them far more extreme than “disliking” might imply. The hanzi

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149 Not to be confused with 智 zhì, “wisdom, intelligence,” though the pronunciation (including the tone) is identical.

150 The translation is adapted from that of Legge (1885).

151 Throughout traditional Chinese literature, from this earliest period through the Song, there are lists of four, five, six, and seven emotions; on this see Ma/Brakel (2016) 351 n. 40.
is built (not surprisingly) on a base of 心 xīn, “heart-mind,”\(^\text{152}\) and as an adjective can mean “evil,” “fierce,” or even “ugly.” As a verb it can mean “hate,” “loathe,” “harm,” or — revealingly — “fear.” The compound 悪心 éxīn, which repeats the character 心 xīn at full size, can refer to “nausea” or “disgust,” but can also mean “to embarrass” someone deliberately — an egregious (nauseous?) violation of propriety in traditional Chinese culture.

7. 欲 yù “liking” can mean “to desire/wish for.” Another hanzi for yù is 慾, “desire” or “passion,” even “lust.” (Note once again the 心 xīn element at the base of the latter.)

Several salient characteristics emerge from careful scrutiny of this list of terms and their multifarious meanings.

- As with the Greek pathê, these are all passive responses which [a] typically have somatic manifestations as well, and [b] may issue in active responses on the part of the person feeling them. In fact, as the above glossary shows, some of the words may at times take on an active connotation.
- The list cannot be meant to be exhaustive. As with the lists of Plato, Aristotle, and Bharatamuni, this raises the question of how and why the items included have been chosen.
- This consideration of the emotions — those (we would say) supremely personal, individual, private phenomena — is presented in a fundamentally interpersonal — even societal — context. That is to say, these emotions are considered, not only as experienced with reference to other people, but also as they impact social and societal relations. Further, those relations extend (given this context in the Lǐyùn chapter and, more broadly, the Lǐjì as a whole) to the political.

The passage marked by the second pilcrow sheds valuable light on why these seven emotions are examined here:

父慈, 子孝, A kind/gentle [慈 cí] father, a son who practices filial piety [孝 xiào];

兄良, 弟弟, an elder brother who is good/virtuous [良 liáng], a younger brother [ditto];

夫義, 妻聽, a just/righteous [義 yì] husband, a submissive [聽 tīng] wife;

長惠, 幼順, kind [惠 huì] elders, obedient/deferential [順 shùn] juniors;

\(^{152}\) The other element is the glyph 亚 (yà or yǎ), which originally meant “house”; this character is particularly ancient, being found already in oracle-bone inscriptions.
君仁，臣忠，a humane/benevolent [仁 rén] ruler, loyal [忠 zhōng] officials/subjects,

十者 these ten things

謂之人義。 are the things that people consider to be right.

This is a full articulation of the 五常 wǔcháng or “five cardinal [relationships]” that lay the infrastructure for the ideal Confucian society. People “considered these to be right” precisely because they reinscribed and underscored the familial, societal, and political values that made traditional feudal society what it was in Confucius’ time. In a treatise on 礼 lǐ, ritual propriety, it is not coincidental that the focus turns from the realm of the emotions to the public sphere; it is precisely in the latter that ritual is enacted. And when such enactments are undertaken with propriety (lǐ), they are more likely to elicit the appropriate emotions in those present, whether they are enacting or observing the rites.

The third pilcrow marks a curious and significant moment in the text. We were already told that the seven human emotions are 弗學而能 fù xué ér néng, “not learned but an innate capacity”; but here we are told that the shèngrén must not “neglect the rules of propriety” if he is to “manage” (治 zhì) the emotions, as well as cultivating the ten virtues, promoting truthful speech, maintaining harmony, showing his value for kindness and courtesy, and putting away quarreling and plundering. This suggests a fundamental role for 礼 lǐ, not only in governance generally, but for the managing of emotions (presumably his own internal emotions as well as the public expression of his people’s emotions). How ritual and ceremony function in the public sphere, vis-à-vis the emotions as well as in other ways, is an important question regarding all three of the ancient works we have been considering here. So it behooves us to broaden and deepen our understanding of the nature and function of ceremony and ritual.

4 Ritual and Ceremony as Epideictic Events

As we have seen, Aristotle, the great taxonomist, had a passion for classification, and he made no exception in his study of rhetoric. Indeed he analyzes and classifies the component parts of rhetoric in a number of different ways, each designed to answer a different question. For the most part, his answers are ternary:

- What are the three loci of the rhetorical situation? (The rhetor, the audience, and the communicative expression that connects them.)
What are the three rhetorical modes of persuasion? (The arguments from *êthos*, from *pathos*, and from *logos*.)

What are the three kinds of communicative expression? (Deliberative or “political”; judicial or “forensic”; and epideictic or “ceremonial.”)

What are the three aspects of *time* that govern communicative expression? (Past, present, and future, corresponding respectively to judicial, epideictic, and deliberative.)

Sometimes, however, he employs a binary analysis: What are the types of persuasion? (*Entekhnoi* and *atekhnoi* – the “entechnic,” i.e. the rhetorical or artistic, and the “atechnic,” i.e. the non-rhetorical or inartistic.) And sometimes he will overlay a binary (antithetical) division upon a ternary; for example, in his examination of the *purposes* of the three kinds of communicative expression (*Rhetoric* 1.3.3–5), we find a ternary division overlaid by not one but two sets of binary divisions:

- Judicial communication focuses on what is just and what is unjust (*to dikaios* and *to adikon*), via *katêgoria* or *apologia* (accusation or defense);
- Deliberative communication focuses on what is advantageous and what is harmful (*to sumpheron* and *to blaberon*), via *protropê* or *apotropê* (“turning-toward” or “turning-against,” i.e. exhortation or dissuasion);
- Epideictic communication focuses on what is honorable and what is shameful (*to kalon* and *to aiskhron*), via *epainos* or *psogos* (praise or blame).

The binary approach is also found in *Rhetoric* 1.3.2, where we are told that there are two possible kinds of *audience* in the rhetorical situation: those who are called upon to act as judges (*kritai*), and those who are simply observers (*theoroi*). Now if, across this binary division, we distribute his ternary taxonomy of the kinds of rhetoric (judicial, deliberative, and epideictic), we find that the audiences for judicial and deliberative events are judges, whereas the audience for an epideictic event will be composed of observers. In practical terms, this means that the audiences for judicial and deliberative events – for example, the jury in a courtroom trial, and a political assembly, respectively – must render a decision, typically by voting. By contrast, the rhetor’s goal regarding the audience for an epideictic event is simply to induce them to “feel a certain way”; common examples of epideictic events are commencement addresses and funerary eulogies.

In addition to the binary divisions of praise/blame and honorable/shameful, Aristotle discusses epideictic in terms of virtue and vice (*aretê* and *kakia*, e.g. *Rhetoric* 1.9.1 ff.).

The verb *diaitôthi*, it must be noted, does not explicitly refer to feelings or emotions: it means to “dispose,”
All of this is useful and important to understand because, if it is true that every incident of communicative expression is in some sense rhetorical, one would like to have a system that is capable of analyzing all of them in comparable terms. Such a system should be capable of analyzing artistic expression as well. This is not a modern idea: indeed, already in Hermogenes of Tarsus we find the notion of classifying works of art rhetorically as *epideictic*.\(^{155}\) This makes sense, given that the audience is not required to vote on any decision as a result of the experience; rather the effect of a work of art is to inspire some aesthetic response. (The very word “aesthetic,” related to *aisthēsis* or perception, reminds us that the *αἰσθή-* root can have to do with emotions.)\(^{156}\) In this regard it is significant that Aristotle’s word for “observers” – *theōroi* – belongs to a word-group (*θεωρ-*) that can refer specifically to attendance at a religious festival,\(^{157}\) which gives us to recall that comedy, tragedy, and satyr-play arose in ancient Athens as aspects of religious festivals. This also endorses the Hermogenic logic underpinning the assertion that works of art, including enacted dramas and ceremonies, should be categorized rhetorically as epideictic events.

This is not to say that “epideictic” is a simple or pellucid category. Judicial communication, Aristotle tells us, has to do with determining of an action committed in the past; deliberative communication has to do with urging the hearer to some action in the future. But in what does “the present” consist? And what is the ultimate purpose of inducing the audience to “feel a certain way”?

Chaïm Perelman, one of the most important theorists of epideictic since Aristotle, posited that the function of epideictic is to inspire “adherence” to the shared values of a community.\(^{158}\)

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\(^{155}\) Kennedy (2007) 47, note 72, cites Hermogenes’ *On Types of Style*, Chapter 12, as an example.

\(^{156}\) This is the case, for example, in Aristotle’s *Poetics* 1454b 37: ἳ τρίτη διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέοντα τι ἰδόντα.

\(^{157}\) *θεωρός*: e.g. Demosthenes *On the False Embassy* 128, Dionysius of Halicarnassus *On Lysias* 29; *θεωρία*: e.g. Aristophanes *Wasps* 1005, Xenophon *Hieron* 1.12, Plato *Laws* 650a; *θεωρέω*: e.g. Thucydides *Histories* 3.104, Lucian *Timon* 50. The use of *θεωρία* at Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* 802 seems apposite. Cf. also *θεατής* at Aristophanes *Clouds* 575.

\(^{158}\) Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), especially §11–12.
The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience, and to this end he uses the whole range of means available to the rhetorician for purposes of amplification and enhancement. In epidictic oratory every device of literary art is appropriate, for it is a matter of combining all the factors that can promote this communion of the audience [...] Epidictic speeches are most prone to appeal to a universal order, to a nature, or a god that would vouch for the unquestioned, and supposedly unquestionable, values [...] The purpose of an epidictic speech is to increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker. The epidictic speech has an important part to play, for without such common values upon what foundation could deliberative and legal speeches rest?159

Perelman has, in this analysis, not only correctly diagnosed the goal (and mechanism) of epideictic communication, but has also made greater sense of why Aristotle assigns epideictic temporally to the present. In the process, he has also provided us with a way of understanding how our ancient texts address the rhetoric of public, communal, societal enactments such as play performances (in Greek and Sanskrit) or ritual solemnities (in Chinese), all of which share salient dramatic, ceremonial, and indeed religious aspects. Equipped with this understanding, we are able to broaden our analysis beyond the more modern approach of the emotions as as solely private and individual experiences: instead, we may also assess them – as we have seen our Greek, Sanskrit, and Chinese texts do – within the public, communal, societal sphere.

Michael D. K. Ing, in his *The Dysfunction of Ritual in Early Confucianism*, outlines two major theories of ritual: the “correspondence” theory,160 and the “subjunctive” theory.161 The correspondence theory posits that the elements of a ritual correspond ontologically to elements in the world around us. “Paraphrasing Eliade, as was done by the gods, so is done by human beings in the performance of ritual; and as is done in ritual, so will be done in the world.”162 As Ing also notes, the correspondence theory is regularly coupled with a theory of “changelessness”: the notion that ritual can allow people to “identify themselves with invariability and timelessness . . . [thereby resisting] the uncertainty of past and future, life and death. In rituals they become ‘eternal.’”163

The correspondence theory, particularly when coupled with the notion of changelessness, can “lead to a significant problem for ritual performers, especially when they are compelled to explain situations where their rituals do not

160 Associated e.g. with Eliade (1954), Myerhoff (1984), Geertz (2000).
161 Associated e.g. with J. Smith (1980), Seligman (2008).
function as claimed.164 In such situations, they are forced to acknowledge that the world around us does not in fact always correspond to the elements of a ritual, leading to the inference either that they have performed the ritual improperly, or that ritual per se is not efficacious.

The subjunctive theory seeks to cope with this problem of “ritual efficacy”: rather than positing that ritual maintains an ontological correspondence with the world around us, it acknowledges the disconnect between the two, and instead embraces ritual as an enactment of what might or ought to happen – hence the grammar of “subjunctivity” in the label. “Instead of depicting primitive actors as being unaware of the constraints of changing the ordinary world, the performers are depicted as rational agents acting out because of the constraints of changing the ordinary world.”165

Both the “correspondence” theory and the “subjunctive” theory are what we might term semiotic theories of ritual: that is to say, both are systems of understanding ritual as itself a system of signs, where elements of the ritual signify other things – be these aspects of the world around us, or objects of wish or desire on the part of the ritual performers. Against both these theories, while incorporating aspects of each, Ing proposes a new system for understanding ritual, which he names the “tragic” theory: a system, like the correspondence theory, that approaches ritual as “meant to order the dysfunctional [real] world,”166 while also freed from misguided notions of changelessness. Moreover, as with the subjunctive theory, this system equipped the early Confucians (who, in Ing’s view, took an essentially “tragic” approach to ritual) to believe that “ritual could in fact change. Since ritual performers were aware of the loose fit between the ritual world and the dysfunctional world, they turned the failures of ritual into disorienting opportunities valued for their creative and therapeutic power.”167

Stated succinctly, the tragic consciousness of ritual is an awareness of vulnerability, ambiguity, and rupture with the past. Yet this tragic consciousness, rather than working against ritual, instead secures its longevity and efficacy. It allows ritual to remain in different, and even “modern,” contexts and to support claims of efficaciousness. Ritual performers can reaffirm the value of the past while looking to the present and can mobilize the resources of vulnerability and ambiguity in enacting their rites.168

164 Ibid.
165 Ing (2012) 207.
166 Ing (2012) 209.
167 Ibid.
What is the role of emotion in ritual? Arguably a crucial one, which would explain why an analysis of them is included in the Lǐjì. And Ing’s choice of the “tragic” as a name for his theory of ritual reminds us that while drama, in ancient Greece as in ancient India, served, precisely, a ritual function, ritual enactment had conversely a dramatic function in China.

To call for a “tragic” theory of ritual raises the issue (and, perhaps, begs the question) of how to define tragedy itself. This is surely a fool’s errand, but most if not all tragedies do seem to represent their characters as coping (or failing to cope), in one way or another, with what Ing calls the “dysfunctional world.” In the process of experiencing the drama, and in response to that experience, the audience will (as Aristotle so famously notes in his Poetics) themselves experience emotions. So intimately related to the very purpose of the event (tragedy, ritual) are such emotions that all three of the texts we have examined here – in Greek, in Sanskrit, and in Chinese – find it worth addressing them as integral to the experience of the enacted ritual event.

