Abstract
Does information regarding the economic consequences of a minimum wage affect the level of support for or opposition to minimum wage policy? We conduct an online survey of 2242 US respondents to study this question. We randomly assign differing, empirically plausible estimates of minimum wage impacts on three outcomes—employment, the distribution of minimum wage gains to households, and comparative impacts of a government transfer program versus a minimum wage— in order to explore the relationship between minimum wage consequences and political commitment. Our results show that while political commitment is indeed influenced by information on the policy’s consequences, such information rarely leads to fundamental changes in political commitment. This is consistent with findings in the larger literature on the effects of information provision on political commitment. We offer a novel explanation for such findings by surveying respondents on their moral beliefs regarding the minimum wage, focusing on the extent to which these beliefs are consequentialist or non-consequentialist in nature. We find that non-consequentialist moral beliefs are prevalent among survey respondents and that the more intense are these beliefs, the less likely people are to be swayed by the policy’s consequences.
Funding source: University of California, Riverside
Award Identifier / Grant number: Edward A. Dickson Emeritus/a Professor Award
Acknowledgments
We have been the beneficiary of much good advice from colleagues in both the social sciences and philosophy on this project, including Michael Bates, Steven Brint, Joe Cummins, John Fisher, Robert Kaestner, Stephen Knowles, Mindy Marks, Ronald Peeters, Todd Sorensen, and John Weymark. We benefited from presentations at UC-Riverside, the University of Otago, Victoria University Wellington, Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development at ISI-Delhi, and the Eastern Economic Association Meetings. We owe a special thanks to Tarek Azzam for helping us navigate the mysteries of surveying on the mTurk site. All errors are our own.
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Research funding: This work was supported by Edward A. Dickson Emeritus/a Professor Award at the University of California, Riverside.
Descriptive statistics of respondents and comparison with American community survey 2018.
| mTurk sample (N = 2242) | US population | |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | |
| Age | 37.61 | 47.60 |
| Female | 0.49 | 0.51 |
| College degree | 0.51 | 0.30 |
| Individual income less than 50,000 | 0.74 | 0.72 |
| Household income less than 50,000 | 0.50 | 0.38 |
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The table shows summary statistics from the Qualtrics sample in column 1 and corresponding statistics in the US population from the 2018 American Community Survey. Data in column 2 are restricted to population 18 years and over. All statistics in column 2 are calculated using individual weights except for household income, where household weight is used. Income is measured in USD.
Summary statistics by employment treatment for supporters and opponents.
| 1% | 10% | 20% | (1)–(2) | (2)–(3) | (1)–(3) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Mean/SD | Mean/SD | Mean/SD | b/t | b/t | b/t | |
| Panel A: supporters | ||||||
| Age | 38.22 | 37.35 | 37.88 | 0.87 | −0.53 | 0.35 |
| (11.58) | (10.94) | (11.21) | (1.33) | (−0.82) | (0.52) | |
| Female | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.48 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.21) | (−0.26) | (−0.46) | |
| College degree | 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.52 | −0.02 | 0.02 | −0.00 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.72) | (0.66) | (−0.06) | |
| Individual income | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.73 | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.00 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.44) | (0.45) | (0.44) | (0.62) | (−0.61) | (0.00) |
| Household income | 0.48 | 0.52 | 0.50 | −0.05 | 0.02 | −0.03 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−1.57) | (0.62) | (−0.94) |
| Liberal | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.51 | −0.03 | −0.01 | −0.04 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.89) | (−0.47) | (−1.35) | |
| Conservative | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.20 | −0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| (0.40) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (−0.41) | (0.87) | (0.45) | |
| Moderate | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.03 | −0.01 | 0.03 |
| (0.46) | (0.45) | (0.45) | (1.20) | (−0.25) | (0.95) | |
| Observations | 582 | 602 | 578 | 1184 | 1180 | 1160 |
| Panel B: opponents | ||||||
| Age | 38.16 | 36.49 | 36.07 | 1.67 | 0.42 | 2.09 |
| (12.09) | (11.42) | (10.03) | (1.26) | (0.35) | (1.69) | |
| Female | 0.58 | 0.45 | 0.59 | 0.12* | −0.14* | −0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.49) | (2.21) | (−2.45) | (−0.22) | |
| College degree | 0.42 | 0.47 | 0.45 | −0.05 | 0.02 | −0.02 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.84) | (0.41) | (−0.44) | |
| Individual income | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.76 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.43) | (0.03) | (0.28) | (0.31) |
| Household income | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.48 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.40) | (0.89) | (0.49) |
| Liberal | 0.31 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.10* | −0.11* | −0.01 |
| (0.46) | (0.41) | (0.47) | (2.03) | (−2.26) | (−0.21) | |
| Conservative | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| (0.50) | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.29) | (0.03) | (0.33) | |
| Moderate | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.25 | −0.10* | 0.10 | −0.01 |
| (0.43) | (0.48) | (0.44) | (−2.01) | (1.88) | (−0.16) | |
| Observations | 158 | 157 | 165 | 315 | 322 | 323 |
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Columns 1–3 show mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) by their assigned treatment group as indicated at the top of the table. Columns 4–6 show the difference in characteristics between groups as indicated at the top of the table. t-statistics on the difference are in parentheses for columns 4–6. Income is measured in USD. ***p
Summary statistics by distribution treatment for supporters and opponents.
