When Christology intersects with embryology: the viewpoints of Nestorian, Monophysite and Chalcedonian authors of the sixth to tenth centuries

The notion that the soul comes into existence simultaneously with the body at the moment of conception was originally introduced into the Patristic discourse as an alternative to the Origenist notion of a pre-existing soul. Yet from the sixth century onwards it was itself regarded as an Origenist tenet. Now it was claimed that only those who believed the soul to be created after the body were truly orthodox. The present article examines the links between this development and the Christological conversies. Adresse: Dr. Dirk Krausmüller, Gratian-Marx-Str. 8/25, 1110 Wien, Österreich; dkrausmuller@hotmail.com In Patristic literature the ensoulment of the embryo is explained in three different ways: the soul either pre-exists the body and enters it at the moment of conception (prohyparxis), or comes into being at the moment of conception (synhyparxis), or appears after the body has been formed (methyparxis). From the late fourth century onwards the first option, which had once been proposed by Origen, met with increasing resistence since many considered it to be irreconcilable with the Christian faith. By contrast, the second and third options were widely regarded as equally orthodox. Their proponents disagreed but did so without rancour as nothing much was at stake. This situation, however, changed in the middle of the sixth century when two developments took place. On the one hand, not only prohyparxis but also synhyparxis was now widely suspected This article is part of the project “Reassessing ninth century philosophy. A synchronic approach to the logical traditions” (SALT) that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon  research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. ). DOI 10.1515/bz-2020-0037 BZ 2020; 113(3): 853–878

of being an Origenist position, and on the other hand,the Christological implicationsofthe different positions wereseen more clearlythan before. This article makes the case thatNestorians,Monophysites and Chalcedonians chose the option that best fitted their understanding of the incarnation and at the same time allowed the most effective polemic. Accordingly, it does not offer an exhaustive discussion of all evidence regarding the ensoulment of the embryob ut deals mainlyw ith texts wherethe specific case of Christ'sbodyand soul is discussed. The timeframe is between the sixth and the tenth century. The debate is not always continuous and it is not always possibletosituate aparticularstatement in its historical context.Yet comparison of the texts shows thatt he representatives of the different views werec ognizant of alternative interpretations.¹ Before delving into the discussion af ew words are in order about the terms of the debate. Those who were in favour of prohyparxis borrowed from Platonic philosophyt he notiono fa ne ver-moving and self-moving soul.² The championso f synhyparxis alsoturned to Platobut chose am ore selective approach since they onlysought to provethat the soul was fullydeveloped at the moment of conception. Those who defended methyparxis could appeal to Scripture and to Aristotle. In the first caset hreev erses playeda ni mportant role: Genesis 2:7: 'AndG od formedt he human being as dust from the earth and breathed into his face a breath of life and the human being became al iving soul' (καὶἔ πλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπονχ ο ῦ νἀ π ὸτ ῆ ςγ ῆ ςκ α ὶἐ νεφύσησενε ἰ ςτ ὸπρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴνζ ω ῆ ςκ α ὶἐ γ έ νετο ὁἄ νθρωπος εἰςψ υχὴνζ ῶ σαν), which seemed to implyatemporal sequence; Exodus 21:22 -23: 'But when two men fight and hit ap regnant woman and her child comes out not yetf igured, he shall be made to payt he penalty,a st he husband of the woman mayl ay upon him, he shall payw ith av aluation, but if it is figured he shall give as oul for as oul' (ἐὰνδ ὲμ ά χωνται δύο ἄνδρες καὶ πατάξωσινγ υναῖκα ἐνγ αστρὶἔ χουσαν καὶἐ ξέ λθῃ τὸ παιδίον αὐτῆςμ ὴἐ ξεικονισμένον ἐπιζήμιον ζημιωθήσεται καθότι ἐπιβάλῃὁἀ ν ὴ ρτ ῆ ςγ υναικὸςδ ώ σει μετὰἀ ξιώματος, ἐὰνδ ὲἐ ξεικονισμένον ἦν  The debatebetween creatianists and traducianists will not be consideredsinceall authors discussed in this article were creatianists of one stripe or another.See R. Hennings,Disputatio de origine animae (CPL , )o rt he victory of creatianism in the fifth century,i nE .A.L ivingstone (ed.), Studia Patristica .L euven ,  -.This does,o fc ourse, not mean that therew ere no longera ny traducianists. See Symeon Stylites (the Youngero fA ntioch), Sermo ;e d. A. Mai, NovaP atrum Bibliotheca VIII/.R ome ,  -,which dates to the later sixth century.  Plato, Phaedrus, c -a.S ee D. Blyth,The ever-movings oul in Plato's "Phaedrus". TheA merican Journal of Philology  (),  -,e sp.  -. δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς), which gave the impression as if the embryow as not considered ah uman being before the formation of the bodyw as completed; and Zachariah 12:1 'Says the Lord … who forms the spirit of ah uman being in him' (λέγει κύριος … πλάσσων πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου ἐνα ὐ τ ῷ ), which suggested that the soul was createdi na na lreadye xistingb ody. In the second caset he main point of reference was twot reatises of Aristotle, De anima and De generatione animalium. Accordingt oDe anima as equence of souls appears in the human embryo, first the nutritive soul, which is also found in plants and is responsiblef or growth and nutrition, then the sensitive soul, which is alsof ound in animalsa nd is responsible for movement and perception, and lastlyt he rational soul, which is onlyf ound in human beingsa nd which appears when the bodyi sf ullyf ormed.³ By contrast, De generatione animalium introduces the notion of am ind thatcomes from the outside.⁴ Knowledge of these theories was mediated through the commentary tradition wherei tw as debated whether or not Aristotle considered the highest faculty to be separable from the body.