Changing Patterns of South Korean Social Movements, 1960s-2010s

Testimony, Firebombs, Lawsuit and Candlelight

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Abstract
This chapter examines the changing patterns of South Korean social movements from the 1960s to the 2010s in terms of their constituents, their communication and mobilization structure, and the way in which they influenced institutional politics. Some long-term trends that require particular attention include: the extension of participants from cultural elites and organized activists to a huge number of ordinary citizens; the shift of the structure of the field of social movements from the inter-organizational ties of committed activists to highly decentralized networks of organizations, communities and individuals; and a change in the major way of affecting institutional politics from the moralized acts of cultural elites through strategic actions by movement organizations to large-scale protests led by networked citizens directly pressuring the actors of institutional politics.

Keywords: democratization, civil society, social movements, protest, contentious

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A3A2075609).

Chiavacci, David, Simona Grano, and Julia Obinger (eds), Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2020
doi: 10.5117/ 9789463723930_CH10
influenced institutional politics. It also traces the historical processes in which new elements of culture and agency are born, develop and combine with pre-existing elements in a particular way to generate new configurations. It is impossible to explore many big topics in social movement research for various movement sectors over a half-century period. Of course, this chapter does not aim to do so. The intent of this chapter is much more moderate, namely, to reconstruct changes in the typical patterns of South Korean social movements based on prior studies and to ask what long-term trends these changes show and what their theoretical and political meanings will be.

The four words in the subtitle of this chapter – ‘testimony,’ ‘firebombs,’ ‘lawsuit,’ and ‘candlelight’ – respectively symbolize the most salient features of the period from the 1960s to the 1970s, from 1980 to the late 1980s, from the 1990s to the mid-2000s, and from the early 2000s to the 2010s. They may be understood in terms of what social movement studies have called ‘collective action repertoires,’ but in this chapter they also refer to the key actors in each period and the particular way in which they affected institutional politics. In the historical context of South Korea, the four symbolic words represent (1) moral accusation by cultural elites committed to social problems, (2) the disruptive protest actions of organized radical groups against dictatorship, (3) the reform movements led by professionalized social movement organizations after the transition to democracy, and (4) the politics of influence through decentralized contentious actions by networked citizens in the twenty-first century.

South Korea is an interesting case for tracing the historical changes in social movements and their relationship to institutional politics. There are three reasons for this. First, South Korea has experienced rapid development and radical changes in political, economic and technological aspects. Accordingly, the subjects of social movements, their mode of action and the source of influence have also experienced distinct changes within a short period of time. Therefore, the South Korean case is appropriate to observe dynamic changes in social movements during the near past. Second, in South Korea, democratization movements played a key role in the resistance to and the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. Moreover, civil society organizations contributed greatly to the reform process since the introduction of democracy in 1987. Therefore, there are many salient examples in South Korean contemporary history for analysing the changes in the way social movements influenced institutional politics. Third, in the twenty-first century, a new form of spontaneous, decentralized and large-scale action of citizens occurred many times in South Korea and often had a grave impact
on the government policies and power relations in party politics. Therefore, a historical consideration of the case of South Korea will help understand the specific characteristics of the most recent trends in social movements and their implications from a global perspective.

Methodologically, the primary interest of this chapter is to describe the most characteristic features of each historical period in the form of ideal types. As is well known, such an ideal type is an ideational construct that highlights, exaggerates, and idealizes certain aspects of a much more complex reality. However, following Simmel (1992: 50-51), this chapter attaches more importance to reconstructing the typical aspects of concrete historical and cultural reality than pursuing conceptual abstractions (like Max Weber). Accordingly, the following pages will not simply present distinctive features of each period one after another, but will try to provide an analysis of the processes and configuration in which the new elements that are specific to the later periods are combined with the traditions in a particular way and the old elements that appeared to have vanished reappear in history and are connected with the new dominant trends.

This chapter will first deal with the period from the early 1960s to the late 1980s under military dictatorship, then the period from the 1990s to the mid-2000s under a democratic regime, and, finally, the period from the early 2000s to the late 2010s in which the latest developments have happened. Conclusively, the notable long-term trends in the historical changes in South Korean social movements and their implications will be discussed.

Protest Movements under Dictatorship

The Emergence of Civil Society from a History of Violence

In 1945, Korea was liberated from the occupation of Japan (1910-1945) and restored its national sovereignty. Since the Republic of Korea was established in the southern area of the Korean Peninsula in 1948, South Korea has been under authoritarian rule for nearly 40 years until the end of dictatorship and the introduction of democracy in 1987. The South Korean people, who had already experienced the rule of the Japanese military-police complex for more than 30 years, continued to live in a history dominated by state violence. The Korean War (1950-1953), the military confrontations under the Cold War order, the two military coups in 1961 and 1979, and the military massacre of the democratization movement in 1980 are merely some among the most widely known events. Under military dictatorship, kidnapping,
torture, confinement, execution, surveillance and threats were not exceptional events but a constant and essential part of daily life.

Despite the long dominance of state violence, the political dynamics of South Korea is not characterized by the sorrow of the victims only, but also by the clash between a ‘strong state and [a] contentious society’ (Koo 1993). In particular, during the four decades from the establishment of the Republic of Korea to the breakdown of the dictatorship, the antagonism between the authoritarian ruling elites and the resistant civil society was one of the biggest cleavages in South Korean politics and society. The civil society of South Korea was born as a response to the authoritarian-bureaucratic state and thus had a resistant character from the beginning.

The April Revolution of 1960 – when hundreds of thousands of people nationwide participated and protested against the corruption and abuse of power of the Rhee Syng-Man regime (1948-1960) – achieved the resignation and exile of Rhee. This event was not only the first case of realizing vertical accountability against political power that had lost its legitimacy, but it also established the typical pattern of South Korean citizen politics in which a concentrated and large-scale citizen protest exerted a strong influence upon state power. Nevertheless, the Second Republic, which was established by a democratic election after the April Revolution, was soon collapsed by a military coup led by General Park Chung-Hee.