| 80%/5% | 60%/20% | 40%/40% | (1)–(2) | (2)–(3) | (1)–(3) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Mean/SD | Mean/SD | Mean/SD | b/t | b/t | b/t | |
| Panel A: supporters | ||||||
| Age | 37.25 | 37.54 | 38.66 | −0.28 | −1.12 | −1.40* |
| (10.76) | (11.23) | (11.70) | (−0.44) | (−1.66) | (−2.14) | |
| Female | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.48 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.09) | (−0.41) | (−0.50) | |
| College degree | 0.53 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.27) | (0.17) | (0.44) | |
| Individual income | 0.72 | 0.74 | 0.72 | −0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.45) | (0.44) | (0.45) | (−0.54) | (0.60) | (0.06) |
| Household income | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.48 | −0.01 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.24) | (1.29) | (1.06) |
| Liberal | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.00) | (0.59) | (0.60) | |
| Conservative | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.03 | −0.04 | −0.01 |
| (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.42) | (1.11) | (−1.59) | (−0.49) | |
| Moderate | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.28 | −0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| (0.45) | (0.46) | (0.45) | (−0.90) | (0.95) | (0.06) | |
| Observations | 598 | 584 | 580 | 1182 | 1164 | 1178 |
| Panel B: opponents | ||||||
| Age | 35.69 | 37.12 | 37.80 | −1.44 | −0.68 | −2.12 |
| (9.53) | (12.02) | (11.78) | (−1.17) | (−0.52) | (−1.75) | |
| Female | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.57 | −0.01 | −0.04 | −0.05 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.25) | (−0.73) | (−0.97) | |
| College degree | 0.42 | 0.45 | 0.47 | −0.02 | −0.03 | −0.05 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.36) | (−0.49) | (−0.85) | |
| Individual income | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.77 | 0.00 | −0.01 | −0.01 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.43) | (0.43) | (0.42) | (0.05) | (−0.23) | (−0.17) |
| Household income | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.47 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.25) | (1.16) | (0.89) |
| Liberal | 0.33 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
| (0.47) | (0.44) | (0.44) | (1.39) | (0.22) | (1.60) | |
| Conservative | 0.35 | 0.43 | 0.47 | −0.09 | −0.04 | −0.13* |
| (0.48) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (−1.58) | (−0.72) | (−2.29) | |
| Moderate | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| (0.46) | (0.45) | (0.44) | (0.52) | (0.34) | (0.85) | |
| Observations | 153 | 164 | 163 | 317 | 327 | 316 |
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Columns 1–3 show mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) by their assigned treatment group as indicated at the top of the table. Columns 4–6 show the difference in characteristics between groups as indicated at the top of the table. t-statistics on the difference are in parentheses for columns 4–6. Income is measured in USD. ***p
Summary statistics by relative impact (MW vs. GT) treatment for supporters and opponents.