But it is the writer of the Lǐjì passage who, in addressing the emotions – those deeply personal, individual, often private expressions of the self – most directly points up both the public, sociopolitical importance of emotions, and the need for “managing” them appropriately. In the Lǐjì, the answer to this conundrum seems to be: ritual itself. To manage the emotions in a communal ritual context is to take steps, on an individual level, toward appropriately managing the self; to manage the self is to take steps toward appropriately managing the social order as a whole. All of this illuminates the appropriateness of the title of the Lǐjì, the “Record of lǐ.” At the end of the day, ritual in ancient China, as in Greece and India, was constituted as a semiosic system that helped to make the sociopolitical order possible and to keep it in good working order: all three of these cultures reified and mobilized the communal experience of emotions and, thereby, the experience of one’s very humanity as woven into the fabric of society. Given the centrality of this experience, it is no wonder that the Lǐjì, including the “Liyūn” chapter, was traditionally ascribed to none other than Confucius himself.

Perhaps we should not be surprised to find that already in remote antiquity, writers across a vast swath of the globe were grappling with questions not only of how to identify and classify the emotions, but also how to assess the role of

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169 The bibliography is impossibly vast. If, like this fool, you would nonetheless like a few points of entry, you might begin with Else (1967), Kaufmann (1968), Vickers (1973), Nussbaum (1986), Eagleton (2002) and (2020), and Csapo and Miller (2007) – and all their assembled bibliography, back to Plato and Aristotle.
such experiences in the social order. What does, I confess, surprise me is how similar those assessments are. The irresistible next question is whether their analyses share some common source: whether there was even in antiquity some communication between peoples regarding the nature and function of ritual – and of the emotions. The answer to this, we may never know with certainty. But that these disparate and far-flung cultures should all share such similarities of approach takes as given, among other things, that all three cultures shared an ancient respect for the process of rational philosophical analysis – and, more fundamentally, that they also shared a common experience of the human condition. In a world so riven by the vagaries of difference and alienation, this is perhaps a lesson worth remembering in our own day as well.\footnote{I am grateful for having been awarded a senior fellowship at the University of Miami’s Center for the Humanities. In his \textit{Vermischte Bemerkungen}, Ludwig Wittgenstein memorably wrote: “This is how philosophers should greet one another: ‘Take your time’” – and time is, above all, what such a fellowship allows philologers, as well as philosophers, to make progress in their work.

My personal debts are numerous and substantial. Please understand, if I thank these good people for their generous help (in a broad variety of ways), that is not to implicate them in any of my assertions in this essay; still less in my errors: Jaswinder Bolina, Douglas Cairns, Stephen Halsey, He Xiangqian 贺向前, Thomas Martin, Peter Mentzel, Michael Nylan, Michael Puett, Steven Owyoung, Justin Ritzinger, Mihoko Suzuki, Anand Venkatkrishnan, Curie Virag, Robyn Walsh, and Yang Xiao 蕭陽.

Three names must stand outside the alphabetical order, \textit{honoris causa}. These are Robert Wright, Huang Yang 黄洋, and – \textit{sine quo non} – David Konstan. For these three, no amount of thanks can be adequate.}


Else (1967): Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy, Cambridge MA.


Williams (1976): Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, London.

Yiqun Zhou

Gender, Social Hierarchies, and Negative Emotions in Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women

Current discussions of the emotions in early China, which mainly draw upon philosophical writings, rarely touch upon gender.¹ I attempt to remedy the situation by bringing in a different kind of material, Liu Xiang’s (ca. 79–8 BCE) Lienü zhuan (Biographies of Women; hereafter Biographies, cited as LNZ). A collection of short narratives about exemplary women, the Biographies aims at defining female virtue and is a monumental text in Chinese women’s history.²

This paper examines the significance of gender in the display and perception of negative emotions (anger, sadness, and shame) in the Biographies. In particular, it is concerned with how gender is relevant to the nuanced ways in which these emotions are involved in expressing and navigating social hierarchies. By “negative” emotions I mean those that create an unpleasant physiological and psychological experience in the person undergoing them, and they also typically elicit disagreeable reactions from the person who witnesses them or is at the receiving end. As such, negative emotions are normally the objects of control and avoidance, although this is not necessarily always the case. In fact, all three emotions to be examined in this paper could be positively embraced and may have welcome moral benefits when manifested by the right person for the right reason under the right circumstances.³ Whether they are disapproved and shunned or potentially beneficial and countenanced, negative emotions, in their expression and reception, are deeply embedded in power relations.⁴

The Biographies possesses certain unique merits as a source for investigating gender and emotion. While Liu Xiang’s protagonists are women, in most of the biographies they are shown interacting with men, and the narrative form of

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² On the question of these stories’ status as putative biographies, see Raphals (1998) 24–26.
³ For a collection of studies on the cognitive, moral, and social benefits of negative emotions, see Parrott (2014).
⁴ For a general discussion of the roles of emotions in status attainment and hierarchy negotiation, see Steckler/Tracy (2014).

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the accounts provides good contexts for interpreting the characters’ emotions. There is no other early Chinese text in which men and women interact as extensively and frequently. In comparison with philosophical writings, the narrative contexts of the biographies also enable us to inquire about the emotions without being overly constrained by terminological considerations. For example, in one of the biographies, a woman who is disappointed with her husband flings the basket she is carrying to the ground and walks out on him then and there. The word “angry” (or any of its cognates) does not appear in the account, but she is clearly very upset, and I discuss her action as a manifestation of anger. Another example concerns sadness. There are many instances in which a person weeps and clearly intends to convey sorrow but is not explicitly said to be sad. I include these cases as expressions of sadness.

The didactic nature of the Biographies certainly imposes considerable limitations on its usefulness for an inquiry about gender and emotions in early China. However, it is far from the case that every detail of the narratives of the Biographies has been tasked with a didactic function. When the narrator is not deliberately trying to make a point about how things ought to be, his account offers us opportunities to tease out information about what things might actually have been like. Moreover, many of the stories in the Biographies are put together from earlier historical writings, and they are as useful as any early Chinese historical writings in helping us grasp not only norms and ideals but also practices. In short, comparison between representations of female and male vehicles of negative emotions in the Biographies demonstrates the importance of gender for understanding the relationship between power and emotion in early China, mainly as a normative construct but also offering many insights into the lived reality. Moreover, the portrayal of the female paragons’ display of and response to anger, sadness, and shame in this paradigmatic text in Chinese women’s history will contribute to our understanding of the positive side of negative emotions.

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6 This consideration helps account for the exclusion of jealousy, an emotion that is normally perceived and condemned as a purely negative emotion and is presented as such in the Biographies, from this brief study.
1 Anger

In the Biographies there are twelve instances in which men display anger and five in which there is an angry woman. It seems to make sense that there are many more angry men than women, because the free expression of anger, the "prototypical negative emotion,"\textsuperscript{7} is the privilege of those in a relative position of power, and there are more men occupying such positions of power.\textsuperscript{8} The following shows the identities of the angry men, the objects of their indignation, and the reasons for their anger:

\textit{LNZ 1.1:} Father of Shun the legendary king (the story takes place when Shun is not yet king but already enjoys considerable standing in the community because of his virtue and abilities. The father is a wicked man who simply hates his virtuous son and does all sorts of things to hurt him, even going so far as to conspire with his wife to kill their filial son. We are told that the parents cannot stop being angry with Shun, but Shun, despite being deeply sad, never relaxes his filial devotion.)

\textit{LNZ 5.10:} A minister in the state of Zhou (his wife, who is having an affair with a neighbor, tries to kill the minister by serving him poisoned wine. The concubine is charged with presenting the wine to the minister. Wishing neither to kill her master nor to inform on her mistress, the concubine pretends to trip and spills all of the wine. He is enraged at the concubine’s apparent clumsiness and has her flogged.)

\textit{LNZ 6.3:} Duke Ping of Jin (his bow-maker has spent three years making a new bow for the duke. When the duke draws the bow and shoots, he fails to penetrate even one layer of armor. Angry at this, the duke orders that the bow-maker be killed.)

\textit{LNZ 6.5:} A minister in Chu (when his carriage is passing a woman’s carriage on a narrow path, their wheels knock against each other and as a result the axle rod of his carriage is broken. The minister becomes angry and is about to seize and whip the woman.)

\textit{LNZ 6.7:} Zhao Jianzi, the chief councilor of the state of Jin (he leads his army to a ferry and expects to be ferried across the river, but the ferry official is drunk and cannot perform his duties. Zhao Jianzi becomes angry and wants to kill him.)

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\textsuperscript{7} Hess (2014) 55.

\textsuperscript{8} On the long-standing double standard in the perception of male and female fury, see Traister (2018). In her exploration of the positive side to anger, Hess (2014) acknowledges that the situation is not quite the same for women as for men.
*LNZ 7.2:* King Zhou, the last ruler of the Shang Dynasty (his infatuation with a favorite consort leads him to engage in extravagant, irresponsible, and brutal behaviors that alienate the people and cause the vassal lords to rebel. Angry with a loyal minister who remonstrates with him, and abetted by the depraved consort, the king has the minister’s heart opened.

*LNZ 7.5:* Duke Huan of Lu (his wife, Wen Jiang, repeatedly engages in an incestuous affair with her own brother, Duke Xiang of Qi. The enraged Duke Huan tries to stop her but to no avail.)

*LNZ 7.10:* Duke Ling of Qi (his wife commits adultery with a minister. When another minister finds out about the affair and is about to investigate it, the duchess trumps up charges against him and accuses him of plotting to oust Duke Ling. The duke becomes angry and punishes the alleged conspirators, exiling two of them and cutting off the feet of another.)

*LNZ 7.11:* Cui Zhu, minister of Qi, and his two sons by his first wife, named Cheng and Qiang (Cui Zhu denies a request by Cheng because of the objection of his new wife’s brother and her son from a previous marriage. Cheng and Qiang become angry and kill the two “outsiders” who insert themselves into the Cui family’s affairs. This in turn makes Cui Zhu angry, and his retaliation results in the deaths of Cheng and Qiang.)

*LNZ 7.12:* Duke Ling of Wei (his wife commits adultery with a prince of her native state. This comes to the knowledge of Duke Ling’s crown prince and incurs his displeasure. The duchess slanders the crown prince to Duke Ling, alleging that he wants to kill her. Duke Ling becomes very angry, causing the crown prince to flee out of the state.)

In all of the cases above, the angry man is in a position of power over the object of his anger and he becomes angry because the other person has encroached upon the privileges reserved for himself or has disobeyed his wishes in any number of ways, including failure to meet job performance expectations. Of these, there are only two instances in which the man’s anger is not described in a negative light. One involves Duke Huan of Lu, whose anger at his incestuous and adulterous wife appears to be the normal reaction of any man. The other concerns Zhao Jianzi, who gets angry at the ferry official because the latter is in a drunken stupor and cannot fulfill his duty to ferry the army across the river. Here the military commander’s anger seems justified. In yet another two cases, those featuring Cheng and Qiang, the two disaffected sons of Cui Zhu, their anger at their stepmother’s brother and son from a previous marriage for taking away Cui Zhu’s love for them and for interfering in the Cui family’s affairs, is also understandable in the context of contemporary lineage rules, although the way they take out their anger and its consequences are horrendous and do not warrant great sympathy.
As for the other eight cases, they all feature an angry man who is rash, foolish, abusive, and unreasonable. The father of Shun has no redeeming qualities. He is just an evil old man, whom the most loving and obedient son in the world can only manage to displease and enrage. Duke Ping of Jin gets angry at the bow-maker and sentences him to death, not realizing that his own lack of skills, not the quality of the new bow, is the reason why he cannot even pierce through one layer of armor. The enraged minister of Zhou has his concubine flogged because she has tripped and spilled the wine, but he does not know that she has deliberately done that to save him from being poisoned; even without this knowledge, his reaction is excessive. The minister of Zheng flies into a rage and wants to whip the woman whose carriage collides with his on a narrow path, when she has already moved over as far as she could while he is not willing to give way in the least. Duke Ling of Qi becomes angry and punishes his officials harshly, not knowing that his wife has trumped up charges against them because they constitute obstacles to her adultery (like Duke Ling of Qi, Duke Ling of Wei succumbs to the lie of his adulterous wife and gets angry at the crown prince, causing him to flee and plunging the state into a long period of instability). Cui Zhu, becoming mad when he learns that his two sons by his first wife have killed his new wife’s brother and her son from a previous marriage, organizes an attack on his two sons and ends up killing them both; one cannot fail to be struck by the total senselessness in this family tragedy driven by the indignation of a few angry men. In short, in all these examples, the angry man suffers from a lack of good judgment, due to a combination of his being accustomed to having his wishes obeyed vis-à-vis his social inferiors and the loss of his senses under the assault of strong emotions. It can be said that, when displayed by men, anger generally appears as a highly negative emotion in the *Biographies.*

Most of the objects of anger in the twelve examples above are men, but two are women. One of them, the concubine of the minister of Zhou, endures his anger and flogging without explaining her clumsy handling of the wine. She chooses endurance, not because she is meek, but because telling the truth will destroy her mistress. The other, the woman who faces a whipping by the minister of Zheng after the collision of their carriages, stands up against him and points out to him how badly he has behaved on a number of fronts. He has not made the least attempt to make room while she has moved her carriage to the far side of the road; his driver is to blame for the damage thus caused to his carriage but he takes out his anger on her, who is innocent; his seizing her and wanting to whip her shows that he has failed to live up to the standards of conduct for a man in a ministerial position and is merely a bully picking on the weak and vulnerable. The woman’s reproach makes the minister ashamed of himself; he releases her and even asks her to return with him (i.e., marry him),
but she answers that she is already married. In this story, while the angry minister behaves as an arrogant and inconsiderate man, the woman puts him in his place by making him realize how unjustified and unbecoming his rage is.

