Jean-Pierre Meunier’s Modalities of the “Filmic Attitude”: Towards a Theory of Referentiality in Cinematic Discourse

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Abstract
Meunier’s reflections upon the differences between the “home-movie attitude,” the “documentary attitude,” and the “fiction attitude” can help to develop a theory of reference in cinematic discourse. Such a theory needs to take into account three fundamental ideas. First, reference is not constituted by the film alone but results from an interaction between film and viewer. Second, there are different kinds of objects (or entities with different “modes of being”) that are referred to. These two ideas can be drawn more or less directly from Meunier’s argument. The third idea is less obvious but logically implied: it is based on a differentiation between three dimensions of meaning: intensional (with an ‘s’), extensional, and referential meaning, all of which co-exist phenomenologically.

Keywords: Film theory; reference; intension; extension; realism; modes of reading

Introduction

In a brief note published in 1963 in Raymond Bellour’s short-lived journal Artsept, Roland Barthes writes about Strangers of the Earth (Les inconnus de la terre, 1961), a cinéma-vérité documentary by Mario Ruspoli:

This film is a genuine investigation; Ruspoli lets his farmers speak and they immediately convey, through their direct, concrete language, the problems of the French peasantry today: their pitiful revenues, the antiquated technology, the generational antagonism between young and
old, the conflict between individual and the group, the demand for better living conditions and more freedom. Before our eyes, class-consciousness awakens and speaks of its own accord.¹

Ruspoli had interviewed several peasants in Lozère (a department in the region of Occitanie, in southern France). Sometimes they discuss among each other in front of the camera. Yet, for Barthes, the film is not about these individuals, but about class-consciousness and the general “problems of the French peasantry today.”

In the French original, this last phrase reads “les problèmes généraux du paysan français d’aujourd’hui," which reminds me of Jean-Pierre Meunier’s la personne-en-générale (“the person-in-general”), who we tend to see, according to Meunier, when watching home movies.² Meunier writes that “the consciousness of the home movie appears as a constitutive activity: it looks beyond the image, to the person-in-general that it depicts, in order to produce and maintain his existence even during the screening” (p. 88).

The two cases are also quite different, of course: Barthes, in his reading of Strangers of the Earth, merges several individuals into one collective singular (“the French peasant”), while Meunier claims that we look beyond one single person who is well known to us, to perceive her general traits, her gestures, her individual personality. But the cases are comparable in that the cinematic discourse’s referents shift from what we immediately perceive – individuals in specific situations – to more abstract entities. Both thus raise questions for a general theory of referentiality in film.

Meunier’s Modalities

Jean-Pierre Meunier’s thoughts on the structures of film experience, and especially his differentiation of three “modalities of the ‘filmic attitude,’” can help formulate such a theory³ (p. 116). These three modalities (or forms, or types) of attitude are: the “home-movie attitude,” the “documentary attitude,” and the “fiction attitude.”

In many aspects, these attitudes resemble three of Roger Odin’s “modes of producing meaning and affect” which play a central role in his semio-pragmatic approach: the “private mode,” the “documentarist mode,” and the “fictionalizing mode.”⁴ Both authors have developed them from what they consider normal or typical ways of watching and apprehending the corresponding kind of film: home movie (the film-souvenir or the film de famille, respectively), documentary, and fiction film.⁵ Both are also
eager to remark that films can be watched against the grain: applying the documentary attitude to a fiction film, or the fiction attitude to a home movie and so on. And they can be used in combination, as Meunier writes: “when looking closer, we can see that the attitudes described can succeed each other or intertwine with each other during the viewing of a single film” (p. 116). Besides, Meunier is quite aware (as is Odin) that his categories are ideal types, heuristically useful but relating only to a theoretically abstracted reality.

These caveats need to be taken seriously, but they should not prevent us from reflecting upon the construction of the three modalities of filmic attitude, nor from making use of them for a theory of reference in the cinema. In Meunier’s study, the first and fundamental distinction of the three different modes is based on the two factors existence and knowledge. The home-movie attitude “considers its object to be known and existing elsewhere,” the documentary attitude “considers its object as existing but not known” (p. 152, emphasis mine), and the fiction attitude considers it to be non-existing – and therefore necessarily unknown prior to the experience of the fiction.

