The political Exiles: their Policies and their Contribution to Post-War Reconstruction

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I

The National-Socialists persecuted their Jewish victims because of their "racial" origin, that is, independently of their political attitudes, religious creed, or cultural identity. Emigration — the National-Socialist régime’s "solution of the Jewish question" during the prewar years — was therefore the only alternative for the entire Jewish population in response to economic repression, social isolation, deprivation of rights, and murder. Different from those of the Jewish emigration were the motives, circumstances, and aims of persons who emigrated for reasons other than anti-Semitism. This group included two main subdivisions. First, political opponents of the N.S.D.A.P. and representatives of the democratic "system" who had to fear persecution, or were exposed to it during the Third Reich because of their political affiliation (and not primarily because of their possible Jewish family background or religion); or those who had decided to continue fighting National-Socialism in exile. Second, there was a group of emigrants who had not been involved in political parties or government, and who did not share the consciousness and cultural patterns of the Jewish population: authors, journalists, artists, and scientists, who feared creative, moral, and intellectual atrophy under the Hitler régime, or had lost their means of livelihood due to National-Socialist Kulturpolitik. With the German language as their means of production, or deep roots in the social, cultural, and scientific traditions of their surroundings, this latter group of the émigrés stood between the political exile and the Jewish emigration. It was characterized mainly by a continuing, often occupational concern with German affairs, and, after the war, by re-establishing ties to the home countries, returning to them, or through public activity pertaining to them.

The emigration of the Jewish population and its political, intellectual, and religious elite, which had to a certain extent acquired ethnic consciousness under the pressures of racial persecution, put an end to German-Jewish acculturation. Relations to Germany or Austria were usually seen by this group of Jewish émigrés as a history of suffering. This became a definite trait when, for the majority of Jews and Germans, the inconceivable had become reality — the replacement of the German "islands abroad" in a period when crucial changes took place on the European continent: the dissolution of the German Reich; the population transfer from former Eastern provinces of Germany and from Czechoslovakia; the establishment of an Austrian national state; and the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western powers for influence in Central Europe. Exiles not only expressed their opinions about these changes and tried to influence this policy early on, but also participated to a considerable extent in shaping the states succeeding the Third Reich.

If we define the German and Austrian political and cultural exile in terms of continuing ties to the home country and of the desire to return to it, in contrast to those who considered their emigration as irreversible, some qualifications are in order. Discontinuities in social consciousness, variations in political aims, and the range of individual motivations and available options preclude a single categorization applicable to the whole period and to all refugees. Emigrés who fled political persecution as active opponents of National-Socialism sooner or later felt themselves to be immigrants, and sought full integration in the host country. On the other hand, many of those who were "racially" persecuted put off the decision to resettle permanently rather than return. Reemigration at the end of the war depended on various personal, economic, and administrative factors, so that failure to return home does not necessarily mean that an émigré broke ties with his country of origin. Furthermore, exiles and Jewish émigrés were linked by similar experience during their emigration, and by the impact of the Third Reich. For heuristic reasons, the juxtaposition, in documentation and analysis, of the two groups will lead to a better understanding of both. On the basis of these methodological considerations, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte and the Research Foundation for Jewish Immigration have tried to present their lives, emigration histories, and achievements in the form of a common project.
The joint cause of the “racial,” “political,” and weltanschauliche emigration lay in the totalitarian and terrorist character of the N.S.D.A.P., originally a socially and intellectually marginal party, that managed to seize power because particularly German developments and the collapse of the social balance during the worldwide economic crisis reinforced each other.

The National-Socialists introduced a radical form of political violence and emotion into German culture that went beyond conflicts known to other modern Western societies. There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon. The governmental system of Wilhelminian Germany prevented the integration of the organized working class into a parliamentary and constitutional state. The failure of the “bourgeois revolution”, in turn, led the middle classes to misunderstand the emancipatory thrust of the labor movement as part of a common political interest. The foundations and goals of the German Reich were not meant to realize liberté, égalité, fraternité, but rather, to raise the authoritarian state into a moral category. Instead of accommodating alliances between the labor movement and the liberal middle class, political and psychological conditions led to a closed, class-specific ideology of the workers' organizations based on Marxism. Besides the rhetorical claim to being a revolutionary force in the historically inevitable change from capitalism to a socialist order of the future, their international creed, refusal of any monarchic hierarchy, and their basic laicism questioned directly the fundamental ideological tenets of society. This was far more effective in placing the socialist workers' movement in the position of a threatening outsider than socio-political or parliamentary actions could have been.

While large parts of the Jewish population during the Wilhelminian era strove for integration into society, the workers' movement developed an effective counter-culture. With their educational and cultural activities, their self-help organizations, their press and publishing houses and with the special modes of expression and behavior which develop in such an uniform community, the workers' movement assumed a role within society almost as alien to Wilhelminian Germany as that of non-assimilated Jews. Because of their growing membership and representation in parliament, the labor parties and trade unions became the target of ideological and social rejection and caused existential anxieties in the establishment and the lower middle classes. That a relatively large number of politicians and intellectuals of Jewish origin had been functionaries of the labor movement was in part related to both of these groups being social outsiders — aside from a certain affinity between Jewish ethics and socialist reformism: Instead of adapting to the social and religious values of the system in power, “scientific socialism” promised not only civic equality for the future but also a whithering of the self-segregating characteristics of historically grown Jewish ethnicity. Ideology and solidarity of the labor movement held out the possibility of becoming fully integrated, even if only in a German counter-culture. In addition, the Social-Democrats offered access to Jews to influential political and parliamentary positions, which were much more difficult to obtain in bourgeois parties.

The trench fighting of World War I, with the various social classes united in a side-by-side struggle for survival, paved the way for the labor movement to identify emotionally with German national interests. The appointment of Social-Democratic politicians to administrative positions, and their ultimate assumption of governmental responsibility, seemed to point to their integration in the political structure of the Empire. For the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party, it was precisely this participation in the declining imperial era which prepared them psychologically to hope for the success of the Republic after the war was lost, without effecting true changes in the administrative, legal, military, and educational systems. On the other hand, the patriotic loyalty of the S.P.D. majority to the war effort spurred the growth of a radical left outside as well as within its own party. For nationalists, the anti-war activity of this left opposition and the leading role of the Social-Democrats in replacing monarchical state and national governments led to the belief that the labor movement was mainly responsible for the military defeat and the humiliation of the German nation. This highly emotionalized belief was reinforced even during the years of relative stability of the Weimar Republic: Under the protection of Social-Democratic and Liberal administrations, modernizing trends developed in the arts, literature, and public morality which threatened and provoked the traditionalists although modernization did not extend beyond the cultural centers in the big cities.

The Social-Democrats and the Free Trade Unions, the liberals and most Jews were convinced that the Weimar Republic had created the conditions necessary for social justice, individual freedom, and civic equality. In the eyes of the nationalist and monarchist right, the labor movement, liberalism, and Jewish influence in business, culture, and politics, as much as democratic Weimar symbolized the decline of the German Staat and its “natural” order. The racist and anti-Semitic völkische considered communism, Social-Democracy, liberalism, capitalism, and the Weimar Republic to have been brought about by the Jewish spirit and a worldwide Jewish bid for power.

In the elections of July 31, 1932, the N.S.D.A.P. became the largest party in the Reichstag, but not necessarily on the strength of its Weltauschaung. More decisive factors in this success were the hopes among industrialists for the protection of their economic and socially-political interests; middle and lower class fear of losing status because of the deepening economic crisis and under the impression of a noisy propaganda of Communist organizations; the urge to protest and bring about change among large numbers of unemployed proletarians and intellectuals. Comprising large sectors of the German population, these groups of N.S.D.A.P. voters were not necessarily bound to any political or ideological system. They welcomed the destruction of the Marxist labor movement and the displacement of Jews from influential public and economic positions on grounds of emotional nationalism and traditional anti-Jewish and class prejudices, without, in their majority, desiring or approving the “excesses” anti-Semitism and anti-Socialism would lead to. Equally, most persons, who would be affected directly by a National-Socialist victory — functionaries of organizations wielding influence in the constitutional state and in the Jewish community — had expected, at the worst, that a temporary Hitler government would suspend their organizations for a time, or restrict the economic activities of Jews. They were not prepared for the terror and extreme ideological hatred which the National-Socialists developed after they seized power. The intensity of this hatred corresponded to the historically conditioned National-Socialist
perception of their Jewish, leftist, and liberal-democratic enemies. Their primary aim was not to defeat the internal opponent, but rather to "square accounts" in the tradition of ethnic or religious blood feuds. The socialist labor movement and the Jews represented the _artfremde_ ("totally other") tribal minority, whose usurping rule had to be destroyed once and for all.

