Accessible Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter May 11, 2021

Can Targeted Child Benefits Affect Fertility? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Panayiota Lyssiotou

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on whether targeted cash child benefits can affect fertility and, specifically, induce families to have more than two children. We exploit the introduction of a monthly non-means tested cash child benefit paid only to families with at least four children. We apply a quasi experimental methodology since the reform is expected to have increased births of fourth child relative to births of third child or higher than four. We find robust evidence that the reform increased significantly the treated family’s probability to have a (fourth) child by about 5% and had no effect on births greater than four. In the post reform period, the control group’s probability to have a (third) child was not significantly different than before the reform. In particular, the finding that the probability of birth among parities greater than four was not affected by the reform supports that what we are estimating is a response of the targeted family to the introduction of the child benefit and not a change in the fertility preferences of families with many children. Other changes (besides the reform) had a negative effect on the probability to have a child that was reversed only for the birth of fourth child among treated families due to the economic incentives created by the reform.

JEL Classification: D12; J13; J18; H31; J11

Corresponding author: Panayiota Lyssiotou, Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, 1678Nicosia, Cyprus, E-mail:

Funding source: University of Cyprus

Award Identifier / Grant number: Unassigned

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the Editor in Chief Prof. Hendrik Schmitz and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. I also would like to thank the University of Cyprus for financial support and the Statistical Service of Cyprus for making available the Family Expenditure Survey data. I am solely responsible for the interpretation of the data and all errors.

Appendix
Table 1A:

Summary statistics of macro fertility indicators.

Fertility indicatorsBefore reform: 1980–1989After reform: 1990–2002
MeanStd. Dev.MinMaxMeanStd. dev.MinMax
Total fertility rate2.420.062.322.501.970.341.492.49
Total number of births10585.00301.1710099.0011005.009537.851099.807883.0011372.00
Total number of first birth4255.60301.683791.004726.003473.00379.373026.004145.00
Total number of second birth3886.40151.083657.004104.003206.92433.292551.003826.00
Total number of third birth1823.20180.351463.002021.001803.85330.831195.002249.00
Total number of forth birth449.4080.16327.00559.00714.77160.54461.00931.00
Total number of fifth to eight birth149.9014.00126.00178.00231.0840.97154.00290.00

  1. Source: The data are obtained from the Statistical Service of Cyprus.

Table 2A:

Marginal probit estimates – marriage behavior and educational outcomes of the youth.

Unmarried and in educationIN Education
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
Male children age 18–25Female children age 18–23Male children age 18–25Female children age 18–23Male children age 18–25Female children age 18–23Male children age 18–25Female children age 18–23Male children age 18–25Female children age 18–23Male children age 18–25Female children age 18–23
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy0.1050.324***0.09210.277***0.1050.358***0.09210.308***
(1.143)(2.890)(1.143)(2.889)(1.143)(3.188)(1.143)(3.187)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy0.1260.285***0.1190.264***0.1470.287***0.1370.265***
(1.352)(2.698)(1.351)(2.697)(1.569)(2.698)(1.568)(2.697)
Post91*Family has two children0.0753−0.1030.0686−0.08910.0755−0.1360.0686−0.118
(0.685)(−0.935)(0.685)(−0.935)(0.685)(−1.274)(0.685)(−1.274)
Post91*Family has three children−0.0681−0.126−0.0620−0.107−0.0683−0.148−0.0620−0.126
(−0.693)(−1.058)(−0.693)(−1.058)(−0.693)(−1.275)(−0.693)(−1.275)
Post91*Family has more than three children−0.159−0.119−0.142−0.100−0.159−0.140−0.142−0.118
(−1.536)(−0.870)(−1.535)(−0.870)(−1.536)(−1.056)(−1.535)(−1.055)
Post96*Family has two children0.08410.04660.08160.04460.06350.03510.06180.0336
(0.754)(0.388)(0.754)(0.387)(0.579)(0.293)(0.579)(0.293)
Post96*Family has three children−0.06720.0233−0.06630.0224−0.08250.0234−0.08180.0225
(−0.680)(0.173)(−0.680)(0.173)(−0.856)(0.173)(−0.855)(0.173)
Post96*Family has more than three children0.0568−0.06610.0556−0.06320.0365−0.06660.0358−0.0635
(0.438)(−0.507)(0.438)(−0.507)(0.288)(−0.507)(0.288)(−0.507)
Family has two children−0.007320.101−0.006670.0886−0.007170.0976−0.007340.113−0.006670.0996−0.007200.109
(−0.0920)(1.218)(−0.0919)(1.218)(−0.0919)(1.218)(−0.0920)(1.357)(−0.0919)(1.357)(−0.0919)(1.357)
Family has three children0.04750.02010.04350.01750.04660.01930.04760.02020.04350.01770.04670.0194
(0.578)(0.210)(0.578)(0.210)(0.578)(0.210)(0.578)(0.210)(0.578)(0.210)(0.578)(0.210)
Family has more than three children−0.06670.0647−0.06070.0568−0.06560.0621−0.06680.0650−0.06070.0573−0.06580.0624
(−0.852)(0.678)(−0.852)(0.677)(−0.852)(0.678)(−0.852)(0.678)(−0.852)(0.677)(−0.852)(0.678)
Observations968703666492654516968703666492654516
Pseudo R20.04230.07680.04310.05060.04030.09880.04280.07640.04310.05260.04120.0969

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The estimates are based on the observations of male children age 18–25 and female children age 18–23 of the family. The reference is the child of the family with one child. The multi-member family has more than three children and the non-multi-member family has less than four children.

