2 Form and Content of Metochites’ *In De anima*

2.1 Nature and purpose

Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases fill some 1200 folio pages in *V*. They cover every book of every treatise in the *corpus aristotelicum* from the *Physics* to the *De generatione animalium* (Bekker pages 184–789), except for, on the one hand, the spurious *De mundo* and *De spiritu* and, on the other, the *Historia animalium*. It is clear from the outset that the composition of such a massive and in some sense systematic work must have been a carefully planned enterprise.

It is by no means the only large-scale systematic exposition of Aristotelian philosophy preserved from the early Palaiologan period. Leaving aside Leon Magentenos’ commentaries on the Organon, which should probably be backdated to the early to mid twelfth century,¹ there are, to begin with, George Pachymeres’ works: the *Philosophia*, a compendium in twelve books of the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy, was written c. 1285–1295;² a series of more extensive “exegetical” commentaries on the Organon, the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* may date from the following decade.³ Around the same time Sophonias composed his paraphrases of the *Categories*, the *Prior Analytics*, the *Sophistici elenchi*, the *De anima* and parts of the Parva naturalia.⁴ To these may be added, even if they transcend the strictly Aristotelian realm, such philosophical compendia as Nikephoros Blemmydes’ *Epitome logica* and *Epitome physica* (final version c. 1260), not to mention the *Synopsis variarum disciplinarum*, a.k.a. *Encyclopaedia* (c. 1326), by Metochites’ friend and contemporary Joseph Rhakendytes, whose parts on logic and natural philosophy are drawn from Blemmydes’ two *Epitomae* as well as Pachymeres’ *Philosophia*.⁵

Certain aspects of Metochites’ enterprise are no doubt to be understood against the background of the encyclopedic tastes and aspirations of his time. Whether his

1 For a review of the evidence, including the date of the oldest manuscript, Vat. gr. 244 (*Diktyon* 66875), see now Agiotis (2021, xxxiii–xxxviii; lxi–lxii), who concludes that it is “eminently reasonable to consider the period prior to 1185 or even the first half of the twelfth century as being a more suitable floruit for this scholar’s writing activities”.

2 Several books of the *Philosophia* have appeared in critical editions in the Academy of Athens’ series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina*. For the date of the work, see Pappa (2002, 16–17), who cautiously sets it between 1285 and c. 1307, and Golitsis (2007, 63–64), who argues for a date before 1296.

3 On Pachymeres’ “exegetical” commentaries, see Golitsis (2007).


5 The date of the *Encyclopaedia* may be inferred from a reference in a letter to Joseph from Nikephoros Gregoras (*Ep. 22 Leone*), written between May 1326 and May 1328. On Joseph’s work, see Gielen (2013). For the dates of Blemmydes’ *Epitomae*, see Lackner (1981).

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2.1 Nature and purpose

The decision to write on Aristotle’s natural philosophy has anything to do with the fact that three complete series of commentaries on the Organon had already been published in the long century before he set to work is a matter for speculation. But the very comprehensiveness of the enterprise is clearly no accident.

In his Proem, Metochites explains that part of his purpose has been to make it “possible for any random person to have to hand everything by Aristotle about his views on existing things and nature in general as well as in particular”. He emphasizes that he has taken pains to collect it all in a single volume. He repeatedly asserts that the enterprise has been motivated by his “humanitarianism” (φιλανθρωπία). Unfortunately, Metochites is not very specific about who the prospective beneficiaries of his humanitarian efforts may be, except that they are “lovers of the noblest and most important things” – including “learning” – and, of course, that they suffer. One may at least surmise that the actual beneficiaries would have been not so much struggling philosophy students as gentlemen scholars like Metochites himself, who could afford to own a copy of his work and use it as a reference volume. As we know, the circulation was limited: only four extant MSS – two of which contain only half the work – belong to the fourteenth century (see sec. 1.1). Alongside his humanitarian virtue-signalling, Metochites stresses more than once that he expects his work to be useful, no less so to the author himself than to others (11.25; 12.16–20; 12.26 DL). But he also addresses an anonymous dedicatee, who was presumably presented with a copy, sarcastically predicting – if I interpret him correctly – that the Aristotelian paraphrases will prove a more valuable asset to the dedicatee in the future than the dedicatee’s contributions to Metochites’ own “everyday prosperity” have been in the past. The dedicatee may have been Metochites’ rival at court, Nikephoros Choumnos, or – much less likely, I think – his student, Nikephoros Gregoras. We know that both men read at least parts of the paraphrases. Another early reader, as Metochites himself informs us in

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6 τάχα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔξεσται παντὶ γε ὑμών ἵκες τῆς παρούσης συντάξεως ἔχειν ἀπαντα τοῦ ἀνδρός περὶ πάντων, ὡσ’ ἐδοξεῖν ἐπί τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τῇ ψύπει καθόλου τε καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστα ... (12.10–11 DL).
7 ... καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς τὸν ὁμοῦ σύνταγμα ... (11.29–30 DL); ... ὡς ἂρα δὴ συνεσκεύασται ἡμῖν πάνθ’ ἑκάστα καὶ ἐκτέθειται, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐγκείται πρὸς ἑτοίμην τὴν χρήσιν ... (12.15–16 DL).
8 The catchword φιλάνθρωπος and cognates occur five times in two pages in the Proem (11.7, 11.14, 11.16, 12.8, 12.31 DL) and once (v. 313 Cunningham & al.) in the twenty-four lines of Carm. 12 devoted to the Aristotelian paraphrases.
9 ... τοῖς τῶν καλλίστων καὶ μεγίστων ἐρασταῖς ... (11.25 DL) ... τοῖς φιλομαθέσιν ... (11.30 DL) ... καὶ κάμνουσιν ἰσως ἐνεσ ... καὶ μὴ ῥᾷστ’ ἐποπτεύουσα ... τοῖς ἀπορωτέροις ... (12.2–6 DL).
10 ... καὶ ῥᾳδίς οὐκ εὐσεβορίνητον σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονος ἰμέλει λόγου, ἢ ὅσα κομιδὴ πλεῖστα βιωτικῆς εὐκληρίας φθάναιowns' ἡμῖν παρεσκεύασται σοι ... (12.29–31 DL). For the interpretation, see Bydén (2019, 101–3 n. 52).
12 Choumnos' reaction was to suggest, with ill-concealed irony and in a highly polemical context, that a monument with Metochites' effigy should be erected “at the Peripatos”, bearing an inscription to the effect that Metochites knows the titles of all of Aristotle's writings and that these writings are “his
the short section on the Aristotelian paraphrases in his self-promotional Carmen 12 (vv. 303–26) from the late 1320s, was the church historian Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos, who “repeatedly expressed his admiration” for the work.¹³

The intended readership, then, will have consisted of these men and their peers. What did Metochites think he could do to relieve their suffering? He resolved, as he puts it – acknowledging the forbidding character of Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy, which is due, he says, both to the depth and complexity of their content and to the fact that they are deliberately couched in impenetrable language,¹⁴ and imagining that some lovers of learning were “struck by a vehement desire to follow Aristotle’s laborious paths to philosophy” but forced by the “labyrinthine and impassable” character of these paths to stop and turn around –,¹⁵ “to provide some kind of aid … by summarizing, in commentaries, [Aristotle’s] secrets in a very succinct way and laying them bare for ready access by those who love what is most noble and important”.¹⁶ Three key selling points of the Aristotelian paraphrases advertised in the...
Proem are that they are comprehensive (11.28–29; 12.10–11 DL), clear (11.29 DL) and concise (11.24–25 DL). A fourth is, as I have already mentioned, that they are all collected in one volume (11.29–30 DL). These features, Metochites assures us, will enable any user effortlessly to look up Aristotle’s views on any given subject (12.10–15 DL). The convenience and ease of use of the work are also emphasized at 12.1–2 DL (the predicate verb – ἔδοξα – is found at 11.26 DL) and 12.5–6 DL.

Comprehensive as they are, Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases are of course by modern standards not particularly easy to use. Even contemporary readers may have felt that they fell short in this respect of the standard set, for instance, by Pachymeres’ *Philosophia*. Pachymeres rearranged his material according to topics, divided it into books, chapters and sections, which he numbered, and attached a descriptive heading to each section. Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases lack all these facilities apart from a rather erratic division into unnumbered sections. As a consequence, his cross-references come in three grades of precision: “in the n-th book of the treatise on so-and-so”, “previously/later in this book/treatise” and “elsewhere”. And only those readers who already know in which of the forty paraphrased books Aristotle expressed his views on the subject of their interest will be saved the trouble of perusing the best part of 1200 pages in order to “look them up”. New sections of *In De an.* are marked in *V*, *P* and *M* by a hard punctuation mark (ː– in *V*; ː + in *P*; ː in *M*), a line break and the conjunction Ὅτι, normally with a rubricated initial capital (in *V* and *P*, but not in *M*, the breathing and the accent are also normally in red ink). Strictly speaking this indicates that the first sentence in each section is dependent on an understood ἰστέον or σημειωτέον (“nota bene”). The sections are of uneven length, from a mere three lines (1.1.40) up to almost five pages (2.1.1–17) in this edition. Their thematic unity is not necessarily very strong.

