Introduction

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Sinocentric Confucian genealogies and the forgotten Japanese contribution to modern Confucianism

In the late 1980s, the Chinese philosopher Yu Ying-shih coined his famous metaphor for Confucianism’s plight in modern China as a “wandering soul” (游魂 youhun). What the metaphor conveyed first of all was the insight that Confucianism was dominant in traditional Chinese life only for so long as its “soul” was institutionalized in various “bodies.” These bodies included the political and educational institutions of dynastic China, as credentialed Confucian Learning was the gateway to employment in the imperial public service and to regional administrative, literary and educational employments. Such bodies also included the community life of the rural masses, shaped by Confucian rites and folk moralities in family life. The metaphor’s second insight was that Confucianism “cannot remain at the level of speculation for a long time” without embodiment in such ways of life, since it is a practice-oriented philosophy dedicated to moral and ritual self-cultivation and to the moral perfectibility of institutions, from the family though to the state.

Yu’s conclusion is that Confucianism’s decline to an ethereal, disembodied status followed the gradual collapse of its institutional bodies beginning in the mid-19th century: the corruption and final dissolution of the imperial civil service examination system, the replacement of Confucian Learning with Western sciences and humanities in newly established universities, the fall of the monarchy, and the wars, revolutionary campaigns and disasters that upended traditional rural family life during the 20th century. Yet what to make of the burgeoning academic discourse today on Confucianism in Chinese, Taiwanese, South Korean, Singaporean, European and American universities? Could this academic discourse be the new, institutional body for Confucianism’s ghost to find a modern home in? The answer for Yu is no. Such an academic discourse severed from (largely) institutionalized practices and ways of life is mere speculation—it is empty or clever talk.

A debate can certainly be had about the fairness of Yu’s judgement. After a century of wandering, perhaps Confucianism is now finding renewed embodiment within the institutions of academic philosophy, and in a Chinese “Confucian revival” of educational, religious and ritual practices that has recently gained momentum. The striking thing about this debate so far, however, is how Sinocentric it is. Consider the following passage from Stephen Angle, a leading Confucian scholar in the United States. It briefly encapsulates the standard 20th-century genealogy of academic Confucianism, and implicitly rebukes those like Yu who would dismiss its significance:

The final historical period of which we should take note is the last 100 years, from the end of the civil service examination system in 1905 (and the end of the Qing
Dynasty itself in 1911) down to the present. The label “New Confucians” refers to a number of Chinese philosophers and historians from this past history who aim to interpret and/or reconstruct Confucianism—typically drawing significantly on Neo-Confucianism—for the new realities of the 20th and 21st centuries. Some of these thinkers had significant exposure to western philosophy and engaged with themes from Kant or Hegel for example, quite explicitly. An important goal for many of them, in addition, was to show that Confucianism already was, or could be, made compatible with science and democracy.2

The genealogy sketched here begins with late Qing- and Republican-era scholars and reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Shuming. It proceeds through mid-20th-century “New Confucian” scholars such as Mou Zongsan, to the prolific influence abroad of Mou's student Tu Weiming in the late 20th century, and the latter-day expansion of Confucian scholarship in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and the United States.

This genealogy is correct so far as it goes. Yet it omits an early, decisively formative influence in the reconstruction of Confucianism “for the new realities” of the modern era, which first developed outside China. It also misses one national-level institutionalization of Confucianism, that may go some way to modify Yu Ying-shih's thesis about Confucianism's forlorn status as a “wandering soul” in the 20th century. Which is to say, it omits the pioneering influence that Japanese scholars exerted in the reconstruction of Confucianism as an East Asian or oriental “philosophy” (東洋哲学 Tōyō tetsugaku), beginning in the late 19th century. These scholars, many of whom studied philosophy, political science and sociology in Europe, generated a template for historical, philosophical and nationalist-ideological interpretations of Confucianism that would be passed on to the first generations of Chinese and Korean academic thinkers and nationalists in the early 20th century. It was they who would also create Confucian educational institutions such as the Shibunkai (斯文会) that would bring into their sphere members of Japan's intellectual, political, business and military elites—institutions whose influence would peak in the 1930s, the era of “Imperial Way” (皇道 Kōdō) Confucianism.

The Sinocentrism in recent assessments of Confucianism’s modern genealogy is in part the result of a general neglect of modern Japanese Confucianism by political and moral philosophers and intellectual historians in both Japan and abroad during the postwar era—a neglect that I will discuss shortly. This collection of essays, Handbook of Confucianism in Modern Japan, joins a small group of other studies bringing modern Japanese Confucianism to international scholarly notice, largely covering the time period between the Bakumatsu era of the mid-19th century and the 21st century.3 It could also be viewed as a sequel volume to a recent edited collection of studies spanning Edo, Bakumatsu and early Meiji-era Japanese Confucianism, the Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy.4

The essays in this volume can be read for the insight they provide into the intellectual diversity and ideological proclivities of reformers, educators and philosophers explicitly reconstructing Confucian thought, or more tacitly influenced by it, during critical phases in Japan's modernization, imperialist expansionism and post-1945 reconstitution as a liberal democratic polity. They can be read as introductions to the ideas of modern Japanese Confucian thinkers and reformers whose work is little known outside Japan—and sometimes barely remembered inside Japan. They can also be read as a needful corrective to the above-mentioned Sinocentric bias in the 20th-century intellectual history of Confucianism. If part
of the fault of this bias lies with a general neglect of 19th–20th-century Japanese Confucianism in contemporary scholarship, fault also lies with a longstanding default assumption that China is the cultural epicenter of Confucianism, and Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam its derivative peripheries. In helping redress both of these biases, this volume’s chapters are a contribution to studies of what Huang Chun-chieh has described as East Asian Confucianisms. These are the Confucian traditions in East and South-east Asia which evolved through varied “contextual turns” in response to political and cultural conditions divergent from those of Dynastic China, even as they shared family resemblances with its Confucian traditions. The reinterpretation, reinvention and re-institutionalization of Japanese Confucian traditions in modernizing Japan—as integral ideological and intellectual components to modernization—must surely count as a refutation of the Sinocentric “default assumption.”