⁵ Towards the end of the fourth century the bishop and theologian Gregory of Nyssa composed the treatise De hominis opificio in which he set out his views about the make-up of the human being.⁶ Following Aristotle, he distinguished between anutritive power,asensitive power,and arational power,which appear in sequence in the human embryo. Yetinone point he parted ways with the philosopher.H ec laimed that the rational soul was present in the embryof rom the  Aristotle, De anima II/, a -b.  Aristotle, De generatione animalium II., b.  Arguments for inseparability can be found in the writings of the Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias.B yc ontrast,N eoplatonic philosophers stressed the independence of the highestf aculty from the body, which allowed them to reconcile the views of Plato and moment of conception and that it regulated the actitivy of the lower faculties, which werenot part of it.⁷ He did not,however,gosofar as to accept the Platonic concept of apre-existent soul, which Origenhad introducedinto the theological discourse.⁸ In the twenty-eighth chapter he dealt with the question in systematic fashion. He maintained that synhyparxis was the golden mean between two diametricallyo pposite but equallyw rong extremes, prohyparxis and methyparxis.⁹ Accordingt oh im, those who defendedt he latter theory basedt heir arguments on Genesis 2:7. ¹ ⁰ He rejected their interpretation, arguingt hat if the bodyc ame first the soul would be created for the sake of the bodya nd thus have al ower ontological status thani t.¹¹ All three positions reappear in the ensuingp eriod of Christological controversies. Foralong time, however,t hey weren ot aligned with the different camps. Theodoret of Cyrus and Eutherius of Tyanaw ereb oth representatives of the 'Antiochene school'.¹² In theirwritingsthey emphasised the differencebetween the divinity and the humanityofC hrist.¹³ Yett hey did not hold the same views about the formation of the human being.E utherius explained thatt he human being was one 'because neither part has ahypostasis that precedes without the other' (διὰ τὸ μηδέτερονχ ωρὶςτ ο ῦἑ τ έ ρου προάγουσαν ἔχειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν),¹⁴ whereas Theodoretc laimed 'that the embryoi se nsouled when the bodyhas been fullyformed in the womb' (τοῦ σώματος ἐντῇμήτρᾳ τελείου διαπλασθέντος, τότε ψυχοῦσθαι τὸἔμβρυον), in accordancewith Genesis2:7 and forty days after the conception and referred to Exodus 21:22and Zacharias 12:1as proof texts.¹⁶ By contrast, Severus of Antioch, drawing his inspiration from Gregory of Nyssa, insisted that the soul and the bodyw erec reated simultaneously, even though Genesis 2:7m ight seem to implyatemporals equence.¹⁷ It appears that the choice was largely determined by aperson'sbackground: 'Syrians' took aB iblicist line whereas 'Greeks' had recourse to philosophy.
All these authors rejected the view thatt he soul pre-existed the body. Their stance reflects an intellectual climate that became increasinglyh ostile to Platonising interpretations of the Christian faith. Thisd evelopment reached its first peak duringt he reign of Justinian. In 527t he emperor closed the Academyi n Athens and in 553a ne cumenical council convened by him condemned the teachings of Origena nd his follower Euagrius. Yett his does not mean that there werenolonger dissenting voices.A tthis point we need to turn to Leontius of Byzantium, aP alestinian monk who was known for his Origenist leanings, and to John Philoponus, aC hristian philosopher who taught in Alexandria.¹⁸ On the face of it they held mutuallye xclusive positions. In his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos Leontius did not challenget he argument that body and soul werecreated simultaneously. By contrast,Philoponus statedinhis treatise De opificio mundi thatt he soul appeared in the embryoa fter the bodyh ad been formed. Yetc lose readingo ft he texts suggests that this is not the whole story.L eontius puts forward twoc omplementary definitions of soul and body, which reveal his philosophical allegiance.¹⁹ In the first case he speaks of an 'incorporeal self-moved substance' (οὐσία ἀσώματος αὐτοκίνητος), which is how Plato'su nderstanding of the soul is summarised in doxographical literature.²⁰ In the second case he uses the formula 'natural instrumental bodythat has life in potentiality' (σῶμα φυσικὸν ὀργανικὸνδ υνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον).²¹ This formula is of Aristotelian provenance. It is, however,adefinition not of the bodyb ut of the soul, which is characterised as 'first entelechyo fanatural instrumental body that has life in potentiality' (ἐντελέχεια πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος).²² By truncating it,Leontius could signal to his readers that he wishedt or eplacet he Aristotelian inseparable soul with the Platonic separable one. ForP lato the soul existed not onlya fter the separation from the body but also before its union with it.Thisraises the possibility thatLeontius,too, accepted the pre-existenceo fs ouls. Indeed, the passagec ontains other features, which suggest as much. He claims that he will employ the anthropological paradigm exclusively in order to illustrate 'thatthe Word is united with the bodyfrom us in its very substance' (τοῦ αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸνΛ ό γον ἡνῶσθαι τῷἐ ξἡ μ ῶ ν σ ώ ματι).²³ This is an unusual characterisation of the incarnation since it only considers one part of the human compound. Instead one would have expected him to use the phrase 'with the human being from us' (τῷἐ ξἡ μ ῶ νἀ νθρώπῳ), which would also have included the soul.²⁴ The following argument is equally odd. Leontiustells us that both the Word and the soul are invisibleand immortal 'even though our soul and the Word come to be in av isiblea nd mortal body' (καίπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ καὶ θνητῷ σώματι τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆςκ α ὶτοῦ Λόγου γεγενημένων).²⁵ The wayi nwhich the sentencei sp hrased givest he impression that not onlythe Word but also the soul is alreadyexistent when it appears in the body.²⁶ Since Leontius picks his terminologyw ith great care these featuresmust be considered significant.