As for conciseness, it is true that the Aristotelian paraphrases are considerably shorter than the fully-fledged “exegetical” commentaries on the same works, but they are still on average two to three times as long as the paraphrased Aristotelian texts.¹⁷ The extra space is to a large extent taken up by words and phrases more or less semantically equivalent to those used by Aristotle and introduced by the particle combinations ἤτοι, εἴτευν or ἤγουν (there are on average two to three such integrated glosses per printed page), as well as by short examples, often borrowed from the an-

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¹⁷ At c. 62,000 words Metochites’ paraphrase of the *De anima* is in fact longer than Themistius’, although slightly shorter than Sophonias’, and shorter still than each of the two “exegetical” commentaries (counting Philoponus’ on books 1–2 and Ps.-Philoponus’ on book 3 as one commentary for the sake of convenience). Metochites may have compared his Aristotelian paraphrases specifically with works of the latter type.

ετόμον (11.22–25 DL). Patristic usage of ὁριστικός, which is likely to have evolved from both of the two technical senses of “definitional” and “indicative” (grammatical mood), seems to combine or oscillate between the meanings of “clear”, “brief”, “straightforward” and “descriptive”. For the adverb, see, e.g. (pace Lampe, s.v. p. 973), ?Basil of Caesarea, *De baptismo libri duo* 1516.14; 1517.15; 1517.23 et passim.
cient commentators, and often introduced by the relative adverb οἷον (roughly one per printed page). Earlier discussions are frequently briefly recapitulated, or at least cross-referenced, with the phrases ὡς εἴρηται, ὡς διώρισται, or the like (see further below). In particular, new sections tend to begin with a transitional sentence, which briefly recapitulates the results of the preceding section, often in the form of a prepositional phrase or a participial phrase (“having determined x and y ...”), and introduces the topic now under consideration (“... he next wants to investigate z and says ...”).

It is obvious, on the other hand, that Metochites deliberately avoids any extensive digressions from the Aristotelian text under consideration. He has hardly exploited any material of this character in his subsidiary sources, neither from Philoponus, where it is very abundant, nor from the other ancient commentators, where it is less so. When, for example, Philoponus, in commenting on 1.5, 411a26–b3 (193.2–195.24), seizes the opportunity to discuss the implications of that passage for his own conviction that Aristotle recognized a substantial difference between the rational and the irrational souls and ascribed immortality only to the former, there is no trace of this in Metochites; but when Philoponus returns to the topic in connection with 1.5, 411b14–19 (199.23–200.6), Metochites copies his remark that Aristotle’s words seem to imply that the intellect is separable, and “if it is separable, it is inevitably also imperishable”, only to add, characteristically: “Anyway, staying on the original topic of the discussion, ...” (1.5.38, 96.6–7). Similar reminders that the argument must be resumed after a brief departure occur, e.g. at 1.3.16, 44.11; 2.2.12, 122.6; 2.10.9, 222.7; 3.6.9, 318.1–2; 3.6.11, 318.21; 3.13.2, 374.11.

The policy just described is not, however, strictly enforced. A few digressions do occur, for instance in 1.2.18–22, where Plato’s theory of number is summarized and applied to his psychology, following the lead of the ancient commentators, who all (including Themistius) add an amount of extraneous material in commenting on 1.2, 404b18–21. And the inspiration to expatiate does not always derive from the ancient commentators. Witness 2.5.9–10, where Aristotle’s straightforward but Solomonic solution, in 2.5, 417a18–20, to the age-old dilemma of whether perception is of what is like or what is unlike (it is of both: “what is unlike is affected, but when it has been affected it is like”) receives such a complicated exegesis that Aristotle’s text looks like a brilliant summary by comparison. No ancient commentator wastes more than six lines on clarifying this passage. Another feature that adds bulk to Metochites’ paraphrase is repetition. In 1.2.36–39, for instance, we are told no less than four times in twenty lines that Anaxagoras is an exception to the rule that all previous natural philosophers supposed that the soul consists of the first principles in order to be able to know “like by like”. And in 2.10.4 the three ways in which things can be “invisible” are enumerated, as a template for the ways in which things can be imperceptible by the other senses, with only small variations on the preceding enumeration, which came as recently as in 2.9.8.

True as it may be that clarity and conciseness are sometimes hard to reconcile, for a self-confessed summarizer Metochites does appear to be unusually, perhaps unnec-
essarily, prolix. One may argue that George Scholarios’ epitomes (see above, sec. 1.3.1), since they are about six times shorter than the originals, also come correspondingly closer to embodying the virtue of conciseness claimed by Metochites in his *Proem*. Whether they are also easier to follow than the originals is a matter of opinion, but they were certainly praised for their clarity by Jugie, their modern editor.¹⁸ The fact that Metochites’ convoluted style with its sometimes unusual diction and its frequent affronts to Attic grammar may be every bit as difficult to understand as Aristotle’s allegedly impenetrable prose is possibly more of a problem for us than it was for Metochites’ contemporaries, but I would not bank on it. On some aspects of the language of *In De an.*, see below (secs 2.3 and 3.2).

There is some ambivalence in the literature as to the correct classification of the Aristotelian paraphrases. Are they really paraphrases, or perhaps rather commentaries?¹⁹ One thing that may seem self-evident, but perhaps deserves pointing out all the same, is that there are, from a purely formal point of view, no hard and fast boundaries between the genres of paraphrase and (continuous or “exegetical”) commentary. Even in the earliest surviving commentaries on Aristotle’s works, those by Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, paraphrase is an integral element,²⁰ and conversely, Themistius’ excursus on the productive intellect in his *De anima* paraphrase is as “exegetical” as anything one might come across in a continuous commentary. Aristotelian scholars in the Palaiologan period were very much prone to formal experimentation, in the sense that they happily combined literary features normally associated with different genres. Sophonias is often held up as an example of this, but that is only because he himself, in the preface to his *De anima* paraphrase, offers a binary classification of all the previous secondary literature on Aristotle as either “paraphrastic” or “exegetical”, and professes to have preserved the virtues and eradicated the vices of both categories in his own work. There can be no doubt that Sophonias’ classification oversimplifies the situation, not only on account of the porous boundaries between the two genres, but also because “exegetical commentaries” come in many different styles and formats, as attested by Simplicius’ survey in the preface to his *Categories* commentary (1.8–2.29).²¹

Metochites, too, eludes Sophonias’ dichotomy. He does not, for instance, “take on the role of Aristotle”, so as to expound the Philosopher’s views in the first person, which is considered by Sophonias as a distinctive mark of the paraphrase (*In De an.* 1.11–12). His preferred style is the third-person report, lavishly sprinkled with

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¹⁸ “Ici encore, la qualité maîtresse qu’admire le lecteur est la clarté, et ce n’est pas un mince mérite chez un abréviateur d’Aristote” (Jugie & al. 1936, v).
¹⁹ Borchert (2011) wisely sidesteps the issue by calling them “paraphrastische Kommentare” (see also his discussion, ibid. xlii–xlv).
²⁰ D’Ancona 2002, 224; Fazzo 2004, 8–11.
²¹ On Sophonias’ classification and the literary features of Aristotelian commentaries and paraphrases in the Late Palaiologan period, see also Bydén (2006).
the reporting verb φησίν (three to four instances per printed page). Nevertheless, in some respects there are interesting parallels between the programme delineated in Sophonias’ preface and Metochites’ paraphrastic practices. Sophonias’ main complaint about traditional “exegetical” commentaries on Aristotelian works is that they fail to preserve the continuity of Aristotle’s argument (because it is divided into individual lemmata each followed by extensive discussion of particular points: *In De an.* 1.5–8, 1.23–2.4, 2.8–20). His main complaint about traditional paraphrases of Aristotelian works is that they provide no access to Aristotle’s actual wording (since their aim was only to convey the sense in a more readable style: *In De an.* 1.11–19, 1.22–23, 2.20–28).

Neither continuity nor quotation accuracy is mentioned among the “selling points” of the Aristotelian paraphrases in Metochites’ *Proem*. But the way he actually goes about his business in *In De an.* shows, I think, that these were matters of concern to him. We have already seen how he avoids digressions, apparently in an effort to adhere to the progression of Aristotle’s text. But the incorporation of words and phrases from the latter is also a characteristic feature of his style. So it is, to a considerable extent, of Sophonias’ and indeed even Themistius’ styles. But in contrast to his predecessors, Metochites had at his disposal a device for highlighting his Aristotelian quotations, since he eschewed the paraphrastic first-person artifice.²²

For on the whole, words and phrases directly quoted from Aristotle’s text in *In De an.* do tend to cluster around occurrences of φησίν. These clusters, then, practically fulfil the function of a lemma in an “exegetical” commentary (this is for the most part reflected in the paragraph division of the Edition and Translation). One should probably assume that the understood subject of φησίν, unless otherwise specified, is always Aristotle, even though the subordinate or coordinate clauses may occasionally have no equivalent in Aristotle’s text, but rather in one of Metochites’ subsidiary sources (see notes to 2.2.22, 2.4.20, 2.6.4, 2.8.5, 2.12.2 and 3.1.13 in the Translation). It is admittedly hard to envisage how Themistius’ paraphrase or Philoponus’ commentary has come to be mistaken for Aristotle’s text, but it is even harder to think of any other reason why Metochites should have referred in this indiscriminate manner to both his primary and his subsidiary sources. One passage, however, which seems to fly in the face of this assumption is 2.7.23, 190.14, where κεκλῆσθαι can only be governed by φησίν in the previous clause (or else, which comes to the same thing, an “implicit” φησίν). Assuming that the subject of φησίν is Aristotle, the resulting attribution is not

²² It is true that neither Themistius nor Michael Psellos, the other author mentioned by Sophonias (*In De an.* 1.21) as an example of the paraphrastic genre, employs this artifice consistently (on the artifice in Psellos, see Ierodiakonou 2002, 165–66), but by and large they do employ it, and thus make it impossible for the reader to distinguish between Aristotelian and other elements of the text. In the oldest MS of Sophonias’ paraphrase, Laur. Plut. 07,35 (*Diktyon* 16058), Aristotelian quotations are usually indicated by marginal quotation marks, but this method is obviously precarious, since the marks are liable to be misplaced or lost in the process of textual transmission; and it is not clear anyway whether the marks originated with the author.
just factually wrong, but downright absurd: “Aristotle says that he himself is unable to designate the medium of odour by a name, but that this, too, has been designated by later writers as ‘transodorant’” (see also ad loc. in sec. 1.6). Aristotle is also mentioned by name 27 times (and is once referred to as “the Philosopher”, in distinction to “the commentators”: 3.10.15, 352.7); Themistius and “Simplicius” (Priscian) once each (3.10.12, 350.13 and 3.10.13, 350.17); Philoponus never.