In the home-movie attitude, the viewer seeks to “render present” a person one is well acquainted with, to recognize what she knows about the absent person’s physiognomy and comportment. As stated above, this implies a certain activity on the part of the viewer consisting of looking “beyond the image, to the person-in-general that it depicts” (p. 88). The image is enriched by the spectator’s individual memories. Identification in the home-movie attitude consists in what Meunier calls an “incantatory” behavior; it serves to “presentify” the absent person. It therefore necessarily involves a dimension of latent frustration, because it makes one all the more aware that the person is truly absent. In sum, for Meunier, the overall purpose of the home-movie attitude consists in the presentification of a well-known but absent person by way of extending the image’s content beyond itself and seeking an imaginary contact with the “person-in-general.”

Inspiring as this claim is, I think it warrants a qualification, because not all home-movie consumption seems to work along this line. Imagine watching a friend’s wedding video – a paradigm case of what Meunier calls the film-souvenir. The two brides – the year is 2019 – are standing in front of the celebrant, looking at her, and then at each other, as the camera zooms in on your friend’s face. What you are likely to see in these images is less the “person-in-general” (her general behavior, her typical gestures), but the person-in-a-very-particular-moment. You wait for her smile in this special moment, and try to read her feelings (is there a slight hesitation behind the
overall happiness?). This is not to deny that Meunier’s description is valid for many cases of home-movie viewing, but what he sees as the home-movie attitude could well be only one of its sub-modes, another of which I have just hinted at.

A similar qualification might be helpful for Meunier’s outline of the documentary attitude. This attitude posits, according to Meunier, its objects as existing, but not known to the spectator prior to the viewing. Its main purpose is to gain knowledge, via the film, about what are considered real world events or states of affairs. Therefore, the images acquire a greater degree of “autonomy”; they are less invested with prior beliefs than in the home-movie attitude. However, according to Meunier, “retention” and “protention” (the imaginary prolongation of the present movement into past and future, respectively) are still less important than they are in the fiction attitude: “[W]e can cut the film after any sequence, or even right in the middle of a sequence, without the spectator being truly frustrated by it,” he claims (p. 110). This characterization of the documentary attitude must seem more doubtful today, after increasing tendencies towards narrative documentary, than at the time of Meunier’s writing when classical documentaries and cinéma-vérité films seem to have constituted the paradigms. Here again, we might be tempted to regard what Meunier elaborates as the documentary attitude solely as one of its possible sub-modes.

The fiction attitude differs more radically from the two others as it does not posit the filmic objects, persons, and events as existing, even though they appear to be real. As Meunier writes: “the filmic world is erected as an autonomous reality” (p. 112) (a “diegesis,” he could have said in Souriau’s wording). As the character’s movement (when considered as such, not as the actor’s movement) has no existence outside the diegetic world, it only gains meaning in relation to his or her other movements in the same film, whence results both the much greater importance of retention and protention and the “captivating” dimension of the fiction attitude (p. 113). With regards to identification, Meunier distinguishes two sub-modalities in the fiction attitude: a participation in the mode of “being-with” and a participation in the mode of “being-like” the character (p. 129).

Consequences for a Theory of Referentiality

What I find especially original in Meunier’s theory is his differentiation of referential objects according to the respective attitude the viewer applies. As I aim to show, Meunier’s ideas can help to sketch a theory of referentiality in
cinematic discourse. Three ideas are of key importance here, two of which are explicitly stated by Meunier. I have already mentioned them but will reiterate them for the sake of clarity. The third one remains implicit (but appears to me to be a logical consequence) and needs to be explained.

The first idea is that its reference is not constituted by the film alone, but results from an interaction between film and viewer: “[W]e should also note that the positing of existence does not essentially depend on the type of film. [...] We can indeed posit a purely fictional character as existing, and we can also posit the Paul Anka of Lonely Boy as not existing” (p. 110). However, “each type of film solicits consciousness to comprehend it” in a way that renders one kind of reading far more probable than others. By implication, every other attitude appears as a “deviation” (p. 100).

The second idea is that there are indeed different kinds of objects – or objects with different “modes of existence” – that are referred to. The home-movie attitude’s “person-in-general” is obviously a different kind of being than the documentary attitude’s “object-yet-unknown” or the fictional attitude’s “non-existing-person.” Philosophical problems loom large here. And there are not only the three grand object categories of the three major types of attitudes, but also intermediate cases that pose particular complications. Within the domain of fiction, Meunier distinguishes two groups of films: “the purely fictional film, such as we find in heroic and fantasy genres” and “this other category of films closer to the real” (p. 97). Stories told in films belonging to the second category appear “lifelike, or at least possible,” referring to “slices of lived experienced” (p. 98).