The first wave of political emigration from Germany consisted of persons in acute physical danger, namely the _Novemberverbrecher_ ("political criminals"). They had been either active in the founding of the Republic, or had been prominent politicians, democratic government officials, or _Kulturbolchesewissen_ and literary exponents of the left, who had acquired reputations as opponents of National-Socialism. In addition, many rank-and-file Communists, Social-Democrats, and union officials, known to be militant anti-fascists on a local level, now had to fear acts of personal revenge from S.A. gangs in their neighborhoods. In Prussia alone, where as early as February 22, 1933, the S.A. had been commissioned as auxiliary police, close to 30,000 political arrests were registered during March and April. Especially after the _Reichstag_ fire, thousands of regionally and locally known activists and members of the political or publicist elite disguised themselves as tourists, and legally or illegally crossed the nearest borders to the Saar Territory, France, Holland, and Belgium, to Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Austria, or Switzerland. Their escape at that time was not organized.

Many of these political exiles — contemporary sources speak of approximately on third of the total — also faced potential anti-Semitic persecution because of their Jewish background; the decisive reason for their flight was, however, their activist political opposition to National-Socialism. The bloody terror taking place in the cellars of the S.A. and in "wild" concentration camps during the months after the so-called _Machtergreifung_ illustrate how well-founded the fears of the first wave of refugees had been. 500 to 600 political opponents were murdered during this period by the National-Socialists, and thousands were tortured cruelly. On the other hand, the comparatively larger number of persons getting away with "moderate" treatment — relatively short internment in concentration camps and "only" professional and social discrimination against formerly very active enemies of National-Socialism — demonstrates that the flight to other countries helped to evade the perhaps deadly risks during the "revolutionary" phase of the régime, but as a rule was not the only alternative for survival for its non-Jewish opponents. After their political _A usschaltung_ (elimination), the destruction of their organizations and ideological influence in public and in cultural life, the National-Socialists in most cases were satisfied if a former opponent renounced his ideas, or just abstained from further political engagement. The integration of formerly _marxistisch verbesserte Volksgenossen_ (fellow-travelling Marxist Germans) into the national community was a declared goal of the régime. The emigration of political opponents was not in the interest of the new government, in contrast to that of the Jewish population. Border controls were intensified, and temporary visas were required for foreign travel to assist authorities in apprehending refugees. In addition, the National-Socialists believed correctly that their political opponents not only wanted to flee from persecution, but would continue their activities from the outside. To those non-Jewish political refugees who had refrained from political activities in exile, the Third Reich offered an opportunity to return to Germany — but few accepted. Accordingly, the unorganized emigration during the first months of 1933 differed mainly because of its circumstances, rather than in political background and goals, from the second phase of emigration, which started around the middle of 1933.

The S.A. terror against the organizations of the left, prohibitions to assemble in public and publish periodicals, and the regional repressions by the police, were followed by the _Notverordnung zum Schutze von Volk und Staat_ ("Emergency Decree for the Protection of People and State") of February 28, 1933, which inaugurated a period of semilegality for leftist party organizations and their parliamentary representatives. Then, on March 9, the _Reichstag_ mandates of the K.P.D. were annulled, on May 2, the trade unions were dissolved, on June 22, the S.P.D. was outlawed, and on July 14, 1933, totalitarian rule was decreed formally in the _Gesetz gegen die Neubildung von Parteien_ (law prohibiting the establishment of new parties). The middle-class parties of the Weimar Republic had dissolved their organizations between June 27 and July 6, 1933.

After the spring of 1933, S.P.D., K.P.D., and the splinter parties of the left sent representatives to neighboring countries to organize activities from abroad in view of the increasing obstacles to their organizational and publishing work in Germany. These centers expanded, and top-party officials who had been persecuted joined them beginning in the summer of 1933. In the end, these transplanted structures assumed the character of exile party directorates after their organizations in the _Reich_ were outlawed.

During the third stage of emigration, which lasted far into the war years, the ranks of parties-in-exile were reinforced by members of their home resistance organizations escaping from Germany. The illegal continuation of party and trade union activities there had become the object of prosecution by the police and the courts. Dealing with political opponents had been taken from the S.A. by the _Gestapo_ and by special courts. Political offenders, after having served their sentences, were usually threatened with unlimited _S chutzhaft_ ("protective custody") in concentration camps. The terror from below was replaced by the "legal" terror from above. In face of the full impact of a modern police state, resistance in exile and illegal activities within the country depended increasingly upon close cooperation. Organized opposition at home had to rely on communication and coordination, on propaganda material, escape routes, and shelters provided by their friends in exile. The escape or shift abroad of endangered "illegal persons" and the continuation of their political work within the framework of the exile organizations constituted an important part of resistance to the National-Socialist system. The utilization of emigrants as couriers and instructors in the home country served the same purpose.

Representatives of bourgeois politics and oppositional N.S.D.A.P. members also went into exile. This group was comprised mostly of prominent individuals: Liberals, _Christlich-Soziale_, leaders of youth organizations, national conservatives, monarchists, and left nationalists, who all strove to continue fighting against Hitler by means of a variety of
associations and federations, but more so through their contacts with personalities and political circles abroad. Aside from the escape of a few politically exposed publicists, lay functionaries and theologians, the two Christian churches participated in emigration primarily by transferring their clergy to foreign countries. Besides clerics and members of the religious orders who were threatened by persecution because of their "non-Aryan" origin, quite a few clerics had to go into exile under the guise of regular monastic transfer connected with "criminal" charges against religious orders instigated by the régime, and because of the pressure exerted against religious, research, educational, and missionary institutes. Some of these men and women participated in the political, publicistic, and welfare activities of the German opposition abroad. In Austria, the threat to adherents of the Christian corporate state after the Anschluss of 1938 and of racial persecution caused many clerics to escape.