When we turn to Philoponus we seem to enter ad ifferent world. He concludes from Genesis 2:7a nd Exodus 21:22t hate nsoulment onlyt akes place after the bodyh as been fullyf ormed.²⁷ YetS criptural proof texts are clearlyo f secondary importance to him. His argument is largely derivedf rom the philo- sophical discourse.²⁸ With Aristotle, he declares thatthe formation of the embryo is the task of the nutritive soul.²⁹ Yethis readingofAristotle is heavilyinfluenced by Platonic notions. He distinguishesbetween two typesofentelechy, one that is inseparablea nd one that is separable from the body.³⁰ This allows him to safeguard the immortality of the rational soul. In his treatment he repeatedlyr ejects synhyparxis,with the argument that the rational soul would then also disappear with death, as is the case with animals.³¹ This is arather odd line of reasoning. A closer look suggests that one further aspect needstobetaken into account.Philoponus does not saythat the rational soul is created in the pre-existing bodybut that it is infused into it,which is ac lear reference to the Aristotelian 'intellect from the outside' (θύραθενν ο ῦ ς ). Whatt his meansf or the soul can be seen from the following statement: 'But the soul of human beings has come to be from adifferent origin, for having asubstance that is separable from the bodies, it is infused into them from the outside after the formation … and for this reason it is again (!) separated when (sc. the body) is corrupted and is not equallyd issolvedw hen (sc. the body) is dissolved( ἡδ ὲτ ῶ νἀ νθρώπων ψυχὴἐ ξἑ τ έ ρας γέγονεν ἀρχῆς· χωριστὴνγὰρσωμάτων ἔχουσα τὴνοὐσίαν ἔξωθεν αὐτοῖςεἰσκρίνεται μετὰ τὴνδ ι ά πλασιν … καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φθειρομένου πάλιν χωρίζεται καὶ οὐ συνδιαλύεται αὐτῷ λυομένῳ).³² One gets the impression as if the crucial factor is not the pre-existenceo ft he bodyb ut the pre-existenceo ft he soul. This does not mean that Philoponus is an Origenist for he claims that 'no … rational soul pre-exists' (μηδεμιᾶς … προϋπαρχούσης ψυχῆςλογικῆς),³³ and he states that the souls of human beingsc ame into existence 'after the coming-to-beo ft he world' (μετὰ τὴντ ο ῦκ ό σμου γένεσιν).³⁴ It seems that for him av ery brief timespan was sufficient to ensure the separability of the soul.³⁵ Leontius and Philoponus had to tread carefullyb ecause they might have been accused of Origenism. By contrast, there is no evidence for polemic between the champions of the other twoo pinions. Eutherius and Theodoret on  See Scholten,Seele (as footnote  above),  -,who compares De opificio mundi with Philoponus' philosophical works. Discussion of this topic would go beyond the scopeo ft his paper.S ee also the brief remarks in Congourdeau,L ' embryon (as footnote  above), .  Scholten,S eele (as footnote  above), ,c oncludest hat Philoponus was ac reatianist. This is certainlyt rue but it does not invalidate the 'brief' pre-existencep roposed here. D. Krausmüller,W hen Christology intersects withe mbryology the one hand,a nd Philoxenus and Severus on the other evidentlyd id not consider the topic to be of such importance that they felt the need to inveighagainst each other.This irenic attitude, however,was not to last forever.
In the first half of the sixth century Nestorians could still holdthe view thatsoul and bodyare created at the same time.InLeontius of Byzantium'streatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos aNestorian interlocutor claims that the human being cannot be used as an analogyfor the incarnatedW ord because the Word pre-exists the flesh whereas in it 'neither of the parts has its being without the other' (οὐδ᾽ὁ π ότεροναὐτῶνδί χα θατέρου τὸ εἶναι ἔσχηκεν).³⁶ Thus he insinuates that the position of the Chalcedonians is inconsistent.I ft heir Christology is correct and they nevertheless wish to use the anthropological paradigm they can only meaningfullyd os ow hen theya ccept that the soul, too, pre-exists the body. From the argument it is clear that synhyparxis is regarded as a 'safe option', which rules out an Origenistunderstanding of the soul. By the end of the century the situation had changed radically. In his Liberd eu nione Babai the Great,a Nestorian monkw ho had studied at the School of Nisibisa nd was well versed in speculative theology, claimedt hatt he soul was created in the embryof orty days after conception, in accordancew ith Exodus 21:22a nd Genesis 2:7, ³ ⁷ and that up to that point the bodyg rew like ap lant or az oophyte,³⁸ av iew that mayo we something to Aristotle. He regarded it as impossible that as oul could be present in abodythat wasnot yetfullyformed, and supported his contention with the argument that damageo rl oss of vitalorgans forced the soul to leave its receptacle.