The coup of 1961, which launched a long period of dictatorship in South Korea, was not an accidental event, but rather was prepared with a high probability by the nation’s previous history. What Moore (1966) saw as a constellation vulnerable to a fascist path to modernization existed in South Korea. The military not only grew in size during the Korean War, but also belonged to the first to acquire modern bureaucracy, technology and discipline. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, was neither economically nor politically independent, and there was no radical peasantry. Against this historical background, the military rulers could greatly repress citizens’ basic rights and political-cultural pluralism. They suppressed the political expression and participation of the citizens, restricted the actions of the opposition parties and frequently dispatched police to labour disputes. Above all, comprehensive monitoring and terror by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was the most terrible aspect of the military dictatorship. Although in South Korea, unlike in Taiwan under the Kuomintang dictatorship, party competition and regular elections were not denied in principle, everyday control by the state power and political intervention in the electoral process made the operation of the institutions of democratic pluralism virtually impossible.
However, such state violence did not totally suppress all freedom. An independent civil society has grown steadily and in constant confrontation with the authoritarian rulers and their allies within society since the 1960s. What made such a development possible was above all the democratization movements, but a great number of groups that wanted to join and act together beyond the limits allowed by the state contributed to the gradual expansion of civil society. They included religious groups that worked for industrial workers and the urban poor; student movement organizations and communities at the university; autonomous labour movements that have grown since the early 1970s; and the scholars, artists, writers and journalists who played a role in diverse movement sectors. These civil society organizations and their participants became influential actors in Korean politics and society after the collapse of the dictatorship.

Politics of Testimony by Cultural Elites

In South Korea, violent revolts and sporadic resistance have been present since at least the 1950s, but from the 1960s the protest movement made clear its identity and goals by turning into a democratization movement. Paradoxically, under authoritarian rule, the collective action repertoires typical to democratic nations (such as public assemblies, street rallies and press conferences) have become increasingly dominant in South Korea. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s independent civil society forces emerged everywhere the complete control of state violence has failed.

During the Park Chung-Hee regime (1961-1979), several national-level social movement organizations began to grow. In the mid-1960s, the first nationwide student movement organization that emerged was led by Christian students. More importantly, organizations affiliated with religious institutions (such as the Gatoliknodongcheongnyeonhoe (Catholic Youth Workers, JOC), the Protestant Dosisaneopseongyohoe (Urban Industrial Mission, UIM), the Christian Academy, and the YMCA) extended their activities to provide cultural, educational or legal support for workers, peasants and the urban poor. Many of them refrained from making direct political challenges, but their existence had significant political implications and consequences. In particular, they were increasingly monitored and oppressed by the authoritarian regime as they have spread ‘dangerous’ ideas of universal human dignity and equality.

In the early 1970s, Park’s one-man dictatorship was strengthened after the enactment of the so-called Yushin [Revitalizing] Constitution in 1972. What is interesting is that the democratization movement became more active and
politici zed as the repression of human rights and civil liberties became harsher. In contrast to the case of Taiwan, in which middle-class activists with moderate goals played a key role during the period before the end of dictatorship (Ho 2010; Hsiao 1996), the reinforcement of political violence in South Korea during the 1970s resulted in the extension of politicized protesters into a wide range of civil society groups which have focused on charity and gradual social reform.

To explain why the enhanced repression in Korea did not lead to the decline, but rather to the extension, of protest is well beyond the scope of this chapter. What can be said in the present context is that the shared values and organizational collaboration between various movement sectors seem to have been of great significance in maintaining the movements. In the mid-1970s, the oppositional politicians and the leaders of student movements formed the Mincheonghakryeon (Alliance of Democratic Youth and Students), a nationwide solidarity organization for resistance against the dictatorship, and theorized the sammin (three min) ideology declaring political democracy (minju), social justice and equality (minjung) and national independence and inter-Korean reconciliation (minjok) as the highest goals to accomplish. Meanwhile, the religious institutions, too, raised their voices, advocating democracy and human rights. In particular, the Christians – Catholic or Evangelical – contributed hugely to the political and moral influence of democratization movements in general (Chang 1998; Chang and Kim 2007; Kang 2000). For example, the activities of the Jeonguiguhyeonsajedan (Catholic Priests Association for Justice), the Cheonjugyoingweonuiwonhoe (Catholic Human Rights Committee) and the Gidokgyogyohoehyeopuihoe (National Council of Christian Churches in Korea) put a considerable political burden on the dictatorship.

Another important event of the 1970s was the resurgence of the labour movement, which had been nearly destroyed in the course of the Korean War and the militarization of Korean politics. After the suicide by self-immolation of a young worker, Jeon Tae-II, in 1970, an independent labour movement, which will eventually be called Minjunodongundong (Democratic Trade Union Movement), began to establish independent trade unions, defend workers’ rights and oppose the government’s repressive practices. The resistance took place primarily in the light-industry manufacturing sectors (such as textiles, clothing and electronics), which at that time had an important strategic position in South Korea’s industrialization. Workers who worked in such industries – mostly young female workers from rural areas – developed a sense of solidarity and collective identity by sharing the pain of hard work, economic hardship and abuse in the workplace (Koo 2001; Nam 2000; Yoon 2001).
Such changes in the area of religion, universities, politics and factories need to be properly evaluated when we explore the social foundations of South Korean civil society and democracy. Many leaders of the democratization movement of the 1980s, as well as the key symbolic figures in today’s South Korean democracy, have the roots in this period. Despite their significance, social movement organizations in the 1970s were nothing but small and scattered oases within the political desert of South Korean society. It took a long time before they had enough structural and associative power (Wright 2000) to threaten the regime through collective action.

Under such conditions, the democratization movements and other independent civil society forces of the 1960s and 1970s relied heavily on loose networks and declarative acts of prominent dissidents, including oppositional political leaders and cultural elites. Movement organizations gradually accumulated local changes, but their political and social influence at the national level could be amplified only by the act of declarations by a small number of cultural elites, such as religious leaders, professors, teachers, journalists and artists. For that reason, the violence committed by the military and the secret police was often targeted at the leaders with moral influence.

However, the state terror resulted in a paradoxical effect of creating the sacred symbols of innocence and conscience by making the victim a martyr and a prophet. Yeoksa-wa-jeungoen (History and testimony), the title of a book written by Ahn Byung-Mu (1972), one of the theologians who established Minjung theology in South Korea (comparable to the Liberation theology of Latin America), identified the enormous power of the act of testimony in an era of repression, concealment and distortion. However, the power of the testimony of history was soon relativized by the advent of a new history – the Gwangju massacre in May 1980.