This type of fiction film “is perceptibly close to the documentary genre” but is “distinguished by the fact that it does not convey, beyond the image, a specific, existent, concrete reality.” As an example, Meunier points to Bicycle Thieves (Ladri di biciclette) by Vittorio de Sica (1948), a film, he writes, that “is presented almost as a social observation” and “refers to something other than itself, a specific reality existing elsewhere.” However, in contradistinction to what happens in the documentary, “this reality remains indistinct, vague and undifferentiated. Thus, the bicycle thief is not posited as existing in his specific reality, that is as a personal being, but he is valid as a representative of a number of anonymous beings existing in a certain period and sharing the same problems with him” (p. 98, emphasis mine). In this formulation, Meunier comes quite close to what Barthes said about Strangers of the Earth – only reversed: whereas Barthes had merged several real individuals into one abstract person, Meunier splits one fictional character into a group of “anonymous beings.” Both authors, however, refer to a social reality outside
the film.\textsuperscript{11} A little later Meunier writes: “The bicycle thief as such does not exist, but the existing reality that it [the film] illustrates confers on it a power of existence that gives it a certain substance of reality” (p. 98). This seems to be yet another kind of \textit{mode of existence} of filmic entities.\textsuperscript{12}

Again, the positing of this particular filmic entity (fictional-but-with-a-certain-substance-of-reality) depends not only on the film, but also on the viewer. As Meunier explains, it is always possible to deny the ascription of that “substance of reality” – but, and this is important, only at the cost of also denying the existence of the underlying social structure: “At the same time as I break my belief in the bicycle thief as a fictional character, I must also, in order for this act to be complete, deny a certain social reality that this fictional character illustrates, and whose major characteristics he reproduces” (p. 98/99).

A telling historical instance of such a denial is François Truffaut’s review of \textit{The Roof} (\textit{Il Tetto}, 1956), another neorealist film by De Sica and Zavattini, in which they portray a young newlywed couple who desperately search for a place to stay in Rome. Truffaut, angry young man and passionate hater of De Sica’s cinema that he was, writes:

\begin{quote}
Concerning \textit{The Roof}, I would only reproach De Sica and Zavattini for having radically deformed the reality they are referring to, for having distorted the housing problem by inventing facts that are not true, and for having evaded the real difficulties of this problem, substituting them with inappropriate sentimental considerations.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

This accusation of having invented ‘alternative facts’ (\textit{avant la lettre}!) only makes sense within a realist reading of the film. Note that the accusation does not, of course, relate to the characters – that Luisa and Natale and all the other characters of \textit{The Roof} were indeed invented, too, cannot bother Truffaut. What he minds is what he regards as false statements about real social structures such as the housing problem, thereby \textit{first assuming, then denying} what the film appears to claim, namely its “substance of reality.”\textsuperscript{14}

This implies, and here I come to my third point and my more original contribution, that there are several layers of meaning which we need to differentiate. First, there are the sequences of moving images and sounds that have, as I have laid out elsewhere, both an \textit{intensional} and an \textit{extensional} dimension.\textsuperscript{15} The intension is what we immediately perceive in a scene (as soon as we read them “figuratively”); for example, a woman doing the dishes, a man in his pajamas taking water from the tap, seen in black-and-white in a medium-long shot (see Fig. 5).\textsuperscript{16} In other words, the
intension is what the images and sounds represent in themselves, without reference to contextual knowledge except for the “tacit knowledge” of basic cultural “codes of iconic nomination” which allow us to identify objects in images at all.17

The extensional meaning refers to full-fledged entities: objects, persons, actions as constituent parts either of a pro-filmic situation or of a diegetic world. The intensional ‘woman doing the dishes’ can extensionally refer either to the fictional character of Giovanna in her kitchen (fiction attitude), or to the non-professional actor Maria di Fiori during the shoot (documentary attitude).