³⁹ Thisinitself would not be surprising.Aswehaveseen Theodoret had been of the sameo pinion. YetB abai then launches into ab listering attack against thosew ho accepted the notion of synhyparxis. That one part does not precedethe other is the opinion of those wicked ones,eveni ft hey express themselvesobscurely, and of Origen the pagan, that <first> were the souls and that they then came by force intot he bodies and werea fflicted. And because of that they deceivet he children, <saying>: We sayt hus in order that the union does not happen twice, and when one stable hypostasis from God and the human beingi sn ot completed, for the same is God and the same is human being, one naturea nd one hypostasis.⁴¹ Herei ti sc laimedt hat whoever speakso fsynhyparxis in reality holds the view that the soul pre-exists the body. This rather surprising shift is the consequence of twodevelopments, aheightened awareness of the Christological implications of the different options and an even more aggressive attitude towards Origenists.⁴² Chalcedonian and Monophysitet heologians felt thatt hey had to opt for synhyparxis in the case of Christ because otherwise they could not uphold their belief that the incarnation resultedi no ne hypostasis or nature.O nce the Nestorians realised this fact they pounced on their adversaries, arguingt hat in the ordinary human being the bodyp receded the soul and that this must then also be true for Christ'sh umanity,s ince accordingt oH ebrews 4:15 he was like us in all respects apartf rom sin.⁴³ They themselvesc ould hold such av iew because they believed that the divine Word and the human being Jesus weres eparate hypostases even after the union. This does not,h owever,m ean that for Nestorians everything was plain sailing.T wo options presented themselves to them: either the Word united itself first with the bodya nd then with the soul, or the union onlyhappened when the soul appeared. Babai ruled out the second option because he thoughtt hat it would run counter to the account of the Annunciation.⁴⁴ Indeed, for him it was little better than adoptionism.⁴⁵ Accordingly,hehad to explain whythere werenot two successive unions with the Word, first of the bodyand then of the soul. His solution was to maintain that it was in both cases the Word that effected the union.⁴⁶ Babai who wroteh is treatises in Syriac livedi nt he PersianE mpire. Yett his does not mean that Nestorianism had disappeared from Greek-speakingm ilieus inside the Roman Empire. In the late sixth or earlys eventh century an anonymous Nestorian author wroteaChristological treatise against Chalcedonians and Monophysites, which is partially preserved as quotations in Leontius of Jerualem's Contra Nestorianos.⁴⁷ This author started from the same premises as Babai but came to ad ifferent conclusion.
Like Babai, the anonymous author baseshis argument on Hebrews 4:15.Heavers that in ordinary human beingst he bodyp recedest he soul and that the same must then also be true for Christ'sh umanity.M oreover,h ea ccepts thatt he union can onlyhaveh appened once. Yett hen the arguments diverge. The anonymous author rejects the solution proposed by Babai, and instead claims that the incarnation onlyt ook place when the soul was created. This means that the bodye xisted independentlyb efore the union, ap osition, which the anonymous author does not find problematic because for him the union onlye stab- lishes al oose relationship of good pleasure.⁴⁹ Fortunately for us, he takes the trouble to explain whyt he alternative needst ob er uled out.H es tates thatt he union of bodya nd divinity had to be established through the soul because it was closer to the divinity.The phrase διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς is most likelyanallusion to afamous statement of Gregory of Nazianzus: 'The uncontainable is contained through the mediation of the intelligible soul, which mediates between the divinity and the denseness of the flesh' (ὁἀ χ ώ ριστος χωρεῖται διὰ μέσης ψυχῆςν οερᾶςμεσιτευούσης θεότητι καὶ σαρκὸςπαχύτητι).⁵⁰ It maybethat the anonymous author onlyf ormulated his argument in this wayb ecause Chalcedonians (and possiblya lso Monophysites) referred to Gregory'sd ictum in order to exclude the scenario sketched by Babai.
Interestingly,i nh is response Leontius of Jerusalem does not speak about these conceptual problems but rather rejects the anonymous author'sp remise.
Instead of claiming thati no rdinary human beingsbodyand soul come into existenceatthe same time and thatthis is then also the casewith the incarnation, Leontius questions the relevance of Hebrews 4:15 for the discussion. He points out thatC hrist'sh umanityd iffered from other human beingsn ot onlyt hrough sinlessnessb ut also through the conception without semen, and the birth without corruption. This then permits him to claim that synhyparxis is just one further supernatural feature in Christ'sl ife. Leontius' willingness to accept the anonymous author'sv iew about the ensoulmento ft he embryos howst hat this view was not onlyh eld by Nestorians. Indeed, several of his own arguments are basedo nt his conceptual framework. At one point the anonymous author claims that Mary should not be called Godbearer because ah uman being can onlyg iveb irth to ah uman being.L eontius responds by claiming that this is not even the case with ordinary human beings.