Last, and for those Confucian scholars currently exploring how Confucianism is, or can be “made compatible with science and democracy,” at least some of the studies in this volume serve as a warning. They enjoin readers to consider how Confucianism was also rendered compatible with the authoritarian ultranationalism and militarism that captured Japan’s political system in the 1930s, and brought war to the Asia-Pacific region. This is not to disparage the “compatibility thesis” advocated in many current theorizations for Confucian democracy in East Asia. But that thesis needs to come to grips with a historically attested “pull” of reconstructed Confucian ideas of statecraft, paternalistic governance and political perfectionism towards modern authoritarianism.

The remainder of this introduction will cover the motivations for the present handbook, provide background historical discussion for its thirteen chapters, and introduce their main themes.

**Motivations for this Handbook**

The idea for this handbook was hatched out of the relative lack of representation of Japanese Confucianism in studies in Anglophone scholarship on modern Japanese philosophy, and in studies on modern Confucianism in East Asia. Some explanation for this lack is required here.

Confucianism has for the past half century held a respectable place in both Japanese and foreign-language studies of Japanese intellectual history (思想史 shisōshi), which has usually meant the history of Japanese Edo period Confucian thought. In Japanese-language scholarship, Confucianism is usually defined as “thought” or “ideology” (思想 shisō) rather than “philosophy” (哲学 tetsugaku). However, in studies of modern Japanese philosophy, Confucianism is often out of the picture, and its key thinkers remain confined to an index of forgotten or half-remembered, disgraced scholars. The dominant image of modern Japanese philosophy in the Anglophone arises from the 20th-century Kyoto School of philosophers, notably Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, Nishitani Keiji and their fellow traveller Watsuji Tetsurō. Buddhism figures prominently in studies of their philosophical inspirations and their philosophical syntheses of Eastern and Western thought. Until recently, corresponding Confucian influences were less recognized.

The reasons why the Buddhist influence in modern Japanese philosophy has merited such attention lies in postwar trends of intellectual transmission between Japan and the United States. One prolific scholar of religion connected to the Kyoto School, D. T. Suzuki, acquired a global audience after 1945 for his popularizations of Zen Buddhism, and for an aesthetic,
spiritual representation of Japanese culture which contrasted sharply with a still-prevalent image of Japan as a militaristic nation. His erudition and charismatic proselytizing left a deep impression in the United States, where he held a lectureship at Columbia University during the 1950s, fueling a “Zen Boom” in American cultural life. Working on the fertile ground seeded by Suzuki and his followers, Japanese and American scholars embarked on projects to translate into English the major thinkers of the Kyoto School, focusing on those who worked with Buddhism-inspired concepts and themes. These translations, published as books or in journals in both Japan and the United States, drove the dissemination of those thinkers’ ideas into American universities. A full blossoming of interest in the Kyoto School thinkers in the 1980s coincided with the global rise of the Japanese economy and generous Japanese government funding for Japanese language education in the United States and elsewhere. Such support provided a soft power dimension to the success story of Kyoto School studies abroad.8

This cannot be the only explanation for the relative eclipse of Japanese Confucianism from contemporary Anglosphere understandings of modern Japanese intellectual history and philosophy. Japanese philosophers had begun working in comparative philosophy and promoting Confucianism abroad some time prior to the rise of the Kyoto School. Japan’s first modern philosopher, Inoue Tetsujirō, had presented some of his early comparative work on Confucianism and European moral philosophy to European scholarly forums during his studies in Germany in the 1880s.9 The sinologist and philosopher Hattori Unokichi lectured on Confucian ethics while teaching at Harvard University in 1914–1916.10 The bias in favor of the Kyoto School in American scholarship on modern Japanese philosophy has also advanced in parallel with the decades-long scholarship on pre-modern Japanese Confucian intellectual history in both Japan and abroad.

Yet it is true to say that more publicly engaged intellectuals like Inoue and Hattori never wrote at the same level of profundity and philosophical sophistication as Nishida, Tanabe, Watsuji or Nishitani. Nor for that matter did their thought match the profundity of their Edo period Confucian predecessors, such as Hayashi Razan, Yamazaki Ansei, Ito Jinsai or Ogyū Sorai. Inoue, moreover, dedicated himself to writing of a more overtly ideological type on topics such as national morality (国民道徳 kokumin dōtoku), Shintō (神道 Shintō), Bushidō (武士道 Bushidō) and Confucianism (儒教 Jukyō) after the turn of the 20th century. This was a pattern that was followed by a younger 20th-century generation of Confucian scholars such as Yasuoka Masahiro. These factors must surely have weighed on the minds of postwar Japanese and American scholars selecting representative Japanese philosophy for translation and international study.

This brings us to the third reason for the relative neglect of modern Japanese Confucian thought in international receptions of modern Japanese philosophy after 1945: that Japanese Confucianism itself became a “wandering soul” as its reputation collapsed in the postwar era, and it lost its major institutional support bases and official patronage. Kiri Paramore has written of a “postwar taboo” on Confucianism, in reaction against its presumed association with pre-1945 fascism, which led to an avoidance of references to it across Japan’s postwar political spectrum.11 Some chapters in this volume question the extent of that postwar taboo. I will add that one political scientist and sometime Confucianism scholar who Paramore claims went silent about Confucianism in the postwar era—Maruyama Masao—did continue to publish and edit studies on Japanese Confucian intellectual history. Yet, in a repudiation of
the preceding generation of Confucian scholars and national morality theorists, Maruyama’s postwar thought denied Confucianism any role as a positive morality in modern life. In any case, the fallen status of Confucianism in postwar Japanese universities is an undeniable fact. The Kyoto School philosophers had theorized at some ideological as well as geographical distance from the centers of political power in Tokyo—or had at least appeared to. After the war, some did suffer the recriminations and American occupation-era purges which also fell on the heads of notable Confucian and Chinese Learning (漢学 Kangaku) scholars at Tokyo Imperial University. However, the latter scholars had enjoyed closer relations with political elites during the 1930s and 1940s, though of course there were those among the former who had also declared explicitly for Japan’s wartime expansionism. These facts may also have been taken into consideration by the postwar Japanese and American scholars selecting representative Japanese philosophy for translation and international study.