By eschewing the paraphrastic artifice and reclaiming the first-person forms for himself, Metochites is thus in a position to distinguish between himself as author of the paraphrase and Aristotle as author of the paraphrased text. In In De an. there are twenty-odd instances of past tense forms of verbs of saying in the first person, both in the plural (most frequent) and in the singular (there are also present tense forms in the first person plural, but these are usually of general reference). The most natural interpretation of this situation is that, unless otherwise specified, third person forms refer to Aristotle and first person forms refer to Metochites himself. Apart from the aforementioned cases where φησίν introduces a statement derived from a subsidiary source, this interpretation does not seem to be contradicted by any circumstances in the actual usage. That is to say, not only φησίν and λέγει, but also (προ‑)ἐφη, (προ‑)ἐπε, (προ‑)ἔλεγε, (προ‑)ἐρημε and ἐρεῖ, appear by default to refer to Aristotle and to statements made in the paraphrased texts, while (προ‑)ἔφην and (προ‑)ἐφημεν (and occasionally ἐλέγομεν and εἰρήκαμεν) appear by default to refer to Metochites and to statements made in the paraphrases. There are, however (as with φησίν), also cross-references by past tense forms of verbs of saying in the third person that lead us to subsidiary sources rather than to Aristotle: for instance, ἔλεγο in 3.4.1, 290.5 seems to refer to Themistius’ paraphrase of 3.3, 427b14–17 (88.30–32) rather than the Aristotelian text.

The question is, then, how to interpret passive forms of verbs of saying, such as (προ‑)ἐρηται (c. 270 instances) and (προ‑)ἐλέγετο (c. 30 instances), but also, for instance, (προ‑)διώρισται (c. 80 instances). My own interpretation is that while the perfect forms, (προ‑)ἐρηται and (προ‑)διώρισται, refer to the Aristotelian text,²³ (προ‑)ἐλέγετο normally, but not necessarily always, refers to Metochites’ paraphrase itself. As we have seen, the latter form normally serves to secure the continuity of the argument: after a long parenthesis, for instance, the discussion may be brought back to topic by the phrase ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, …. The perfect forms, on the other hand, usually preceded by ὡς, no doubt serve the pedagogical purpose of connecting new information with already familiar material (and sometimes that of repeating the already familiar material), but are arguably also meant to underscore the adequacy

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²³ Thus, for instance, the antecedent of ὃ μὴ πρότερον εἴρηται in 2.8.4, 192.23–194.1 is a statement the absence of which in De an. 2.7 Metochites has already noted (2.7.24, 190.15–16), so εἴρηται cannot refer to the paraphrase. And while it is true that τὸ εἰρημένον διηχές in 2.8.2, 192.7 has not been mentioned in the Aristotelian text, Metochites seems to think it has (see 2.7.21, 190.6–7 and the note to the Translation).
of the interpretation offered in the passage in which they occur, by showing how it is consistent with statements made by Aristotle previously in the paraphrased work or in the passage currently under consideration. An (unusually, perhaps) illustrative example of the latter function can be found in the following passage:

And as we say (ὡς φαμέν), the motion of [the formal] life is comparable to this kind of operation: what was stated (ὅπερ εἴρηται) was that one must conceive of that by means of which [the animal] is moved as the same thing both as a starting-point and as an end-point. And from this it is possible to understand how “being moved and being at rest” is conceived of in this case ... (3.10.16, 352.14–17).

It seems clear that ὅπερ εἴρηται here is a reference to the text under consideration (433b22), while ὡς φαμέν introduces the interpretative framework favoured by Metochites.

The discussion to which this passage belongs (3.10.11–18) is the only one in In De an. where Metochites uses his reclaimed first-person forms to take sides in an interpretative disagreement. It is about 3.10, 433b21–27, where Aristotle says that the bodily entity used by the desiderative faculty of an animal’s soul as an organ (or instrument) for setting the animal’s body in motion is found at a place where beginning and end are the same, that is, different in account but inseparable in magnitude, such as a joint. According to Metochites, some commentators, including Themistius, Alexander and Plutarch, maintain that the place Aristotle has in mind is the heart, from which arises the vital pneuma or spirit, which is the organ by which an animal’s body is set in motion (cf. Aristotle, MA 10, 703a9–16). The report of Themistius’ view is relatively unproblematic: it is based on the author’s own words (In De an. 121.7–9), although, as Todd points out (1996, 194), the vital (or “connate”) spirit is not mentioned in this passage. The fact that it is bracketed with Alexander’s and Plutarch’s is perhaps more surprising. It is true that Priscian ascribes one or two similar interpretations to “Aristotle’s commentators” (In De an. 301.15–30; cf. 303.31–33), and it is not unlikely that the commentators in question are in fact Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens, since they are both referred to for the clarification of details in the immediate context (In De an. 302.24–33 and 304.9–20), but even if this is the case they are not mentioned by name in the relevant passage.

Metochites goes on to set out an alternative interpretation, based on Priscian’s doctrine of the twofold entelechy. In Priscian’s view, the “bodily” entity through which, or, rather, in virtue of which (καθ’ ὅ), an animal’s body is set in motion is properly speaking its specifying life (εἰδοποιοῦσα ζωή), which is “bodily” only in the sense of being wholly immersed in the body (In De an. 301.30–302.17; 303.8–10; 303.33–305.18). The “joint” mentioned by Aristotle is taken by Priscian simply as a comparison (that is, of course, also how it is understood on the Themistian interpretative mentioned above). The Priscianic interpretation is emphatically endorsed
by Metochites: “With this view I myself also agree completely ...”.

By attributing it not only to “Simplicius” but also to Iamblichus, who is not mentioned by name in the relevant passages of Priscian’s commentary, but whose authority is reverently acknowledged in the programmatic statements of its introduction (1.14–21), Metochites shows that he had read the Lydian commentator’s work carefully enough to be aware of its debt to the Syrian philosopher, but not enough, perhaps, to recognize the originality of this particular doctrine.

Otherwise, the use of first-person forms, when not of general reference, is limited to cross-references within the paraphrase. Personal views are rarely if ever expressed. Metochites’ furthest steps in that direction are represented by a few subtle repudiations of views that are in open conflict with Orthodox Christian dogma (see 1.2.18, 26.13–15; 2.1.6, 102.16–17; 2.3.6, 136.19–22; 3.12.1, 362.2–4; 3.12.9, 366.11–15).

Whether or not Metochites was in the end successful in his humanitarian enterprise, he clearly conceived of his Aristotelian paraphrases as an œuvre de haute vulgarisation. Another characteristic feature of such works – besides comprehensiveness, clarity, concision and ease of use – is a natural tendency towards the mainstream. One way for the popularizer of science or philosophy to avoid extreme or eccentric views is to collate the opinions of several authorities, and as a principle follow the majority view, or at least a view that seems compatible with more than one authority. With few exceptions (such as the discussion in 3.10.11–18), this eclectic approach is in evidence on every page of In De an.

Of course, Metochites does not say that his aim is to present the views of the majority of Aristotle’s interpreters. He says that it is to clarify Aristotle’s views. But since he grants that it is not only the language in which they are couched that prevents easy access to Aristotle’s views, but even more so the thoughts themselves, which are amazingly “deep and multifaceted” as well as “lofty and precise” (Proem 11.17–19 DL), it is hard to see why he would court disaster by bypassing the views of Aristotle’s interpreters. Which, of course, he did not. In fact he seems to have drawn on almost every commentary on Aristotle’s natural philosophy to have survived from the previous centuries. Why shouldn’t he? He was after all the Emperor’s μεσάζων, and would not be denied his requests, even for books. In the next section we shall take a closer look at the sources for In De an.

### 2.2 Sources

Metochites’ main sources for In De an. are, besides Aristotle’s De anima, Philoponus’ commentary and Themistius’ paraphrase, but every once in a while a snippet of infor-

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24 τούτῳ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς συντίθεμαι μᾶλιστα ... (3.10.14, 352.1–2).

mation crops up that could only derive from Priscian of Lydia (Ps.-Simplicius). In the paraphrase of De an. 3, especially from 3.7 onwards, borrowings from Priscian become more regular. In contrast to Sophonias, who admits, in the preface to his paraphrase (In De an. 3.3–4), to having incorporated entire sections from earlier commentators, especially Philoponus, into his work, Metochites as a rule does not refer to his subsidiary sources by name. The only exception in In De an. is the passage in 3.10.11–18 discussed in section 2.1.²⁶

Moreover, while Sophonias often copies whole phrases, sentences and even paragraphs from his subsidiary sources with only the minimal changes required to fit them into their new syntactic and pragmatic context, Metochites’ borrowings are always heavily paraphrased, sometimes to the point that even the ideas they express are transformed in the process (see the apparatus of parallel passages appended to the Translation). This makes them rather more difficult to identify and especially to demarcate with any precision. Different sources are also often combined. An instructive example of Metochites’ method in this regard is provided by the first two paragraphs of the work, where four lines of Aristotelian text are expanded into seventeen by a deft amalgamation of ideas from all three extant ancient commentators on the passage (again, see the apparatus of parallel passages). When the ideas expressed in the sources are distorted, this need of course not always be due to misunderstanding – passages in other commentators may be legitimately utilized as springboards to fresh insights – but for the most part this is probably the case. At any rate, when the ideas expressed by Metochites differ from those expressed in his putative sources, they are rarely if ever as good.