HereLeontius accepts the view thatthe soul onlyappears when the bodyisfully formed, and even adds areference to Exodus 21:22. The allusion to Zachariah 12:1 givesthe impression that like Babai, he believed the soul to be created. Yetother passages suggest that this is not the entire story.When discussingGenesis 2:7he states that 'the divine inbreathingw as united in ah ypostasis with the bodyo f Adam that had been formedf irst' (τῷ πλασθέντι πρῶτον σώματι ᾿Αδὰμτ ὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἡνώθη).⁵³ At first sight this appears to be an unequivocal referencetomethyparxis. The statement is, however,less clear-cut than it first seems. In this case Leontius does not saythat Adam'ssoul was created in the pre-existingbody. He merelyspeaks of the endowment of Adam'sbodyw ith the soul. Moreover,h er ephrases the Biblical verse in such aw ay that it corresponds to traditional definitions of the human being as 'the soul … that has been united in ah ypostasis with the body' (ἡ ψυχή … καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἡνωμένη  Ibid., B-C.  Ibid., B -. τῷ σώματι).⁵⁴ The obvious consequenceofthis reformulation is the replacement of 'the soul' (ἡ ψυχή)w ith 'the divine inbreathing' (τὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα), which sends aclear signal to the readersthat these two terms refertoone and the same reality.Ihave discussed this statement and other passages wheret he term appears in ar ecent article. From Leontius' equation of divine inbreathinga nd divine 'emanation' (ἀπόρροια)Ihave concluded thath ec onceiveso ft he soul as ap re-existinge ntity,w hich had been in God.⁵⁵ If this interpretation is correct Leontius would have opted for ap osition that was considered strictlya nti-Origenist but onlyinorder to manipulate it in such away thatitallowed for an Origenistr eading. Such as cenario presupposes that methyparxis was also widely accepted in Chalcedonian circles. That this was indeedt he case can be seen from ap assagei nt he Ambigua of Maximus the Confessorw ho flourished in the first half of the seventh century.⁵⁶ Maximus opens the discussion with ar hetorical strategyt hat had alreadyb een used by Gregory of Nyssa. He presents synhyparxis as the happy medium between prohyparxis and methyparxis as two diametricallyo pposed but equally wronge xtremes.The discussion of prohyparxis has repeatedlyb een the subject of scholarlye nquiry.There Maximus rejects Origen'sn otion of am onad of preexisting minds that entered their bodies at al ater stagea nd instead sets out his ownt eachinga bout the eternal 'reasons' (λόγοι)i nG od.⁵⁷ By contrast, the discussion of methyparxis has elicited less interest.⁵⁸ Yeti tw as clearly of great importance to Maximus. Onlyh ere does he directlya ddress his adversaries as 'youp eople' (ὦ οὗτοι)a nd consistentlyu se the second person plural.⁵⁹ These are clear signs that he intervened in ac ontemporary debate. Maximus claims that it is easy to speak of methyparxis but that deeper engagment reveals concep- tual problems.⁶⁰ At first he statest hat ab odyw ithout as oul is dead and thati t was thereforeimpossiblefor the embryotogrow prior to its ensoulment.⁶¹ This is indeedaproblem that ariseswhen the case for methyparxis is exclusivelymade on the basis of Scripture. Yetb yM aximus' time the champions of methyparxis had long moved beyond this point.Theym ade use of Aristotelian concepts, declaring that the embryowas fashionedfirst by the nutritive soul and then by the sensitivesoul, before the rational soul appeared. Maximus ridicules this conceptual framework, claiming that human beingsw ould then be parents of plants and animals.⁶² Then he turns to another opinion, which does not seem to be attested elsewhere. According to him some people werew orried that the rational soul would be somehow involved in the messy business of conception and therefore concluded that it would onlyb ei nfused forty days later.⁶³ Biblical proof texts playasubordinater ole in Maximus' treatment.O nlyo nce does he refer to Exodus 21:22o nw hich the champions of methyparxis built their argument. He claims that the verse does not refer to the enteringofthe soul but to the formationo ft he body.⁶⁴ This is ar ather lame argument since it does not explain whyt he one responsible for am iscarriagei ne arlyp regnancyo nlyh as to pay af ine.⁶⁵ In the last part of his discussion Maximus considers the implication of the different models for the incarnation. He explains that therew as no interval between the coming-to-be of the bodya nd the coming-to-be of the soul and that 'the Lordw as united with the flesh through the mediation of the rational soul' (διὰ μέσης ψυχῆςλ ογικῆς ἑνωθῆναι σαρκὶ τὸνκ ύ ριον)a nd not through the mediation of asoulless body.⁶⁶ Thisstatement bears astriking similaritytothe argument of the anonymous Nestorian, which shows clearly that we are dealing with the samediscourse. YetMaximus' adversaries wereundoubtedlyChalcedonians. Had they belonged to adifferent Christological sect he would not have hesitated to point it out.Indeed, it appears thatMaximus responded to people who shared the views of Leontius of Jerusalem. Διὸ μάλιστα περιέχομαι τοῦ τῆςσυνυπάρξεως λόγου … αὐτὸντῆςφύσεως ποιητὴν ἔχων … τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου ἔχων συνήγορόντ εκ α ὶδιδάσκαλον ἀπαραλόγιστον τὸνγ ενόμενον ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴνφ ύ σιν τελείως ἔχουσαν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι κατὰ τὴνγ έ νεσιν ὑφίστασθαι δι᾽ἑ αυτοῦ βεβαιωσάμενον, καὶ μόνην καινοτομήσαντα τὴνκ αινοτομίαν τῆς φύσεως, λέγω δὴ τὴνδιὰσπορᾶςσύλληψιν καὶ τὴνδιὰφθορᾶςγέννησιν, ἅπερ ἡ φύσις μετὰ τὴνπ αράβασιν ἐπεσπάσατο … ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸνλ ό γον τῆςφ ύ σεως καθ᾽ὃἔ στι καὶ γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι ἐκψ υχῆςλ ογικῆς ὑφισταμένη καὶ σώματος.⁶⁷ ThereforeImost of all hold fast to the concept of simultaneous existence … havingt he maker of naturehimself … as an advocate and undeceivedt eacher of such aconcept,who trulyb ecame ah uman being, and made suret hroughh imself that the natureg ains hypostasis as one that is complete simultaneouslyw ith its beingi nr espect of coming-to-be, and whoo nlyi nnovated twot hings in nature, that is, the conception through semen and the birth through corruption, which the natureacquiredafter the fall … but not the account of nature,a ccordingt ow hich it is and comest ob eb yn ature, simultaneouslyw ith its being, as beingc onstituted from ar ational soul and ab ody.
