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Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?

  • Maciej Czerkawski EMAIL logo


This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.

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Published Online: 2021-08-21
Published in Print: 2022-12-31

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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