The number of emigrants organized in exile by the Social-Democrats and the trade unions was estimated at 3,500 at the end of 1933; according to the High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations, 55,000 racially persecuted emigrants from Germany, 5,000 to 6,000 Social Democrats, 6,000 to 8,000 Communists and almost 5,000 other political opponents of National-Socialism lived as refugees in foreign countries in 1935. Altogether, the German "political exile" comprised between 16,000 and 19,000 people in 1935. Apart from the approximately 4,000 political refugees from the Saar Territory who escaped after the referendum of January 1935, the growing success of the Gestapo in destroying resistance groups had been the primary cause of their increase in the years 1934 to 1935. During the following years, political emigration from Germany decreased due to the decline of organized resistance at home. Young, unmarried party activists with a record of unemployment during the depression years constituted the majority of the Communist and Social-Democratic emigration. For France, the following data on Social-Democratic exiles were compiled by the S.P.D. directorate at the end of 1933:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons under 20 years of age</th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>Unskilled workers 60%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30 years</td>
<td>50-60%</td>
<td>Skilled workers 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-40 years</td>
<td>15-20%</td>
<td>Employees 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 40 years</td>
<td>10-15%</td>
<td>Professionals 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5-10%</td>
<td>Party and Union officials and persons without professional occupation 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>3-4%</td>
<td>Persons of Jewish religion or family background 30-35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After February 12, 1934, several thousand persons persecuted by the Austrian corporate state joined the political emigrants from Germany. They were activists from the suppressed left-wing parties and the dissolved Free Trade Unions of Austria. Their foreign organizations maintained close contacts with underground groups at home. Since the Austrian police were far less efficient than the Gestapo, their political work was centered primarily in the home country until 1938. The Austrian authoritarian system had to deal not only with the leftists and the outlawed N.S.D.A.P., but was increasingly involved in sharp conflicts with the Third Reich. After the German invasion in 1938, the hatred of the National-Socialists was therefore directed — aside from the Jewish population — against representatives of the corporate state as much as against the former labor parties, with whose members they had, after all, served sentences in Austrian Anhalterlagern (concentration camps) and prisons. Thus, the Anschluss not only led to a renewed emigration of the former German émigrés who had found refuge in Austria after 1933, and to the flight of an (unknown) number of Austrian Socialist and Communist activists; they were joined by a smaller group of Austrian conservative opponents of National-Socialism. Now, Christlich-Soziale and legitimists as well as representatives of the left who had been living in exile since 1934 claimed to be the true exponents of the Austrian resistance against National-Socialism. In their countries of asylum, especially since 1940/41 in Great Britain and the U.S.A., later in Sweden and Latin America, the Austrian exile organizations were divided into three more or less distinct groups: the Communist emigration with its conspiratorial cadre structure and its attempts to form popular fronts; the adherents of the corporate state and legitimist groups which, to varying degrees, accepted the Communist strategy of political alliances; and finally, the Socialist emigration which refused to cooperate with either of the two other groups.

Starting in the fall of 1938, the German-language exile was further enlarged by political refugees from the C.S.R. The political and social difference between the labor movement and the opponents of socialism had been intensified by the ethnic conflicts within Czechoslovakia: Since the end of the twenties, the Sudeten-German Social-Democratic party had tried in vain to cooperate with the Czech government in order to find a socio-political solution to the problems of the German minority. Wide sectors of the German population believed increasingly that the Social-Democrats and other democratic parties had in this way abandoned the vital aims of their own ethnic group. In addition to the stigma of alleged disloyalty to the national cause, the far-reaching support the Sudeten labor movement had given to Reich-German exile organizations in the C.S.R. since 1933, made it a special target of persecution for the Gestapo. When the Sudeten area was surrendered to the Reich in the fall of 1938, nearly 30,000 Germans fearing political persecution fled to the unoccupied parts of Czechoslovakia. 4,000 to 5,000 Social-Democrats, about 1,500 Communists, about 150 members and functionaries of the Deutsch-Demokratische Freiheitspartei (German Democratic Liberty Party) and about 25,000 Jews succeeded in emigrating to foreign countries. The Sudeten-Germans were thus the largest contingent of political émigrés from Czechoslovakia. Thousands who had not been able to emigrate fell into the hands of the Gestapo after the establishment of the Protectorate, or after having been previously returned to their native towns by Czech officials — thus, in fact, handed over to the National-Socialists. With the establishment of the Czech exile government, Paris, later London, were the main centers of the Sudeten-German exile politics. Strong Sudeten-German Social-Democratic groups established themselves in Norway, and,
after the beginning of the war, in Sweden. The Communist leaders emigrated to the U.S.S.R. where the executive committees of the other Communist exile parties had already settled. In contrast to German and Austrian émigrés after 1933/34, the Sudeten groups had neither time nor politico-geographic opportunities to establish contact with opposition groups in their region. Their escape was part of a development that soon threatened the entire European exile.

Until shortly before the war, about 30,000 people had left Germany, Austria, and the German-language regions of Czechoslovakia for political reasons. A majority of these émigrés identified with exile politics for a longer or shorter period, and felt committed to fight National-Socialism.

II

The majority of Jewish émigrés chose to migrate overseas to settle there permanently. Most of the political refugees remained in states adjoining the Reich. They participated closely in the developments of, and maintained contacts with, opposition groups at home, which became an important element in the self-perceptions of the exiled parties and groups. They saw the democracies of Europe as actual or potential allies against the Third Reich, and as the true centers of international affairs. Writers, publicists, and journalists found their small publics-in-exile enlarged by readers in German-language areas of Europe, where the cultural climate was more familiar than anywhere else. Also, the majority of political refugees, i.e. the rank and file of the labor parties and unions, usually lacked the means, connections, and experience necessary for escaping the depressing social circumstances of the life in exile by emigrating overseas. Above all, they hoped, at least during the first years of exile, for an imminent collapse of the Hitler régime.

Before the war, the main centers of exile were France and Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1933, nearly 30,000 of the 65,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Memberships and election returns prior to suppression, membership in exile (approx. numbers)</th>
<th>Location of headquarters in exile</th>
<th>Principal party newspapers and periodicals published in exile (U = mainly for underground dissemination; C = highest circulation in approx. numbers)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.P.D. – Social-Democratic Party of Germany</td>
<td>1 mill. 7,2 mill. 6,000</td>
<td>Prague — Paris — London</td>
<td>Sozialistische Aktion (Karlsbad/C.S.R., 1933—1938) (U) (C: 25,000); Neuer Vorwärts (Karlsbad, Paris, 1933—1940) (C: 10,000); Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Paris, Prague, 1934—1940) (C: 450); Zeitschrift für Sozialismus (Karlsbad, 1933—1936) (C: 1,000); Sozialistische Mitteilungen (London, 1940—1948) (C: 450)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.P.D. – Communist Party of Germany</td>
<td>300,000 5,9 mill. 8,000</td>
<td>Paris — Moscow</td>
<td>Die Rote Fahne (Saar Territory, C.S.R., Belgium, Netherlands) 1935—1939 (U) (C: 60,000); Der Gegen-Angriff (cont. as Deutsche Volkszeitung (Prague, Paris, Basel/Switz., Copenhagen, 1933—1937) (C: 10,000 and 25,000); A.I.Z. Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung (cont. as V.I. Die Volks-Illustrierte) (Prague, Strasbourg/Fr., 1933—1939) (C: 12,000); Die Internationale (Prague, Paris, 1933—1939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.S.A.P. – German Social-Democratic Workers’ Party in the Czechoslovak Republic/ T.G. – Association of Sudeten-German Social-Democrats</td>
<td>80,000 300,000 5,000</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Der Sozialdemokrat (London, 1940—1972); Freundschaft (London, 1941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.P.Tsch. (Deutsche Sektion)—Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (German membership)</td>
<td>13,000 1,500 (total vote: 850,000)</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Einheit (London, 1940—1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.P.Ö. – Communist Party of Austria</td>
<td>7,000 20,000 (?)</td>
<td>Prague — Paris — Moscow</td>
<td>Weg und Ziel (Prague, 1936—1938)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Without numerous papers and periodicals published by individual party members, by regional or local party groups and fellow-travelling organizations, and without the German-language press published by the Comintern and the Soviet government.
German emigrants lived in France. The size of this colony seems to have remained relatively constant during the years that followed — after having increased to about 35,000 in 1935 by refugees from the Saar. It may be assumed that between 7,000 and 10,000 German emigrants had come to France as political refugees. This corresponds in number to the 18,500 Jewish emigrants to France registered by the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland. Paris became the intellectual, cultural, and political center of the German opposition to Hitler. It was a microcosm of organizations, groups, associations, and discussion circles, in which writers and left-leaning bourgeois publicists of high standing exerted a major influence. However, the strongest political power was the K.P.D. which for several years maintained its headquarters in Paris. Approximately half of all German Communist émigrés lived in France during the mid-thirties.