Massacre and the Radicalization of Protest Movements

In the late 1970s, as resistance against the dictatorship spread across the country, President Park Chung-Hee seriously considered using violent repression by mobilizing the military. Kim Jae-gyu, the then-chief of the KCIA, opposed it, but when he failed to dissuade Park, he assassinated the president in October 1979. After the death of Park, expectations of a restoration of democracy grew, but the so-called New Army Group (Singunbu) led by General Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, who had been supported by Park Chung-Hee during the 1970s, staged a coup in December. In the spring of 1980, massive protests called the Seoul Spring occurred and a series of
rallies demanding democracy continued nationwide. To put down the challenges, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo mobilized the army and the Special Forces in Gwangju, a capital city in the south-western region of South Korea. As a result, hundreds of people were killed either during the military operation or as a consequence of the wounds and trauma caused by the operation, which is called the Gwangju massacre.

The massacre of 1980 and the defeat of democracy taught a serious lesson for South Korean civil society: The ‘truth’ without the organized power of the people acting together was helpless against the machine gun and the bayonet of the state, and its price was the blood of innocent humans. Documents of the then-protest groups show that they became increasingly convinced that what they needed was the power of the organized people in order to clarify the truth of Gwangju, in order not to repeat the tragedy of Gwangju, and, ultimately, in order to end the rule of violence.

Under the Chun Doo-Hwan regime (1980-1987), the ideological radicalization of the resistant groups and the strengthening of their organizational power have progressed rapidly. Attempts have been made to expand and consolidate popular organizations, and anti-fascist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideas have spread, particularly among university student activists. They systematically and strategically mobilized the action units which were organized hierarchically from the national level through the regional and university level to the individual departments and secret associations at each university.

The activities of the student movements in the 1980s were not always provocative. Given the fact that intelligence agents, police and their collaborators were ubiquitous, an impetuous collective action could be a fatal error exposing organizations and sacrificing activists. However, once they decided to act, the act was usually highly disruptive. In an environment in which no political expression of dissent was tolerated, students used sudden assemblies, demonstrations and occupations as the means of action to inform the people and the world of the voice of resistance. They were also armed with firebombs and iron pipes to extend the duration of demonstration once the police arrived to stop them.

It is true that violent actions can be detrimental to social movements when they are negatively framed by mass media (Gamson 1990), but, under certain circumstances, disruptive actions can be effective when the pains and claims of the powerless are so systematically repressed that they are not delivered to the public (Piven and Cloward 1977). South Korean student activists wanted to bring out the truth of the massacre and the voices against dictatorship to the ordinary citizens of their country and to the outside
world, but the media was being strictly controlled by the state. They chose to attract attention from the public and the foreign media by highly provocative actions. So, the firebombs became the symbol of the South Korean student movements of the 1980s.

The transition of South Korean democratization movements from the pastors and intellectuals of the early days to the young and much more radical figures of student fighters throwing firebombs and occupying government buildings was a drastic change. However, it would be a mistake to think that the subjects of the democratization movements of the 1970s were simply replaced by the new generations. In reality, they both continued their fight alongside each other and were closely connected to each other organizationally and personally. The Minjuheonbeopjaengchui Gukminundongbonbu (Alliance of People's Movements for a Democratic Constitution), a coalition organization that played a leading role in the successful democratic uprising in June 1987, was launched at historic Myeongdong Cathedral and was composed of respected spiritual leaders who led the resistance movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Moral authority and political disruption met and amplified their power to go beyond the violence of the dictatorial state.

Reform Movements after the End of Dictatorship

The Differentiation of Civil Society under Democracy

In June 1987, a democratic uprising involving more than two million people nationwide took place. The scale of the protests was incomparably greater than that of 1979-1980, and above all, white-collar, middle-class citizens were at the forefront of resistance. Because of the unprecedented size and intensity of the protest, the military had to abandon their original plan to use violent repression like in Gwangju in 1980 to extend the regime and eventually promised to introduce a democratic system, including direct presidential election, in response to citizens' demands. It was the end of decades of dictatorship and the beginning of a protracted process of democratization in South Korea.

After the end of the authoritarian regime, the political opportunities of civil society organizations gradually expanded. The oppression of public authorities over the contentious claim making by civil society organizations was weakened. In addition, the attitudes of the institutional sectors such as the government, political parties, enterprises, and the press became more open and cooperative to communication with civil society. Meanwhile, civil
society organizations participated in advisory activities for the government, played a leading role in the legislation in the National Assembly, encouraged corporate social responsibility, and initiated cooperation with the mainstream media. This kind of change was particularly remarkable during the period from 1998 to 2007 under President Kim Dae-Jung, a symbolic figure of the democratization movements in Asia, and President Roh Moo-Hyun, a former human rights lawyer.

However, even after the democratic transition, the expansion of civil liberties and rights was limited and selective. Moreover, the confrontational oppression-resistance relationship between the state and civil society did not disappear. In the first free election of 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, one of the military bosses, was elected as president. The first democratically elected government showed a change both in domestic and foreign policies, but soon reinforced the suppression of political opposition and labour disputes. Although Kim Young-Sam, a former democratic dissident, was elected as the first civilian president in 1992, his election victory was a consequence of the much criticized coalition of his Unified Democratic Party with the Democratic Justice Party, which was a successor party organized by the former dictators.

In these limited and ambiguous democratization processes, the political environment of social movements varied greatly, depending on the issues and the movement sectors. The freedom of expression, of the press, of thought and association of the middle classes expanded considerably, but the organization and collective action of the lower classes were systematically controlled. Class-based movements, such as the labour and peasant movements, were still under surveillance and suppression by state power and corporations. In response to this situation, trade unions that inherited the tradition of the Democratic Trade Union Movement of the 1970s and 1980s formed the Jeonnohyeop (National Council of Trade Unions) in 1990 to continue a militant trade union movement. In 1995, the Minjunochong (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions), based upon the powerful trade unions of big conglomerates like Hyundai, was established.

It is true that the South Korean workers’ organizations acted more frequently and radically than in other countries of East Asia during the 1990s (Liu 2005). However, the labour movements continued to decline after the late 1990s. The unionization rates rose for a short period of time from 1987 to 1989, but after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, fell to less than 10% as the number of irregular workers increased and the labour market segmentation deepened. Organized workers could play a limited role in political and social reforms and had great difficulty in being recognized as representatives of
the entire working class. Militant workers’ struggles in South Korea were sometimes referred to as an example of ‘social movement unionism,’ but such a view may make a mistake of ‘romanticizing’ the more complex reality of the South Korean labour movements (Park 2007).