To recapitulate, then, the motivation for this handbook is to join other recent studies in redeeming the neglect discussed above, showcasing studies which comprehend modern Japanese Confucianism under the categories of philosophy as well as thought or ideology. In the following sections I will introduce the chapters of this volume, within the following explanatory frames: 1) the tacit, subordinate as well as explicit dimension to Confucianism’s participation in intellectual, academic and educational life in modernizing Japan; 2) the institutional basis for the efflorescence under government patronage of nationalist, “Imperial Way” Confucianism in the 1930s and 3) the legacy and intellectual pathways of Confucianism in Japan after 1945.

**The tacit and subordinate influences of Confucianism in modernization**

Most of those scholars who took part in formative Meiji period intellectual innovations were not self-conscious Confucians. In the 1870s leading intellectuals like Fukuzawa Yukichi, now well-versed in European thought through their scholarly studies in Japan and abroad during the 1860s, were inclined to minimize Confucianism’s relevance to Japan’s modernization. Some, like Nishi Amane, refused to recognize Confucianism or other East Asian traditions as “philosophy,” looking instead to European intellectual traditions such as utilitarianism as their standard. Other reforming intellectuals, while rejecting Confucian self-identification, more consciously drew on its moral teachings and exemplars in recognition of the continued importance they believed Japanese traditions should play in the modernization process. For them, however, Confucianism was just one among many such traditions, and had no “dominant” status. The common denominator for all of these intellectuals lay in their shared classical Chinese and Confucian education. That education exerted an important tacit influence in the modernization process.

I will consider that “tacit” influence first. The men who, in the early years of the Meiji period, began the prodigious task of translating European political, theological, scientific and philosophical thought into Japanese were all steeped in classical Chinese literacy (Kanbun) and learning (Kangaku). Such learning had been the standard late Edo-period education for the samurai and wealthier merchant and farming classes provided by regional schools and academies, or private tutors. This Chinese Learning and literacy furnished a rich linguistic pool of concepts, idioms and neologisms for Nishi Amane and other pioneering interpreters of European thought. They drew from this pool to translate this thought in a manner that
they hoped would be intelligible to an emerging reading public, as modern mass schooling and university education were in the process of being introduced. This undertaking turned out to be successful. Their translations, and published commentaries and studies on European thought and institutions would also prove intelligible for the Korean and Chinese students who flocked to study in Japan’s new universities in the coming decades, and who would eventually translate much of that thought into their own languages.

The first chapter in this handbook covering this tacit dimension to the Confucian influence in Japan’s Meiji-era modernization is Lee Yu-ting’s “The Confucian Traits in the Meiroku Zasshi.” Lee utilizes a statistical corpus search of Confucianism-linked terms in the mid-Meiji-era Meiroku Magazine (明六雑誌), famous for its patronage by intellectual reformers such as Nishi Amane, Nishimura Shigeki, Fukuzawa Yukichi and Tsuda Mamichi, who comprised the Meiroku society (明六社), established in the sixth year of the Meiji Emperor’s reign. Lee analyses the results of his search under three categories, of personages, texts and Confucianism-derived ideas. This analysis also proceeds at three levels: of Confucianism as a target of debate or refutation, as a pathway for argumentation appealing to textual evidence and authority in the Confucian classics, and as an instrument for rhetorical, illustrative or allusive expression. Lee concludes that these reformers introduced and debated foreign ideas at least partially in deference to Japan’s Confucian intellectual legacy, even as some of them argued for its contemporary irrelevance.

It is remarkable too that liberal contributors to the Meiroku Magazine like Fukuzawa Yukichi and Katō Hiroyuki also debated the question of women’s rights and education in the mid-1870s. By the 1880s a number of Japanese women intellectuals had also joined the public discussion on the question of women’s education. Some had been entirely educated abroad. Others, like their male peers in the former samurai classes, had received a traditional classical Chinese and Confucian education during the Bakumatsu-Meiji era transition.

We would expect to find a divergence in views on women’s education between the prominent women reformers of this era educated abroad, and those whose formative education was that of the old samurai class. Tsuda Umeko and Yamakawa Sutematsu, who grew up and were educated in the United States, represented the former group, while Niijima Yae and Shimoda Utako represented the latter. Yet among these women, involved in the founding of notable modern women’s educational institutions such as Tsuda College, Doshisha College and Jissen Women’s College, there were important intellectual convergences. They all agreed on the objectives of a then-innovative gender ideology that would become state policy for women’s education: “Good Wife and Wise Mother” (良妻賢母 ryōsai kenbo).

Though in the past ryōsai kenbo ideology has been associated with Confucianist or traditionalist beliefs, this association has lately been challenged. Ryōsai kenbo certainly appears conservative to modern eyes, in presuming a gendered division of labour in which women were educated to become competent in the financial management of households and in the overseeing of children’s nutrition, healthcare and moral education. However, this ideology was institutionalized as a modernization objective to be achieved via the mass education of all girls in literacy and numeracy, and via the higher education of an upper-class minority of women. In this respect it was discontinuous with the classical and patriarchal moral-based education available only to a minority of wealthy Japanese girls a generation earlier. Ryōsai kenbo in fact borrowed heavily from later 19th-century European and American ideals of middle class women’s education.16 It comes as no surprise that the American benefactor of the young Yamakawa Sutematsu did not encounter any resistance from her Japanese wards.
when he suggested that she would, through her schooling, “acquire that knowledge of domestic duties and employments which qualifies an American lady to become the mistress of a family.” Some of the inspirations for ryōsai kenbo were sown in the American schooling of Sutematsu and her peers during the 1870s and 1880s.

Yet in its emphasis upon personal cultivation through education and in its familialist moral focus, ryōsai kenbo could also be made compatible with Confucianism, and there was some accommodation of conservative demands that it incorporate education in traditional feminine morals (婦徳 futoku). In this domain of modernizing education, we can thus discern an acknowledged, but subordinate influence for Confucianism. Women educational reformers steeped in Confucian education also found it meaningful to draw on Confucianism for rhetorical devices, allusions, moral exemplars and textual authorities to reach and persuade their readers, even if they rejected any Confucian self-identification.

