Abstract
The paper seeks to specify how, according to Plato’s Sophist, true statements achieve their being about objects and their saying that ‘what is about such objects is’. Drawing on the 6th definition of the sophist, I argue for a normative-teleological conception of truth in which the best condition of our soul –in its making statements or having mental states– consists in its seeking to attain the telos of truth. Further, on the basis of Plato’s discussion of original and image, his distinction between correct and incorrect image, and the 7th definition, I argue that achieving the telos of truth involves preserving the original’s proportions and appropriate features. The view that Plato’s conception of truth takes statements or mental states to be certain types of image is not ground-breaking. The important contribution of my argument is that it offers a plausible way to understand two recalcitrant claims made by Plato: first, that falsity obtains not only in the region of incorrect images (appearances) but also within correct images (likenesses); second, that some incorrect images are based on knowledge and so could be true.
Bluck, R. S. 1975. Plato’s Sophist: A Commentary. Manchester.Search in Google Scholar
Bondenson, W. 1972. “Plato’s Sophist: Falsehoods and Images”. Apeiron 6, 1–6.10.1515/APEIRON.1972.6.2.1Search in Google Scholar
Bostock, D. 1984. “Plato on ‘Is-Not’ (Sophist 254–9)”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy II, 89–119.Search in Google Scholar
Brown, L. 2010. “Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist”. In Definition in Greek Philosophy. Ed. D. Charles. Oxford, 151–171.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564453.003.0005Search in Google Scholar
Crivelli, P. 2012. Plato’s Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9781139015004Search in Google Scholar
Frede, M. 1992a. “Plato’s Sophist on False Statements”. In The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Ed. R. Kraut. Cambridge, 397–424.10.1017/CCOL0521430186.013Search in Google Scholar
–. 1992b. “Plato’s Arguments and the Dialogue Form”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Supplementary volume. Oxford, 201–19.Search in Google Scholar
Gill, M. L. 2012. Philosophos: Plato’s Missing Dialogue. Oxford.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606184.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Gulley, N. 1962. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. London.Search in Google Scholar
Haack, S. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9780511812866.002Search in Google Scholar
Harte, V. 2006. “Beware of Imitations: Image Recognition in Plato”. In New Essays on Plato: Language and Thought in Fourth-Century Greek Philosophy. Ed. F.-G. Hermann. Swansea, 21–42.10.2307/j.ctvvn951.5Search in Google Scholar
Hestir, B. E. 2016. Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth. Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9781316450864Search in Google Scholar
Hestir, B. E. 2003. “A ‘Conception’ of Truth in Plato’s Sophist”. Journal of the History of Philosophy 41, 1–24.10.1353/hph.2002.0097Search in Google Scholar
Keyt D. 1973. “Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B”. In Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos. Eds. E. N. Lee/A. P. D. Mourelatos/R. M. Rorty. Assen, 285–305.Search in Google Scholar
Leigh, F. 2009, “Plato on Art, Perspective, and Beauty in the Sophist”. Literature and Aesthetics 19, 183–214.Search in Google Scholar
Notomi, N. 1999. The Unity of Plato’s ‘Sophist’: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher. Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9781107297968Search in Google Scholar
Rosen, S. 1983. Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image. New Haven.Search in Google Scholar
Szaif, J. 21998. Platons Begriff der Wahrheit. Munich.Search in Google Scholar
Tarski, A. 1944. “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 341–76.10.2307/2102968Search in Google Scholar
Tilghman, B. R. 1969. “Parmenides, Plato, and Logical Atomism”. Southern Association of Philosophy 7, 151–160.10.1111/j.2041-6962.1969.tb02049.xSearch in Google Scholar
Walker, R. C. S. 1989. The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, Idealism. London/New York.Search in Google Scholar
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