Philoponus, Ps.-Philoponus and Sophonias. Philoponus is the most exploited subsidiary source for In De an. 1 and 2. In In De an. 3, of course, the matter gets complicated, since there are two commentaries on De anima 3 attributed to Philoponus, one of which (= Ps.-Philoponus) survives in extenso,²⁷ while the continuation of the commentary on De anima 1–2, which we may call the “Ammonian” commentary,²⁸ is extant only in William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of chapters 3.4–8 and an Arabic adaptation of a lost Greek paraphrase, together with excerpts in Sophonias and scholia in cod. Laur. Plut. 87,20 (Diktyon 16837).²⁹ It is not unlikely that Metochites had

²⁶ He also makes an unspecific reference to “the later commentators on [Aristotle’s] writings” in 3.7.16, 330.11–12, where he is in fact thinking of Themistius, and to “Theophrastus and those who came after him” in 2.7.21, 190.8.
²⁷ For arguments pro and contra Philoponus’ authorship, see Charlton (2000, 1–12), who ascribes it to Stephanus of Alexandria, and Golitsis (2016), who defends the traditional attribution.
²⁸ Since, according to its full title, it was largely drawn from Ammonius’ lectures (see further Golitsis 2019).
²⁹ For Moerbeke’s translation, see Verbeke (1966); for the Arabic adaptation, see Arnzen (1998, 80–139); for the excerpts in Sophonias, see Van Riet (1965); for the newly discovered scholia, see Steel (2017).
access to either the original text or the paraphrase of the Ammonian commentary on *De anima* 3.\(^{30}\) At any rate, there are a few passages in *In De an.* 3.4–8 where there seem to be closer parallels to this than to any other commentary. There are also a couple of passages in *In De an.* 3.1–3 where there seem to be closer parallels to Sophonias’ paraphrase than to any other commentary. For these, I refer to the apparatus of parallel passages appended to the Translation. Some of the vocabulary in *In De an.* 3, such as ἐναπομένω in 3.2.7 (258.4 and 7), which occurs five times in Philoponus’ commentary on *De anima* 1–2, but not in any other ancient commentary on the *De anima*, may possibly also indicate dependence on the Ammonian commentary.\(^{31}\)

In 2.4.7, 144.19–20 there is a brief passage with a close parallel in Sophonias’ paraphrase but not in any extant ancient commentary (see the apparatus of parallel passages to the Translation, ad loc.). Pending other explanations (coincidence seems unlikely, but Sophonias may draw on lost or unedited older material), this may be taken as an indication that Metochites was familiar with the work of his contemporary. I have found no other similar indications (apart from the possibility that the parallels in *In De an.* 3.1–3 are due to direct dependence), but my investigations have not been very systematic.

**Themistius.** Themistius is relied upon throughout *In De an.*., especially in book 3. Except for a few lines that reveal the influence of Priscian,\(^{32}\) he is the only subsidiary source for the paraphrase of *De an.* 3.5. The single most extensive borrowing from Themistius is probably the passage on the unity of the sense capacity as a whole, at the very end of the discussion of sense perception, in 3.2.23–29, which is in effect a paraphrase of Themistius 85.27–87.16 rather than of the corresponding sentences in Aristotle. Metochites was apparently very impressed by this passage in his well-spoken predecessor, so much so that he returned on a couple of occasions, in his *Semeioseis gnomikai* (89, 577–80 MK and 95, 599–603 MK), to Themistius’ comparison (in 87.8–11) of the five individual senses to messengers and the unified sense capacity to their king, developing some of its implications, but substituting the intellect for the sense capacity (the intellect “must punish transgressions and never ever allow the senses to ‘drink neat wine’ and revel independently of its orders”).\(^{33}\)

**Priscian.** The brevity and irregularity of Metochites’ borrowings from Priscian in *In De an.* 1–2 may seem to suggest that Metochites only had access to the Lydian commen-

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\(^{30}\) Arnzen (1998, 104–7) argues that the excerpts in Sophonias derive from the lost paraphrase.

\(^{31}\) Obviously, such correspondences can never be more than a heuristics for establishing dependences: while ἐναπομένω, for instance, is an extremely rare word in pagan authors, it is quite common in Christian authors from Late Antiquity onwards.

\(^{32}\) See further Bydén (2022, 73–74).

\(^{33}\) τὰ ὑπερβάθμια κολάζειν, καὶ μὴ ἐνγχωρεῖν καθάπαξ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔξω τῶν ἐντολῶν ἀκρατίζεσθαι καὶ βακχεύειν (600 MK).
tator’s work in the form of selected scholia. This suggestion is, however, contradicted by the passage in 3.10.11–18, in which the reference to Iamblichus seems to presuppose familiarity with the commentary as a whole. A more likely explanation of Metochites’ relative neglect of Priscian’s commentary may be that he did not find it conducive to two of the features that, if my suggestions in section 2.1 were correct, he wanted his paraphrase to embody, namely, close adherence to Aristotle’s text and a mainstream interpretation.\footnote{Even if long digressions like those scattered over Philoponus’ commentary and occasionally occurring even in Themistius – notably 100.16–109.3 on the productive intellect – are uncommon in Priscian, his exegesis is normally geared towards showing the consistency of Aristotle’s account with a more general theoretical (Platonist) framework.}

**Aristotle.** I have not made any systematic inquiries into the Aristotelian text presupposed by Metochites, partly because it is for the most part not very clearly reflected in his rather transformative style of paraphrase, partly because he may well have worked from multiple sources: he is after all using material from all the extant earlier commentaries in Greek (perhaps with the exception of Sophonias), and if he found these in scholia they would have accompanied an Aristotelian text, while if he used the continuous commentaries they would all have included either lemmata of the text or close paraphrases (cf. Borchert 2011, lviii–lx).

In a couple of passages the observation by Rashed (2001, 59) and Borchert (2011, lxii–lxiv) that In GC often agrees with Vat. gr. 253 (L) seems to be borne out for In De an. too: thus in 433\textsuperscript{a}29 Metochites seems to have read (3.10.6, 346.22–23) first τὸ πρακτικόν (τὸ πρακτόν Ross) and then πρακτόν; according to Siwek, only L offers the combination of these two readings. Similarly, in 430\textsuperscript{b}26 he seems to have read (3.6.11, 318.22–23) φάσις τις (φάσις τι Ross); only L has τις.

There are, however, also many passages where Metochites seems to have read a variant not offered by L. For instance (readings of Aristotle MSS as reported by Siwek):

1.2.15, 24.19 γαίῃ μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν (γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν Ross 404\textsuperscript{a}13–14 : γὰρ om. κ σ V P D\textsuperscript{f});
1.3.21, 46.11 κωμῳδοδιδασκάλου (κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ Ross 406\textsuperscript{b}17–18 : κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ ρ y H\textsuperscript{c} N\textsuperscript{c} R\textsuperscript{c} V\textsuperscript{v});
1.5.36, 94.21 διαπνεῖ (διαπνεῖται Ross 411\textsuperscript{b}9 : διαπνεῖ τε ρ σ y D\textsuperscript{f});
1.5.41, 96.27 legit fort. ψυχή ἀρχή (ἀρχή ψυχή Ross 411\textsuperscript{b}28 : ψυχή ἀρχή Ωο D\textsuperscript{e} L\textsuperscript{c} T);
2.6.5, 178.21–24 Διάφρος (Διάφρος Ross 418\textsuperscript{b}21 : Διάφρος ρ m D\textsuperscript{e} e E\textsuperscript{e} F\textsuperscript{c});
3.3.33, 288.13 γιγνομένης (γιγνομένη Ross 429\textsuperscript{a}2 : γι(γ)νομένη ξ H\textsuperscript{a} U L\textsuperscript{c} E\textsuperscript{f} i m);
3.4.5, 292.8 ἀντιφράξει (ἀντιφράττει Ross 429\textsuperscript{a}20–21: ἀντιφράζει κ σ U W H\textsuperscript{a3});
3.5.7, 334.16 φαντάσματι (V : φάντασμα τι Μ A) (φάντασμα τι Ross 432\textsuperscript{a}8 : φαντάσματι ξ H\textsuperscript{a} U L\textsuperscript{c} i y);
3.10.5, 346.19 ὄρεκτικον (ὅρεκτον Ross 433\textsuperscript{a}28 : ὄρεκτικον X T\textsuperscript{u} B\textsuperscript{d}).
As is seen, no clear pattern can be detected. Once Metochites even agrees with a modern conjecture: it looks as if he may have read σφαῖρα σφαῖραν in 3.11, 434a13 with Torstrik, Essen and Ross (3.11.5, 358.6).35

2.3 Language

This is not the place for a detailed study of Metochites’ language, so I shall restrict myself to discussing some characteristic departures from classical Greek with potential ramifications for editing and translating In De an. (see also sec. 3.2).