Table 3A:

Linear probability estimates – all families and married families with two and three children age 2–17.

VariablesAll families with two and three children age 2–17Married families with two and three children age 2–17
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy−0.0155−0.0124−0.00453−0.0124−0.0132−0.0105−0.00189−0.0105
(−0.851)(−1.093)(−0.220)(−1.093)(−0.700)(−0.914)(−0.0893)(−0.915)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy−0.0192−0.0217*−0.0494**−0.0217*−0.0168−0.0200−0.0471**−0.0200
(−1.074)(−1.659)(−2.225)(−1.658)(−0.913)(−1.502)(−1.997)(−1.502)
Post91*Has three children age 2–17 dummy0.01370.01240.01200.01240.01170.01040.009920.0104
(0.832)(0.764)(0.730)(0.765)(0.699)(0.625)(0.592)(0.625)
Post96*Has three children age 2–17 dummy0.0423*0.0396*0.0511**0.0396*0.0411*0.0395*0.0506**0.0395*
(1.944)(1.828)(2.310)(1.827)(1.818)(1.762)(2.206)(1.762)
Has three children age 2–17 dummy−0.0385***−0.0402***−0.0379***−0.0402***−0.0390***−0.0402***−0.0377***−0.0389***−0.0372***−0.0389***−0.0387***−0.0389***
(−2.917)(−3.094)(−2.864)(−3.095)(−2.895)(−3.094)(−2.795)(−2.938)(−2.746)(−2.939)(−2.809)(−2.937)
Sex ratio index0.8590.1440.1900.8980.2050.185
(0.956)(0.123)(0.184)(0.961)(0.171)(0.172)
Has two children with same sex0.007920.008620.02390.005070.005090.0185
(0.679)(0.654)(1.421)(0.432)(0.386)(1.096)
Log real household income0.004490.002810.0162**0.003070.0002280.0125
(0.918)(0.488)(2.516)(0.550)(0.0338)(1.572)
Couple household0.0485**0.0458*
(2.428)(1.752)
Working spouse−0.0205***−0.0205**−0.0257**−0.0206***−0.0206**−0.0271**
(−2.703)(−2.453)(−2.508)(−2.710)(−2.452)(−2.565)
Age of spouse−0.00575*−0.00735**−0.00376−0.00581*−0.00740**−0.00388
(−1.910)(−2.138)(−1.047)(−1.918)(−2.146)(−1.070)
Age of spouse square7.94 × 10−50.000152−3.51 × 10−57.62 × 10−50.000145−4.92 × 10−5
(0.623)(1.031)(−0.240)(0.598)(0.987)(−0.335)
Age of head−0.000142−0.000446−4.69 × 10−5−3.14 × 10−5−0.0002580.000172
(−0.133)(−0.331)(−0.0323)(−0.0277)(−0.186)(0.108)
Number of additional adults−0.00317−0.00217−0.00536−0.00246−0.000998−0.00322
(−0.653)(−0.377)(−0.834)(−0.483)(−0.165)(−0.456)
Constant−0.3750.0668***0.003290.0668***−0.1410.0668***−0.3380.0663***0.03470.0663***−0.1120.0663***
(−0.830)(7.386)(0.00556)(7.387)(−0.271)(7.384)(−0.719)(7.238)(0.0574)(7.239)(−0.205)(7.236)
Observations337833782689268917521752328832882621262116981698
R-squared0.0340.0040.0390.0050.0450.0050.0330.0040.0390.0050.0440.004

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–17. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Table 4A:

Linear probability estimates – all families and married families with more than one child age 2–17.