In two other examples where a man is the object of a powerful man’s ire, it is a woman who steps forward to defend and rescue the victim. When Duke Ping of Jin is about to have the bow-maker killed, the hapless man’s wife requests an audience with the ruler and successfully convinces him that he has made a wrong decision. She first cites famous benevolent rulers in history to make the point that a good ruler should not harm innocent people. Then she explains how much work and what fine material went into the making of the new bow, with the conclusion that the problem cannot possibly be with the bow and that it must be because the duke does not know how to shoot. After receiving some coaching from the woman on archery, the duke pierces through seven layers of armor, and he immediately sets the bow-maker free and rewards him with gold. In the other example, when Zhao Jianzi is about to kill the intoxicated ferry official, the drunkard’s daughter pleads with the irate commander. She first explains that her father drank because he was sacrificing to the river deity in prayer for safe passage for the army that was going to cross the river and he was unfortunately overcome by the alcohol—indeed, he meant well. Next she offers to die in her father’s place, but Zhao Jianzi denies her request, saying that she is not the guilty party. Then she asks to delay administering the death penalty until the culprit has woken up, because it would be pointless to punish a man when he is not even conscious. Persuaded by her reasoning and also impressed by her courage and filial devotion, Zhao Jianzi releases the ferry official.

In the two stories just recounted, the male characters are portrayed rather differently, with Duke Ping appearing dim-witted, and Zhao Jianzi reasonable, but they both serve as foils for the brave and intelligent heroines. The bow-maker’s wife tells Duke Ping straightforwardly that he is “absurd” in blaming the bow instead of himself for his poor performance, and she then proves herself correct by showing him how to improve his archery skills. Thanks to her forceful argument and the satisfactory result she brings, the woman turns the angry duke into a happy man, winning not only her husband’s release but also a handsome reward. The ferry official’s daughter faces a different situation (her father is indeed guilty of dereliction of duties and Zhao Jianzi is not being dumb and whimsical), and she approaches it differently. She starts out trying to appease Zhao Jianzi by explaining the mitigating circumstances of her father’s inebriation, then she offers to die in his stead, and when that is declined, she comes up with the most sensible argument that the punishment be stayed until the drunkard has regained consciousness and is able to realize what he
has done wrong. Her pleading is so earnest, smart, and compelling that it effectively assuages Zhao Jianzi’s anger and secures a pardon for her father.

The stories of the bow-maker’s wife and the woman who argues with a minister over a traffic accident praise women whose courage and intelligence enable them to criticize and check the unjustified anger of powerful but unwise and undisciplined men. The story of the ferry official’s daughter, by eulogizing her filial piety and her successful handling of the crisis, also portrays Zhao Jianzi in a positive light, inasmuch as he is wise and compassionate enough to react favorably to the young woman’s pleading and allow his emotions to change from anger to appreciation and eventually to admiration (after further interaction, he realizes that she is the woman he wants to marry and he proposes). This openness and flexibility is depicted as the trait of a good leader.

In view of the generally negative way in which anger is portrayed in the *Biographies* in the case of men, we might well expect the same of the images of its female protagonists. Indeed, the biography of Mencius’ mother, famous in Chinese history for the teaching and guidance that she gave her son, the future Second Sage, concludes by praising her as follows, “The Gentleman says that Mencius’ mother understands the Way of Women. As it is stated in the *Odes*, ‘With agreeable looks and smiles, teaching without anger’ (*LNZ* 1.11). As commonly understood, the verses quoted to lend approval for Mencius’ mother were originally composed as a eulogy of a duke in the seventh century BCE who influenced and taught his people with his gentle and graceful manners. Judging from the wording of the passage from the *Biographies*, it seems that, whereas “teaching without anger” is an ideal for both men and women who are in a position to influence and guide others, it is particularly true of women. Mencius’ mother, who fits that model, is commended as someone who “understands the Way of Women.”

The ideal notwithstanding, of course women got angry, just as men did. Now we move on to women who are represented as displaying anger in the *Biographies*. There are five of them:

*LNZ* 1.1: Mother of Shun (she is a full accomplice of her husband in hating and mistreating their model of filial son. She shares in his “non-stop anger” at Shun.)

*LNZ* 1.9: Jing Jiang (her son Wenbo, who is a minister in Lu, feasts guests at home. One of them is offended and leaves the banquet when he is served a tortoise that is small. Jing Jiang becomes angry when she learns of this, scolds Wenbo for being stingy, and expels him from the house. It is only five days later that she allows him back, after a minister has interceded on his behalf.)

*LNZ* 2.9: Mother of Dazi (her son, who is serving as an official, has not garnered a good reputation for his performance but has greatly enriched himself. When he returns home for a visit with great fanfare, relatives all congratulate...
him, but his wife alone weeps. This makes the mother angry. The wife explains her concern that Dazi’s self-enrichment and poor acquittal of his government duties may lead to a disaster, and she asks to leave with her young son. The indignant mother drives her away.

_LNZ_ 2.14: Wife of Laolai the hermit (when the king visits Laolai and invites him to take up a government post, he consents. When Laolai’s wife returns from work outside and learns what has happened, she reproaches him for giving up freedom to be someone’s slave and says that she cannot join him in that lifestyle. She throws the basket she is carrying to the ground and walks away. He implores her to stay and promises to reconsider. They go into hiding together.)

_LNZ_ 7.10: Wife of Duke Ling of Qi (already encountered above. When her affair with a minister is discovered by several of his colleagues and he stops meeting with her for a long time, she becomes angry at them and accuses them of trying to overthrow Duke Ling, with the result that the duke cuts off the feet of one of the offending ministers and sends the other two into exile.)

As can be seen from this summary, women in power can be just as abusive, unreasonable, and foolish in exhibiting anger as their male counterparts. Shun’s mother is consistently mentioned along with his father in the biography’s account of the persecution he endures from his evil parents. Dazi’s mother is angry at her son’s wife and expels her, because she fails to appreciate the daughter-in-law’s discernment and concern; the irony is that only one year later Dazi and his entire family are put to death for graft, the mother being the only one who is spared because of her old age, and at this juncture the divorced daughter-in-law returns with her young son to take care of the mother. The wife of Duke Ling of Qi gets angry at those who impede her pursuit of an affair and takes relentless revenge against them. The victims in these examples include an adult son, a daughter-in-law, and a husband’s male subordinates. The actions of the angry women and the identities of the objects of their rage show that the experience and display of anger are first and foremost represented as an expression of power relationships, in which gender is not an independent determinant. Within the family, generational seniority takes precedence over gender hierarchy. Outside the family, a woman, by virtue of the high status enjoyed by her male kin, may well feel that she is entitled to express and act on her anger against those in a lower position. Notably, of the three examples, only the wife of Duke Ling is overtly condemned for her actions (adultery and revenge), whereas the rage of Shun’s mother and Dazi’s mother receives neither protest from the objects of their anger nor criticism from the narrator but rather serves to bring out the unconditional devotion and obedience of the filial son and daughter-in-law.
If we look back at the reception of the anger displayed by men in the *Biographies*, we find that Shun’s father and Zhao Jianzi are the only two men whose expression of anger elicits neither explicit criticism from the narrator nor resistance from the person upon whom the anger is visited. Zhao Jianzi receives this distinction because, as I have argued, his anger is both justified and open to palliation. The case of Shun’s father, on the other hand, is of the same nature as those of Shun’s mother and Dazi’s mother. Taken together, they suggest that, whereas rulers, masters, and other people of high social standing (both male and female) can all be subjected to explicit criticism and outspoken protest for their improper display of anger, parents are to a great extent spared moral stricture for the expression of anger. As shown by the cases of Shun and Dazi’s wife, the totally unreasonable indignation of bad and stupid parents turns out to provide the ultimate test and indisputable proof of the filial piety of the son and daughter-in-law.\(^9\)

We still need to examine the two remaining examples of angry women in the *Biographies*: Jing Jiang, who gets mad at her son Wenbo for failing his duties in hospitality, and Laolai’s wife, who angrily leaves her husband because he has accepted a government position and abandoned the eremitic ideal. Jing Jiang’s biography is the longest in Liu Xiang’s text, and the length itself is an index of his esteem for this meticulous, austere and strong-willed aristocratic matron living in sixth-century BCE Lu. In the episode in question, as in several other narrative components in the *Biographies*, she receives unreserved praise for teaching her son moral principles and correcting his misconduct. Offending a guest because of the size of a dish and earning a reputation for being stingy is extremely ill-advised, and a principled matriarch like Jing Jiang cannot tolerate the harm that such a petty incident would cause to her distinguished house. So she reacts swiftly and imposes a severe punishment on Wenbo, intending it as a highly visible gesture to the public of the family’s determination to uphold the strictest standards in the observation of social protocol. It takes five days and then with the intercession of a minister to pacify Jing Jiang’s rage and allow the recall of Wenbo. In Liu Xiang’s narrative, Jing Jiang’s fury over Wenbo’s faux pas is righteous, necessary, and well-measured, wholly befitting a high-minded female guardian of an aristocratic house. In view of the fact that

\(^9\) In the tragedy involving Cui Zhu’s family, if the two sons had refrained from becoming angry over the favorite treatment that Cui Zhu gives his new wife’s brother and son from a previous marriage, the series of bloody events that lead to the destruction of the family would not have happened. Cui Zhu’s fury is an insane reaction to the consequences of his sons’ angry actions. Of course, in Liu Xiang’s narrative, Cui Zhu’s new wife is the primary culprit blamed for causing utter chaos in the family.
terrible parents such as Shun’s father and mother are spared despite the emotional abuse they inflict on their son and their incessant rage, because the purpose of the narrative is to demonstrate Shun’s filial piety, it is not surprising that Jing Jiang’s fury, which is for the good of her son and the family and expressed in the right manner, should be depicted as evidence of her impeccable virtue.

In Liu Xiang’s account of the interaction between Laolai and his wife, we encounter something new: a wife getting angry at her husband and walking out on him as soon as she has made her disappointment clear. Laolai’s wife is praised for her firm dedication to the lofty principle of eremitism, which provides a model for her husband and prevents him from deviating from their common ideal. There are many female exemplars in the Biographies who advise, remonstrate with, and challenge their husbands, but none is as feisty and free-spirited as Laolai’s wife in so doing. Whereas the other wives typically offer their opinions and suggestions out of consideration for the interest and honor of the family represented by their husbands, Laolai’s wife sees herself as an equal partner and independent individual vis-à-vis her husband. Only such a wife can react to her husband’s acceptance of a king’s invitation with an instant and vigorous expression of her rejection of him and simultaneous declaration of her independence and freedom. Her anger testifies to the self-assured and non-negotiable nature of her moral commitment, and Laolai’s pleading for her to stay and his pledge to change his mind for her sake bespeaks the power of her anger and his acknowledgement of her moral superiority. Other male characters in the Biographies, when they endorse the advice of a remonstrating woman, usually convey their approval by terse phrases such as “Great” and “Wonderful,” acting as social superiors wisely and graciously accepting the well-meaning input of their subordinates.

2 Sadness

Reversing the ratio of 12:5 in the numbers of men and women displaying anger in the Biographies, the same text shows three males and eleven females expressing sadness (I use the shedding of tears as the index of sadness). Just as the gender ratio in the manifestation of anger is indicative of the power differential between men and women as well as the different social expectations for male and female

10 On the association of eremitism with freedom and independence in early Chinese culture, see Vervoon (1990).
conduct, it also makes sense that there are many more sad females than males, because the expression of sadness reveals a person’s weakness and vulnerability, conditions that are more often associated with women than men.

The three males in tears are:

*LNZ* 1.1: Shun (treated to his parents’ never-ending anger, Shun goes out into the fields, wailing and weeping, and calling out to Heaven and his parents. Despite such suffering, however, Shun’s devotion and love for his parents is never diminished.)

*LNZ* 3.5: Sunshu Ao (when Sunshu Ao the boy sees a two-headed snake, he kills it and buries it. Returning home and seeing his mother, he weeps, because he has heard that those who have laid their eyes on two-headed snakes will die. When the mother finds out that the boy has killed and buried the snake to prevent other people from seeing it again, she assures him that because of this good deed he not only will not die but also is destined to rise to eminence. Indeed, Sunshu Ao will become the country’s chief counselor when he grows up.)

*LNZ* 4.12: Son of the concubine of a lord in Wei (the lord dies, leaving behind his childless wife and the concubine, who has a son. The concubine serves the wife diligently. After eight years have passed, the wife feels that, as a childless woman, she does not deserve such treatment from the concubine, the mother of the family’s heir, and she offers to move out. The concubine will not hear of it. After some back and forth between the two women, the concubine withdraws and plans to commit suicide because she cannot stand the idea of having the wife move out, which would constitute a violation of the hierarchy between wife and concubine. The concubine’s son weeps and tries to stop her, but she will not listen. The wife is frightened by this turn of events and agrees to stay.)

All three cases above involve a son crying either in the presence of a parent or for reasons related to his parents, who command indisputable authority over their children. The weeping of Sunshu Ao, a young boy who has just encountered a strange creature and believes that he is going to die, befits the behavior of a normal child under those circumstances. Rather than a comment on Sunshu Ao, this story is intended to praise the mother’s perspicacity, which enables her to discredit what is apparently a popular belief, as she affirms the boy’s good deed and correctly predicts a great future for him. The power relationship between the crying little boy and the mother as a consoler and guide in this narrative is clear. We are not told the age of the Wei concubine’s son, who tearfully pleads with his mother not to kill herself. He does seem to be devoted to his mother and concerned with her welfare, but begging is the only thing he can do, and his earnestly expressed wishes are overruled. It takes a gesture
from the wife, who occupies a higher position in the family hierarchy than the concubine and whose seniority is precisely what the concubine is willing to uphold at the cost of her own life, to resolve the crisis.