Czechoslovakia had become the center of German Social-Democratic resistance abroad after the S.P.D. leaders settled in Prague in June 1933, and the Auslandsvertretung der deutschen Gewerkschaften (Foreign Representation of German Trade Unions) was founded in Komotau in June 1935. The borders shared by the C.S.R. and the Reich followed a complex pattern that made illegal crossing easy. In addition, the solidarity of the Sudeten-German labor movement offered very advantageous conditions for secret contacts with Germany. Between 1934 and 1938, Czechoslovakia was the only neighboring state which offered the Austrian left political possibilities for illegal activities in the home country. In May 1933, the central committee of the K.P.O. was established in Prague; in February 1934, the Auslandsbüro österreichischer Sozialdemokraten (Foreign Bureau of Austrian Social-Democrats) was founded in Brünn. Although as many as 20,000 refugees may have found their first asylum in the C.S.R., the country did not attract larger numbers of Jewish émigrés: many of those who came re-emigrated to other countries. Until 1938, probably less than 3,000 Jewish émigrés and about 1,500 political refugees had lived in Czechoslovakia for an extended period of time. The functionaries of the labor movement who had fled across the border from central Germany, Silesia, Bavaria, and Austria to the C.S.R. lent exile activities there a distinctly political character in comparison to the predominantly cultural scene in France.

Although government authorities in France and Czechoslovakia tried, as did those of other European countries of refuge, to enforce their laws against the gainful employment of aliens and against an undesirable intervention of aliens in domestic politics, the activities of the exile organizations directed against the National-Socialist régime were generally in line with the interests of the governments in Paris und Prague. As long as the balance of power permitted, diplomatic démarches of the Third Reich against the political activities of German exiles were answered by these governments by referring to the constitutional liberties prevailing in their countries, or by pretending to have no knowledge of clandestine activities organized from their territories by émigrés.

Besides the headquarters they established in France and the C.S.R., parties, groups, and trade unions maintained representations, bureaus, and frontier stations in almost all other states bordering on Germany and, until 1935, in the Saar Territory administered by the League of Nations. The latter was, however, only a provisional asylum. Between March 1933 and spring 1934 it was the first station in the flight of about 37,000 emigrants. 5,000 to 6,000 persons stayed there temporarily, among them probably 1,500 political refugees. Many participated actively in the campaign against the return of the Territory to National-Socialist Germany under the slogan “Beat Hitler at the Saar.” Together with opponents from the Saar Socialist, Communist, and Christian groups, these refugees moved on to France after the referendum of January 1935. Austria also was only a transitional country for emigrants. It lost much of its attraction for members of leftist groups in February, 1934, when the constitutional government was overthrown; apart from the nearly 2,500 Jewish émigrés from Germany, only Catholic conservative exiles struck some roots and found official recognition there under the corporate régime.

The Soviet Union, partly in contravention of article 12 of its own Constitution of 1925 (which assured asylum to all foreigners who were “subject to persecution due to their activity in the service of the revolutionary liberation movement”), admitted émigrés from National-Socialist-controlled Europe only with great reluctance. The fact that between 1933 and 1941, only 17 German Jews had been registered by the Reichsvertretung as emigrants to Russia might be due to the quite obvious lack of attraction the U.S.S.R. held as an immigrant country. Still, after 1938, only about 1,000 persecuted Jews from Austria were granted asylum in the Soviet Union, a comparatively small number in view of increasingly limited possibilities for escape. Soviet admission policy was equally restrictive regarding emigrants from the lower ranks of the Communist parties. One prerequisite for an entrance permit was “the threat of death sentence or very long imprisonment, or the danger of immediate extradition, with the Soviet Union the very last possibility for granting asylum.” The “fatherland of all workers” was thus not an open country of refuge, even for leftists. An exception was made for several hundred activists of the Austrian Republikanischer Schutzbund to whom the U.S.S.R. ostentatiously offered asylum after February, 1934. Including relatives, they totalled about 1,000 persons. In 1938/39 the U.S.S.R. granted entrance permits to about 200 Communists and their families from Czechoslovakia. The temporary or permanent residence of fellow-travelling intellectuals, writers, and artists was determined by Moscow’s propagandistic and cultural self-interests, and required a personal invitation from a Soviet institution. According to Soviet sources, approximately 7,000 anti-fascist Germans and Austrians and members of their families lived in the U.S.S.R. in 1937; this number includes, however, those German industrial specialists who immigrated to the Soviet Union on temporary contracts in the late thirties (approximately 18,000, of whom ca. 12,000 returned to Germany until 1939). So only up to 3,000 German-speaking refugees may have found asylum in the U.S.S.R. after 1933. Most of them had been admitted only after the deterioration of conditions for political work in Western Europe. Stalin’s purges claimed a high death toll among this group. From the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact of 1939 until the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, an unknown number of émigrés were delivered directly to the Gestapo from N.K.W.D. prisons. They had become victims of internal party strife. Others who had fallen into political
disgrace, or were deeply disappointed by conditions in the U.S.S.R., applied for voluntary repatriation into the Reich. After 1945, those who returned home were moved into important positions in the Communist hierarchy, having survived Stalin’s purges by toeing the party line, and having proved their loyalty to the Soviet state by fulfilling functions in the party, the Comintern, or propaganda activities during World War II. The struggle for leadership and the ideological conflicts which accompanied the exile continued even after the war. The “purges” of the fifties in the G.D.R. and C.S.S.R. claimed their victims mainly from among former members of the “western emigration.”

Spain held a special position among exile countries. After 1936 and during the Civil War, primarily Communist and left-wing Socialist emigrants served as civilians for the republican government, or became members of the International Brigades. Armed resistance against Fascism within an international united front had a special ideological and emotional appeal. It was thus possible for Communist exile organizations to free large numbers of ordinary members from demoralizing emergency conditions and emigrants’ “collectives” in their countries of refuge. This was also affected by a situation in which illegal work in the home country had become almost impossible owing to the increasing efficiency of the Gestapo. Of the approximately 5,000 German and Austrian members of the International Brigades, close to 2,000 are said to have died in the Civil War. After the defeat of the Republic at the beginning of 1939, the majority of those who had fought in Spain went to France where they were usually interned as soon as they had crossed the border. Some of them eventually established contacts with the Résistance, or Communist underground organizations in Southern France.

Due to the annexation of the Sudetenland in the fall of 1938, and the occupation of the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, Great Britain and Sweden, two countries where political asylum had until then been marginal, became centers of party emigration in Europe. The London government had applied strict rules to keep the number of refugees from Germany transient and limited. Until 1935, about 2,500, and until November 1938, between 7,000 and 8,000 persons were admitted. Permanent residence permits were granted only in special cases. After the pogroms of the Reichskristallnacht, however, and in an public moral response to Britain’s share in concluding the Munich Pact, Great Britain admitted refugees whose re-emigration from the U.K. was not assured. By this policy, the government also tried to take pressure off Jewish demands for admission to Palestine. In early 1939, about 16,000 Jewish émigrés and 4,000 political refugees from Germany, Austria and the Sudeten region lived in Britain. As a result of emigration overseas and internment in Australia and Canada, the number of German and Austrian (55,000), and Czech (8,000) émigrés admitted after 1939 was reduced to about 40,000 in 1942, 25,000 in 1943. The number of political refugees from Germany, Austria, and the C.S.R. probably amounted to 5,000 in 1940. England developed into a significant center for exiles primarily through the establishment of the Social-Democratic headquarters-in-exile in London early in 1941, and the presence of representatives of the Sudeten-German labor movement.

Until 1937, only about 1,500 German emigrants had settled in Sweden, which held little attraction because of its economic situation and, especially, because of its anti-alien and particularly anti-Semitic immigration policy. Swedish attitudes remained essentially unchanged even during World War II on account of her neutrality. After 1938, most of the approximately 4,000 émigrés from Germany, Austria, and the Sudeten area sought and succeeded in gaining entry to Sweden only because this was the last possible refuge left to them. In 1943, probably 5,000 German-speaking emigrants, including the refugees from German-occupied Denmark and Norway, lived in Sweden. As many as one third of those were political refugees, and since Swedish culture and society offered very little opportunity for integration, Sweden’s exile groups congregated in urban centers in political party organizations with relatively large memberships.