On the other side, a new wave of reform movements relying on more moderate and institutionalized means of action and seeking support from and the participation of a broader spectrum of citizens grew rapidly during the same period. Participants in these movements often referred to themselves as simin undong (citizens’ movements) in a sense distinguished from minjung undong (class-based movements). The fact that the conceptual distinction between simin undong and minjung undong became increasingly popular in the first half of the 1990s was a sign showing that the South Korean social movements were rapidly differentiating under democracy. The differences that have remained latent under the big slogans such as ‘democratization,’ ‘anti-dictatorship,’ and ‘anti-fascism’ came to the surface. Such differences were embodied in different organizations and inter-organizational ties that shared the movement goals, problem definition, strategies and means of action.

The actual relationship between the differentiated sectors was, however, far more complex than the conceptual division. On the one hand, some citizens’ movements ruled out class issues definitely and refused to cooperate with organizations with class-specific goals. In such a context, the distinction between ‘legal, popular, and peaceful citizens’ movements’ versus ‘illegal, radical, and violent class-oriented movements’ served as a linguistic device for stigmatizing the class-based movements. Pastor Seo Kyung-Suk, who first presented this conceptual division in a systematic form, became a leader of New Rights in the 2000s. On the other hand, many of those who founded and led progressive citizens’ movements were participants in the democratization movement and the radical student movements of the 1980s, and they actively cooperated with workers’ organizations throughout the 1990s (Kim 2006: 103-104). Progressive citizens’ movements had a significant impact on national policy reforms in the area of economic, labour and social policies. Moreover, a number of local and community-based organizations for social services and support of socially disadvantaged people emerged in the name of citizens’ movements.

The Citizens’ Movements: Their Influence and Its Dark Side

The citizens’ movements have been active in various fields of reform, including political democratization, economic reform, social welfare, environment,
women, education, peace, human rights and consumer rights. Their activities in these sectors partially overlapped with those of other movement groups of the same or earlier period, which were not called ‘citizens’ movements.’ Yet the citizens’ movements had an orientation and identity to distinguish themselves from democratization movements during the authoritarian era and the minjung movements of the 1990s. First, in terms of the ideology of movements, they pursued solidarity in diversity, respecting the differences of movement ideologies within a broad consensus of values instead of requiring ideological homogeneity among the movement sectors and organizations. Second, in terms of the goals of movements, they emphasized concrete reform of law, institutions and practices, although they, too, emphasized the need for fundamental changes in social structure. Third, they would not directly defend particular class interests but sought broad support for reform by means of a kind of hegemonic strategy of connecting particular reform agendas with universalistic appeals to the ‘common good’ or the ‘public good.’

The citizens’ movements played a decisive role in a wide range of reform activity, including the monitoring of the government and the parliament; advancements in political institutions; economic democratization; protection of human rights; expansion of civil liberties; improvement in gender equality; and the introduction of environmental policy paradigms. In particular, organizations that had rich human, organizational and financial resources replaced many of the roles which are normally expected of government and political parties in a representative democracy. The South Korean political parties were lacking the ability to produce and legislate new policies under a democratic system because they could not develop properly during the long period of dictatorship. Thus, competent leaders of the citizens’ movements and scholars, lawyers and members of other expert groups associated with the movement organizations greatly contributed to legal and institutional reforms in many sectors (Lee and Park 2009). In this sense, they performed a ‘proxy representation’ function, replacing the less developed party politics (Cho 2000: 286).

The significance of the citizens’ movements in the overall reform processes after the end of dictatorship has to do with the tradition of strong commitment of South Korean civil society to national politics. In contrast to many Japanese NGOs focusing on local activities, for example, many civil society organizations in South Korea have been highly politicized and interested in influencing politics and policy at the national level (Lee and Arrington 2008). The major examples of the 1990s citizens movements are the Gyeongsilryeon (Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice), founded in 1989,
and the Chamyeoyeondae (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), founded in 1994. They grew into a ‘comprehensive citizens’ movement’ (Cho 2000; Kim 2006), which had a very broad range of areas of activity, including economic, labour, welfare and political reform and the monitoring of administrative, legislative and judicial institutions. In addition, nationwide movement organizations concentrating on specific sectors, such as the Yeoseongdancheyeonhap (Korean Women's Association United), founded in 1987, and the Hwangyeongyeonhap (Korean Federation for Environmental Movements), founded in 1993, provided innovative ideas, knowledge and policy contents to the government, political parties and the media.

In terms of means of action, their activities centred on solving problems and providing realizable alternatives through institutionalized channels, such as the court, political parties, the government and the media. Although they also used conventional means of action, such as rallies and demonstrations, for putting public pressure on institutional actors, such campaigns as such were not of essential importance within their overall strategic scheme. In response to such changes in behaviour, the key actors of the movement have also changed. In addition to experienced leaders and fully employed activists of the movement organizations, members of expert groups, including lawyers, scholars, and employees of various non-profit research institutions, have played a crucial role. In contrast, most of the members and sympathizers of the movements normally contributed either by paying their dues, making donations or occasionally volunteering in the campaigns.

The Institutionalization of Social Movements and Its Consequences

The changes mentioned above imply that the institutionalization of social movements has been progressing in South Korea in many respects since the 1990s. Institutionalization of social movements has two aspects. If one is a growing recognition and acceptance of social movements by the institutional sectors of politics and society, the other is that the movement actors tend to resort to institutionally established routines. In South Korea since the 1990s, social movements have gradually gained recognition as a ‘normal’ component of society, while at the same time favouring institutionalized goals and means of action. These trends may be interpreted as an aspect of the tendency towards a ‘social movement society’ (Neidhardt and Rucht 1993; Meyer and Tarrow 1998b).

There were some typical ways of mobilizing institutional channels by the citizens’ movements: raising issues and promoting alternatives through
the support of friendly media; introducing new policies or reforming old institutions in cooperation with political parties and politicians in the parliament; and providing policy contents to the bureaucrats and putting pressure for acceptance, sometimes in consultation with high-ranked officials in the presidential office and the government ministries. The movement organizations often combined such constructive activities with offensives against the veto forces whom they blamed for being responsible for the problem and resisting the reform. For that aim, the essential means of action that has become increasingly important was the lawsuit. The citizens’ organizations exploited the legal disputes to attract popular support and to draw responses from politicians while making an issue of various problems, such as corruption, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, irregularity and unconstitutionality.