It can be argued that the sons’ expressions of sadness in the above two examples reflect the power dynamics between mothers and sons but are not endowed with special moral significance. It is a different case in Shun’s story. Shun, subjected to senseless persecution from his parents, expresses his pain – but also his acceptance – by leaving the house to cry in the fields. While we may think that wailing and weeping may have performed a cathartic function and enabled Shun to carry on as the unconditionally loving son, to early Chinese readers his tears no doubt are pure testament to his deep and unwavering filial piety. The subdued sorrow that Shun, who has already been identified as a potential successor to the ruler of the realm, expresses in reaction to his horrible parents shows that filial piety is regarded as an immutable, life-long duty. Shun’s example demonstrates that, whether a male is a boy or an adult, he is in an inferior and vulnerable position vis-à-vis his parents, and his showing it by tears is not only socially acceptable but is regarded as persuasive evidence of his devotion and obedience, qualities of a good son.

Now we come to the women who express sadness in the Biographies. They are listed in the following:

*LNZ* 1.7: Ding Jiang of Wei (her son died soon after getting married. After his wife has observed three years of mourning for him, Ding Jiang sends her back to her natal family. As she accompanies the young woman to the outskirts of the city, Ding Jiang’s heart is filled with affection and sorrow. Waving goodbye to the departing traveler, Ding Jiang weeps and composes a poem to express her sorrow.)

*LNZ* 1.13: the Loving Mother in Wei (married to Mang Mao, she has three sons. Mang Mao’s previous wife left behind five sons, none of whom feels any affection for their stepmother, despite the fact that she goes out of her way to treat them with love, at the expense of her own children. Then one of those five sons commits a capital offense. The Loving Mother is so sad that she loses a great deal of weight, and she works day and night in an effort to save him. Moved by her genuine love for her stepson, the king grants her appeal. From then on the five sons all become attached to her.)

*LNZ* 2.9: Wife of Dazi of Tao (encountered before. When everybody else is celebrating her husband’s apparent success in office, she weeps and her angry mother-in-law expels her.)

*LNZ* 3.9: Mother of Zang Wenzhong of Lu (before her son goes on a diplomatic mission to Qi, she warns him of the dangers that are in store for him on this trip. It turns out that Wenzhong indeed is arrested in Qi. He sends a secret
missive to the duke of Lu, writing it in a cryptic language for fear of its being intercepted. The duke asks Wenzhong’s mother to help decipher the letter. She reads it and starts weeping, as she understands from it that her son is in shackles.)

*LNZ* 4.8: Wife of Qiliang (after her husband dies in a battle, she wails over his body for ten days, so sorrowfully that the city wall collapses. Having no children or close relatives, she commits suicide after completing the funerary rites for her husband.)

*LNZ* 4.12: Concubine of the Lord of Wei (encountered above. When the childless wife feels that she does not deserve to be waited upon by the loyal concubine and wants to move out, the concubine weeps and begs to be allowed to continue performing her duties to the rightful mistress of the household.)

*LNZ* 5.7: Lady Zhao of Dai (her brother murders her husband by a ruse. When the news reaches her, she weeps, cries out to Heaven, and kills herself with a sharpened hairpin.)

*LNZ* 5.8: Righteous Stepmother of Qi (her son and stepson are both present at the scene of a murder, and they both confess to the crime. Still unable to determine who the real killer is after a year, the authorities ask the mother to pick a son to be sentenced to death. The mother, weeping, chooses her own son. When asked why, she answers that she promised her deceased husband to take care of his previous wife’s son and she must keep the promise.)

*LNZ* 5.13: Righteous mother and daughter of Zhuya (the mother has a nine-year-old boy, her own son, and a thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. When her husband dies while serving as a magistrate in Zhuya, which is famous for its pearls, the three travel back home with his casket. The boy places some large pearls in his mother’s toiletry case, not knowing that it is against the law to take pearls out of the region. When the pearls are discovered by customs officials, mother and daughter vie to claim responsibility, each thinking that the other is guilty. As they argue and try to shield each other, they both become emotional and start weeping.)

*LNZ* 6.15: Ti Ying (she is the youngest of her father’s five daughters. He has been convicted of a crime and is due to receive corporal punishment. When he is about to be taken to the capital for punishment, he laments that he has no

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12 We are told that all passersby are moved to tears. Partly because the gender makeup of these people is unknown and partly because they are not the story’s main actors, I have not included them in the case count.

13 Also moved to tears are witnesses of the scene, from those in the funeral cortège, to bystanders, to the customs official. For reasons indicated in note 12, these people are not included in the case count.
son and curses his daughters for being of no use to him at this difficult time. Weeping sorrowfully, Ti Ying follows her father into the capital and submits a memorial to the emperor begging for leniency. Moved by her argument, the emperor issues an edict to abolish corporal punishment.

*LNZ 7.7:* Li Ji of Jin (the favorite consort of Duke Xian of Jin, Li Ji has given birth to two sons and schemes to alienate the duke from his other sons. One night, she weeps. When the duke inquires about the reason, she asks him to put her to death because the crown prince has purportedly accused her of infatuating his father and endangering the state. As the conversation continues, Li Ji successfully instills in the duke fears and suspicions about the crown prince. As a result of her slandering, the crown prince and two other of the duke’s sons end up committing suicide or fleeing the state.

Of the eleven cases, two involve simple and straightforward expression of feelings between parents and children: a mother who cries upon learning that her son is in prison (*LNZ 3.9*), and a daughter who weeps for her father who has been convicted of a crime and is being taken to the capital to receive punishment (*LNZ 6.15*). There does not seem to be much to say about these two cases, except that they represent a small portion of the eleven examples, the rest of which all have something less simple and straightforward about them.

The uniqueness of Li Ji’s example is obvious. Unlike any of the other cases of crying women, in which the emotion is undoubtedly genuine, Li Ji feigns sad-ness in order to win the duke’s attention and sympathy, portraying herself as a weak victim and impressing upon him that, if he does not take proactive action against the crown prince, he, as her protector, will be toppled in the son’s alleged plot to get rid of her bad influence on the duke and the state. Li Ji’s shedding of tears is manipulative, taking advantage of its show of vulnerability, helplessness, and submissiveness to beseech the duke’s good will and protection.

At first glance, there is no resemblance between Li Ji and the other crying women, but the just-mentioned basic signification of tears in fact helps explain the preponderance of one broad type of human relationship in the ten cases. From the relationship between stepmothers and the children of their husbands’ previous marriages in *LNZ* 1.13, 5.8, and 5.13, to the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in *LNZ* 1.7, to the relationship between wife and concubine in *LNZ* 4.12, they alert us to the major inherent fault lines in the Chinese family, where tensions and conflicts are rife and diligent management is necessary. Whereas a biological mother such as Jing Jiang can be stern, over-bearing, and angry in teaching and disciplining her son and invite no suspicion about her love for him but receive applause for her guidance, stepmothers are susceptible to such suspicions and criticisms, and they have to go out of their way to prove themselves. The stepmother in each of the three examples under
discussion is exceptionally kind to her stepchildren, to the extent of being willing to sacrifice her own life or the welfare and lives of her own children. The tears they shed in the stories do not merely capture the emotionally charged moments in the dramatic episodes depicted, but they also point us to the tremendous emotional investment these stepmothers have put into their relationship with their stepchildren on a daily basis. Their tears bespeak their love and also their vulnerability and struggle as they negotiate an inherently difficult family relationship. Our earlier examination of both anger and sadness demonstrated the superiority that mothers enjoy over children of either gender and any age. The current discussion complicates the picture by revealing the different situation faced by stepmothers.

Similarly, the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is fraught with tension. The praise that Ding Jiang receives for showing deep sorrow and affection for her widowed daughter-in-law reminds us of the difficulty that often accompanies this relationship and suggests that, instead of always appearing as the authority figure vis-à-vis her son’s wife, a good mother-in-law is one who would allow herself to be emotionally vulnerable before the younger woman under her charge. The relationship between concubine and wife, two women of the same generation competing for the attention and affection of the same man and over the status and interest of their offspring, is even more problematic than the one between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. The Wei concubine’s devoted service to the wife and the wife’s appreciation both for the concubine’s personal loyalty and for her reproductive contribution to the preservation of the family line make them an exemplary pair. The concubine’s shedding of tears at the wife’s attempt to move out sends two messages at once: it is a strong indication of her devotion to the wife, and it also conveys her respect and submissiveness – as she states in her speech, the wife’s moving out would condemn the concubine to being an inauspicious transgressor of the family hierarchy. The concubine’s tears testify to the depth and firmness of her adherence to the prescribed hierarchy.

In short, in as many as five examples, the crying women are in intrinsically challenging family relationships, and their strong expression of sadness both signals their difficult position and suggests that demonstration of their emotional vulnerability could stand them in good stead and earn them approbation for their handling of a delicate relationship. Men, living in patrilocal, patrilineal and patriarchal households, are spared most of the huge practical and emotional challenges of the relationships just examined.

In the remaining two examples, a wife commits suicide after the death of her husband. Her tears testify to her fierce loyalty to her husband and serve as a prelude to her decision to take her own life. While Lady Zhao’s suicide is
recorded in earlier texts (The Annals of Lü Buwei and Records of the Grand Historian), Qiliang’s wife is not said to have killed herself in any other source. The celebration of ethically motivated female suicide is a new phenomenon in the Biographies, and arguably represents the most innovative and influential part of Liu Xiang’s didactic project. In portraying his new heroines who commit suicide in honor of moral principles (including wifely fidelity), Liu Xiang seems to have relied upon three practices: inventing such a woman ex nihilo (though we cannot discount the possibility that she is mentioned in sources no longer extant), taking a preexisting female character and reporting suicide as her way of death, and giving speeches to a known female suicide allowing the reader insight into her motivations and moral understanding. The second and third of these apply to Liu Xiang’s narratives about Qiliang’s wife and Lady Zhao respectively. In other words, while it is natural for a wife to weep and mourn her dead husband, Liu Xiang makes it unusual by enthusiastically lauding women whose intense weeping and mourning precedes the ultimate action that earns them a place in his roster of paragons.

3 Shame

“Shame” translates three terms in the Biographies, can 憾, chi 耻, and kui 媿. The following shows the usage of the three terms in the Biographies:

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<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
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<tr>
<td>Can</td>
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<td>Chi</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kui</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
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The nine instances in which a man is said to feel ashamed:

LNZ 1.14: Tian Ji, chief councilor of Qi (he receives a monetary bribe from a subordinate and presents it to his mother. She reproaches him for his failure to be a loyal minister of his lord, announces that he is not her son, and asks him

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14 On the techniques Liu Xiang employed to reshape his sources, see Hinsch (2007) and Kinney (2014) xxxi-xxxii.
to leave. Feeling ashamed, Tian Ji returns the bribe and requests punishment from the king.)

_LNZ_ 4.9: King Helü of Wu (Wu conquers Chu, and King Zhao of Chu flees. King Helü enters the Chu palace and takes all of the palace women as his consorts. When he comes to Bo Ying, however, she holds a sword in her hand and rebuffs him with a long speech about the impropriety of his action and her determination to defend her honor. King Helü feels ashamed and withdraws from Bo Ying’s quarters.)

_LNZ_ 5.9: Qiu Hu (five days after his wedding, Qiu Hu leaves home for a government post in another state. Five years later, he returns for a visit. Before reaching home, he takes a fancy to a woman picking mulberry leaves by the roadside and tries to seduce her, but she rejects his advances. When he gets home, he discovers that the mulberry picker is none other than his own wife, and he feels ashamed.)

_LNZ_ 5.14: Ren Yanshou (he secretly murdered his wife’s brother over a family dispute but escaped punishment because of a general amnesty. He subsequently reveals his secret to his wife and asks her to kill him in revenge or to leave with all of his property. She rejects both options, saying that a wife cannot kill her husband, nor does a woman who fails to avenge the death of her brother have a reason to continue living. Feeling ashamed, Yanshou leaves home and does not dare to face his wife.)

_LNZ_ 6.5: The Chu minister involved in a traffic dispute with a woman (encountered above. She criticizes him for failing to measure up to the standards for the conduct of a minister. He feels ashamed and releases her.)

_LNZ_ 6.11: King Min of Qi (while on an outing, he meets an ugly but intelligent and virtuous mulberry picker. Impressed, he wants to make her his consort and orders that she ride back with him to his palace, but she rejects this plan, because a proper marriage has to be arranged by parents. The king feels ashamed and proceeds to follow the relevant ritual protocol for the making of a marriage. Later, when the woman arrives in the palace in her usual plain clothes, her appearance triggers uncontrollable laughter among the palace ladies who have gathered to meet the newcomer. The king feels ashamed and defends himself by saying that ornamentation will significantly improve the ugly woman’s looks. She, however, gainsays this defense and gives everybody present a lecture on why virtue is the best ornament. Moved by this speech, the king appoints her his queen.)

_LNZ_ 6.15: Emperor Wen of Han (after arriving in the capital with her father who is to receive corporal punishment for a crime, Ti Ying submits a memorial to the emperor. She points out her father’s reputation as an upright and fair official, laments that corporal punishment will inflict irreversible damage to a
person’s body and make it hard for him to have a fresh start later in life, and offers to become a government slave in exchange for a reduced sentence for her father. After reading the memorial, the emperor takes pity on the girl and issues an edict, in which he expresses shame for having to rely on cruel punishments instead of virtue to teach his people and hereby orders its abolishment.

*LNZ* 7.5: Duke Huan of Lu (encountered above. He is angry at his wife, Wen Jiang, for carrying on an affair with her own brother, Duke Xiang of Qi. When Wen Jiang informs Duke Xiang of her husband’s opposition to their relationship, Duke Xiang invites Duke Huan to a banquet and has him murdered. The people of Lu are ashamed by the way their ruler came to his demise and demand that the murderer be handed over for punishment. The request is granted.)

*LNZ* 7.9: Duke Ling of Chen along with two of his ministers (the duke commits adultery with the beautiful wife of another minister. Xie Ye, also a minister, learns of this and makes a critical comment about the duke’s conduct. The duke is displeased by Xie Ye’s comment, because although he does not mind anyone else knowing about his indiscretion, Xie Ye’s knowing it makes him feel ashamed. He then orders someone to murder Xie Ye.)