| Equal impact | Unclear impact | (2)–(1) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| Mean/SD | Mean/SD | b/t | |
| Panel A: supporters | |||
| Age | 37.87 | 37.75 | −0.12 |
| (11.44) | (11.06) | (−0.23) | |
| Female | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.56) | |
| College degree | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.34) | |
| Individual income | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.00 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.45) | (0.44) | (0.23) |
| Household income | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.14) |
| Liberal | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.01 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.40) | |
| Conservative | 0.21 | 0.20 | −0.01 |
| (0.41) | (0.40) | (−0.71) | |
| Moderate | 0.29 | 0.29 | −0.00 |
| (0.46) | (0.46) | (−0.05) | |
| Observations | 864 | 898 | 1762 |
| Panel B: opponents | |||
| Age | 36.72 | 37.07 | 0.35 |
| (10.42) | (11.97) | (0.34) | |
| Female | 0.55 | 0.53 | −0.03 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (−0.64) | |
| College degree | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.00 |
| (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.09) | |
| Individual income | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.03 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.43) | (0.42) | (0.65) |
| Household income | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.03 |
| Less than 50,000 | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.73) |
| Liberal | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.02 |
| (0.45) | (0.46) | (0.51) | |
| Conservative | 0.46 | 0.38 | −0.08 |
| (0.50) | (0.49) | (−1.76) | |
| Moderate | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.07 |
| (0.43) | (0.47) | (1.62) | |
| Observations | 240 | 240 | 480 |
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MW and GT stand for minimum wage and government transfer, respectively. Columns 1–2 show mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) by their assigned treatment group as indicated at the top of the table. Column 3 shows the difference in characteristics between the two groups. t-statistics on the difference are in parentheses for columns 4–6. Income is measured in USD. ***p
Effect of minimum wage consequences on political commitment for reliable and unreliable survey takers: supporters.
| Favor reduction of MW | Support for MW | Favor GT | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Unreliable | Reliable | Unreliable | Reliable | Unreliable | Reliable | |
| Employment loss = 10% | 0.070 | 0.206*** | ||||
| (0.111) | (0.061) | |||||
| Employment loss = 20% | 0.158 | 0.363*** | ||||
| (0.109) | (0.064) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% | −0.124 | −0.167*** | ||||
| (0.115) | (0.054) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% | −0.311*** | −0.488*** | ||||
| (0.107) | (0.053) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT | 0.084 | −0.003 | ||||
| (0.089) | (0.047) | |||||
| Observations | 454 | 1762 | 454 | 1762 | 454 | 1762 |
| R 2 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Comparison | – | 1 = 2 | – | 3 = 4 | – | 5 = 6 |
| F-stat | 2.52 | 2.04 | 0.88 | |||
| P-value | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.41 | |||
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MW and GT stand for minimum wage and government transfer, respectively. See Table 3 for details on survey questions corresponding to each outcome. F-stat and P-val correspond to the test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the reliable and unreliable respondents are the same for the comparison indicated in the Comparison row. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p
Effect of minimum wage consequences on political commitment for reliable and unreliable survey takers: opponents.
| Favor enactment of MW | Opposition to MW | Favor MW | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Unreliable | Reliable | Unreliable | Reliable | Unreliable | Reliable | |
| Employment loss = 10% | 0.050 | −0.225** | ||||
| (0.187) | (0.115) | |||||
| Employment loss = 20% | 0.030 | −0.170 | ||||
| (0.193) | (0.113) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% | 0.178 | −0.069 | ||||
| (0.195) | (0.112) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% | 0.153 | −0.312*** | ||||
| (0.184) | (0.109) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT | −0.231 | −0.167* | ||||
| (0.142) | (0.092) | |||||
| Observations | 154 | 480 | 154 | 480 | 154 | 480 |
| R 2 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Comparison | – | 1 = 2 | – | 3 = 4 | – | 5 = 6 |
| F-stat | 1.60 | 3.98 | 0.17 | |||
| P-value | 0.19 | 0.01 | 0.84 | |||
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MW and GT stand for minimum wage and government transfer, respectively. See Table 4 for details on survey questions corresponding to each outcome. F-stat and p-val correspond to the test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the reliable and unreliable respondents are the same for the comparison indicated in the Comparison row. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p
Effect of minimum wage consequences on and political commitment for supporters (using non-standardized dependent variable).
