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Aggregate Costs of a Gender Gap in the Access to Business Resources

Javier Gonzalez and Francisco Parro

Abstract

We quantify the aggregate costs of a discriminatory restriction against women in the access to business resources. To do so, we develop a general equilibrium model with an endogenous size distribution of production units, which are run by either female or male entrepreneurs. In this setting, we introduce a distortion that limits the amount of capital that women can use to run their businesses. We calibrate the model to match data from benchmark economies that exhibit relatively egalitarian labor market results between women and men, except in entrepreneurship. Our counterfactual analyses show that a gender-specific capital constraint causes an output loss between 14% and 28% and a fall in aggregate productivity between 12% and 20%. Furthermore, we show that most of the output loss is accounted for by a fall in total factor productivity. Lastly, we show that the aggregate cost of the distortion is mainly triggered by preventing the most skilled women from running bigger businesses, and not the exit of women from entrepreneurship.

JEL Classification: E2; J21; J24; O40

Corresponding author: Francisco Parro, School of Business, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile, E-mail:

Appendix A: Inputs Demands

In this appendix, we derive the demand level for each of the inputs of the production technology of our model economy. We first derive the demands from unconstrained agents, and then, the demands from constrained agents.

We use first Eqs. (3), (4), and (6) to get:

(A1) k ( z ) = ζ α R 1 1 ζ α A 1 1 ζ α z 1 ζ 1 ζ α n ( z ) ζ ( 1 α ) 1 ζ α .

Then, we plug (A1) in (3) and use (4) to get:

(A2) y ( z ) n ( z ) = ζ α R ζ α 1 ζ α A 1 1 ζ α z n ( z ) 1 ζ 1 ζ α .

Let Ω 0 = ζ α R ζ α 1 ζ α A 1 1 ζ α . Then, we can express Eq. (A2) as:

(A3) y ( z ) n ( z ) = Ω 0 z n ( z ) 1 ζ 1 ζ α .

Next we use Eqs. (7) and (A3) to get:

(A4) n ( z ) = Ω 1 1 ζ α 1 ζ n ( z ) n f ( z ) 1 ζ α ( 1 ζ ) σ z ,

where Ω 1 = ζ ( 1 α ) Ω 0 w f .

We can substitute back (A4) in (A3) to get:

(A5) y ( z ) n ( z ) = Ω 0 Ω 1 n f ( z ) n ( z ) 1 σ .

We derive now expressions for nf(z)/n(z) and nf(z)/nm(z). From (2) we get:

(A6) n ( z ) n f ( z ) = n m ( z ) n f ( z ) σ 1 σ + 1 σ σ 1 .

From Eqs. (7) and (8) we get:

(A7) n f ( z ) n m ( z ) = w m w f σ .

From Eq. (8) we compute:

(A8) n m ( z ) = ζ ( 1 α ) ( y ( z ) / n ( z ) ) w m σ n ( z ) .

We directly express:

(A9) n f ( z ) = n f ( z ) n m ( z ) n m ( z ) .

From Eq. (6) we can get:

(A10) k ( z ) = ζ α R y ( z ) n ( z ) n ( z ) .

Let M = {wf, wm, R}. Substituting back the expressions derived for y/n, n(z), n(z)/nf(z), and (A7) into Eqs. (A8)(A10) we can express the inputs demand system as:

(A11) k ( z ; M ) = Φ 0 ( M ) z ,
(A12) n f ( z ; M ) = Φ 1 ( M ) z ,
(A13) n m ( z ; M ) = Φ 2 ( M ) z ,

We now consider the case in which k = k ̄ . Then, we plug this condition in (3) and use (4) to get:

(A14) y = A z 1 ζ k ̄ ζ α n ( 1 α ) ζ ,

Next we use Eqs. (7) and (A14) to get:

(A15) n ( z ) = Ω 0 ̄ 1 ω 0 z 1 ζ ω 0 k ̄ α ζ ω 0 ( n f ( z ) ) 1 σ ω 0

where Ω ̄ 0 = ζ ( 1 α ) A w f and ω 0 = 1 1 σ ( 1 α ) ζ .

From Eqs. (7) and (8) we get:

(A16) n m ( z ) n f ( z ) = w f w m σ .

From (2) we get:

(A17) n ( z ) = n m ( z ) n f ( z ) σ 1 σ + 1 σ σ 1 n f ( z ) .