Masako Racel’s chapter on Shimoda Utako, “Kokumin Dōtoku for Women: Shimoda Utako’s Vision in Taishō Japan” investigates these subordinate influences in a women’s education reformer who did not identify as a Confucian, and who often criticized its restrictive views on women. Shimoda was born into a samurai family and schooled in the Confucian classics, and she became one of the most energetic advocates for modernized women’s education in the 1890s. However, Racel also reveals that Shimoda began to partake of a conservative interpretation of women’s education and virtues by the Taishō era, as she shared in the dismay of nationalist ideologues at the spread of radical Western ideas such as socialism and feminism. Racel shows how Shimoda then participated in the promotion of a particularistic national morality (国民道徳 kokumin dōtoku) developed by nationalist Confucian scholars like Inoue Tetsujirō, while tailoring that morality to women’s interests. In her writings she drew amply on classical Chinese and Japanese literature to encourage the practice of distinctive Japanese women’s virtues, and to encourage respect for the exemplary virtues of the imperial Japanese family.

In Lee’s and Racel’s chapters we can see how Confucianism remained a living tradition even for reformers who rejected any explicit identification with it. They drew on its conceptual-linguistic resources to interpret, translate and explain European thought, and they drew on its traditional authority to anchor a conservative management of the modernization process, making it an integral constituent in that process.

The explicit influences of Confucianism in modernization

In documenting Confucianism’s more explicit ideological participation in a modernizing Japan, we are struck again by the difficulty of drawing a line between “pre-modern” and “modern.” Most obviously, many key ideas and themes of modern Japanese Confucian thought—and political ideology—are found in seminal form in 17th- to early 19th-century Edo-period scholarship. The Shintō-Confucian syncretism that preoccupied 20th-century Japanese Confucians first appears in the 17th-century thought of Hayashi Razan and Yamazaki Ansai. From the 17th-century Japanese scholars would grapple with interpreting the great principle duty to the ruler (大義名分 taigi meibun), and the fraught question over how to apply that principle where “the ruler” was embodied in the temporal sovereignty of the shogun and the spiritual sovereignty of the emperor. They would also confront the fraught question of applying—or, as was mostly the case, finding reasons not to apply—the normative standard of the Mandate of Heaven (天命 tenmei) to the shogunate’s rulers, and to emperors.
By the early- to mid-19th-century, loyalist scholars such as Aizawa Seishisai and Yoshida Shōin drew on Shintō-Confucian orthodoxy to emphasize the uniqueness of Japan's national polity (国体 kokutai) grounded in the sacred, unbroken imperial line ultimately descending from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. They also affirmed a quasi-Confucian unity of loyalty and filial piety (忠孝一致 chukō icchi) among the Japanese emperor's subjects not found in any other state, including China.

These concepts and themes developed in Kimon (崎門学 Kimon gaku), Suika Shintō (垂加神道) and Mito Learning (水戸学 Mitogaku) would be reinterpreted and reinvented anew between the Bakumatsu era and the 1940s. The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (教育勅語 Kyōiku chokugo), a text which all schoolchildren were required to study, represented the first major statement of these reinterpreted ideologies by the new Japanese nation-state. It incorporated a modified version of Mencius' conception of the five fundamental relations (五倫 gorin) but also affirming the unity of the emperor's subjects “in filial piety and loyalty.” Yet the Rescript also outlined duties for those subjects intelligible only in a modernized, industrialized state capable of both mass education and the mass conscription of men from all classes for military service: for instance, “should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State.” Overlooking such discontinuities between the Edo-period feudal order and its industrializing Meiji-era successor in the late-19th to early-20th centuries, scholars such as Inoue Tetsujirō were eager to contrive genealogies of Confucian and Shintō-Confucian thought extending seamlessly from the Edo period through to their own day. These genealogies were meant to demonstrate the continuity of a unique Japanese national spirit (国民精神 kokumin seishin) driving the Meiji “Restoration” of imperial political power and sustaining the supposed resilience of Japan's national morality from ancient times into the 20th century.

Song Qi’s chapter “Reinterpreting Matsumiya Kanzan: On the Interval between State Shintō and the Idea of the Three Religions” highlights the importance of Edo-period thinkers in 20th-century retrospective constructions of Japanese Shintō-Confucian genealogies. A lesser-known Edo period scholar of the 17th–18th centuries, Matsumiya was a pragmatic loyalist who affirmed the spiritual authority and unbroken lineage of the imperial throne while remaining deferential to Tokugawa temporal authority. Song presents Matsumiya as a typically quarrelsome scholar of his era, engaging in controversy with other loyalists and with devotees of Ogyū Sorai’s thought, while also rejecting the nativist tendencies of the Shintoist National Learning (国学 Kokugaku) scholars. Qi shows what aspects of Matsumiya’s ecumenical thinking on the “Three Religions” attracted the interest of 20th-century Japanese nationalists. Acknowledging the contribution of Confucianism and Buddhism to Japanese life, Matsumiya nevertheless asserted the centrality of Shintō to upholding Japan’s imperial authority and the uniqueness of Japan itself, in distinction from and also equality with India and China, where (on his estimation) Buddhism and Confucianism respectively predominated. Matsumiya’s Shintō proto-nationalism, consciously influenced by Confucianism, would supply inspiration for State Shintō doctrine and national morality ideology in the 20th century.

In “The Confucian Classics in the Political Thought of Sakuma Shōzan” Han Shuting investigates the explicit Confucian dimension to the modernization strategy proposed by the influential Bakumatsu-era inventor, scholar and reform advocate Sakuma Shōzan. Sakuma is remembered today for urging a combination of “Eastern morality with Western technology” to help Japan resist the threat of Western domination. Han finds that Sakuma invoked
Confucian ideals and exemplars to justify arguments for the study of Western technology, and followed a classic Neo-Confucian investigative approach to the study and application of such technology in fortifying Japan against Western encroachment. Han shows how Sakuma adopted this approach in two important affairs. The first was his attempt to secure statewide publication of a Dutch-Japanese language dictionary to facilitate studies of foreign knowledge. The second was his involvement in and defense of the “Yoshida Shōin Stowaway Incident,” in which Yoshida, his most famous student, had tried along with a friend to stow away on one of Commodore Perry’s ships prior to their departure back to the United States in 1854.