The distinction between intension and extension goes back to Gottlob Frege’s famous distinction between Sinn (translated as ‘sense’) and Bedeutung (most often rendered as ‘reference,’ sometimes as ‘meaning’ or ‘denotation’ in English). In order to avoid confusion and because I would like to reserve the terms ‘reference’ and ‘referential’ for yet another dimension, I therefore prefer to use Rudolf Carnap’s pair of terms intension and extension for Sinn and Bedeutung respectively, following their common use in analytical philosophy.18 One famous example which Frege used in order to introduce the distinction is the difference between the expressions ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star,’ which have different intensions (one being the star seen in

Fig. 10: Scene from The Roof by Vittorio de Sica.
the morning, the other the star in the evening) but the same extension (that physical object which is also called Venus). The very same logic applies to images, I would argue. Two photographic images of planet Venus can have different intensions (displaying different details of the surface structure, having been recorded from different viewpoints, one looking brighter and smooth and beige, the other appearing redder and hotter) but point to the same extensional entity.

In his original text, Frege was skeptical about fictional extension. For him, sentences such as “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca sound asleep” and the name Odysseus in the same context lack Bedeutung, although they do have Sinn. The literary theorist Lubomír Doležel has characterized “Frege’s doctrine as a semantics of one world with two languages.” Doležel argues that this doctrine results in a counter-intuitive treatment of fictional names such as Odysseus or Hamlet as either empty or self-referential. For him, using a possible world’s theory as framework for his fictional semantics, such names “refer to an individual of a fictional world.” This does not render Frege’s distinction obsolete for fictional texts. According to Doležel, it is perfectly possible to use the “two-language” model to distinguish intensional and extensional structures of meaning for literature as well, the only difference being that in fictional texts the extension does not exist a priori, but is “stipulated” through the creation of a possible world.

What I suggest is thus an adaption of Doležel’s terms from the field of literary studies to that of film, where, mutatis mutandis, the same logic applies. In every film we watch – with the possible exception of purely abstract films such as Arnulf Rainer (Peter Kubelka, 1960) or The Flicker (Tony Conrad, 1965) – we deal with both an intensional and an extensional structure. The former refers to the immediate sense in its audiovisual layout (including camera perspective, lighting, optical filters, editing, sound design etc.), the latter to the ensemble of denoted (pro-filmic or fictional) entities.

According to Doležel, “intension is necessarily linked to texture, to the form (structuring) of its expression,” and the “crucial role of intensional meaning is explained by aesthetic factors;” he even claims that “extensional meaning is aesthetically neutral; only on the level of intension is aesthetically effective meaning achieved.” Gertrud Koch’s similar formulation – “In the aesthetic experience, intensional meanings prevail” – is more cautious, and more accurate. There is no need to exclude the extensional from the realm of aesthetics completely (the choice for a certain layout of the fictional world can have aesthetic reasons and aesthetic effects), but it certainly seems right
to regard the intensional meaning as aesthetically dominant. Furthermore, we can determine the relation of intension and extension as follows:

Although extensions and intensions can and must be differentiated in semantic theory, they are by definition complementary in the production of literary [and filmic, G.K.] meaning. Extensions are available only through intensions and conversely, intensions are fixed by extensions.

We have access to the diegetic situation only through the audiovisual texture and its intension, but our knowledge of the diegesis also disambiguates elements of the intensional structure.

So far, so good. What Meunier’s categories and his discussion of the possible denial of the “substance of reality” of realist fictional films show, however, is that the conceptual couple of intension/extension does not suffice. Consider the example from The Roof again. Intensionally, we perceive a woman doing the dishes and a man in his pajamas taking water from the tap in a black-and-white medium long shot. In the extensional dimension, we can have this intensional ensemble refer either, in the fiction attitude, to the fictional characters of Natale and his sister Giovanna in her kitchen, or, in the home-movie or the documentary attitude, to the non-professional actors Maria di Fiori and Giorgio Listuzzi during the shoot. But in order to understand the concepts of “the person-in-general” or the “denied substance of reality,” it is necessary to consider at least a third dimension of meaning. I suggest calling this the referential meaning – a meaning which is determined by references to the external, non-filmic, or “afilmic” reality.

Imagine you are Giorgio Listuzzi’s sister and you are watching the scene from The Roof in Meunier’s home-movie attitude. You would not care about the fictional story, but would focus on your brother’s gestures, his corporeal attitude, maybe on his way of talking, the timbre of his voice. The reference would then be Meunier’s “person-in-general.” Or, alternatively, but still within the home-movie attitude, you could think of your brother in that very specific situation when he first stood in front of a camera, and perceive a suppressed nervousness in his gestures other viewers remain perfectly unaware of, because you have talked to him shortly before or after the shoot.