| Favor reduction of MW | Support for MW | Favor Gov transfer | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Employment gain = 10% | 4.717*** | 4.419*** | ||||
| (1.392) | (1.352) | |||||
| Employment gain = 20% | 8.327*** | 8.488*** | ||||
| (1.473) | (1.425) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% | −4.049*** | −4.011*** | ||||
| (1.315) | (1.315) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% | −11.863*** | −11.961*** | ||||
| (1.289) | (1.295) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT | −0.079 | −0.298 | ||||
| (1.307) | (1.309) | |||||
| Observations | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 |
| R 2 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Baseline mean | 20.98 | 20.98 | 66.68 | 66.68 | 36.64 | 36.64 |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
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See Table 3 for details on survey question and control variables. Baseline mean is the mean of the dependent variable for the baseline group. ***p
Effect of minimum wage consequences on political commitment for opponents (using non-standardized dependent variable).
| Favor enactment of MW | Support for MW | Favor MW | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Employment loss = 10% | −6.438** | −4.149 | ||||
| (3.274) | (2.919) | |||||
| Employment loss = 20% | −4.844 | −5.281* | ||||
| (3.225) | (2.879) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% | −1.383 | −1.055 | ||||
| (2.239) | (2.304) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% | −6.227*** | −5.364** | ||||
| (2.186) | (2.271) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT | −4.563* | −4.145 | ||||
| (2.521) | (2.559) | |||||
| Observations | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 |
| R 2 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
| Baseline mean | 45.18 | 45.18 | 53.71 | 53.71 | 57.07 | 57.07 |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
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See Table 4 for details on survey question and control variables. Baseline mean is the mean of the dependent variable for the baseline group. ***p
Minimum wage consequences, non-consequentialist intensity, and political commitment for supporters (using non-standardized dependent variable).
| Favor reduction of MW | Support for MW | Favor Gov transfer | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Employment gain = 10% | 7.113 | 8.938** | ||||
| (4.550) | (4.274) | |||||
| Employment gain = 20% | 19.141*** | 18.466*** | ||||
| (4.901) | (4.758) | |||||
| NCintensity | 0.256*** | 0.172*** | −4.102 | −4.590 | 0.247*** | 0.189*** |
| (0.039) | (0.047) | (3.567) | (3.483) | (0.052) | (0.063) | |
| Employment gain 10% × NCintensity | −2.450 | −4.696 | ||||
| (4.579) | (4.285) | |||||
| Employment gain 20% × NCintensity | −11.241** | −10.397** | ||||
| (4.842) | (4.706) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% | −8.036** | −8.475** | ||||
| (3.637) | (3.546) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% | −15.112*** | −15.217*** | ||||
| (4.740) | (4.563) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% × NCintensity | 4.180 | 4.674 | ||||
| (3.567) | (3.483) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% × NCintensity | 3.426 | 3.443 | ||||
| (4.876) | (4.684) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT | 8.279* | 8.327* | ||||
| (4.308) | (4.359) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT × NCintensity | −8.661** | −8.944** | ||||
| (4.252) | (4.304) | |||||
| Observations | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 | 1762 |
| R 2 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Baseline mean | 20.98 | 20.98 | 66.68 | 66.68 | 36.64 | 36.64 |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| F-stat* | 16.04 | 6.43 | 12.85 | 4.22 | 13.43 | 6.55 |
| P-value | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
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See Table 6 for details on survey question and control variables. Baseline mean is the mean of the dependent variable for the baseline group. ***p
Minimum wage consequences, non-consequentialist intensity, and political commitment for opponents (using non-standardized dependent variable).