2.3.1 The definite article

Metochites does not always conform to the grammatical rule which says that the definite article is repeated only if the attribute is placed after its head noun (the “second attributive position”). Thus, for instance, in 1.4.28, 72.6–7 we read (in all three main MSS plus P) καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ..., where we might expect καὶ τοῦ σώματος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο (or καὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο σώματος). This may reflect a contemporary development in the vernacular: the phenomenon appears in texts from at least the fourteenth century onwards, to judge from the examples given by Holton & al. (2019, 4: 1973–74), who refer to it as “so called ‘reverse determiner spreading’”. Occasionally (e.g. 2.12.4, 238.7), this word order is exhibited in V but not in β. In one instance (1.2.28, 32.1), Metochites may have taken the further step of removing the article before the preposed adjective, if V is in the right here: ἄδε ἐκ σφαιρικοῦ [τοῦ add. V : fort. legendum του] σχήματος οὐσιοῦται, εὐκινητότατον ἐστι....

Among other noteworthy features in the use of the article can be mentioned that attributive numerals sometimes precede the article (e.g. 1.3.25, 48.7: εἰς δύο τὰς ἀντικειμένας φοράς). This usage seems to have been relatively widespread already in Early Imperial times. Also, the noun after the interrogative determiner takes the article on two occasions (1.3.22, 46.18; 1.5.28, 90.15), both in the phrase διὰ τίνα τὴν

35 Borchert’s conclusion is well worth quoting in full: “Die Analyse ergibt, dass die im Text des Metochites festzustellende Kombination signifikanter Lesarten nicht mit dem Textbestand einer einzelnen individuellen Handschrift oder dem einer näher eingrenzbaren Familie übereinstimmt, sondern charakteristische Elemente aus den Textbeständen aller Handschriftengruppen reflektiert sowie umgekehrt charakteristische Lesarten von an anderer Stelle reflektierten Handschriften nicht reflektiert. Metochites ist also entweder eklektisch vorgegangen oder hat eine Handschrift benutzt, in der die verschiedenen Textbestände bereits in der aus seiner Paraphrase erschließbaren Weise kontaminiert waren” (2011, lxi).
αἰτίαν: this phrase otherwise only occurs in Galen (eight instances in TLG). In 2.2.15, 122.21–22 and 3.2.8, 258.18 the same noun takes the article after διὰ and the relative pronoun.

For the position of the article with pronouns, see the next subsection.

2.3.2 Pronouns

One of the most striking linguistic features of In De an. is the lavish use of the pronoun/ pronominal adjective αὐτός. This accounts for more than 3 percent of the word tokens; the corresponding figure in Aristotle is 1.2 percent.

There seem to be four distinct uses of αὐτός in In De an., three of which (1–3) are classical: (1a) Used by itself in the nominative, or (1b) in agreement with a head noun in any case and standing in the predicate position, it is emphatic. The high frequency of αὐτός in In De an. seems to be due mainly to the very high frequency of emphatic αὐτός (with the caveat that some instances are ambiguous between this and use [4]). (2) Used by itself, preceded by the article, or in agreement with a head noun in any case and standing in the attributive position, it means “same”. (3) Used by itself in oblique cases it is an anaphoric third-person personal pronoun. (4a) Used by itself in the nominative (or, in genitive absolutes, in the genitive), or (4b) in agreement with a head noun in any case and standing in the predicate position, it is a demonstrative pronoun (4a) or adjective (4b).

How to interpret and best to translate each instance of αὐτός has been a vexing problem throughout my work on the Translation. It is not always immediately evident which of the uses listed above is the relevant one. This is especially true of cases where αὐτός agrees with a head noun and appears in the predicate position, and thus theoretically could be either (1b) emphatic or (4b) demonstrative. In the vast majority of instances, however, it seems clear that the relevant use is the emphatic one. Leaving aside those rare cases in which exophoric deixis may occur in In De an., the only possible functions for αὐτός used as a demonstrative are anaphoric and cataphoric. In its emphatic use, αὐτός is neither anaphoric nor cataphoric. So the touchstone for deciding whether a particular instance of predicative αὐτός is emphatic or demonstrative must be whether it is anaphoric, cataphoric or neither. In the first two pages of In De an. there are exactly four instances of αὐτός agreeing with a head noun and standing in the predicate position:

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36 It may also be thus used in oblique cases, but in so far as it is anaphoric this is indistinguishable from use (3).
38 I am not sure whether true exophoric deixis actually occurs, but there are several instances of the Aristotelian τοῦτο (τί), which arguably is a nominalization of that pronoun in its exophoric use.
2.3 Language |

(1.1.2, 4.11) καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἀνάγεται ἡ θεωρία εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ θεία καὶ καθάπαξ νοερά ....

(1.4. 6.5) δι’ αὐτῆς γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖται, καὶ τέλος οίονει ἔχει τὰ ἐμψυχα, εἰς ὧν ἄρη ἡ φύσις αὐτή ὀρθῶς τὴν ψυχήν ....

(1.8, 6.22) ἐξ ὧν ζητεῖν ἐστι τὰ προκείμενα αὐτὰ ἐκαστα εἰς τὸ ορίζεσθαι ....

(1.9, 6.25) ἄλλων γὰρ, φησίν, ἄλλων ἀρχαῖα, ἄλλης ἀρχής τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἂν οὐκ εἰσέχονται ἐν τῷ διωρισμένον ποσὸν ή ἡ μονᾶς αὐτή ....

There is also one instance where αὐτός stands between an attributive adjective and its head noun, presumably modifying the adjective:

(1.3–4, 6.2) καὶ πρὸς θεολογίαν ... καὶ πρὸς ἧδικὴν φιλοσοφίαν ... μᾶλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φυσικὴν αὐτὴν πραγματείαν ....

In none of these instances does the head noun with which αὐτός agrees refer to anything mentioned previously or later in the immediate (or, indeed, the not so immediate) context. Consequently, αὐτός must be emphatic in all these instances. As such, it serves to mark the referent of its head noun as being a thing of special importance or relevance (in 1.8, perhaps, by extension, simply a different thing from something previously mentioned). This kind of marking is often best expressed in spoken English by stress, and in written English by italics. Thus I have often represented clear cases of emphatic adjectival αὐτός by italicising the head noun in the Translation. Of course, not all cases of emphatic αὐτός are exactly like these, and the word has also often been rendered as “(him-, her-) itself” or “themselves”, and occasionally as “the very ...”. Not seldom “actual” suggests itself as a fairly accurate translation, but with a couple of exceptions I have avoided this on account of the risk of confusion with the philosophical terms of art (ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἐνεργείᾳ).

Nevertheless, there are also many cases in In De an. of αὐτός in the predicate position that can be understood as demonstrative. Some of them can probably only be thus understood. Here are a few examples:

(1.5.2, 8.07) οἱ μὲν γὰρ ... ἐνεχονται ἀτόπω αὐτόθεν τῷ λέγειν δύο σώματα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι .... καὶ ἐκεῖ πως τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ τῷ λέγειν ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς στιγμαῖς ἐνεῖναι ἅμα ἐν ταυτῷ καὶ τὰς μοναδικὰς στιγμὰς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ....

τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ seems unambiguously to refer to the preceding statement, that two bodies occupy the same place.

(3.2.15, 262.5) ... ἥ παντάπασιν ἀνενεργητός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ μέτρου, ἡ καὶ φθαρτική, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων αὑτοῖς τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ προσῆκον μέτρον ....

τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν is the same kind of ratio as the one mentioned in the preceding clause. In the following passage we seem to have instances of both the emphatic and the
demonstrative use (in the latter instance οὗτος again stands between an attributive adjective and its head):\(^\text{39}\)

\[(3.10.13, 350.17–18) \text{ Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ, ὃ καὶ Σιμπλίκιος συντίθεται, τὸ ὀργανικὸν \textit{αὐτό} κινοῦν ... τὸ εἰδητικὸν \textit{αὐτό} φασιν εἶναι τῆς ζωῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ....}

τὸ ὀργανικὸν \textit{αὐτό} κινοῦν refers to the topic of discussion since 3.10.11; τὸ εἰδητικὸν \textit{αὐτό} ... τῆς ζωῆς has not been mentioned previously in this context.

It may be added that some instances that may be interpreted as (4b) demonstrative adjectival \textit{αὐτός} may also be interpreted as instances of use (3), the personal pronoun, with a noun in apposition, e.g. 1.2.23, 28.20: ... τάς παρά τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀρχάς τιθεμένας εἰς \textit{αὐτό} – τὸ γνωστικόν – ἑξῆς ..., or 1.4.36, 76.2: τὸ κινοῦν ἐξ \textit{αὐτοῦ} τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μόνον (which may be = τὸ κινοῦν ἐξ \textit{αὐτοῦ} – τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ – μόνον).

Examples of (4a), where \textit{αὐτός} is apparently used as an independent demonstrative pronoun, are a bit more frequent:

\[(1.4.10, 62.8) \text{ τὰ \textit{αὐτὰ} δὲ, φησιν, ἔστι λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα. καὶ \textit{αὐτός} γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ τὰ \textit{εἴδη} τῶν μορίων τῶν \textit{ζῴων} ....}

Here \textit{αὐτός} obviously refers to Empedocles, and it seems irrelevant to stress the fact that he generates the forms of the parts of animals \textit{himself}.

\[(2.7.12, 184.26) \text{ καὶ τὸ \textit{αὐτὸ} ὑποκέιμενον \textit{ὁστ} πο \μόνον τοῦ φωτισμοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σκότους. \textit{αὐτό} δὲ \textit{ὁστ} διὰ \textit{τὸ} \textit{λεγόμενο} διαφανές δυνάμει ....}

Here \textit{αὐτό} clearly refers to the subject of illumination and darkness mentioned in the preceding sentence.

