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Publicly Available Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg May 14, 2016

Perfect or Bounded Rationality?

Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals

Werner Güth
From the journal Analyse & Kritik

Abstract

Simple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of ‘games and boundedly rational economic behavior’ with enhanced explanatory power.

Online erschienen: 2016-5-14
Erschienen im Druck: 2004-11-1

© 2004 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

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