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Hybrid Invariance and Oligarchic Structures

Susumu Cato

Abstract

This study addresses the problem of Arrovian preference aggregation. Social rationality plays a crucial role in the standard Arrovian framework. However, no assumptions on social rationality are imposed here. Social preferences are allowed to be any binary relation (possibly incomplete and intransitive). We introduce the axiom of hybrid invariance, which requires that if social preferences under two preference profiles make the same judgment, then a social preference under a “hybrid” of the two profiles must extend the original judgment in a certain way. Then, we characterize the structure of decisive coalitions under hybrid invariance.

JEL Classification: D71

Acknowledgements

I thank Marc Fleurbaey, Burkhard Schipper, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments. I also thank participants at PET 15 Luxembourg. This study was financially supported by Grant-in-Aids for Young Scientists (B) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (26870477). This paper was also supported by the Postdoctoral Fellowship for Research Abroad of JSPS. I also gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of Princeton University.

Postdoctoral Fellow for Research Abroad of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

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Published Online: 2017-11-16

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