This statement is immediatelyf ollowed by ap assaget hat rules out 'innovation' (καινοτομία)inc reation and makes the casethatnoc reature can changeits nature, which defines what it is.⁶⁸ It has often been discussed but without consideration of the specific context in which it is found.⁶⁹ Maximus sets himself the task to show that there is astrict parallelism between Christ'shumanity and ordinary human beings. He claims that synhyparxis is required by the 'account of nature' (λόγος τῆςφ ύ σεως)a nd that it must thereforea pply in both cases because otherwise Jesus would not be in all respects like us apartf rom sin. Yet he does admitthat therea re twoe xceptions, the conception and birth of Christ, which weaken his argument considerably.Aswehaveseen Leontius of Jerusalem claims that these are supernatural events, which limit the significance of Hebrews 4:15,a nd that it is therefore entirelyc onceivable that synhyparxis is also as upernatural trait.M aximus has to exclude this optiona ta ll costs.H ed oes so by claiming that the conception through semen and the birth through corruption weren ot originallyp art of human nature but wereo nlyi ntroduced into it after the fall.⁷⁰ Maximus' adversaries werem ost likelyd rivenb ya nti-Origenist concerns.⁷¹ Fort hem, as for Babai, synhyparxis in ordinary human beings would have opened the door for prohyparxis and thus for the Origenist heresy. Maximus' rejection of prohyparxis mayh aveh ad the function to show thatt his was ab aselessf ear.
Maximus' life-time was ap eriod of dramatic political change. In the 630s and 640s the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire werelost to the Arab invaders. Once the Muslim Caliphate had been established all three Christological sects flourishedand manytheological works wereproduced. Thisraises the question: did the debate about the ensoulment of the embryoalso continue? In the case of the Chalcedonians or Melkites the evidence is slight.Inthe later seventh century the monk Anastasius of Sinai wrotetwo sermons about the divine image.⁷² In the formert ext he listst he different options, rejecting prohyparxis as heretical but mentioning synhyparxis and methyparxis without comment.⁷³ In the latter text he claims thato nly synhyparxis is correct.H ec omes to this conclusion because he has ap articular understandingo ft he divine imagei nt he human being.H e believes thatA dam was created in the imageo ft he incarnated Word. Since in the caseo fC hrist the components appeared simultaneouslyt he samem ust applyt ot he conception of ordinary human beings.⁷⁴ Later authorss how even less interest in the question. In the first half of the eighth century John of Damascus, af ormerC aliphal administrator who had become monk in Palestine, declares in his Expositio fidei that soul and bodyare created at the same time. But he then onlyr ejects prohyparxis as ah eretical opinion.⁷⁵ Methyparxis as at hird option is not even considered. Gregory'sopinionthatthe soul must mediate between God and the bodyi sm entioned but without reference to an alternative view.⁷⁶ Even in John'sa nti-Nestorian treatisest he topic is not discussed. There we onlyf ind the banal statement that the humanity does not pre-exist the union.⁷⁷ When we turn to Theodore AbuQ urrah, the bishop of Carrhae, who flourishedi nt he late eighth and earlyn inth century we find thatt he situation is not much different.Inhis opuscula Theodore onlysaysthat the Word assumed an ensouled bodyi nto his hypostasis.⁷⁸ This silence is rather peculiarsince members of the other two camps continued to discuss the topic. In the late eighth century the Nestorian Theodore Bar Koni, at eacher of Scripture,e xplained in his Book of Scholia thatt he soul was created after the body.⁷⁹ His contemporary,p atriarch TimothyI( 780 -823), a highlyl earned man who exercised his function in Baghdad, the new capital of the Caliphate, spelt out the Christological implications of this view.I naletter to the Christians of Basrah ee xplainedt hat the Evangelist John said 'the Word became flesh' but not 'the Word became ah uman being' since he united himself first with the bodya lone, at the moment of conception, and onlya fter forty days with the soul as well, just as it is the casewith ordinary human beings. In order to support this view he pointed out that bodya nd soul were also separatelyu nited with the Word duringt he three days between death and resurrection.⁸⁰ This is in keepingw ith Babai'sp osition, which suggests that the alternative explanation of the anonymous Nestorian author was considered to be tooe xtreme.
