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Publicly Available Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg May 12, 2016

We-Intentions and Social Action

Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller
From the journal Analyse & Kritik

Abstract

In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indispensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general in a theory of intentional social action is emphasized along with the fact that we-intending leads to action in suitable circumstances.

Online erschienen: 2016-5-12
Erschienen im Druck: 1985-5-1

© 1985 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

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