A film historian, on the other hand, could proceed from the identical extensional basis – the same profilmic situation – but refer to a different set of objects, e.g. Listuzzi and di Fiori as representatives of non-professional acting in Italy in the 1950s. Or she could analyze the cinematography and the mise en scène, including the lighting, the choreography of the actors,
and the placement of props and realistic details in the room (in implicit comparison with other staging practices common around that time). 29

Referring to these two sets of referent objects is not the standard mode of viewing, however. *The Roof*’s institutional purpose is rather to be watched in the realist sub-mode of the fiction attitude. This means, as Meunier explains, not only to assume Natale’s non-existence (as with every character in every fiction), but, paradoxically, also his existence as “a representative of a number of anonymous beings existing in a certain period and sharing the same problems with him” (p. 98). Alternatively, it is possible to deny the existence of these problems or to claim, like Truffaut, that the real problems are quite different, thus referring to an invented reality and thereby, but implicitly and *ex negativo*, to the real reality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intension</th>
<th>Extension</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>a woman doing the dishes (before putting a child to bed), a man in his pyjamas taking water from the tap, seen in a black-and-white medium-long shot</td>
<td>a) pro-filmic non-professional actors Maria di Fiori and Giorgio Listuzzi during the shoot</td>
<td>a1.1) the “person(s)-in-general” (home-movie attitude 1)</td>
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<td>b) fictional characters Natale and his sister Giovanna in her kitchen</td>
<td>a1.2) the “person(s)-in-a-specific moment” (home-movie attitude 2)</td>
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<td>a2.1) non-professional-actors-in-Italy-in-the-1950s (film historian attitude 1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>a2.2) techniques of mise-en-scène and cinematography (film historian attitude 2)</td>
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<td>b1) the problematic housing situation in Rome in the 1950s (realist fiction attitude)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>b2) an “invented reality” in distinction from the real reality which is referred to <em>ex negativo</em> (skeptic’s fiction attitude)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 11: Intension, extension, and reference in the kitchen scene from *The Roof*. 
The crucial difference between extension and reference is that they imply different ways of looking beyond the given image. In referring to the extensional dimension we merely look ‘through’ the image into the diegetic world or back to the moment of production, treating it as quasi-transparent. But, in the referential dimension, we really look ‘beyond’ it, including thoughts, memories, beliefs, and imaginations of or about persons, things, and social structures that are absent in a much stronger sense.

Conclusion

What I have sketched here are merely the first tentative steps towards a theory of referentiality in cinematic discourse. I will end with two remarks. The first has to do with the relatively undetermined character of what I have called the referential meaning. Looking at the categories intension, extension, and reference in the table above (Fig. 11), we can note that their respective content becomes less clearly fixed when moving from the left to the right column: a scene’s intension is completely determined by the combination of images and sounds (given our reading them ‘figuratively,’ which is something we practically always and automatically do). The extension is less fully determined, because it is possible to have the material refer either to their profilmic origin or to a diegetic universe.

Compared to the referential dimension, however, the extension is still relatively fixed, too. The aforementioned scene from The Roof offers several options for referential meaning. And even if we agree on a standard realist reading and agree that it is clearly about the housing problem in Rome in the 1950s (accurately described or not), one could also claim that the film is more generally about poverty, or about the unjust distribution of wealth: the “opposition of standards of living: bricklayers, who are badly housed themselves, construct buildings for others,” as Raymond Borde and André Bouïssy have put it. But then, why not say it is really about capitalist class society, or even more broadly about stratified forms of sociality as such? How wide should we draw the circle of reference?

This problem of where to set the limits of reference for a given cinematic discourse (ranging from a particular case to a general notion) may be less a theoretical then an empirical one: historical reception studies can help ascertain what sets of references were actualized by critics and other viewers, and detailed film analyses (informed by the film’s discursive context) may discover how the work’s inner organization shapes the probability of referring to this or that topic, of referring to a very specific case or a very general claim.
My second concluding remark has to do with the phenomenological framework of Meunier’s discussion. The reason why Meunier has not spelled out a differentiation of dimensions of meaning similar to the one I have outlined here (even though it does seem to be logically implied) is possibly that this would be at odds with his approach of describing “lived experience” (p. 34). In the lived film experience, intension, extension, and reference are all more or less immediately given. They are not separated phenomenologically. Together, irreducibly intertwined, they constitute the thick and complex texture of meaning in filmic discourses. In terms of the epistemology of film studies this indicates that what we need are fruitful articulations between phenomenological and other, more semiotic approaches.