Switzerland also was extremely reluctant to admit refugees for reasons of economic nationalism and fear of foreign penetration, but mainly out of consideration for Swiss foreign trade with Germany. Until 1941, scarcely more than 1,800 Jewish refugees from the Reich and barely 3,500 from Austria had been permitted to remain in Switzerland; the number of transients was, of course, much higher. In 1939 close to 3,000 political exiles and about 5,000 Jewish refugees were counted. Altogether, approximately 10,000 German-speaking emigrants resided in Switzerland during the war years. The majority had been granted temporary asylum because they were unable to migrate elsewhere. From 1933, the Swiss Federal Council had prohibited emigrant employment or political activity. Accordingly, the number of emigrants active in exile party politics was limited to a few hundred persons. Until the second half of the thirties, some exile circles had succeeded in making contacts with resistance groups in Southern and Southwestern Germany. During the war, Switzerland became more important as an exile country: it offered the last possibility for escape into a neighboring country to persons persecuted in the Reich or in France, and through cooperation with allied secret service organizations, German and Austrian émigrés in Switzerland managed to re-establish contacts with oppositional circles at home.

The United States did not initially attract the political refugees because of its distance from the European centers of exile politics. With Hitler’s increasing threat to Europe, several hundred political refugees, mostly scientists, academics, writers, publicists and a small number of political leaders — particularly from the Social-Democratic and the middle-class parties — turned to the U.S.A. This group was able to meet the requirements for a non-quota visa, or possessed the personal and political connections necessary to secure affidavits and travel costs.

During World War II, several thousand German-speaking political émigrés lived in North and South America. Centers of organized political and journalistic activities developed in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and, especially, in Mexico. Communists and left Socialists, usually coming via France, were the largest group seeking refuge in Mexico, because this country offered shelter without restrictions to the defeated Spanish Republicans as well as to former members of the International Brigades, and a domestic labor movement granted support to the exile groups.
After 1939, conditions in the countries of refuge influenced decisively the further development of the political exile groups: With the approach of the war, the majority of political émigrés living in Europe had to escape from the National-Socialist military juggernaut to a free country if they wanted to survive. Laws concerning the rights of aliens had a far-reaching influence on the nature, extent, and duration of exile political activity. In Great Britain, for example, refugees were enlisted to work for the war effort in different parts of the country, thus reducing their opportunities to participate in metropolitan party affairs. This, however, lent further impetus to the organization of refugees, including the younger generation, in exile labor union groups affiliated with the British T.U.C. In other countries, laws forbidding refugees to work tended to bring party members together in urban centers and to strengthen exile political life. Internment and prohibition of political work, as in Switzerland, thwarted open organizational activities, but led to a personal cohesion of like-minded emigrants, loyalty towards their own past, and readiness for future activity. The political culture in a country of admission, above all, and the existence of a labor movement similar to the one at home which respected the refugee as member of a fraternal party and expected him to continue the fight against Fascism, was an important factor in the maintenance of political identity in exile. Where exiles found opportunities for integration, and where the geographic distance from the home country was too wide, the exiled groups tended to dissolve.

III

During the prewar period, political exile organizations considered their main tasks to be threefold: to support, instruct, and represent abroad illegal groups at home; to influence public opinion and politics in the country of settlement; and, at least in the large exile parties, to safeguard the social, legal and political interests of fellow exiles as well as to support imprisoned members and their families at home. All exile organizations tried to establish contacts with opposition groups in the homeland. Their common claim of speaking for the German and Austrian resistance was, however, met in reality only as far as the exile organizations of the old labor movement and the left splinter groups were concerned. Social-Democrats, Communists, and Unionists relied on their numerous former members at home, and were helped by fraternal organizations and friendly governments abroad. They also disposed of funds transferred from the treasuries of their now suppressed home organizations and were thus able to maintain a network of underground connections. The splinter groups profited from their pre-1933 experience in conspiracy and their elitist structure, and managed to work successfully with their friends in Germany. With the aid of salaried party members stationed at the borders in the C.S.R., in Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and to a lesser degree, in Poland, Austria, and Switzerland, all these groups tried to spread information and propaganda material, or to deliver it to illegal groups for distribution. Couriers and instructors endeavoured to keep in constant contact with resistance circles at home, to establish new organizations there, to ensure the authority of the exiled directorates, and to secure confidential information on political and economic developments.

In contrast to the thesis of a "consistent guidance" of the illegal K.P.D. by its leadership abroad as propagated in Communist historiography, relations between the activities of the underground movements in Germany and the politics-in-exile of the respective party directorates were, however, only of subsidiary character for both sides: Regardless of their actual effectiveness in posing a threat to the security of the régime, the exile groups tried to contribute to resistance at home in the form of illegal organizational and propaganda activities. In this way they hoped to prove that they were still a political force to be reckoned with. Furthermore, organized cadres at home were needed to secure influence immediately after the expected breakdown of the régime. Legitimation through underground activities was an important point of contention in the political and ideological discussions among the parties in exile and their competitive factions and leaders. Press, public opinion, and the fraternal parties abroad tended to judge exile parties and to give them political, propaganda, and financial support relative to their successful connections to oppositional forces at home. On the other hand, the militants in Germany welcomed illegal literature and organizational assistance from abroad as contributions to their underground fight, as long as the strategic concepts of the exiled leaders corresponded with their own evaluations of internal reality. Until June 1936, for instance, more than 1.2 million numbers of the party newspaper, 100,000 pamphlets and over 1.5 million broadsheets and stickers were illegally transported into the Reich on behalf of the S.P.D. headquarters in Prague. These quantities were even exceeded by the Communists' attempts towards mass propaganda in Germany.

None of the exile groups tried to hinder the consolidation of the N.S. régime or at least demonstrate their presence through
direct action or sabotage. Although such action had occasion-
ally been discussed, the exile groups refrained from it because
they knew that their return to a political future would depend
not only on their own party members at home but also, and
more importantly, on the majority which had accepted Hit-
ler's rule because they feared anarchy, and would shy away
from partisan "counterviolence" even against this violent régime.
Instead, most non-Communist groups in exile expected the
end of National-Socialist power due to an initiating action of the
Reichswehr and other traditional forces responsible for the
public order, i.e. sectors of the civil service and the churches,
backed up by the secretly organized members of the former
political parties. They considered the promotion of such a de-
velopment by clandestine political education, organization,
and encouragement, and by an international isolation of the
N.S. régime, as the true contribution of exile politics to the
fall of the Third Reich. Orthodox Marxist groups hoped that,
by the same means, they would accelerate the inevitable social
and economic crises of the régime, and prepare the working
class for united revolutionary action under their leadership.

The failure of the resistance movements, and the eventual de-
struction of the Third Reich by military action from the out-
side, suggest that the activities of political émigré groups were
historically irrelevant. Indeed, their methods and means of re-
sistance were no match for a modern totalitarian government.
The hopes and expectations of the exiles until shortly before
the end of the war and the sacrifices of the resistance groups
proved equally illusionary and ineffective. To a large extent,
the strategies and actions of this opposition, which paid a high
death toll for their futile attempts to counteract the régime at
home and from abroad, might appear as results of wrong or
ideological judgment, or as casualties of the political aspirations
of their leadership. For those involved at the time, however,
to continue fighting the régime became a re-affirmation of
their identity, and the discharge, in exile, of a political mis-
tion. Whether their sacrifices succeeded or failed is not as cru-
cial as their efforts, which deserve to be remembered as part
of recent German and Austrian national history.

The "offensive of truth," that is, the propaganda battle against
the N.S. régime in foreign countries, was much more successful
in damaging the interests of National-Socialism. While the exile
organizations viewed it secondary to illegal political work
at home, propaganda was indeed their main activity. More
than 400 newspapers, magazines, news services, circular let-
ters, and bulletins issued by Reich German émigrés have so far
been identified. They were only partly geared towards under-
ground circulation, or internal information purposes. The
most important periodicals, frequently continuations of Weim-
ar German publications or of reputable political-cultural
magazines, reached politicians, government institutions, and
editors abroad, in addition to their German-language readers
in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, the Saar Territory,
and Austria. Press services, announcements, speeches, contrib-
utions by émigré journalists to the press and radio of their
countries of exile, books published by prominent politicians
and well-known authors, as well as reports on the experiences
of persecuted persons influenced international public opinion
on National-Socialist Germany.