| Favor enactment of MW | Support for MW | Favor MW | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Employment loss = 10% | −0.784 | 2.408 | ||||
| (5.798) | (5.406) | |||||
| Employment loss = 20% | −7.009** | −8.103*** | ||||
| (3.501) | (3.000) | |||||
| NCintensity | 0.398 | −0.413 | 0.281 | 0.066 | 1.285*** | 1.134*** |
| (0.582) | (0.508) | (0.550) | (0.529) | (0.315) | (0.353) | |
| Employment loss 10% × NCintensity | −5.202 | −6.264 | ||||
| (4.748) | (4.291) | |||||
| Employment loss 20% × NCintensity | 1.809** | 2.223*** | ||||
| (0.874) | (0.686) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% | −3.257 | −3.163 | ||||
| (2.493) | (2.540) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% | −3.652 | −3.327 | ||||
| (4.472) | (4.488) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 60%/20% × NCintensity | 1.502** | 1.627** | ||||
| (0.719) | (0.691) | |||||
| Low/high-income beneficiaries = 40%/40% × NCintensity | −2.349 | −1.990 | ||||
| (3.365) | (3.213) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT | −3.185 | −2.964 | ||||
| (2.815) | (2.867) | |||||
| Equal relative impact of MW and GT × NCintensity | −1.138 | −1.017 | ||||
| (0.781) | (0.867) | |||||
| Observations | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 |
| R 2 | 0.02 | 0.29 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
| Baseline mean | 45.18 | 45.18 | 53.71 | 53.71 | 57.07 | 57.07 |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| F-stat* | 4.32 | 5.92 | 5.17 | 4.47 | 8.35 | 5.17 |
| P-value | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
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See Table 7 for details on survey question and control variables. Baseline mean is the mean of the dependent variable for the baseline group. ***p
Bounding exercise for bias in NCintensity variables.
| With | Lower bound | Exclude | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variables | Independent variables | Baseline | controls | for δ = 1 | zero | δ for β = 0 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Panel A: supporters | ||||||
| Favor reduction of MW | NCintensity | 0.011 | 0.007 | 0.006 | Yes | 5.3 |
| Employment loss 10% × NCintensity | −0.107 | −0.205 | −0.242 | Yes | −5.6 | |
| Employment loss 20% × NCintensity | −0.490 | −0.453 | −0.439 | Yes | 25.0 | |
| Support for MW | NCintensity | −0.169 | −0.189 | −0.215 | Yes | −9.7 |
| Low-/high-income beneficiaries = 60/20 × NCintensity | 0.172 | 0.192 | 0.218 | Yes | −9.7 | |
| Low-/high-income beneficiaries = 40/40 × NCintensity | 0.141 | 0.142 | 0.143 | Yes | 55.4 | |
| Favor GT | NCintensity | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.006 | Yes | 9.3 |
| Equal relative impact of MW & GT × NCintensity | −0.310 | −0.320 | −0.323 | Yes | −239.8 | |
| Panel B: Opponents | ||||||
| Favor enactment of MW | NCintensity | 0.014 | −0.014 | −0.024 | Yes | −1.6 |
| Employment loss 10% × NCintensity | −0.182 | −0.219 | −0.232 | Yes | −28.6 | |
| Employment loss 20% × NCintensity | 0.063 | 0.078 | 0.083 | Yes | −19.6 | |
| Opposition to MW | NCintensity | 0.014 | 0.003 | −0.001 | No | 0.7 |
| Low-/high-income beneficiaries = 60/20 × NCintensity | 0.075 | 0.081 | 0.084 | Yes | −66.5 | |
| Low-/high-income beneficiaries = 40/40 × NCintensity | −0.118 | −0.100 | −0.092 | Yes | 10.2 | |
| Favor MW | NCintensity | 0.047 | 0.041 | 0.039 | Yes | 14.5 |
| Equal relative impact of MW & GT × NCintensity | −0.042 | −0.037 | −0.036 | Yes | 16.2 | |
-
The baseline (without controls) and with controls results in columns 3 and 4 are for supporters and opponents from Tables 6 and 7, respectively. Column 5 reports the Oster (2019) lower bound on the coefficient based on R max = 1.3R and δ = 1, and the upper bound is the coefficient reported in column 4 (from controlled specification). Column 6 shows whether the identified range of coefficients excludes zero (null effect). Column 7 reports the Oster (2019) δ that is the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables that will produce treatment effect (β) of zero for R max = 1.3R. MW and GT stand for minimum wage and government transfer, respectively.
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