VariablesAll families with more than one child age 2–17Married families with more than one child age 2–17
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy−0.0110−0.0124−0.00304−0.0124−0.00797−0.01058.02 × 10−5−0.0105
(−0.627)(−1.092)(−0.153)(−1.092)(−0.439)(−0.914)(0.00394)(−0.914)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy−0.0171−0.0217*−0.0343−0.0217*−0.0140−0.0200−0.0312−0.0200
(−0.981)(−1.658)(−1.612)(−1.658)(−0.782)(−1.502)(−1.407)(−1.501)
Post91*Has three children0.01310.01240.01190.01240.01080.01040.009520.0104
age 2–17 dummy(0.798)(0.764)(0.723)(0.764)(0.650)(0.625)(0.569)(0.625)
Post91*Has more than three0.03660.04070.03600.04070.03300.04010.03210.0401
children age 2–17 dummy(0.916)(1.027)(0.898)(1.027)(0.801)(0.974)(0.776)(0.974)
Post96*Has three children0.0430**0.0396*0.0499**0.0396*0.0419*0.0395*0.0495**0.0395*
age 2–17 dummy(1.973)(1.827)(2.258)(1.826)(1.855)(1.762)(2.161)(1.761)
Post96*Has more than three−0.00703−0.00969−0.00714−0.00969−0.0108−0.0133−0.0167−0.0133
children age 2–17 dummy(−0.210)(−0.294)(−0.212)(−0.294)(−0.313)(−0.393)(−0.471)(−0.393)
Has three children−0.0990***−0.0402***−0.104**−0.0402***−0.0930*−0.0402***−0.102***−0.0389***−0.106**−0.0389***−0.0513***−0.0389***
age 2–17 dummy(−2.894)(−3.093)(−2.574)(−3.094)(−1.959)(−3.092)(−2.880)(−2.937)(−2.566)(−2.938)(−3.045)(−2.936)
Has more than three children−0.143*−0.0135−0.153*−0.0135−0.129−0.0135−0.146*−0.0108−0.156*−0.0108−0.0327−0.0108
age 2–17 dummy(−1.900)(−0.491)(−1.709)(−0.491)(−1.237)(−0.491)(−1.898)(−0.377)(−1.706)(−0.377)(−0.809)(−0.377)
Number of children age 2–50.0674*0.0720*0.04800.0721*0.0768*
(1.847)(1.659)(0.930)(1.912)(1.717)
Number of children age 6–170.0729**0.0786*0.06220.0777**0.0834**0.0199**
(2.150)(1.922)(1.290)(2.211)(1.977)(1.974)
Number of children age 2–5*Number of−0.0149**−0.0159**−0.00475−0.0162**−0.0174**−0.00135
of children age 6–17(−2.191)(−1.982)(−0.603)(−2.314)(−2.110)(−0.246)
Sex ratio index0.507−0.1880.08050.552−0.09020.0911
(0.589)(−0.165)(0.0814)(0.615)(−0.0774)(0.0883)
Has two children with same sex0.008300.008330.02480.005590.004870.0200
(0.712)(0.632)(1.472)(0.476)(0.369)(1.182)
Log real household income0.004630.003420.0136**0.00267−5.34 × 10−50.0111
(0.994)(0.618)(2.016)(0.500)(−0.00830)(1.513)
Couple household0.0654***0.0626**0.0389
(3.308)(2.472)(1.280)
Working spouse−0.0258***−0.0270***−0.0269***−0.0259***−0.0269***−0.0270***
(−3.527)(−3.283)(−2.667)(−3.531)(−3.280)(−2.675)
Age of spouse−0.00565*−0.00668*−0.00627−0.00574*−0.00678*−0.00733*
(−1.671)(−1.729)(−1.599)(−1.685)(−1.743)(−1.888)
Age of spouse square3.13 × 10−57.97 × 10−54.41 × 10−62.58 × 10−56.95 × 10−53.74 × 10−5
(0.226)(0.495)(0.0280)(0.185)(0.431)(0.247)
Age of head−0.000770−0.00136−2.88 × 10−5−0.000642−0.00111−4.87 × 10−5
(−0.722)(−0.985)(−0.0206)(−0.567)(−0.779)(−0.00325)
Constant−0.3510.0668***0.005800.0668***−0.2020.0668***−0.3050.0663***0.03270.0663***−0.05790.0663***
(−0.803)(7.384)(0.00997)(7.385)(−0.401)(7.381)(−0.672)(7.235)(0.0552)(7.236)(−0.111)(7.233)
Observations364236422862286219181918354435442787278718601860
R-squared0.0390.0050.0430.0060.0470.0050.0390.0050.0440.0060.0450.005

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–17. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Table 5A:

Linear probability estimates – all families and married families.