In order to explain how the bodyi sf ormedw ithout as oul Timothyh ad recourse to Aristotelian philosophy. He distinguishedt he nutritive and sensitive powers from the rational soul that wasc reated later.⁸¹ He thus was of the same mind as Maximus' Chalcedonian adversaries. Interestingly,this conceptual framework alsoa ppears in the writingso fM onophysitea uthors. One of their number,Jacob of Edessa, alearned monk who flourished in the earlyeighth century,r ejected prohyparxis and methyparxis. In aletter to the styliteJ ohn of Litarba he declared that both options were heretical, the former because it was defended by Origen, and the latter because it implied thatt he soul was created for the sake of the bodya nd thus ontologicallyi nferior,a na rgument that we have alreadye ncountered in Gregory of Nyssa's De hominis opificio. Yeth e does acknowledge the existenceo ft he nutritive and sensitivep owers.U nlike Gregory,h ec onsiders them to be parts of one single soul, which graduallyu nfolds itself. That he should engagew ith Aristotle is not surprising since he was familiar with the philosopher'sw orks.⁸² In the later ninth century another Monophysiteauthor,Moses BarKepha, inserted Jacob'stext into his Liberdeanima. There it is part of an extensive discussion of the question. Mosesw ho was extremelyw ell-read starts the discussion with ah istorical overview. He explains that originallyt hereh ad been no agreement among 'Syrian' and 'Greek' Monophysites since the former tended to opt for methyparxis and the latter for synhyparxis.⁸³ Yeth em akes it clear that for a Monophysite of his generation only synhyparxis was acceptable, no doubt for Christological reasons.⁸⁴ Then he launches into ad ebate with the defenders of prohyparxis and methyparxis. In the latterc ase exegesis of Scripture is again at the centre. Moses explains thatG enesis 2:7d oes not implyatemporals equence and that Exodus 21:22c oncerns itself alone with the formation of the bodya nd not with the soul, an argument that we have alreadye ncountered in Maximus.⁸⁵ In the second step he then strivest os how that methyparxis leads to absurd consequences.H ec laims that death involves bothb odya nd soul, which are separated from one another,a nd that at the conception bothb ody and soul must also be present,s ince beginning and end must correspond to one another.M oreover,h ea vers that if one accepted methyparxis the human being would at first not be ah uman beinga nd onlyl ater become one, which is impossibleb ecause one and the same beingc annot be itself and its exact opposite.⁸⁶ One can ask whyM onophysites and Nestorians continued to debate the issue whereasthe Melkites did not.One possibleanswer is that in Iraq members of the former two sects liveds ide by sidea nd had to defend theirp ositions against one another.B yc ontrast, Melkites who weres trongest in Western Syria and Palestinem ay have livedi naconfessionallym ore homogeneous world.⁸⁷ The texts that we have analysed reflect the lively intellectual climate in the Caliphate. Evidence for Byzantium is more limited. Intellectual activity was largely restricted to the capital Constantinople. There we have no evidence for continuous engagement with the topic. In the eighth and earlyn inth century the theological debate focused on as ingle issue, the veneration of images. Topics that had no bearing on it weren ot discussed. The situation onlychanged in the second half of the ninth century.I nh is Amphilochia the learned Patriarch Photius (858 -867, 877-886) offers an exegesis of Exodus 21:22. Surprisingly he claims that this verse and Genesis 2:7a re evidence for methyparxis. What he has to say, however,t urns out to be al iteral quotation from Theodoret of Cyrus.⁸⁸ A more considered treatment is found in atreatise against the heresy of the Theopaschites,which targets the MonophysiteArmenians.⁸⁹ There Photius argues that the human compound is not asuitable paradigm for the incarnated Word. In this context he makes the following statement.
 Thereisscant evidencefor the presenceofNestorians in these regions and there was no disagreement with the Monophysites who did live there. This statement is immediatelyf ollowed by the Christological application. Photius points out that the divine Word existed from eternity.T he claim that the soul comes into existence togetherw ith the bodyw hereas the Word pre-exists the flesh is alreadyfound in Maximus' writings. YetP hotius introduces asignificant modification. He claims that the soul is created shortlybefore the body.⁹¹ In order to forestall criticism he condemns Origenism. We are not told whyitwas so importantt oa ffirm the soul'sp re-existence. It is possible that Photius agreed with Philoponus thatt he soul had to exist on its own even if onlyf or av ery brief timespan in order to ensure that it could continue to exist after its separation from the body. What is missing is adiscussion of the Christological implications. Does the Word first unite with ahuman soul and then with ahuman body? We do not know how Photius dealt with this problem or whether he was even aware of it.
The issue is discussed in much greater depth in as hort treatise by Arethas (d. c. 944), the metropolitan of Caesarea, avery learned man, who playedanimportant role in the ecclesiastical politics of the time.⁹² Accordingtothe proem it was composed afteradiscussion with the monk Nicetas the Paphlagonian, a well-known author of encomia in honour of saints, who was equallybelligerent.⁹³ It is written in fiendishly difficult Greek, which poses considerable problems to the understanding.The first argument,which accordingtothe pinax was directed 'against Aristotle and those who saythat in the womb the embryoisprovided for by av egetative power' (πρὸς ᾿ Aριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺςλ έ γοντας φυτικῇ δυνάμει τὸ ἔμβρυον ἐντ ῇμ ή τρᾳ διοικεῖσθαι), is unfortunatelyn ol onger extant.⁹⁴ We only have the lastp aragraph where Arethas pokes fun at those who claim that at the beginning therei so nlyanutritive soul. He pointso ut that if one assumed that ap lant can become ah uman being, one would also have to accept as truth that the nymph Daphne was transformed into al aurel tree.⁹⁵ We have alreadye ncountered as imilar argument in Maximus.
 This featurehas no bearingonthe polemic against the Armenians.Thereforew ecan be certain that it reflects Photius' personalo pinion. That Arethas should dismiss Aristotelian teachinginsuch an off-hand wayis surprising since he composed scholia on the Categories and in general showed great interest in ancient philosophy.⁹⁶ Yeti ti sn ot difficult to see whyh et ook this stance. He was concerned that the soul might lose its status as as elf-sufficient being.H ec omplains that it would die with the bodyl ike the souls of animals if it could onlyf unction when the organs are fullyf ormed.⁹⁷ This was, of course, aview that nobodyheld at the time.Yet it is worth noting that Babai believed the soul was dependent on the bodyand would become unconscious after death.⁹⁸ It is not always easy to getasense of the arguments since the text is not a technical treatise likethe Liberdeanima but ar hetorical tourdeforce. Yets ome observations can be made.Inone case Arethas responds to the objection that the soul does not remember its stayinthe womb by stating that it wasoverwhelmed by the matter thatsurrounded it.⁹⁹ In another case we encounter astring of arguments and counterarguments. The championso fmethyparxis declared that the nutritive soul wasr esponsible for the formation of the body. When their opponents told them that the human being would then be controlled by an 'irrational nature' (ἄλογον φύσιν)t hey repliedt hat nature producedt he embryo 'with reason' (μετὰ λόγου)s ince it operateda ccordingt oadivinep lan. Arethas brushes off this reasoning and asserts thatthe naturalprocessesare controlled by the rational soul.¹⁰⁰ Twice he mentions arguments that werea lreadyf ound in earlier texts,that synhyparxis was an Origenist teaching, and that the punishment for those who cause am iscarriagep roves methyparxis. In the first case he has this to say.