In all except two examples in the above, it is a woman who makes a man feel ashamed. The two exceptions in question come from the last chapter of the *Biographies*. In one of them, Duke Ling of Chen is ashamed that Xie Ye knows about and criticizes his adultery and has the critic murdered to solve the problem. In the other, the people of Lu are ashamed that their ruler has been killed upon the orders of his wife’s lover and seek to punish the murderer. In these two instances, the shame felt by the men produces consequences that elicit either no moral judgment (the Lu people’s killing of the murderer of their ruler) or a negative judgment (Duke Ling’s murder of his critic). They do show that shame is an important motivation for action.

In the other seven examples, a man feels shame because of a woman’s input, and the sense of shame exerts a positive moral impact on him, making him realize his mistake or shortcoming and enabling him to embark upon self-improvement where there is room to do so. Reprimanded and renounced by his mother, Tian Ji returns the bribe and requests punishment from the king. Denounced by Bo Ying for his licentious behavior, King Helü backs off and leaves her alone. The formerly arrogant Chu minister asks the woman who criticizes him over a traffic dispute to marry him. Touched and enlightened by the physically deformed woman’s speech, King Min of Qi makes her his queen. Led by Ti Ying’s memorial to reflect on his failure in governance, Emperor Wen abolishes corporal punishment. Women are commended for the wisdom, nobility, and courage with which they bring out the better self in a man.
However, of the seven cases there are two in which the man ashamed by a woman is not able (and does not have opportunities) to take action to produce the kinds of good results just described. Yanshou’s wife, caught in a conflict of loyalties to her brother and her husband, sees no other way out than to kill herself (she cannot stay married to her brother’s murderer, nor could she bring herself to marry another man if she were to leave her husband). Qiu Hu’s wife, after the revelation that her husband is the very man who had tried to seduce her on his way home, reproaches him for his despicable act and then kills herself by jumping into a river. The reason she gives for her suicide is that she cannot live with such a husband but as a chaste woman she will not consider remarrying either. In these two cases, whatever shame felt by the man is outweighed by the much greater emotional consequences his shameful deed creates for the woman. With her uncompromising moral standards (which come down to the principle of no remarriage for a woman in these two cases), she is compelled to end her own life under the circumstances, whereas he would live on (almost certainly with a new wife), despite his feeling of shame.

According to the Verse Summary in the biography Qiu Hu’s wife, she kills herself because she “is ashamed of her husband’s unrighteous behavior.” This provides a segue into our examination of shame felt by women in the Biographies. There are three such cases:

- **LNZ 4.12**: Wife of the Lord of Wei (encountered above. Feeling ashamed by the fact that the concubine has produced the heir of the family but still unfailingly serves her as the mistress of the household, the wife asks to move out.)

- **LNZ 5.5**: Wife of the general of Ge (Ge is conquered by an invading army. The woman reprimands her husband for not killing himself to demonstrate his loyalty to his ruler. Feeling shame for him and declaring it impossible for her to bear this shame, she commits suicide.)

- **LNZ 6.11**: King Min of Qi’s palace women (encountered above. They laugh at the ugly but virtuous newcomer’s appearance, but after hearing her eloquent speech on virtue as the most important ornament, they all feel ashamed of themselves.)

There is not much to be said about the last example. It shows that women are capable of understanding moral instruction and reacting properly to it. We are not told whether the palace women will put what they have learned from this lecture into practice in the future. The shame felt by the wife of the Lord of Wei is also portrayed as a positive emotion. It demonstrates her respect for the essential service the concubine has provided for the family, her awareness of her own inadequacy, and her willingness to take action to honor the concubine and reduce her burden. This combined biography of the wife and the concubine commends the wife for showing such respect, awareness, and willingness, and
the concubine for firmly upholding the hierarchy between wife and concubine. As portrayed in the biography, the wife’s virtue consists in nothing but her expression of shame, an emotion that shows her to be a morally alert and conscientious woman.

The story of the general of Ge’s wife is reminiscent of that of Qiu Hu’s wife. Both women kill themselves because of the shame their husbands have brought them. Their choice of death seems extraordinary and is meant to demonstrate their exceptionally high moral standards, but we have to look beyond the praises they receive in their biographies and ask why they need to go to that extreme to deal with the shame that their husbands cause them. No man, in the Biographies or in any other early Chinese source, has to make the decision to kill himself in the event that his wife has done a shameful deed, and certainly no man was enthusiastically praised for committing suicide in such an event. Qiu Hu’s wife explicitly states that she has to die because she can neither continue living with her husband nor allow herself to remarry. (Ren Yanshou’s wife also refers to her refusal to remarry before hanging herself.) The general of Ge’s wife does not cite the same reason for her suicide and only says that she cannot bear living with him in shame, but clearly she assumes that she has to continue living with him if she is to live at all. Leaving the husband, no matter how shameful he is, is not an option for these high-minded women. This moral principle dictates that they pay with their lives for the shameful deeds committed by their husbands. Men, free to remarry and expected to remarry, do not have this constraint and therefore are in a different relationship with the shame caused by their womenfolk.

This brings us back to the wife of the hermit Laolai, who gets angry with her husband and is ready to leave him as soon as she finds out that he has agreed to serve in the government. Her story conveys a drastically different message from the biographies of Qiu Hu’s wife and the wife of the Ge general. Neither the marvelously spunky and independent hermit wife nor the two single-minded women who commit suicides represents the average woman in early China.\(^{15}\) What is important to note is that these atypical paragons would meet with different fates as the Biographies steadily gained the status of being the most important text used in premodern Chinese women’s education and spawned numerous imitations aimed at popularizing its teachings and updating its collection of exemplars. Laolai’s wife would quietly lose favor with Liu

\(^{15}\) The discrepancy between ideal and practice regarding female remarriage in the Han is widely noted. On Liu Xiang’s role in the promotion of the ideal, see Chen (2010) 329–341 and Hinsch (2007) 6–7, 18.
Xiang’s successors, because she is too feisty and free-spirited.\textsuperscript{16} By contrast, passionate suicides in the mode of Qiu Hu’s wife and the wife of the Ge general would increasingly become the most exalted moral heroines, because they regard their husbands as the only source of the meaning of their lives.\textsuperscript{17}

\section*{4 Conclusion}

As shown in the \textit{Biographies}, the expression and reception of negative emotions of anger, sadness, and shame are part and parcel of power relations, and gender provides a useful perspective for understanding the role of these emotions in the manifestation and navigation of social hierarchies and in the cultivation of moral virtues. The reversal in ratio in the numbers of males and females displaying anger (12:5) and sadness (3:11) is as revealing as the dominance of mothers among the irate females and of sorrowful sons among the doleful males. A classification of the kinship roles of the sad women points us to several family relationships that are especially and innately difficult and pose much greater challenges for women than for men: stepmother and stepchild, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, and wife and concubine. The proper exhibition of anger and sadness forms an important part of the character of the virtuous female paragons. Shame is depicted as a positive moral emotion for both men and women, but the cases in which women commit suicide because of their husbands’ shameful acts call our attention to the more severe constraints that tend to be placed on women’s life choices. In sum, through their display of and response to negative emotions, Liu Xiang’s female exemplars maneuver in challenging and complex power relations (mostly in the home, but occasionally also in the public sphere), and they demonstrate the dangers, and more often, the positive moral potential of these emotions.

\textsuperscript{16} Elsewhere I examine the eclipse of the early images of exemplary female hermits like Lao-lai’s wife by Meng Guang (first century CE), who, known for the respect and compliance with which she supports and follows her husband in his pursuit of the eremitic life, became the most celebrated hermit wife in the Chinese tradition.

\textsuperscript{17} The literature on this later development is enormous. Interested readers may begin with Mou (2004).
References

Primary source


Secondary sources


Among the philosophers of the Warring States Period (ca. 475–221 BCE), Xúnzǐ 荀子 (c. 310–220 BCE) was arguably the most intellectually ambitious and systematic, forwarding a vision of how the psychic and bodily workings of human beings were integrated with the broader social, political and cosmic realities of which they formed a part. This unified approach was premised on a growing sense during this period that the natural world operated according to intelligible patterns and processes, and that these patterns and processes grounded human reality as well, both explaining human tendencies and capacities, as well as providing normative guidelines for their fulfillment. It also depended, crucially, on an account of emotions – one that is more complex and multifaceted than any other to have survived from the pre-imperial era.

Although Xunzi did not articulate a theory of emotions as such, he theorized extensively about a broad range of issues that would reasonably fall under what we would commonly refer to as emotions. This includes the widely-debated moral psychological categories of xìng 性 (inborn nature) and qíng 情 (innate/affective dispositions), as well as terms pertaining to dispositional states such as desire (yù 欲), liking/loving (hǎo 好) and disliking/hating (wù 恨). It also includes

1 I would like to thank David Konstan and Máté Veres for their valuable feedback on this paper.
2 Scholars have not been able to verify Xúnzǐ’s precise dates but those given here follow a widely accepted range of approximate dates within which Xúnzǐ is believed to have lived. For a reconstruction of Xúnzǐ’s life and work supporting these dates, see Knoblock (1982-3).
4 Qíng represents an alluring candidate for comparison with the modern term “emotions” insofar as it served as the umbrella category for various groupings of certain basic emotions, which in Xúnzǐ’s case consisted of the six feelings of liking (hǎo 好), disliking (wù 恨), happiness (xǐ 喜), anger (nù 怒), sadness (āi 衰) and joy (lè 樂). It would be highly problematic, however, to assume a one-to-one correspondence between qíng and the modern concept of emotions, since the two terms cover vastly different conceptual territory. For a survey of the conceptual history of qíng in traditional Chinese thought, see Eifring (2004). On the terminological and methodological complications involved in investigating “emotions” in the context of early Chinese thought, see Virág (2017) 6–10.
various specific emotions such as delight/pleasure (lè 樂), anger (nù 怒), happiness (xǐ 喜, yú 愉), and sorrow (yōu 忧), and more socially complex notions such as courage (yǒng 勇), shame (chǐ 耻), and respect (jìng 敬). These discussions take place within a number of distinct explanatory contexts, including the account of human nature and self-cultivation in the “Human Nature is Bad” (Xìng’è 性惡) chapter (Ch. 23); the elaborations of affective dispositions, or qíng, as a focus of training in the “On Honor and Disgrace” chapter (Ch. 4); the natural theory and philosophical anthropology outlined in the “Discourse on Heaven” (Tiān lùn 天論) chapter (Ch. 17); and the analysis of ritual and its therapeutic, aesthetic and ethical functions in the “Discourse on Ritual” (Lǐ lùn 礼 論) chapter (Ch. 19).

What to make of these discussions is not entirely straightforward. The Xúnzǐ seems to propose a variety of distinct pronouncements about what the emotions are and what ought to be done with them, not all of which are easy to reconcile with one another. But even more basically, there is the perennial problem of how to confront the very topic of emotions in the early Chinese context, given the limits of our modern terms and analytic categories. While it would be convenient to simply take a certain familiar formulation and look for its presumed classical Chinese counterpart in Xúnzǐ’s writings, this does not necessarily lead us to an understanding of what the emotions were, in their broader sense, inclusive of its complex layers of meanings and phenomenological features.

It is this more expansive sense of emotions that this paper seeks to bring out – a task that requires not only examining assertions about certain emotion terms, but also interrogating a fuller range of issues with which emotions were entangled in Xúnzǐ’s conception: 1) the ontological question of how the natural world operates, the realm of human beings included; 2) the epistemological question of what the criteria of knowledge and understanding are, and how the human agent has access to them; and 3) the ethical question of how right understanding is cultivated and carried out. As envisaged by Xúnzǐ, emotions pervaded and linked together all of these realms, furnishing the site of resonance between the human and cosmic worlds. It was through the proper fulfillment of emotional dispositions, which represented the intelligible patterns and processes of nature within humans, that we enacted our proper role within the cosmos, thereby achieving a condition of alignment with Heaven and Earth. Thus realized, the emotions formed the keystone of what Philip J. Ivanhoe has termed a “grand ecological ethics” in which the optimal condition of human beings was to harmonize with Heaven and Earth “for the fulfillment of all three,” bringing to realization “a design inherent in the universe itself.”

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of Xúnzǐ’s understanding of emotions, then, needs to recognize and take into consideration the multiple, overlapping spheres of theoretical concern within which emotions were embedded, and to pay due attention to Xúnzǐ’s ideal of cosmic alignment, which prioritizes the fulfillment and optimal realization of human emotional dispositions as the proper condition of human beings.

The crux of this alignment is the realm of human intelligence, cognition and right judgment. This is a realm that includes, but is not fully covered by, Xúnzǐ’s ideas about the heart-mind (xīn 心). As is evident from the existing scholarly literature, how one understands the nature and normative implications of emotions in Xúnzǐ depends considerably on how one understands the operations and potentialities of the cognitive faculty. The latter is a topic that is in need of deeper exploration, and I propose here that some of the limitations of existing accounts of emotions in Xúnzǐ’s philosophy can be traced back to a narrowly circumscribed conception of Xúnzǐ’s approach to cognition and understanding – one that focuses specifically on rational control. In this paper I aim to contribute to a more conceptually informed account of emotions in Xúnzǐ’s thought through an expanded view of the cognitive domain, approached through his account of practical wisdom. I argue, in brief, that Xúnzǐ articulated a robust conception of practical wisdom to which he attributed a capacity to achieve perspicacious insight into the workings of reality and to arrive at sound methods of responsiveness. Such an ideal of responsiveness provides a quite different perspective on emotions from the standard account, which presents Xúnzǐ as taking emotions as objects of control through the exercise of reason and “external” standards of rightness. It points, instead, towards a normative framework defined by the alignment of human beings with the patterns of Heaven and Earth itself, instantiated through the fulfillment of human emotions.