VariablesAll familiesMarried families
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy−0.0324**−0.0124−0.0369**−0.0124−0.0346**−0.0105−0.0379**−0.0105
(−2.008)(−1.092)(−2.086)(−1.092)(−1.991)(−0.914)(−1.983)(−0.914)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy−0.0341**−0.0217*−0.0371*−0.0217*−0.0367**−0.0200−0.0388*−0.0200
(−2.056)(−1.658)(−1.843)(−1.658)(−2.087)(−1.502)(−1.773)(−1.501)
Post91*Has no−0.0522**−0.0554**−0.0524**−0.0554**−0.0539*−0.0469−0.0547*−0.0469
child age 2–17 dummy(−2.115)(−2.050)(−2.113)(−2.051)(−1.730)(−1.348)(−1.756)(−1.348)
Post91*Has one−0.0245−0.0202−0.0229−0.0202−0.0274−0.0274−0.0260−0.0274
child age 2–17 dummy(−0.982)(−0.768)(−0.919)(−0.768)(−1.032)(−0.979)(−0.980)(−0.979)
Post91*Has0.007020.01240.005660.01240.006340.01040.004950.0104
three children age 2–17 dummy(0.418)(0.764)(0.336)(0.764)(0.372)(0.625)(0.289)(0.625)
Post91*Has more than0.008110.04070.007960.04070.003470.04010.002870.0401
three children age 2–17 dummy(0.208)(1.027)(0.203)(1.027)(0.0857)(0.974)(0.0704)(0.974)
Post96*Has−0.0200−0.0151−0.0225−0.0151−0.0118−0.00474−0.0144−0.00474
no child age 2–17 dummy(−0.668)(−0.450)(−0.746)(−0.450)(−0.306)(−0.109)(−0.374)(−0.109)
Post96*Has one−0.0639**−0.0810***−0.0666**−0.0810***−0.0732**−0.0941***−0.0756**−0.0941***
child age 2–17 dummy(−2.324)(−2.802)(−2.418)(−2.801)(−2.493)(−3.050)(−2.568)(−3.049)
Post96*Has0.0427*0.0396*0.0496**0.0396*0.0411*0.0395*0.0486**0.0395*
three children age 2–17 dummy(1.919)(1.827)(2.210)(1.827)(1.791)(1.761)(2.090)(1.761)
Post96*Has more than−0.0322−0.00969−0.0256−0.00969−0.0323−0.0133−0.0248−0.0133
three children age 2–17 dummy(−0.942)(−0.294)(−0.736)(−0.294)(−0.908)(−0.393)(−0.686)(−0.393)
Has no child age 2–17 dummy0.443***0.116***0.460***0.116***0.400***0.116***0.478***0.171***0.499***0.171***0.435***0.171***
(6.657)(5.216)(6.156)(5.217)(4.474)(5.214)(6.838)(6.257)(6.428)(6.259)(4.563)(6.255)
Has one children0.289***0.154***0.296***0.154***0.274***0.154***0.306***0.174***0.315***0.174***0.290***0.174***
age 2–17 dummy(7.837)(7.541)(7.300)(7.543)(5.748)(7.539)(7.946)(7.989)(7.501)(7.991)(5.750)(7.987)
Has three children−0.153***−0.0402***−0.160***−0.0402***−0.140***−0.0402***−0.161***−0.0389***−0.170***−0.0389***−0.147***−0.0389***
age 2–17 dummy(−4.794)(−3.093)(−4.485)(−3.094)(−3.266)(−3.092)(−4.864)(−2.937)(−4.641)(−2.938)(−3.257)(−2.936)
Has more than three children−0.237***−0.0135−0.250***−0.0135−0.211**−0.0135−0.251***−0.0108−0.269***−0.0108−0.226**−0.0108
age 2–17 dummy(−3.227)(−0.491)(−3.029)(−0.491)(−2.166)(−0.491)(−3.309)(−0.377)(−3.174)(−0.377)(−2.197)(−0.377)
Number of children age 2–50.110***0.121***0.0767*0.117***0.130***0.0832*
(3.306)(3.217)(1.682)(3.409)(3.376)(1.720)
Number of children age 6–170.135***0.142***0.117***0.142***0.151***0.124***
(4.348)(4.025)(2.743)(4.412)(4.178)(2.731)
Number of children 2–5*Number−0.0232***−0.0265***−0.0106−0.0235***−0.0269***−0.0110
of children 6–17(−3.695)(−3.646)(−1.433)(−3.631)(−3.594)(−1.432)
Sex ratio index1.605**2.064**1.0751.749**2.147**1.214
(2.345)(2.346)(1.328)(2.283)(2.175)(1.346)
Has two children with same sex−0.0111−0.01220.000699−0.0151−0.0168−0.00602
(−0.936)(−0.906)(0.0410)(−1.281)(−1.260)(−0.358)
Log real household income0.00665*0.006300.005840.0132**0.0129*0.0102
(1.786)(1.523)(0.977)(2.222)(1.899)(1.232)
Couple household0.239***0.244***0.229***
(16.74)(15.00)(11.18)
Working spouse−0.0377***−0.0407***−0.0306***−0.0387***−0.0417***−0.0320***
(−4.859)(−4.610)(−2.862)(−4.991)(−4.724)(−2.992)
Age of spouse−0.00721***−0.00674**−0.00875***−0.00545**−0.00504*−0.00692**
(−2.873)(−2.393)(−2.606)(−2.078)(−1.717)(−1.987)
Age of spouse square−0.000259**−0.000295**−0.000220−0.000324***−0.000357***−0.000302**
(−2.369)(−2.371)(−1.513)(−2.904)(−2.821)(−2.039)
Age of head−0.0007621.23 × 10−5−0.00207*−0.00129−0.000554−0.00253*
(−0.902)(0.0115)(−1.777)(−1.115)(−0.382)(−1.690)
Number of additional adults−0.0102**−0.0108**0.000231−0.0125**−0.0128**2.89 × 10−5
(−2.212)(−2.070)(0.0331)(−2.253)(−2.036)(0.00353)
Constant−1.209***0.0668***−1.463***0.0668***−0.876**0.0668***−1.114***0.0663***−1.338***0.0663***−0.769*0.0663***
(−3.436)(7.384)(−3.245)(7.385)(−2.086)(7.382)(−2.849)(7.235)(−2.670)(7.236)(−1.651)(7.232)
Observations627962794953495333413341570557054502450230513051
R-squared0.1630.0470.1680.0500.1740.0510.1630.0640.1670.0660.1780.070

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–17. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Table 6A:

Marginal probit estimates – all families and married families with two and three children age 2–15.