The radical shift of action repertoires by the citizens’ movements is evident, but it does not necessarily mean that the institutionalized action methods were always quantitatively dominant. According to Jung (2011) and Kim (2009a), the frequency of non-institutional protest events such as street demonstration increased during the period of the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1998), declined under President Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003), and rose again under the Roh Moo-Hyun government (2003-2008). Notwithstanding such ambiguities in the quantitative trends, it seems to be clear that the institutionalized means of action of the citizens’ movement were the most effective in achieving important reforms at this time. Additionally, in many cases, popular actions (such as public assemblies, street rallies and signature campaigns) have eventually been linked to activities in and with the government, the parliament, the media and the courts.

However, the process of professionalization and institutionalization as described above did not only imply progress in social movements, but also caused considerable problems inside the movements and triggered new sorts of conflict. First, as the experienced activists and expert groups came to hold key positions in the movements, ordinary citizens became increasingly marginalized in the planning and performance of the movements. The fact that such processes of institutionalization involve both the aspect of inclusion and that of marginalization (Meyer and Tarrow 1998a: 21) became a source of the emergence of new dynamics of change. Second, as the progressive movement organizations, particularly the big ones, formed a reform alliance with the liberal regime since the late 1990s, the citizens’ trust in the civil society groups began to decline (Kim 2009b). While leaders of the citizens’ movements often prioritized the achievement of reform by any means, the scepticism about their political independence has grown as
many movement figures were appointed as high-ranking officials and played important roles in the policymaking of the government (Kim 2006: 118).

Third, under the liberal regime, the so-called New Right movements emerged. Anti-communist right-wing groups became active, leading to the intensification of ideological and political confrontation ‘within’ civil society in the place of the conventional cleavage of ‘the state versus civil society.’ The right-wing groups promulgated diverse ideologies and reform visions stretching from belligerent anti-leftist extremism to radical market liberalism, but they collaborated in their struggle against the liberal-progressive parties and civil society forces. They emerged as a reaction to the crisis of the conservative parties in the mid-2000s after a series of electoral success of the progressives and, later, could exert significant influence over the process of the conservative turn in politics and public opinion from the late 2000s (Shin 2015).

As such, the institutionalization of the citizens’ movements not only has resulted in many significant reforms, but also created problems that later turned out to be a cause of transformation in the contentious politics of South Korea. Actually, more and more citizens in the 2000s wanted to distance themselves from every political party and influential organization of civil society and, eventually, created an entirely new and independent way of conducting contentious politics. The symbol of such a change was the ‘candlelight.’

Citizen Politics in the Twenty-first Century

From Organizational to Networked Social Movements

In the previous pages, we saw that since the 1990s, professionalized civil society organizations have achieved reform goals through institutionalized means, whereas the democratic movements of the 1980s have continued to conflict with the authoritarian state through their provocative actions. The two periods are sharply contrasted not only in terms of the environment of the social movement, but also of the movement participants’ recognition of reality, their goals and modes of action, and the institutional recognition. What is common to them, however, is that ‘organizations’ and their strategies have played a decisive role, even if the support of the unorganized citizens were essential to the success of the movement. Still in the 1990s, many of the movement activists called them ‘mass,’ that is, an object of conscientization, persuasion and mobilization.
This situation has changed completely since the early 2000s. The South Korea of the twenty-first century saw a sudden rise and spread of spontaneous and decentralized collective actions by loosely connected individuals and communities, which Manuel Castels (2012) called ‘networked social movements.’ A new form of protest called *chotbuljiphoe* (candlelight protest) symbolizes this trend: The gathering of a great number of citizens spreads rapidly by independent communication, networking and coordination; participants share information and exchange opinions via the internet and smartphones; and they plan their actions, consult about action methods, and recruit further participants without connection with political parties or movement organizations; the constituents are greatly diversified in terms of their age, sex, occupation and prior experience of protest action.

Over the past few years, such new forms of resistance have emerged and spread in many parts of the world. Elements that social movement researchers have often considered as mutually exclusive coexisted in these new protests (consciousness and spontaneity, collectivity and individuality, online communication and offline gatherings) and were combined in various ways in one and the same movement. The Arab Spring of 2010-2011, Spain’s movement of the *indignados* from 2011, the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the United States in 2011, the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014 are well-known examples. New citizen politics in South Korea shares the contexts and characteristics of these global trends in many respects.

What is particularly interesting in the case of Korea is that not only did large-scale protest actions involving millions of people take place repeatedly within a short period of time, but also in many cases they have had a strong and immediate impact on government action, election politics and power relations at the national level. Although participants pursued independence from all institutional political forces and ostensibly claimed to be ‘non-political,’ their actions were in reality targeted at highly political issues and aimed at exercising influence upon national politics. They were more interested in institutional politics and more active in institutionalized forms of political participation such as voting than non-participants (Lee 2009).

Obviously, the form of the candlelight vigil itself is not new at all. It not only has a long history in religious rituals, but also has been a popular form of gathering in the modern social movements, such as in the German peace movement and the Indian women’s movement. It was also often used by religious groups in the South Korean democratization movements until the 1980s. The novelty of the Korean candlelight protests in the twenty-first century is that individual citizens connected by the internet and the SNS
could amplify their issues and increase the number of protest participants extremely rapidly; effectively combine spectacular physical gatherings and online communications; and exert immediate political pressure on the government and political parties. For example, the candlelight protest in 2004 led to a surprising election victory of the reform-oriented party and thus completely changed the power relations in the state; the protest in 2008 blocked the neoliberal policy lines of the newly formed conservative administration; and the protest in 2016-2017 succeeded in impeaching the president, who was accused of corruption and power abuse in a peaceful and constitutional way.