As we have seen, Japanese people soon acquired the right Sakuma and Yoshida had dreamed of—to travel abroad and study foreign learning. Future reformers including prominent Meiroku Society members were among the first to do so in the last years of the Baku-matsu era, and more would follow in the years following the Meiji Restoration. The young Inoue Tetsujirō helped set a new trend when he traveled to Europe in 1884 to pursue further studies following his graduation from Tokyo University. Prior to his departure he commenced work on a book he titled A History of Oriental Philosophy (東洋哲学史 Tōyō tetsugakushi). He explained his motive for this work in the following way, hinting at a new, modernizing direction for Confucian studies: “Up to now, the splendid history of Western philosophy and religion has been well developed, and its research methods established. However, a history of Buddhism, Confucianism or Shintō (仏教儒教もしくは神道 Bukkyō jukyō moshi ku wa Shintō) has not yet been developed, and its research method has yet to be established.”21 The historian of education Okita Yukuji offers the following gloss on Inoue’s statement:

In such a motive it is not impossible to see a reflection of nationalism. However, it was not (Inoue’s) intention to relativize western thought; rather, his primary aim was to research oriental philosophy and religion in light of research on western philosophy and religion. In proceeding with these comparative studies, Inoue would uncover issues related to the reception of foreign thought in Japan.22

Most of the chapters in this volume comment on some aspect of Inoue’s storied sixty year career as Japan’s first, modernizing Confucian philosopher, pioneering comparative philosophy scholar, conservative “scholar of the state” (御用学者 goyōgakusha), nationalist ideologue and propagandist for Japan’s World War Two regime. When he is remembered today it is usually for the final phases of his career, when he was as morally compromised by his commitment to wartime authoritarianism as Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt were by their entanglements with Nazism in Germany. Yet Inoue’s early career scholarly work remains understudied.

Two chapters in this volume consider Inoue’s early career teaching, scholarship and ideological work. The first, “The Invention of ‘Chinese Philosophy’—How Did the Classics take Root in Japan’s First Modern University?” by Mizuno Hirota, investigates the intellectual innovations to which Okita Yukuji testified. Mizuno notes that the Chinese and Confucian classics initially had a marginal role in the literature curriculums of Tokyo Imperial University following its foundation in 1881. However, there was also a growing awareness that the Chinese classics needed to be taught more analytically and comparatively. On Mizuno’s reading, it was Inoue Tetsujirō, newly employed at Tokyo Imperial University in 1883, who first addressed this need. He started teaching Confucian thought in accordance with European
methodologies for the analysis and periodizing of intellectual history. Mizuno concludes that Inoue and his peers pioneered the investigation of Confucianism in modern intellectual historical and comparative philosophical terms, starting a modern academic tradition for Confucianism that would be passed on to Chinese scholars in the following decades.

In “Inoue Tetsujirō and Modern Yangming Learning in Japan” Yamamura Shō considers a slightly later stage in Inoue's intellectual career, in which his earlier philosophical and intellectual history interests were giving way to a more overt ideological aim: to use Confucianism to foster national unity. Concerned over what he deemed to be the chief dangers to Japan and its emperor-centered national polity—the internal spread of Christianity and the external threats of the European Great Powers—Inoue proposed to use a syncretic, Japanized Shintō-Yangming Learning to help cultivate a national morality. Yamamura argues that in doing so, Inoue inherited the reinterpretations worked on Yangming Learning (陽明学 Yōmeigaku) during the early-mid 19th century by Mito Learning and loyalist scholars. They had also promoted a synthesis of Shintō and Confucianism, urging bold reforms based on their interpretation of the Yangming Learning ideal, “unity of knowledge and action” (知行合一 chikō gōitsu). Inoue's efforts to retrospectively include these thinkers as participants in a Japanese Yangming tradition have some credibility inasmuch as they, like he, were theorizing the conditions for a strengthened national polity in awareness of the threat posed by foreign powers and ideologies like Christianity.

The wandering soul finds a Japanese home: the Shibunkai and Imperial Way Confucianism

Four chapters of this book focus on the 1930s era of Kingly Way and Imperial Way Confucianism. One prominent philosopher of the era, Watsuji Tetsurō, is also the subject of two chapters. Though Watsuji was not formally affiliated with the Shibunkai scholars advocating for Japan's Imperial Way, he partook of the wartime ideological Zeitgeist which this organization participated in and contributed to. In that Zeitgeist Confucianism was closely aligned with a particularistic national polity ideology that had its beginnings in the Mito School theorists in the early 19th century. Through that alignment, Confucianism was coopted for the authoritarianism and militarism of the Japanese state during the 1930s and 1940s.

I will leave the detailed explanation of that alignment to the relevant chapters in this volume. However, I do want to discuss here in detail the institutional background to the rise of this variety of Japanese Confucianism, and some of the consequences of the collapse of that institutional support after 1945. To explain that background, I will cover the genesis and career of the Shibunkai as a publicly incorporated organization from 1918, drawing on the very few studies which have documented its history, and explain the role it and other institutions like Daitō Bunka Gakuin played in the promotion of Confucianism to perhaps its highest level of public prominence and elite patronage in the 1930s.23

The Shibunkai arose out of a merging of older Meiji-era societies dedicated to Chinese studies and Confucianism. The scholars, politicians and businessmen organizing the new Shibunkai, men such as the University of Tokyo sinologist Hattori Unokichi, Vice-president of the Privy Council Kiyōra Keigo and leading industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi founded it with a sense of urgency. They professed alarm that the material civilization imported from the West, though needful for Japan's national development and modernization, was also bringing with it dangerous new ideologies which threatened to overwhelm Japan's traditional moral
and spiritual culture. They also worried about the disappearance of Chinese Learning and Confucian morals from modernized school curriculums in Japan; the promotion of classical Chinese literacy and Confucian morals in Japanese schools became one of their chief objectives. They saw in a revived Confucian way a means for reasserting Japan's distinctive moral culture to counterbalance (though not negate) the influence of materialistic civilization.

Two things need to be said about the Shibunkai at this early point in its development. First, it is recognizable as a politically conservative organization. Unlike any nativist or reactionary politics, it accepted the progress so far achieved in Japan by “materialistic culture” but sought to ameliorate its disruptive effects by rejuvenating traditional Confucian morality. Moreover, its leading thinkers such as Hattori Unokichi expressed cautious support for constitutional democracy, so long as it did not endorse republicanism. The Shibunkai did not at this early stage elevate an anti-Western perspective, though advocates for such a perspective did have a voice in the organization.