VariablesAll families with two and three children age 2–15Married families with two and three children age 2–15
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform−0.0139−0.0149−0.00201−0.0149−0.0122−0.0135−0.000233−0.0139
1990/91 dummy(−0.905)(−1.302)(−0.115)(−1.252)(−0.762)(−1.144)(−0.0129)(−1.144)
Post reform−0.0163−0.0184−0.0284**−0.0198−0.0143−0.0170−0.0280**−0.0185
1996/97 dummy(−1.121)(−1.538)(−2.107)(−1.500)(−0.941)(−1.377)(−1.975)(−1.377)
Post91*Has0.01910.01590.01590.01500.01800.01440.01500.0143
three children age 2–15 dummy(0.731)(0.528)(0.639)(0.499)(0.684)(0.473)(0.605)(0.473)
Post96*Has0.0837**0.0697*0.0766***0.0693*0.0844**0.0691*0.0799***0.0704*
three children age 2–15 dummy(2.367)(1.871)(2.592)(1.831)(2.340)(1.829)(2.608)(1.829)
Has three children−0.0363***−0.0392**−0.0350***−0.0390**−0.0292***−0.0407**−0.0365***−0.0385**−0.0351***−0.0385**−0.0300***−0.0402**
age 2–15 dummy(−2.775)(−2.480)(−2.746)(−2.445)(−2.865)(−2.445)(−2.738)(−2.378)(−2.735)(−2.378)(−2.870)(−2.378)
Sex ratio index0.328−0.4680.01090.369−0.3880.0226
(0.465)(−0.517)(0.0187)(0.507)(−0.419)(0.0370)
Has two children0.006200.007000.008360.003670.003820.00558
with same sex(0.679)(0.690)(0.952)(0.396)(0.375)(0.625)
Log real household income0.007530.005210.0118*0.004600.0006030.00929
(1.220)(0.767)(1.951)(0.695)(0.0802)(1.431)
Couple household0.02380.02290.01730.0114
(1.191)(0.884)(0.714)(0.578)
Working spouse−0.0177**−0.0183**−0.0180**−0.0180**−0.0183**−0.0186**
(−2.288)(−2.110)(−2.412)(−2.284)(−2.092)(−2.421)
Age of spouse0.001410.0005260.0001660.001410.0005080.000126
(0.620)(0.212)(0.0820)(0.609)(0.203)(0.0607)
Age of spouse square−0.000341***−0.000298**−0.000219*−0.000353***−0.000317**−0.000231**
(−2.699)(−2.109)(−1.944)(−2.750)(−2.217)(−2.004)
Age of head−0.000578−0.00105−3.72 × 10−5−0.000459−0.0007648.73 × 10−5
(−0.504)(−0.743)(−0.0339)(−0.380)(−0.526)(0.0740)
Number of additional adults−0.00560−0.00334−0.00611−0.003360.000473−0.00407
(−0.539)(−0.305)(−0.659)(−0.316)(0.0427)(−0.420)
Observations229522951690169015641564223322331646164615171517
Pseudo R20.08630.01270.1030.01560.1080.01110.08410.01110.1010.01480.1060.0105

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–15. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–15.

Table 7A:

Marginal probit estimates for all families and married families with more than one child age 2–15.