The topic of practical wisdom in Xúnzǐ’s thought has not received much attention. Most of the scholarly emphasis has been on Xúnzǐ’s moral philosophy – particularly the normative dimensions of his theory of human nature, self-cultivation, and moral agency – to the relative neglect of his understanding of the epistemology and ontology of the virtuous human agent more broadly. When these matters have been discussed, the emphasis has been on the operation of “rational” judgment, whose main function is to “approve of” (kě 可) and apply external standards of rightness. Correspondingly, emotions are primarily

6 Justin Tiwald’s (2012) generous conception of “moral expertise” points, exceptionally, to some of the important intellectual features that I highlight in this paper. See also note 18, below.
7 See, e.g., Van Norden (2000) 124–125; Lodén (2009); Slingerland (2003) 217–264. The basic model of emotions and desires as objects of training, restraint, and transformation has remained intact through the recent turn towards practice-centered approaches to ethics, which has
construed as “mental states” comprised of those unreflecting desires and impulses that need to be tamed, directed and trained through the exercise of one’s reason. The default model invoked to capture this process is the craft analogy laid out in the “Human Nature is Bad” chapter, where Xúnzǐ compares the enterprise of cultivating the inborn nature (xing 性) with the various crafts – the carpenter straightening out a piece of warped wood with a steam press, the sword maker honing metal into a sharp blade, and the potter fashioning a vessel out of a lump of clay. Just as a craftsman applies external force to give shape to a formless, or ill-formed, mass of material, so must some presumably “external” agent shape and direct an amoral raw nature with deliberate effort (wei 偽) so as to achieve her chosen ends. The logic of the craft analogy suggests that, for Xúnzǐ, emotions and desires are passive, malleable objects to be shaped, trained and refined.

While Xúnzǐ’s concern with training and cultivating one’s desires and preferences is an important part of his blueprint for ethical, social and political reform, it concerns only one end of the scale of cultivation – that of the uncultivated individual whose “raw” affective dispositions are out of alignment with standards of virtuous and intelligent attainment. Xúnzǐ, however, recognized a spectrum of human possibilities with respect to moral development and attainment, and made clear that those who engaged in the craft-like enterprise of abiding by pre-established guidelines – the “men of standards” (fāng zhī shì 方之士) – were just of the middling sort, inferior to the “sage” (shèngrén 聖人) who, being capable of deliberation (lǜ 慮), firmness (gù 固), and fondness (hǎo 好) for the Way, represented the “ultimate in the Way” (Dào zhī jí 道之極). Xúnzǐ, then, explicitly posits two distinct models of virtue, with the superior one being that of the sage who goes beyond mere conformity to standards and who is able to grasp and put into practice the proper course, or the Way, through insight and deliberation.

What this means for the emotions is that they could have wide-ranging ontological and ethical profiles depending on the situations in which they are actualized, and on the cognitive attainments of the individual human agent. And indeed, we find other important discussions of emotions in the Xúnzǐ that are not consistent with the standard passive account, and that reflect a different understanding of the nature and workings of cognition and judgment as well. These

focused on the somatic and therapeutic aspects of Xúnzǐ’s theory of ritual. See Kline (2004), Kline (2006), and Tavor (2013).
9 Xúnzǐ 5/19/3. Translated passages from the Xúnzǐ are those of Hutton (2014), with occasional modifications.
correspond to a conception of practical wisdom in which cognitive mastery and skilled responsiveness work in tandem, and which are premised on the possibility of achieving balanced and perspicacious insight into the nature of reality – and thus also of the emotions as well. Xúnzǐ theorized such ideas by way of a technical discourse of measurement that established the possibility of making genuine claims about balance, moderation and appropriateness.

This discourse played a key role in Xúnzǐ’s efforts to outline what I call a technê of practical wisdom. It involved references to measuring instruments such as the scale (héng 衡), the ink-line (shěng 繩), the compass (guī 規) and the carpenter’s square (jǔ 矩), and to their corresponding activity of gauging the weight and the dimensions of things. It also included standards for assessing the physical properties of things, such as squareness and roundness (fāngyuǎn 方圓), light and heavy (qīngzhòng 輕重), and straight and crooked (qūzhí 曲直), as well as certain optimal criteria of evaluation such as balance (quán 權), moderation (jie 節) and proper measure (dù 度). Although the presence of such terms in Xúnzǐ’s ethical theory is often taken as evidence of a conception of virtue based on conformity to standards that lie outside of the human agent, I propose here that it be read, instead, as an important part of Xúnzǐ’s conceptual strategy of introducing and legitimating an ideal of sagely intelligence premised on balanced, objective and perspicacious understanding of how things are in the world. Displaying the cognitive resources grounding Xúnzǐ’s technê of practical wisdom, they help to sustain the idea that the sagely mind responds intelligently and strategically to one’s circumstances through expert understanding, or shù 術.

In approaching Xúnzǐ’s account of emotions through this more expansive conception of technê as a paradigm of practical wisdom, I have sought to benefit from engagement with scholarship in classical Greek and Hellenistic thought, where the more intellectual dimensions of technê have been a topic of significant interest for decades. With respect to the issue of skill more generally, Julia Annas has long argued for the need to go beyond its narrow conception as mindless and mechanical conformity to set models, and to recognize the relevance of broader notions of expertise that is inclusive of intellectual virtues. And as far as the technical vocabulary of measurement is concerned, a compelling case has been made for both Plato and Aristotle that its application in the context of emotions reveals an effort to establish the capacity of the rational agent to properly grasp how things are, as the basis for making right decisions. Henry Richardson has proposed that the

theory of measurement in pleasure, as postulated by Socrates in the *Protagoras*, should be primarily taken as an epistemic point, where “the emphasis certainly seems to be on the precise description of objects, rather than on the precise making of a choice.” In the case of Aristotle, where ideas of quantification and measurement in ethics emerges particularly strongly in the Doctrine of the Mean, Christof Rapp has similarly argued that the idea of the mean as a criterion of virtue in between the extremes of excess and insufficiency “does not presume a decision procedure, or method for determining the right course of action,” but instead, represents “the aspects of rightness, correctness or goodness in the definition of ethical virtues.” What is being highlighted is the capacity of the wise person to determine the right course of action, rather than a strict conformity to the quantitative midway point between extremes.

In Xünzǐ as well, there is a case to be made for extending ideas of mastery to the epistemological domain, and generally for recognizing a far greater scope for cognitive agency of a deliberative kind than is usually acknowledged. Thus far, when it comes to issues related to technē, most of the attention has been on notions of mastery involving spontaneity, effortless ease and virtuosity of performance in matters of practical skill. These features have usually been associated with the *Zhuāngzǐ* and have tended to be identified as non-intellectual, or even anti-intellectual, and as defying rational comprehension. Such a conception is relevant to Xünzǐ as well, and Aaron Stalnaker has productively applied notions of skill mastery to Xünzǐ’s conception of ritual performance. But it is also important to emphasize that Xünzǐ’s technē of practical wisdom goes beyond applying or approving of “external” criteria of right and wrong, and gives priority of place to the attainment of perspicacious insight into the workings of things more generally – a far more demanding conception.

As outlined here, Xünzǐ’s understanding of practical wisdom aligns with what Jason Swartzwood has summed up – taking his cue from Mencius – as “understanding that enables us to identify what should be done and how to pull it off.” Like Mencius, Xünzǐ recognized the activities of “weighing” and “deliberating” as

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11 Richardson (1990) 25.
14 A collaborative volume, edited by Tom Angier and Lisa Raphals, on the ethical dimensions of skill across the ancient traditions of China, Greece and Rome was published after the completion of this article and could not, regrettably, be taken into account. See Angier/Raphals (2021). Of particular relevance is the paper on Xünzǐ by Tang (2021).
necessary for responding intelligently to one’s predicaments. More than an analogy for the craft-like enterprise of abiding by techniques and standards, Xúnzǐ’s technical discourse of measurement ultimately presents us with an ambitious conception of sagely wisdom that recognizes the mind’s capacity to grasp the proper order of things, and to achieve meta-level insight that allows one to evaluate and adjudicate received standards and methods themselves. Such a conception corresponded to a reevaluation of the emotions as well: the possibility of cognitive mastery as the basis for sound practical action meant that the emotions, like other natural phenomena, were knowable and measurable, and that bringing about their highest expression in harmony and beauty of form was a task of utmost importance. As Xunzi emphasized in the “Discourse on Heaven” chapter, the affective disposition (qing) of human beings were natural features of the inborn nature that ought to be properly nurtured (yǎng 養) so as to “complete the accomplishment of Heaven” (quán qí tiān gōng 全其天功).

1 The Intelligibility of Nature

Xúnzǐ’s vision of sagely understanding and of the proper course of action goes hand in hand with his descriptive account of the world of natural phenomena as patterned and intelligible. In this respect, we can identify in the Warring States period (ca. 475–221 BCE) the emergence of what Geoffrey Lloyd has argued for the ancient Greeks: the “invention” of Nature as a coherent and intelligible realm by thinkers seeking to establish new criteria of knowledge and expertise that challenged traditional approaches. Xúnzǐ’s naturalistic discourse may be read


18 This speaks to what Julia Annas has identified as one of the explanatory outcomes of the skill-based analysis of virtue: namely, an account of “just how the agent is to be able rationally to criticize and evaluate the deliverances of her tradition,” in Annas (1995) 238. Along these lines, Justin Tiwald has observed that the “great Confucian scholar” (dà rú 大儒) – Xúnzǐ’s term for the bearer of sagely wisdom – is one whose moral expertise goes beyond the application of models to a certain level of “deliberative autonomy” that allows them to assess and evaluate the correctness of models themselves. Possessing a “comprehensive grasp” of various fields of expertise, they can “use themselves as living standards or tools of measurement (yì jǐ dù 以己度), and thus know, without consulting the historical record, that these descriptions are correct (Xúnzǐ 5.4–5).” In Tiwald (2012) 286–287.

19 Xúnzǐ 17/80/13.

20 Lloyd (2005).
along similar lines, and is also implicated in his attempt to redefine sagely intelligence as capable of perspicacious understanding of the natural world and its operations, although he was also adamant that we not go too far in this direction.

On the other hand, Xúnzǐ was arguably more upfront than the Greeks about his purposes: denouncing widespread belief in prognostication, divination and other ways of appealing to inscrutable “higher” forces beyond human control, Xúnzǐ stressed that the proper object of human concern was the workings of the world itself, and that one must learn how to respond appropriately to one’s situation. Accordingly, he endeavoured to establish the intelligibility of worldly phenomena by identifying certain patterned features.

First, Xúnzǐ emphasized the constancy and regularity by which things in the world proceeded. In the cosmic realm, this is evident in the regular movements of the constellations and the heavenly bodies, as well as in the cycle of the seasons and weather conditions:

The arrayed stars follow each other in their revolutions, the sun and the moon take turns shining, the four seasons proceed in succession, yin and yang undergo their great transformations, and winds and rain are broadly bestowed.21

Such observations about the constancy and regularity of things in the natural world provides the basis for making observations about comparable features in the human realm. Indeed, Xúnzǐ often formulated this connection by way of a neat triad of Heaven, Earth and Human. This was an especially important motif in the “Discourse on Heaven” chapter, where he observes, “Heaven has a constant way (chángdào 常道), Earth has a constant measure (cháng shù 常數), and the gentleman has a constant substance (cháng tǐ 常體).”22 Here, Heavenly Way, Earthly measure, and human substance are posited as analogous, structurally corresponding features, and specifically point to the human constitution or substance (tǐ 體) as that which is constant and knowable in the human realm.

In addition to possessing constant tendencies and features, Xúnzǐ also emphasized that the phenomenal world proceeds through a mechanism of causation that explains why and how things happen – a causality that represents the natural unfolding of prior conditions in the substance of things. In the “Exhortation to Learning” chapter (Quàn xué 勸學), he directly extends this idea to the domain of human action, observing that one’s fate is similarly the result of one’s virtue (dé 德):

All the things and the kinds that come about (wù lèi zhī qǐ 物類之起)
Surely have a point from which they start out (bǐ yǒu suǒ shǐ 必有所始).
Honor (rónɡ 榮) or disgrace (rǔ 辱) that comes unto you
Surely reflects your degree of virtue (dé 德).
In rotten meat bugs are generated.
In fish that’s spoiled maggots are created.
Lazy, haughty men who forget their place
Shall have misfortune and ruin to face.23

As Xúnzǐ makes clear, understanding the causal mechanisms that operate in the natural world illuminate the workings of the human world: just as events in the natural world do not occur mysteriously, but are the result of causal processes, so it is in the human realm, where an individual’s success or failure depends on the unfolding of one’s accumulated virtue. It is not the consequence of inexplicable factors, or of chance, but of what human beings bring about as a result of their virtue, or the lack thereof. More specifically, one’s fortune and misfortune are determined not by the “operations of Heaven” but by how we respond (yìnɡ 應) to our situation:

There is a constancy (chánɡ 常) to the operations of Heaven (tiān xìnɡ 天行). They do not persist because of Yáo. They do not perish because of Jié. If you respond (yìnɡ 應) to them with order, then you will have good fortune. If you respond to them with chaos, then you will have misfortune.24

Xúnzǐ’s naturalistic discourse, then, points to the conclusion that the proper object of human investigation is the nature and workings of the world itself, insofar as it furnishes the arena of human action and dictates the nature of proper responsiveness to one’s circumstances. This implies a need to understand the nature of human beings as well – a concern that can be seen in his more general attempts to theorize about the common faculties and tendencies of “all people” (fánrén 凡人):

All people (fánrén 凡人) share one thing in common (tónɡ 同): when hungry they desire to eat, when cold they desire warmth, when tired they desire rest, they like what is beneficial and hate what is harmful. This is something people have from birth; it is not something one awaits to become so. This is something in which Yǔ and Jié were the same. The eyes distinguish between light and dark, beautiful and ugly. The ears distinguish between noises and notes, high and low sounds.25

Like the heavenly bodies, human beings, too, possess certain unavoidable tendencies and preferences arising from their natural endowments.

