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ABSTRACT
This paper comes in support of an idea advocated, among others, by Putnam and Searle according to which “computation is in the eyes of the beholder”, i.e. the question whether a physical system implements a computation is a subjective issue. The attacks mounted by David Chalmers and Jack Copeland against this ideology constitute, essentially, the subject of my critique: I have ventured to show that, to the extent to which notions like ‘causality’ and ‘physical system’ Are accepted and/or tolerated by the contemporary science of Physics, both attacks are rendered ineffective.
Published Online: 2010-03-16
Published in Print: 2002-November
© Philosophia Press 2002