Second, the organization was from its inception the beneficiary of state and business sector patronage. In a powerfully symbolic gesture the government donated the Sage Confucian Hall (湯島聖堂 Yushima Seidō) in Tokyo to become the Shibunkai’s institutional base, which it remains to this day. Members of the House of Peers were regular speakers at Shibunkai events. One leading member of the House and head of the Tokugawa Clan, Prince Tokugawa Iesato, was appointed as head of the Shibunkai in 1922, further raising its prestige and its networking potential with leading political figures. In his 1959 study Modern Japanese Confucianism Warren Smith documented the succession of Prime Ministers and cabinet members who attended the Shibunkai’s annual Confucian ceremonies from 1922, and who began officially presenting speeches to its gatherings from 1926. By the early 1930s, these political leaders were, according to Smith, explicitly arguing for “guiding the thoughts of the nation with Confucianism.”

The Shibunkai was not the only institution founded in that era to promote the Chinese classics and combat the excesses of Western materialism. Daitō Bunka Gakuin (大東文化学院, re-founded after the war as Daitō Bunka University) was founded through the lobbying efforts of the Eastern Culture Society (大東文化協会 Daitō bunka kyōkai) under the leadership of veteran politician, writer and House of Peers member Katō Masanosuke. The university’s mission is explained in a dedicatory classical Chinese poem written in 1963 by Takada Shinji, on the fortieth anniversary of its foundation. Takada had been a leading member of the Shibunkai in the 1930s and 1940s. On Takada’s interpretation, Daitō Bunka Gakuin’s institutional aims were very much the same as those of the Shinbunkai, conceived out of the conviction that Japan’s spiritual condition was failing:

...Thus Westernization broke the pure wind of Confucianism...  
Here, patriots worrying about Japan's future rose in anger  
To swear an oath and clarify the proper path.  
They submitted the Proposal for reviving Chinese Studies to the Diet  
And founded Daito Bunka University.  
Drawing on Japanese and Chinese studies,  
They resolved to earnestly study the Imperial Way.28

The influence of these institutions peaked in the 1930s. Relations had soured with Western nations as Japan expanded its political and military influence in Manchuria, and at the
same time Japanese and some Chinese Confucians worked for a revived Confucian Kingly Way in the new puppet state “Empire of Manchuria” (滿洲帝國 Manshū teikoku). Japanese Confucians and their political patrons urged a strengthening of Japanese morality against influxes of Western ideas—which now came to be perceived in a far more hostile light—and a fortifying of the spiritual culture it shared with other East Asians. Warren Smith notes that Confucianism’s increasing synthesis with national polity ideology enabled nationalists to “preempt and use the force of Confucian values for their own purposes,” ultimately making it complicit in ideologies justifying authoritarianism at home and expansionism abroad.29

At the same time these institutions’ advocacy for Confucianism and Chinese Learning militated against more chauvinistic and politically destabilizing ultranationalist and radical Shintoist interpretations of concepts like the national polity or the Imperial Way. Echoing the National Learning scholars of the Edo period, the ultranationalists repudiated Confucianism. In this respect then, Japanese Confucianism was more palatable to political and military leaders who wanted to make a moral case for Japan’s empire building in East Asia, who saw Confucianism as a means for fostering obedience and loyalty among imperial subjects, but who were repelled by the violence of ultranationalist factions. The latter’s ideologies found expression in the terroristic conduct of the military officers who organized the failed coups d’état known respectively as the May 15 Incident of 1932 (五月一五事件 Go ichi go jiken) and the February 26 Incident of 1936 (二二六事件 Ni ni roku jiken). For their part, the Japanese Confucianists upheld a Pan-Asian aspiration, which asserted a collective East Asian spiritual difference from the materialist West. Given the central Shintō-Confucian assumption about the uniqueness of Japan’s national polity that had purified and perfected Confucian ideals of virtuous statecraft as the Imperial Way, Japanese Confucianists believed Japan was positioned to lead East Asia in a spiritual conflict with the West.

This Confucian Pan-Asianism was prominently displayed at two events that marked the apogee of Japanese Confucian institutional influence and patronage in modern Japan. The first was the founding ceremony on January 27, 1934 in Tokyo for a new Japanese Society for the Promotion of Confucianism (日本儒教宣揚会 Nippon jukyō senyō kai), which gathered 700 notables from Japan’s political, scholarly and military elite. These included members of the government cabinet, and representatives from the House of Peers and the Diet Legislature, with the leading speech being given by Katō Masanosuke.30 The second event, organized by the Shinbunkai, brought together Japanese, Korean, Manchurian and Chinese scholars, government ministers, members of the House of Peers and the Emperor of Manchuria, Puyi, for a conference on the Confucian Way held at Yushima Sage Hall in Tokyo in April 1935.31

Pan-Asian civilizational idealism, with its assertions of profound Asian spiritual difference from the materialist West, had already proven to be compatible with endorsement of warfare against China. As early as 1903 the Pan-Asianist writer Okakura Tenshin—whose writings attained new fame in the 1930s—testified to Japan’s recent victory over Qing China in the First Sino-Japanese War as proof of “our supremacy in Eastern waters” and as “a natural outgrowth of the new national vigor.” However, this war had also brought China and Japan closer together in “mutual friendship,” Okakura claimed, and enhanced, rather than distracted from Japan’s mission to “revivify the dormant life of the old Asiatic unity.”32

The Japanese Confucians also proved capable of endorsing war against China as a means for furthering Pan-Asianism. This is painfully obvious in the pages of the Shinbunkai’s journal Shibun (斯文) in 1937–38, following the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Standard scholarly fare for the Shibun on Edo period Japanese studies of Song Dynasty Confucianism,
or on theories of the five cardinal Confucian virtues, jostles with articles giving full-throated support to war. Leading members of the Shibunkai such as Inoue Tetsujirō, the historian of China, Iijima Tadao, and the Chinese literature scholar Shionoya On fulminated against the Chinese Republicans for having overthrown China’s monarchical system, and for abandoning the Confucian Way. The jingoistic wartime slogan “Punish Savage China” (暴支膺懲 Bōshi yōchō) was deliberately echoed in extravagant praise for the Japanese Imperial Army “punishing” the “savage” Chinese Republican forces. Iijima also contrived moralizing arguments based on Confucian literature to explain why the Chinese Republicans deserved such punishment.33

Even as the Shibunkai scholars hoped for a new Chinese leadership that would revive Confucianism, overthrow Republicanism and return China to the Pan-Asianist fold, their pro-war statements were as vehement as the utterances of the ultranationalists and militarists of the time. Now suitably tamed and stripped of its terroristic and anti-elite tendencies, by 1937 ultranationalism had become mainstream government ideology, justifying authoritarian statism and militarist expansionism abroad.34 The Shibunkai Confucians were in complete alignment with it.

