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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter March 16, 2010

The Validity of the Human Rights. Reconstruction, Justification, and Application

  • Petra Hedberg
From the journal SATS

Abstract

This paper is divided into three main topics: 1) Habermas makes usage of the liberal vs. republican models of democracy in order to reconstruct the basic rights which are part of both democratic and human rights. To what extent are the human rights justifiable by a reconstructive approach? 2) The Habermas-Apel debate will be brought forward in the two last parts. Within the Apelian approach, the human rights may be reflexively justified, but within the Habermasian one, they are left to a discursive justification. The discursive conditions of practical discourses are, further on, considered to be ‘neutral’ by being procedural. The human rights may, analogously, seem to get a ‘neutral, procedural foundation’ within the Habermasian approach. A discursive justification, however, will not be able to accomplish a strong justification of the human rights, and according to Apel, both a stronger reflexive justification and a weaker discursive one will have to rest on meta-normative presuppositions. In which sense are these meta-norms ‘neutral’, and in which sense are they based upon modern-liberal presuppositions? 3) The last part turns to dilemmas linked to specific human rights, such as the freedom of speech vs. freedom of religion. To what extent are these kinds of dilemmas resolvable by Apelian (reflexive) and Habermasian (discursive, procedural) means?

Published Online: 2010-03-16
Published in Print: 2007-May

© Philosophia Press 2007

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