Accordingt oA rethas such an opinion givest he impression as if God was constrainedi nh is actions by fear of being misunderstood by human beings, which would be ridiculous. In the second case the reasoning goes as follows.
At first one might think that this refers to Exodus 21:22s ince Arethas speaks of anger.Yet it would be very odd if this were the case because the statement flatly contradictsthe Biblical verse. Thus it seems more likelythat Arethas appealed to contemporarylaw.¹⁰³ Thiswas aclever move, because previous attempts by Maximus and Moses BarKepha to reinterpretExodus 21:22had been quite unsatisfactory.
In the second part of his treatise Arethas discusses the implications of methyparxis for the union of the Word with the flesh.
Hereweget another summary of Aristotelianembryology, which is then summarilyd ismissed with the quotation from Gregory of Nazianzus that had already been produced by the anonymousN estorian and by Maximus.¹⁰⁵ Unlikee arlier authors, Arethas claims thati fo ne accepted methyparxis the rational soul would onlyappear when achild is three years old, or even later. This is arather extreme interpretation of Aristotle'steachings.The subsequent paragraph shows whyitappears in the text.There Arethas refers to the Biblical storyofthe twelveyear-old Jesuswho confounded those present in the temple with his wisdom.¹⁰⁶ This story becomes the starting point for ac omplex argument.
The purpose of this argument is to show that the soul must be completefrom the moment of conception. It is claimedthat what Jesus did waspotentiallypossible for ordinary human beingsa sw ell. Arethas states thato therwise Jesus' precocious wisdom would be an 'innovation' (καινοτομία)i nn ature. Like Maximus,  Ibid., . -.  Luke : -.  Arethas, Opusculum .;e d. Westerink, . -.
Arethas appeals to Hebrews 4:7i no rder to emphasise that Christ'sh umanity cannot be categoricallyd ifferent from ours. Yeth ea lso has to contend with the troublingnotion that Christ'sbirth was without corruption. Maximus had explained this feature away by claiming that corruption was ac onsequenceo ft he fall. Arethas does not avail himself of this argument,i nstead adding the rather lame comment that featuresofthis kind are not 'very supernatural'.Inasecond step he then plays the heresiological card. He claims that those who accept that ordinary human beingsr eceive theirr ational soul onlyl ater are necessarilyf ollowers of Apollinaris of Laodicea who taught that in Christ the place of the human rational soul was taken up by the divinity.¹⁰⁸ Thisi sc learlyaspecious argument.I td oes not consider the possibility that Christ'ss oul could have been strengthened by the HolySpirit so as to be able to do thingsthat are beyond the reach of ordinary human beings.
At this point we need to ask: was thereadebate about embryologyi nC onstantinople at the beginning of the tenth century? As Ih avea lreadym entioned Arethas wroteh is treatise after ac onversation with Nicetas the Paphlagonian who appears to have defended the notion of methyparxis. Unfortunately, the account of this conversation is no longer extant as the folio is missing in the manuscript.Weonlyfind the brief comment thatthe tone had been irenic.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, we do not know whether Nicetas had produced all the arguments that are refuted in Arethas' treatise. In the end, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the discussion was merelyani ntellectual game.¹¹⁰ Even if this is the case, however,wec an see very clearly that Byzantine intellectuals of the time had av ery good knowledge of the debate and its terms.Itmay well be that they had access to further texts,which are now lost.
To conclude: The notion thatthe soul comes into existencesimultaneouslyw ith the bodyatthe moment of conception was originallyintroduced into the Patristic discourse as an alternativet ot he Origenistn otion of ap re-existing soul. Yeti n the course of the sixth century,w hen anti-Origenists entiment intensified, manypeople came to the conclusionthat synhyparxis was simplyafront behind which the Origenists hid, probablynot without justification, as some authors indeed tried to smuggle in the concept.I nstead, they promoted methyparxis as a safe option, although the sources show thate veni tc ould be subverted. The Christological controversies also had an impact on the debate. The Chalcedonians and Monophysites had to subscribe to synhyparxis in the case of Christ because otherwise they could not show thatthe union resulted in one hypostasis or nature. By contrast,t he Nestorians who posited am uch looser relationship between humanitya nd divinity opted for methyparxis. The Nestorians and some Chalcedonians insisted thatt here was no categorical differenceb etween the coming-to-beo fC hrist'sh umanitya nd ordinary human beings, since according to Scripture Christ wasi na ll respectsl ike us apart from sin. Other Chalcedonians, for fear of being tarred with the Origenistbrush, claimed that in ordinary human beingst he soul appeared after the bodyw hereas Christ wasaspecial case and synhyparxis was asupernatural feature, along with conception without semen and birth without corruption. They could come to this conclusion because they put less emphasis on the full humanityo fC hrist.