In the genitive, \textit{αὐτός} can also occur as the subject of a genitive absolute:

\[(2.9.3, 208.19) \text{ ... ἀν' \textit{αὐτῶν} τῆς τροφῆς λόγοι, καὶ \textit{αὐτῶν} τῆς \textit{ζῴως}, τοῦ δὲ πικροῦ, \textit{αὐτῶν} \textit{τοῦ} \textit{μὲν} \textit{γλυκέο}, τοῦ δὲ \textit{ἀνιᾶσθαι} ....}

Here \textit{αὐτῶν} refers to the perceptible objects of taste, mentioned in the main clause. Finally an example of cataphoric demonstrative \textit{αὐτός}:

\[(2.4.19, 152.4) \text{ ἐπ' \textit{αὐτών} \textit{ὁ} τῆς τροφῆς λόγος, \textit{ἔφ' οὖν} \textit{ὁ} \textit{μόνον} \textit{ἡ} \textit{ἐκ} \textit{τῶν} \textit{ἐναντίων} \textit{αὐτὴ} \textit{καταλαμβάνεται} γένεσις ....}

Conversely, \textit{οὗτος} is occasionally used when \textit{αὐτός} might be expected:

\[(1.3.35, 52.24) \text{ καὶ οὗτος \textit{συμπέρασμα} ....}

\(^{39}\) Cf. Kühner & Gerth §465.4 Anm. 5, 1: 628.
The instances of demonstrative αὐτός are, however, relatively few in *In De an.*, and especially the instances of (4b) demonstrative adjectival αὐτός are vastly outnumbered by the instances of (1b) emphatic adjectival αὐτός. This could suggest that they represent involuntary lapses into the vernacular. The usual demonstrative is οὗτος, which occurs over 800 times (much more often as a pronoun than as a pronominal adjective). There are about 30 instances of ἐκεῖνος; and more than 50 of ὅδε, but many of these involve the technical term τόδε (τι).

Unlike the case in classical Greek, the genitive of αὐτός relatively often stands in the attributive position in *In De an.* (c. 40 instances). In most of these instances, its semantic value is probably best taken as possessive (e.g. 2.1.7, 102.20: ... ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγραμμάτων ...), but in some of them it can also be understood as partitive (e.g. 2.2.20, 124.24: ... ἐκάτερον τῶν αὐτοῦ τιμημάτων ...) or separative (e.g. 1.5.25, 90.5: ... καὶ τὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ στέρησαν), and in some it is unequivocally objective (e.g. 3.2.8, 258.11: ... ὁ ψόφος ... ὁ κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἀκοή).

Some of these instances may be possible to explain as demonstrative αὐτός, on the assumption that this has inherited the syntactic properties of the classical demonstratives, genitives of which do stand in the attributive position. In many cases, however, the genitive of αὐτός in this position refers to the subject of the clause in which it stands (or to the subject of a governing clause); that is to say, it is directly (or indirectly) reflexive (e.g. 1.1.38, 18.15: καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τε χνῖται παραπλησίως κατὰ μέρος περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ὑποκείμενα [περιεργάζονται]; 1.2.1, 20.1: κατὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔθος ἐν πάσῃ προθέσει βουλόμενος κάνταυθα προεκθέσει τὰς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόξας, λέγει ...; 1.3.28, 50.4: ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀρθοὶς τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων νοησεί [ὁ νοῦς]). Reflexive pronouns, too, stand in the attributive position in classical Greek. In principle, then, we could in such cases have to do with the third-person reflexive pronoun, in its normal position, but erroneously given a smooth breathing. The third-person reflexive pronoun is after all also used in *In De an.* (c. 160 instances, more than a third of which are in the set prepositional phrase καθ᾽ αὐτό). However, since (a) there are so many instances of the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position and little or no variation in the MSS; (b) there are also many instances of the genitive of αὐτός in the *predicate* position that refer to the subjects of their own clause or of a governing clause, where the MSS are also more or less unanimous in giving the smooth breathing; and (c) several instances of the genitive of personal (or demonstrative) αὐτός in the attributive position do not refer to the subjects of their own clause or of a governing clause, it seems more likely that the reason for this situation simply is that Metochites had no qualms about us-

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40 Exceptions to the rule in classical Greek occur almost only when the noun takes a second attribute: see Kühner & Gerth §464.4 with Anm. 2, 1: 619–20.
ing the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position, and that he uses it reflexively or non-reflexively with little or no discrimination.⁴¹

The latter suspicion is strengthened by the occurrence of passages like 2.9.3, 208.16 (μόνον δ’ ἔχει ἐν τοῖς κατ’ αὐτήν αἰσθητοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτή τοῖς μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ λυπεῖσθαι ...), where more than just the breathing prevents us from taking αὐτήν as a reflexive pronoun, although it undoubtedly refers to the subject of the clause; and 3.13.4, 376.19 (πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβολή αἰσθητοῦ τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει ...), where more than just the breathing prevents us from taking αὐτὸ as a personal (or demonstrative) pronoun, although it undoubtedly does not refer to the subject of the clause. One may even find a reflexive and a personal pronoun with the same referent in the same clause, as in 1.3.12, 42.18 (πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινοῦμεν ἡ καθ’ ὅλον ἑαυτὸ κινεῖται ἡ κατὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ ...), although it is of course possible that αὐτοῦ is an error of transmission here.

In the light of this, the description of use (3) above should be rephrased to read “used by itself in oblique cases it is (3a) an anaphoric third-person personal pronoun or (3b) a reflexive pronoun”. Consequently, I have in these instances as a rule not corrected a smooth breathing unanimously exhibited in the MSS. The only exceptions are a few instances after prepositions where it seems to me, on the basis of his usage elsewhere in the work, that Metochites must have intended the reflexive (e.g. 1.3.14–15, 44.5–10: δί’ αὐτό; 2.8.15, 198.21: δί’ αὐτοῦ; 2.10.1, 218.6: μεταξὺ αὐτῶν). In view of the rather frequent erroneous breathings in all MSS, such corrections should not in principle be considered a major intervention.

The other suspicion, that Metochites had no qualms about using the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position, is strengthened by the occurrence of other irregularities in the position of complements and adjuncts (e.g. prepositional complements in the predicate position, as in 2.5.4, 162.21–22: δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καὶ συνειλημμένη καὶ ἀχωρίστως συνουσιωμένη αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, where the dative complement αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις ... seems to exclude the possibility that ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις is adverbial).

2.3.3 ἔστιν

“Modal” ἔστιν, normally complemented by an infinitive phrase, occurs relatively frequently in In De an., not only in the well-established sense of “it is possible that ...”, but also in the senses of “it is necessary/desirable/appropriate that ...”. Examples of cases where it seems unavoidable to take it in one of the latter senses include several instances in which it is part of a phrase that formulates the agenda for the next few paragraphs, interchangeably with phrases like ζητητέον ἐστί (e.g. 1.1.5, 6.6: περὶ ⁴¹ And he is probably not the only one to do so: the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position is common in many Byzantine authors from Arethas (Scholia in Cat. 175.6) onwards.
2.3 Language

ψυχῆς ἔστι· μὲν προηγουμένως ἐπιζητεῖν τίς ἡ οὐσία ...; 1.1.12, 8.15: ἐτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ ὀρα μὴ ...; 1.1.24, 12.20: ἀπορεῖν ἔστιν, φησι, καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον ...), but also instances where it is detached from this pragmatic function, such as these:

(2.5.8, 164.19) ... τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ διαιρεῖν ἔστιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὴν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ώς ὃν γένος πρὸς εἴδος ....

(2.5.11, 166.18–19) ὥσπερ δέ, φησί, τὰ νῦν ἀδιορίστως λεγόμενα – τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν – ἔστι διαιρεῖν οὕτωσι, οὕτω διαιρεῖν οὑτωσί, οὕτω διαιρεῖν οὑτωσί, οὕτω διαιρεῖν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν πρὸς τὸ ἐντελεχεία ὃν, καὶ κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο θεωρεῖν αὐτὰ τῷ λόγῳ.

It also allows of degrees (“it is more appropriate to ...”, “one should rather ...”), as is seen in

(3.3.31, 286.18) ... τὰ γὰρ ὑποκείμενα αὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας μᾶλλον ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ λέγειν ....

2.3.4 Moods and tenses

As for the use of the moods, some of the departures from classical Greek in the MSS are probably due to errors of transmission. This holds especially for instances of the indicative where a subjunctive may be expected and the subjunctive where an optative may be expected.

The indicative with ἄν in main clauses. Of the 38 instances where the three main MSS agree on the indicative with ἄν in a main clause, 34 are in modo irreali, usually with the imperfect, only a couple of times with the aorist and once with the pluperfect. The remaining four are future indicatives, in three cases (1.3.14, 42.24; 2.5.14, 170.6; 3.1.13, 250.22) ἐρεῖ, in one (3.8.5, 334.5–6) συνήσει. This seems to be accepted Middle and Late Byzantine usage. Horrocks (2017, 235) gives an example (15a) from Anna Komnene, Alexias (1.16.6).