It is in this context, I propose, that we situate Xúnzǐ’s theorizing about the inborn dispositions, or qíng. In the “Discourse on Heaven” chapter, Xúnzǐ endeavors to provide a naturalistic account of qíng, which he defines under the rubric of “Heavenly dispositions” (tiān qíng 天情). Comprised of a package of six feelings – liking (hǎo 好), disliking (wù 惡), happiness (xǐ 喜), anger (nù 怒), sadness (āi 哀) and joy (lè 樂) – which all human beings presumably possess from birth, these are in turn accompanied by a set of other innate endowments: the “Heavenly faculties (tiān guān 天官),” consisting of the five sense faculties; the “Heavenly lord (tiān jūn 天君),” referring to the heart-mind (xīn 心) that controls the senses; “Heavenly nourishment (tiān yǎng 天養),” defined as the capacity to “use what is not of one’s kind as a resource for nourishing what is of one’s kind (yǎng qí lèi 養其類);” and “Heavenly government (tiān zhēng 天政),” which is the ability to “accord with what is proper to one’s kind (shùn qí lèi 順其類).” Within this framework, our ethical task is to align with and bring to fulfillment all of these natural endowments, and it is success in this very endeavour that defines the achievement of the sage: the sage, in Xúnzǐ’s account, “keeps clear his Heavenly lord, sets straight his Heavenly faculties, makes complete his Heavenly nourishment, accords with his Heavenly government, and nurtures his Heavenly dispositions, so as to keep whole the accomplishment of Heaven.”

The realm of affective dispositions, or qíng, then, is part of a set of natural endowments that human beings possess from birth, and that require nurturing and fulfillment. From a broader perspective, this qíng is simply the human correlate of what Xúnzǐ understands as the disposition (qíng) of things more generally, which he regards as the proper object of human investigation. The human ethical project thus rests on a proper understanding of how things in the phenomenal world operate and, on this basis, arriving at a proper course or method for navigating through it. The quality of our destiny – whether we achieve happiness, success and fulfillment, or end up in misery, frustration, and failure – is determined by how intelligently we respond to the reality around us. Essential to this vision is the idea that there exist objective criteria for assessment and evaluation, both with respect to external reality (qing) and to the reality of human beings (qing), and that such criteria are knowable to the human agent. The technical discourse of measurement was instrumental in establishing such an idea.

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2 Weighing, Measuring and Sagely Cognition

Xúnzǐ’s account of perfected human understanding and proper responsiveness is premised on an ideal of intelligence that prioritizes comprehensive insight into the workings of things. One of the most sustained discussions of this ideal can be found in the “Undoing Fixation” chapter (Jiě bì 解蔽), where Xúnzǐ outlines the various forms of cognitive failure that have afflicted past and current thinkers, and then proceeds to define his own standard of knowledge against it. Xúnzǐ’s targets include influential figures of the various schools, such as Mòzǐ 墨子, Sòngzǐ 宋子, Huìzì 惠子, and Zhuāngzǐ, whose ideas and teachings he criticizes for their limited, narrow concerns – what he calls “fixations” (bì蔽). He explains that such fixations lead to a distorted and instrumentalized approach to the proper course of action, or the Way:

Thus, if one speaks of it in terms of usefulness, then the Way will consist completely in seeking what is profitable. If one speaks of it in terms of desires, then the Way will consist completely in learning to be satisfied. If one speaks of it in terms of laws, then the Way will consist completely in making arrangements. If one speaks of it in terms of power, then the Way will consist completely in finding what is expedient. If one speaks of it in terms of wording, then the Way will consist completely in discoursing on matters. If one speaks of it in terms of the Heavenly, then the Way will consist completely in following along with things.27

According to Xúnzǐ, such limited approaches demonstrate the “disaster of being fixated and blocked up” (bì sāi zhǐ huò 被塞之禍) in one’s thinking and of considering “merely one corner of the Way” (dào zhī yī yú 道之一隅). What is needed is a more comprehensive grasp of the larger picture, and a more expansive way of understanding how to live in, and respond to, that reality. Xúnzǐ’s rhetorical strategy, then, is not to point to the wrongness of the claims of his intellectual rivals, so much as to diminish them by upholding a standard of comprehensivity – having a full view vs. having a partial, incomplete and imbalanced view of things – and measuring everyone against it. In contrast to the limited understanding displayed by his intellectual competitors is the fullness of the Way itself, whose “substance (tǐ 體) is constant (cháng 常), yet it covers all changes” and about which “no one corner is sufficient to exhibit it fully.”28 What distinguishes the sage is precisely the capacity to comprehensively grasp the Way:

The sage knows the problems in the ways of the heart, and sees the disaster of being fixated and blocked up in one’s thinking. So, he is neither for desires, nor for dislikes, is

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neither the origins, nor for the end results, is neither for what is near, nor for what is far away, is neither for what is broad, nor for what is shallow, is neither for the ancient past, nor is for the present. He lays out all the myriad things and in their midst suspends his scales (xiàn héng 县衡). For this reason, the various different things are unable to become fixating and so disorder his categories of judgment.\textsuperscript{29}

Xúnzǐ invokes the imagery of the scale here to capture the balanced perspective of the sage that has access to a clear and all-inclusive understanding of reality. Although the image of the scale and other measuring tools has been taken as evidence of Xúnzǐ’s deployment of an external standard by which to assess things, a closer examination of how the weighing imagery is used, both in Xúnzǐ’s writings and in other Warring States texts, does not bear this out. Griet Vankeerberghen has argued that the imagery of weighing (quán 權) in many early moral and political writings about human action conveys the possibility of arriving at a true and objectively correct assessment of things, and even to a capacity for balanced, discretionary judgment that calls for breaking and defying fixed rules and standards if the situation calls for it. In other words, weighing points to a cognitive ability and access to objective criteria, rather than to the sheer presence and application of some fixed standard.\textsuperscript{30} While such a capacity has often been associated with the use of weighing imagery in Mencius,\textsuperscript{31} it is also arguably applicable to Xúnzǐ as well. Xúnzǐ often uses the terms of weighing and measuring to convey the idea that there is an objective and universal standard by which to know and assess things, thus providing a basis for distinguishing true understanding from false. As Xúnzǐ explains in the “Correct Naming” (Zhèng míng 正名) chapter, just as it is necessary to use properly calibrated scales in order to determine the correct weight of things, so it is that, in any situation where people must decide upon a course of action, there must be a “balance” (quán jù 權俱):

Thus, for every action people make, they must come prepared with a balance (quán jù 權俱). If a set of scales (héng 衡) is not correct (bù zhèng 不正), then what is heavy (zhòng 重) will hang in the raised position, and people will think it is light (qīng 輕). Or what is light will hang in the low position, and people will think it is heavy. This is how people become confused about light and heavy.\textsuperscript{32}

Xúnzǐ goes on to explain that, from antiquity to the present, this scale is none other than the Way (dào 道) and that taking the Way as standard is to be


\textsuperscript{30} Vankeerberghen 2005.

\textsuperscript{31} Stalnaker (2019) 103–114.

\textsuperscript{32} Xúnzǐ 22/111/24-22/112/1. Hutton (2014) 245.
contrast with “proceeding from within oneself” (內自擇). It is, accordingly, by way of this very imagery of tools of measurement that Xúnzǐ asserts that the inherited tradition of ritual practice (禮) constitutes correct and appropriate action:

And so, when the ink-line (繩墨) is reliably laid out, then one cannot be deceived by the curved (曲) and the straight (直). When the scale (衡) is reliably hung, then one cannot be deceived by the light (輕) and the heavy (重). When the compass (規) and carpenter’s square (矩) are reliably deployed, then one cannot be deceived by the circular (圓) and the rectangular (方). The gentleman examines ritual carefully, and then he cannot be deceived by trickery and artifice. Thus, the ink-line is the ultimate in straightness (之至), the scale is the ultimate in balance (之至), the compass and carpenter’s square are the ultimate in circular and rectangular (方圓之至), and ritual is the ultimate in the human way (之道之極).33

Xúnzǐ’s account of the optimal course of action in terms of the tools of measurement is revealing. First, these tools do not merely represent a technique or standard to abide by, but instead, support the idea that those of sagely attainment possess and use these tools. Through them, they are able to consider things correctly and have access to the right course of action. Indeed, Xúnzǐ asserts that those of sagely understanding embody the true standard itself in their capacity to deploy it in responding to her circumstances: “One who knows the Way and observes things by it, who knows the Way and puts it into practice, is one who embodies the Way (察, 知行, 端道者也).”34 The sage, then, does not look outward for guidance, but rather, is one who, possessing the standard, “makes oneself a measure (己度者).”35 Moreover, Xúnzǐ’s imagery of measurement allows him to outline a sliding scale of attainment and virtue – one that distinguishes between an adequate virtue of abiding by the right standards, on the one hand, and the fully realized one of the sage, who is able to go beyond mere conformity:

Those who nevertheless do not take ritual as their model (不法禮) nor find sufficiency in it (不足禮) are called standardless commoners (無方之民). Those who take ritual as their model and find sufficiency in it are called men of standards (方之士). To be able to reflect and ponder (思索) what is central to ritual is called being able to deliberate (慮). To be able to be undeviating in what is central to ritual is called being able to be firm. When one can deliberate and be firm (固), and adds to this fondness (好) for it, then this is to be a sage. Thus, Heaven is the ultimate in height (高之極), Earth is the ultimate in depth (下之極), the boundless is the ultimate in breadth (廣之極), and the sage is the ultimate in the Way (道之極). And

so, learning is precisely learning to be a sage – one does not learn solely so as to become a standardless commoner.”\textsuperscript{36}

Here, X\u0101nz\u0101 differentiates among three types of people: those “standardless commoners” who fail to take ritual as their model and to find sufficiency in it; those scholars or persons of standing who take ritual as their model and find sufficiency in it; and those who go beyond this and achieve even more worthy attainments. It is in this third category that we find the sage, who is not simply one who adheres to ritual standards, but who “reflects and ponders” on “what is central to ritual” and is thus deemed capable of deliberation (lǜ 盧). The sage, moreover, is firm (gù 固) in his devotion to ritual, and is also fond of (hăo 好) it. These attitudinal qualities of firmness and fondness set the sage apart as an “ultimate (jí 極)” among human beings, as Heaven is the ultimate in height, Earth is the ultimate in depth, and boundlessness is the ultimate in breadth.

By way of the discourse of measurement, then, X\u0101nz\u0101 posits an ethical vision that eschews the idea that true virtue and attainment can be captured in a formula, or reduced to a set of principles to apply. While working with fixed guidelines might be necessary for those who are completely untrained in virtue and in ritually proper conduct, the most wise and virtuous, Xunzi stresses, go beyond mere conformity to predetermined standards of proper conduct. To a certain extent, this is a way to accommodate the practical problem of the corruptibility of institutions. X\u0101nz\u0101 notes that, however correct one’s standards, they are not sufficient for bringing about a viable social and political order. There still has to be a virtuous ruler at the top to ensure that standards are properly instituted, and that the entire system remain in good order. A system is only as good as the one who oversees the whole, since right measures can be circumvented or ultimately put to ill uses. Thus, as X\u0101nz\u0101 observes, “Setting up scales (héng shí 衡石) and measuring out weights (chēng xiàn 稱縣) are means to establish what is balanced (píng 平), but if the superior is fond of overthrowing people, then his ministers below and the hundred functionaries will take advantage of this to act precariously.”\textsuperscript{37} Proper tools, then, are not enough, and it is only when they are expertly deployed by a virtuous and sagacious ruler that they achieve their true purposes. As X\u0101nz\u0101 concludes, “proper use of such equipment and measures (xiè shù zhē 械數者) is what flows from good order – it is not the fount of good order.”\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} X\u0101nz\u0101 1919/92/16-19. Hutton (2014) 205–6.
\textsuperscript{37} X\u0101nz\u0101 12/57/12-13. Hutton (2014) 118.
\textsuperscript{38} X\u0101nz\u0101 12/57/14. Hutton (2014) 118. Emphasis added.
3 Emotion and Right Measure in Ritual

The sagely virtues of comprehensiveness, balance, and right measure have important repercussions for Xúnzǐ’s conception of emotions. Xúnzǐ uses the same terminology in explaining what the emotions are and how they are to be optimally realized – a theme that he develops to a high level of specificity in his theorization of ritual. Prior to examining this account, it is worth taking a look at what Xúnzǐ has to say more generally about the proper stance with which one ought to approach the emotions in the first place. This is a topic that Xúnzǐ takes up in his criticisms of other thinkers like Sòngzǐ and Mencius, whose attitude towards the emotions he considers extreme. In one passage in “The Twelve Masters” chapter (Fēi shì ěr zǐ 非十二子), he points out that, while some of them “give rein to their inborn dispositions and nature,” others “resist their inborn dispositions and nature.” Xúnzǐ’s verdict is that these thinkers, with their one-sided, “fixed” point of view, “do not understand the proper scales for unifying the world and establishing states and families.”39 The proper standpoint, as we have seen, is the balanced one embodied by the sage, who is “neither for desires, nor for dislikes,” and who “lays out all the myriad things and in their midst suspends his scales (xiàn héng 縣衡).” Xúnzǐ extends this ideal of balance to the emotions as well, which in their optimally realized form abide by right measure, avoid unreasonable extremes, and are fully appropriate. Attaining such an idea involves not only training and habituating one’s innate dispositions, but also nurturing (yǎng 養) them – an endeavour that the “Discourse on Heaven” chapter explains as “using what is not of one’s kind as a resource for nourishing what is of one’s kind.”40 One of the most important of these resources is ritual, which Xúnzǐ refers to as the measure (dù 度) of all goodness, and that which one ought to deploy so as to order one’s qi (zhì qi 治氣) and nurture life (yǎngshēng 養生).41

How ritual works to achieve this condition is explored in the “Discourse on Ritual” chapter, which focuses specifically on the workings of grief and sorrow in rites of mourning, and on the criteria for the optimal performance of such ritual so as to allow emotions to achieve their most satisfying and proper expression. The language of measurement pervades this discussion. In this chapter, Xúnzǐ affirms that ritual, along with rightness (yì 義) and patterned conduct (wén lǐ 文理), is what one uses to “nurture one’s dispositions” (yǎng qíng 養情).
Such nurturing involves engaging and satisfying the desire for sensual and bodily gratification:

Thus, ritual is a means of nurture (yăng 養). Meats and grains, the five flavors and the various spices are means to nurture the mouth (yang kǒu 養口). Fragrances and perfumes are means to nurture the nose (yang bí 養鼻). Carving and inlay, insignias and patterns are means to nurture the eyes (yang mù 養目). Bells and drums, pipes and chimes, lutes and zithers are means to nurture the ears (yang ěr 養耳). Homes and palaces, cushions and beds, tables and mats are means to nurture the body (yang tǐ 養體). Thus, ritual is a means of nurture.42

As Xúnzǐ makes quite explicit here, ritual works through the nurturing of the senses in such a way that it not only guides and trains the emotions to achieve their proper realization, but also provides the means to fulfill and satisfy the emotional needs and desires of human beings. There is an optimal alignment of what the senses naturally desire and find delight in, with correct ritual form, leading to the completion and fulfillment of both.