The Birth, Growth and Success of Candlelight Protests, 2002-2017

We can identify the exact date when the 'candlelight protest' emerged as a term referring to a new form of collective political expression of citizens in South Korea. On 27 November 2002, a citizen suggested on the internet that a small memorial meeting be held in front of Seoul Metropolitan City Hall. In three days, a small number of citizens gathered with candles in their hands. It was a candlelight vigil to commemorate the two middle school girls who died by being hit by an armoured vehicle of the US army stationed in South Korea in June of that year. This incident was considered a mere accident at the time and did not attract public attention at all. However, the problem began with the fact that the South Korean court did not have jurisdiction over the case under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and South Korea. In November of that year, the two US soldiers responsible for the accident were acquitted in the US military court and returned to the United States. This was a trigger. The size of candlelight vigils increased rapidly in a few weeks and exceeded 100,000 in mid-December. Citizens communicated on the internet and held a candlelight vigil every weekend, asking for the revision of the SOFA and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The rise of candlelight vigils has had a significant impact on the presidential election held in late December. Former human rights lawyer Roh Moo-Hyun, who was but a peripheral figure in Korean politics, won a dramatic victory in the election.

The political influence of the candlelight protest was confirmed again just two years later. President Roh Moo-Hyun, who had a strong reform tendency, repeatedly clashed with established politicians and political parties after his inauguration, and the National Assembly impeached him for violating political neutrality in March 2004. About 70% of the citizens
opposed impeachment, according to several polls by the time, and some of them directly expressed their opinions, continuing candlelight vigils and street marches at the city centre of Seoul. The protest in 2004 were not only larger than in 2002, but also had a more direct political impact. The Yeollin Woori Party, which was a small party supporting President Roh, won a majority of seats in the general election held in April when the candlelight protests were underway. In May of that year, the Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment.

Since 2008, as the conservative Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye governments have regressed to quasi-authoritarian politics, the candlelight protests have grown remarkably in size, frequency and intensity. Lee Myung-Bak, who was one of the bosses of Hyundae conglomerate, took office in February 2008. The candlelight protests, which lasted about four months from spring to summer, brought about a new stage in the development of South Korean social movements in the twenty-first century. The protest was triggered by the conclusion of the US-Korea Agreement on the Import of US Beef Products in Korea in April of that year. Many South Koreans worried about mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), because the agreement allowed the import of the SRMs (specified risk materials). Surely, there are similar cases of protest related to anxiety about mad cow disease in other countries (Ho and Hong 2012; Lewis and Tyshenko 2009; Setbon et al. 2005). However, the issue in Korea was highly political in nature.

Many South Koreans blamed the Lee Myung-Bak administration not only for ignoring the health rights of the people, but above all for placing no importance on public opinion. The key word in the initial phase of the protest was ‘communication.’ The major target of blame was the government’s unilateral policy decision and implementation without efforts to communicate with citizens and to reflect the majority opinion of the public. The issue soon expanded into a heated debate over the aggressive neoliberal policies of the new government. The key issues of the protest were often summarized as ‘5+1,’ namely: large-scale construction projects by the government, privatization of the public sector, privatization of medical services, reduction of public support for education, government control of broadcasting, and ‘beef.’ The candlelight protest in 2008 is often called the ‘beef protest,’ but, in reality, it was the opposition to political re-authoritarianization and neoliberalization that intensified and politicized the protest.

In terms of scale, the protest that started with a relatively small number of citizens in April 2008 expanded very rapidly, reaching an estimated 0.6 million in mid-June. This scale was well above the candlelight vigils in 2002 and 2004. What is surprising in terms of duration is the fact that even
though the mobilization by movement organizations has played a minimal role, the protest continued for about four months with tens of thousands of participants on average. The participants maintained the protests by the online-street spiral, in which they linked online communication to the offline protests while sharing online the experience of their offline gatherings (Lee et al. 2010).

If in the first candlelight vigils of the early 2000s, tensions between movement organizations and networked individuals became visible even though the former still played a role, the candlelight vigils in 2008 was an event in which the latter definitely became the new ‘leaderless’ leader of the social movement in South Korea (Jho 2009). The majority of participants were citizens with little or no prior experience of protest; their age, sex and occupation were much more diversified than in the past. The active participation of the youth, housewives and young couples with their children, who have been rare in places of political rallies in the past, attracted much attention. Online communities with millions of members, which were usually non-political in nature, suddenly turned into spaces of political debate and strategic discussion. The protest of 2008 could not bring about any substantial change in party politics because it took place right after the conservatives won a victory in the presidential and parliamentary election. Nevertheless, the Lee administration had to abandon many important policy intentions, such as the reduction of public welfare and the privatization of the water supply, electricity, and medical services.

After the decline of the protest in 2008, large-scale candlelight protests continued addressing various issues, including police violence, political control of broadcasting, educational policy and the intervention of intelligence agency in the presidential election. It was, above all, the candlelight protests in 2016-2017 for the impeachment of the then-President Park Geun-Hye that showed the political influence of the new citizens’ activism in the most dramatic way. Park Geun-Hye, daughter of former dictator Park Chung-Hee, was elected president in December 2012, and the former key figures of the authoritarian rule of the 1970s returned to the highest positions of the government. The Park administration restricted freedom of expression, media, assembly and demonstration. Moreover, suspicions had been raised repeatedly that the president and high-ranked officials were involved in corruption and that the president’s private friends exerted a huge influence on the government’s decisions. However, the presidential office kept major state institutions under its control, including prosecutors, police and the judiciary, while the opposition parties lacked sufficient political resources. It was the candlelight protest that started to bring a change to this situation.
The protest began on 29 October 2016, and lasted until 11 March 2017, a day after the Constitutional Court’s final approval of the impeachment. The cumulative number of participants exceeded seventeen million. On 26 November 2016, when the protest reached its peak, more than two million people participated nationwide. Every Saturday, about 20 times, hundreds of thousands of citizens gathered in the centre of Seoul to demand the resignation or impeachment of the president, criticizing abuses of power, political corruption and the privatization of state power. Not unlike the candlelight vigils over the past decade, the participants were very diverse in respect of their age, sex and occupation; most of them communicated and decided to participate independently of political parties and movement organizations. The protest was peaceful and orderly. The police reported that there was not a single incident of violence and not one arrest during the four months. By demonstrating such peace and order, the participants wanted to gain friendly media coverage and broad public support. In this way, they were also able to exert maximal pressure on the legislators and the government.