In 1944, amidst signs of a worsening war situation, Shionoya On dropped his earlier bellicose rhetoric and pinned his hopes for peace on the signing of a treaty between Japan and the puppet regime of Wang Jingwei in Nanjing the previous year. Shionoya anticipated that Japan’s “Sacred Imperial Army” would eventually eradicate the “violence of the English and Americans from the lands of the East” paving the way for a full restoration of China’s sovereignty. Yet in the conditions of total war that now prevailed, as Japanese political leaders recognized the limited appeal of Confucianism in negotiating with a rising nationalism among the Chinese, the views of the Shibunkai Confucians held little sway.35

The first chapter in the handbook to consider Imperial Way and wartime Confucianism in this historical context, Chang Kun-chiang’s “Modern Contextual Turns from ‘The Kingly Way’ to ‘The Imperial Way’” adapts Huang Chun-chieh’s concept of the “contextual turn” in East Asian Confucianisms to analyse the long-term evolution of the “Imperial Way” concept out of Kingly Way and Shintō ideologies between the 17th century and 1945. Chang closely analyses the different “turns” by which Confucianism and its conception of the Kingly Way were conflated with and absorbed into Shintō, then subordinated to Shintō through emerging loyalist doctrines for revering the emperor that first mentioned an “Imperial Way.” But Chang finds that the conception of a distinctive Japanese Imperial Way only emerged during the 1930s era of imperialist expansionism, coinciding with the creation of the Manchurian “empire” and the Second Sino-Japanese War. At this point there was a felt need to distinguish a uniquely Japanese Imperial Way from a subordinate Chinese/Confucian Kingly Way that would be guided by it. In this final “turn,” Chang argues that Confucianism gradually lost its value for Imperial Way ideology.

Kang Haesoo’s chapter “The Discourse on Imperial Way Confucian Thought: The Link between Daitō Bunka Gakuin and Chosŏn Gyunghakwon” explores the little-studied transmission of “a Confucianism purified for incorporation into the Imperial Way and national polity” into colonial Korea during the 1930s and 1940s by two Korean graduates of Daitō Bunka Gakuin, Ahn In-sik and Joo Byung-kŏn. Ahn became head of the colonial-era Korea Gyunghakwon (조선 경학원 Chosŏn Gyunghakwon: in Japanese 朝鮮経学院 Chōsen Keigaku-kuin), formerly Chosen Dynasty Korea’s chief Confucian academy, and he and Joo both taught at the Gyunghakwon’s institute, the Myeongnyun Hakwon (명륜학원; in Japanese 明
In this capacity, they were instrumental in interpreting to a Korean audience the Imperial Way Confucianism then being formulated by Daitō Bunka Gakuin and Shibunkai scholars. Kang concludes by raising some yet to be resolved questions about the legacy of this colonial-era Confucianism in post-1945 South Korean society.

In “The Image of the Kingly Way during the War: Focusing on Takada Shinji’s Imperial Way Discourse” Park Junhyun writes about the studies into the Imperial Way conducted by Takada Shinji, a Tokyo Imperial University Chinese studies scholar and leading Shibunkai member (as noted above). Park argues that Takada went beyond the ideological statements and propaganda that typically characterized discussion of the Imperial Way, and sought to develop a deeper philosophical justification for that concept in Confucian terms. On Park’s presentation, Takada offered a more sophisticated interpretation of the Confucian concept of the Mandate of Heaven and a reinterpretation of the Rectification of Names doctrine to explain the Confucian credentials of the Japanese Imperial Way.

In “Watsuji Tetsurō’s Confucian Bonds: From Totalitarianism to New Confucianism” Kyle Shuttleworth investigates the troubling philosophical and ideological affinities in 1930s and 1940s editions of Watsuji’s magnum opus Ethics (倫理学 Rinrigaku). Though Watsuji was disdainful of the output of the more ideological Confucians of the era, Shuttleworth finds that his interpretation of the five Confucian bonds or relationships (五倫 gorin) in these editions is vulnerable to accusations of complicity in totalitarianism made by modern critics. Shuttleworth agrees that such accusations are convincing, since Watsuji does interpret these bonds in a manner which is compatible with the subsumption of the individual in complete obedience and loyalty to the state. However, Shuttleworth finds that through postwar revisions to Ethics Watsuji participated in New Confucianism trends that actively identified compatibilities between Confucianism and democracy. Nevertheless, his traditionalist account of family relations remains open to feminist and gender critics’ objections.

**Japanese Confucian legacies from the postwar era into the 21st century**

Finally, we must take stock of modern Japanese Confucianism’s legacy and fate in the post-1945 era. Has it indeed become like Yu Ying-shih’s wandering soul, de-housed by postwar purges of Confucian nationalist scholars from the University of Tokyo, by the dominance of Euro-American philosophical thought in post-1945 philosophy departments, and by the reduction of the Shibunkai to a small-scale educational organization and conservator of Japan’s Confucian heritage? In present day circumstances it is difficult to dispute this assessment. Confucianism also faces wider social indifference or even hostility. Indeed, the contemporary marginalization of Confucianism and its “museumification” in specialist intellectual history may have inadvertently enabled its final nativist repudiation in some Japanese nationalist discourse.

A number of best-seller books in Japan with titles such as *The Tragedy of Chinese and Koreans Dominated by Confucianism* and *The Grudges of a Confucianism that Undermine Korea: its Anti-Japanese Sentiment is Endless* strongly suggest such a trend. With their cultural essentialist presentations of Confucianism as a Korean and Chinese ideology, such books downplay Japan’s own Confucian heritage. Bereft of historically or philosophically informed insight, they turn Confucianism into a “floating signifier” and project into it the anxieties afflicting Japanese nationalists over relations with the Koreas and China amidst
the unstable geopolitics of 21st century East Asia. Confucianism is thus stigmatized as a source of supposed Korean and Chinese cultural vices such as despotism, toadyism to the powerful, pathological anti-Japanese sentiment, self-righteous grudge-holding and historical revisionism.37

The popularity of such books is a sign of strong headwinds against a Japanese Confucian revival in the 21st century, especially among the political conservative constituencies where it once found its chief supporters. Nevertheless, the three chapters in the final part of this volume investigate some of the post-1945, Cold War-era survival and revivalist paths for Japanese Confucianism. They also explore its wider regional legacies and possible future directions.