Xúnzǐ appeals to naturalistic reasoning in order to explain and justify this ideal of optimal alignment. Rather than simply invoking precedent or tradition, Xúnzǐ argues that, in their workings, ritual practices are perfectly suited for nurturing the innate dispositions. The discourse of measurement is a key element in this argument, and Xúnzǐ deploys it in a number of senses. First, he states that proper ritual form is based on “taking measure” of qíng (chèng qíng 稱情), and thus on an awareness and appreciation of people’s emotional needs and circumstances. Given that emotions and desires are an undeniable part of the inborn nature of human beings, the proper course of action is to engage in correct forms of ritual practice, which are calibrated in accordance with human dispositions as they actually are. As he explains in the case of the three-year mourning period for one’s parents:

What is the reason for the three-year mourning period? I say: It takes measure of people’s dispositions (chèng qíng 稱情) and establishes a proper form (liwèn 立文) for them. It accordingly ornaments the various groups of people, distinguishing different regulations for close and distant relatives and for the noble and the lowly, such that one can neither add to nor subtract from it (bù kě yì sǔn 不可益損). Thus I say: It is a method (shù 術) that is to be neither adapted nor changed. When a wound is great, it lasts for many days. When a hurt is deep, the recovery is slow. The three-year mourning period takes measure of people’s dispositions and establishes a proper form for them. It is the means by which one sets a limit for the utmost hurt. Wearing the mourning garments, propping oneself on a crude cane, dwelling in a lean-to, eating gruel, and using a rough mat and earthen pillow are the means by which one ornaments the utmost hurt. After the twenty-five months

of the three-year mourning period, the sorrow and hurt are not yet done, and the feelings of longing and remembrance are not yet forgotten. Nevertheless, ritual breaks off the mourning at this time. Surely this is in order that there may be a proper stopping point (yǐ 已) for sending off the dead and proper regulation (jiē 謀) for resuming one’s normal life, is it not?\(^{43}\)

Here, Xúnzǐ explains that the particular prescriptions corresponding to the three-year practice of mourning serve both to recognize the enduring sense of loss and to ensure the continuity of life in the wake of the death of one’s parents. Ritual manages to perform all of these functions at once, and its fittingness is established through the many references to the correct measuring of the depth and degree of sorrow, and to the length and extensiveness of ritual prescriptions.

Apart from signaling the fittingness and appropriateness of established ritual prescriptions, Xúnzǐ’s use of the language of measurement also defines the optimal condition of emotions as one of balance and moderation, and explains the role of ritual in bringing about such a condition. The logic of right measure thus implies that what ritual does is to make suitable adjustments to one’s feelings to ensure that its expression is neither inadequate nor excessive. Xúnzǐ explains this in detail by outlining how the goods and materials used in ritual settings work to moderate and retrain the emotions from falling into indulgence or perversity:

**Ritual cuts off what is too long (duàn cháng 斷長) and extends what is too short (xù duǎn 續短).** It subtracts from what is excessive (sǔn yǒu yú 損有餘) and adds to what is insufficient (yì bù zú 益不足) . It achieves proper form for love and respect (達愛敬之文), and it brings to perfection the beauty of carrying out rightness (滋成行義之美者). Thus, fine ornaments and coarse materials, music and weeping, happiness and sorrow – these things are opposites, but ritual makes use of all of them, employing them and alternating them at the appropriate times. And so, fine ornaments, music, and happiness are that by which one responds to peaceful events and by which one pays homage to good fortune. Coarse mourning garments, weeping, and sorrow are that by which one responds to threatening events and by which one pays homage to ill fortune. Thus, the way ritual makes use of fine ornaments is such as not to lead to exorbitance or indulgence. The way it makes use of coarse mourning garments is such as not to lead to infirmity or despondency. The way it makes use of music and happiness is such as not to lead to perversity or laziness. The way it makes use of weeping and sorrow is such as not to lead to dejection or self-harm. *This is the midway course of ritual (lǐ zhī zhōng liú 禮之中流).*\(^{44}\)


Xúnzǐ thus highlights the function of ritual to balance out excess and deficiency, and to prevent emotions from falling into harmful extremes. This ideal of balance and right measure is captured in what Xúnzǐ refers to as “the midway course of ritual.”

But there is another crucial sense in which ritual serves as a “midway” point, and this brings us to the question of what, ontologically speaking, emotions are. Xúnzǐ argues that ritual is necessary for bringing about the proper fulfillment of the emotions of love and respect that tie human beings together. It is through the actual performance of ritual that human beings attain a proper balance of the dispositions (qing 情) and form (wen 文), and can find their fulfillment:

In every case, ritual begins in that which must be released, reaches full development in giving it proper form (wen 文), and finishes in providing it satisfaction. And so when ritual is at its most perfect (zhì bèi 至備), the requirements of inner dispositions (qing 情) and proper form are both completely fulfilled (jù jìn 俱盡). At its next best, the dispositions and outer form overcome one another in succession. Its lowest manner is to revert to the dispositions alone so as to subsume everything in this grand unity.45

Xúnzǐ’s idea of balance thus has an ontological correlate: namely, a vast, differentiated world of interrelated and potentially resonant components that find their optimal realization in a convergence that is appropriately measured and that, in tallying with one another, become part of a harmonious and interdependent whole.46

Within this conception, it becomes difficult to extricate the emotions from other realms of human action and expression, and to delineate the boundaries between them. For Xúnzǐ, what we might call “emotions” can assume any number of these forms, and indeed, it is through ritual that “one gives a shape to that which is without substance (狀乎無形) and magnificently accomplishes

45 Xúnzǐ 19/92/3-3. Hutton (2014) 204.
46 Xúnzǐ uses this logic elsewhere, for instance, in explaining the relationship between human nature (xing 性) and deliberate effort (wei 偽), which he similarly sees as two sides of one interdependent whole. As Xúnzǐ puts it:

Thus, I say that human nature is the original beginning and the raw material, and deliberate effort is what makes it patterned, ordered, and exalted. If there were no human nature, then there would be nothing for deliberate effort to be applied to. If there were no deliberate effort, then human nature would not be able to beautify itself. Human nature and deliberate effort must unite, and then the reputation of the sage and the work of unifying all under Heaven are thereupon brought to completion. And so I say, when Heaven and Earth unite, then the myriad creatures are born. When yin and yang interact, then changes and transformations arise. When human nature and deliberate effort unite, then all under Heaven becomes ordered. (Xúnzǐ 19/95/1-3; Hutton [2014] 2).
Ritual thus represents the giving of proper form to one’s emotions and dispositions and, to that extent, is inseparable from the emotions themselves. Such ritual-as-emotion spans a whole range of expressions, from one’s facial expressions, to one’s dress and movements, and even to the way one orders one’s environment. Xúnzǐ provides a detailed account of how this plays out in the following passage:

And so, a joyful glow and a shining face, a sorrowful look and a haggard appearance – these are the ways in which the dispositions in good fortune and ill fortune, happiness and sorrow are manifest (fā 發) in one’s countenance (yánsè 颜色). Singing and laughing, weeping and sobbing – these are the ways in which the dispositions in good fortune and ill fortune, happiness and sorrow are manifest in one’s voice (shēngyīn 声音). Fine meats and grains and wine and fish, gruel and roughage and plain water – these are the ways in which the dispositions in good fortune and ill fortune, happiness and sorrow are manifest in one’s food and drink (shí yǐn 食飮). Ceremonial caps and embroidered insignias and woven patterns, coarse cloth and a mourning headband and thin garments and hempen sandals – these are the ways in which the dispositions in good fortune and ill fortune, happiness and sorrow are manifest in one’s dress (yīfú 衣服). Homes and palaces and cushions and beds and tables and mats, a thatched roof and mourning lean-to and rough mat and earthen pillow – these are the ways in which the dispositions in good fortune and ill fortune, happiness and sorrow are manifest in one’s dwelling (jūchù 居處).

As Xúnzǐ relates here, if the look on one’s face represents the manifestation (fā 發) of one’s feelings of happiness and sorrow in one’s countenance (yánsè 颜色) – the realm to which some modern theorists of emotion would limit their inquiry – there are correlates in other domains as well: in one’s voice, in one’s food and drink, in one’s dress, and in one’s dwelling. All of these forms, according to Xúnzǐ, are inseparable from the affective experience itself, and point to the way in which emotions are situated in, and interdependent with, the dynamics of our environment.

For Xúnzǐ, then, emotions represent an expansive domain that extends far beyond the realm of mental states and bodily symptoms to which many contemporary scholars of emotion have relegated them. Xúnzǐ’s ritual theory presents a complex world of differentiated components in which meaningful human activity is conceived as an orchestration and optimal interaction of do-

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49 The idea that affectivity “extends” beyond the boundaries of the person has been a prominent theme in the work of Giovanna Colombetti and her collaborators. See, e.g., Colombetti and Roberts (2015) and Colombetti (2017).
50 On this theme, see Virág (2021).
mains that come together in very particular ways. The language of measurement provides an important foundation for the claim that these realms share an optimal standard of realization, and that they can, through such realization, be brought into resonance and alignment with one another.

4 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have traced the role and significance of the technical discourse of standards and measurements in Xúnzǐ’s ethical vision. I have argued that it presents us with a far more complex and dynamic conception of emotions than is usually acknowledged – and one that is integrated with the workings of practical wisdom. Insofar as they can be properly measured and assessed, the emotions, as Xúnzǐ envisions them, are not simply passive objects of rational control, to be shaped and channeled through the application of “external” standards. Instead, they form an essential part of the constitution of human beings and proceed, like other natural phenomena, in an intelligible, constant and predictable way. Moreover, insofar as their proper state is defined by the qualities of right measure, balance and appropriateness, which are best achieved in conjunction with the beautiful sights, sounds, movements, and material trappings of ritual performance, they represent the locus of connectivity uniting human beings with each other, with their environment, and with the workings of the cosmos itself. I have also argued that Xúnzǐ’s deployment of the tools and criteria of measurement to establish that emotions can be known and evaluated in terms of such objective criteria as fittingness, appropriateness, and fulfillment, reveals an expanded vision of human cognitive possibilities as well. For those of sagely intelligence who possess balanced, perspicacious, and all-inclusive understanding, the workings of the world are not mysterious or ineffable, but ultimately knowable. This is what enables them to respond appropriately to the conditions of the world, and to make use of things to nurture and fulfill one’s own “kind.”

That Xúnzǐ invoked such ideas in the context of his discussions of the time-honoured ritual system preserved by the Confucians, of which he was a staunch defender, takes us beyond the (ultimately modern) project of reconstructing what “emotions” might have been for Xúnzǐ, and points us towards what Xúnzǐ’s own priorities, at least as far as we can reconstruct them, might have been. For in appealing to such criteria as rightness and fittingness in emotions in his account of the received ritual practices, Xúnzǐ offered a basis for justifying the ritual system on something other than tradition. As Michael Puett has argued,
what makes the ritual system right is that they are “fitting and proper for humans” and are thus optimal.\textsuperscript{51}

This is a bold claim, and one that resonates with what appears to be a similar deployment of notions of measurement and balance in the classical Greek tradition, as noted above. There would be much to unpack from this fascinating convergence, but any effort to do so will need to consider not only the common recourse to the technical language of measurement, but also certain shared explanatory contexts and exigencies as well. Xúnzí, like his Greek counterparts, deployed ideas of balance and right measure to establish and justify the idea that true standards of ethical attainment were accessible to the sage or the wise person by virtue of her cognitive access to what things were like. That he appealed to such language when it came to matters of ethics and statecraft might well be read as a key element in his strategy to assert the value and rightness of his own vision. In the competitive intellectual and political world of 3rd century BCE China, the use of technical vocabulary, as Mark Csikszentmihalyi has emphasized, was part and parcel of the effort among competing thinkers representing diverse fields of expert knowledge to proclaim the value and authority of their own forms of shu 術, or expertise.\textsuperscript{52} Xúnzí was clearly deploying such rhetoric to defend his own claims by arguing that his form of understanding was superior to the rest – and indeed, that it represented a Way that united diverse shu under an all-encompassing, comprehensive vision.\textsuperscript{53} Through his account of practical wisdom Xúnzí outlined extraordinary new cognitive capacities for those who devoted themselves to the pursuit of this Way. As he put in no modest terms, single-minded devotion to the Way would enable one to achieve

\textsuperscript{51} Puett (2004), 58.
\textsuperscript{52} Csikszentmihalyi (1997) has noted that this was the case even prior to the Han period, when boundary-crossing among fields of expertise became almost de rigeur among thinkers who were operating within a discursive field that valued comprehensive knowledge over narrow, specialized forms of expertise. Such thinkers explored ways to integrate technological modes of explanation into discussions of ethics so as to present them as part of a single discourse.
\textsuperscript{53} These claims were clearly tied to intellectual filiations: Xúnzí’s claims about the proper form of knowledge and the basis of cognitive authority are inseparable from the question of who occupied the most privileged place among the learned. Xúnzí’s answer on this count was clear: it was the sages and the gentlemen who represented the virtues and attainments forwarded by the Confucians, or the Ru. What distinguished Confucius, Xúnzí observed, was his learning of various methods, and through them, arriving at the necessary standard of discernment, understanding and judgment required for efficacious action in the world. As he asserts, “Confucius was humane and wise, and was not fixated, and so through his learning (xué 學) of various methods (luàn shù 亂術), he was worthy of being one of the former kings.” Xúnzí 21/103/15. Hutton (2014) 227.
nothing short of “spirit-like understanding” (tōng yù shén míng 通於神明) and to realize one’s potential to “form a triad with Heaven and Earth” (càn yǔ tiān dì 參於天地).”

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