Let Ω ̄ 1 = n m ( z ) n f ( z ) σ 1 σ + 1 σ σ 1 . Then, using (A15) and (A16) in (A17), we get:

(A18) n ̄ f ( z ) = Ω ̄ 0 σ 1 + σ ω 0 Ω ̄ 1 σ ω 0 1 + σ ω 0 k ̄ α ζ σ 1 + σ ω 0 z ( 1 ζ ) σ 1 + σ ω 0

Then, substituting back (A18) in (A16), we can get n ̄ m ( z ) . Then, the demand of constrained entrepreneurs is given by the following system:

(A19) k ( z ; M ) = k ̄ ,
(A20) n f ( z ; M ) = n ̄ f ( z ; M ) ,
(A21) n m ( z ; M ) = n ̄ m ( z ; M ) ,

Appendix B: Solving the Benchmark Model

We first discretize the ability space so it contains Z n evenly spaced points between z l and z h . Then, we use a lognormal density distribution to compute the probability vector for each of the points in the space Z n . Denote by p the latter vector. Once we have built the ability space and the discrete density function for them, we solve the household problem for fixed wages and rental price of capital. In Appendix A we showed that, for unconstrained entrepreneurs:

(B1) k ( z ; M ) = Φ 0 ( M ) z ,
(B2) n f ( z ; M ) = Φ 2 ( M ) z ,
(B3) n m ( z ; M ) = Φ 1 ( M ) z .

and for constrained entrepreneurs:

(B4) k ( z ; M ) = k ̄ ,
(B5) n f ( z ; M ) = n ̄ f ( z ; M ) ,
(B6) n m ( z ; M ) = n ̄ m ( z ; M ) ,

Then, we use the inputs demands to compute the profits, which is the value of being a manager: π i (zM), for i ∈ {f, m}. The value of being a production worker is simply w i . Then, considering the value of being a manager and the value of being a production worker, we build the indicator function that identifies the members of the household who become a manager:

(B7) I i ( z ; M ) = 1 if π i ( z ; M ) > w i 0 if π i ( z ; M ) w i .

Notice that the vector I i ( z ; M ) also identifies the skill size of the marginal manager:

(B8) z i * ( M ) = min { z Z : I i ( z ; M ) = 1 } .

Next, we build the aggregate demands and supply of labor and capital services. Denote by N i j the aggregate demand for labor service type j by group i. Analogously, denote by K i the aggregate demand for capital services by group i. The aggregate demand for labor services type j of agent type i is:

(B9) N i j ( M ) = θ i z = z l z h n i j ( z ; M ) I i ( z ; M ) p ( z ) ,

The aggregate demand for capital services by agent type i is:

(B10) K i ( M ) = θ i z = z l z h k i ( z ; M ) I i ( z ; M ) p ( z ) .

Next, we compute the aggregate demand for each of the four inputs:

(B11) N f ( M ) = i { f , m } N i f ( M ) ,
(B12) N m ( M ) = i { f , m } N i m ( M ) ,
(B13) K ( M ) = i { f , m } K i ( M ) ,

Then, we compute the supply of labor inputs:

(B14) S i ( M ) = θ i z = z l z h ( 1 I i ( z ; M ) ) p ( z )

For the supply of capital we initially set K = K ̂ . Then, given the guess for the capital stock, we compute equilibrium prices. We iterate on prices until all markets clear and find equilibrium prices for a given stock of capital. Then, we evaluate if the resulting rental rate for capital services differs from ( 1 + x c ) / β + δ 1 and we iterate on capital until the R is equal to ( 1 + x c ) / β + δ 1 , using an bijective algorithm.

Appendix C: Additional Results

This appendix presents further analysis considering an economy in which entrepreneurial ability and labor income are correlated. This alternative model captures the idea that entrepreneurs with higher ability also have better outside options and are generally more skilled, which would enable them to earn higher wages.[24]

In general, labor income can be modeled as wz γ with γ ≥ 0. In our baseline model, we follow Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008), Buera and Shin (2013), Buera, Moll, and Shin (2015), among others, and set γ = 0. The additional analysis presented in this appendix considers γ = 1 − ζ; that is, we set the same degree of concavity for the production function and the expression for labor income, as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Then, the market clearing condition for production labor was modified accordingly to match the supply of labor in efficiency units with the demand, the model was recalibrated, and the capital thresholds that define the counterfactual scenarios were modified to make them consistent with those of the main analysis. Tables C1C4 show the results. We observe that the magnitude of the effects is relatively similar to that of the original model, the effect being somewhat lower for some outcomes and higher for other outcomes.

Table C1:

Aggregate output losses in benchmark relative to counterfactuals.

S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Aggregate output, Y (%) 13.7 17.1 21.0 23.7 34.1
Ratio output per female manager, r f (level) 2.3 2.8 3.4 4.0 7.0

Table C2:

Aggregate output per worker losses in benchmark relative to counterfactuals.

(%) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Output per efficiency unit of labor, q1 16.1 19.8 24.1 27.0 37.8
Output per production worker, q2 9.9 11.9 14.0 15.6 21.8
Output per manager, q3 24.7 30.9 37.9 42.5 58.6

Table C3:

TFP losses in benchmark relative to counterfactuals.

(%) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
TFP1 7.1 8.3 9.8 11.1 12.1
TFP2 7.1 8.3 9.8 11.1 12.1

Table C4:

Contribution to output per worker losses.

(%) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Output Y 1 / L 1
Capital intensity 29.0 31.8 31.7 30.8 47.5
TFP 71.0 68.2 68.3 69.2 52.5
Output Y 2 / L 2
Capital intensity 29.0 31.8 31.7 30.8 47.5
TFP 71.0 68.2 68.3 69.2 52.5

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Received: 2021-06-10
Revised: 2022-01-25
Accepted: 2022-01-26
Published Online: 2022-02-15

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