Spurious indicative with ἄν for subjunctive (or optative) with ἄν in dependent clauses. The present indicative with ἄν occurs a number of times in dependent clauses in at least one of the three main MSS. Leaving aside the category of concessive clauses with κἂν (for which see below), two cases of the imperfect with ἄν in dependent clauses assimilated to unreal contexts, and the special case of 1.1.23, 12.17 (see below), all these present indicatives are probably due to errors of transmission. Some of them only occur before correction by the respective scribe(s). If we disregard the latter as well, there remain nine instances where at least one MS has the present indicative with ἄν in a dependent clause: 1.1.30, 14.23 (temporal clause, ὅταν); 1.5.25, 88.23 (final/consecutive clause, ώς ἄν); 2.4.17, 150.9 (temporal clause, μέχρις ἄν); 2.9.13, 216.2
In De anima (final/consecutive clause, ὡς ἄν); 3.4.5, 292.6 (final/consecutive clause, ὡς ἄν); 3.4.21, 300.20 (relative clause); 3.10.8, 348.10 (temporal clause, ὅταν); 3.10.8b, 348.10 (temporal clause, ὅταν); 3.10.8c, 348.10 (temporal clause, ὅταν). In five of these β appears to have had the indicative: in three cases this has been corrected into the subjunctive in M, A or both. V has the subjunctive in five instances and the indicative in four (once in a final/consecutive clause and three times – coordinated – in a temporal clause). There is only one instance where all MSS have the indicative, in 3.10.8b, where it is coordinated with two other verb forms, both of which are indicative in V and subjunctive in M and A (in one case post correctionem). In six of the nine instances the indicative and the subjunctive are homophonous. In the remaining three the distinctive mood suffix is in the unstressed penultimate syllable. It is clear from the many disagreements and scribal corrections in the MSS that confusion between homophonous or near-homophonous indicatives and subjunctives was absolutely commonplace.

Normally, the predicate verbs of final/consecutive clauses introduced by ὡς ἄν (ὡς ἄν can also introduce clauses of comparison) stand in the subjunctive or the optative. Of 29 instances of verb forms in such clauses, 16 are subjunctive in all MSS; 8 are optative in all MSS; one (3.4.5, 292.6) is subjunctive in V, indicative in M and A; one (1.5.25, 88.23) is subjunctive in V and A, indicative in M; one (3.12.7, 364.21) is subjunctive in M and A, optative in V; and one (2.9.13, 216.2) is subjunctive in A, optative in M and indicative in V. There is also one occurrence (1.5.2, 80.5) where all MSS have a non-existent form (ἐμψυχῆ, see ad 1.5.2 in sec. 1.4.2). The variation between the subjunctive and the optative seems free: in fact, the optative always follows a main clause in a primary tense. In one case (3.12.7, 364.21) a subjunctive and an optative are coordinated in V: I have somewhat hesitantly corrected the optative on the basis of M and A.

The case is similar with temporal clauses introduced by ὅταν, although there is an even greater preponderance of the subjunctive here. Of 74 instances of verb forms in such clauses, 61 are subjunctive in all MSS; two are optative in all MSS (see below, “Temporal clauses”); five are undetermined, since they are of contract verbs; one (2.8.6, 194.14) is an imperfect assimilated to an unreal context; one (1.1.30, 14.23) is subjunctive in V and Ap, indicative in M and Aac; one (3.7, 324.17) is subjunctive in V amAc, probably future indicative in MAc; one (3.10.8, 348.10) is subjunctive in M and A, indicative in V; one (3.10.8c, 348.10) is subjunctive in Mpc and Ap, indicative in V, Mpc and Apc; and one (3.10.8b, 348.10) is indicative in all MSS. As already noted, the last three verb forms are coordinated.

In the relative clause in 3.4.21, 300.20, where two verb forms are coordinated, the first form is subjunctive in V and Ap, indicative in M and Aac, the second is subjunctive in V, M and Ap, indicative in Aac. The special case of 1.1.23, 12.17 is a relative clause with ὅν and οὐκ ἔστιν with the infinitive. Here it seems that the indicative is due to the specific semantic (“modal”) value of οὐκ ἔστιν, which cannot be transferred.
to the other moods (cf. Kahn 2003, 294), and ἄν may be felt to belong to the relative pronoun.⁴²

In the light of the above, the most likely explanation for the occurrence of the present indicative with ἄν in these nine instances seems to be that they are errors of transmission, some in V, some in β, some, perhaps, in a common ancestor (the archetype). Accordingly, the four present indicatives with ἄν in dependent clauses in V should be emended: in two cases this can be done with the support of both M and A, in one case with the support of A.

**Spurious indicative for subjunctive (or optative) in final clauses.** The present indicative also occurs in final clauses introduced by ἵνα. ὅπως (ἄν) is not used as a final conjunction in *In De an*. Of 25 verbs in final clauses introduced by ἵνα, 23 are in the subjunctive in all MSS, one is in the optative in all MSS, and one (3.13.6, 378.7) is in the subjunctive in M and Apc and in the indicative in V (if in 2.8.30, 240.23 the indicative in A is right against the subjunctive in V and M, that clause is naturally taken as co-ordinated with the preceding main clause: see ad loc. in sec. 1.4.2). This suggests that the indicative in V (προφέρει), which is homophonous with the subjunctive and follows after two indicatives in a relative clause, is an error of transmission and should be emended with the support of M and Apc.

**Spurious subjunctive with ἄν in main clauses, etc.** The optative with ἄν in main clauses, substantive clauses, causal clauses, result clauses and comparative clauses (*modus potentialis*) occurs almost 200 times in *In De an*. In addition, there are five passages where at least one of the three main MSS have the subjunctive with ἄν in such contexts, namely: 1.3.30, 50.17 (V: optative M A); 2.4.27, 156.19 (V Apc : indicative M); 2.8.4, 194.5 (all MSS); 3.2.27, 266.29 (all MSS); 3.4.5, 292.7 (all MSS). The situation in 2.4.27 is a bit complicated and may involve a more extensive error of transmission (see ad loc., sec. 1.4.2). In the three passages where all MSS have the subjunctive this is homophonous with the optative of the same tense stem, voice and person: διαρρέη for διαρρέοι (2.8.4), ὑπολάβη for ὑπολάβοι (3.2.27); γνωρίζη for γνωρίζοι (3.4.5). In the last-mentioned passage, this verb form follows four words after an authentic occurrence of γνωρίζη (γνωρίζει in β). These are most likely errors of transmission and should be emended.

**Spurious optative without ἄν in main clauses.** In 1.5.36, 94.19 the three main MSS all have the optative without ἄν in a main clause, which is a negative declarative clause

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⁴² On the topic of relative clauses, it may be noted that ὅστις, when it is not combined with the particle οὖν, does not seem to be used as a general relative, but instead often introduces non-restrictive (digressive) relative clauses (e.g. 1.3.25, 48.10; 1.5.10, 82.23; 1.5.41, 96.27; 2.3.12, 140.21; 2.5.1, 162.3; 2.5.8, 164.21; 2.9.7, 212.5; 3.10.2, 344.12; 3.11.4, 358.3). On occasion, however, it also introduces restrictive relative clauses, as in 1.5.23, 88.11–12.
with οὐ. This is most likely a scribal error (see ad loc., sec. 1.4.2). In 1.4.40, 78.3 there is another instance of the optative without ἄν in a main clause which does not express a wish; it does, however, express a question, and so special considerations may apply (see ad loc., sec. 1.6).

Conditional clauses. In thirteen conditional clauses with ἐάν (ἄν, ἤν) all three main MSS have the subjunctive. In two (1.4.35, 74.15 and 2.9.10, 214.4) they all have ἐάν with the optative. In 2.9.10 we may well have to do with a scribal error (ἐνθείη for expected ἐνθῇ): it is almost the reverse of the error in 3.6.7, 314.16 (see below). 1.4.35 is more difficult to explain in this way, since it is not as close to being a homophone (σῴζοιτο for expected σῴζηται). It is, however, coordinated with a subjunctive, and for that reason doubly suspicious. All the same, I have left the transmitted text as it is in both cases, but not without hesitation.43

Of c. 200 conditional (and concessive) clauses with εἰ, c. 120 have the present indicative (often ἐστίν) or omit the copula. There are a couple of perfect indicatives and ten future indicatives. The latter rarely if ever have the “minatory and monitory character” often attached to them in classical Greek (Gildersleeve 1876 and 1888). C. 25 clauses with εἰ have the optative (present or aorist). Apart from the two cases of ἐάν with the optative mentioned above, there are also three occurrences of the optative with ἄν in a conditional clause with εἰ (3.1.3, 244.16; 3.10.5, 346.8 and 9). While this is certainly suspicious, errors of transmission are perhaps less likely to be the cause, not least on account of the fact that two of these occurrences are within two lines of each other. I have thus left the transmitted text as it is in these cases too.

In the subjunctive in 2.6.3, which is coordinated with an indicative, the mood suffix is in the unstressed penultimate syllable (ἐμποδίζηται). Here I have printed the indicative (which is also the reading of Π).

In the apodoses, we find the present indicative or the omission of the copula c. 90 times, optatives with ἄν c. 40 times (mostly present forms, some aorists), the future indicative 16 times and only once the subjunctive with ἄν (3.2.27, 266.29; see above, “Spurious subjunctive with ἄν in main clauses”), although the subjunctive with ἄν in 3.4.5 (292.7; ibid.) also deserves another mention here, since it takes a conditional participle.