VariablesAll families with more than one child age 2–15Married families with more than one child age 2–15
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform−0.00802−0.0145−0.000896−0.0152−0.00551−0.01350.00145−0.0142
1990/91 dummy(−0.545)(−1.253)(−0.0535)(−1.252)(−0.358)(−1.144)(0.0847)(−1.144)
Post reform−0.0113−0.0182−0.0183−0.0196−0.00849−0.0171−0.0171−0.0183
1996/97 dummy(−0.801)(−1.501)(−1.490)(−1.500)(−0.571)(−1.377)(−1.303)(−1.377)
Post91*Has three children age 2–15 dummy0.01580.01500.01390.01530.01430.01440.01280.0146
(0.645)(0.499)(0.588)(0.499)(0.583)(0.473)(0.540)(0.473)
Post91*Has more than0.009010.04390.007290.04480.006700.04030.004690.0409
three children age 2–15 dummy(0.264)(0.856)(0.220)(0.856)(0.196)(0.785)(0.143)(0.785)
Post96*Has0.0796**0.0682*0.0699**0.0688*0.0800**0.0694*0.0734**0.0698*
three children age 2–15 dummy(2.314)(1.831)(2.532)(1.831)(2.281)(1.829)(2.530)(1.829)
Post96*Has more than−0.0243−0.0215−0.0165−0.0225−0.0252−0.0242−0.0179−0.0252
three children age 2–15 dummy(−1.051)(−0.614)(−0.911)(−0.614)(−1.080)(−0.696)(−0.950)(−0.696)
Has three children−0.0465*−0.0383**−0.0531**−0.0394**−0.0335−0.0394**−0.0471*−0.0380**−0.0518**−0.0389**−0.0294***−0.0390**
age 2–15 dummy(−1.911)(−2.446)(−2.091)(−2.445)(−1.416)(−2.445)(−1.904)(−2.378)(−2.032)(−2.378)(−2.867)(−2.378)
Has more than three children−0.0230−0.00195−0.0322−0.00199−0.0151−0.00202−0.02330.00114−0.03010.00116−0.0002280.00117
age 2–15 dummy(−0.466)(−0.0732)(−0.753)(−0.0732)(−0.293)(−0.0732)(−0.461)(0.0410)(−0.664)(0.0410)(−0.00912)(0.0410)
Number of children age 2–50.02510.03570.008730.02690.0342
(0.814)(1.037)(0.267)(0.861)(1.007)
Number of children age 6–150.03220.04380.01830.03440.04250.0103*
(1.072)(1.300)(0.573)(1.124)(1.281)(1.776)
Number of children age 2–5*Number−0.0115**−0.0115**−0.00296−0.0126**−0.0126**−0.00362
of children age 6–15(−2.257)(−1.981)(−0.613)(−2.437)(−2.173)(−0.804)
Sex ratio index0.0897−0.526−0.04920.132−0.414−0.0423
(0.137)(−0.613)(−0.0931)(0.194)(−0.472)(−0.0757)
Has two children with same sex0.006670.006520.008550.004250.003400.00619
(0.755)(0.662)(1.047)(0.476)(0.344)(0.735)
Log real household income0.007070.004480.0111**0.00396−0.0007510.00871
(1.210)(0.686)(2.025)(0.629)(−0.103)(1.436)
Couple household0.0282*0.02350.0153
(1.646)(1.092)(0.932)
Working spouse−0.0194***−0.0208**−0.0159**−0.0197***−0.0209**−0.0166**
(−2.726)(−2.535)(−2.426)(−2.718)(−2.527)(−2.432)
Age of spouse0.001120.000766−0.001250.001090.000734−0.00139
(0.466)(0.283)(−0.602)(0.447)(0.269)(−0.646)
Age of spouse square−0.000376***−0.000364**−0.000188*−0.000389***−0.000386**−0.000200*
(−2.854)(−2.410)(−1.669)(−2.912)(−2.533)(−1.734)
Age of head−0.000871−0.00144−6.01 × 10−5−0.000757−0.001114.24 × 10−5
(−0.795)(−1.051)(−0.0591)(−0.657)(−0.794)(0.0382)
Observations247124711791179116981698240424041743174316471647
Pseudo R20.09750.01360.1120.01620.1130.01260.09660.01310.1130.01570.1110.0121

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–15. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–15. The estimate of the number of additional adults in the family is insignificant across all specifications.

Table 8A:

Marginal probit estimates – all families and married families without and with children age 2–15.