The extensive countermeasures taken by the Third Reich
prove that it perceived the propaganda activities of political émi-
grés as potentially damaging to its aims. In May 1933, the Ger-
man government had already begun to register all political émi-
grés. This led to a detailed data compilation which was
kept up-to-date until the end of the war by systematic observa-
tion on the part of the German embassies, the N.S.D.A.P.
Auslandsorganisation, Gestapo-agents, and confidential informers.
The National-Socialists attempted to infiltrate and corrupt or-
ganizations, abduct and murder refugees beyond the German
borders, aim propaganda at the émigrés, intervene diplomati-
cally, and have the Gestapo collaborate with the police and
immigration offices of the countries of asylum, in order to de-
prive the emigrants of their personal, material, and political
basis. The Gesetz über den Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und
über die Anerkennung der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft (Law for
the Revocation of Naturalizations and the Deprivation of
German Citizenship), effective July 14, 1933, provided a spe-
cial tool in this concerted effort. On the basis of this law, close
to 40,000 persons listed by name had their German nationality
voided by the spring of 1945. At first, the law was directed exclud-
antly against political opponents who had left Germany.
After 1937, more and more Jewish refugees were added to the
list of those deprived of German citizenship. Instigated by the
Gestapo and the German Foreign Office, by April 1939 about
9,000 émigrés thus had lost the relative mobility which a valid
German passport would have permitted. In the end, the 11.
Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz (11th enabling decree to
the law of Reich-citizenship — the Nürnberger Gesetze of
September 15, 1935 —) dated November 25, 1941, decreed the
expatriation of all Jewish émigrés and deportees.

IV

The activities of the exile groups had been increasingly hin-
dered after 1935/36 by the destruction of organized circles of
resisters in Germany. This not only decreased the possibilities
for propaganda work in Germany, but rendered reports on
the Third Reich by exiles less detailed and authoritative. By
1937, the Prague government began to limit the freedom of
movement of political exiles in the C.S.R. because of heavy
pressure from Germany. The occupation of Austria and Czecho-
slovakia and the effect of the Reichskristallnacht on German
Jews in favor of emigration increased the flow of émigrés to
the few countries of asylum remaining free in continental Eu-
rope, which were themselves feeling the growing danger of a
German take-over. As a result, they restricted the admission
and rights of aliens, and limited the mobility of the exile par-
ties. Declining financial resources of non-Communist exile
groups coincided with the low point in organized opposition
in the Reich. The German-Soviet Non-Agression Pact of Au-
gust 1939 finally paralyzed even Communist exile
organizations.

The climax in this crisis of the political emigration between
1938 and 1941 came with the German military offensives in
the West. Deportation, internment, and compulsory service in
labor battalions of the French army were now added to the
prohibition of political activities of aliens and to the dissolu-
tion of organizations brought about by the flight of emigrants
from Western European capitals, or their emigration overseas.
Between 1939 and 1941, 18,000 to 20,000 emigrants were held
in more than 100 French internment camps. Families and rela-
atives of the internees, and discharged or escaped refugees gathered in Southern France hoping for a chance to emigrate. During this period, political parties and groups in exile concentrated on measures to obtain entrance permits for threatened members, especially for Great Britain and overseas. In 1940/41, for instance, almost 1,000 Social-Democratic refugees were rescued from France with the support of American trade unions; in 1942, about 500 German and Austrian Socialists remained behind without exit visas. Some émigrés found shelter in hiding, and were able to disguise their true identities permanently, or later joined domestic resistance movements. Despite closed borders and the risk of being expelled after entering illegally, some tried to reach nearby Switzerland; others chose the route to African, Asian, and Latin American ports, frequently with visas of doubtful value, and with the help of obscure shipping agencies. The number of those who died in French internment camps due to inadequate living conditions, who were picked up by the Gestapo, or were delivered to the German occupying forces by collaborating Western-European governments will never be known. In the early fifties, approximately 16,000 pre-1945 Jewish refugees still lived in their former countries of asylum on the European continent.

It was only after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the entry of the United States into the war that a new phase of political activities began. The political centers had shifted since 1938 from Czechoslovakia and France to England, Sweden, and Switzerland, and, for the Communist parties, to the Soviet Union. Small groups and informal circles of party members — often connected to journals or prominent individuals — established themselves in almost all overseas countries. This geographic dispersion posed more than the problem of maintaining connections during wartime; the discouraging political developments, the troubles accompanying an apparently permanent exile, and the tempting integration in host countries also contributed, in a major way, to the decline of membership in exile organizations. They were not totally reduced to being "generals without an army," but the difficulties of adhering to political aims and cultural values subjected these groups to a selective process which challenged the national identity of each individual. Among the political refugees of Jewish background, members of the Socialist and Communist parties were most capable of maintaining their national ties during this last phase of exile, despite their growing knowledge of National-Socialist genocide.

During World War II, exile parties and groups outside the Soviet Union continued in their attempts to influence public opinion in their settlement countries. Before 1939, providing information on the crimes committed by the Third Reich and the demand for tougher attitudes on the part of the democracies against National-Socialist Germany had been major concerns for the exiles. Now, exiles promoted the image of the "Other Germany," and emphasized their views of the future post-war order in Europe. But their once vital publicity work had been severely limited by changed circumstances: major exile journals and book publishers succeeded in continuing their work only in a few Latin American countries during the war. In general, mimeographed newsletters distributed in small quantities had to serve as party and group publications. Financially, the exile party directorates in England, Scandinavia, and America survived, most often poorly, on the modest contributions provided by the rank and file and through donations from friendly organizations in the countries of refuge.

Apart from bases in Switzerland and Sweden, where "illegal" actions against the National-Socialist Germany were prosecuted under penal law as breaches of neutrality, effective attacks on the Third Reich were only possible within the framework of Allied war efforts. Thus, individual members and functionaries of exile parties, and a number of intellectuals and political publicists closely connected with them, contributed to the overthrow of the N.S. régime by collaborating in Allied propaganda agencies, advising decision-making authorities on the war, or serving in Allied armies. The official representatives of the democratic parties and the Free Trade Unions in exile requested, however, that the cooperation of their organizations with the Allies be based on some recognition of their political goals, or some degree of autonomy in pursuing exile policies. Since the U.S. administration, the British government, and the Czech exile government fundamentally opposed even a very limited autonomy for German exile organizations in the common fight against Hitler, the possibilities for action were extremely restricted. Only in a few cases were radio scripts, manifestos, drafts, handbills, or information material provided by the exile parties taken over by Allied propaganda agencies. Towards the end of the war, some groups seized the opportunity to employ their own couriers behind the German lines in exchange for cooperating with Allied military intelligence services. There had been isolated plans to set up emigrant units within the allied forces, or even to establish independent "Free German" military units. Like attempts to create an exile government, or form an official representation for the German opposition, they were bound to fail. The only exception were Austrian émigrés. When the Moscow declaration of October 1943 proclaimed the reconstruction of Austria as an Allied war aim, but made Austria's treatment by the victors dependent on her contributing to her own liberation, five refugee battalions were formed on Communist initiative within the Yugoslav People's Army of Liberation in Serbia and Slovenia, and recognized as Austrian units on the Allied side. Only one unit saw military action before the war ended.