Following up on Kyle Shuttleworth’s investigation of the Confucian elements in Watsuji Tetsurō’s Ethics, Alexandra Mustătea develops a close reading of Watsuji’s postwar intellectual history work on Japanese ethics in her chapter “Thinking about Confucianism and Modernity in the Early Postwar Period—Watsuji Tetsurō’s The History of Ethical Thought in Japan.” She contests an influential postwar judgement on Confucianism’s supposedly negative, feudalistic influence in Japan’s modernization. On her reading, Watsuji’s book shows a way forward for Confucian normative theory drawing on a distinction between the historically, culturally particular ethical thought or rinrishisō (倫理思想) of a society and a universal ethics or rinri (倫理). The philosophy of ethics (倫理学 rinrigaku) is a critical investigation that seeks out the universal ethical principles of rinri. Confucianism came close to fulfilling a rinrigaku role in pre-modern Japan. Watsuji’s analysis shows that Confucianism is not, as Maruyama Masao asserted, a largely feudal-era holdover, and that it was a creative, innovative influence in the Edo-Meiji transition. Mustătea hopes that this latter, universalizing and normative potential in Confucianism as rinrigaku can still be realized today, in acknowledgement of its capacity to adapt creatively to changing social-historical conditions.

Eddy Dufourmont’s chapter “Yasuoka Masahiro and Confucian Survival in Postwar Japan, 1945–1983” provides a social and intellectual historical perspective on the postwar propagation of conservative Confucian ethics by philosopher Yasuoka Masahiro. Dufourmont explains how Yasuoka, a charismatic and energetic networker, was able to reconstitute his prewar relations with former patrons in regional business elites and with politicians in the postwar Liberal Democratic Party to aid in the dissemination of his thought. Dufourmont also shows how this thought suited the interests of corporate leaders and politicians aiming to combat Communism and excessive “westernization” in postwar Japan. Dufourmont ultimately finds that Yasuoka’s influence did not long outlast his death and the end of the Cold War. It did, however, contribute to an international boom in books during the 1980s linking the success of Japan’s and other East Asian nations’ brands of postwar capitalism with Confucianism.

In our chapter “Universalizing Kingly Way Confucianism: A Japanese Legacy and Chinese Future?” Jiang Dongxian and I explore the concept of a modular “exemplary nationalism” originating in early 19th-century Germany which combines—unstably—an affirmation of particularistic national values with a national mission to exemplify and propagate those values universally. We show that the characteristics of such a nationalism can be found in 1930s era Japanese Kingly Way and Imperial Way Confucianism promoted by the Shibunkai, which became complicit with wartime imperialism and militarism. We then survey Chinese Confucian thought today to warn that a similar “Kingly Way” Confucian nationalism may be on the rise in authoritarian China, testifying to its “modularity” between Japan and China.

Introduction
We conclude our chapter with a normative argument for a conscientious Confucianism in the 21st century, uncoupled from nationalist and “national mission” ideologies.

Notes
7 A Compendium of Japanese Thought [日本思想大系 Nihon shisō taiketsu] a monumental 67-volume study of Japanese intellectual history, has perhaps one third of its volumes dedicated wholly or partly to the study of late Civil War era-Edo period Confucianism. Other volumes treat individual thinkers associated with Confucianism in the Heian period and with the Bakumatsu era through to the mid-19th century. It was compiled between 1970 and 1982. For a brief summary of other Japanese language and Anglophone scholarship since the 1960s, see Chun-chieh Huang and James Tucker, “Introduction” in Huang and Tucker, eds., The Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy, 2–3.
11 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 169–170
Some critical discussions on the complicity and willing cooptation of Kyoto School philosophers and Zen Buddhism scholars and practitioners by Japan’s wartime regime include Ichikawa Hakugen, *Bukkyōsha no sensō sekinin* [仏教者の戦争責任 The Buddhists’ war responsibility] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1970); Brian Victoria, *Zen at War* (New York: Weatherhill, 1998); and James Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).

The thematic-based introduction of these chapters undertaken here does not follow their chronological order in this handbook.

For a wide-ranging discussion of the conundrums—and also opportunities—that early Japanese translators of European thought faced when working from the classical Chinese and Confucian lexicons, see Douglas Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).


Maruyama Masao described this genealogy-building process linking the Ansai and Mito lineages in a continuous line with 20th-century kokutai ideology as the “emanation theory.” “Ansai Learning and the Yamazaki Ansai School,” 346–47.


See Warren Smith’s translation of “Aims of the Shibunkai” in *Confucianism in Modern Japan*, 270.

Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan*, 269–70.

Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan*, 128; see also Hattori Unokichi, “*Jukyō to demokurashii*” [儒教とデモクラシー Confucianism and democracy] Shibun [新文] 1, no. 4 (1919): 331.

Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan*, 138.


Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan*, 137–38

Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan*, 148–52.


Inoue Tetsujirō, “*Jukyō yori mitaru Shina jihen*” [儒教より観たる支那事変 The China Incident seen from the viewpoint of Confucianism], *Shibun* 20, no. 1 (January 1938): 1–10; Iijima Tadao, “*Kokutai no meichō to Shina no kakusei*” [國體の明徴と支那の覺醒 Clarifying the national polity and the awakening of China], *Shibun* 19, no. 12 (December 1937): 1–3; and Shionoya On, “*Jukyō to sanninshugi*” [儒教と三民主義 Confucianism and the Three Principles of the People], *Shibun* 19, no. 10 (October 1937): 5–10.
36 For a fieldwork-based assessment of the present-day Shibunkai’s organizational aims and activities, see Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 181–82. In a recent survey, James McMullen finds that there are currently nine localities in Japan—including Yushima Sage Hall—where Confucian rites continue to be practiced, usually on a modest scale. See McMullen, The Worship of Confucius in Japan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asian Center, 2020), 478–79.