VariablesAll familiesMarried families
Post reform survey(s)Post reform survey(s)
FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97FES 90/91 & FES 96/97FES 90/91FES 96/97
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
Post reform−0.0230−0.0224−0.0253−0.0241−0.0240−0.0216−0.0257−0.0232
1990/91 dummy(−1.624)(−1.253)(−1.500)(−1.253)(−1.506)(−1.144)(−1.363)(−1.144)
Post reform−0.0240*−0.0282−0.0289*−0.0301−0.0242−0.0275−0.0289−0.0289
1996/97 dummy(−1.706)(−1.501)(−1.729)(−1.501)(−1.524)(−1.377)(−1.581)(−1.377)
Post91*Has no child−0.0178−0.0193−0.0195−0.0204−0.0183−0.0141−0.0197−0.0149
age 2–15 dummy(−1.161)(−0.783)(−1.178)(−0.783)(−1.023)(−0.512)(−1.030)(−0.512)
Post91*Has one child−0.0004230.009490.0003480.00997−0.002340.00885−0.001730.00929
age 2–15 dummy(−0.0265)(0.380)(0.0202)(0.380)(−0.134)(0.336)(−0.0921)(0.336)
Post91*Has three children0.01670.02290.01700.02400.01490.02260.01530.0237
age 2–15 dummy(0.560)(0.499)(0.539)(0.499)(0.461)(0.473)(0.448)(0.473)
Post91*Has more than three0.002870.06450.004670.0675−3.09 × 10−50.06110.001670.0638
children age 2–15 dummy(0.0697)(0.856)(0.105)(0.856)(−0.000693)(0.785)(0.0349)(0.785)
Post96*Has no child−0.001800.00525−0.005120.005400.0004030.0105−0.002960.0108
age 2–15 dummy(−0.0990)(0.187)(−0.280)(0.187)(0.0189)(0.338)(−0.141)(0.338)
Post96*Has one child−0.0172−0.0340−0.0202−0.0356−0.0229−0.0400*−0.0253−0.0417*
age 2–15 dummy(−1.145)(−1.490)(−1.313)(−1.490)(−1.412)(−1.685)(−1.555)(−1.685)
Post96*Has three children0.0994**0.1000*0.111**0.102*0.101**0.104*0.111**0.105*
age 2–15 dummy(2.317)(1.831)(2.491)(1.831)(2.198)(1.829)(2.380)(1.829)
Post96*More than three−0.0310−0.0340−0.0284−0.0352−0.0364−0.0397−0.0331−0.0409
children age 2–15 dummy(−1.079)(−0.614)(−0.890)(−0.614)(−1.159)(−0.696)(−0.983)(−0.696)
Has no children0.709***0.0888***0.670***0.0931***0.722***0.0914***0.774***0.139***0.733***0.145***0.782***0.142***
age 2–15 dummy(5.528)(4.577)(4.159)(4.577)(4.615)(4.577)(5.608)(5.998)(4.240)(5.998)(4.715)(5.998)
Has one children0.330***0.124***0.315***0.129***0.347***0.126***0.349***0.138***0.334***0.144***0.361***0.140***
age 2–15 dummy(6.411)(6.854)(4.972)(6.854)(5.588)(6.854)(6.459)(7.167)(5.024)(7.166)(5.641)(7.166)
Has three children−0.0622***−0.0557**−0.0649***−0.0590**−0.0643***−0.0573**−0.0707***−0.0577**−0.0736***−0.0612**−0.0711***−0.0590**
age 2–15 dummy(−4.207)(−2.446)(−3.340)(−2.446)(−3.896)(−2.446)(−4.142)(−2.378)(−3.319)(−2.378)(−3.880)(−2.378)
Has more than three children−0.0498**−0.00300−0.0513−0.00316−0.0531**−0.00309−0.0563**0.00181−0.05750.00190−0.0582**0.00185
age 2–15 dummy(−2.164)(−0.0732)(−1.560)(−0.0732)(−2.080)(−0.0732)(−2.122)(0.0410)(−1.538)(0.0410)(−2.059)(0.0410)
Number of children0.0810***0.0779**0.0796**0.0904***0.0858**0.0871***
age 2–5(3.250)(2.327)(2.553)(3.281)(2.343)(2.601)
Number of children0.0924***0.0885***0.0979***0.102***0.0975***0.106***
age 6–15(3.768)(2.687)(3.185)(3.771)(2.707)(3.202)
Number of children−0.0170***−0.0184***−0.0107−0.0196***−0.0210***−0.0125*
2–5*No. Of children 6–15(−2.979)(−2.590)(−1.549)(−3.102)(−2.697)(−1.670)
Sex ratio index0.6170.7830.3960.842*0.9590.591
(1.456)(1.255)(0.887)(1.767)(1.359)(1.198)
Has two children0.008540.009710.01490.003980.003280.00837
with same sex(0.765)(0.713)(1.073)(0.332)(0.226)(0.583)
Log real0.007020.007170.006160.00979*0.009460.00944
household income(1.511)(1.237)(1.037)(1.798)(1.383)(1.389)
Couple household0.0632***0.0675***0.0625***
(7.973)(6.724)(6.634)
Working spouse−0.0269***−0.0294***−0.0246***−0.0312***−0.0340***−0.0280***
(−4.671)(−4.213)(−3.474)(−4.763)(−4.311)(−3.573)
Age of spouse0.001760.001770.001420.002310.002460.00194
(1.356)(1.127)(0.897)(1.596)(1.414)(1.136)
Age of spouse square−0.000624***−0.000668***−0.000648***−0.000723***−0.000772***−0.000747***
(−7.508)(−6.510)(−6.615)(−7.850)(−6.834)(−7.104)
Age of head−0.000904−0.000518−0.00153−0.000844−0.000570−0.00138
(−1.163)(−0.486)(−1.637)(−0.923)(−0.451)(−1.277)
Number of additional adults0.004760.005410.0130*0.006410.007610.0164**
(0.730)(0.672)(1.911)(0.845)(0.821)(2.133)
Observations481048103484348433413341437843783175317530513051
Pseudo R20.2510.05580.2550.06000.2550.05430.2450.06890.2490.07210.2530.0684

  1. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–15. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–15.

Table 9A:

Standard and recursive bivariate probit estimates.