Notes

3. Alternatively, Meunier speaks of “general” or “major” “types of attitude” (p. 113) or different “forms” attitudes can adopt “according to the modalities of existence of the object under consideration” (p. 118).
7. In The Structures of the Film Experience, Meunier only mentions Lonely Boy (Wolf Koenig and Roman Kroitor, 1963), a quite interesting cinema-vérité style portrayal of the Canadian superstar Paul Anka, and the hyper canonical Nanook of the North (Robert J. Flaherty, 1922).
9. Roger Odin claims that it depends less on the film than on the viewing’s “institutional context” or “space of communication.”
10. Etienne Souriau, The Different Modes of Existence, trans. Erik Beranek and Tim Howles (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2015 [1943]). Whether or not it actually makes sense to postulate different modes of existence is a key debate in contemporary philosophy. For a good introduction, see: Francesco
Berto and Matteo Plebani, *Ontology and Metaontology. A Contemporary Guide* (London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2015). Even if one opts for a Quinean metaontology, which only allows for the (unqualified) existence of “real” entities, the talk of “modes of being,” “fictional worlds,” etc., is still valid in my opinion. It then points to the necessary, and not yet fully achieved, theoretical integration of these phenomena into the “standard view” (and thus to a probably rather complex rephrasing in Quine’s language).

11. Social ontology, such as intended by John Searle and others, could be helpful here.

12. This reasoning corroborates the proposition I have made elsewhere, namely to postulate the “realist reading” as a sub-mode of the fiction attitude. Cf. Guido Kirsten, *Filmischer Realismus* (Marburg: Schüren, 2013), pp. 139-178.


16. ‘Figuratively’ in the sense of Odin, *De la fiction*, pp. 18f.


18. See Berto and Plebani, pp. 41-47.

22. Ibid., p. 16.
26. The diegetic can be thought of without reference to the camera and thus to découpage, whereas “intensional perception is always from a certain perspective” (Koch, ibid.) – and a film’s intensional structure is most often made up of an articulation of a multitude of different perspectives.
27. Doležel, p. 142.
28. Note that my terminology differs from Bordwell’s. For Bordwell, the “referential meaning” denotes “the diegesis, or spatio-temporal world, and [...] an ongoing story.” It covers thus what I have called the extensional dimension. David Bordwell, *Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 8. The term “afilmic” is Souriau’s (“The structure” [forthcoming]).
29. Meunier touches upon this kind of reading when he mentions the “critical attitude which brings about a type of perception that is quite different to that of the naïve spectator.” It is characterized by “a willed distanciation and a taking into consideration of the film as an aesthetic object” – “a more complex attitude whose description warrants its own chapter” (p. 116). To be sure, there are many possible attitudes towards audiovisual texts. Odin mentions, aside from the “private,” the “documentarist,” and the “fictionalizing mode,” an “aesthetic,” an “artistic,” an “energetic,” a “fabulizing,” an “argumentative/persuasive,” and a “spectacular” mode (Odin, “Reflections,” p. 255). He elaborates on these in several of his publications. Cf. Odin, *Les espaces*, passim. And the list does not need to be closed. In a response to an earlier version of this essay, Julian Hanich has suggested to take into account a “medium-conscious attitude” and a “hermeneutic attitude,” none of which seems to be fully synonymous with any of the ones proposed by Odin.
30. In moving images, there are only rare instances of “double-intension.” One of them is called *The Spinning Dancer* (sometimes the silhouette illusion). It was invented in 2003 by the web designer Nobuyuki Kayahara. What is exceptional with this image is that different observers can perceive motion in different directions: some see the animated ballerina spinning clockwise, others counterclockwise, some are even able to switch between the two di-
reactions. This ambiguity concerning the movement exists on the level of intension only, because the images do not relate to any extensional entity, real or fictional. Another example for such a double-intension regarding movement is the optical illusion Train Moves Both Ways, in which a train appears to be going into two opposite directions depending on which part of the image one focuses on: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynx6pb8GVTA (Last accessed: 27 March 2018).


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