Even more than previously, dependence upon the Soviet Union determined the behavior of the Communist exile parties during the war. In the period between the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Communists were isolated within the framework of the political emigration, and were seen as tools of the Russian-German alliance in western countries of asylum. Even after 1941, they continued, for the most part, conspiratorial forms of organization, and appeared only rarely in public as a political party. As their main task at that time, they activated welfare and cultural associations and, from 1943 on, tried to recruit political and un-affiliated émigrés in "democratic bloc organizations." These associations also served as platforms for the propaganda of the Communist exile parties in western countries of settlement. For those among Communist leaders who had established themselves in the U.S.S.R., there seemed indeed to exist the prospect of making their exile policy effective and influential after the end of the "imperialistic phase" of the war in 1941. Émigrés worked for radio and propaganda groups on the front, in the Red Army, in the Soviet administration, and in
agencies of the Comintern, often in important positions. The Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" founded in 1943 could be considered the first recognized political representation of the German opposition to Hitler. Later developments proved, however, that the Communist exile parties were used, ultimately, as instruments of Moscow's European policy. When, in 1944, the Soviet Union agreed to dismember the Reich and to "transfer" the German populations residing in Central East Europe to Germany, the result was a new and final isolation of the K.P.D. within the spectrum of German exile politics.

V

The discussions, conflicts, and ideological reflections within the political emigration were initially concerned with identifying the reasons for the failure of their own movements at home. With the exception of the Communist parties — which here, too, were tied to the Comintern line and viewed the victory of fascist and "reactionary" forces in Germany and Austria as a further step taken by capitalist society towards its inevitable crisis — the defeat led Socialist and liberal émigrés to self-criticism, especially of their political strategies since World War I, and thus also of the ideological theorems of this period. The immediate results of this were usually a return to left traditions of political thought and demands for radical internal, economic, social, and cultural policies in the future. The respective change of outlook at the foreign leadership level of the old Social-Democratic parties had also been promoted by competitive relations to left opposition groups, who saw their point of view confirmed by the course of history. This initial reaction was soon followed by attempts to reflect upon the developments of the past decade by applying the methods of sociology and the history of ideas to the analysis of Fascism. Consideration of the "objective factors" leading to the rise and victory of Fascism promoted the ideological stabilization of the party leaders and their return to the basic aims and political methods of the time before their flight. Their recognition that the victory of the German dictatorship was mainly a result of the social isolation of their own movement was one of the intermediate results of the historical re-assessment in almost all camps of the exile. Apart from left splinter groups, whose hope for a united party of the working class was finally destroyed only by the German-Soviet Pact, the exile parties began with the idea that their future policy would have to be built on an alliance with strata of society beyond their own traditional clienteles. Impressed by the success of National-Socialism, sectors of the Reich German and Sudeten Social-Democracy, for instance, saw an ally in those classes which, like the lower middle class and the peasants, had not or only partly accomplished their economic, social, and psychological integration into modern industrial society and, due to the exclusive class character of the old labor movement, now served as a mass basis for Fascism. They were to be won for a nationally oriented socialism (Volkssozialismus) which was to be organized on the line of professional corporations. As a part of this framework, the organized workers would be able to overcome their former positions as outsiders in society.

The majority of political exiles, however, sooner or later came to the conclusion that only through the collaboration of the labor movement with other progressive sections of society could a modern democratic order be realized. In almost all camps it was assumed that private and state capitalism had once and for all been discredited by the economics and politics of the thirties and the role they had played within the war machinery of the Third Reich. Capitalism was to be replaced by a form of socialist economy which would adjust its production goals to the needs of the consumer majority. Workers and consumers were to be guaranteed a far-reaching economic co-determination by a system of democratic decisions starting on basic local and factory levels. While, at first, the left still meant to realize this goal by means of a new revolutionary class movement, the Social-Democratic leadership saw the future task of their party in convincing the majority of the voters by political education within the framework of a pluralistic society that democratic socialism would serve the best interests of all. They wanted to prevent the re-establishment of a party system based on the exclusive representation of classes and ideologies, which would again prevent a basic democratic consensus of the nation as a whole. Without a doubt, these programs and considerations anticipated important elements of the Volksfront conceptions of the West German parliamentary parties of the postwar period, and the historic compromise between the Austrian Socialists and former supporters of the corporate state. The creation of federated trade unions in Germany and Austria after 1945 was also influenced by these ideas. Whereas the common anticipations of a Socialist economy did not survive the realities of the reconstruction period in the Western zones of occupation, and were succeeded by programs of a modified market economy and of a limited co-determination on an industrial level, the concept of ideological and social pluralism became constituent for the postwar party system in contrast to the Weimar Republic. The reflections of the exiles thus combined the experiences of the opposition at home with the objective processes of modernization which came through the National-Socialist régime's destruction of Wilhelminian social traditions and political milieus.

The theoretical possibility of including the Communists in a democratic alliance first arose after the 7th World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935. Abandoning their previously "ultraleft" course, the Communist parties now demanded a united labor-front and an "anti-fascist popular front" of all opponents of National-Socialism. It soon became apparent, however, that a declaration of liberal and democratic principles on the part of the K.P.D. without renouncing the dictatorship of the proletariate as the ultimate aim would not remove their differences from Social-Democracy. The temporary cooperation between the K.P.D., some middle class and Social-Democratic exile politicians, and representatives of the cultural emigration, for example in Paris within the Deutsche Volksfront, failed, because the Communist partners aspired to political control. After 1939, the Communists increasingly restricted their concept of a popular front to seeking an Einheitspartei aller Werkstatigen nited party of all workers under Communist dominance, and reduced their factual alliances to cooperation with middle class groups and fellow-travelling dissenters of the socialist parties. Events like Stalin's purges in the U.S.S.R., or the German-Soviet Pact, rendered the socialist exile groups even less prepared to enter any organizational ties or even pragmatic contacts with the Communists. Only with the founding of the Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" in Moscow in July 1943 did the Communist concept of an alliance gain new, if temporary, impetus; Freie deutsche Bewegungen based on this
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model were set up also in Western countries of exile. Their initial success was influenced strongly by the extensive concessions which Soviet policy on Germany seemed ready to make in response to an effective German resistance movement. In contrast to the harsh plans advanced by the Western Allies for a defeated Germany, the Soviet step created hopes in patriotic exile circles for the territorial and economic survival of the Reich. Moscow's actual German policy after 1944, however, destroyed the basis for this coalition, too. After 1945, Communist Blockpolitik on the lines of the Nationalkomitee and the Freie deutsche Bewegungen, which excluded the Social-Democratic parties unwilling to accept "unification" under Communist control, became a central element in Communist strategy in East Germany and the Soviet-dominated countries of Europe.

The ambivalent relations of the German exile towards Allied war aims had already been predicted in theoretical papers prepared by émigrés on the eve of World War II. Besides the Communist definition of the war as an "imperialist war" which, until 1941, had been propagated by Moscow, other political groups also saw the imminent military confrontation between France, Great Britain, and the Third Reich more or less as a traditional conflict of interests between imperialist powers, not only as a "civil war between democracy and dictatorship." It was apparent, however, that the territorial expansion of "Greater Germany" could only be stopped by military intervention of the main European powers. In addition, the effectiveness of the National-Socialist system of persuasion and oppression had convinced the exiles that the uprising of the "Other Germany" could only be brought about by heavy setbacks from outside. As effective resistance in the Reich finally seemed impossible under the conditions of war, one hoped, if at all, for a democratic revolt at the time of the last decisive defeat on the battle-field. In line with the motto "For Germany, against Hitler," political exiles had no choice but to support the military war aims of the Allies.

Until 1943, i.e. during the period when the Allies still had not yet decided on a political program for Germany, the exile groups recognized in the aims for peace offered by the Labor Party in November 1939, the Atlantic Charter, the declarations issued by Stalin in November 1941 and May 1942, and in Winston Churchill's radio speech of Mai 21, 1943, provisions for the construction of an independent democratic post-war Germany within a cooperative European community of states. It was important, at the time, that publics, parties, and politicians of the host countries gained confidence in the regenerative forces of the "Other Germany." The battle against the "Vansittartist" thesis of the basically authoritarian, militaristic, imperialist, and inhumane nature of the German people and its collective guilt for the rise and the crimes of National-Socialism therefore became a main concern for the exiles. After the Teheran Conference at the end of 1943, when the consent of the powers to the cession of German territory to Poland became known, and plans for the division of the Reich appeared, the non-Communist exile groups tried to oppose these plans for cession of territory, population transfer, deindustrialization and national partition, despite the hopelessness of this endeavour. The futility of exile political actions in foreign countries became apparent. Besides the lack of material means, this was the second, and main reason for the shift of activities from public programs to internal preparations, from actionism to attentism.