On 3 December 2016, the National Assembly voted 234 to 56 in favour of impeaching President Park for five major reasons: violation of the constitutional principle of people’s sovereignty and rule of law; abuse of presidential power; violation of the duty to protect the right to life; violation of criminal law such as bribery; and violation of free speech. On 10 March 2017, the Constitutional Court unanimously approved the impeachment proposal and dismissed President Park. The reasons for impeachment were the violation of the people’s sovereignty and the rule of law, as well as the abuse of presidential power. A presidential election was held within 60 days after the impeachment decision and a new government came into being. The candlelight protest showed a typical example of ‘politics of influence’ promoting the work of democratic-constitutional institutions through powerful but self-limiting actions from below.

Submerged Networks and the Encounter of Histories

New subjects of political activism in South Korea, symbolized by the ‘candlelight,’ show a tendency to come onto the public stage when they find it necessary to act about an issue and return to their everyday life after the decline of the protest waves, instead of constantly committing themselves to movement organizations or establishing a new one. This kind of pendulum movement between appearance and disappearance of acting citizens in South Korean politics continued for the first two decades of the twenty-first
century. The retreat of the citizens from contentious politics does not imply here ‘exit’ as opposed to ‘voice,’ to borrow from Albert Hirschman’s concepts (Hirschman 1970).

Today, the private world of the citizens includes as its indispensable component a variety of loose but broad communication networks connected by online public spheres, internet communities and the SNS. Information, knowledge, opinions and communication about public issues are inherent in the private lives of individuals. In this sense, it would be accurate to say that the citizens holding the candles did not disappear, but rather that they ‘submerged’ when they left the political space. For they are not isolated individuals, but part of what Alberto Melucci called the ‘submerged networks’ (Melucci 1989), and these dispersed and fragmented forces in everyday life may suddenly ‘emerge’ at the centre of politics in a moment when they encounter specific triggering events. The characteristics of civil society that Charles Taylor described as ‘amphibian’ (Taylor 1990) now are being generalized among the citizens.

The reason why the conflict between a ‘strong state and [a] strong civil society’ (Oh 2012) has intensified in South Korea in the twenty-first century can be found in the fact that the citizens’ desire and capacity for political participation have become stronger, whereas institutional politics was still dominated by old behavioural patterns or even regressed into re-authoritarianization. In particular, the fact that the Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye administrations have not just pursued conservatism in policy, but turned the nations’ democracy and rule of law backward, has had two significant consequences for South Korean civil society. One is the politicization of a widespread citizenry which came to more consciously attach value to democracy and the rule of law after experiencing the violation of them. The other is that the newly politicized citizens encountered in the process of political participation the former participants of the democratization movements of the prior periods and their symbols, rituals, protest cultures and narratives of their experience of violence and resistance against it.

Just as in 1987 the symbolic figures of the democratization movements of the 1970s fought together with the citizens of younger generations who filled the square in front of Seoul Metropolitan City Hall, the leaders of the movements that have grown since the 1990s formed the Bisanggukmin-haengdong (People’s Emergency Action for Park’s Resignation) to support the citizens who stood in the same place in 2016-2017. Although such experienced activists could not claim to be leaders of the protest like in the 1990s, they managed to find their role within a decentralized movement ecology of the twenty-first century. Moreover, during the candlelight protests, not only
was the story of Park Geun-Hye's abuse of power and corruption told, but accounts of the violence committed by the state under the dictatorship and the sacrifices of those who resisted it were passed on to the younger generations and to the older citizens who had not been much interested in politics and history. They learned slogans, poems, protest songs and the lived experiences of the 1970s and 1980s, while at the same time the former dissidents learned new cultures and ways of communication. As such, social movements in South Korea underwent a great change during the past half century, but, at the same time, different histories met each other in every new present and created a new mosaic.

Discussion and Conclusion

The history of South Korean civil society and social movements for decades from the 1960s to the 2010s shows some long-term trends.

The first one is a tendency of the expansion of movement participants. The subjects of South Korean social movements have been continuously widened from a small number of cultural elites and organized student activists who led the protest movements in the 1970s and 1980s; through an increasing number of professional movement organizations that grew under democracy during the 1990s; to millions of ‘candlelight citizens’ in the twenty-first century who communicate, network, mobilize and strategize independently. Most recently, the trend towards the political activism of citizens and the changes in the logic of institutional politics, which Ulrich Beck had predicted in the 1980s (Beck 1986), are becoming more and more salient and are being generalized across ideological, generational, occupational and gender differences.

Here we need to specify the exact nature of this change. First of all, the individualization of the unit of action does not necessarily suggest the decline of associational life. In the case of South Korea, the participants of the candlelight protests were more frequently affiliated in voluntary associations and more active in voting behaviour than non-participants. However, it is noticeable that while on the whole, the movement participation is becoming normal, the specifically class-based movements are continuing to shrink. The growing inequalities in many aspects after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, including income, employment and assets, are becoming important political agenda in electoral competition and party politics, but mobilization from below on the issues of inequality are not led primarily by class organizations such as trade unions, but by a broad network of civil
society communities and associations. Last but not least, the generalization of political activism is ambivalent from a normative point of view. Not only actions pursuing universalistic values but also those opposing them are now emerging and spreading rapidly.

The second trend is that the structure of the field of social movements has moved from the simple coexistence of a limited number of weakly organized actors until the 1970s; through a centralized system of organizations and inter-organizational ties in the 1980s; to a set of loose networks of diverse organizations and inter-organizational networks in the 1990s; and, finally, to a highly decentralized field within which a huge number of social networks, communities and individuals communicate and interact.

Until the 1970s, progressive religious groups, student movements, democratic dissidents and the labour movements were still poorly organized and the connection between the groups was not solid. After the military massacre of 1980, the democratization movements considerably reinforced their organizational capacity and a nationwide structure of solidarity. After the end of dictatorship, the field of social movements has become diversified in terms of ideology, goals, and issues. From the early 2000s, individual citizens, non-movement communities and social networks gained great importance in the rise, spread and success of contentious actions. These recent changes drastically increased the complexity of the movement ecology and reduced the predictability and strategic manageability of the progress of mobilization.