Finally, there are around twenty unreal conditionals with either a secondary tense and ἄν or, in two cases, ἔδει, and, in one case (2.8.13, 198.5), οὖκ εἶχεν with the inﬁni-

43 Horrocks (2017, 237) reports an example (16a) of ἕν with the optative in Anna Komnene, Alexias (1.2.7).
tive, in the apodosis. It is perhaps not unlikely that in the latter case εἶχεν is treated as an “imperfect of unfulfilled possibility”, so that the omission of ἄν is authorial and well considered, although οὐκ εἶχεν (or οὐκ ἔσχε) without ἄν does not seem to occur in the apodosis of a conditional sentence anywhere else in Metochites’ printed works, nor does it ever seem to have counterfactual force. Anyway, I have not treated the omission of ἄν in 2.8.13 as a suspected error of transmission.

As an addendum I may mention in this connection that εἰ μή alternates with ὅτι μή and ή to introduce necessary conditions after οὐκ ἄλλως, which are never expressed by finite clauses, but sometimes by participles (conjunct or even absolute, as in 2.5.5, 164.5).

Concessive clauses. There are twenty clauses introduced by κἂν in all three main MSS. As mentioned above (ad 1.5.39, 96.20, sec. 1.4.8), V has erasures immediately following κἂν in eight of these, over two of which εἰ has been written in a secondary (?) hand. In several instances the reading ante correctionem was manifestly καί: presumably this is true also of the less obvious cases. In one case (1.5.39), V, but not M or A, still has κἂν καί, followed by the present indicative. Apart from the two secondary εἰ (2.4.23, 154.18 and 3.3.10, 274.9), there are three other instances of κἂν εἰ (1.4.38, 76.17; 2.1.21, 110.23–24; 2.10.3, 218.21). In V, two of these five instances are followed by the present indicative (2.10.3, 3.3.10), two by the present subjunctive (1.4.38, 2.4.23) and one by the aorist optative (2.1.21). A has the present indicative in 2.4.23. In three other clauses κἂν is followed by the indicative in all MSS: aorist in 2.7.24, 190.15; perfect in 3.7.14, 330.2 and 3.10.1, 344.6–7. In all of these there is an erasure immediately following κἂν in V (manifestly of καί in 2.7.24). In one clause (3.2.11, 260.7) the copula is omitted; here, too, κἂν is followed by an erasure in V. In the ten remaining clauses (without εἰ or καί) κἂν is followed by the subjunctive in V (although ὁρῶνται in 2.3.3, 134.15 is ambiguous). In M and A one occasionally finds the indicative (M A in 2.5.13, 168.24; M in 2.7.22, 190.10; M in 2.5.15, 170.23), but only when the indicative and the subjunctive are homophonous. In two of these ten instances (2.5.13 and 2.7.22) κἂν is followed by an erasure in V. In addition, I have conjectured κὰν for ἂν before an εἰ-clause with the present optative in 1.3.35, 54.3.

Concessive clauses introduced by εἰ καί or καί εἰ follow the patterns of conditional clauses introduced by εἰ (indicatives of all tenses and the occasional optative).

Temporal clauses. Clauses introduced by ὅταν, the most frequent temporal conjunction, were discussed above (“Spurious indicative with ἄν ... in dependent clauses”). Of six predicate verbs in clauses introduced by ἡνίκα and ὁπηνίκα, four are present indicatives; ἡνίκα is once found with the future indicative (1.2.5, 20.19) and once with the pure subjunctive (2.4.27, 158.1) where the subjunctive with ἄν (or the present indicative) might be expected. Similarly, πρῶ occurs once (3.4.6, 292.14) with the expected subjunctive with ἄν after a negative clause and once (2.5.15, 170.20) with the unexpected pure subjunctive after an affirmative clause. Although at least the pure sub-
junctives are suspicious,⁴⁴ they have not been emended, since this would in each case presuppose a relatively major scribal error, and the data is insufficient for determining the author’s idiolectal variation with any confidence.

When μέχρι(ς) is used as a conjunction, it always takes ἄν (nine occurrences), but the mood may be optative or subjunctive seemingly regardless of context. It is used mainly with the present (“so long as”), only once with the aorist subjunctive and ἄν (2.5.8, 164.24–25). Otherwise it is used as a preposition, as is ὁχρί (once, 3.5.1, 306.10). ἔως is only used as a preposition. ἕστε, on the other hand, occurs twice (2.7.12, 186.1; 3.12.14, 370.21), both times with the subjunctive and ἄν.

ὅτε may mean “in case” and take the optative (1.4.15, 64.16–17) or the optative with ἄν (1.1.12, 8.14–15, after emendation). Otherwise (twelve occurrences) it always takes the present indicative. As mentioned above, the predicate verb of a ὅταν-clause twice stands in the optative (aorist: 3.1.14, 252.3; present: 3.1.15, 252.12). These optatives may be comparable to the ones in ὅτε-clauses: their clauses are preceded by ὡς (“e.g.”) and refer to examples of types of coincidentally perceptible objects (see further ad locc. in sec. 1.6).

Causal clauses. ἐπεί and ἐπειδή almost always have a causal force (there is an instance with temporal/quasi-conditional force in 3.3.7, 272.9, and possibly one with purely temporal force in 1.3.2, 38.10; for the latter see the note to the Translation ad loc.). Together the two conjunctions occur 113 times, almost always with the indicative, usually the present. Two of these indicatives are imperfects with ἄν dependent on the apodoses of unreal conditional sentences. As in the case of ὅτε-clauses, there are a small number of instances where the optative with ἄν occurs after these conjunctions, too, and always under special circumstances: in 2.1.13, 106.19 ἐπειδή introduces a whole potential (or “less vivid future”) conditional sentence; in 2.1.22, 110.25 and 2.12.7, 238.22 ἐπεί introduces independent clauses; in 3.10.1, 344.2 ἐπειδή introduces two coordinated causal clauses, the first of which has the optative with ἄν and is quasi-concessive, while the second has the indicative. ἐπειδάν does not occur. I have not examined the moods and tenses in causal clauses after ὅτι and ὡς.

Consecutive clauses with ὥστε. ὥστε occurs both with the infinitive (33 times) and with finite tenses (indicative 41 times, optative with ἄν 22 times, omitted verb 20 times). Some of the infinitives may be in reported speech. On the whole, the distribution seems to follow classical patterns inasmuch as the infinitive is more likely to express an expected or intended result than a factual one, the finite tenses more likely to express a factual result than an expected or intended one. In two instances of the infinitive after ὥστε the negative is οὐ (1.5.15, 84.24; 1.5.32, 92.20–21).

⁴⁴ Of 14 other occurrences of ἡνίκα-clauses in printed prose works by Metochites, one has the optative and 13 have indicatives, most of them in a past tense; πρίν is mainly an adverb, occasionally takes the infinitive and once (Sem. gnom. 5.1.4) even the aorist optative with ἄν.
2.3.5 Negatives

οὐ and its compounds are almost three times as frequent as μὴ and its compounds (more than 1100 instances against slightly less than 400). In the majority of cases, Metochites' usage conforms to the rules of classical grammar: οὐ is generally used with participles that are not conditional or general (and occasionally with declarative infinitives, e.g. 3.3.5, 270.17–18: καίτοι γε φησιν αὐτοῖς ταῦτ’ οἰόμένους καὶ λέγοντας οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὅρθως ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐντελῶς λέγειν); μὴ is generally used with the indicative in conditional, conditional relative, and indefinite temporal clauses. But there are also many examples of non-classical usage. It is, for instance, striking that μὴ is sometimes used with the indicative in (a) causal clauses and (b), as was common already in Late Antiquity, in direct or indirect “why” questions:

(a)

(1.3.3, 38.15) κινοῦνται δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὃτι μὴ βαδίζουσιν ....

(2.4.27, 158.2) δὴ δὴ καὶ μὴ μόνον πρόσθεσις καὶ αὐξήσις ἐνεργεῖται τῷ ἐμψύχῳ ....

(3.4.12, 296.5) ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐστιν ὁ νοὸς αὐτός τι ένεργεία ἄλλο ἢ αὐτά τα νοήματα, ὅταν νοῇ ὁ αὐτός γενόμενος τοὺς νοομένους, τηνικαύτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ ....

The use in 1.3.3 could be by analogy with the rather frequent use of ὅτι μὴ in conditional relative clauses (“in so far as not”, “unless”, “except”).

(b)

(1.5.36, 94.23) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, διατι μὴ μᾶλλον ἄν εἴη αὐτό, ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἡ ψυχή, τὸ συνέχον καὶ ἑνοποιοῦν;

(3.1.18, 254.13) Ὅτι ζητεῖ ἑξῆς διατι μὴ μία αἰσθησις ἐν ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ πλείους ....

There is also an example of μὴ with the present subjunctive in an independent clause, the force of which is suggested by the context not to be exactly that of a “doubtful assertion”, as is common in Plato (cf. Kühner & Gerth §394.7, 1: 224; Smyth §1801, 404):

(1.5.37, 96.3) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ νοὸς ὡς ἐν τι τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι, τὸ λέγειν καὶ αὐτὸν ὃτι ἐν ὁτιοῦν μέρος τοῦ σώματος συνέχει μὴ γελοῖον παντάπασιν ἡ καὶ ἀτοπον ὀλως πλάσαι ....

Whether there are any general principles that allow us to explain why Metochites adheres to the classical rules concerning negatives when he does and why he does not when he does not will have to remain an open question. There are a few instances in In De an. where Β and β disagree over the negative particle. Two of these were discussed in sec. 1.4.7: in 1.5.22, 88.6 οὐ is most likely a stylistic amendment in β; in 2.1.28, 114.15 the case is not so clear.