After 1943, the "anti-fascist" period of exile politics was followed by a phase of democratic patriotism, which also saw National-Socialism as its main enemy, but concentrated on the political autonomy, territorial integrity, and economic viability of the postwar German nation state. The main activity of the exile organizations now centered around political, social, and economic plans and programs for an autonomous postwar German republic. They were intended to serve as practical guidelines for the democratic forces at home, and as alternative plans for the Western powers, once the expected failure of their policy had become apparent.

Despite the severe conditions which Washington and London planned to impose on a defeated Germany, for most of the non-Communist groups hope for the future lay in an alliance with the Western democracies. In their opinion, economic and political necessities called for a federation of Central and Western European states, and sooner or later would lead to the integration of postwar Germany on the basis of industrial reconstruction and political partnership. Furthermore, they foresaw that the Western powers would come into conflict with the expansionism of the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Territorial, economic and political measures initially imposed on occupied Germany by the Allies might then be revised in favor of the reconstruction of a free and democratic state within historical borders as a counterweight against Moscow's predominance in Eastern Europe.

For the Austrian émigrés, the national question was settled by an understanding reached in 1943 by the Allies about an independent Austrian postwar republic. Initially, the Auslandsvertretung der österreichischen Sozialisten adhered to the principles of the 1918 constitution which proclaimed that Deutsch-Osterreich was part of the — not yet existing — unified German Republic. Their plans anticipated, at first, the integration of Austria into a revolutionary Germany along ethnic lines (Gesamtdaschland). Until the Moscow Declaration of 1943 it then was hoped that Austria would be incorporated into a socialist European federation which would render national boundaries obsolete. This idea served as a deus ex machina not only for the Austrian, but also for Reich and Sudeten-German Socialists who basically welcomed the incorporation of German-speaking territories into the Reich as a revision of the Versailles Peace Treaties, but who could not, of course, agree with the means and political effects of German expansion under National-Socialist leadership. For the Austrian Communists as well, incorporating Austria into a Soviet-Germany (Rätischeutschland) was a basic point of their program until the second half of the 1930s. By 1937, however, the K.P.O. had turned to propagating an historically and culturally evolved Austrian nation distinctly separate from the German nation. On this basis, Communist émigrés were able to define their resistance against the National-Socialist régime as an Austrian national fight for liberation in accordance with the Comintern's concept of anti-fascist strategy. Exiles who were legitimist or adherents of the corporate state differed greatly among themselves about the national question. But they, too, rejected a German annexation and Prussian-Protestant infiltration, and could thus agree to the prospect of an independent Austria. Therefore, after 1943, Austrian exiles, including the
Socialists, also focused their considerations and discussions on the form of a future national state.

For the Sudeten-German exiles, the elaboration of their national interests posed more difficulties. Exiled Social-Democrats and Communists had, at first, rejected the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia without being assured of autonomy for the German minority. During the war years, the Sudeten Social-Democrats who still insisted on guarantees for self-determination had to face a popular front-like coalition of Communists, Social-Democratic oppositions, and middle class liberals, all of whom cooperated with the Czech government-in-exile. This union broke apart in 1944 because plans for transferring the German minority to Germany were supported by the Communists only. The Social-Democratic majority tried in vain to prevent the displacement of the German population by influencing public and government opinion abroad and attempting to create a Sudeten-German resistance organization in the home country. The expulsion of approximately 10 million ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia and the Eastern provinces of the Reich was equivalent to a second, final displacement of the anti-Hitler refugees from these areas. They remained in their countries of asylum, or settled in the postwar German states and in Austria.

It has been estimated that at most 4% of those who had left the Reich for "racial" reasons remigrated to West Germany. The number of politically motivated refugees who returned to their home countries, however, seems to have been significant. Of the 2,150 political emigrants who appear in volume I of this International Biographical Dictionary about 280 (13%) had fallen into the hands of the Gestapo during illegal missions to Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia or, after 1938, in the occupied countries; some of these survived imprisonment and concentration camps. Only about 30 returned voluntarily to the Third Reich, for the most part in 1933/34, or after the occupation of Western Europe. Close to 200 (9%) died abroad before 1945. Nearly 1,000, i.e. 68% of those still living in exile at the end of the war, returned to West and East Germany and to Austria. Of course, the high percentage of returnees in this Dictionary cannot be extrapolated to the entire group of political exiles. It permits the assumption, however, that a considerable part of the political exile population had preserved its national identity. In addition, quite a few of those refugees who remained in their countries of emigration have kept or re-acquired their former nationalities, and thus became Germans or Austrians living abroad. They contributed extensively to the reestablishment of political, economic, and cultural relations between postwar Germany, Austria, and the countries where they had settled.

In contrast to the speedy repatriation of Communist exiles to Germany with the help of the Soviets, an early return, or the return of groups of political émigrés was prevented by the Western powers as a matter of policy; only some individuals were granted entrance permits. Those whose political attitudes the military governments distrusted had the chance to return to the Federal Republic of Germany only after 1949. In the meantime, a probably not insignificant number of former exiles had despised of being able to participate in the construction of a new order, while the old bureaucracies and social elites reasserted themselves under Allied military control. Although the German public evinced, at first, a lively and positive interest in the émigrés — as evidenced by the public debate between Walter von Molo, Frank Thiess, and Thomas Mann in 1945 and 1946 — it eventually based its picture of the exile on those former émigrés who served in the military governments, and thus appeared as "victims." Due to the restrictive repatriation practices, the public failed to notice that most of the political emigrants had projected programs which agreed with Allied policy on the military, organizational, and ideological destruction of National-Socialism, but had rejected those points of Allied war and postwar policies towards Germany which were understood by the Germans not as measures to combat the Third Reich but as steps towards the dissolution of the German nation. The official attempts to come to terms with the National-Socialist past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) either in categories of guilt and collective responsibility, or by administrative "de-nazification" procedures, did not meet the perceptions of the realities of the Third Reich held by the majority of contemporary Germans, and thus contributed strongly to a general habit of defense and inhibition instead of a cathartic confrontation with the whole spectrum of the National-Socialist régime, i.e. with its every-day normalcy, its crimes, its victims, and its resisters. Later, the atmosphere of the Cold War intensified public mistrust of any "anti-fascist" engagement against the Third Reich as a potentially subversive Communist activity. The exile experience came to be regarded at least as a dubious detachment from the fate and sufferings of one's own people. Very soon, returnees to West Germany and Austria began to abstain from public reference to their exile in response to the unifying pragmatism in the period of social and economic reconstruction. So, until the mid-sixties, the history of political and cultural emigration and resistance from abroad was almost nonexistent in the literature and general knowledge about the National-Socialist era. The factual extent of re-emigration and participation of former émigrés in the political leadership of West Germany and Austria belonged to the remarkable findings in the course of research work for the Dictionary. The representation of returnees in political parties and trade unions, in press, administration, diplomacy, judiciary and education has been documented on a high level of selection mainly by the biographical entries in Volume I.

**Table 4: Leading Political Positions of Former Émigrés in Germany and Austria, 1945–1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of National and Länder Governments</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of National Parliaments</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Länder Parliaments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of National Party and Labor Union Directors</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishers, Editors-in-Chief, and Directors of Leading Periodicals and of Radio Stations</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Länder dissolved in 1952.
Introduction

The important part former émigrés played in the construction of the Federal Republic of Germany and the respective roles of remigrants to East Germany and Austria prove that politics in exile served as a factor of special significance within the continuities and discontinuities of pre-National-Socialist political culture and postwar Central European history. Developments suggest a direct connection between experiences gained in exile and new party structures, basic political values, economic theories, and orientations in national and foreign policy.

Errata

Introduction, page XLI, last paragraph, line 5 should read:

The so-called Nürnberger Gesetze of September 15, 1935