Finally, the third trend is a change in the way social movements and protest actions affect institutional politics. South Korean citizens could move politics and society: (1) until the 1970s, by a strongly moralized act of cultural elites testifying the repressed ‘truth,’ e.g. democracy, equality, or human dignity; (2) then, by disruptive actions of radical activists of the 1980s to attract the attention of the public and to impose political burden over the dictators; (3) after the introduction of democracy in 1987, by disputes, negotiations and cooperation of the civil society organizations with the institutional sectors like the government, politicians, media and the court; and, finally, (4) after the considerable expansion of citizenship under democracy during the 1990s and 2000s, by means of massive self-mobilization of individual citizens and their power of influencing public opinion and, thereby, putting substantial political pressure on the government and political parties.

The most recent changes in South Korea may be interpreted, to borrow from Reinhard Bendix (1977), as a premature decline of ‘functional representation’ and the rapid rise of political dynamics based on ‘plebiscitarian principle,’ in which the state and individuals face each other without allowing the
intervention of the institutionalized intermediary channels. This specific configuration generates a particular ambiguity in the meaning of recent upsurges in ‘people power.’ During the decades of authoritarian rule, South Koreans did not have the opportunity of expanding their citizenship. The end of dictatorship in 1987 could have brought substantial change in this respect, but while the rights of individuals have been improved gradually, organized civil society remained extremely underdeveloped for various reasons that cannot be discussed further here. Under such historical conditions, Korean citizens in the twenty-first century have created a unique methodology of quickly collectivizing themselves without the hard work of organization and instantly influencing powerful actors without changing the deeper power structure.

The recent development of South Korean social movements – the expansion of the participants, the decentralization of the field and the increasing power of spontaneous protests – suggests both new democratic potentials and the persistence of old problems. Therefore, we may be able to expect a sustainable progress towards the social ideals that can be justified normatively only by deliberately dealing with such ambivalence.

I will conclude this chapter by briefly mentioning the implications that the transformations of South Korean civil society and social movements described here have had for the broader relationships between the state and civil society in the nation – although a detailed discussion on this issue goes well beyond the goals and scope of this chapter.

As mentioned in the introduction, autonomous actors of South Korean civil society have developed their organizations, collective identities and political consciousness in the process of resistance to the authoritarian state. Therefore, scholars have characterized the state-society relationship in South Korea until the late 1980s by conceptual schemes such as ‘strong state versus contentious civil society’ or ‘strong state versus strong civil society’ (Koo 1993; Oh 2012). Actually, it seems clear that South Korea’s state-society relationship did not take the form of ‘strong societies, weak states’ (Migdal 1988), which was characteristic of many developing countries. However, we need to recognize the relationship between the state and civil society in Korea on the basis of a more differentiated conceptualization about what ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ of the state and civil society mean.

The literature on the power of the state over society has illuminated the diverse aspects of state capacity, including coercive, administrative, legislative and extractive capacities and the capability of collaborating with societal actors to implement public goals (Evans et al. 1985; Hall 1986; Mann 1993; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1990). During the period of dictatorship, the South Korean state certainly had a powerful coercive capacity, but that was
not the whole story. During this period, not only has the administrative
capacity of the South Korea government greatly expanded, but also the
relationship between the state bureaucracy and the fast-growing economy
has become closer. South Korea’s authoritarian-developmental state had
strong transformative capacities to implement its growth-oriented national

On the other hand, due to the suppression of democracy, the legislative and
democratic regulatory capacity of political parties and the state bureaucracy
remained extremely low, while the growth-centred state has enhanced its
taxation capacity, which is one of the most important preconditions for the
redistributive function of the modern state, only to a limited extent. In that
sense, South Korea’s state has long been strong in some respects but weak
in others. To borrow from the well-known conceptual pairs elaborated by
Michael Mann (1988, 1993), it was not just a ‘despotic’ state, but had many
limitations in developing the ‘infrastructural’ capacities to penetrate into
society in a collaborative relationship with society.

Civil society actors in South Korea, who have confronted a state that
possessed powerful coercive and administrative capacities but lacked demo-
cratic and redistributive capabilities, pursued values such as democracy and
human rights, economic equality and justice, and reconciliation between
the two Koreas. They were struggling to realize ‘heterodox’ (Eisenstadt
1998) projects of social and political development, which were obviously
antithetical to the authoritarian, growth-oriented and anti-North Korean
orientation of the political centre. Furthermore, they continued to use
strategies and action methods that substantially threatened and challenged
political power. For these reasons, the relationship between the public
authorities and civil society actors was essentially conflict-ridden throughout
the whole periods under the authoritarian regime.

Since the 1990s, the relationship between the state and civil society in
South Korea has undergone qualitative changes in many respects, although
the legacies of the civil society actors’ distrust of and opposition to the state
still are vital. Three changes seem to have particular significance.

The first one is the differentiation and the growing complexity of the
institutional domains of both the state and civil society. As the structure of
the state and civil society has become more plural, a complex relationship
has developed between diverse actors of the state and party politics, on the
one side, and equally variegated actors in civil society, on the other side. Thus,
the dichotomy of ‘the state versus civil society’ has been relativized in its
significance. Second, the interplay between institutional politics and social
movements has brought about both conflict and cooperation. Challengers
of social movements still are criticizing governments and political parties and urged change, but as the political environment has become more open under democratic system, more opportunities have been given to social movements to cooperate and negotiate with actors in institutional politics. The third change is the increasing interpenetration between the state and civil society. On the one hand, civil society leaders, agendas and policy proposals are increasingly coming into the administrative and legislative institutions of the state. On the other hand, the field of civil society tends to be divided along the lines of cleavages in the institutional politics. As a result, there emerged a complex constellation of conflicts and alliances between political and civil society actors having various interests and ideas.

In short, if the relationship between the state and civil society in South Korea was clearly oppositional and confrontational during the decades from the 1960s to the 1980s, their new relationship during the subsequent decades from the 1990s to the 2010s is characterized by increasing complexity and contingency. In response to such changes, the South Korean state and civil society now have the task of innovating their mutual relationships by developing new capacities corresponding to the new environments. The South Korean state has to find ways of achieving public goals by raising administrative efficiency, strengthening capacities of democratic regulation and institutionalizing the participation of citizens in public issues. Meanwhile, civil society actors should not be contented with criticizing the government and politicians, but have to make more efforts to create what Amitai Etzioni (1968) has called ‘the active society,’ in which citizens are aware of the common purpose, are committed to activities for actualizing those purposes and potent in their capacity to create and maintain such a social order. The question of how to fulfil these demanding tasks will continue to be of importance in South Korea in the future.

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