Birth probabilityWorking probability
RecursiveStandardRecursiveStandard
MarginalzMarginalzMarginalzMarginalz
Working spouse−0.1238−2.05
Sex ratio index1.20632.531.11692.380.42460.340.40610.32
Post reform 1990/91 dummy−0.0370−2.56−0.0430−3.150.04911.450.05201.54
Post reform 1996/97 dummy−0.0359−2.87−0.0400−3.72−0.0276−0.48−0.0052−0.09
Post91*Had no child age 2–17 dummy−0.0279−2.05−0.0214−1.72−0.0614−1.29−0.0599−1.25
Post91*Has one age 2–17 dummy−0.0032−0.20−0.0065−0.480.04221.090.04281.11
Post91*Has three children age 2–17 dummy0.01530.510.01360.480.00530.120.00640.15
Post91*Has more than three children age 2–17 dummy0.01180.260.01840.39−0.0772−0.93−0.0756−0.90
Post96*Had no child age 2–17 dummy0.00000.000.00070.030.00030.000.00480.08
Post96*Has one age 2–17 dummy−0.0146−0.85−0.0174−1.190.06541.370.06261.32
Post96*Has three children age 2–17 dummy0.09192.080.08081.950.03910.720.03900.72
Post96*Has more than three children age 2–17 dummy−0.0449−2.24−0.0349−1.79−0.1796−2.17−0.1800−2.16
Has no child age 2–17 dummy0.25836.510.24276.460.03671.020.03500.96
Has one child age 2–17 dummy0.15136.250.14636.49−0.0040−0.13−0.0037−0.12
Has three children age 2–17 dummy−0.0497−3.43−0.0407−3.58−0.0906−2.59−0.0916−2.62
Has more than three children age 2–17 dummy−0.0038−0.120.00740.23−0.1059−1.70−0.1059−1.69
Log real household income0.01542.550.01172.49−0.1777−2.04−0.1363−1.63
Square log real household income0.01192.330.00951.93
Age of spouse−0.0031−4.22−0.0041−4.780.01325.920.01325.88
Age of spouse square−0.0008−4.85−0.0006−8.91−0.0008−5.22−0.0008−5.20
No. of additional adults−0.0022−0.29−0.0049−0.680.02892.540.02832.54
Living in rural area0.01551.860.02403.01−0.1212−5.38−0.1255−5.92
Working husband−0.0714−1.79−0.0817−2.020.07641.520.07521.52
Age of husband0.00020.23−0.0060−2.94−0.0062−2.99
Age of spouse_rural dummy0.00010.070.00813.840.00854.29
Correlation parameter (rho)0.3944−0.1802
P-value0.21080
Number of observations57055705

  1. Note: The reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Figure 1A: Sex Ratio Index: Age 20–24.Note: Individuals born between 1965–1969 were of age 20–24 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 20–24 over the number of males and females of age 20–24.

Figure 1A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 20–24.

Note: Individuals born between 19651969 were of age 20–24 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 20–24 over the number of males and females of age 20–24.

Figure 2A: Sex Ratio Index: Age 25–29.Note: Individuals born between 1960–1964 were of age 25–29 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 25–29 over the number of males and females of age 25–29.

Figure 2A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 25–29.

Note: Individuals born between 19601964 were of age 25–29 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 25–29 over the number of males and females of age 25–29.

Figure 3A: Sex Ratio Index: Age 30–34.Note: Individuals born between 1955–1959 were of age 30–34 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 30–34 over the number of males and females of age 30–34.

Figure 3A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 30–34.

Note: Individuals born between 19551959 were of age 30–34 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 30–34 over the number of males and females of age 30–34.

Figure 4A: Sex Ratio Index: Age 35–39.Note: Individuals born between 1950–1954 were of age 35–39 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 35–39 over the number of males and females of age 35–39.

Figure 4A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 35–39.

Note: Individuals born between 19501954 were of age 35–39 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 35–39 over the number of males and females of age 35–39.

Figure 5A: Sex Ratio Index: Age 0–4.Note: The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 0–4 over the number of males and females of age 0–4.

Figure 5A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 0–4.

Note: The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 0–4 over the number of males and females of age 0–4.

Figure 6A: Mean Age of Female of Giving Birth to First Child.Note: In Figures 1A–6A, the very thick lines show the year of the independence (1960) and war (1974). The lighter thick line shows the introduction of child benefits (1988). The lighter lines show the years of the FES individual data (1984/85, 1990/91, 1996/97). The data after 1974 refer to the area controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus.Sources:Figures 1A–6A are based on the OECD database; Figure 6A is based on Demographic Reports, CYSTAT, Cyprus.

Figure 6A:

Mean Age of Female of Giving Birth to First Child.

Note: In Figures 1A6A, the very thick lines show the year of the independence (1960) and war (1974). The lighter thick line shows the introduction of child benefits (1988). The lighter lines show the years of the FES individual data (1984/85, 1990/91, 1996/97). The data after 1974 refer to the area controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Sources:Figures 1A6A are based on the OECD database; Figure 6A is based on Demographic Reports, CYSTAT, Cyprus.

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Received: 2020-06-01
Revised: 2021-04-07
Accepted: 2021-04-14
Published Online: 2021-05-11

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston